Ernest Sosas The Raft and the Pyramid

What is the nature of the controversy between Foundationalism and Coherentism?

o Two Assumptions: a) Knowledge involve beliefs, and such beliefs must be true and
justified, b) Justification involves a normative/evaluative property in its being relevant to
knowledge
o Two Key Questions: Objects of knowledge and criteria for knowledge
Particularism starts from the objects of knowledge and is anti-sceptical on principle, while
Methodism starts from epistemic principles and is more receptive to the possibility of scepticism.
Descartes and Hume both endorse Methodism in accepting only the obvious and what derives
from deductive reasoning.
o Descartes relies on knowing epistemic principles as a matter of intuition of what is clear
and distinct, indubitable. Basic knowledge is an infallible belief in an indubitable truth.
While for him this accommodates much of the scientific knowledge of his time, for
Hume these criteria entail that our claims to knowledge go beyond their limits.
o Methodism admits as fundamental and obvious what is nothing of the sort. These
principles are not indubitable.
o Humes route is to show how knowledge based on what is obvious on any given moment
is to be rejected.
This failure seems to be connected with the system of knowledge in a given mind. The
interrelation of beliefs is what is purported to justify a certain knowledge-claim. For both
Descartes and Hume, knowledge has an architectonic structure. A body of knowledge can be
subdivided in order to obtain a non-symmetric relation between the parts, ordering them in a
pyramidal way. A part of knowledge F bears a relation R to other parts while in turn they do not
bear R to F. F is supported by the structure of the relation.
o This relation is a relation of justification, where a set of node on the same level support
the belief that precede the set, and each node is a proposition that a subject can be
justified in believing. If a belief is not self-evident, it must have (justificational) support
from the set of beliefs that supports it and finally the branches of the pyramid must
terminate, that is, each branch must have an indubitable proposition at the bottom
o An indubitable proposition can be believed with no possibility of error. Non-terminal
beliefs are obtained inferentially (or obtain their justification inferentially) from the
terminal, basic beliefs
What are these obvious beliefs? Furthermore, everyday knowledge is underdetermined by those
basic beliefs that hold in every possible context.
This Methodism threatens to plunge us into scepticism. If principles are not able to explain our
knowledge of particular objects, we ought to reject this methodical approach based on criteria.
This pyramidal Methodism, called Foundationalism, can be rejected in favour of a coherent
system of beliefs that is free-floating as a raft. Justification is obtained by a belief due to its
cohering with a comprehensive system of beliefs
o Question: does this mean that coherentism is a kind of particularism? This seems
unlikely as coherence is a criterion for explaining how we know object, in the same sense
as the linear concept of justification in foundationalism is.
Sosa begins to describe Coherentism by explaining the difference between subjective states
incorporating a propositional attitude (a mental state with a proposition for its object, such as
fear), and those who do not (having an headache)
o Question: Is having a headache something entirely non-propositional? To realize I have a
headache I must localize pain in my head and recognize that its source is neither
something external nor an illusion. It seems that having headache as an object for a
proposition is not something too weird, otherwise what would differentiate it from mere
sensation of pain? (cf. Wittgensteins discussion of criteria for tooth pain in the Blue
Book)

From this distinction, Sosa begins to highlights two arguments, both shared by foundational
pictures of justification, which end in disproving foundationalism itself.
o A propositional attitude gives us at best indirect contact with reality, hence it doesnt
shield us from the possibility of error. This means that a propositional attitude cannot
provide a foundation for knowledge, hence, any mental state incorporating a
propositional attitude is no foundation.
Remark: It seems that the first three points can be applied to Cartesianism, while
the fourth is different. I think therefore I am is definitely a propositional
attitude, derived from something indubitable, and is foundational at least for
establishing the subject. For the truth of the objects we will need something
different (ultimately, God), but it seems therefore that we have direct contact
with the reality of the cogito even though it is expressed through a propositional
attitude (it is effectively an existential attitude)
o If the basic mental state incorporates no propositional attitude, we appear to have no
support for any hypothesis from it. This amounts to saying we cannot state the content
of our knowledge-claims or observations. If the mental state is propositionally empty,
we have no foundation for knowledge in a mental state.
o It does not matter at the end whether a mental state incorporates a propositional attitude,
as in both cases, no foundation for knowledge is to be found. Mental states grant no
foundational support for knowledge.
