GCPS 2014 __________________________________________________________________________

Driving Consistency in the Estimation of Severity

Levels in PHA Studies
Marc Guindon
Suncor Energy
1900 River Road, Sarnia, ON, Canada
mguindon@suncor.com
Christopher Wells, Suncor Energy
Rich Piette, Suncor Energy
Greg Knight, ABS Consulting
Gary Fitzgerald, ABS Consulting

Prepared for Presentation at

American Institute of Chemical Engineers
2014 Spring Meeting
10th Global Congress on Process Safety
New Orleans, LA
March 30 April 2, 2014

UNPUBLISHED

AIChE shall not be responsible for statements or opinions contained

in papers or printed in its publications

GCPS 2014
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Driving Consistency in the Estimation of Severity Levels

in PHA Studies
Marc Guindon
Suncor Energy
1900 River Road, Sarnia, ON, N7T 7J3, Canada
mguindon@suncor.com
Chris Wells, Suncor Energy
Rich Piette, Suncor Energy
Greg Knight, ABS Consulting
Gary Fitzgerald, ABS Consulting
Keywords: PHA, Estimation, Severity, Likelihood, Consistency, Releases

Abstract
During the course of PHA studies, team members are required to categorize the severity
level for releases of hazardous materials associated with various cause/consequence
pairings. Typically the assessment of severity level is performed in a qualitative
fashion such that there is a potential that the team may either overstate or understate the
impact of a release which will result in inaccuracies in the risk assessment. This may be
due to differing perceptions or experience levels of PHA study teams.
In the absence of detailed consequence analysis modeling for a given release scenario,
PHA study teams may utilize a table similar to the one provided in Table 3.1 Example
Consequence Categorization contained in the CCPS concept book Layers of Protection
Analysis. Alternatively tools such the Dow F&EI or CEI tools can be utilized to
estimate the severity level. However all of these tools have limitations in their ability to
properly assess severity levels for operating units with differing levels of process
congestion or population density, etc which may result in unconservative
categorizations of severity levels.
This paper outlines a methodology and associated tool developed to estimate the severity
level for flash fire, vapour cloud explosion, jet fire, pool fire, and toxic exposure
consequences for various hazardous materials.
Using some basic Process Safety Information associated with the release scenario and the
process unit under study, the PHA study team can use the tool to obtain the severity
category as well as the associated inherent risk (prior to the application of safeguards) for
a given release. The study team can then proceed with the application of safeguards to
determine the residual risk (following the application of safeguards) associated with the
scenario.

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1. Introduction
When analyzing cause/consequences pairings as part of a What-if, HAZOP, or other
hazard analysis technique, PHA study teams are required to assign severity levels for
release scenarios. The determination of the severity level is a key input in the assessment
of overall risk level, and may help guide the PHA study teams in determining whether or
not additional safeguards should be recommended.
However assigning the severity level can at times be a difficult task. As an example if
the team has determined that a scenario can result in a release of 80F gasoline in a tank
farm area through a inch equivalent hole at 50 psi, the team may have to decide if the
health & safety severity level is a fatality, permanent disability, temporary, disability,
medical aid, etc Without proper information or experience some teams make take a
conservative approach and may select a fatality as the category. On the other hand a
team may look at experiences within the facility or the company and conclude that a
medical aid is the category.
It quickly becomes apparent that PHA study teams studying the same issue at different
facilities often have very different views of the risk level associated with a given release
scenario. In order to assist PHA study teams in analyzing scenarios in a consistent
fashion, a tool has been developed focusing on the health & safety impacts associated
with releases that can result in fires, explosions, or toxic exposures.

2. Scenario Selection
The PHA Assessment Tool is a precompiled database of chemical release scenarios and
their resulting explosion, fire and toxic hazards. Since the tool is a prototype, only 11
chemicals were modeled and are shown in Table 1. Multiple pressure, temperature and
hole sizes were modeled for each chemical. Pressure and temperature ranges were
chosen based on the chemical and its use within the manufacturing locations within the
company. All chemicals were modeled with hole sizes of 6 mm (0.25 inch), 13 mm (0.5
inch), 25 mm (1 inch) and 51 mm (2 inches). The combination of chemicals and process
conditions were obtained by surveying different business areas across the organization to
determine which combinations would be of most value.

