Case Notes(to be digested)

I. Session 1
Art 2 Publication of laws
1) Tanada vs Tuvera (1986) keyword: Marcos Presidential issuances
-Petioners wants to clarify the ruling in 1985 as some PDs where not published by the
Exec Secretary
- Tanadas contention
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
-OSG
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not
have to be made in the Official Gazette;
-Court held: Unless it is otherwise provided
refers to the date of effectivity not of the publication which is required

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended.

such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have
any legal justification at all

Laws that required publication

all statutes, including those of local application and private laws
presidential decrees and executive orders
Administrative rules and regulations
charter of a city

M-unicipal in character
I-nternal regulations

L-etter of instructions
I-nterpretative
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.

that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could
better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals
are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly.
they ask the following questions:
1.

What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2.

Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3.

What is meant by "publication"?

4.

Where is the publication to be made?

5.

When is the publication to be made?

2) Honasan vs Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ (assailed order)

Held: Assailed order upheld.More time for DOJ to submit counter affidavit
August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by
respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano.
-Attached as Annex "B" is the affidavit of Perfecto Ragil and made an integral part of this
complaint.
-2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion
in deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the
claim of the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation.
2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary investigation involving Honasan.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the
powers granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of
publication, hence null and void.

Ratio:
-arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:
1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant
to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in
relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513
-3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular, as a ground
to question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below, is misplaced. The
jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant under the Revised Administrative Code. It is
not derived from any provision of the joint circular which embodies the guidelines
governing the authority of both the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation on offenses charged in relation to public office.
-4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of
the Ombudsman need not be published since it neither contains a penal provision nor
does it prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain or penalty. It does not
regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.
-The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution,
viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute
cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power
to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution
provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of
1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.

- -and application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal
arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the case of
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this,
on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said
precedent, to date, has not yet been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit
any, under pain or penalty.
3) Roy vs CA keyword: publication of the ruling of court
- firewall of Roy (petitioner) collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop and house
occupied by the family of the respondents. It resulted also to injuries to some members
and the death of Marissa Bernal.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided
by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents
- the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule,
to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p.
212)

-Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made
to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette
- bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
-, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer
within the coverage of the grace period
Art 3 Ignorance of the Law / Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

4) Manuel vs People (bigamy/good faith)

- Manuel was convicted with the crime of bigamy for marrying Tina Gandalera even if his
previous marriage with Rubylus Gana is still subsisting.
-Manuel didnt obtain a judicial declaration of presumptive death of his former wife
- He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that
the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married
the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
- petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after
the effectivity of the Family Code.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a
legal right or duty;
(b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. [70] If the provision does
not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the
other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. The latter provision

is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or
other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case. [71]

Art 4-Non-retroactivity of the law

5) Espiritu vs Cipriano (rental law)
- question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126,
otherwise known as the Rental Law.
- by plaintiffs, now petitionersagainst private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged
failure to pay rentals
-Facts:
2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and
consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease;
3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement,
rentals being then payable at or before the end of the year;
5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis
and rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;
7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly
rate;
8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail
to, and received by, defendant.
1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of
Republic Act 6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which
Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof.
Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is
located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the
monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to the
approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos
(P300.00) a month.
Court ruled for the petioner Espiritu
- Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was
effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a
period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected.
-. Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract
covering the increased rate of rentals
claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect
is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute
affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order.
Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to

the facts as found. 2 The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary
situation", 3 it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and
unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one
year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and
lessee prior to the approval of this Act." -statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear:
a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal
language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from
March 31, 1970
Expressium facit cessare tacitum
- deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126, as recorded
its Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law did not
entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment.

MANDATORY/PROHIBITIVE LAW
6) Brehm vs Republic (adoption case)
Brehm an American citizen married Ester Mira, a Filipina who had a daughter named
Elizabeth from another American citizen.
In 1959, the couple filed a joint petition for the adoption of Elizabeth in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court
opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the
Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely
temporary, ..disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule
100, Rules of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
-only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners
are qualified to adopt Baby Rose
-. Art. 335 clearly states that "The following cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is
therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the
negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated
other
hand,
Art.
338,
Provides
"the
following may be
adopted:
(3)
a
step-child, by the step-father or step-mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be
given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.
Article 6: Waiving of rights
7) Consunji vs CA (Res ipso loquitor/accident)
- Respondents wife (Maria Juego) died in a construction related accident in the building
being built by Consunju, herein petitioners.
-The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from
the State Insurance Fund.

-Consunji maintains that police report are hearsay and inadmissible

-CA, excepted from hearsey rule being an entry in the official records
- Entries in official records made in the performance of his by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the facts
, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,[10] this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran,
enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined
by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
petitioner contends the last is missing
- The concept of res ipsa loquitur (the things or facts speaks for themselves)
where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control
or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendants want of care

Applied to the case.

- following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that
private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also assails
the same statement for being hearsay
Petitioner is correct. Fabro's sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible.
petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds
employer damages under the Civil Code.

an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses
not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person
against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of the party's rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and
has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a
knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the
record or by the evidence.[40]
Held: case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC

a waiver by election.
- When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies,
the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy,
in the absence of fraud by the other party.

It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the
party's rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.

8) Ereneta vs Bezore (tenant)

Held: order affirmed
- Ignatius Henry Bezore, Elwood Knickerbocker and Mary Irene Fallon McCormick were
claiming a part of the estate of deceased Camon
-Camons land is leased from hacienda Rosario, half of it is owne3d by appellant Fallon
-Camons wife the petioner Erenata administrates his properties. (grant to her of letters of
administration of the estate of the deceased Camon.
- claimants-appellants Bezore, et al.. filed a claim against the estate in appertaining to the
claimants' half-share in thehacienda.
- appellants had demanded payment of their claim from Emilio Camon when he was still alive, but
the latter ignored the demands
- A "Release and Waiver of Claims" (exhibit "3"), executed on January 12, 1961, whereby Amparo
Sta. Romana and Alberta vda. de Hopon, for and in consideration of "their gratitude for the
various services, financial and personal" extended to them by Emilio Camon, released him from
"any and all claims that may have accrued pertaining to the two-fourth
Wala ako maintindihan (need to illustrate)
EREETA V. BEZORE (November 26, 1973)

FACTS:
Emilio Camon is a lessee of sugar plantation Hacienda Rosario. of the plantation is
owned by Petronila Alunan vda. De Santa Romana, Amparo Santa Romana and Alberta
vda. De Hapon while the other half is owned by the appellants Bezore et al. Camon died
and his widow Conception Ereeta filed a petition for the grant of the letters of
administration of the estate of his husband. Bezore at al. filed a claim against the estate
of Camon amounting to P64,165 for sugar allotments, palay, allowances and rental.
Agreement to sell - whereby Bezore et al. agreed to sell their share to Romana et al.
Release and waiver of claims Romana et al. released Camon from all the claims that
may have accrued pertaining to the 2/4 pro indiviso share in Hacienda Rosario.
Deed of Sale- Bezore transferred to Romana et al. all their rights, title, interest and
participation whether accrued or accruing in their 2/4 pro indiviso share in consideration
of P78,000.