This is the coherentist argument against foundationalism. Sosa investigates the possibility that
propositional attitudes can be supported by something else than themselves (which is incidentally
something shared by the coherentist as well). What if justification is based on practical or
consequential (utilitarian) concerns?
o Remark: This argument is spurious. What we have here is not a foundational, a priori
justification, but an a posteriori validation of a propositional attitude. Justification by
consequence runs against foundationalisms tenets in the same way coherentism does
(and could be seen as a kind of pragmatic justification)
What if the belief that something is red has its origin in the direct perception, in ones own visual
experience of something appearing as red? In this case we would have a belief resting upon
something non-propositional. A mental state as something non-propositional and foundational at
the same time.
o Remark: this is the crux of Foundationalism. It relies in the end on something brute, a
physical fact that has to be recognized without being reduced to either a propositional
attitude or an inference but whose content can be ultimately grasped as a mental state.
How this actually happens (from the evidential experience of something red to
recognizing that this is really red) seems left mysterious (cf. Sellars and the necktie
example). This is an example of the Myth of the Given.
What if, furthermore, this mental state is propositional after all and it is not infallible? Why
should it be rejected as a foundation? Here Sosa analyses again the situation in terms of
consequence of a certain action (intended in parallel as the consequences in adopting a certain
belief as foundational) as giving a foundation for the justification of adopting a certain
action/belief. For Sosa, if this is true then the anti-foundationalist is on the wrong track and it is
furthermore a distinctive intellectualist trait that taints its concept of justification.
o Remark: The problem is, once more, how this a posteriori justification can be intended
as a foundational belief in the sense the foundationalist would want it to be. It appears
not to be indubitable, nor immediate. It is not even a reference to some brute fact, as its
consequence are at best contingent; if such consequence were indeed something
necessary (i.e. self-evident), shouldnt this kind of necessity already occur at the terminal
node of the pyramid? It seems difficult for a justification obtained by the consequence of
a belief to be terminal in the way the foundationalist model requires (and indeed, if the

belief is non-evidential, it has to be supported by something else, as per the pyramidal

requirements already outlined)
For Sosa, intellectualist models hold justification as being parasitical on logical relations among
propositions: the justification for Q being based on the fact that P and the logical relation that P
implies Q.
o Remark: This seems however again a model that is shared by foundationalism. P can be
thought of as a self-evident fact that is taken to be true and cannot be otherwise, and the
logical relation of P implies Q as the linear justification, the Relation R we saw earlier,
that grants support to the upper-level proposition Q.
This logical parasitism is for Sosa a trait that this anti-foundationalist argument impales both
foundationalism and coherentism, threatening the possibility of substantive epistemology.
o Remark: However, Coherentism would not need the self-evident fact that P, in order to
explain how justification is obtained. It seems that Sosa has in mind the linear
transmission of Justification that belongs to the pyramidal setting even when he analyses
the anti-foundationalists position. However, Coherentism needs only the logical
implications between beliefs. This is for Sosa a further problem, namely that reality is
left out of the picture, but, interestingly enough, he does not pushes this issue right here.
He focuses on it instead in his other 1980 paper The Foundations of Foundationalism.
Sosas attack on the antifoundationalist argument: the implication yielded by P and P Implies Q
that grounds Q in foundationalism is not immediately yielded in coherentism. This appears to
indicate the problem of how and why the justification of a certain belief is obtained in a
coherentism picture, if all we have left is mere membership in a set of beliefs.
o Remark: again, Sosa appears to value more the linear kind of justification belonging to
foundationalism than the one defended by coherentism. Why should mere coherent,
logical implications not be enough to grant justification to a certain belief? It appears that
the problem for Sosa is the already mentioned problem of leaving out reality. But this is a
foundationalist assumption, if we argue that foundationalism is a defining property of
Epistemological Realism, as Michael Williams does.