3. Methodology
In order to understand the magnitude of hazardous contours for releases resulting in fire,
explosion or toxic releases, dispersion and fire modeling for each of the release scenarios
were performed by using PHAST software. Parameters illustrated in Table 2 were
selected as inputs. Fire modeling was performed using the cone model.

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Chemical specific explosion and toxic properties are shown in Table 3. The auto ignition
temperature was compared with the discharge expanded temperature to determine if a
delayed ignition explosion was possible. Reactivity and explosion energy are as defined
by the Baker Strehlow Tang (BST) vapour cloud explosion model. AEGL-3
concentrations are provided at 10 minutes and 60 minutes reference times. The toxic
Probit values N, A and B are used in vulnerability the calculations associated with toxic
releases.
Table 1 Chemicals Included in the PHA Assessment Tool
Chemical

Temperature Range (C)

Pressure Range (kPa)

Hydrogen
Propane (C 3 )
Butane (C 4 )
Hexane (C 6 )
Octane (C 8 )
Decane (C 10 )
Icosane (C 20 )
Hydrogen Sulfide (H 2 S)
Sour Water (2% H 2 S)
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF)
Natural Gas / Fuel Gas (90% C 2 , 10%
C1)

27 345
0 260
0 260
0 260
0 500
27 425
66 425
0 149
27 149
0 149
0 66

1034 - 16000
345 - 4826
345 - 4826
345 - 4826
345 - 1724
345 - 16000
345 - 3447
345 - 1724
345 - 1724
345 - 1724
345 - 4826

4. Vulnerability Determination
Once dispersion modeling information for selected scenarios has been obtained, the next
step in the process is to determine the vulnerability associated to individuals who may be
impacted by the release. In the case of flash fires and vapor cloud explosions, it is
assumed that individuals will not be able to attempt an escape due to the relatively short
duration of these events. Since jet fires, pool fires and toxic releases are longer duration
events, individuals may be able to attempt to escape from the hazard. A retreating speed
of 1.5 m/s will be assumed.
Unlike buildings impacted by process events which are fixed objects where occupant
vulnerability can be easily determined, individuals outside buildings in the process unit
could be at any location when the hazardous event occurs, and therefore their
vulnerability will differ based on their location. Therefore this methodology will
calculate an average vulnerability within the hazardous process unit, and will assume that
individuals are evenly distributed throughout the process unit.

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Table 1 Dispersion Modeling Weather Conditions and Release Parameters

Weather Conditions
2.2 m/s wind speed
E stability
27 C ambient temperature
50% relative humidity
0 kW/m2 solar flux
1 m surface roughness
27 C surface temperature

Release Parameters
1 meter release elevation
Horizontal, non-impinging
No bund
Infinite leak inventory

Table 2 Chemical Properties

Chemical Auto
Ignition
Temp, C

BST
Explosion AEGL
Reactivity Energy
at 10
in-lbf/ft3
min.
(ppm)

AEGL
at 60
min.
(ppm)

Toxic
N

Toxic
A

Toxic
B

Hydrogen
Propane
(C 3 )
Butane
(C 4 )
Hexane
(C 6 )
Octane
(C 8 )
Decane
(C 10 )
Icosane
(C 20 )
Hydrogen
Sulfide
(H 2 S)
Sour
Water
(2% H 2 S)
Hydrogen
Fluoride
(HF)
Natural
Gas / Fuel
Gas (90%
C 2 , 10%
C1)

574
450

High
Medium

732924
842952

None
None

None
None

None
None

None
None

None
None

288

Medium

852291

None

None

None

None

None

225

Medium

854453

None

None

None

None

None

220

Medium

859190

None

None

None

None

None

210

Medium

862262

None

None

None

None

None

202

Medium

868345

None

None

None

None

None

260

High

651907

76

50

4.55

-8.53

0.44

Not
Flammable

None

76

50

4.55

-8.53

0.44

Not
Flammable

None

170

44

1.5

-8.62

504

Medium

788988

None

None

None

None

None

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4.1 Average Vulnerability Determination for Flash Fires

