Powell v.

McCormack
Argued April 21, 1969
Decided June 16, 1969
395 U.S. 486
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Petitioner Powell, who had been duly elected to serve in the House of
Representatives for the 90th Congress, was denied his seat by the adoption of House
Resolution No. 278 which the Speaker had ruled was on the issue of excluding Powell
and could be decided by majority vote. The House's action followed charges that
Powell had misappropriated public funds and abused the process of the New York
courts. Powell and certain voters of his congressional district thereafter brought suit in
the District Court for injunctive, mandatory, and declaratory relief against respondents,
certain named House members, the Speaker, Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and
Doorkeeper of the House, alleging that the Resolution barring his seating violated Art.
I, 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution as contrary to the mandate that House members be
elected by the people of each State, and cl. 2, which sets forth the qualifications for
membership of age, citizenship, and residence (all concededly met by Powell), which
they claimed were exclusive. The complaint alleged that the House Clerk threatened
to refuse to perform the service to which Powell as a duly elected Congressman was
entitled; that the Sergeant at Arms refused to pay Powell's salary, and that the
Doorkeeper threatened to deny Powell admission to the House chamber. The District
Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint "for want of jurisdiction of
the subject matter." The Court of Appeals affirmed on somewhat different grounds.
While the case was pending in this Court, the 90th Congress ended and Powell was
elected to and seated by the 91st Congress. Respondents contend that (1) the case is
moot; (2) the Speech or Debate Clause (Art. I, 6) forecloses judicial review; (3) the
decision to exclude Powell is supported by the expulsion power in Art. I, 5, under
which the House, which "shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own
embers," can by a two-thirds vote (exceeded here) expel a member for any reason at
all; (4) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation, or, alternatively,

(a) Powell's averments as to declaratory relief are sufficient. Alejandrino v.

Quezon, 271 U. S. 528, distinguished. Pp. 395 U. S. 496-499.
(b) The mootness of Powell's claim to a seat in the 90th Congress does not affect the
viability of his back salary claim with respect to the term for which he was
excluded. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116. Pp. 395 U. S. 499-500.
2. Although the Speech or Debate Clause bars action against respondent
Congressmen, it does not bar action against the other respondents, who are
legislative employees charged with unconstitutional activity, Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U. S. 168; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, and the fact that
House employees are acting pursuant to express orders of the House does not
preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of the underlying legislative decision.
Pp. 395 U. S. 501-506.
3. House Resolution No. 278 was an exclusion proceeding, and cannot be treated as
an expulsion proceeding (which House members have viewed as not applying to preelection misconduct). This Court will not speculate whether the House would have
voted to expel Powell had it been faced with that question. Pp. 395 U. S. 506-512.
4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners' action. Pp. 395 U. S. 512516.
(a) The case is one "arising under" the Constitution within the meaning of Art. III, since
petitioners' claims "will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction
and will be defeated if it [is] given another." Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678. Pp. 395 U. S.
513-514.
(b) The district courts are given a broad grant of jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. 1331(a),
over "all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the
Constitution . . . ," and, while that grant is not entirely coextensive with Art. III, there is
no indication that 1331(a) was intended to foreclose federal courts from entertaining
suits involving the seating of Congressmen. Pp. 395 U. S. 514-516.
5. This litigation is justiciable because the claim presented and the relief sought can
be judicially resolved. Pp. 395 U. S. 516-518.
(a) Petitioners' claim does not lack justiciability on the ground that the House's duty
cannot be judicially determined, since, if

Page 395 U. S. 487

Page 395 U. S. 488

(5) the litigation is not justiciable under general criteria or because it involves a
political question.

petitioners are correct, the House had a duty to seat Powell once it determined that he
met the standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution. P. 395 U. S. 517.

Held:

(b) The relief sought is susceptible of judicial resolution, since, regardless of the
appropriateness of a coercive remedy against House personnel (an issue not here
decided), declaratory relief is independently available. Pp. 395 U. S. 517-518.

1. The case has not been mooted by Powell's seating in the 91st Congress, since his
claim for back salary remains a viable issue. Pp. 395 U. S. 495-500.

6. The case does not involve a "political question," which, under the separation of
powers doctrine, would not be justiciable. Pp. 395 U. S. 518-549.
1

(a) The Court's examination of relevant historical materials shows at most that
Congress' power under Art. I, 5, to judge the "Qualifications of its Members" is a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to [that] co-ordinate political
department of government" (Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 217) to judge only
standing qualifications which are expressly set forth in the Constitution; hence, the
House has no power to exclude a member-elect who meets the Constitution's
membership requirements. Pp. 395 U. S. 518-548.

authorities as to travel expenses. The report also indicated there was strong evidence
that certain illegal salary payments had been made to Powell's wife at his
direction. See H.R.Rep. No. 2349, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1966). No formal action
was taken during the 89th Congress. However, prior to the organization of the 90th
Congress, the Democratic members-elect met in caucus and voted to remove Powell
as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. See H.R.Rep. No. 27, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1967).

(b) The case does not present a political question in the sense, also urged by
respondents, that it would entail a "potentially embarrassing confrontation between
coordinate branches" of the Government, since our system of government requires
federal courts on occasion to interpret the Constitution differently from other branches.
Pp. 395 U. S. 548-549.

When the 90th Congress met to organize in January, 1967, Powell was asked to step
aside while the oath was administered to the other members-elect. Following the
administration of the oath to the remaining members, the House discussed the
procedure to be followed in determining whether Powell was eligible to take his seat.
After some debate, by a vote of 363 to 65, the House adopted House Resolution No.
1, which provided that the Speaker appoint a Select Committee to determine Powell's
eligibility. 113 Cong.Rec. 26-27. Although the resolution prohibited Powell from taking
his seat until the House acted on the Select Committee's report, it did provide that he
should receive all the pay and allowances due a member during the period.

7. In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, 5, Congress is limited to

the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution. P. 395 U. S. 550.
129 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 395 F.2d 577, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
to the District Court for entry of a declaratory judgment and for further proceedings.
Page 395 U. S. 489
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In November, 1966, petitioner Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from the
18th Congressional District of New York to serve in the United States House of
Representatives for the 90th Congress. However, pursuant to a House resolution, he
was not permitted to take his seat. Powell (and some of the voters of his district) then
filed suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the House could exclude him only if it
found he failed to meet the standing requirements of age, citizenship, and residence
contained in Art. I, 2, of the Constitution -- requirements the House specifically found
Powell met -- and thus had excluded him unconstitutionally. The District Court
dismissed petitioners' complaint "for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter." A panel
of the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, although on somewhat different
grounds, each judge filing a separate opinion. We have determined that it was error to
dismiss the complaint, and that petitioner Powell is entitled to a declaratory judgment
that he was unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress.
I

The Select Committee, composed of nine lawyer-members, issued an invitation to

Powell to testify before the Committee. The invitation letter stated that the scope of the
testimony and investigation would include Powell's qualifications as to age,
citizenship, and residency; his involvement in a civil suit (in which he had been held in
contempt), and "[m]atters of . . . alleged official misconduct since January 3,
1961." See Hearings on
Page 395 U. S. 491
H.R.Res. No. 1 before Select Committee Pursuant to H.R.Res. No. 1, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 5 (1967) (hereinafter Hearings). Powell appeared at the Committee hearing
held on February 8, 1967. After the Committee denied in part Powell's request that
certain adversary-type procedures be followed, [Footnote 1] Powell testified. He
would, however, give information relating only to his age, citizenship, and residency;
upon the advice of counsel, he refused to answer other questions.
On February 10, 1967, the Select Committee issued another invitation to Powell. In
the letter, the Select Committee informed Powell that its responsibility under the
House Resolution extended to determining not only whether he met the standing
qualifications of Art. I, 2, but also to

During the 89th Congress, a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on

House Administration conducted an investigation into the expenditures of the
Committee on Education and Labor, of which petitioner

"inquir[ing] into the question of whether you should be punished or expelled pursuant
to the powers granted . . . the House under Article I, Section 5, . . . of the Constitution.
In other words, the Select Committee is of the opinion that, at the conclusion of the
present inquiry, it has authority to report back to the House recommendations with
respect to . . . seating, expulsion or other punishment."