Sosa takes into account the possibility that coherence supervenes on any actual instance of a
belief being a member of a set that is in fact coherent, and this coherence is indirectly parasitical
on the logical relations among propositions. This would mean that justification is a relation that is
established only when the set of propositions is in place with the logical relations among them
already structured.
This is for Sosa deeply problematic: it seems that the justification of the belief regarding being in
pain is obtained by the fact that one is in pain. P logically implies P and this seems a bit trivial.
This also means that, if we rely merely on beliefs for justifying other beliefs, we have no hope of
constructing a complete epistemology as we would end up in an infinite regress. Other Normative
enterprises are also rendered impossible
o Remark: This is one of Sosas most contentious points. He is right in analysing the fact
that in coherentism, justification is only obtained through logical relations among
propositions, and that the coherence that is needed in the first place is only parasitic,
albeit indirectly, on these same logical relations being in place. However, his argument
that this would lead to a trivial concept of justification is more problematic, in particular
because it appears to rely on a problem regarding the content of the proposition (having
an headache, P). Coherentism only regarding justification would indeed appear to grant
justification to a proposition only due to its being this particular proposition whatever its
content (having a particular position for any proposition would grant to that proposition
the property of being justified); however this seems ludicrous, and it signals that Sosa is
considering again the coherentist proposal in light of a linear model of justification, a
foundational model. If we recall the remarks made earlier that the linear model of
justification needs to rely on some ultimate, self-evident, brute fact, such as being in

pain or seeing red, we can easily see that higher-order beliefs obtain justification from
these fundamental states because they have already some kind of content expressed in
them. If I know that being hit on the head entails a headache, and Im hit on the head
with a bat, I have a justified belief to know that Im in pain. However, why is Sosa
supposing that in coherentist systems, the place of a certain proposition doesnt bear
anything at all on its actual content? If coherentism is only a matter of a web of beliefs
bestowing justification upon a certain belief P, it means that the content of those beliefs is
already Given, hence actually opening up a space for a foundational outlook on these
beliefs themselves. It appears to put in place a linear conception of justification regarding
the content of single beliefs, while obtaining some other kind of justification (left
somewhat vague) from its position in the coherent set. This seems therefore only a
foundational system that requires the beliefs in the system to cohere with each other,
which is already a requirement of whatsoever belief system we might adopt
(Mathematics, with its avoidance of contradictions, is a pretty apt example). This would
indeed make manifest a fundamental inadequacy in coherentism. However, this picture
doesnt withstand the fact that the set of coherent beliefs bears also on their content, with
the position of a certain proposition P influencing the content of the beliefs that support it
while in turn supporting and bearing on the content of these same beliefs in return. P is
therefore not merely logically implied by P, something that betrays again a linear
conception of justification, but is logically implied, and its content too, by all of the other
propositions it is connected with, and by its position too. The mere position of the
proposition in the web of beliefs is not enough to confer justification on it, rather, its
position in the web of coherent beliefs is due to its having a certain meaning, and its
having a certain meaning is due to its being connected to the other beliefs of the system.
This betrays a further interesting point: Sosa views coherentism as threatening an infinite
regress, due to the fact that to justify a belief another belief is needed. However, to view
this picture in these terms is precisely to see it in a linear, foundationalist manner. The
problem with coherentism, both regarding justification and content of beliefs is a
problem of circularity. This is why coherentist pictures such as Davidsons often adopt a
kind of causal externalism, where is the causal history of the particular belief that allows
it to take initially part in a web of beliefs. These pictures might be shown to rely too on
some kind of foundational given (as McDowell has argued for in Mind and World), but
this will suffice to show that Coherentism about justification cannot be meaningfully be
detached from coherentism about content (holism), without falling into some kind of
linear foundationalism at some stage, and that the issue with coherentism is not an issue
of regress, but rather a problem of circularity, entailing that coherentist pictures of
justification should also employ a genealogical account aiming at explaining how we
acquired the beliefs that form the raw material for the coherent web of beliefs.