When the release of a flammable gas occurs, the area inside the LFL contour and the area
between the LFL and the LFL contours are compared with the total unit area to
determine the average occupant vulnerability. Occupants inside the LFL contours are
assumed to have a vulnerability of 1 (100% fatality). Occupants between the LFL and
LFL contours are assumed to have a vulnerability of 0.5 (50% fatality). The vulnerability
of individuals outside the LFL contour is expected to be zero. Therefore the average
vulnerability for individuals inside a process unit impacted by a flash fire can be
calculated as follows:
V AVG = [A LFL + 0.5 (A HLFL A LFL )] A TOT

[Eq. 1]

Where:
V AVG = Average occupant vulnerability within the process unit
A LFL = Area within the LFL contour
A HLFL = Area inside the LFL contour
A TOT = Total area of the process unit

4.2 Average Vulnerability Determination for Vapour Cloud Explosions

Explosion calculations start by determining the explosion volume as either the minimum
of either the unit volume (Unit Area LFL Height) or the LFL volume. Explosion
energy equals the explosion volume multiplied by the explosion energy per unit volume
for the dispersed material. The BST explosion flame speed is calculated using the
congestion and confinement (assessed by the user) and the database chemical reactivity.
Finally, the BST solver is invoked to calculate the maximum pressure in the cloud as well
as the distance from the epicenter to the 10 psi and 1.4 psi contours.
The average vulnerability for individuals inside the process unit in the event of a vapour
cloud explosion is determined by calculating vulnerabilities at equidistant points from the
epicenter of the vapour cloud explosion to either the 1.4 psi contour or the equivalent unit
radius. The vulnerability at each point will be weighted based on the area between
segments. Inside the 10 psi contour the vulnerability is assumed to be 1. Outside the 1.4
psi contour the vulnerability is assumed to be 0. In-between the 1.4 psi and 10 psi
contours the following Probit equation should be used:
Y = A + B ln(P)

[Eq. 2]

Where:
Y = Scaled probability of fatality
P = Free field overpressure (psig)
A = Probit constant for vapor cloud explosion = 1.47 [3]
B = Probit constant for vapor cloud explosion = 1.37 [3]

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The scaled probability of fatality (Y) needs to be converted to a vulnerability using the
following equation:
V = 0.5 [1 + (Y-5) / (|Y-5|) erf (|Y-5|/2)]

[Eq. 3]

Where:
V = Occupant vulnerability due to overpressure at a given point (0 1)
The average vulnerability of individuals inside a process unit impacted by a vapour cloud
explosion can be calculated as follows:
V AVG = [(A 1 V 1 ) + (A 2 V 2 ) +. + (A n V n )] A TOT

[Eq. 4]

Where:
V AVG = Average occupant vulnerability within the process unit
A 1..n = Area within the segment under consideration
V 1..n = Vulnerability within the area under consideration
A TOT = Area of the 1.4 psi contour or area of the process unit (whichever is
smallest)
4.3 Average Vulnerability Determination for Jet Fires
Vulnerability is determined by integrating in a radial manner from the center of the jet
fire to the minimum of either the 1.6 kW/m2 contour or the equivalent unit radius. If the
distance from the center of the jet fire is less than half the flame length of the fire, it is
assumed that 27% of the population will be flame impinged and that 73% will not, due to
the aspect ratio of the typical jet fire as shown in Figure 1. It is assumed that for
individuals inside the impingement zone that the vulnerability will be 1. For individuals
outside of the impingement zone, the following Probit equation should be used:
Y = A + B ln(L)

[Eq. 5]

Where:
Y = Scaled probability of fatality
L = Accumulated thermal dose s(kW/m2)4/3
A = Probit constant for thermal radiation = -10.7
B = Probit constant for thermal radiation = 1.99

[3]
[3]

The scaled probability of fatality can then be converted to vulnerability by using Eq. 3.
At each differential annulus in the integration, the vulnerability is calculated using a
linear fit model via the following equation:
Vi = MAX(0,MIN(1,slope distance + intercept)) [Eq. 6]

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Figure 1 Typical Aspect Ratio for a Jet Fire

The linear fit model is used in order to mathematically express the vulnerability as a
function of the distance from the source. An illustration of the linear fit model is shown
in Figure 2. The slope and intercept represent a linear fit over the region of the
vulnerability curve that transitions from 0% to 100%. The vulnerability curve is
calculated based on an evacuation directly away from the fire during which a thermal
dose is accumulated.
The integrated vulnerability is expressed as an average vulnerability over the exposed
area.
4.4 Average Vulnerability Determination for Pool Fires
Pool fire calculations for the determination of vulnerability are the same as jet fire
calculations except that the linear fit model for vulnerability is modified not by a jet fire
flame length but by the pool fire radius, inside which the vulnerability is 1.

