Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACTS:
Corazon Zarate Romero and his brother Gonzalo Zarate coowned a property covered, located in Dagupan City,Province of Pangasinan.
It appears that sometime in 1975, Corazon and Gonzalo obtained
a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As
collateral, they executed a real estate mortgage [ over the subject property in
favor of DBP. On the alleged failure of the two borrowers to pay their
amortizations, DBP foreclosed the real estate mortgage on September 15,
1983. Purportedly, no redemption was made within one year, and thus, DBP
consolidated ownership over the subject property.
In March 1993, when Corazon passed away, her sole heir, her
daughter respondent Cristina Trinidad Zarate Romero, asserted ownership
over the subject property to the extent of one-half. However, respondent
discovered that the property was already registered as early as June 13,
1989 in the name of DBP under TCT No. 54142, with TCT No 10070 in the
names of her mother and uncle already cancelled.
Respondent filed before RTC a complaint for reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent DBP from conducting any
auction sale on the subject property during the pendency of the
case. Respondent claimed that her uncle and DBP conspired in committing
fraudulent acts relative to their true transaction and concealed the same from
her mother, thereby depriving her of her right of redemption.
The RTC, , issued TRO restraining DBP from proceeding with its
scheduled auction of the disputed property.
DBP moved to lift the TRO arguing that it violates Section 2 of PD
No. 385 which prohibits the issuance of a restraining order, temporary or
permanent, against government financing institutions like DBP to enjoin any
action taken pursuant to the mandatory foreclosure clause of the decree.
RTC denied DBPs motion to lift the TRO and granted
respondents plea for an injunctive writ.
DBP moved to reconsider the December 14, 1998 Order and at
the same time sought the dismissal of respondents complaint on the
sole ground that the same states no cause of action
RTC denied DBPs motion for reconsideration of the denial of its
motion for the lifting of the TRO. The RTC likewise denied in the same order
DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint, and ordered DBP to file an answer.
DBP moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss. But
even before the RTC could resolve said motion, DBP filed its Answer on April
5, 1999. A manifestation was later filed by DBP indicating that the answer it
filed was a mere cautionary measure or what is known as an answer ad
cautelam and thus without prejudice to any right of action it may take and
without any waiver of any of the grounds for the dismissal of the complaint
and any favorable resolution or order that a superior court may issue
hereinafter.
CAs RULING
On June 23, 1999, DBP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
but was dismissed on procedural grounds (filed beyond the sixty (60)-day
reglementary period). e CA noted that as regards the third order, DBP was
notified of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the December 14,
1998 Order on March 18, 1999 and thus only had until May 17, 1999 to
question the same. The CA further stated that DBPs subsequent filing of its
Answer to the complaint rendered its motion to dismiss moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
HELD:
1.
NO. As to DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint, we agree with the RTC
and CA that the same should be denied, but not for the reason cited by
said courts that it has been rendered moot and academic by DBPs filing
of its answer but because the same lacks merit. Contrary to DBPs
submission, a perusal of the allegations of the complaint clearly
reveals respondents cause of action against DBP. The complaint
states.
YES. The petition for certiorari assailing the orders pertaining to the
grant of the TRO and the writ of injunction were filed out of time. Notice
of the issuance of the TRO was received by DBP on the same day it was
granted, November 24, 1998; thus, the petition for certiorari should have
been filed not later than January 23, 1999. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of injunction, on the other
hand, was received by DBP on March 18, 1999 and thus, it had only until
May 17, 1999 to file the petition for certiorari. DBP, however, filed its
petition only on June 23, 1999.
FACTS:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the
RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,
answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not
been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent
"amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being
authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a
new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the
pleading - i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading-as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the
basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the property in
litigation or the value of the estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other words,
as already above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property, in
which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction,
account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and
there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery
of money and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount
of the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside from being
the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees). 19
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid
at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the
fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving
real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the
action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the
action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims
for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each
item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the
relevant prescriptive period.