The threat of the regress is for Sosa an indication that we have to look for beliefs that do not
require other beliefs for their being justified. This is however something that arises out of the
supposed impossibility of an actual infinite regress. Foundationalism needs to show why an
infinite regress is something vicious, and why foundationalism has to rule out a chain of
justification without end in order to obtain foundational beliefs. This is the doctrine of epistemic
foundationalism.
Sosa Begins to analyse objections to an endless regress of justification.
o Finitude of Human mind Objection: For Sosa this is a mere presumption and furthermore
our problem is the nature of justification in itself, not to see whether it can actually be
ever achieved by human minds. Is an infinite regress ruled out by the very nature of
justification?
o It is ruled out in principle because otherwise justification would never end: Sosa argues
that if the end is merely a temporal matter, an eternal being could very well obtain that

kind of justification. Furthermore, what precludes the possibility of acquiring an infinite

body of beliefs at a single stroke?
Remark: In his two answers here, Sosa is highlighting the problem of infinite
regress as a problem pertaining to finite minds, and specifically to their power.
However there is another route that shows how an infinite regress is ruled out in
principle by the very nature of justification and it hinges on the seemingly werid
statement by Sosa that what precludes acquiring an infinite body of beliefs at a
single stroke. If we were capable of such a feat, we would need no justification
for them as we would have immediate intuition of their content. If we do need
justification, we would not acquire an infinite body of beliefs, as we would still
need to investigate whether these beliefs are true in the first place. An infinite
body of beliefs whose justification is left ambiguous would not work for us as a
body of beliefs. This is a distinctively Kantian argument I want to explore a bit
further: for Kant the human mind is finite, and in order to characterize this
feature, he relies on a comparison to a supposedly divine intellect. The divine
intellect would be indeed capable of acquiring an infinite body of beliefs at a
single stroke because it is an intuitive intellect, that is, an intellect that doesnt
need to rely upon judgments, logical inferences, justification, representations in
order to get to the content of those beliefs or to have beliefs in the first place. The
intuitive intellect acquires immediately an infinite body of true beliefs. The
human intellect is instead not an intuitive one, it is a discursive intellect. We
employ judgments, statements, beliefs, representations, justifications, logical
relations in order to obtain a certain belief making sure that it is true, we
synthesize information in order for a belief to arise in the first place, while for
the intuitive intellect that belief is immediate. If we could acquire an infinite
body of beliefs at a single stroke we wouldnt need an infinite chain of reasoning
or of justification in the first place. We need reasoning because we are not in
immediate contact with beliefs, we need justification because we are not in
immediate contact with their truth-status. Therefore, if we could ever acquire an
infinite body of beliefs there wouldnt even be a question regarding an infinite
chain of justification, there wouldnt be a need for justification at all. Thus, if an
infinite regress is a substantial possibility, we wont be able to grasp it, neither in
a single stroke, nor in an eternal timeframe. The infinite regress does seem to
threaten justification, because of the role justification plays in our finite and
discursive reasoning.
Objection of the infinite proposition: this is a variation on the infinite chain of regress.
How can we ever grasp a belief if the proposition that justifies it potentially extends to
infinite? For Sosa this is not a problem because, if we allow that for each proposition P,
the support that the proposition Q grants it, transmits justification to P, then for each
proposition P we have a finite proposition that justifies P
Remark: Two problems with Sosas solution. In this linear view, the Justification
obtained by P relies only on Q, on its antecedent member in the chain of
reasoning. This appears to be an arbitrary cut-off in the transmission of
justification, and more specifically it resembles the Agrippan trope of
Assumption, which is historically one of the way the regress to infinite ends. The
assumption in this case is that a sufficient relation of justification is obtained
already at the level of the logical relation between two propositions. The
foundationalist has to show how justification is retained in the implication of P
by Q with the status of Q not positively resolved. This leads to the problem of the
source of justification: is it merely created by the logical relation between P and
Q? This could very well be a way to answer the infinite regress from a

coherentist position (albeit the relation would have more members than just two
propositions), but the foundationalist has a need to show where the justification
arises in the first place, and is exactly this requirement that drives
foundationalism into the perils of an infinite regress. A coherentist position
instead does not need to disprove an infinite regress, because it doesnt share the
linear conception of justification upon which the infinite regress is created (as
explained before, the problem with coherentism is ultimately the Trope of
Circularity)
o Objection of the appeal to the successor: This objection seems to be the second problem I
highlighted in the remarks over here. A mere appeal to the successor of a proposition P in
the chain of justification wont be enough to grant justification to the proposition P itself.
Justification seems to be floating somewhere between P and its successor, leaving vague
its anchoring point. Sosa tries to avoid this problem by making a distinction between
actual and potential regress, however it is not clear how this distinction dispels the threat
of a regress. Sosa seems to think, rightfully so, that even a merely potential regress is
enough to disrupt the chain of justification. If a single proposition were to be justified,
then its predecessor would be justified, but the question of whether (and most
importantly how) that single proposition is actually justified is left unanswered, therefore
none of its predecessors are known to actually obtain justification.
o Objection against this distinction: For Sosa, an actual regress has as its members only
justified beliefs, while a potential regress doesnt need to. For Sosa we can hold an
infinite chain of actual beliefs that are justified and that terminate with a belief at its head
that is justified in virtue of its position. However, if it were not justified due to its
position would actually settle the question in the negative. The possibility of a potential
regress with a belief at its head that is not justified doesnt show the impossibility of an
actual regress with every of its member being justified
Remark: The observation already stated apply also here. What does it mean for a
belief to be justified in this linear setting, if a foundation is not achieved? It is an
arbitrary cut-off just to say that the successor of a proposition P is all that is
needed to grant justification to P. Where does the justification reside? If it reside
in Q then we need to be sure whether Q is justified. The problem is that in going
through a regress we never achieve the justification we were seeking unless we
arbitrarily assume a certain cut-off point. Furthermore how can a belief at the top
of a chain be actually justified if the original instantiation of the justification is
out of reach in this sense?
Sosa proceeds in arguing that the possibility of an actual infinite regress shouldnt be seen
immediately as tarnishing the justificatory enterprise for the foundationalist. A route that doesnt
involve ruling out the regress is to accept the fact that what we need are justified beliefs at the top
of the chain, at the top of a terminating regress. A single belief can lead to both an actual regress
and a terminating regress, as in the case of the set of even natural numbers. This could be a
terminating regress for a powerful enough intellect.
o Remark: apart for the observations already carried out, the example relying on numbers
seems to appear intuitive enough to show us that a terminating regress is an actual
possibility even in those cases where the same justified belief could incur in an endless
regress. However, using natural numbers is trickier than Sosa supposes. The definition
and justification of beliefs about natural numbers is actually grounded in mathematics on
the Peano axioms, which in turn give rise to Peano Arithmetics when addition and
multiplication are added to the axioms. These are fundamental propositions, hence the
regress to the infinite is avoided in a completely different way, namely by turning to
fundamental assumptions and definitions regarding the nature of the numbers. This move
terminates the regress employing a classical foundationalist route: the validity of the

foundations themselves however is not discussed (Goedels theorems prove their being
either incomplete or incoherent, cutting the ground under mathematical axiomatic
foundationalism). What if laymen do not use this definition in order to have justified
beliefs about numbers? If we employ a concept in a commonsense way as in this case, we
are just using an incomplete, imperfect concept of number, good enough for pratical and
everyday purposes, but that would not stand epistemological scrutiny regarding their
ultimate grounds.
Sosa recognizes that the foundationalist would not be thrilled to go for this route, the very
possibility of an actual infinite regress is enough for him to avoid infinitism altogether
How we answer to our need for foundations if an endless regress is not ruled out? Sosa
introduces at this point a distinction between two forms of coundationalism. Formal
foundationalism and substantive foundationalism: the former defines the general conditions under
which a certain normative or evaluative property phi applies, whereas the latter is a particular
way of doing so.
o Remarks: This definition has some issues: formal foundationalism can hardly be defined
classical foundationalism tout-court, as it only specifies when normativity obtains the
content and authority it has, independently from more fundamental assumptions. This
definition could be useful when some anti-foundationalist positions, such as
Wittgensteins, are branded as kinds of foundationalism just because they allow for the
application of some normative property. However, if, as Sosa argues, foundationalism
and coherentism are both kinds of substantive foundationalism, isnt this definition too
vague? Every normative proposal, even relativism, could be understood as a kind of
foundationalism which would be odd to say the least. If the distinction is merely
formal/general and substantive/particular as it appears to be by the inclusion of
coherentism in the latter grouping, why labelling it as foundationalism in the first
place?
Classical foundationalism has three main tenets: infallible, indubitable beliefs are justified, every
belief obtained through deductive reasoning from these basic beliefs is justified, every justified
belief is either a basic belief or deducted from one. This is an example of formal foundationalism
(why not substantial? Coherentism or relativism would not need to share any of these tenets)
This kind of foundationalism is not really attractive anymore and has been deemed as impossible.
Philosophy has however lost sight of the different types of foundationalism as exemplified by the
formal/substantial distinction.
o Remark: hasnt this happened because the distinction is too inclusive and vague?
Everything can be labelled foundationalism, so if we are to argue for an antifoundationalist position the distinction doesnt actually help this task.
In a passing note, Sosa makes a more fundamental distinction that characterizes foundationalism
proper: conditions that epistemically justify a belief are to be specifiable in nonepistemic terms.
We saw an hint of this position when Sosa analysed propositional and non-propositional attitudes
towards basic features of experience such as having a perception of something red.
Foudnationalism holds that ultimately, epistemic beliefs are to be justified in virtue of something
nonepistemic.
o Remark: we should clarify here that non-epistemically basic for a foundationalist means
something immediate, indubitable, whose content is not established by recourse to a
proposition about it. A given, brute fact (Sosa doesnt state this explicitly, but following
his various definitions of foundationalism in the paper, this position can pretty easily be
stated)
Epistemic justification is something that supervenes on something else that is neither normative
nor evaluative. Something is epistemically justified to its having a nonepistemic basis in
perception, inference, memory, etc. Sosa bases this on an analogy with what is regarded as good
in ethics

Remark: why are perception, inference or memory valid bases in themselves for
granting the non-epistemic basis? Why should they grant us something non-epistemic in
the first place? Usually an argument about this is made from the supposed non-epistemic
experience of colours; however perception of colours isnt something trivially nonepistemic. In philosophy of perception a lively debate focuses on whether even these
basic facts belonging to perception have a conceptual, linguistic, or inferential property.
Relying on perceptually basic (nonepistemic) properties, upon which justification
supervenes, in order to explain why a certain belief arising from perception is
epistemically justified doesnt actually explain the connection between non-epistemic
facts and epistemic justification. How is the non-epistemic content delivered? What does
it mean that epistemic normativity supervenes on it? Does this mean that already at the
non epistemic level we can have a propositional attitude about its content? If so, why
should it still be considered as epistemic? If we allow for a gap between brute, basic,
non-propositional facts and epistemic justification, we are left puzzled on how either side
can bridge this gap without becoming ultimately the other side? This is a distinctive
Cartesian problem (addressed the most by Hegel, Wittgenstein, Sellars and McDowell).
Sosa takes into account however that there are higher grades of formal foundationalism, in which
the conditions for epistemically justified beliefs can be specified recursively and by a simple,
comprehensive theory.
o Remark: This recursive specification is left here a bit vague. It seems, from what Sosa
has just said, that we can reference to perception (or memory, or inference) in order to
ground epistemically justified beliefs based on the contents of perception (or memory, or
inference). This appears to be circular reasoning, and a kind of circular reasoning usually
found in externalist theories (Appeal to the reliability of perception in order to explain
perceptual content which in turn explains why perception is reliable).
