FERRER v.

BAUTISTA
Petitioner: Jose J. Ferrer
Respondent: Herbert Bautista, Quezon City Mayor; City Council of Quezon City;
City Treasurer of Quezon City; City Assessor of Quezon City
Citation: G.R. No. 210551
Date of Promulgation: June 30, 2015
Ponente: Peralta, J.
FACTS
On October 17, 2011, Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095,
S-2011 a.k.a. the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) of Quezon City. Section 3 of
which provides:
Section 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment to one-half percent (0.5%)
on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (php
100,000) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the
Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be
established for the purpose.
Effective for 5 years, the SHT shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government
for the following projects:
a) land purchase/ land banking;
b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing facilities;
c) land development;
d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and
other similar structures; and
e) financing the public-private partnership agreement of the Quezon City
Government and the National Housing Authority with the private sector.
Section 7, of the SHT provides that a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers
regularly paying the special assessment.
a) it can be availed only after 5 years of continued payment;
b) the taxpayer must be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by the
City Treasurer and City Assessor;
c) only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be
continued by the subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in good
faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the subject
property.
Another ordinance was enacted on December 16, 2013, Ordinance No. SP2235, S-2013, which places the imposable fees on garbage collection
dependent on the land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a
lot condominium, social housing project or apartment. The proceeds collected
from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely and
exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be
utilized for garbage collections.
Ferrer is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in
Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 216288, and
that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the

garbage fee in the sum of Php 100.00. He filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to declare
both Ordinances, imposed by the respondents, unconstitutional and illegal.
Procedural Matters
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that the petition for certiorari is improper since
they are not tribunals, boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
Petitioner counters that in enacting such Ordinances, the Quezon City Council
exercised quasi-judicial functions because the ordinances ruled against the
property owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee, exacting from
them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be held
liable for.
The Supreme Court defined such terms as follows:
a) Judicial function is the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
b) Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the functions,
discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
In regard to the issuance of a writ of certiorari the following requisites must
concur:
a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
b) the tribunal board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction; and
c) there is not appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The Supreme Court finds that respondent neither acted in any judicial or quasijudicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogatives. The enactment of the Quezon City Council was done in the
exercise of its legislative function, as provided for in the Local Government
Code of 1991.
This petition for certiorari essentially seeks to declare the unconstitutionality
and illegality of the Ordinances. Therefore, it partakes the nature of a petition
for declaratory relief--something over which the Supreme Court only has
appellate, not original jurisdiction. However, such may be regarded as a
petition for prohibition or mandamus over which the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction.
In such a petition (prohibition or mandamus) against any tribunal, corporation,
board or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered commanding the

respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified

in the petition. In this case, the implementation of Ordinance Nos. SP-2905 and
SP-2235. Petitioner seeks for prohibition, commanding desistance. And
petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse
to the Supreme Court should be allowed. He challenges the Ordinances
adversely affecting the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon
City. This also serves as a test case for the guidance of other local government
units.
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner's legal standing on the ground that:
1) the petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has an
assessed value of more than Php 100,000. (SP-2905)
2) by what standing or personality did petitioner file the case to nullify
SP-2335.
Legal standing or locus standi calls fro more than just a generalized grievance.
It has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. A party challenging the
constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid but also
that he has sustained or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
The Supreme Court finds the petitioner of legal standing for he is a real partyin-interest, given that the respondents did not dispute his co-ownership of a
residential property in Quezon City and his payment of property tax which
included the SHT and garbage fee.
C. Litis Pendentia
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
S-2905
Petitioner asserts that:
1) the protection of real properties from informal settlers are basic and
essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government.
2) such collection is tantamount to a penalty imposed on real property
owners due to the failure of respondents to perform their duties to secure and
protect real property owners from informal settlers.
3) it is a kind of class legislation that violates the right of property owners
to equal protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy
properties not their own, and pay no taxes.
4) 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is an
alias of respondent City Mayor, and the adaptation of Bistekvilles as the name
of the project for informal settlers, makes it clear that politicians will take the
credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.
S-2235

Petitioner, argues
1) it is discriminatory as it collects garbage fees only from domestic
households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other
commercial dining places that spew garbage more than residential property
owners.
2) that such imposition is tantamount to double taxation because
garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should be paid
out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community
tax, other taxes, and the IRA (internal revenue Allotment) of the Quezon City
Government.
3) the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fees under
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, a.k.a. Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the
costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management
plan.
4) Ordinance is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003 for while the law
encourages segregation, composting, and recycling of waste, the Ordinance
only emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fees.
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements:
1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute;
2) not unfair or oppressive;
3) not partial or discriminatory;
4) not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) general and consistent with public policy; and
6) not unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether
the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law),
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy). An ordinance must pass muster under the 1) test of
constitutionality and 2) the test of consistency with the prevailing
laws.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not SP-2095, S-2011 or the SHT is valid.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that SP-2095, S-2011 is VALID.
The SHT charged by the Quezon City government is a tax which is within its
power to impose. Cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic
services and facilities which include among others, programs and projects for
low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to its

socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of
taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory
purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for
the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public
interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon city is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe
community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them lawabiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Such Ordinance is not oppressive. Its reasonableness cannot be disputed since
the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. While
the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more
than Php 50,000, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed
value exceeding Php 100,000. Furthermore, the Ordinance grants a tax credit
equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the
sixth year of its effectivity.
ISSUE
2. Whether or not SP-2335, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is valid.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance is INVALID.
From the provisions of R.A. No. 9003, it is clear that the authority of a
municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of
these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other hand, have the
authority to impose fees for the collection and segregation of biodegradable,
compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce, other
sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but
consistent with Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and
collection of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes shall be
conducted at the barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable
materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or
city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the
garbage fee is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in
Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the
increasing trend of waste generation for the past three years. Granting, for the
sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to
non-recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the validity of
Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable
and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay, and not unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is in fact, no substantial distinction

between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most
likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and
does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.
The classification under the Ordinance are not relevant to its declared purpose
of "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common
mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating
waste." Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor
occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors
that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the
appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population
density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual
occupancy of the property.
The petition is partially granted. The constitutionality of Ordinance No. SP2095, S-2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, is SUSTAINED. On
the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual
garbage fee on all domestic households in uezon City is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

Petitioner: The Diocese of Bacolod, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra, and the Bishop himself in his personal capacity
Respondent: Commission of Elections and the Election Officer of Bacolod City,
Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon
Citation: G.R. No. 205728
Date of Promulgation: January 21, 2015
Ponente: Leonen, J.
FACTS
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was

approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists
candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted
against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in
the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or contentneutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.
HELD
1. No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by
this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective
right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to
choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are dutybound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies
subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny.
It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
2. No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that
the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom
of speech.
3. No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the
Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.
4. Yes. The Court held that every citizens expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against
the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution
to public deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.

5. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the

subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule
will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by
the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of noncandidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
6. Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to
use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals
and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizens private property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
7. No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are
not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one
of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as
to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into
account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a persons or institutions religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account .
. . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
0.
It has a secular legislative purpose;
0.
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
0.
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Leila Reyes Johnson
Citation: G.R. No. 138881
Date of Promulgation: December 18, 2000
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and
a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who
was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working
as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with
Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in
Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26.
On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on
the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at
5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998.
- At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady
frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing
passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited
drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.
- When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United
States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two
panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy.
- Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her
superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty
lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room
for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1
Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside.
- Inside the women's room, Johnson
was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked
her "to bring out the thing under her girdle."
- Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned
over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a
total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de
Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson
and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st
RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were
taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized.
Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2

grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA

7659.
On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found
Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD
No. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never
placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested has
committed it; and xxx."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has
been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation's airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus
been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise
without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.