Page 395 U. S. 490

See Hearings 110. Powell did

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was chairman. The Special Subcommittee issued a report
concluding that Powell and certain staff employees had deceived the House

Page 395 U. S. 492

FACTS

not appear at the next hearing, held February 14, 1967. However, his attorneys were
present, and they informed the Committee that Powell would not testify about matters
other than his eligibility under the standing qualifications of Art. I, 2. Powell's
attorneys reasserted Powell's contention that the standing qualifications were the
exclusive requirements for membership, and they further urged that punishment or
expulsion was not possible until a member had been seated. SeeHearings 111-113.
The Committee held one further hearing at which neither Powell nor his attorneys
were present. Then, on February 23, 1967, the Committee issued its report, finding
that Powell met the standing qualifications of Art. I, 2. H.R.Rep. No. 27, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 31 (1967). However, the Committee further reported that Powell had
asserted an unwarranted privilege and immunity from the processes of the courts of
New York; that he had wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and
himself, and that he had made false reports on expenditures of foreign currency to the
Committee on House Administration. Id. at 31-32. The Committee recommended that
Powell be sworn and seated as a member of the 90th Congress, but that he be
censured by the House, fined $40,000, and be deprived of his seniority. Id. at 33.
The report was presented to the House on March 1, 1967, and the House debated the
Select Committee's proposed resolution. At the conclusion of the debate, by a vote of
222 to 202 the House rejected a motion to bring the resolution to a vote. An
amendment to the resolution was then offered; it called for the exclusion of Powell and
a declaration that his seat was vacant. The Speaker ruled that a majority vote of the
House would be sufficient to pass the resolution if it were so
Page 395 U. S. 493
amended. 113 Cong.Rec. 5020. After further debate, the amendment was adopted by
a vote of 248 to 176. Then the House adopted by a vote of 307 to 116 House
Resolution No. 278 in its amended form, thereby excluding Powell and directing that
the Speaker notify the Governor of New York that the seat was vacant.
Powell and 13 voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York subsequently
instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Five
members of the House of Representatives were named as defendants individually
and "as representatives of a class of citizens who are presently serving . . . as
members of the House of Representatives." John W. McCormack was named in his
official capacity as Speaker, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the
Sergeant at Arms and the Doorkeeper were named individually and in their official
capacities. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the
Constitution, specifically Art. I, 2, cl. 1, because the resolution was inconsistent with
the mandate that the members of the House shall be elected by the people of each
State, and Art. I, 2, cl. 2, which, petitioners alleged, sets forth the exclusive
qualifications for membership. [Footnote 2] The complaint further alleged that the
Clerk of the House threatened to refuse to perform the service for Powell to which a
duly elected Congressman is entitled, that the Sergeant at Arms refused to pay Powell
his salary, and that the Doorkeeper threatened to deny Powell admission to the House
chamber.

Page 395 U. S. 494

Petitioners asked that a three-judge court be convened. [Footnote 3] Further, they
requested that the District Court grant a permanent injunction restraining respondents
from executing the House Resolution, and enjoining the Speaker from refusing to
administer the oath, the Clerk from refusing to perform the duties due a
Representative, the Sergeant at Arms from refusing to pay Powell his salary, and the
Doorkeeper from refusing to admit Powell to the Chamber. [Footnote 4] The complaint
also requested a declaratory judgment that Powell's exclusion was unconstitutional.
The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint "for want of
jurisdiction of the subject matter."Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.Supp. 354 (D.C.
D.C.1967). [Footnote 5] The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed on somewhat different grounds, with each judge of the panel filing a separate
opinion. Powell v. McCormack, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 395 F.2d 577 (1968). We
granted certiorari. 393 U.S. 949 (1968). While the case was pending on our docket,
the 90th Congress officially terminated, and the 91st Congress was seated. In
November, 1968, Powell was again elected as the representative of the 18th
Congressional District of New York, and he was seated by the 91st Congress. The
resolution seating Powell also
Page 395 U. S. 495
fined him $25,000. See H.R.Res. No. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong.Rec. H21
(daily ed., January 3, 1969). Respondents then filed a suggestion of mootness. We
postponed further consideration of this suggestion to a hearing on the merits. 393
U.S. 1060 (1969).
Respondents press upon us a variety of arguments to support the court below; they
will be considered in the following order. (1) Events occurring subsequent to the grant
of certiorari have rendered this litigation moot. (2) The Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution, Art. I, 6, insulates respondents' action from judicial review. (3) The
decision to exclude petitioner Powell is supported by the power granted to the House
of Representatives to expel a member. (4) This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over petitioners' action. (5) Even if subject matter jurisdiction is present, this litigation
is not justiciable either under the general criteria established by this Court or because
a political question is involved.
II
MOOTNESS
After certiorari was granted, respondents filed a memorandum suggesting that two
events which occurred subsequent to our grant of certiorari require that the case be
dismissed as moot. On January 3, 1969, the House of Representatives of the 90th
Congress officially terminated, and petitioner Powell was seated as a member of the
91st Congress. 115 Cong.Rec. H22 (daily ed., January 3, 1969). Respondents insist
that the gravamen of petitioners' complaint was the failure of the 90th Congress to
3

seat petitioner Powell, and that, since the House of Representatives is not a
continuing body [Footnote 6]
Page 395 U. S. 496
and Powell has now been seated, his claims are moot. Petitioners counter that three
issues remain unresolved, and thus this litigation present a "case or controversy"
within the meaning of Art. III: [Footnote 7] (1) whether Powell was unconstitutionally
deprived of his seniority by his exclusion from the 90th Congress; (2) whether the
resolution of the 91st Congress imposing as "punishment" a $25,000 fine is a
continuation of respondents' allegedly unconstitutional exclusion,see H.R.Res. No. 2,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong.Rec. H21 (daily ed., January 3, 1969), and (3)
whether Powell is entitled to salary withheld after his exclusion from the 90th
Congress. We conclude that Powell's claim for back salary remains viable even
though he has been seated in the 91st Congress, and thus find it unnecessary to
determine whether the other issues have become moot. [Footnote 8]
Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See E. Borchard, Declaratory
Page 395 U. S. 497
Judgments 35-37 (2d ed.1941). Where one of the several issues presented becomes
moot, the remaining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case or
controversy. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 86-94
(1947); 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice 1157.13 (2d ed.1966). Despite Powell's obvious
and continuing interest in his withheld salary, respondents insist that Alejandrino v.
Quezon, 271 U. S. 528 (1926), leaves us no choice but to dismiss this litigation as
moot. Alejandrino, a duly appointed Senator of the Philippine Islands, was suspended
for one year by a resolution of the Philippine Senate and deprived of all "prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments" for the period of his suspension. The Supreme Court of
the Philippines refused to enjoin the suspension. By the time the case reached this
Court, the suspension had expired and the Court dismissed as moot Alejandrino's
request that the suspension be enjoined. Then, sua sponte, [Footnote 9] the Court
considered whether the possibility that Alejandrino was entitled to back salary required
it "to retain the case for the purpose of determining whether he [Alejandrino] may not
have a mandamus for this purpose." Id. at 271 U. S. 533. Characterizing the issue of
Alejandrino's salary as a "mere incident" to his claim that the suspension was
improper, the Court noted that he had not briefed the salary issue, and that his
request for mandamus did not set out with sufficient clarity the official or set of officials
against whom the mandamus should issue.Id. at 271 U. S. 533-534. The Court
therefore refused to treat the salary claim and dismissed the entire action as moot.

insufficiently substantial to prevent the case from becoming moot, but rather that his
failure to plead sufficient facts to establish his mandamus claim made it impossible for
any court to resolve the mandamus request. [Footnote 10] By contrast, petitioners'
complaint names the official responsible for the payment of congressional salaries and
asks for both mandamus and an injunction against that official. [Footnote 11]
Furthermore, even if respondents are correct that petitioners' averments as to
injunctive relief are not sufficiently definite, it does not follow that this litigation must be
dismissed as moot. Petitioner Powell has not been paid his salary by virtue of an
allegedly unconstitutional House resolution. That claim is still unresolved, and hotly
contested by clearly adverse parties. Declaratory relief has been requested, a form of
relief not available
Page 395 U. S. 499
when Alejandrino was decided. [Footnote 12] A court may grant declaratory relief even
though it chooses not to issue an injunction or mandamus. See United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, supra, at 330 U. S. 93; cf. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 332 U.
S. 25-26 (1947). A declaratory judgment can then be used as a predicate to further
relief, including an injunction. 28 U.S.C. 2202; see Vermont Structural Slate Co. v.
Tatko Brothers Slate Co., 253 F.2d 29 (C.A.2d Cir.1958); United States Lines Co. v.
Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 385 (C.A.2d Cir.1952). Alejandrino stands only for the
proposition that, where one claim has become moot and the pleadings are insufficient
to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to another remedy, the action should be
dismissed as moot. [Footnote 13] There is no suggestion that petitioners' averments
as to declaratory relief are insufficient, and Powell's allegedly unconstitutional
deprivation of salary remains unresolved.
Respondents further argue that Powell's "wholly incidental and subordinate" demand
for salary is insufficient to prevent this litigation from becoming moot. They suggest
that the "primary and principal relief" sought was the seating of petitioner Powell in the
90th Congress, rendering his presumably secondary claims not worthy of judicial
consideration.Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966), rejects respondents' theory that the
mootness of a "primary" claim requires a conclusion that all "secondary" claims are
moot. At the Bond oral argument, it was suggested that the expiration of the session
of the Georgia Legislature which excluded Bond had rendered
Page 395 U. S. 500
the case moot. We replied:

Page 395 U. S. 498

"The State has not pressed this argument, and it could not do so, because the State
has stipulated that, if Bond succeeds on this appeal, he will receive back salary for the
term from which he was excluded."