ISSUE:
WON the appellants have the right to claim over the estate of Camon.

HELD:
Appellants dont have the right to claim over the estate of Camon because of the waiver
of claims made by Romana et al, who are the now owner of hacienda Rosario.
The claim of the appellants that the waiver is not valid because it was made before the
rights transferred were even sold to the Roman et al is of no merit. The waiver is
subsequently cured by the sale of the rights of the appellants to Romana et al.
The court also finds no merit to the contention of the appellants that the sale has infirmity
because of cheap consideration of 1,300 per hectare. Inadequacy of cause in a contract
does not of itself invalidate the contract.
9) Gongon vs CA (Tambobong estate)
Held: petitioner is declared to have the preferential right to purchase the said lot
Petitioner Gongon held a lot in Tambobong Estate but LTA ordered him to turned over the lot to
respondent Aquino.

Roman Catholic owned the land,leased it to Aquino, Sublet it to Gongon for

15 years (third party) and built his house

-In 1947, government bought the lot through CA 539. It would sell it to home owners/small farmrs
at a reasonable price

-Gongon filed an application to own land claiming as bona fide occupant.It was opposed by
Aquino (claiming as bona fide lessee)

-. Justice and equity command that petitioner be given the preferential right to purchase in order
to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.
-issue petitioner's position is that his preferential right could not be validly waived, such waiver
being against public policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or goad customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law."
-Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays dawn a public policy there can be no doubt. In the case
of Juat vs. Land Tenure Administration, G. R. No. L-17080, January 28, 1961 (Justice Angelo
Bautista)
, 'to provide the landless elements of our population with lots upon which to build their homes
and small farms which they can cultivate and from which they can derive their livelihood without
being beholden to any man'
, the LTA Board of Administrators found out that it would be more in keeping with the spirit and
intention of the laws (Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20 and 539 and Republic Act No. 1400)
governing acquisition and disposition of the landed estates (including the Tambobong Estate) if it
followed the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case ofMarukot, et al., v. Jacinto, et
al., (G. R. Nos. L-8036-38) promulgated on December 20, 1955, giving the actual occupants
or sublessees the preference to purchase the lots occupied by them as against tenants or
lessees who do not occupy the same

REPEAL OF Laws

10) Iloilo Palay vs Feliciano (keyword rice importation)

-Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the
President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice ..
recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series
of 1964.
- President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to
undertake the importation
- Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,PETITIONER, : importation is contrary to Republic
Act 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law
appropriating funds
- Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition.. They
anchor the validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207
- importation in question being undertaken there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such

gravity as to constitute a national emergency

petitioners counter-argued: the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its
Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any
other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
Court: our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands.
Section 2 of said Act wherein., it provides that should there be an existing or imminent
shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this
is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such
importation thru any government agency
contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is
untenable in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws (Repeal)
- Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a repealing clause (not express)
- presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding
implied repeals apply
, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to
different circumstances
- Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different
situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when
the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national
emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency. .. Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with
situations 1 and 2
Senate debate: RA 3452 applies only on normal times.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its
policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the
duty of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in
order to effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant to the prior existing law
- This attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with
regard to future importations. (House records)
11) Noblejas vs Teehankee (Comm of Land Registration acting as a judge)
Held: Petition denied. Commissioner could be investigated by Sec. of Justice
Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151.
-respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain
in writing ..why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans
covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles
-Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank,
privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he
could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts
of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to
the Supreme Court

-Exec Sec sent letter gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest",
petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the
above charges."
- issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes
heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance.
- that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,
specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the
President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme
Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land
Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
- would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these
officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere
implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove
administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly
placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
- the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No.
1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the
same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of
appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No.
103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown
that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for
Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and
unequivocal language.
- well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible,
a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are constrained to rule
that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance"
Article 8-Judicial Decisions of court interpreting law or constitution part of jurisprudence

12) People vs Jabinal (illegal possession of firearm)

Held: Defendant Jabinal is acquitted (committed in 1964)
-They want to revisited the doctrine laid in People vs Mapa
-1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint,
without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.
-Governor Leviste authorized him to have the revolver in order to perform his job (he was
commended)
-1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as
Confidential Agent and was issued a temporary gun license
- while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are

exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms;
People vs Mapa:
next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines],
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
13) People vs Licera (same illegal possession of firearms, 1968)
Held: Acquitted
-Licera was sentenced inot 5 years for illegal possession of firearms in Occ. Mindoro
- charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .
30
-One incident: two crimes
1) for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two offenses having arisen from
the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog
on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit
therefor.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his
appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas.
He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms.
Issue: The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be
applied to the case at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11,
1961" includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of
your duties."
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although
in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of
the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4

At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit
therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this
jurisdiction's legal system

Article 9: Courts duty to render judgement (no excuse for obscurity of the law)

14) Floresca vs PHILEX (PHILEX compensation case in a mining accident)

-The petitioners want higher compensation from PHILEX

In this case, the court didnt entertain the case

Held: Order of dismissal reversed by SC. Trial must resumed.

-petitioners were relatives of employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation who died in a
mining accident
-respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the
ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission.
- Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees,
irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's
negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section
4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the
compensation fixed in the Act.
-petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

PLAINTIFFS-

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.
Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say,
whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited
compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the
employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other
employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect
the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in
addition for damages in the regular courts.

Amicus Curiaes diverged in opinion.

