UNNO COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, in his capacity as
Director of Patents, Respondents.
FACTS : A.) On December 11, 1962, respondent General Milling Corporation filed an
application for the registration of the trademark "All Montana" to be used in the sale
of wheat flour.
B.) In view of the fact that the same trademark was previously, registered in
favor of petitioner Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc.. Respondent General Milling
Corporation, in its application for registration, alleged that it started using the
trademark "All Montana" on August 31, 1955 and subsequently was licensed to use
the same by Centennial Mills, Inc. by virtue of a deed of assignment executed on
September 20, 1962.
C.) On the other hand petitioner, Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. argued that
the same trademark had been registered in its favor on March 8, 1962 asserting that it
started using the trademark on June 30, 1956, as indentor or broker for S.H. Huang
Bros. & Co., a local firm.
D.) The Director of Patents, after hearing, ruled in favor of respondent General
Milling Corporation.
ISSUE :
Whether or not director of patents can issue cancellation of the certification of
registration?
HELD :
The Court finds without merit petitioner's argument that the Director of Patents could
not order the cancellation of' its certificate of registration in an interference proceeding
and that the question of whether or not a certificate of registration is to be cancelled
should have been brought in cancellation proceedings.
Under Rule 178 of the Rules of the Patent Office in Trademark Cases, the Director of
Patents is expressly authorized to order the cancellation of a registered mark or trade
name or name or other mark of ownership in an inter partes case, such as the interference
proceeding at bar.The right to register trademark is based on ownership. When the
applicant is not the owner of the trademark being applied for, he has no right to apply for
the registration of the same. Under the Trademark Law only the owner of the trademark,
trade name or service mark used to distinguish his goods, business or service from the
goods, business or service of others is entitled to register the same.The term owner does
not include the importer of the goods bearing the trademark, tradename, service mark, or
other mark of ownership, unless such importer is actually the owner thereof in the
country from which the goods are imported. A local importer, however, may make

application for the registration of a foreign trademark, trade name or service mark if he is
duly authorized by the actual owner of the name or other mark of ownership.
Thus, petitioner's contention that it is the owner of the mark "All Montana" because
of its certificate of registration issued by the Director of Patents, must fail, since
ownership of a trademark is not acquired by the mere fact of registration
alone.Registration merely creates a prima facie presumption of the validity of the
registration, of the registrant's ownership of the trademark and of the exclusive right to
the use thereof. Registration does not perfect a trademark right.As conceded itself by
petitioner, evidence may be presented to overcome the presumption. Prior use by one will
controvert a claim of legal appropriation, by subsequent users.
In the case at bar, the Director of Patents found that "ample evidence was presented
in the record that Centennial Mills, Inc. was the owner and prior user in the Philippines of
the trademark 'All Montana' through a local importer and broker. Use of a trademark by a
mere importer, indentor or exporter (the Senior Party herein) inures to the benefit of the
foreign manufacturer whose goods are Identified by the trademark. The Junior Party has
hereby established a continuous chain of title and, consequently, prior adoption and use"
and ruled that "based on the facts established, it is safe to conclude that the Junior Party
has satisfactorily discharged the burden of proving priority of adoption and use and is
entitled to registration." It is well-settled that we are precluded from making further
inquiry,since the findings of fact of the Director of Patents in the absence of any showing
that there was grave abuse of discretion is binding on us and the findings of facts by the
Director of Patents are deemed conclusive in the Supreme Court provided that they are
supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner has failed to show that the findings of fact of
the Director of Patents are not substantially supported by evidence nor that any grave
abuse of discretion was committed.

Societe Des Produits Nestl, S.A. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: A.)On January 18, 1984, private respondent CFC Corporation filed with the
BPTTT an application for the registration of the trademark "FLAVOR MASTER" for
instant coffee.
B.) Petitioner Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A., a Swiss company registered
under Swiss laws and domiciled in Switzerland, filed an unverified Notice of
Opposition, claiming that the trademark of private respondents product is
"confusingly similar to its trademarks for coffee and coffee extracts,to wit: MASTER
ROAST and MASTER BLEND."
C.)A verified Notice of Opposition was filed by Nestle Philippines, Inc., a
Philippine corporation and a licensee of Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A., against
CFCs application for registration of the trademark FLAVOR MASTER.
D.)Nestle claimed that the use, if any, by CFC of the trademark FLAVOR
MASTER and its registration would likely cause confusion in the trade; or deceive
purchasers and would falsely suggest to the purchasing public a connection in the

business of Nestle, as the dominant word present in the three (3) trademarks is
"MASTER"; or that the goods of CFC might be mistaken as having originated from
the latter.
E.)In answer to the two oppositions, CFC argued that its trademark, FLAVOR
MASTER, is not confusingly similar with the formers trademarks, MASTER
ROAST and MASTER BLEND, alleging that, "except for the word MASTER
(which cannot be exclusively appropriated by any person for being a descriptive or
generic name), the other words that are used respectively with said word in the three
trademarks are very different from each other in meaning, spelling, pronunciation,
and sound".
F.)The BPTTT denied CFCs application for registration. The Court of Appeals
reversed the BPTTTs decision and ordered the Director of Patents to approve CFCs
application. Hence this petition before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the BPTTT denying CFCs
petition for registration.
Ruling:
Yes, Colorable imitation denotes such a close or ingenious imitation as to be
calculated to deceive ordinary persons, or such a resemblance to the original as to deceive
an ordinary purchaser giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, as to cause him
to purchase the one supposing it to be the other.
In determining if colorable imitation exists, jurisprudence has developed two kinds of
tests - the Dominancy Test and the Holistic Test. The test of dominancy focuses on the
similarity of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks which might cause
confusion or deception and thus constitute infringement. On the other side of the
spectrum, the holistic test mandates that the entirety of the marks in question must be
considered in determining confusing similarity.
In the case at bar, other than the fact that both Nestles and CFCs products are in
expensive and common household items, the similarity ends there . What is being
questioned here is the use by CFC of the trademark MASTER. In view of the difficulty of
applying jurisprudential precedents to trademark cases due to the peculiarity of each case,
judicial for a should not readily apply a certain test or standard just because of seeming
similarities. As this Court has pointed above, there could be more telling differences than
similarities as to make a jurisprudential precedent inapplicable.