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Figure 2 Example of a Linear Fit Model to Complex Vulnerability Curve

4.5 Average Vulnerability Determination for Toxic Releases
Vulnerability for toxic releases is determined by integrating in a radial manner from the
release point to the minimum of either the AEGL-3 contour (either 10 minutes for an
established evacuation strategy or 60 minutes for no clear evacuation plan) or the
equivalent unit radius.
For toxic releases, the scaled probability of fatality can be determined by applying the
following equation:
Y = A + B ln(Cn t)

[Eq. 7]

Where:
Y = Scaled probability of fatality
A, B, n = Probit constants located in Table 3
t = Exposure duration in minutes
C = Concentration at downwind location in ppm
At each differential annulus in the integration, the vulnerability is calculated using Eq. 3.
This allows the construction of a linear fit model similar to the one shown in Eq. 6.

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5. Severity Determination
The following section will outline the steps that allow PHA Study teams to utilize the
vulnerability values obtained in Section 3 in order to estimate the severity level that can
be used in a PHA Study.
To help with the assessment of risk levels associated with hazardous scenarios identified
by PHA study teams during the HAZOP or what-if portions of the study, many
companies utilize a risk matrix or equivalent. As an example consider the sample Risk
Matrix as illustrated in Figure 3 utilized by Company X. This sample Risk Matrix is
limited to Health & Safety Receptors and contains 5 distinct categories of severity which
are described on the bottom horizontal axis. The vertical axis provides information
relating to the expected frequency for the defined severity category. For this risk matrix,
the frequency has been divided into 6 distinct categories. Company X has also
established 4 risk categories ranging from low risk to extreme risk.
Company X has also defined the concept of inherent frequency as the interval at which a
given severity level will occur without considering any possible safeguards. The inherent
frequency will take into account the initiating event frequency, the average vulnerability
as calculated in Section 3, as well as modifiers such as the probability of occupancy and
the probability of ignition.
For each of the applicable hazardous release scenario impacts (flash fire, vapour cloud
explosion, jet fire, pool fire and toxic exposure) an initial evaluation will be made to
determine the inherent frequency of a single fatality. If the inherent frequency of a
fatality is found to be outside the lower limit of the frequency range (e.g.: less than
0.00001 events per year), it will be assumed that although a fatality is possible it will not
be retained as the severity category, and the team will then evaluate the inherent
frequency of the next lower severity level permanent disability. The team will continue
with this approach until the inherent frequency of a defined severity level is within the
limits of the risk matrix.

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1 or more
events per year
Between 1 and
0.1 events per
year
Between 0.1
and 0.01 events
per year
Between 0.01
and 0.001
events per year
Between 0.001
and 0.0001
events per year
Between 0.0001
and 0.00001
events per year

F6

High Risk

Extreme
Risk
High Risk

Extreme
Risk
Extreme
Risk

Extreme
Risk
Extreme
Risk

Extreme
Risk
Extreme
Risk

F5

Moderate
Risk

F4

Moderate
Risk

Moderate
Risk

High Risk

Extreme
Risk

Extreme
Risk

F3

Low Risk

Moderate
Risk

Moderate
Risk

High Risk

Extreme
Risk

F2

Low Risk

Low Risk

Moderate
Risk

Moderate
Risk

High Risk

F1

Low Risk

Low Risk

Low Risk

Moderate
Risk

Moderate
Risk

C1
First aid
Injury

C2
Medical aid
/ Restricted
duties injury

C3
Temporary
Disability /
Lost time
injury

C4
Permanent
disability
injury

C5
Fatality

Figure 3 Sample Risk Matrix

5.1 Severity Determination for Flash Fires, Vapour Cloud Explosions, Jet Fires and
Pool Fires
In order to determine if a fatality should be the selected severity level, the frequency of a
fatality associated with a flash fire, vapour cloud explosion, jet fire or pool fire will be
determined by applying the following equation:
F f = IEF V avg OF P ign