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the
total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not
invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
-provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
-rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being
made as compensation and not as damages
- claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that
unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Whether claimants could pursue to civil actions:
Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
Note:
the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution,
Held: The former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
Art 10- Presumption that lawmaking body wants justice to prevail
15) Republic Flour Mills vs Comm of Customs (bran and pollard)
Held: CTA decision affirm. 1
Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of the
Philippines" found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code 1 as excluding bran (ipa) and
pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the
Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which is the flour produced

sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its construction of the Act, be liable for
wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they are not "products of the Philippines",
coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported from abroad, and being "merely parts
of the wheat grain milled by Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste."

, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage
dues "upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade
regardless of the non-use of government-owned or private wharves."

: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of
milling the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports
abroad

, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the
legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must be carried
out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should
not be at war with the end sought to be attained.
desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept
closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative
mandate.

Art 11 Customs contrary to law and public policy

16) In Matter Use of Firm Name Ozaeta (custom)

Atty Sycip and Atty Ozaeta praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away

same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964,
entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw

-

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception.

the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run
counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
o

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or
may not include the name of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the
firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.

-clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must
either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living
persons who can be subjected to liability
- Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment
to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the
fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the
recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent
service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "

MAIN Point:
Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association- that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name
of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a
practice is permissible by local custom
of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by
the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title. (what the law tries to avoid)
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as
a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom,
and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein.
Article 13-Computation of period
17) NAMARCO vs Tecson (prescription of 10 years)
Held: Petition denied. The revival of judgment prescribed.
Issue: Proper interpretation of word year (if calendar or 365 days)
- November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment,
Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May
25, 1960 u
- Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said
case. On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the
properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation

Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language
of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be
revived has become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment which was received by the defendants herein on
November 21, 1955 no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1
- This case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 but more than ten years have
passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were
both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.
Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are
referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the
"natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which
case "they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was
later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." 4

18) Garvida vs Sales (SK age limit)

Held: Garvida is not qualified to run
March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election
Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who was then
twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824
-. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court (MuTC) found petitioner qualified and
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
-Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent
Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan,
filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy
- Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK
chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte
Age:
- by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth
organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but
less than 18 years of age
In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the
maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to
"not more than 21 years of age

- A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member I
n the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of
an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21
years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21
years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an
elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election."
- The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law
speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each.
- phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years.
- question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means being
"legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the
lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52
Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK
Chairman.
Article 14-Generality of Law
19) SEAFDEC vs Acosta (illegal termination)
Held: proceedings continue, SEAFDEC immune
-Two labor cases--, were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases,
the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment
by the petitioner.
- It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying
diplomatic immunity. This, we have already held in Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992;
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction
of public respondent NLRC.

- private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune
from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however,
impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found

Art 15- Nationality Principle

20) Van Dorn vs Romillo (Filipina-foreigner divorce,conjugal property)

Held: Complaint dismissed

is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States;
that they were married in Hongkong in 1972
-1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
-Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property
- It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
hey are valid according to their national law. 6

Article 16-Lex situs/Successsion

21) Aznar vs Garcia (Davao testate succession/renvoi doctrine
Held: petition granted. Remanded to the court. Philippine succession law applied. Helen
Garcia could succeed
Decease Edward Christensen (American citizen) left a will bequeathing some property to
only daughter Maria Helen. Another child (acknowledged natural child) Helen Garcia
objected
The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as
it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the
estate in full ownership.
it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen
should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because
several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the
case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable

since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California. Domiciled in RP
- the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
-"'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing

- domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile
Renvoi
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar
- find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California,

22) Miciano vs Brimo (exclusion from will/Turkish will)

Held: Partition include petitioner
Main contention
denial of his participation in the inheritance;
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
- the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Will is presumed to be valid)
- article 792 of the civil Code
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
- deals with the exclusion of the last part of the second clause of the will, which says: (Appelant is
excluded)
The exclusion is void under Philippine Law?

23) Bellis vs Bellis (partition of land in Manila)

Held: Petition denied.Order of probate court affirmed. , the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

-Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate

children:
-wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children
- he had three illegitimate children
-1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines
People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will
- to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
- divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
- Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
- in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia
- In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his de
ath.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.

-(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
-, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to
be governed by the national law of the decedent.
Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now
Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern

24) Manila Gas Corp vs CIR (tax computation)

Held: Judgment of CIR affirmed
brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against the Collector of Internal Revenue for the
recovery of P56,757.37, which the plaintiff was required by the defendant to deduct and
withhold from the various sums paid it to foreign corporations as dividends and interest
on bonds and other indebtedness and which the plaintiff paid under protest
- income tax in the hands of its stockholders, because to impose the tax thereon
would be to impose a tax on the plaintiff

- income tax in the hands of its stockholders, because to impose the tax thereon
would be to impose a tax on the plaintiff
- that portion of Act No. 3761 which permits taxation of interest on bonds and other indebtedness
paid without the Philippine Islands, the question is if the income was derived from sources within
the Philippine Islands.
-approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within its jurisdiction without violating the
due process clause of the constitution. The taxing power of a state does not extend beyond its
territorial limits, but within such it may tax persons, property, income, or business. If an interest in
property is taxed, the situs of either the property or interest must be found within the state. If an
income is taxed, the recipient thereof must have a domicile within the state or the property or
business out of which the income issues must be situated within the state so that the income may
be said to have a situs therein. Personal property may be separated from its owner, and he may
be taxed on its account at the place where the property is although it is not the place of his own
domicile and even though he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes the tax
- The Manila Gas Corporation operates its business entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings,
therefore come from local sources.
Article 17-Forms and Solemnities of Contracts
25) Insular vs Franck (minor working in the Philippines)
the Defendant, through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two years with the Plaintiff in Chicago, by
which the Defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer
in the service of the said Plaintiff,
-11th day of February, 1904, the Defendant left the service of the Plaintiffand refused to
make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
- Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract
could not be enforced against him.
. The Plaintiff [Defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the
contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being
enforced.
Article 19-Exercise of duty
26) Albenson vs CA (bouncing check)
Held: Decision of CA reversed. Favor to petitioner.
Fact: Albenson delivered steel plates to Guaranteed Industries
Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a
single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". I
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check
which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00,
respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona,
its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L.

Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.

Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since
1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of
plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street,
that the defendants may have been dealing with

- Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.

elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
-Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand.
Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners
at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not
countenance this devious scheme

Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following
results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the
President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S.
Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against
whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao";
verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature
appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
- A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel
the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check
pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make
the action wrongful

- In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or
humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him

- Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in
good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria

Article 21-causes injury contrary to morals

27) Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA (Iranian)

Held: Petitioner is liable for damages
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis
of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

-1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married
- she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character..
- an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course
- latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would
get married

- a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
- He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in
his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
- lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision 5 favoring the private respondent
-that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of
loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at
the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality
- Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
- In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction
- The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121;
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

28) Wassmer vs Velez (failed wedding)

Held: Wassmer liable for P15,000 for moral damages and the cost of wedding
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

RETURNING

VERY

SOON

PAKING
This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
amicably were nil.
-defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our
ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new
Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
- But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

29) Constantino vs Mendoza (acknowledge illegitimate child)

Held: Mendoza not required to support the child
-1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and damages
against private respondent Ivan Mendez
-she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a
waitress
-, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita
that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and
November, 1974,
- that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is
a prosperous businessman of Davao City
Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of Noember, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974 by
August should be pregnant
- informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the
duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
-2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to

Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she
had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work
- Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory
that through Ivan's promise of marriage - Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of
marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed
after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their
sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
30) Pe vs Pe (Chinese,seduction,rosary)
Held: Reversed.Defendant must pay
- that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman,
being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his
marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
- Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a
married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
- Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of
Lolita's father.
-1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts
-1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. Clothes disappeared and a love letter was
found
-There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing
plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in
spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on
between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of
plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, (Trial Court dismissed complaint)she
just might have fell in love
-under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion
than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him
- no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to
the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

31) Meralco vs CA and Chaves(disconnection notice)

Held: Petition dismissed

- recovery of damages for embarassment, humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride,
caused to herein private respondents, by reason of the disconnection of their electrical
service
-CFI Manila ruled in favor of Chavezes
- Isaac Chaves became a customer of defendant MERALCO
-, he deposited the sum of P5.00 (Exh. "A") with defendant MERALCO on February 12,
1953
-, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs and presented two overdue
bills
-, Isaac Chaves went to the defendant's main office at San Marcelino, Manila, but paid
only the bill marked as Exhibit 'C" leaving the other bill Identified as Exhibit "C-l" unpaid.
-1965, MERALCO caused the electric service in plaintiff's residence to be
discontinued and the power line cut off1965, MERALCO caused the electric
service in plaintiff's residence to be discontinued and the power line cut off.
- there was no notice given to herein respondent.
-Petitioners also maintain that ' private respondents were in arrears in the payment of
their electricity bills when their electric service was connected, no moral damages may be
recovered by them under the 'clean hands' doctrine enunciated in Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric
Company
- MERALCO's right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer "is an
absolute one, subject only to the requirement that defendant MERALCO should give the
customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance." This requirement is embodied in
Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission
-. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of
the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar case, 4
- The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and
moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This is
reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
Article 23-Unjust enrichment
32) Obana vs CA (Palay, middleman)
Held: Obana must pay Sandoval
- SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill, engaged in the
buying and selling of palay.
- certain Chan Lin who offered to purchase from him 170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) at
the price of P37.26 per cavan (Chan Lin delivered it to Obana)
- driver tried to collect from petitioner, but the latter refused stating that he had purchase the

goods from Chan Lin at P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already been paid to
Chan Lin.
- it is evident that this is a simple case of swindling perpetuated by Chan Lin at the expense of the
plaintiff and the defendant. The act of Chan Lin in purchasing plaintiff's rice at the price of P 37.25
per cavan and thereafter offering the same goods to defendant at a much lower price is an
indication that it was never his intention to comply with his obligation to plaintiff.
- very least, Chan Lin had a rescissible title to the goods for the non-payment of the purchase
price, but which had not been rescinded at the time of the sale to petitioner.
- Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between them, had been
voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby divested of any claim to the rice.
-7 In law and in equity, therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value theref
since hewas not paid the price therefor.
33) Rep vs Lacap (DPWH, no license, unpaid contract)
Held: DPWH must pay Lacap for the services he provided
- The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid
Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and
Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified together with two other
contractors
- respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
- However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the
contractors license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the
contract.
- since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractors
License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is
void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the
contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate
administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor
-13 Despite such recommendation for payment, no payment was made to respondent.
-petitioner, contends that respondents recourse to judicial action was premature since
the proper remedy was to appeal the District Auditors disapproval of payment to the
COA, pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines
- his Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code provisions relating to human
relations. He submits that equity demands that he be paid for the work performed;
otherwise, the mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to human relations would be
rendered nugatory
- wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void
contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such
contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for
the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the
fine prescribed under the law.
, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode
debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury
Article 26-Dignity, privacy and peace of mind
34) RCPI vs Verchez (delayed mail)
Held: RCPI is liable

1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital
due to an ailment.
- her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch
of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)
- a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) urging her to send money
for mother
-telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991. 4 On
inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it
-RCPI: , delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances
which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the
transmission process
- April 17, 1992, Editha died
- telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it partakes of the nature of a
contract of adhesion
- the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to the addressee is of an urgent nature.
Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the
negligence of its employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time making it
liable for damages under Article 2176.
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
- culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify,prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
- When the effect is found to be partly the result of a persons participation whether by
active intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
- RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the presence of the
following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly,
proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages
sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. 34
- failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of appellees on time, disturbed
their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for failing to respond swiftly to an
emergency that involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes. 35
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. (Emphasis
supplied)
-." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts
mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when
courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 27-Public official duty

35) Ledesma vs CA (officials not letting student graduate with honors)

Held: President of school (West Visayas College is liable)
- organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West
Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer
- Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school
- the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and
regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her
that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a
candidate for any award or citation from the school.
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
- However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her
capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of the Student
partnership Club. Resolution No. 2
-Office (school) considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the questioned order
stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this school or
any organization in this school
-1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case

- he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish
Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director
informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy
thereof.. He didnt give Ms. Delmo a copy
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice. When
his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of
Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss
Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo.
ISSUE:
sole question of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the
rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying
the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his
personal capacity.

