Cathay Pacific vs sps.

Fuentebella
The case originated from a Complaint for damages filed by respondents Arnulfo and
Evelyn Fuentebella against petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondents prayed for a
total of P13 million in damages for the alleged besmirched reputation and honor, as
well as the public embarrassment they had suffered as a result of a series of
involuntary downgrades of their trip from Manila to Sydney via Hong Kong on 25
October 1993 and from Hong Kong to Manila. In its Answer, petitioner maintained
that respondents had flown on the sections and sectors they had booked and
confirmed.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner prays that the Complaint be
dismissed, or in the alternative, that the damages be substantially and equitably
reduced
Respondents bought Business Class tickets for Manila to Sydney via Hong Kong and
back. They changed their minds, however, and decided to upgrade to First Class.
The overarching disagreement was on whether respondents should have been given
First Class seat accommodations for all the segments of their itinerary.
Issue: WON there is a breach of contract which would amount to award for
damages?
Held: YES.
In Air France v. Gillego, this Court ruled that in an action based on a breach of
contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common
carrier was at fault or was negligent; all that he has to prove is the existence of the
contract and the fact of its nonperformance by the carrier. In this case, both the trial
and appellate courts found that respondents were entitled to First Class
accommodations under the contract of carriage, and that petitioner failed to
perform its obligation.
AWARD OF DAMAGES
Moral and exemplary damages are not ordinarily awarded in breach of
contract cases. This Court has held that damages may be awarded only
when the breach is wanton and deliberately injurious, or the one
responsible had acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Bad faith is
a question of fact that must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. Both the trial and the appellate courts found that petitioner
had acted in bad faith.
Travel and tours vs Cruz
Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Passenger jeepney that he owns
with plate number along Angeles-Magalang Road around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile, a
Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines) owned by petitioner Travel and Tours
Advisers, Inc. and driven by Edgar Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that
of respondent Edgar Hernandez' vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped the rear

portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree which resulted in the
death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious physical injuries of Virginia Muoz.
Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muoz and Alberto Cruz, Sr., father of
the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint for damages, before the RTC
claiming that the collision was due to the reckless, negligent and imprudent manner
by which Edgar Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing
traffic laws, rules and regulations, and praying that judgment be rendered ordering
Edgar Calaycay and petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc.
For its defense, the petitioner claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee Edgar Calaycay
and further argued that it was Edgar Hernandez who was driving his passenger
jeepney in a reckless and imprudent manner by suddenly entering the lane of the
petitioner's bus without seeing to it that the road was clear for him to enter said
lane. In addition, petitioner alleged that at the time of the incident, Edgar
Hernandez violated his franchise by travelling along an unauthorized line/route and
that the jeepney was overloaded with passengers, and the deceased Alberto Cruz,
Jr. was clinging at the back thereof.
Issue: WON who is at fault
Held:
It was the fault of the bus but with the jeepneys contributory negligence
From the factual findings of both the RTC and the CA based on the evidence
presented, the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence of the driver of
petitioner's bus. The jeepney was bumped at the left rear portion. Thus, this Court's
past ruling, that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are
presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence,
can be applied. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear
vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in
front of him. Consequently, the petitioner, being the owner of the bus and the
employer of the driver, Edgar Calaycay, cannot escape liability.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 which states the following: The
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Be that as it may, this doesn't erase the fact that at the time of the vehicular
accident, the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route as found by the RTC and
the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence
as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
When the plaintiff's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
NILO B. ROSIT, vs. DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL

Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray soon taken the next day at
the Davao Doctors Hospital showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then
referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries, who, operated on Rosit.
During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal
screws to immobilize the mandible. As the operation required the smallest screws
available, Dr. Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo
knew that there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so
inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to afford the same.
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth and was
in pain. X-rays done on Rosit 2 days after the operation showed that the fracture in
his jaw was aligned but the screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray
results, Dr. Gestuvo referred Rosit to a dentist. The dentist who checked Rosit, Dr.
Pangan, opined that another operation is necessary and that it is to be performed in
Cebu.
In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed by Dr. Gestuvo and
replaced them with smaller titanium plate and screws. Dr. Pangan also
extracted Rosit's molar that was hit with a screw and some bone fragments. Three
days after the operation, Rosit was able to eat and speak well and could open and
close his mouth normally.
On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost
of the operation and the expenses he incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as
well as for the P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the plate
and screws that Dr. Pangan installed.
Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay.
Issue: WON Dr. Gestuvo should reimburse
Held:
YES. For the foregoing, the trial court properly awarded Rosit actual
damages after he was able to prove the actual expenses that he incurred due to the

negligence of Dr. Gestuvo. In Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 21 the Court explained

that a claimant is entitled to actual damages when the damage he sustained is the
natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and he adequately proved
the amount of such damage.
Rosit is also entitled to moral damages as provided under Article 2217 of the Civil
Code,22 given the unnecessary physical suffering he endured as a consequence of
defendant's negligence.
A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a
patient. There are four elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely:
duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on one's conduct.
The standard in turn refers to the amount of competence associated with the proper
discharge of the profession. A physician is expected to use at least the same level of
care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same
circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to comply with these
professional standards. If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach, the
physician is answerable for negligence. (emphasis supplied)
We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception
to the requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be
availed of if the following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a
kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
DY Vs People
Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCI. In the course of her
employment, petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving several properties.
One such business pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property
(Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a
property owned by Pantranco. As the transaction involved a large amount of money,
Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the International China Bank of Commerce
(ICBC). Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the approval of the loan. True
enough, ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced
by a promissory note. As security, MCCI also executed a chattel mortgage over the
warehouses in the Numancia Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the
obligation to manage the payment of the loan.
MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to its default
in paying the loan obligation. In order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed
petitioner to facilitate the payment of the loan. MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13
Allied Bank checks and 12 AsiaTrust Bank checks in varying amounts and in

different dates. The total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash, was
P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner. Mandy claims that he
delivered the checks with the instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the
loan. Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and
returned the money to Mandy. ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property
as MCCI continued to default in its obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was only
at this point in time that he discovered that not a check was paid to ICBC.
MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila. An Information was filed against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila.
Issue: The propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal case
for estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all
the elements of the crime charged.
Held: This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases
Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any
personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from
the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability
arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same
act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought
to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.

The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil liability ex
contractu where the civil liability arises from an entirely different source of
obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal case, and consequently must be filed separately. This is necessarily so
because whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not
exist, it effectively says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that
constitutes criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be
sourced from something that does not exist.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a
contract of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence
of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence
or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give something
or to render some service. In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the
property received amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to
comply with his obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding that the
source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that
there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are
consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and the different
sources of obligations under our laws.