CERVANTES V. CA
Facts:
On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner
Nicholas Cervantes a round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los AngelesHonolulu-Manila, which is valid until March 27, 1990. On March 23, 1990,
petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he immediately booked a
flight to Manila, which was confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane
would make a stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there
on April 2, petitioner made arrangements to board in San Francisco. On April
2, he was not allowed to board due to the expiration of his ticket.
TACAY DOCTRINE:
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the
docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."
He filed a complaint for damages, and for breach of contract of carriage with
the RTC but was dismissed for lack of merit. CA upheld the dismissal of the
case. Petitioner came to the SC via Petition for Review.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket
extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket
(2) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper
One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely
for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts
being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although
as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint
and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become
time-barred.
Held:
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim,
but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the
court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed
fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is
cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless
in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the
right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages
as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of
the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
(1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that
there was a need to send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the
extension of the period of validity of his ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the
New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do
not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or
impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that
the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be
held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such
limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from
the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
(2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that
PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San
Francisco. In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the
breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible
acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a
strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he
bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of
bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What the
employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on
the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to
accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of
damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
and the existence of bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only
if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent
manner. Here, there is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An
award for attorney's fees is also improper.
May 4, 2010
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents.
Villarama, Jr. J
Notes: Without So Ping Bun v. CA and Lagon v. CA, this would have been a
case for tortious interference. The SC had to rely in Article 19, to uphold its
ruling that there was tortious interference. All of this when Article 1314 does
not in itself require malice.
CAST: (lol)
Mortimer F. Cordero Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana)
Tony Robinson an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is
the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Allan C. Go owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single
proprietorship
Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson lawyers of Go
FACTS:
1996, Cordero ventured into the business of marketing interisland passenger vessels
o After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to
meet Robinson.
Petitioner:
They are not liable for unpaid commissions (and also damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses) for it was Robinson who
undertook to pay Cordero supposed commissions.
Even so, they should not be held solidarily liable with Robinson
and AFFA
Respondent:
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the
enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may pertain to
a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or
violate his undertaking under a contract.
FACTS:
YES
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to
quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the
information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the
pleading are concerned. But by clear implication it not by express provision
of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent's actuations goes
to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in
the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
The petition will therefore be granted and the respondent judge ordered to
desist from proceeding with criminal case No. 11963 upon the information
filed by Attorney Abelardo Subido, without costs.
ISSUE:
WON Atty Subido is disqualified for appointment as special counsel
WON petitioner may question lack of jurisdiction even after he has pleaded
to the informatiom
NATURE
PETITIONERS
RESPONDENTS
HELD:
1
FACTS.
On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with
the crime of "other forms of swindling" penalized by Article 316, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
o Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas sold their
property in Paranaque to Conrado P. Avila, representing it
tobe free from all liens and encumbrances while it was
leased to the Rural Bank of Imus.
30 June 1994: RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
19 February 1999: CA affirmed decision of the trial court, and on 22
December 1999 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
11 February 2000: Petitioners filed a petition for review, rejected by the SC
for failure to state material dates
28 June 2000: SC denied subsequent motion for reconsideration; judgment
of conviction final and executory
On April 27, 2001, Petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas was arrested by the police
but they failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was
nowhere to be found
On July 16, 2001, Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of
arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the motion, petitioners
instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the
annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the
September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for
reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. Whether or not the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC
and CA since the courts did not take any action when they (the
petitioners) raised the issue of jurisdiction. NO.
2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal case. YES.
the established rule is that the statute in force (in this case the
statute was BP 1293) at the time of the commencement of the
action determines the jurisdiction of the court
The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, which has a duration of 1
month and 1 day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the
DECISION.
Petition DENIED.
SARMIENTO V. ZARATAN
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against
respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. ( MeTC ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff monthly rentals and
to vacate the premises.)
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the
RTC of Quezon City.
In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her
memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days
from receipt.
Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had
until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3
June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his
failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for
the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to
storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because
the wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the
RTC dismissed the appeal for failure to submit the required memorandum
within the prescribed period.4
1 Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to
46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value. Here, the imposable fine is P12,895.00
The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
action because at the time of the filing of the information, its
jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not
more than P4,000.00.
HELD:
1.