Article 29- Institution of an independent civil action

36) Sarmiento vs CA (illegitimate child/presumption of marriage/land partition)

Held: Affirm CA.No judicial partition. Petitioners mother is illegitimate

- Virginia P. Sarmiento and Apolonia P. Catibayan, the petitioners herein, filed a complaint
for partition of a piece of land in Naic, Cavite
- Petitioners are sisters, their parents being Tiburcio Pangilinan and Leogarda Arguelles
- Leogarda was the daughter of Francisco Arguelles who died on February 18, 1949 and
Emilia Pineli, who died on May 2, 1950. Private respondent Simon Arguelles is a half brother
of Leogarda, with Francisco Arguelles as their common father.
-according to private respondent, petitioners are not the legal heirs of Francisco Arguelles
because their(petitioners) mother, Leogarda Arguelles, was allegedly an illegitimate child of his
father, Francisco Arguelles, and Emilia Pineli who were not married. Under the old Civil Code
an illegitimate child did not have successional rights.
- the petitioners presented Section 3 (aa) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court or the
presumption of marriage (DISPUTABLE)
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husbands and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
However the said presumption were rebutted by the the death certificate of Francisco
Arguelles contained the word none opposite the phrase surviving spouse, indicating
that he died a widower on February 18, 1949. His deceased wife was Petrona Reyes,
the mother of private respondent.[17]
THE PRESUMPTION THEREFORE WAS OVERCOME.
Article 33- civil action for damages for defamation, fraud, and physical injuries
37) Esguerra vs CA wrong case

Article 36- Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution
38) Landicho vs Relova (bigamy/annulment of marriage)
Held: No, there is no prejudicial question.
Issue: whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the
instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party
complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a
prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him
- On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy
-petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not
been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia Elvira was the one filing
- March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas,
likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her

marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly
bigamous character.--> second wife was a judge (she was forced by the petitioner)
- On June 15, 1963, , praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation,
she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the
Peace of Makati, Rizal. he wants his first marriage annulled because of it was taken
with force and intimidation

- mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said
civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy."
-

Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore
defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question we further said must be determinative
of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another
court.
- the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was
the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant
in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage
with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was
correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

39) Zapanta vs Mendoza (bigamy)

Held: writ granted. It is a prejudicial question
Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil
Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
- by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by
respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(Criminal Case No. 3405),
-, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against
respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress,
force and intimidation. wanted out of the marriage
- September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to

suspend proceedings therein prejudicial question

- prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial
question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra).
-, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy

40) Jimenez vs Averia

Held: there is a no prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned
heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must be first resolved before the
proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed.
- Criminal Case No. TM-235 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite respondents Ofelia V.
Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were charged with estafa
- having received from Manuel Jimenez the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase
for him a fishing boat known as "Basnig", with the obligation on their part to return the
money on January, 30, 1963
-accused filed Civil Case No. 6636 against Jimenez in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon contesting the validity of a certain receipt signed by them on October 26, 1962
(Annex "A" of the present petition) wherein they acknowledged having received from him
the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories,
and the further sum of P240.00 as agent's commission
- alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged
with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment
they sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be
established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they had actually
received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and
that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to
return it
to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be tenable had they
been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action.
Article 40- Birth determines personality (for natural persons)

41) Quiminguing vs Icao (34 SCRA 132-1970)- married man seducing a girl/aborted?
Result: Order of lower court reversed and remanded.

Issue: Could the plaintiff Carmen Quiminguing sue Felix Icao, the father of her conceived
son under Article 40?
Held: Yes.
Facts:
-the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
- complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial
judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Ratio:
-. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines
-The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as
yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code
- a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

42) Geluz vs CA (2 SCRA 510-1961) Abortion (3 times)

Held:
Issue: whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from physician who caused the same.
Facts:
-Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
(Oscar Lazo) before they were legally married. she had herself aborted by the defendant.
- After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed
in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953
-. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sisters- . Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the
province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election
- third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages.

-). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
- prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child
Obiter?
-trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages,
evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections
-. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim

Article 43- Succession of rights (presumption)

43) Joaquin vs Navarro (1953)- succession of deaths
Result:
Issue: main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the
deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the
massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945.
- The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of
Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin
and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
- In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely
to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must
be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of
age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
- Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who
would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must
prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at
the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.
- We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward
on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son.

Article 46-Juridical Person could acquire property

44)

Cease vs CA (92SCRA493) Corporation/Estate

Result: Petition denied. Properties divided among the heirs

Issue: THAT SUBJECT PROPERTIES, FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS AS ACTUALLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER CORPORATION
AND/OR ITS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION
COMPANY, DURING ALL THE 50 YEARS OF ITS CORPORATE EXISTENCE "ARE ALSO
PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE OF FOREST L. CEASE."
Held: No

Facts:
-June 1908, one Forrest L. Cease common predecessor in interest of the parties together
with five (5) other American citizens organized the Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Company
-in the course of its corporate existence the company acquired various properties but at
the same time all the other original incorporators were bought out by Forrest L. Cease together
with his children
-; the charter of the company lapsed in June 1958; but whether there were steps to liquidate it,
the record is silent; on 13 August 1959, Forrest L. Cease died and by extrajudicial partition of his
shares, among the children, this was disposed of on 19 October 1959
- here where the trouble among them came to arise because it would appear that Benjamin and
Florence wanted an actual division while the other children wanted reincorporation
- children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and aforementioned other stockholder Bonifacia Tirante
proceeded to incorporate themselves into the F.L. Cease Plantation Company and registered it
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 9 December, 1959
-on 21 May, 1961 apparently on the eve of the expiry of the three (3) year period provided by the
law for the liquidation of corporations, the board of liquidators of Tiaong Milling executed an
assignment and conveyance of properties and trust agreement in favor of F.L. Cease Plantation
Co. Inc. as trustee of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co
Decision of the lower court-in favor of the defendants
-The assets or properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company now appearing
under the name of F.L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is the estate also of the deceased
Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided, share and share alike, among his six children the plaintiffs
and the defendants in accordance with Rule 69, Rules of Court
- That F.L. Cease Plantation Company is removed as 'Trustee for interest against the estate and
essential to the protection of plaintiffs' rights and is hereby ordered to deliver and convey all the
properties and assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling
Ratio:

-, petitioners argue that no evidence has been found to support the conclusion that the registered
properties of Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest L. Cease; that on the
contrary, said properties are registered under Act No. 496 in the name of Tiaong Milling as lawful
owner and possessor for the last 50 years of its corporate existence.
THE COURT DIDNT AGREE
- the trial court did aptly apply the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the legal
fiction of distinct and separate corporate personality and regarding the corporation and the
individual member one and the same. In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge
narrated the undisputed factual premise, thus:
- The Board of Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which Forrest
L. Cease always retained the majority stocks and hence the control and management of its affairs
- noteworthy to observe that as his children increase or perhaps become of age, he
continued distributing his shares among them adding Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the
time of his death only 190 were left to his name. Definitely, only the members of his family
benefited from the Corporation.
- of the corporation and therefore its operation, as well as that of the family appears to be
indistinguishable and apparently joined together. As admitted by the defendants (Manifestation of
Compliance with Order of March 7, 1963 [Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never' had any account
with any banking institution or if any account was carried in a bank on its behalf, it was in the
name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease.
- the rule known as the doctrine of disregarding or piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Generally, a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of
the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related .
By virtue of this attribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or
liabilities of its stockholders or those of the legal entities to which it may be connected, and vice
versa. This separate and distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by law for
convenience and to promote the ends of justice (Laguna Transportation Company vs. Social
Security System, L-14606, April 28, 1960;
- Their participation as nominal shareholders emanated solely from Forrest L. Cease's gratuitous
dole out of his own shares to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.

Article 48-Domicile
45)
Romualdez vs COMELEC (248SCRA 300) 1995 Election Case of Imelda(define
domicile)
Result: Imelda Marcos proclaimed winner as she is a resident in Leyte
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District
of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. Held: Yes.
Facts:
- Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte
- RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.

-On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency
- March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte denied the said amendment
- petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head
Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995 petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood".. "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
- In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban,
226 SCRA 408)
COMELEC 2nd Division ruling:
-. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one
acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent
chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as
her place of domicile.

Ratio:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home",
"a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently
- The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain,
it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence
- Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of

returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place
of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.

-. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile
- deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in
election law, it actually means only "domicile"
- In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in
election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
Imelda Marcos statement
- April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila."
-. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of
the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

-that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte
Reasoning:
- First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
- Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
- In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should

be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted,
effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

- Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
-. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
- The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is
that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Family Code of the Philippines

Requisites of Marriage and Marriage Exempt from Marraiage License (Art 1-34)
1) Star Paper Corp vs Simbol 487SCRA228 (2006)- illegal dismissal, spouses in company
Issue: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution.. or is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Held: Yes especially Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution and American jurisprudence
"The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."
Star Paper Corp was ordered to reinstate respondents and pay their backwages.
Facts: respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E.
Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company.[1] They were fired because they
violated company policy namely:
1.
New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up
to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2.
In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female)
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.[3]
-Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an
employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco

advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to
a company policy promulgated in 1995.
-Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee,
whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company
policy
-Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker.
Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man (MISREPRESENTED), got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign
on December 21, 1999
-Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation
pay and attorneys fees..
-Labor Arbiter (dismiss because company has prerogative) but CA reversed
that:

On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding

1.
X X X THE SUBJECT 1995 POLICY/REGULATION IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TOWARDS MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF EMPLOYEES AND
OF ARTICLE 136 OF THE LABOR CODE; AND
-. We note that two types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses
from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all
immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism
employment policies).[18]
Discussion of Marital Discrimination:
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital discrimination,
[19] there are twenty state statutes[20]in the United States prohibiting marital discrimination.
-utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate
impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy
is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of aparticular
sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory.
-disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a
disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, although most employment policies do
not expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy
often disproportionately affects one sex.[23]
The courts narrowly[25] interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as married,
single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would
have either chosen different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is
if one is married rather than to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination
to include only whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the identity,
occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse. These courts have upheld the
questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of
their respective state statutes.

The courts that have broadly[26] construed the term marital status rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down the nospouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They
reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital status provision because it
arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees without regard to the actual
effect on the individual's qualifications or work performance
courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present
any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the
same workplace might adversely affect the business.[28] They hold that the absence of such a
bona fide occupational qualification[29] invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due
to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office.[30]
. We employ the standard ofreasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona
fide occupational qualification requirement.
In the recent case of Duncan Association of
Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[34] we passed on the
validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company.
Held: do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. ..If we uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
Relevant article: Article 1. ...inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
2) PT and T vs NLRC-misrepresent civil status, contract vs marriage,reliever
Issue: WON PT&T company policy of prohibiting women employee from getting married
valid.
Held: No. Contrary to Art 136, Labor Code
petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company invokes the alleged concealment of
civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an
employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues
..PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment,
which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was
discriminated ...being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
-Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever,
-1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee,..In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she
indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3]
-private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly
learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private

respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In
that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married
women for employment.[4]
-Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992,[6] which she
readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
-Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of employee
-The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions.
-Section 14, Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes
the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
-Section 14 of Article XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working women through
provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
Act No. 6727[12] which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms
and conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities;
Republic Act No. 6955[13] which bans the mail-order-bride practice
Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code,[18] womens rights in the
field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
Held:
the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of
the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
-In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. SIMULATED
The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work x x x.
.[41] In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner

PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.
3) Manuel vs People-bigamy/legal capacity
ISSUE: WON Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Indispensible in order to contract a
second marriage.
Held: Yes. State's interest
-. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law.[20]
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance.
Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,
safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing
essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every
aspect of life and death.
4) Zulueta vs CA-Medical Malpractice, getting docu from husbands safe
Issue: WON The documents by Cecilia Zulueta, obtained without the respondents consent,
admissible as evidence in court for case for legal separation.
Held: No. Constitution provision
-Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours
-The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and

for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
-Court held that the documents are inadmissible as evidence
-petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case)
were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr.,
did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct.
-case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence,
Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
-The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is
a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.5
-A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
-The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6
Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and
void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the
three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional
cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
5)SSS vs Jarque-3 marriages/presumptive death, SSS
Issue: WON a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary
Held: Yes in case of 1st marriage since Civil Code is necessary
Facts:
-April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. [6]
-1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition [7] to
declare Alice presumptively dead.., 1970, [8] the CFI granted the petition
-1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon
-, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree
pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. [11] Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral
benefits, and was granted P12,000 [12] by the SSS.

-Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona
(Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits.
She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second
with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive;
-Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February
13, 1999 [15] averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as
husband and wife as early as 1958..Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of
Aliz P. Diaz, filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death, [17]
he further attesting in a sworn statement [18] that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral
expenses
-1999, [23] the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was
void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still subsisting;
--> Alice or Alicia is still alive
-2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was
just a common-law-wife.
-It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding..as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spousebeneficiary of Bailon.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,[48] it is terminated by final
judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary.
Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
6) People vs De Lara-forcible abduction with rape, rapist forcing to marry her
==> the alleged marriage is missing because there is no consent
Issue:
Held:

Facts:
-May 13, 1993, at around 8 p.m. in Sitio Buli, Barangay Cabra, Lubang, Occidental Mindoro, while
Rosabella and her mother Gloria de Lemos were on their way to attend a procession (locally
known as the libutan), they were stopped by Rosabellas uncle, Magno Tamares
-On the other hand, Eduardo Eming Villas held the victims left arm, while Rolando de Lara held
her right arm. Rosabella said she was able to identify her abductors because the latters
flashlights were on.[3] She knew Rolando because she and Rolando had been special friends
(sweethearts) for a year when the latter was still working in Saudi Arabia. They had since
broken off, however
-Rosabella testified that she was raped by Rolando de Lara as Eming and Carlito Villas watched.
She was threatened with death if she did not submit to his will.
-Rosabella was brought by Rolando de Lara, Carlito and Eming Villas to the house of Reynaldo
Tarcena in Barangay Libis, Cabra, about two (2) kilometers from the place where she was raped.
[6]..In Kagawad Tarcenas house, Magno Tamares threatened to kill Rosabella and her family if
she did not marry Rolando de Lara. When Rosabellas parents arrived that morning with some
policemen and Rosabella was asked by Pat. Isagani Yuson if she was willing to marry Rolando
de Lara, she responded yes. But Rosabella said she did so only because Magno Tamares was
threatening her, and he was then present when she was asked the question by Pat. Yuson.[12]
Defense:
Rolando de Lara claims that he and Rosabella were sweethearts and that they were eloping on
May 13, 1993 when they were found in the house of Kagawad Araceli Tarcena. Several
circumstances negate this claim.
when the parents of Rosabella allegedly agreed to the proposition that Rolando and Rosabella
will be married, Rosabella refused to marry the accused and, instead, opted to file charges
against him thereby subjecting herself and her entire family to public ridicule and the difficult
consequences of such action?
As this Court held, [a] sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a
man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worst, employ violence upon her on
the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.[27]
7) De Loria vs Felix-articulo mortis, world war 2
Issue: central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz
and Felipe Apelan Felix. WON The failure of the parties to sign a marriage contract and the
subsequent failure of priest to send it invalidated the marriage?
Held: No.Marriage is valid but Felix has the right to the estate.
Facts:
-during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera
Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation
of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill.

-They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning
that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both
parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed.(1945)
-After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in
January 1946, she was interred in Pasay
-1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an
accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. grandchildren of Adriana de la
Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan
Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in
the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the
complaint.
-legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended ..no
question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. ..no question that the
parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest,
as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.
-In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
-No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite not the
formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing;
the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
-. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during
the liberation of Manila and its environs.
. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving
spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.) --> Collateral
8) Silverio vs Republic-Sex Change, change of sex in Birth Certificate
Oh, Corona.
Issue: a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.
Held: No.
Facts:
-November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8

-April 4, 1962. His name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his certificate of
live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as male.
-he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.[1]
-on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand
-sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and
his sex from male to female.
-He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
-June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision[4] in favor of petitioner.
-OSG..6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration
-The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12]
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
..except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
-RA 9048 now governs the change of first name...The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3)

The change will avoid confusion.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048

Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a

minor; and (16) changes of name.

Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership
, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include
such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession
-But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Focus on this:
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.[37] One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.[38] To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations
9) Republic vs Cagandahan-change of gender, approve, CAH
Issue:WON Trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Held: No.
Facts:
-December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
-was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics.
-. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person.
-The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
-respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that

this condition is very rare

-The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005
-The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
-The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
-Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048[17] in so far asclerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
-Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start
to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty.
-Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose
not to do so.
10) Bologbog vs CA- brother thought to be single married
Issue: WON Gavino Balogbog married Catalina Ubas despite lack of marriage certificate or
is marriage certificate essential to prove marriage.
Held: No. It is not essential.
Facts:
-Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother,
Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
-In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino
by Catalina Ubas
Testimonies:

-Priscilo Y. Trazo,[2] then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934,
who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their
first child
said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father
Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of
the witnesses
-was Matias Pogoy,[3] a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private
respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino
and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu
-Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.[4] She testified that after the
wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but
it was burned during the war.
-June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private
respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the
finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the
estate of Basilio and Genoveva,
Ratio:
Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove
the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
[15] the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.[16] Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in
infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents herein, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate
children of Gavino.
-An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the
witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment.
-The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
-Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor
of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban,
Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by
Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified that the
complainant in that administrative case is his nephew.
11) Eugenio vs Velez- corpse burial fight, cult, common law
Issues: 1) WON Eugenio Velez and Vitaliana Vargas are common law marriage
2) WON Eugenio Velez has legal capacity to marry

Held: 1) No
2) No
Facts:
-. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.19
-Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September
1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental ..alleging that Vitaliana
was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in
his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
-Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner
Tomas Eugenio (who was MARRIED).
-Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings
palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered
religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
-. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
-The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since
there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally
married to another woman. 11
12) Cosca vs Palaypon-falsification of marriage, no license
Issue: WON The acts of Judge Palaypayon are irregularity in the marriage.
Held: Yes.
Facts:
-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents
(Palaypon) were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases;
-Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz (6).:
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and

Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte
-their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage
license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
-Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of
the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he
was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she
discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo
-Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin
falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement;
-With respect to the mar
riage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their
marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was
not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he
and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before
they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen
(13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe.
-Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it
was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a
false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
-The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a
marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate,
is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of
the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however,
received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64
Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his
personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family
Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
-The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The
Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his
court personnel."