In this sense classical foundationalism is a higher grade formal foundationalism, because it
delivers a recursive simple theory in which epistemic justification supervenes with infallibility
and indubitability. However, Sosa argues that even coherentism should be allowed within this
definition, provided that coherentist justification supervenes on non-evaluative or normative
facts.
o Remark: this is, again, problematic, because coherentism doesnt need this nonnormative requirement. Classical Foundationalism needs it because otherwise it would
lose its foundational grounds which connects beliefs to something immediate, certain,
indubitable and infallible (hence non-normative. Something that is really such-and-such).
However, why should coherentism share this proposal? If we picture coherentism about
justification as having some linear, noncoherentist ultimate connection with something
immediate, indubitable, infallible, etc., how does this coherentism differ ultimately from
foundationalism? Isnt this kind of coherentism just a more complex and structured
foundationalist variant, a pyramid with Relations between beliefs that cohere and that
terminate by referring to some non-epistemic, non-evaluative brute fact? Even more so, if
coherence between beliefs is the only thing that characterizes coherentist justification,
isnt this a feature shared by classical foundationalism as well? The beliefs that make up
the various layers of the pyramid do need to be coherent with each other. This should
mean that coherentism is something more than just coherence between beliefs, a web of
justified beliefs. In coherentism, every single belief supports every other belief.
Therefore coherentism about justification doesnt need to supervene only on something
non-normative. All coherentism need for justification is normativity between mutually
supporting beliefs. This again raises the problem for coherentism of how it can relate to
an outside world but coherentism can work for explaining justification perfectly well by
merely employing normative, epistemic beliefs.
o

Coherentism is for Sosa therefore a formal foundationalism as it explains that a belief is justified
iff it has a place within a system of beliefs that is coherent and comprehensive
o Remark: as already observed, if this is all that coherentism requires, classical
foundationalism is itself a kind of coherentism (a non-coherent pyramid of
foundationalism would grant support to hardly anything). This must mean that
coherentism must require something else, such as the mutual support in beliefs for their
mutual justification. This means that coherentism has a distinctive holist property that
foundationalism has not, and that furthermore the content (or meaning) of beliefs in a
coherent system does not need to be ultimately tied to something non-normative, nonevaluative, brute, given, but it is the holistic web of justifications and mutual support that
explains why a belief has the (justificatory) role and the content it has in a coherentist
proposal.
For Sosa, epistemologys goal is to explain how justification supervenes on something nonepistemic, non-normative, non-evaluative. Sosa realizes that if coherentism share this goal, this
includes strong restrictions on the notion of coherence. Coherentism must rely on explanations
that are free of normative or evaluative content. Therefore coherentism and substantive
foundationalism turn out to be varieties of a deeper fountionalism as they both develop a formal
foundationalist theory that explains how justification supervenes on the non-epistemic.
o Remark: Sosa seem to realize that if Coherentism shares these goals then much of its
opposition to foundationalism is in fact misplaced, and coherentism has actually much
more in common with foundationalism than usually recognized. However this picture of
coherentism is both puzzling and problematic. Why doesnt Sosa realize that, if all that
made up coherentism seems to vanish into foundationalism, then this should be a hint
that coherentism require something more? (such as what we explained in the previous
remarks)
ADDENDUM: we should probably here remark again that the non-epistemic the
foundationalist is seeking is something indubitable and infallible in the classical variant,
while in more modern and modest proposals it is still something immediate, nonattitudinal, a brute matter of fact. A non-epistemic basis such as pragmatic, practical or
teleological reasons wouldnt work for the foundationalist, as they rely either on
something evaluative of normative, such as an inter-subjective setting of rule-following.
However, the coherentist could easily accept these features of non-epistemic reasons,
provided that coherentism is not just what Sosa defined it to be.
o