Respondents believe that Powell's salary claim is also a "mere incident" to his
insistence that he was unconstitutionally excluded so that we should likewise dismiss
this entire action as moot. This argument fails to grasp that the reason for the
dismissal in Alejandrino was not that Alejandrino's deprivation of salary was

385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 128, n. 4. Bond is not controlling, argue respondents, because
the legislative term from which Bond was excluded did not end until December 31,
1966, [Footnote 14] and our decision was rendered December 5; further,
when Bond was decided, Bond had not as yet been seated, while, in this case, Powell
4

has been. [Footnote 15] Respondents do not tell us, however, why these factual
distinctions create a legally significant difference between Bondand this case. We
relied in Bond on the outstanding salary claim, not the facts respondents stress, to
hold that the case was not moot.
Finally, respondents seem to argue that Powell's proper action to recover salary is a
suit in the Court of Claims, so that, having brought the wrong action, a dismissal for
mootness is appropriate. The short answer to this argument is that it confuses
mootness with whether Powell has established a right to recover against the Sergeant
at Arms, a question which it is inappropriate to treat at this stage of the litigation.
[Footnote 16]
Page 395 U. S. 501
III
SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
Respondents assert that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, 6,
[Footnote 17] is an absolute bar to petitioners' action. This Court has on four prior
occasions -- Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967); United States v.
Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951),
and Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881) -- been called upon to determine if
allegedly unconstitutional action taken by legislators or legislative employees is
insulated from judicial review by the Speech or Debate Clause. Both parties insist that
their respective positions find support in these cases, and tender for decision three
distinct issues: (1) whether respondents, in participating in the exclusion of petitioner
Powell, were "acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity," Tenney v.
Brandhove, supra, at341 U. S. 376; (2) assuming that respondents were so acting,
whether the fact that petitioners seek neither damages from any of the respondents
nor a criminal prosecution lifts the bar of the clause; [Footnote 18] and (3) even if this
Page 395 U. S. 502
action may not be maintained against a Congressman, whether those respondents
who are merely employees of the House may plead the bar of the clause. We find it
necessary to treat only the last of these issues.
The Speech or Debate Clause, adopted by the Constitutional Convention without
debate or opposition, [Footnote 19] finds its roots in the conflict between Parliament
and the Crown culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the English Bill of
Rights of 1689. [Footnote 20] Drawing upon this history, we concluded in United
States v. Johnson, supra, at383 U. S. 181, that the purpose of this clause was "to
prevent intimidation [of legislators] by the executive and accountability before a
possibly hostile Judiciary." Although the clause sprang from a fear of seditious libel
actions instituted by the Crown to punish unfavorable speeches made in Parliament,
[Footnote 21] we have held that it would be a "narrow view" to confine the protection
of the Speech or Debate Clause to words spoken in debate. Committee reports,
resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered, as are "things generally done in

a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before
it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, at 103 U. S. 204. Furthermore, the clause not only
provides a
Page 395 U. S. 503
defense on the merits, but also protects a legislator from the burden of defending
himself. Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra,at 387 U. S. 85; see Tenney v. Brandhove,
supra, at 341 U. S. 377.
Our cases make it clear that the legislative immunity created by the Speech or Debate
Clause performs an important function in representative government. It insures that
legislators are free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they
will be later called to task in the courts for that representation. Thus, in Tenney v.
Brandhove, supra,at 341 U. S. 373, the Court quoted the writings of James Wilson as
illuminating the reason for legislative immunity:
"In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his
publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary that he should
enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offence. [Footnote 22]"
Legislative immunity does not, of course, bar all judicial review of legislative acts. That
issue was settled by implication as early as 1803, See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, and expressly in Kilbourn v. Thompson, the first of this Court's cases interpreting
the reach of the Speech or Debate Clause. Challenged in Kilbourn was the
constitutionality of a House Resolution ordering the arrest and imprisonment of a
recalcitrant witness who had refused to respond to a subpoena issued by a House
investigating committee. While holding that the Speech or Debate Clause barred
Kilbourn's action for false imprisonment brought against several members of the
House, the Court nevertheless reached the merits of Kilbourn's attack, and decided
that, since the House had no power to punish for contempt, Kilbourn's imprisonment
Page 395 U. S. 504
pursuant to the resolution was unconstitutional. It therefore allowed Kilbourn to bring
his false imprisonment action against Thompson, the House's Sergeant at Arms, who
had executed the warrant for Kilbourn's arrest.
The Court first articulated in Kilbourn and followed in Dombrowski v.
Eastland [Footnote 23] the doctrine that, although an action against a Congressman
may be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, legislative employees who
participated in the unconstitutional activity are responsible for their acts. Despite the
fact that petitioners brought this suit against several House employees -- the Sergeant
at Arms, the Doorkeeper and the Clerk -- as well as several Congressmen,
respondents argue that Kilbourn and Dombrowski are distinguishable. Conceding that,
in Kilbourn, the presence of the Sergeant at Arms, and, in Dombrowski, the presence
of a congressional subcommittee counsel as defendants in the litigation allowed
5

judicial review of the challenged congressional action, respondents urge that both
cases concerned an affirmative act performed by the employee outside the House
having a direct effect upon a private citizen. Here, they continue, the relief sought
relates to actions taken by House agents solely within the House. Alternatively,
respondents insist that Kilbourn and Dombrowski prayed for damages, while petitioner
Powell asks that the Sergeant at Arms disburse funds, an assertedly greater
interference with the legislative process. We reject the proffered distinctions.

exercised in conformity to the Constitution, and, if they have not, to treat their acts as
null and void."

That House employees are acting pursuant to express orders of the House does not
bar judicial review of the constitutionality of the underlying legislative decision.

The resolution excluding petitioner Powell was adopted by a vote in excess of twothirds of the 434 Members of

Page 395 U. S. 505

Page 395 U. S. 507

Kilbourn decisively settles this question, since the Sergeant at Arms was held liable
for false imprisonment even though he did nothing more than execute the House
Resolution that Kilbourn be arrested and imprisoned. [Footnote 24] Respondents'
suggestions thus ask us to distinguish between affirmative acts of House employees
and situations in which the House orders its employees not to act or between actions
for damages and claims for salary. We can find no basis in either the history of the
Speech or Debate Clause or our cases for either distinction. The purpose of the
protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action, but
to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their
legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions. A legislator is no
more or no less hindered or distracted by litigation against a legislative employee
calling into question the employee's affirmative action than he would be by a lawsuit
questioning the employee's failure to act. Nor is the distraction or hindrance increased
because the claim is for salary, rather than damages, or because the litigation
questions action taken by the employee within, rather than without, the House.
Freedom of legislative activity and the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause are
fully protected if legislators are relieved of the burden of defending themselves.
[Footnote 25] In Kilbourn and Dombrowski,

Congress, 307 to 116. 113 Cong.Rec. 5037-5038. Article I, 5, grants the House
authority to expel a member "with the Concurrence of two thirds." [Footnote 27]
Respondents assert that the House may expel a member for any reason whatsoever,
and that, since a two-thirds vote was obtained, the procedure by which Powell was
denied his seat in the 90th Congress should be regarded as an expulsion, not an
exclusion. Cautioning us not to exalt form over substance, respondents quote from the
concurring opinion of Judge McGowan in the court below:

Page 395 U. S. 506

we thus dismissed the action against members of Congress, but did not regard the
Speech or Debate Clause as a bar to reviewing the merits of the challenged
Congressional action, since congressional employees were also sued. Similarly,
though this action may be dismissed against the Congressmen, petitioners are
entitled to maintain their action against House employees and to judicial review of the
propriety of the decision to exclude petitioner Powell. [Footnote 26] As was said
in Kilbourn, in language which time has not dimmed:
"Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether its [the
legislature's] proceedings are in conformity with the Constitution and laws because,
living under a written constitution, no branch or department of the government is
supreme, and it is the province and duty of the judicial department to determine, in
cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of the
government, and even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been

103 U.S. at 103 U. S. 199.

IV
EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION

"Appellant Powell's cause of action for a judicially compelled seating thus boils down,
in my view, to the narrow issue of whether a member found by his colleagues . . . to
have engaged in official misconduct must, because of the accidents of timing, be
formally admitted before he can be either investigated or expelled. The sponsor of the
motion to exclude stated on the floor that he was proceeding on the theory that the
power to expel included the power to exclude, provided a 2/3 vote was forthcoming. It
was. Therefore, success for Mr. Powell on the merits would mean that the District
Court must admonish the House that it is form, not substance, that should govern in
great affairs, and accordingly command the House members to act out a charade."
129 U.S.App.D.C. at 383-384, 395 F.2d at 606-607.
Page 395 U. S. 508
Although respondents repeatedly urge this Court not to speculate as to the reasons
for Powell's exclusion, their attempt to equate exclusion with expulsion would require
a similar speculation that the House would have voted to expel Powell had it been
faced with that question. Powell had not been seated at the time House Resolution
No. 278 was debated and passed. After a motion to bring the Select Committee's
proposed resolution to an immediate vote had been defeated, an amendment was
offered which mandated Powell's exclusion. [Footnote 28] Mr. Celler, chairman of the
Select Committee, then posed a parliamentary inquiry to determine whether a twothirds vote was necessary to pass the resolution if so amended "in the sense that it
might amount to an expulsion." 113 Cong.Rec. 5020. The Speaker replied that "action
by a majority vote would be in accordance with the rules." Ibid. Had the amendment
been regarded as an attempt to expel Powell, a two-thirds vote would have been
constitutionally required. The Speaker ruled that the House was voting to exclude
6

Powell, and we will not speculate what the result might have been if Powell had been
seated and expulsion proceedings subsequently instituted.
Nor is the distinction between exclusion and expulsion merely one of form. The
misconduct for which Powell was charged occurred prior to the convening of the 90th
Congress. On several occasions, the House has debated whether a member can be
expelled for actions taken during a prior Congress, and the House's own manual of
procedure applicable in the 90th Congress states that "both Houses have distrusted
their power to punish in such cases." Rules of the House of Representatives,
H.R.Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1967);
Page 395 U. S. 509
see G. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives 32 (1961). The House rules
manual reflects positions taken by prior Congress. For example, the report of the
Select Committee appointed to consider the expulsion of John W. Langley states
unequivocally that the House will not expel a member for misconduct committed
during an earlier Congress:
"[I]t must be said that with practical uniformity the precedents in such cases are to the
effect that the House will not expel a Member for reprehensible action prior to his
election as a Member, not even for conviction for an offense. On May 23, 1884,
Speaker Carlisle decided that the House had no right to punish a Member for any
offense alleged to have been committed previous to the time when he was elected a
Member, and added, 'That has been so frequently decided in the House that it is no
longer a matter of dispute.'"
H.R.Rep. No. 30, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1925). [Footnote 29]
Page 395 U. S. 510
Members of the House having expressed a belief that such strictures apply to its own
power to expel, we will not assume that two-thirds of its members would have
expelled Powell for his prior conduct had the Speaker announced that House
Resolution No. 278 was for expulsion, rather than exclusion. [Footnote 30]
Finally, the proceedings which culminated in Powell's exclusion cast considerable
doubt upon respondents' assumption that the two-thirds vote necessary to expel
would have been mustered. These proceedings have been succinctly described by
Congressman Eckhardt:
"The House voted 202 votes for the previous question [Footnote 31] leading toward
the adoption of the [Select] Committee report. It voted 222 votes against the previous
question, opening the floor for the Curtis Amendment, which ultimately excluded
Powell. "
Page 395 U. S. 511
"Upon adoption of the Curtis Amendment, the vote again fell short of two-thirds, being
248 yeas to 176 nays. Only on the final vote, adopting the Resolution as amended,

was more than a two-thirds vote obtained, the vote being 307 yeas to 116 nays. On
this last vote, as a practical matter, members who would not have denied Powell a
seat if they were given the choice to punish him had to cast an aye vote or else record
themselves as opposed to the only punishment that was likely to come before the
House. Had the matter come up through the processes of expulsion, it appears that
the two-thirds vote would have failed, and then members would have been able to
apply a lesser penalty. [Footnote 32]"
We need express no opinion as to the accuracy of Congressman Eckhardt's
prediction that expulsion proceedings would have produced a different result.
However, the House's own views of the extent of its power to expel
Page 395 U. S. 512
combined with the Congressman's analysis counsel that exclusion and expulsion are
not fungible proceedings. The Speaker ruled that House Resolution No. 278
contemplated an exclusion proceeding. We must reject respondents' suggestion that
we overrule the Speaker, and hold that, although the House manifested an intent to
exclude Powell, its action should be tested by whatever standards may govern an
expulsion.
V
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 198 (1962), there is a
significant difference between determining whether a federal court has "jurisdiction of
the subject matter" and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is "justiciable." The District Court determined that "to decide this
case on the merits . . . would constitute a clear violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers." and then dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction of the subject
matter." Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.Supp. 354, 359, 360 (D.C. D.C.1967). However,
as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the doctrine of separation of powers is
more properly considered in determining whether the case is "justiciable." We agree
with the unanimous conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the District Court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. [Footnote 33] However, for reasons
set forth in 395 U. S. infra we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this
case is not justiciable.
In Baker v. Carr, supra, we noted that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter (1) if the
Page 395 U. S. 513
cause does not "arise under" the Federal Constitution, laws, or treaties (or fall within
one of the other enumerated categories of Art. III); or (2) if it is not a "case or
controversy" within the meaning of that phrase in Art. III; or (3) if the cause is not one
described by any jurisdictional statute. And, as in Baker v. Carr, supra, our
determination (see 395 U. S. B(1), infra) that this cause presents no nonjusticiable
7

"political question" disposes of respondents' contentions [Footnote 34] that this cause
is not a "case or controversy." [Footnote 35]
Respondents first contend that this is not a case "arising under" the Constitution within
the meaning of Art. III. They emphasize that Art. I, 5, assigns to each House of
Congress the power to judge the elections and qualifications of its own members and
to punish its members for disorderly behavior. Respondents also note that, under Art.
I, 3, the Senate has the "sole power" to try all impeachments. Respondents argue
that these delegations (to "judge," to "punish," and to "try") to the Legislative Branch
are explicit grants of "judicial power" to the Congress, and constitute specific
exceptions
Page 395 U. S. 514
to the general mandate of Art. III that the "judicial power" shall be vested in the federal
courts. Thus, respondents maintain, the
"power conferred on the courts by article III does not authorize this Court to do
anything more than declare its lack of jurisdiction to proceed. [Footnote 36]"
We reject this contention. Article III, 1, provide that the "judicial Power . . . shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . .
establish." Further, 2 mandates that the "judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
arising under this Constitution. . . ." It has long been held that a suit "arises under" the
Constitution if a petitioner's claim "will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given
one construction and will be defeated if [it is] given another." [Footnote 37] Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 327 U. S. 685 (1946). See King County v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 263 U. S. 361, 263 U. S. 363-364 (1923). Cf. 22 U. S. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824). See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts 48-52 (1963).
Thus, this case clearly is one "arising under" the Constitution as the Court has
interpreted that phrase. Any bar to federal courts reviewing the judgments made by
the House or Senate in excluding a member arises from the allocation of powers
between the two branches of the Federal Government (a question of justiciability), and
not from the petitioners' failure to state a claim based on federal law.
Respondents next contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners'
suit is authorized by a jurisdictional statute, i.e., 28 U.S.C. 1331(a).
Page 395 U. S. 515
Section 1331(a) provides that district courts shall have jurisdiction in "all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution. . . ." Respondents
urge that, even though a case may "arise under the Constitution" for purposes of Art.
III, it does not necessarily "arise under the Constitution" for purposes of 1331(a).
Although they recognize there is little legislative history concerning the enactment of
1331(a), respondents argue that the history of the period when the section was first
enacted indicates that the drafters did not intend to include suits questioning the
exclusion of Congressmen in this grant of "federal question" jurisdiction.