-The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage
contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their
marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage
license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying
(with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
-On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the
formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
13) Navarro vs Domagtoy-judge marrying outside jurisdiction,
Issue: WON Judge marrying persons outside jurisdiction constitutes absence of essential
requisites of marriage, which would invalidate the marriage.
Held: No. It is only an irregularity which will invalidate the marriage
Facts:
-the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro..submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
-September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
-wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which
does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
-a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on
the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the
second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be
solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that
Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
-Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony.
-Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
-. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
-The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7.
(1)

Marriage may be solemnized by:

Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction

-judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction.
As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in
a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was
made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
-Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage
-Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
14) Dysico vs Dacumos- collection of wedding fee/attend marriage reception
Issue: WON Solemnizing officer such as judge is justified to collect "wedding fee" even if
the contracting parties have paid the necessary fees.
Held: No.
Facts/Ratio:
-The acceptance of fees for solemnizing marriages, even if given voluntarily, is reprehensible. By

such act respondent judge cheapened his noble office, as well as the entire judiciary, in the eyes
of the public. --> Ratio
-complainant Teresita Dysico charged respondent Judge Eugenio Dacumos of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 1 with (1) delay in hearing and resolving Criminal Case
No. 20012 for grave coercion, where said complainant was the offended party; (2) grave
misconduct; (3) partiality; and (4) inefficiency in managing his court personnel.
-for grave coercion against her former employer, Benito Gapuz Te and the latter's counsel, Atty.
Roman Villalon, Jr. for forcing her to sign a resignation letter and an affidavit containing an
admission that she was a dishonest employee of the Te-owned Asian Lumber and Construction
-Complainant in her reply[3] insisted on her previous allegations and added that respondent judge
received money from wedding sponsors thru his employees who passed around a brown
envelope among said sponsors and asked them to contribute "for the judge", in spite of the legal
fees having already been fully paid.
-employee of the respondent passed an envelope among sponsors whispering that the
amount was for the judge. It is further charged that the respondent and his personnel attended
wedding feasts after the solemnization of marriage ceremonies. Attendance at wedding feasts is
not denied, hence is deemed admitted. Respondent denies making collections from sponsors,
but adds that 'Fee if any, is purely voluntary' thereby implying that cash offers voluntarily
tendered, are accepted on said occasions. --> defense
15) Vda de Chua vs CA- guardinship
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
-During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely,
Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City
-, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a Petition 1
FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331 and RUDYARD
PRIDE ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Respondent claims:
-deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or ascendants,
hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua,
his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Article 988
of the Civil Code of the Philippines).

Vda de Chua (petitioner and wife):

-21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving
spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss
-Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful
wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1"
was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner.
the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo as guardian over the persons
and properties of the two minor children. 9
CA affirmed--> denying petitioner
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are: (1) the
death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is
located; and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign
country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting. 19
-Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof
of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage
certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together
with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order
that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents
cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the
judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
16) Rivera vs IAC- two person, legitimate child
Issue: WON Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there
two?
WON Jose Rivera is the legitimate child of the deceased Venancio Rivea
Held: one
NO
Facts/Ratio:
May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On
July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as
SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son
of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in
fact left two holographic wills. 1
-his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show that the said

person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose
Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where
the couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who
testified that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together
several times. 5
-We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he
explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the
war. Even so, he could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years..7 children
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of
the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, ... .
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.
-although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described therein as
the son of Florencio Rivera..Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one and the same person,
arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called by different names. The Court is not
convinced. There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio.
What is more likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the same
name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.
-. There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is more
likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the same name, even in the
same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son
of Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive.
-And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's
legitimate wife if indeed she was she should have objected when her husband
abandoned her and founded another family by another woman, and in the same town at that
17) Republic vs Obercido- Filipino who is naturalized obtained divorce
WON Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her
to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Held: Yes
Facts/Ratio:

-, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
-1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
-2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
-petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
-Background:
. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
-Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to
be validly divorced here and can re-marry...propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
-according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
-Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The
Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Court held:
we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner; and
2.
remarry.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to

-reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry
-However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
18) Bayot vs CA- Dominican Republic divorce
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
-petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the
Court of Appeals (CA) :
-in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial courts grant of support
pendente lite to Rebecca.
-Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then
26 years old, to be an American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA
-1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship seemed to have soured as the
latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in theDominican Republic
-, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8]ordering the dissolution of the
couples marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but
giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would
issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the couples property relations pursuant to an
Agreement
-Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26,
1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage.. Rebecca, however, later
moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the motion to withdraw the petition.
-2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity...
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

-RTC granted support, CA affirmed but didn't appreciate the declaration of nullity
proceedings
-SC held:-bereft of merit on divorce
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a r.divorce obtained abroad by
an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigne[31] Second, the reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured
by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]
-Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American
citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The
following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli ; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of
an American passport.[33]
-Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate
No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport.
-acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then
Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition.
-Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured theFebruary 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
-after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question.
Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only
documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage
Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B).
-. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
-the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony
19) Llorente vs CA- US Navy man
Issue: WON the divorce decree obtain by Llorente capacitated him to marry Alica.
Held: Yes. He is already an American citizen.
Fact:
-Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927
to September 30, 1957.[3]

-1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
-1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited
the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in .. his
brother, Ceferino Llorente
-, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement: withdrawal of support, non-prosecution, conjugal
property
-Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce ..4, 1952, the
divorce decree became final
-1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the
first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.[14] 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife..three
children
-13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and
their three children
-RTC--> in favor of Paula (FUCK OFF COURT!!)
-SC Held:
the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
-Article 15 and 16 (national law principle) applied
-Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
-Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
20) Republic vs Iyoy- Filipina who leaved her husband and married abroad, Psych Incap
Issues: WON Fely Iyoy's divorce decree is valid
WON Marriage between Crasus and Fely Iyoy could be declared null and void due
to psychological incapacity
Held: Yes

No
Facts:
-Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City .. in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, declared marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
-respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages.
-respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children..respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request
-For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as
Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely
left and abandoned respondent Crasus,
-Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor
to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity
-Fely's defense:
Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she
was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their
family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
-SC Held:
-The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
-Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a)
Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b)
Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c)
Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.[22]
Rep vs Molina- Totality of circumstances
-Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case
at bar. :(
- the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
-intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing collusion between the parties,
21) Republic vs Dayot- landlady tricked his boarder into marriage
Issue: WON resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa.
Held:
Facts:
1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. --> Common law spouses
-1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian
-his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties ..his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
-, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house in 1986, the latter being his landlady..They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.
He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship..., he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa
-Felisa defense: they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage..Felisa
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990.
-the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed.
- The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is

the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official
has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]
-Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]
-indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage..
-Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity,
for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to
by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
-. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56]
-COMMON LAW MARRIAGE[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.[58]
22) De Castro vs Assidao-De Castro- sweetheart married, license expired, false affidavit
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
in September 1994.
-couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an
affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
-1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and
from her private practice.
-the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he

and respondent never lived together as husband and wife.

-, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters
-ISSUES of the case:
. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter
of petitioner.
-. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
-, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination
-aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license -> common law
- there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The
false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
-not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.