[Eq. 8]

Where:
F f = Frequency of a fatality associated with a fire or explosion event
IEF = Initiating Event Frequency see Table 4 for sample values
V avg = Average vulnerability for fires and explosions as calculated in section 3
OF = Occupancy Factor
P ign = Probability of ignition
Sample values of initiating event frequencies for selected events can be found in Table
4[1].

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Table 3 Initiating Event Frequency Sample Values

Description

Frequency (events/year)

Instrument control loop failure

Rotating equipment failure (pump, compressor)
Regulator failure
Pressure vessel residual failure
Atmospheric tank residual failure
Pump seal failure

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.00001
0.001
0.1

The occupancy factor is obtained by aggregating the hours spent by any personnel in the
operating unit and operating mode under study. This includes operators, tradespeople,
contractors, supervisory personnel, etc This aggregated value is then divided by 168
hours per week to obtain the occupancy factor. It is worth noting that for areas with a
large number of individuals occupying a process unit for extended periods of time that
the occupancy factor may be greater than 1. Caution must be exercised by the PHA study
team if they are considering applying a safeguard involving an operator field response, as
the occupancy factor that is applicable under normal operating conditions may become
irrelevant if individuals are sent into the process area to respond to an alarm associated
with a safeguard. In such a case the occupancy factor should be set at 1.
Another consideration for the PHA study team lies in the fact that hazardous contours
may extend beyond the limits of the operating unit. If this occurs the team needs to
determine if there is a significant difference in the population density inside and outside
the boundaries of the process unit. Significant differences may impact the conclusions
made by the PHA study team.
The probability of ignition was based on the UKOAA model. If the discharge liquid
fraction (1-flash fraction) is greater than 0.9, the UKOAA ignition curve 09 - Large Plant
Liquid is used along with the mass leak rate to determine the ignition probability;
otherwise the curve 08 Large Plant Gas LPG is used. The PHA study team must also
determine if the extents of the LFL contour falls within a high energy source such as a
fired heater or ground level flare. In such a case the value obtained by the UKOAA
methodology is voided and the probability of ignition is set at 1.
In the event that the result obtained from Eq. 8 is equal or greater than 0.00001 fatalities
(C5 category on the risk matrix) per year, then a fatality will be retained as the
consequence by the PHA study team. The value obtained from Eq. 8 can then be
compared with the frequency ranges shown in the risk matrix, allowing the determination
of the inherent risk associated with a fatality, and the team can then proceed with the
identification and validation of any applicable safeguards. On the other hand if the result
from Eq. 8 is less than 0.00001 fatalities per year, a fatality will not be selected as the
severity level. Therefore a severity level one order of magnitude lower permanent
disability will need to be evaluated by applying the following equation:

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F pd = IEF V avg OF P ign 6.8

[Eq. 9]

Where:
F pd = Frequency of a permanent disability
The multiplication factor of 6.8 in Eq. 9 was derived from research performed by Wells
[2] in which it was discovered that in past process safety accidents involving fires and
explosions that on average there are 6.8 permanent disability injuries for every fatality.
Similar to the methodology described above, if the result obtained from Eq. 9 is equal to
or greater than 0.00001 permanent disabilities (C4 category on the risk matrix) per year, a
permanent disability will be selected as the severity level. The value obtained from Eq. 9
can then be compared with the frequency ranges shown in the risk matrix, allowing for
the determination of the inherent risk associated with a permanent disability. If the result
from Eq. 9 is less than 0.00001 permanent disabilities per year, a permanent disability
will not be selected as the consequence level by the PHA team. Therefore a severity
level one order of magnitude lower temporary disability will need to be evaluated by
applying the following equation:
F td = IEF V avg OF P ign 109

[Eq. 10]

Where:
F td = Frequency of a temporary disability
The multiplication factor of 109 in Eq. 10 was derived from research performed by Wells
[2] in which it was discovered that in past process safety accidents involving fires and
explosions that on average there are 109 temporary disability injuries for every fatality.
If the result obtained in Eq. 10 is equal to or greater than 0.00001 temporary disabilities
(C3 category on the risk matrix) per year, a temporary disability will be selected as the
severity level. The value obtained from Eq. 10 can be compared with the frequency
ranges shown in the risk matrix allowing for the determination of the inherent risk
associated with a temporary disability. If the result obtained in Eq. 10 is less than
0.00001 temporary disabilities per year, then a restricted duties / medical aid will be the
selected severity level, and a likelihood range of 0.0001 to 0.00001 events per year will
be assigned. The restricted duties / medical aid (C2 on the sample Risk Matrix) will be
the lowest health & safety severity level option for fire and explosion scenarios.
5.2 Severity Determination for Toxic Releases
The determination of the severity level associated with toxic releases is performed in a
similar fashion to the methodology for fires and explosions, however the equations used
to perform the evaluation will be slightly different. In order to determine the severity
level, the frequency of a fatality associated with a toxic release will be determined by
applying the following equation:

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F f = IEF V avg OF

[Eq. 11]

Where:
F f = Frequency of a fatality associated with a toxic release
IEF = Initiating Event Frequency see Table 4 for sample values
V avg = Average vulnerability for toxic releases as calculated in section 3
OF = Occupancy Factor
The guidance relating to occupancy factors described in section 4.1 applies to toxic
releases as well.
In the event that the result obtained from Eq. 11 is equal to or greater than 0.00001
fatalities (C5 category on the risk matrix) per year, then it may be assumed that a fatality
will be selected as the severity level. The value obtained from Eq. 11 can then be
compared with the frequency ranges shown in the risk matrix, allowing the determination
of the inherent risk of a fatality, and the study team can then proceed with the
identification and validation of any applicable safeguards. On the other hand if the result
from Eq. 11 is less than 0.00001 fatalities per year, a fatality will not be selected as the
severity level. Therefore a severity level one order of magnitude lower permanent
disability will need to be evaluated by applying the following equation:
F pd = IEF V avg OF 25

[Eq. 12]

Where:
Fpd = Frequency of a permanent disability
The multiplication factor of 25 in Eq. 12 was derived from research performed by Wells
[2] in which it was discovered that in past process safety accidents involving toxic
releases that on average there are 25 permanent disability injuries for every fatality.
Similar to the above methodology, if the result obtained from Eq. 12 is equal to or greater
than 0.00001 permanent disabilities (C4 category on the risk matrix) per year, a
permanent disability will be selected as the severity level. The value obtained from Eq.
12 can then be compared with the frequency ranges shown in the risk matrix, allowing for
the determination of the inherent risk associated with a permanent disability. If the result
from Eq. 12 is less than 0.00001 permanent disabilities per year, then a permanent
disability will not be selected as the severity level. Therefore a severity level one order
of magnitude lower temporary disability will need to be evaluated by applying the
following equation:
F td = IEF V avg OF 397
Where:
Ftd = Frequency of a temporary disability

[Eq. 13]

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The multiplication factor of 109 in Eq. 13 was derived from research performed by Wells
[2] in which it was discovered that in past process safety accidents involving a toxic
release that on average there are 397 temporary disability injuries for every fatality.
If the result obtained in Eq. 13 is equal to or greater than 0.00001 temporary disabilities
(C3 category on the risk matrix) per year, a temporary disability will be selected as the
severity level. The value obtained from Eq. 13 can be compared with the frequency
ranges shown in the risk matrix allowing for the determination of the inherent risk
associated with a temporary disability. If the result obtained in Eq. 13 is less than
0.00001 temporary disabilities per year, then restricted duties / medical aid will be
selected as the severity level, and a likelihood range of 0.0001 to 0.00001 events per year
will be assigned. The restricted duties / medical aid (C2 on the sample risk matrix) will
be the lowest health & safety severity level option for fire and explosion scenarios.