Respondents claim that the passage of the Force Act [Footnote 38] in 1870 lends
support to their interpretation of the intended scope of 1331. The Force Act gives the
district courts jurisdiction over
"any civil action to recover possession of any office . . . wherein it appears that the
sole question . . . arises out of denial of the right to vote . . . on account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude."
However, the Act specifically excludes suits concerning the office of Congressman.
Respondents maintain that this exclusion demonstrates Congress' intention to prohibit
federal courts from entertaining suits regarding the seating of Congressmen.
We have noted that the grant of jurisdiction in 1331(a), while made in the language
used in Art. III, is not in all respects coextensive with the potential for federal
jurisdiction found in Art. III. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 246, n. 8
(1967). Nevertheless, it has generally been recognized that the intent of the drafters
was to provide a broad jurisdictional grant to the federal courts. See, e.g., Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Col.L.Rev.
Page 395 U. S. 516
157, 160 (1953); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90
U.Pa.L.Rev. 639, 6 645 (1942). And, as noted above, the resolution of this case
depends directly on construction of the Constitution. The Court has consistently held
such suits are authorized by the statute. Bell v. Hood, supra; King County v. Seattle
School District No. 1, supra. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S.
109, 299 U. S. 112 (1936); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 228
U. S. 25 (1913).
As respondents recognize, there is nothing in the wording or legislative history of
1331 or in the decisions of this Court which would indicate that there is any basis for
the interpretation they would give that section. Nor do we think the passage of the
Force Act indicates that 1331 does not confer jurisdiction in this case. The Force Act
is limited to election challenges where a denial of the right to vote in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment is alleged. See 28 U.S.C. 1344. Further, the Act was passed
five years before the original version of 1331 was enacted. While it might be inferred
that Congress intended to give each House the exclusive power to decide
congressional election challenges, [Footnote 39] there is absolutely no indication that
the passage of this Act evidences an intention to impose other restrictions on the
broad grant of jurisdiction in 1331.
VI
JUSTICIABILITY
Having concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the District Court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter, we turn to the question whether the case is
justiciable. Two determinations must be made in this regard. First, we must decide
whether the claim
8

Page 395 U. S. 517

presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution.
Second, we must determine whether the structure of the Federal Government renders
the issue presented a "political question" -- that is, a question which is not justiciable
in federal court because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.
A. General Considerations
In deciding generally whether a claim is justiciable, a court must determine whether
"the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and
whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded."
Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 198. Respondents do not seriously contend that the
duty asserted and its alleged breach cannot be judicially determined. If petitioners are
correct, the House had a duty to seat Powell once it determined he met the standing
requirements set forth in the Constitution. It is undisputed that he met those
requirements, and that he was nevertheless excluded.
Respondents do maintain, however, that this case is not justiciable because, they
assert, it is impossible for a federal court to "mold effective relief for resolving this
case." Respondents emphasize that petitioners asked for coercive relief against the
officers of the House, and, they contend, federal courts cannot issue mandamus or
injunctions compelling officers or employees of the House to perform specific official
acts. Respondents rely primarily on the Speech or Debate Clause to support this
contention.
We need express no opinion about the appropriateness of coercive relief in this case,
for petitioners sought a declaratory judgment, a form of relief the District Court could
have issued. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, provides that a district
court may "declare the rights . . . of any interested party . . . whether or not further
relief is or could be sought." The
Page 395 U. S. 518
availability of declaratory relief depends on whether there is a live dispute between the
parties, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), and a request for declaratory relief
may be considered independently of whether other forms of relief are
appropriate. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 93 (1947);
6A J. Moore, Federal Practice 57.08[3] (2d ed.1966); cf. United States v.
California, 332 U. S. 19, 332 U. S. 25-26 (1947). We thus conclude that, in terms of
the general criteria of justiciability, this case is justiciable.
B. Political Question Doctrine
1. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment.
Respondents maintain that, even if this case is otherwise justiciable, it presents only a
political question. It is well established that the federal courts will not adjudicate
political questions. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (1939);Oetjen v.

Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918). In Baker v. Carr, supra, we noted that
political questions are not justiciable primarily because of the separation of powers
within the Federal Government. After reviewing our decisions in this area, we
concluded that on the surface of any case held to involve a political question was at
least one of the following formulations:
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality
Page 395 U. S. 519
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question."
369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 217.
Respondents' first contention is that this case presents a political question because,
under Art. I, 5, there has been a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to
the House of the "adjudicatory power" to determine Powell's qualifications. Thus, it is
argued that the House, and the House alone, has power to determine who is qualified
to be a member. [Footnote 40]
In order to determine whether there has been a textual commitment to a coordinate
department of the Government, we must interpret the Constitution. In other words, we
must first determine what power the Constitution confers upon the House through Art.
I, 5, before we can determine to what extent, if any, the exercise of that power is
subject to judicial review. Respondents
Page 395 U. S. 520
maintain that the House has broad power under 5, and, they argue, the House may
determine which are the qualifications necessary for membership. On the other hand,
petitioners allege that the Constitution provides that an elected representative may be
denied his seat only if the House finds he does not meet one of the standing
qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution.
If examination of 5 disclosed that the Constitution gives the House judicially
unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge whether
prospective members meet those qualifications, further review of the House
determination might well be barred by the political question doctrine. On the other
hand, if the Constitution gives the House power to judge only whether elected
members possess the three standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution,
[Footnote 41] further consideration would be necessary to determine whether any of
the other formulations of the political question doctrine are
9

Page 395 U. S. 521

"inextricable from the case at bar." [Footnote 42] Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S.
217.
In other words, whether there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department" of government and what is the scope
of such commitment are questions we must resolve for the first time in this case.
[Footnote 43] For, as we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, supra,
"[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution."
Id. at 369 U. S. 211.
In order to determine the scope of any "textual commitment" under Art. I, 5, we
necessarily must determine the meaning of the phrase to "be the Judge of the
Qualifications of its own Members." Petitioners argue that the records of the debates
during the Constitutional Convention; available commentary from the postConvention, pre-ratification period, and early congressional applications of Art. I, 5,
support their construction of the section. Respondents insist, however, that a careful
examination of the pre-Convention practices of the English Parliament and American
colonial assemblies demonstrates that, by 1787, a legislature's power to judge the
qualifications of its members was generally understood
Page 395 U. S. 522
to encompass exclusion or expulsion on the ground that an individual's character or
past conduct rendered him unfit to serve. When the Constitution and the debates over
its adoption are thus viewed in historical perspective, argue respondents, it becomes
clear that the "qualifications" expressly set forth in the Constitution were not meant to
limit the long-recognized legislative power to exclude or expel at will, but merely to
establish "standing incapacities," which could be altered only by a constitutional
amendment. Our examination of the relevant historical materials leads us to the
conclusion that petitioners are correct, and that the Constitution leaves the House
[Footnote 44] without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his
constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in
the Constitution.
a. The Pre-Convention Precedents.
Since our rejection of respondents' interpretation of 5 results in significant measure
from a disagreement with their historical analysis, we must consider the relevant
historical antecedents in considerable detail. As do respondents, we begin with the
English and colonial precedents.

The earliest English exclusion precedent appears to be a declaration by the House of

Commons in 1553
"that Alex. Nowell, being Prebendary [i.e., a clergyman] in Westminster, and thereby
having voice in the Convocation House, cannot be a member of this House. . . ."
J. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents: A.D. 1485-1603, p. 596 (2d ed.1930). This
decision, however, was
Page 395 U. S. 523
consistent with a long-established tradition that clergy who participated in their own
representative assemblies or convocations were ineligible for membership in the
House of Commons. [Footnote 45] See 1 E. Porritt, The Unreformed House of
Commons 125 (1963); T. Taswell-Langmead's English Constitutional History 14143
(11th ed. T. Plucknett 1960). The traditional ineligibility of clergymen was recognized
as a standing incapacity. [Footnote 46] See 1 W. Blackstone's Commentaries *175.
Nowell's exclusion, therefore, is irrelevant to the present case, for petitioners
concedes -- and we agree -- that, if Powell had not met one of the standing
qualifications set forth in the Constitution, he could have been excluded under Art. I,
5. The earliest colonial exclusions also fail to support respondents' theory. [Footnote
47]
Page 395 U. S. 524
Respondents' remaining 16th and 17th century English precedents all are cases of
expulsion, although some were for misdeeds not encompassed within recognized
standing incapacities existing either at the time of the expulsions or at the time the
Constitution was drafted in 1787. [Footnote 48] Although these early expulsion orders
occasionally contained statements suggesting that the individual expelled was
thereafter ineligible for reelection, at least for the duration of the Parliament from
which he was expelled, [Footnote 49]
Page 395 U. S. 525
there is no indication that any were reelected and thereafter excluded. Respondents'
colonial precedents during this period follow a similar pattern. [Footnote 50]
Apparently the reelection of an expelled member first occurred in 1712. The House of
Commons had expelled Robert Walpole for receiving kickbacks for contracts relating
to "foraging the Troops," 17 H.C.Jour. 28, and committed him to the Tower.
Nevertheless, two months later, he was reelected. The House thereupon resolved
"[t]hat Robert Walpole, Esquire, having been, this Session of Parliament, committed a
Prisoner to the Tower of London, and expelled [from] this House, . . . is incapable of
being elected a Member to serve in this present Parliament. . . ."
Id. at 128. (Second emphasis added.) A new election was ordered, and Walpole was
not reelected. At least two similar exclusions after an initial expulsion were effected in
the American colonies during the first half of the 18th century. [Footnote 51]
10

Page 395 U. S. 526

Respondents urge that the Walpole case provides strong support for their conclusion
that the pre-Convention English and colonial practice was that members-elect could
be excluded for their prior misdeeds at the sole discretion of the legislative body to
which they had been elected. However, this conclusion overlooks an important limiting
characteristic of the Walpole case and of both the colonial exclusion cases on which
respondents rely: the excluded member had been previously expelled. Moreover,
Walpole was excluded only for the remainder of the Parliament from which he had
been expelled. "The theory seems to have been that expulsion lasted as long as the
parliament. . . ." Taswell-Langmead, supra,at 584, n. 99. Accord, 1 W. Blackstone's
Commentaries *176. Thus, Walpole's exclusion justifies only the proposition that an
expulsion lasted for the remainder of the particular Parliament, and the expelled
member was therefore subject to subsequent exclusion if reelected prior to the next
general election. The two colonial cases arguably support a somewhat broader
principle, i.e., that the assembly could permanently expel. Apparently the colonies did
not consistently adhere to the theory that an expulsion lasted only until the election of
a new assembly. M. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies 196-202
(1943). [Footnote 52] Clearly, however, none of these cases supports respondents'
contention that, by the 18th century the English Parliament
Page 395 U. S. 527
and colonial assemblies had assumed absolute discretion to exclude any memberelect they deemed unfit to serve. Rather, they seem to demonstrate that a member
could be excluded only if he had first been expelled.
Even if these cases could be construed to support respondents' contention, their
precedential value was nullified prior to the Constitutional Convention. By 1782, after
a long struggle, the arbitrary exercise of the power to exclude was unequivocally
repudiated by a House of Commons resolution which ended the most notorious
English election dispute of the 18th century -- the John Wilkes case. While serving as
a member of Parliament in 1763, Wilkes published an attack on a recent peace treaty
with France, calling it a product of bribery and condemning the Crown's ministers as
"the tools of despotism and corruption.'" R. Postgate, That Devil Wilkes 53 (1929).
Wilkes and others who were involved with the publication in which the attack
appeared were arrested. [Footnote 53] Prior to Wilkes' trial, the House of Commons
expelled him for publishing "a false, scandalous, and seditious libel." 15 Parl.Hist.Eng.
1393 (1764). Wilkes then fled to France, and was subsequently sentenced to exile. 9
L. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution 37 (1956).
Wilkes returned to England in 1768, the same year in which the Parliament from
which he had been expelled was dissolved. He was elected to the next Parliament,
and he then surrendered himself to the Court of King's Bench. Wilkes was convicted
of seditious libel and sentenced to 22 months' imprisonment. The new Parliament
Page 395 U. S. 528

declared him ineligible for membership and ordered that he be "expelled this House."
16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 545 (1769). Although Wilkes was reelected to fill the vacant seat
three times, each time the same Parliament declared him ineligible and refused to
seat him. See 11 Gipson, supra, at 207-215. [Footnote 54]
Wilkes was released from prison in 1770, and was again elected to Parliament in
1774. For the next several years, he unsuccessfully campaigned to have the
resolutions expelling him and declaring him incapable of reelection expunged from the
record. Finally, in 1782, the House of Commons voted to expunge them, resolving that
the prior House actions were "subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of
this kingdom." 22 Parl.Hist.Eng. 1411 (1782).
With the successful resolution of Wilkes' long and bitter struggle for the right of the
British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice, it is evident that, on
the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English precedent stood for the proposition
that "the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in
parliament" and those qualifications were "not occasional, but fixed." 16 Parl.Hist.Eng.
589, 590 (1769). Certainly English practice did not support, nor had it ever supported,
respondents' assertion that the power to judge qualifications was generally
understood to encompass the right to exclude members-elect for general misconduct
not within standing qualifications. With the repudiation in 1782 of the only two
precedents
Page 395 U. S. 529
for excluding a member-elect who had been previously expelled, [Footnote 55] it
appears that the House of Commons also repudiated any "control over the eligibility of
candidates, except in the administration of the laws which define their [standing]
qualifications." T. May's Parliamentary Practice 66 (13th ed. T. Webster
1924). See Taswell-Langmead, supra, at 585. [Footnote 56]
The resolution of the Wilkes case similarly undermined the precedential value of the
earlier colonial exclusions, for the principles upon which they had been based were
repudiated by the very body the colonial assemblies sought to imitate and whose
precedents they generally followed. See Clarke, supra, at 54, 59-60, 196. Thus, in
1784, the Council of Censors of the Pennsylvania Assembly [Footnote 57] denounced
the prior expulsion of an unnamed assemblyman, ruling that his expulsion had not
been effected in conformity with the recently enacted Pennsylvania Constitution.
[Footnote 58] In the course of its report, the
Page 395 U. S. 530
Council denounced by name the Parliamentary exclusions of both Walpole and
Wilkes, stating that they "reflected dishonor on none but the authors of these
violences." Pennsylvania Convention Proceedings: 1776 and 1790, p. 89 (1825).
Wilkes' struggle and his ultimate victory had a significant impact in the American
colonies. His advocacy of libertarian causes [Footnote 59] and his pursuit of the right
to be
11

Page 395 U. S. 531

seated in Parliament became a cause celebre for the colonists.
"[T]he cry of 'Wilkes and Liberty' echoed loudly across the Atlantic Ocean as wide
publicity was given to every step of Wilkes' public career in the colonial press. . . . The
reaction in America took on significant proportions. Colonials tended to identify their
cause with that of Wilkes. They saw him as a popular hero and a martyr to the
struggle for liberty. . . . They named towns, counties, and even children in his honour."
11 Gipson, supra, at 222. [Footnote 60] It is within this historical context that we must
examine the Convention debates in 1787, just five years after Wilkes' final victory.
Page 395 U. S. 532
b. Convention Debates
Relying heavily on Charles Warren's analysis [Footnote 61] of the Convention
debates, petitioners argue that the proceedings manifest the Framers' unequivocal
intention to deny either branch of Congress the authority to add to or otherwise vary
the membership qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution. We do not
completely agree, for the debates are subject to other interpretations. However, we
have concluded that the records of the debates, viewed in the context of the bitter
struggle for the right to freely choose representatives which had recently concluded in
England and in light of the distinction the Framers made between the power to expel
and the power to exclude, indicate that petitioners' ultimate conclusion is correct.
The Convention opened in late May, 1787. By the end of July, the delegates adopted,
with a minimum of debate, age requirements for membership in both the Senate and
the House. The Convention then appointed a Committee of Detail to draft a
constitution incorporating these and other resolutions adopted during the preceding
months. Two days after the Committee was appointed, George Mason, of Virginia,
moved that the Committee consider a clause "requiring certain qualifications of landed
property & citizenship'" and disqualifying from membership in Congress persons who
had unsettled accounts or who were indebted to the United States. 2 Farrand 121. A
vigorous debate ensued. Charles Pinckney and General Charles C. Pinckney, both of
South Carolina, moved to extend these incapacities to both the judicial and executive
branches of the new government. But John Dickinson, of Delaware, opposed the
inclusion of any statement of qualifications in the Constitution. He argued that it would
be
"impossible
Page 395 U. S. 533
to make a compleat one, and a partial one would, by implication, tie up the hands of
the Legislature from supplying the omissions."
Id. at 123. [Footnote 62] Dickinson's argument was rejected, and, after eliminating the
disqualification of debtors and the limitation to "landed" property, the Convention

