Framework

First, qualified immunity as a principle is meant to shield government

officials as specific individuals. CORNELL:
[Cornell University Law Institute. Qualified Immunity. Legal Information Institute est. 1992. No Date. LHP MK.]

Qualified immunity balances two important intereststhe need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield[s] officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. Pearson v. Callahan (07-751).
Specifically, it protects government officials from lawsuits alleging that they violated plaintiffs rights, only allowing suits where officials violated a

clearly established statutory or constitutional right. When determining whether or not a right was clearly established, courts consider whether a hypothetical reasonable
official would have known that the defendants conduct violated the plaintiffs rights. Courts conducting this analysis apply the law that was in force at the time of the alleged
violation, not the law in effect when the court considers the case. Qualified immunity is not immunity from having to pay money damages, but rather immunity from having to

Qualified
immunity only applies to suits against government officials as individuals , not suits against
the government for damages caused by the officials actions. Although qualified immunity frequently appears in
cases involving police officers, it also applies to most other executive branch
officials. While judges, prosecutors, legislators, and some other government officials do not receive qualified immunity, most are protected by other immunity
go through the costs of a trial at all. Accordingly, courts must resolve qualified immunity issues as early in a case as possible, preferably before discovery.

doctrines. Recently, in Pearson v. Callahan (07-751), the Supreme Court held that courts considering officials qualified immunity claims do not need to consider whether or not
the officials actually violated a plaintiffs right if it is clear that the right was not clearly established.

The question of limiting qualified immunity therefore applies relative

to other individuals. Qualified immunity as a principle applies to
public officials because of the unique conditions they face, but if the
aff proves there is no distinction between public officials --- like police
officers --- and ordinary citizens, then you affirm since it justifies the
principle of qualified immunity as inapplicable. Therefore, the
reasonable aff burden is to prove there is no morally relevant
distinction between public officials and ordinary people and the neg
burden is to prove there is. Two impacts: (a) topic lit --- the question
the topic centers around is whether the conditions police officers
uniquely face are sufficient to warrant qualified immunity. Key to
fairness and education since its the basis for all clash and
argumentation on the res. (b) even if I lose my burden, my offense
still affirms, proving theres no distinction between those who dont
have qualified immunity and those who do have it would necessitate
that either everyone has it, limiting the police officers unique statute,
or that no one should have it, which proves the res true. Prefer
additionally:
[1] Ground - (a) my interp forces the res on to a central question of
what it means to for qualified immunity to apply to someone. Other
burdens force the aff to defend a limit on qualified immunity, but all
advantage areas are non-unique sicne I cant defend a ban, but my
offense is qualified immunity is bad so the neg can just CP out aff
offense (b) my burden is more reciprocal since the debate is focused
on to a 1:1 burden issue. Other burdens are irreciprocal since the aff
has to defend qualified immunity bad but the neg can go for qualified
immunity good, or that it needs to be expanded, or that we should get
rid of all of it which is a 3:1 ratio of argument access. Key to fairness
and education since it allows for even distribution of access to offense
which allows for the best quality debates.
[2] The burden forces the question of the resolution to how norms
govern individual identity and whether theyre morally relevant i.e.
whether the legal precedent for what it means to be a police officer
uniquely justifies the doctrine of qualified immunity. Debating about
the different frameworks for evaluating norms is the only way to
understand the context for constraints or obligations in the real
world. ANDERSON:
[Anderson, Nicole. Derrida: Ethics under Erasure. 2012. LHP MK]

Transformation is traditionally dened as a radical change or alteration: radical because what is

changed is replaced or substituted, in a word, transformed so completely that the previous thing (object,
event, concept, word, experience, and so on) is unrecognizable. In contradistinction , for Derrida, transformation
is not a radical alteration of a thing or break with inheritance. Instead, transformation is a
process involv[es]ing interpretation, which in turn, is always already iterative. To transform, then, is a repetition of

Transformation is the process of

becoming something other to that which has gone before , and out of which it has arisen. Analogously,
under erasure is the material and/or abstract marking of the transformative process. In rendering
inheritance illegible, while retaining its legibility (and thus its analysability) via the metaphorical and/or graphical mark
of the chiasm, under erasure repeats with difference. Under erasure is an iteration, and thus a transformation, of a
the past (and thus an acknowledgment and recognition of that which we inherit) but with difference.

metaphysical tradition or inheritance. in the same way as iterability, as that which enables but perturbs analysis by resisting binary oppositions, under erasure does not erase a
concept entirely, and nor does it perpetuate a binary between that which is erased and that which the erasure points to: between the illegibility and legibility of a word, concept,
experience. instead, like the iterative process, under erasure contaminates and thus haunts this potential opposition so that what is produced is transformation rather than

transformation is both iterative and a consequence

of iteration (which is always already contretemps), then this means that every
event, every inheritance, is singular. And because transformation produces
singularity, a future event or an outcome can never be absolutely calculated. In
other words, interpretation involves choosing, it means deciding between inheritances,
between other interpretations, and so on. Yet in choosing we cannot ever calculate or have
absolute knowledge (in the Hegelian sense) of what the material or abstract outcomes will be; we
binary and hierarchized oppositions (Derrida 1998, 31). Because

cannot know what it means for the future, for the future is no future if it corresponds to conventions and can be indicated by means of a conventional code (Hamacher, 1999,

we cannot know, because tracing through the materiality of our choices and
decisions is the immateriality, the unknown, an alterity that involves any decisionmaking process in a reckoning-with, in a process of responsibility. Behind every decision and
189). And

interpretation is undecidability and thus spectrality (Derrida 1994, 55). Decisions and interpretations are spectral because they are haunted by that which makes them possible:
undecidability. This spectrality that haunts interpretation, and that produces iteration and thus transformation, is not simply metaphysical and abstract (Derrida 1999c,

transformation, because made empirically manifest in and through the

material who that interprets, is able to produce events, new effective forms of
action, practice, organisation, and so forth (Derrida 1999c, 245). Moreover, this is why Demda insists in Marx and Sons that the spectral
244).15 Rather,

logic 1 appeal to in Specters of Marx and elsewhere, is, in my view, not metaphysical, but deconstructive. This logic is required to account for the processes and effects of . . .
metaphysicalization, abstraction, idealization, ideologization and fetishization' (Derrida 1999c, 2445). Derrida is not denying abstraction because. as he also argues, he is

therefore we should not shrug off abstraction as if it

were nothing to speak of (thats just an abstraction), as if it were the insubstantiality of
the imaginary, and so on (Derrida 1999c, 245). Given this, we can think of transformation as simultaneously
empirical and transcendental, and therefore as quasi-transcendental: transformation involves the
evolution from the old to an uncalculated coming to presence (that is, to the materiality) of the
new, which is inhabited by a mntretemps, a spectrality, that makes the transformation process absolutely other, and that which is transformed,
singular. It is in this iterative process of transformation , which produces the singular, that
there resides the promise to the future to come, a notion that will be elaborated
on shortly.
attempting to account for the possibility of abstraction, and

Hypothetical comparison between worlds undermines the contextspecific iterations of norms --- practices like fiat are not objective,
instead theyre unstable
[3] Power presents itself in the context of the relations between
individuals, testing the way the political ascribes distinctions between
individuals is a prior question to adopting any higher political agenda
--- especially in the context of policing and identity. RANCIRE:
[Rancire, Jacques. Disagreement and Philosophy. Translated by Julie Rose. University of Minnesota. 1999 LHP MK]

We should not forget either that if politics implements a logic entirely heterogenous to that of the police, it is always bound up with the latter. The reason for this is simple:

politics has no objects or issues of its own. Its sole principle. equality. is not peculiar to it
and is in no way in itself political. All equality does is lend politics reality in the form of specic cases
to inscribe, in the form of litigation, conrmation of the equality at the heart of the police order .

What makes an action political is not its object or the place where it is carried out, but solely its form, the form in which conrmation of equality is inscribed in the setting up of a
dispute. of a community existing solely through being divided. Politics runs up against the police everywhere. We need to think of this encounter as a meeting of the
heterogenous. To be able to do this we have to let go of certain concepts that assert in advance a smooth con- nection between them. The concept of power is the main such
concept. This concept once allowed a certain well-meaning militancy to contend that everything is political since power relationships are everywhere. From that moment the
somber vision of a power present everywhere and at every moment can be settled on, the heroic vision of politics as resistance or the dreamy vision of spaces of afrmative action

The concept of power allows one to retort with

an everything is policing' to an "everything is political , but this is pretty poor as a logical conclu- sion. If
everything is political, then nothing is. So while it is important to show,as Michel Foucault has
opened up by those who turn their backs on politics and its power games.

that the police order extends well beyond its specialized institutions and
techniques, it is equally important to say that nothing is political in itself merely because power
relationships are at work in it. For a thing to be political, it must give rise to a
meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance. So
nothing is political in itself. But anything may become political if it gives rise to a meeting of these two
done magnicently,

logics. The same thing an election. a strike, a demonstration can give rise to politics or not give rise to politics. A strike is not political when it calls for reforms rather than a

It is political when it recongures the

relationships that determine the workplace in its relation to the community . The domestic
better deal or when it attacks the relationships of authority rather than the inadequacy of wages.

household has been turned into a political space not through the simple fact that power relationships are at work in it but because it was the subject of argument in a dispute

the police
order. Accordingly the same word opinion can dene two opposing processes: the reproduction of governmental
legitimizations in the form of the feelings of the governed or the setting up of a
scene of conict between this play of legitimizations and feelings ; choosing from among responses
over the capacity of women in the community. The same conceptopinion or law, for example may dene a structure of political action or a structure of.

proposed or the invention of a question that no one was asking themselves until then. But it should be added that such terms may also, and mostly do, designate the very
entanglement of both logics. Politics acts on the police. It acts in the places and with the words that are common to both. even if it means reshaping those places and changing
the status of those words. What is usually posited as the space of politics. meaning the set of state institutions, is precisely not a homogenous place. Its conguration is
determined by the state of relations between political logic and police logic. But it is also, of course. the privileged space where their difference is dissimulated within the
assumption of a direct link between the arithe of the community and the distribution of the institutions, the arkhat that effect its basis. Nothing is political in itself for the

Equality is not a
given that politics then presses into service, an essence embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining. It is
a mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing
it. In the Aventine apologia. this assumption of equality is to be discerned even within a discourse proclaiming the fatal fact of inequality. Menenius Agrippa explains to the
political only happens by means of a principle that does not belong to it: equality. The status of this principle needs to be specied.

plebs that they are only the stupid members of a city whose soul is its patricians. But to teach the plebs their place this way he must assume they understand what he is saying.
He must presume the equality of speaking beings, which contradicts the police distribution of bodies who are put in their place and assigned their role.

[4] Interpretation --- If the aff justifies their burden then the neg must
concede to that burden as it is contextualized in the AC and debate
under it. They must link all their offense to the burden. Violation --This is preemptive. Potential violations include reading theory on the
burden or reading a separate mechanism to evaluate offense that
function higher than the burden like a role of the ballot. To clarify,
you can still read a framework under the burden, it just has to link.
Prefer:
[1] Affirming is harder (a) theres a 7.3% neg side bias from the 2015
TOC (b) theres a 6-7-4 time skew and (c) the aff has to extend offense
twice due to the 1ar and 2ar while the neg only has to once. ABC is key
to check the neg time skew and their ability to layer the debate by
forcing the debate to one layer where I can weigh and frontlineelse
negs can spread me out on multiple layers and collapse to wherever I
undercover. This also means that my burden can be as unfair as
possible because of how hard it is to affirm.
[2] Strat Skew: allowing the neg to question the burden undermines
the value of the AC because I have to restart in the 1AR. This is bad
because the 2NR can just dump on the restart and I have no args to
leverage from the AC. Strat is key to forming a coherent ballot story.
[3] Critical education: ABC provides a stasis point for critical
discussion, allowing the neg to change the burden moots 6 mins of the
AC. And, my arguments dont deny that there are other things that are
critically important, i.e policymaking or genealogy, but rather say that
even if those arguments are true it is bad to moot 6 mins of the AC you can read those arguments when you affirm.
Also other net benefits are the reasons to prefer the burden so by
questioning ABC, the neg has to contest the validity of the burden
itself
Fairness is a voter because debate is a competition governed by rules
otherwise there is no limits on debaters running abusive arguments.
You dont know if they are winning on that layer if that layer is unfair.
1AR theory and meta-theory are legitimate --- otherwise, the neg can
be infinitely abusive and thered be no way to check, 1AR meta theory
checks on the negs ability to overwhelm the aff with nebulous theory.
And drop the debater on 1ar theory - the time crunched 1ar is
insufficient to win both theory and substance, so aff has no ability to
check abuse leading to infinite harm.

Contention DnG & Derrida

I defend the general resolution that the United States ought to limit
qualified immunity. The burden reinterprets what it means to affirm
that resolution but if you want to spec I can. No link to
implementation args cause Ill defend those they arent relevant to
affirming/negating the burden.
Part 1 is identity
Categories like police officer are arbitrary --- the only morally
relevant component of our identity is that it is constantly changing.
SEMETSKY:
[Semetsky. Semetsky, Inna. Deleuze, Education, and Becoming. LHP MK]

Unconscious formations are to be brought into play both because an individual is a desiring machine and the family drama depends ... on the unconscious social investments
that come out in delire (Deleuze, 1995, p. 20), that is, in a pre- rational, differential and excessive, triadic logic of floating images and disparate meanings inhabiting the Alices

Desire is not a single drive it is an assembly line of affects and

effects; machine is not a mechanical law utilized in the production of some predetermined end imposed by a transcendental subject instead subjects
and objects are themselves differentiated and produced as the outcomes of
desiring machines. The unconscious enfolded in subjectivity entails the
insufficiency for subjectivity to be interpreted just in terms of the stable identity of
the rational and intentional subject, or some ideal authentic self. There is no transcendental subject for
Deleuze, it vanishes like the infamous ghost into the unconscious machine, it is nowhere to be found. The unconscious, as yet aconceptual part of the plane of immanence is always productive and constructive,
making subjectivity changing and transient as though forcing it into becoming-other. According to Deleuze, the intentionality
paradoxical Wonderland.

of being is surpassed by the fold of Being, Being as fold (Deleuze, 1988a, p. 110). In this respect, the unconscious perceptions are implicated as minute, or microperceptions; as
such and le pli, the root of the im-pli-cated, means in French the fold they are part of the cartographic microanalysis of establishing an unconscious psychic mechanism that

The notion of being as fold points toward a

subjectivity understood as a process irreducible to universal notions such as
totality, unity or any a priori fixed self- identity. As a mode of intensity, subjectivity is capable of
express[es]ing itself in its present actuality neither by means of progressive
climbing toward the ultimate truth or the higher moral ideal , nor by looking for origins, even lost or deleted
engenders the perceived in consciousness (Deleuze, 1993, p. 95).

19 CHAPTER 1 ones, but setting out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle: breaking things open, breaking words open (Deleuze, 1995, p. 86). The complexity
of subjectivation is related to the complexity of language: there cannot be a single meaning derived from the classical signifier-signified based model, because such description
would failto acknowledge the Deleuzean plural and pragmatic subjects mode of existence as qualitative multiplicity. Subjectivity is always derivative to the expression of

The fundamental Deleuzean concept of fold

contributes to the blurring of boundaries between epistemology, ethics, and
psychology: subjectivity expresses itself [and] through emergence of a new form of
content: it becomes other by way of interaction, or the double transformation as in the aforementioned and oft-cited example
thought, and being true to thought is pre- eminent to the production of subjectivity.

of wasp and orchid.

Impacts:
[1] That affirms --- if we are becoming, the lines between individuals
are imperceptible. BRAIDOTTI 06:
[The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible, Rosi Braidotti, Deleuze and Philosophy, ed. Constantin Boundas, Edinburgh University
Press: Edinburgh, 2006, pp. 133-159. LHP MK]

How does all this relate to the project of ethics as a qualitative evaluation of the costs involved in experimenting with boundaries of sustainability ? In keeping with the deep

the motor of ethical behaviour [is], but also the

relevance of transience for the subject. What we truly desire as humans is to disappear, to step on
the side of life and let [life] it flow-by, without actually stopping it: becoming imperceptible.
materialism of his Spinozist roots, Deleuze stresses not only the importance of shame as

And yet our fundamental drive (conatus) is to express the potency of life (potentia), by joining forces with other flows of becoming. The great animal-machine universe is the
horizon of becoming that marks the eternity of life as bios/zoe and its resilience, its generative power expressed also through what we humans call death. Indeed what we

humans truly yearn for is to disappear by merging into this eternal flow of becomings, the

pre-condition for which is the loss, disappearance and disruption of the self. The ideal would be to take only memories and to leave behind only footsteps. What we most truly

choosing our own way of disappearing, our way of dying to and

the moment of dissolution of the subject the moment of its merging with
the web of non-human forces that frame [them] him/her. This point of evanescence has to do with
radical immanence, with the totality of the moment in which, as Jacques Lacan cynically and wittily put it, you coincide completely with your body, i.e. you become
a corpse. In the perspective of sustainable ethics, the same issue is dealt with more subtlety and considerably more compassion. Deleuze, for instance, makes a point of
desire is to surrender the self, preferably in the agony of ecstasy, thus
as our self. This can be described also as

distinguishing death along the Majority-line of becoming and that which occurs along the minority-line of Becoming. At the point of his/her evanescence or dissolution,

subjects are enfleshed entities, which are immersed, in the full intensity and luminosity of
becoming. Theirs, however, is the light of phosphorescent worms, not the light of the eternal rays of some monotheistic God. This, therefore, is the glorious
expression of the life-force that is zoe, and not the emanation of some divine essence. Life is eternal, but this eternity is
postulated on the dissolution of the self, the individual ego, as the necessary
premise. The Life in me does not bear my name, I inhabits it as a time-share. Whereas Christianity, even in its postmodern variations (I am thinking of Gianni

Vattimo) turns this into the preface to the re-affirmation of a higher order, a totalising One into which all fragments will re-assemble and fins a harmonious re-allocation, the
philosophy of radical immanence remains resolutely attached to zoe the life-force of recurrent waves of positive differences. Life endures in/as bio-centered egalitarianism on
the ruins of the self-representation of a unified, controlling individual subject allegedly motivated by a self-reflexive consciousness. Deleuze does argue that

all

processes of becoming aim at the becoming- imperceptible, but he thinks within the flat ontology on
immanence, which encompasses both the embodiment of mind and the embrainment of matter4. There is no collapse of being into
non-Being, or ontological implosion, but rather a reversal of all negativity into the
great animal, the Body-Without-Organs, the cosmic echoing chamber of infinite
becomings. In order to trigger a process of becoming- imperceptible, quite a transformation needs to take
place in what we could call the self. I think the becoming-imperceptible is the point of fusion between the self and his/her habitat, the cosmos as a whole. It
marks the point of evanescence of the self and its replacement by a living nexus of multiple inter-connections that empower not the self, but the collective, not identity, but
affirmative subjectivity, not consciousness, but affirmative inter-connections.

[2] Universal ethics cant take a realistic account of the subjects

development in the context of other relations --- the subject is not
stable, but constantly developing.
Part 2 is legal indeterminacy
First, police are endowed with power by legal institutions, but the
power of the norms those institutions are predicated off are infinitely
regressive. CARROLL 14:
[Nullification as Law JENNY E. CARROLL* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 2014, Jenny E.
Carroll. editing of The Georgetown Law Journal staff]

the rule of law, the formalist ideal type, creates stability by anchor[s]ing the law in clearly
constructed rules.158 Like the historicist ideal, the formalist ideal draws strength from its adherence to a positivist, fixed, or static notion of the law. The
Fallons second construction of

formalist ideal defines the rule of law as dependent on rules that precede acts, setting up clear prohibitions and defining the outcomes of disobedience.159 Under this conception
of the rule of law, there are sharp distinctions between legislative and judicial functions.160 The legislature creates the rules, and the judiciary applies those rules to cases. The
substantive meaning of the law is achieved by adherence to a positivist canon in which rules are constructed by the legislature and are clearly knowable by the citizenry.161 Legal
form, not some vague underlying moral ideal, lends meaning.162 Like its historicist cousin, this conception of the rule of law faces challenges when applied to the real world.163

Rules, like history,

draw their meaning from the context of the lives they regulate. Answering the
question of whether a rule applies to any given set of factual circumstances
inevitably requires some external examination. 165 In the end, the rule does not
define itself; it must be defined by those who would apply it and those to whom it
would be applied.166 In response to those who would argue that rules require context and interpretation, formalists could embrace the notion that the ideal
Just as historical meaning cannot be separated from the lives of those who would seek to define it, neither can formally constructed rules.164

requires only general legal directives.167 But this in turn creates a new dilemma. If the rule is to survive because it is general or vague, then formalisms promise of clear rules

Even specific rules are fraught with ambiguity because

language itself is, by its nature, open to shifting interpretations that can render
even the best-defined rules unclear.168 In the end, the dilemma of the formalist ideal would seem to be that law cannot be capable of
may not be possible. The rules aim may be uncertain .

both shifting and being static. In moments when the law must evolve to survive or to promote substantive values, adherence to formalism may create an impossible quandary for
the citizen who ironically finds instability in the laws inability to change with shifting social values. The third construction of the rule of law in Fallons world is the legal process
ideal type.169 The legal process ideal rejects the notion that the law consists only of rules that preexist their application and are static in their construction, and instead defines
the law in terms of procedure that seeks to sustain substantive goals.170 In this, adherents to the legal process ideal root law in current, normative consensus and acknowledge
that legal doctrineno matter which formal body creates itmust strive to reflect evolving standards and expectations. 171 This is not to say that adherents to the legal process
ideal abandon stability; rather, they claim that stability is best located in the creation of processes that promote fairness through the development of legal norms as opposed to
rigid rules.172 The ideal seeks to create an internal connection between the law itself and the citizens expectations of reasonableness, which guides not only law creation but also
subsequent legal interpretation.173 Precedent serves as a basis for the determination of particular cases.174 But in the end, the ideal places stock in judicial review to serve as the
basis for procedural fairness and as the guarantor that other lawmaking bodies, including the legislative and executive branches and administrative decision makers, do not
exceed their authority or create laws inconsistent with the normative consensus.175 The legal process ideal wrestles with the dilemma created by the historicist and formalist

law must include some process of interpretation.

The law itself, unable to contemplate every possible application in advance, must
undergo some process of synthesis in the lives of those it governs. 176 The ideal therefore defines the
conception of law [means] not only in terms of its literal creation (in legislative or
administrative bodies), but also in its subsequent interpretation by those who
apply it; the ideal defines law in terms of a consensus that shifts with the communal values. It finds stability in its ability to control the realm of the appropriate decision
ideals allegiance to a rigid construction of law by acknowledging that

makers in the system of governance, ceding substantive and procedural control to formal decision makers,177 and it finds stability by defining the substantive goal of
reasonableness to which the decision makers must constantly adhere in order to legitimate their interpretations.178 In this, the legal process ideal departs from formalism by
abandoning the notion of a static law, while simultaneously maintaining the concept by regulating proper sources of interpretation.179

And, there is a gap between law and the way it is interpreted in

specific circumstances. The current structure of the law fails to
provide absolute guidance in any situation DERRIDA 02:
Derrida, Jacques. 2002. Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority. Cardozo Law Review 11 (919): pg 961.

To be just, the decision of a judge, for example, must not only follow a rule of law or a general law but must
also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if ultimately nothing
previously existed of the law, as if the judge himself invented the law in every case. No exercise of justice as law can be just
unless there is a fresh judgment (I borrow this English expression from Stanley Fishs article, Force, in doing what comes naturally).
This fresh judgment can very well- must very well- conform to a preexisting law, but the reinstituting, reinventive
and freely decisive interpretation, the responsible interpretation of the judge requires that his justice not just
consist in conformity, in the conservative and reproductive activity of judgment. In short, for a decision to be just and
responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also
destroy it or suspend it enough to have reinvent it if the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its principle Each case is other, each
decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no
existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely. At least, if the rule guarantees
it in no uncertain terms, so that the judge is a calculating machine, which happens, and we will not say that he is
just, free and responsible, But we also wont say if he doesnt refer to any law, to any rule or if, because he doesnt
take any rule for granted beyond his own interpretation, he suspends his decision, stops short before the undecidable or if he improvises and
leaves aside all rules, all principles. It follows from this paradox that there is never a moment that we can say in the
present that a decision is just (that is, free and responsible), or that someone is just a [hu]man- even
less, I am with a state of law, with the rules and conventions that authorize calculation but whose founding origin only defers the problem of justice. For in the founding of law
or its institution, the same problem of justice will have been posed and violently resolved, that is to say buried, dissimulated, repressed. Here the best paradigm is the founding
of the nation states, or the institutive act of a constitution that establishes what one calls in French let at de droit.

Impacts:
[1] that affirms --- the law is what establishes a distinction between
police and normal citizens, but if the law is indeterminate it holds no
jurisdiction over that question, so the only force in establishing a
difference between the two has no intrinsic value.
[2] Empirical function of the law is irrelevant to the moral principles
that govern the laws ability to set norms. The empirical nature of
institutions like the state are contingent, so functional obligations
terminate in the aff.
[3] Claims grounded in the legitimacy of the law or restoring the
integrity of institutions within the law to subvert other inherently fail
---