6. PHA Severity Determination Tool

In order to expedite the evaluation process and reduce the likelihood of a computational
error by the PHA study teams, a PHA Severity Determination Tool has been developed
that incorporates the methodologies outlined in sections 3 and 4 of this paper. The tool is
Excel-based and users primarily interact with a single interface worksheet.
The PHA Severity Determination Tool users should initially select the temperature and
pressure closest to the actual process conditions. In addition information on the total
surface area of the process unit under study as well as the aggregate occupancy hours is
entered. The phase selected should match the actual material phase at the process
conditions. Phase is only used as a check on the results returned from the database.
After entering the basic information described above, the user will then obtain
preliminary results based on information from the pre-populated database. Users should
ensure that the phase returned matches the phase they entered. If they do not match an
error message will be displayed, and the user should consider changing the process
conditions initially entered. The phase of the release has a significant effect on the
overall results. Typically, liquid phase releases will result in higher severity levels due to
the much higher discharge mass flow rate.
Based on the flammable cloud parameters obtained as part of the preliminary results, the
user can then enter confinement information within the LFL extents. A yes answer will
be selected if a substantial roof exists above congestion that can be reached by the
flammable vapour cloud (i.e. distance from the release is less than LFL extents).
Confinement will increase the explosion severity. If there is no confinement or the
confinement elevation is greater than two times the height of the flammable cloud (LFL
height), then no should be selected.

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Congestion within the LFL extents is selected by the user as being none, low,
medium or high. Congestion is defined as piping or equipment located within the
process that increases explosion severity.

Low congestion can generally be walked through without path deviation.

Medium congestion requires a serpentine path (the majority of process areas are
medium congestion).
High congestion cannot be traversed.

Fired heater within the LFL extents should be selected as yes if any open flame ignition
sources such as heaters or ground level flares or any other high energy sources are within
the LFL extents, and less than or equal to the LFL height. An affirmative answer will
result in an ignition probability of 1; otherwise the ignition probability is set based on the
UKOAA methodology.
The final selection will be the 10 minute or 60 minute exposure duration which affects
the toxic dose and resulting vulnerability. A 60 minute exposure should be chosen when
no clear evacuation plan is defined. A 10 minute exposure is appropriate for personnel
who are expected to evacuate the site.
The user can then prompt the PHA Severity Determination Tool to perform the necessary
calculations for each of the potential consequences (flash fire, vapour cloud explosion, jet
fire, pool fire and toxic exposure), and where applicable will provide an estimate on the
severity level as well as the inherent likelihood of each of these consequences. The PHA
study team can then proceed with the identification and validation of safeguards for each
of the consequences allowing for the determination of the risk level.
An illustration of the interface page through which the study teams enter the inputs and
obtain the severity level and inherent likelihood is shown in Figure 4.

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Figure 4 PHA Severity Determination Tool Interface Page

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7. Summary
PHA study teams can select from a variety of techniques to assign severity levels to
release scenarios being considered. This paper has outlined a structured approach with
the goal of providing greater consistency in PHA studies across the company.
This paper is meant to illustrate the steps considered necessary to evaluate potential
impacts of flash fires, vapour cloud explosions, jet fires, pool fires and toxic releases, by
understanding the average vulnerability associated with such releases and other factors
such as the initiating event frequency, occupancy, the probability of ignition, and the
relationship between fatalities and varying degrees of injury.
Although the tool developed is currently limited in scope due to the limited number of
scenarios modeled, it is anticipated that over time additional chemicals and process
conditions will be added in order to allow for the assessment of additional scenarios as
part of PHA studies which should further enhance the usefulness of the tool.
It is understood that different companies have their own unique approaches evaluating the
above factors that go into evaluating potential severity levels. In addition, companies
have their own risk matrices and risk tolerance which may differ from what is presented
in this paper. However it is possible to adapt some of the concepts from this paper to fit
the guidelines established as various companies across the chemical process industries.

GCPS 2014
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References
[1]

Layers of Protection Analysis, Simplified Process Risk Assessment, American

Institute of Chemical Engineers Center for Chemical Process Safety, New York,
2001

[2]

Wells, Christopher J., Cumulative Probability of Injury to Fatality Ratio Suncor

Energy, Unpublished

[3]

Lees, Frank P., Loss Prevention in the Process Industries Second Edition
Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 2001