adopted Mason's proposal to instruct the Committee of Detail to draft a property

qualification. Id. at 116-117.
The Committee reported in early August, proposing no change in the age requirement;
however, it did recommend adding citizenship and residency requirements for
membership. After first debating what the precise requirements should be, on August
8, 1787, the delegates unanimously adopted the three qualifications embodied in Art.
I, 2. Id. at 213. [Footnote 63]
On August 10, the Convention considered the Committee of Detail's proposal that the
"Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform
qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said
Legislature shall seem expedient."
Id. at 179. The debate on this proposal discloses much about the views of the
Framers on the issue of qualifications. For example, James Madison urged its
rejection, stating that the proposal would vest
"an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and
elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt., and ought to be fixed by the
Constitution. If the Legislature
Page 395 U. S. 534
could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic
may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number
capable of being elected as the number authorised to elect. . . . It was a power also
which might be made subservient to the views of one faction agst. another.
Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised by the stronger in order
to keep out partizans of [a weaker] faction."
Id. at 249-250. [Footnote 64] Significantly, Madison's argument was not aimed at the
imposition of a property qualification as such, but rather at the delegation to the
Congress of the discretionary power to establish any qualifications. The parallel
between Madison's arguments and those made in Wilkes' behalf is striking. [Footnote
65]
Page 395 U. S. 535
In view of what followed Madison's speech, it appears that, on this critical day, the
Framers were facing and then rejecting the possibility that the legislature would have
power to usurp the "indisputable right [of the people] to return whom they thought
proper" [Footnote 66] to the legislature. Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, noted that a
legislative power to establish property qualifications was exceptional, and "dangerous
because it would be much more liable to abuse." Id. at 250. Gouverneur Morris then
moved to strike "with regard to property" from the Committee's proposal. His intention
was "to leave the Legislature entirely at large." Ibid. Hugh Williamson, of North
Carolina, expressed concern that, if a majority of the legislature should happen to be
"composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, . . . the future
12

elections might be secured to their own body." Ibid. [Footnote 67] Madison then
referred to the British Parliament's assumption of the power to regulate the
qualifications of both electors and the elected, and noted that
"the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made
the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or
Religious parties."

Id. at 178. However, as finally drafted by the Committee of Style, these qualifications
were stated in their present negative form. Respondents note that there are no
records of the "deliberations" of the Committee of Style. Nevertheless, they speculate
that this particular change was designed to make the provision correspond to the form
used by Blackstone in listing the "standing incapacities" for membership in the House
of Commons. See 1 W. Blackstone's Commentaries *175-176. Blackstone, who was
an apologist for the anti-Wilkes forces in Parliament, [Footnote 70]

Ibid. [Footnote 68] Shortly thereafter,

Page 395 U. S. 538

Page 395 U. S. 536

had added to his Commentaries after Wilkes' exclusion the assertion that individuals
who were not ineligible for the Commons under the standing incapacities could still be
denied their seat if the Commons deemed them unfit for other reasons. [Footnote 71]
Since Blackstone's Commentaries was widely circulated in the Colonies, respondents
further speculate that the Committee of Style rephrased the qualifications provision in
the negative to clarify the delegates' intention

the Convention rejected both Gouverneur Morris' motion and the Committee's
proposal. Later the same day, the Convention adopted without debate the provision
authorizing each House to be "the judge of the . . . qualifications of its own
members." Id. at 254.
One other decision made the same day is very important to determining the meaning
of Art. I, 5. When the delegates reached the Committee of Detail's proposal to
empower each House to expel its members, Madison
"observed that the right of expulsion . . . was too important to be exercised by a bare
majority of a quorum, and, in emergencies, [one] faction might be dangerously
abused."
Id. at 254. He therefore moved that "with the concurrence of two-thirds" be inserted.
With the exception of one State, whose delegation was divided, the motion was
unanimously approved without debate, although Gouverneur Morris noted his
opposition. The importance of this decision cannot be overemphasized. None of the
parties to this suit disputes that, prior to 1787, the legislative powers to judge
qualifications and to expel were exercised by a majority vote. Indeed, without
exception, the English and colonial antecedents to Art. I, 5, cls. 1 and 2, support this
conclusion. Thus, the Convention's decision to increase the vote required to expel,
because that power was "too important to be exercised by a bare majority," while at
the same time not similarly restricting the power to judge qualifications, is compelling
evidence that they considered the latter already limited by the standing qualifications
previously adopted. [Footnote 69]
Page 395 U. S. 537
Respondents urge, however, that these events must be considered in light of what
they regard as a very significant change made in Art. I, 2, cl. 2, by the Committee of
Style. When the Committee of Detail reported the provision to the Convention, it read:
"Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five
years at least; shall have been a citizen of [in] the United States for at least three
years before his election, and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the
State in which he shall be chosen."

"only to prescribe the standing incapacities without imposing any other limit on the
historic power of each house to judge qualifications on a case by case basis.
[Footnote 72]"
Respondents' argument is inherently weak, however, because it assumes that
legislative bodies historically possessed the power to judge qualifications on a caseby-case basis. As noted above, the basis for that conclusion was the Walpole and
Wilkes cases, which, by the time of the Convention, had been denounced by the
House of Commons and repudiated by at least one State government. Moreover,
respondents' argument misrepresents the function of the Committee of Style. It was
appointed only "to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed
to. . . ." 2 Farrand 553.
Page 395 U. S. 539
"[T]he Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of
substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so,
and certainly the Convention had no belief . . . that any important change was, in fact,
made in the provisions as to qualifications adopted by it on August 10. [Footnote 73]"
Petitioners also argue that the post-Convention debates over the Constitution's
ratification support their interpretation of 5. For example, they emphasize Hamilton's
reply to the anti-federalist charge that the new Constitution favored the wealthy and
well born:
"The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference
apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may
elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the
national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of
the times, the places, the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who
may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined
and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature."
13

The Federalist Papers 371 (Mentor ed.1961). (Emphasis in last sentence added.)

Page 395 U. S. 542

Page 395 U. S. 540

failure to meet the Constitution's standing qualifications. For almost the first 100 years
of its existence, however, Congress strictly limited its power to judge the qualifications
of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution.

Madison had expressed similar views in an earlier essay, [Footnote 74] and his
arguments at the Convention leave no doubt about his agreement with Hamilton on
this issue.
Respondents counter that Hamilton was actually addressing himself to criticism of Art.
I, 4, which authorizes Congress to regulate the times, places, and manner of
electing members of Congress. They note that prominent anti-federalists had argued
that this power could be used to "confer on the rich and well-born all honours." Brutus
No. IV, N.Y. Journal, Nov. 29, 1787, p. 7. (Emphasis in original.) Respondents'
contention, however, ignores Hamilton's express reliance on the immutability of the
qualifications set forth in the Constitution. [Footnote 75]
The debates at the state conventions also demonstrate the Framers' understanding
that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution.
Before the New York convention, for example, Hamilton emphasized:
"[T]he true principle of a republic is that
Page 395 U. S. 541
the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is
imperfect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of
free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded
liberty allowed."
2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876) (hereinafter cited as
Elliot's Debates). [Footnote 76] In Virginia, where the Federalists faced powerful
opposition by advocates of popular democracy, Wilson Carey Nicholas, a future
member of both the House and Senate and later Governor of the State, met the
arguments that the new Constitution violated democratic principles with the following
interpretation of Art. I, 2, cl. 2, as it respects the qualifications of the elected:
"It has ever been considered a great security to liberty that very few should be
excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This Constitution has amply
attended to this idea. We find no qualifications required except those of age and
residence, which create a certainty of their judgment being matured, and of being
attached to their state."
3 Elliot's Debates 8.
c. Post-Ratification.
As clear as these statements appear, respondents dismiss them as "general
statements . . . directed to other issues." [Footnote 77] They suggest that far more
relevant is Congress' own understanding of its power to judge qualifications as
manifested in post-ratification exclusion cases. Unquestionably, both the House and
the Senate have excluded members-elect for reasons other than their

