Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
HELD:
1. No. The judgment of forced lease is improper. A forced lease, just like co-ownership is not favored. It
should be considered that the parties themselves stipulated that Dumlao, the builder, was in good faith
and it was later found that Depra, the owner, was also in good faith. Hence, what applies is the
provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code, which provides in sum that:
a. Builder in good faith entitled to retain the possession of the land on which he built in good faith until
he is paid the value of the building he built in good faith;
b. Owner in good faith has the option to either (i) pay for the building OR (ii) sell his land to the builder
in good faith but builder cannot be forced to buy said land if the same is considerably more than the
value of the building.
Forced rent only comes in if the owner exercises his right to sell the land but the builder rejects it by
reason of the price thereof being considerably more than the value of the building in such case, the
parties shall agree to the terms of the lease, if they cant agree then they may bring the issue to court.
2. No. The action for quieting of title is not barred by reason of res judicata. The cause of action in the
unlawful detainer case involves possession while the cause of action in the quieting of title case
involves ownership. Furthermore, the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land.
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said
portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article
546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land
occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of
the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land.
The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that
they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so
decide.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
the security provided by law would be impaired. This is so because the right to the expenses and the
right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation juridically impossible; and one
cannot be used to reduce the other.
Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when
they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the
apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed
the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
Despite the Courts recognition of Pecsons right of ownership over the apartment building,
the petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the
lot and the building. Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondents right of retention. Worse,
petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-yielding,
four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the
apartment building. It wasonly four years later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his
right of retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was
reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced
by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such benefits.
and attorney's fees. In their answer, petitioners contend that they own the improvements in the disputed
properties which are still publicland; that they are qualified to be beneficiaries of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program and that they are rightful possessors by occupation of the said properties for
more than twenty years. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the lands in question are public lands and W/N the petitioners are rightful possessors by
occupation for more than 20 years.
Held: No
Ratio: Petitioners aver that respondent court erred in declaring private respondents the owners of the
disputed properties. They contend that ownership of a public land cannot be declared by the courts but
by the Executive Department; and that the respondent court erred in not considering that private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Victoria Tinagan, during her lifetime, ceded her right to the
disputed properties in favor of petitioners.
- to fall under 448, the construction must be of permanent character, attached to the soil
- if transitory, there is no accession and the builder must remove the construction
- proper remedy was an action to eject the builder from the land
as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner
of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. We hold, therefore,
that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings
from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such
buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article
546) of the Civil Code.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
It said that Sps. Benitez cannot claim good faith as against Sps. Macapagal, and therefore they cannot
demand Sps. Macapagal to sell the disputed portion. Builders in bad faith can be ordered to dismantle
said structure at their own expense, or pay reasonable rent until they remove the structure.
Petitioners Claim: MeTC had no jurisdiction overthe case because its real nature is accion publicianaor
recovery of possession, not unlawful detainer.- Not forcible entry because respondents did nothave
prior possession.- Not unlawful detainer because petitioners were not private respondents tenants nor
vendee unlawful withholding possession.
Respondents Comments: Petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC after
they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits and lost.- Petitioners were in bad faith because
they waived intheir deed of sale the usual sellers warranty as to the absence of any and all liens.
ISSUE(S)
1.WON the possession of the portion of Sps.Macapagals land encroached by Sps. Benitezhouse can
be recovered through an action of ejectment, not accion publiciana.
HELD 1.MeTC has jurisdiction.
Reasoning
- Requirements for ejectment as alleged in the facts:after conducting a relocation survey, private
respondents discovered that a portion of their land was encroached by petitioners house; notices were
sent to petitioners, the last one dated Oct. 26, 1989;private respondents filed ejectment suit against
petitioners on Jan. 18, 1990 (a year within lastdemand).- Sps. Macapagals cause of action springs
from Sec.1 of Rule 70, RoC:
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when .
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express of implied, or thelegal
representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring anaction in the
proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs.- That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents purchase thereof
does not negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non
in ejectment. In forcible entry, because there is deprivation of physical possession, a person must
allege and prove prior possession. In unlawful detainer, defendant unlawfully withholds possession after
expiration of his right. Prior physical possession is not required.- Possession can also be acquired, not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thingies subject to the action of ones will or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.- Considering that private
respondents are unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached land and that the action for the
recovery of possession thereof was made within the one-year elementary period, ejectment is the
proper remedy, and MeTC has jurisdiction. And Sps. Benitez are estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the MeTC after voluntarily submitting themselves to its proceedings.
2.Compensation for Occupancy
- The award of P930 is technically not rental, but damages. Damages are recoverable in ejectment
cases under Sec. 8, Rule 70, RoC. These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which privateres pondents may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to their loss. In the context of Sec. 8, it is limited to rent or fair rental value for the use and
occupation of the property.
3.Option to Sell Belongs to Owner
- Art. 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith
builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.
Art. 448
. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Art. 546 and 548,or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent.
Art. 450
. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the
demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in orderto replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.- No compulsion can be
legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would be invalid
and illegal.
4.Review of Factual Findings Unwarranted
- After careful deliberation on the issue, the Court found the petition for review inadequate as it failed to
show convincingly a reversible error on the part of the CA. The decision of the CA did alter nor affect
the MeTCs disposition. The mere fact that petitioners bought their property ahead of respondents does
not establish good faith. Petitioners presented mere allegations without sufficient evidence to support
them.
On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without
their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same
Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene
Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to
Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Admittedly, the appellants house erroneously encroached on the property of the appellees due to a
mistake in the placement of stone monuments as indicated in the survey plan, which error is directly
attributable to the fault of the geodetic engineer who conducted the same. This fact alone negates bad
faith on the part of appellant Miguel.
ISSUE: Whether Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
RULING:
Yes, The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on petitioners
lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas.
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the
applicable provision in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value
is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall
pay reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the
court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the
law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession,
he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.