YES
Under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, an
appeal may be dismissed by the CA on its own motion or that of the appellee
for failure of the appellant to file its brief within the time provided by Section
7, Rule 44 of the said Rules. The petitioner had until January 31, 2004 within
which to file its brief but failed to do so. The only excuse of the petitioner for
its failure to file its brief was the claim of its counsel in the said Motion for
Leave to Admit, thus:
1. The filing of the Appellants Brief is due on January 31, 2004. The notice
from the Honorable Court was received on December 17, 2003 and because
of the holiday season at that time, the undersigned counsel gave instruction
to his Secretary to file the usual Motion for Time asking for forty-five (45)
days from January 31, 2004 or until March 16, 2004.
2. The undersigned started to prepare the Appellants Brief bearing in mind
the new deadline.
3. It was only when the undersigned received the Manifestation of plaintiffs
on March 5, 2004 that he inquired with his secretary if the Manifestation of
counsel is true and she readily admitted that she failed to prepare and file
the Motion for Time.
The excuse contrived by the petitioners counsel is totally
unacceptable. We note that the motion of the petitioner is unverified.
Neither did the petitioner bother appending to its motion an affidavit of its
counsels secretary containing his/her explanation why he/she failed to file
the said motion for extension if there was such a motion in the first place.
The petitioner did not even bother appending to its Motion to Admit its motion
for extension to file brief which its counsels secretary allegedly failed to file in
the CA. Blaming its counsels unidentified secretary for its abject failure
to file its brief is a common practice for negligent lawyers to cover up
for their own negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude.
Such excuse is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the
Rules of Court.[ It bears stressing that it is the duty of counsel to adopt and
strictly maintain a system that insures that all pleadings should be filed and
duly served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do so, the negligence
of his secretary or clerk to file such pleading is imputable to the said counsel.
2.
NO
We agree with the petitioners contention that the rules of procedure may
be relaxed for the most persuasive reasons. But as this Court held
in Galang v. Court of Appeals.
No.
153366:
November
17,
2010
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.
DBP then invited parties to bid on the property. Initially, Cebu Bionic
submitted their interest in bidding, but the price that they gave was
insufficient. DBP then awarded the auction to Respondents To Chip, Yap and
Balila. In response to several demand letters by the Respondents, Cebu
Bionic filed a petition for preliminary injunction, cancellation of deed of
sale and specific performance against DBP with the RTC. Petitioners
then related that, without their knowledge, DBP sold the subject properties to
respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila. The sale was claimed to be simulated
and fictitious, as DBP still received rentals from petitioners until March
1991.By acquiring the subject properties, petitioners contended that DBP
was deemed to have assumed the contract of lease executed between them
and Rudy Robles. They alleged that the original leases clause of the Right of
First
Option
to
Buy
should
be
upheld.
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. As
will be discussed further, this exception is attendant in the case at bar.
The trial court granted their complaint. The Court of Appeals similarly
upheld the decision of the trial court. Cebu Bionic filed a motion for entry
of judgment, but Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that they relied on the friend of their lawyer to personally file the MR,
but apparently did not. The court granted their MR, and reversed their
judgment before. Thus, the petitioners file the case (petition for review on
certiorari)
before
the
Supreme
Court.
1.
NO.
Indeed, the appellate courts Decision dated February 14, 2001 would have
ordinarily attained finality for failure of respondents to seasonably file their
Motion for Reconsideration thereon. However, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the higher interest of substantial justice will be better
served if respondents procedural lapse will be excused.
Verily, we had occasion to apply this liberality in the application of procedural
rules in Barnes v. Padilla[59] where we aptly declared that
The failure of the petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration
within the period fixed by law renders the decision final and
executory. Such failure carries with it the result that no court can
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. Phrased
elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land.
ISSUES:
1. WON ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW AND NOT OF FACT CAN BE RAISED
IN THE INSTANT PETITION BEFORE THIS HON. SUPREME COURT.
Respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila next argue that the instant
petition raises questions of fact, which are not allowed in a
petition for review on certiorari. They, therefore, submit that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court.
3.
HELD:
1.
NO.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed thereunder shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises