THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG
FACTS:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance
of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila
particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said
Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the
aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment
of conviction.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting
of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution
also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III
of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of
the Executive;
(2) Whether or not it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
and
(3) Whether or not it denies the equal protection of the laws.
RULING:
(1) No, the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their
probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation
Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the

probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his
rearrest and imprisonment.
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not
finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment
which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not
terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act
provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally
discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been
terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court
shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation.
The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be
rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when
rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed
upon him.
(2) Yes. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The Court did NOT find any rule or
definite standard, by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it, and
none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a
"roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion.
By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority
extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or
not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed
in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have
the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This to the mind of the Court is
a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
The true distinction between the delegation of power to make the law and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution is that the first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Court concluded that
section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
General rule: the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority.

Exceptions: (a) delegate legislative powers to local authorities; (b) authorize the
President xxx to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and
tonnage and wharfage dues; (c) the President, in times of war xxx to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy (d) matters of detail
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards.
(3) Yes. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. One province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary
of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the
latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the
law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province
while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. It is clear that
in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial
of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
On whether or not the entire Act should be avoided: Section 11, in the opinion of
the Court, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that
with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism
of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who
may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system.