Congress was first confronted with the issue in 1807, [Footnote 78] when the eligibility
of William McCreery was challenged because he did not meet additional residency
requirements imposed by the State of Maryland. In recommending that he be seated,
the House Committee of Elections reasoned:
"The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with relation to the case
submitted to them, and find that qualifications of members are therein determined
without reserving any authority to the State Legislatures to change, add to, or diminish
those qualifications, and that, by that instrument, Congress is constituted the sole
judge of the qualifications prescribed by it, and are obliged to decide agreeably to the
Constitutional rules. . . ."
17 Annals of Cong. 871 (1807). Lest there be any misunderstanding of the basis for
the committee's recommendation, during the ensuing debate, the chairman explained
the principles by which the committee was governed:
"The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of members to have been
unalterably determined
Page 395 U. S. 543
by the Federal Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that which framed
the Constitution at first; that neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested
with authority to add to those qualifications, so as to change them. . . . Congress, by
the Federal Constitution, are not authorized to prescribe the qualifications of their own
members, but they are authorized to judge of their qualifications; in doing so, however,
they must be governed by the rules prescribed by the Federal Constitution, and by
them only. These are the principles on which the Election Committee have made up
their report, and upon which their resolution is founded."
Id. at 872. The chairman emphasized that the committee's narrow construction of the
power of the House to judge qualifications was compelled by the "fundamental
principle in a free government," id. at 873, that restrictions upon the people to choose
their own representatives must be limited to those "absolutely necessary for the safety
of the society."Id. at 874. At the conclusion of a lengthy debate, which tended to center
on the more narrow issue of the power of the States to add to the standing
qualifications set forth in the Constitution, the House agreed by a vote of 89 to 18 to
seat Congressman McCreery. Id. at 1237. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of
Representatives of the United States 414 (1907) (hereinafter cited as Hinds).
There was no significant challenge to these principles for the next several decades.
[Footnote 79] They came under heavy
Page 395 U. S. 544
14

attack, however,
"during the stress of civil war, [but initially] the House of Representatives declined to
exercise the power [to exclude], even under circumstances of great provocation.
[Footnote 80]"
Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
12, p. 7 (1967). The abandonment of such restraint, however, was among the
casualties of the general upheaval produced in war's wake. In 1868, the House voted
for the first time in its history to exclude a member-elect. It refused to seat two duly
elected representatives for giving aid and comfort to the Confederacy. See 1 Hinds
449-451. [Footnote 81]
"This change was produced by the North's bitter emnity toward those who failed to
support the Union cause during the war, and was effected by the Radical Republican
domination of Congress. It was a shift brought about by the naked urgency of power,
and was given little doctrinal support."
Comment, Legislative Exclusion: Julian Bond and Adam Clayton Powell, 35
U.Chi.L.Rev. 151, 157 (1967). [Footnote 82] From that time until
Page 395 U. S. 545
the present, congressional practice has been erratic; [Footnote 83] and on the few
occasions when a member-elect was excluded although he met all the qualifications
set forth in the
Page 395 U. S. 546
Constitution, there were frequently vigorous dissents. [Footnote 84] Even the
annotations to the official manual of procedure for the 90th Congress manifest doubt
as to the House's power to exclude a member-elect who has met the constitutionally
prescribed qualifications. See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc. No.
529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 12, pp. 7-8 (1967).
Had these congressional exclusion precedents been more consistent, their
precedential value still would be quite limited.See Note, The Power of a House of
Congress to Judge the Qualifications of its Members, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 673, 679 (1968).
[Footnote 85] That an unconstitutional
Page 395 U. S. 547
action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less
unconstitutional at a later date. Particularly in view of the Congress' own doubts in
those few cases where it did exclude members-elect, we are not inclined to give its
precedents controlling weight. The relevancy of prior exclusion cases is limited largely
to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously,
therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their
proximity to the Convention in 1787. See Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 272 U.
S. 175 (1926). And what evidence we have of Congress' early understanding confirms

our conclusion that the House is without power to exclude any member-elect who
meets the Constitution's requirements for membership.
d. Conclusion
Had the intent of the Framers emerged from these materials with less clarity, we
would nevertheless have been compelled to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a
narrow construction of the scope of Congress' power to exclude members-elect. A
fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words, "that
the people should choose whom they please to govern them." 2 Elliot's Debates 257.
As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this principle is undermined as much by
limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. In apparent
agreement with this basic philosophy, the Convention adopted his suggestion limiting
the power to expel. To allow essentially that same power to be exercised under the
guise of judging qualifications would be to ignore Madison's warning, borne out in the
Wilkes case and some of Congress'
Page 395 U. S. 548
own post-Civil War exclusion cases, against "vesting an improper & dangerous power
in the Legislature." 2 Farrand 249. Moreover, it would effectively nullify the
Convention's decision to require a two-thirds vote for expulsion. Unquestionably,
Congress has an interest in preserving its institutional integrity, but, in most cases,
that interest can be sufficiently safeguarded by the exercise of its power to punish its
members for disorderly behavior and, in extreme cases, to expel a member with the
concurrence of two-thirds. In short, both the intention of the Framers, to the extent it
can be determined, and an examination of the basic principles of our democratic
system persuade us that the Constitution does not vest in the Congress a
discretionary power to deny membership by a majority vote.
For these reasons, we have concluded that Art. I, 5, is, at most, a "textually
demonstrable commitment" to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set
forth in the Constitution. Therefore, the "textual commitment" formulation of the
political question doctrine does not bar federal courts from adjudicating petitioners'
claims.
2. Other Considerations.
Respondents' alternate contention is that the case presents a political question
because judicial resolution of petitioners' claim would produce a "potentially
embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches" of the Federal
Government. But, as our interpretation of Art. I, 5, discloses, a determination of
petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the
Constitution. Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts to
interpret the law, and does not involve a "lack of the respect due [a] coordinate
[branch] of government," nor does it involve an "initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial
Page 395 U. S. 549
15

discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 369 U. S. 217. Our system of government
requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at
variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged
conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their
constitutional responsibility. [Footnote 86] See United States v. Brown, 381 U. S.
437, 381 U. S. 462 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.
579, 343 U. S. 613-614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52, 272 U. S. 293(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed. As to respondents

Jennings, Johnson, and Miller, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment and
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Nor are any of the other formulations of a political question "inextricable from the case
at bar." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 217. Petitioners seek a determination that
the House was without power to exclude Powell from the 90th Congress, which, we
have seen, requires an interpretation of the Constitution -- a determination for which
clearly there are "judicially . . . manageable standards." Finally, a judicial resolution of
petitioners' claim will not result in "multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question." For, as we noted in Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S.
211, it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, we conclude that
petitioners' claim is not barred by the political question doctrine, and, having
determined that the claim is otherwise generally justiciable, we hold that the case is
justiciable.
VII
CONCLUSION
To summarize, we have determined the following: (1) This case has not been mooted
by Powell's seating in
Page 395 U. S. 550
the 91st Congress. (2) Although this action should be dismissed against respondent
Congressmen, it may be sustained against their agents. (3) The 90th Congress' denial
of membership to Powell cannot be treated as an expulsion. (4) We have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this controversy. (5) The case is justiciable.
Further, analysis of the "textual commitment" under Art. I, 5 (see 395 U. S. B(1)),
has demonstrated that, in judging the qualifications of its members, Congress is
limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. Respondents
concede that Powell met these. Thus, there is no need to remand this case to
determine whether he was entitled to be seated in the 90th Congress. Therefore, we
hold that, since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters of the 18th
Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to serve under any provision
of the Constitution, the House was without power to exclude him from its membership.
Petitioners seek additional forms of equitable relief, including mandamus for the
release of petitioner Powell's backpay. The propriety of such remedies, however, is
more appropriately considered in the first instance by the courts below. Therefore, as
to respondents McCormack, Albert, Ford, Celler, and Moore, the judgment of the
16

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18684

September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO

MERCADO
and
MARIANO
PERDICES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as
National Treasurer,respondents.
SYLLABUS1. REDISTRICTING STATUTES; WHO CAN BRING ACTION TO TEST
VALIDITY. Citizens who are deprivedof an election franchise to which they are
entitled under theConstitution by an apportionment act, have sufficient interestto test
its validity.
2. ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO REVIEWAPPORTIONMENT LAWS.
District apportionment lawsare subject to review by the courts. The constitutionality of
alegislative apportionment act is a judicial question.
3. ID.;
ID.;
BASIS
OF
APPORTIONMENT;PRELIMINARY
CENSUS
ENUMERATION. Apportionment of legislative district may legally rest
onofficial census enumeration even if not yet final.
4. ID.;
ID.;
AVOIDANCE
OF
STATUTE;DISPROPORTIONMENT
OF
REPRESENTATION. Republic Act No. 3040 that gave provinces with less number
ofinhabitants more representative districts than those with biggerpopulation is
declared invalid because it violates the principleof proportional representation
prescribed by the Constitution.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Statement of the case. Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented
from implementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts in this
country. It is unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the
House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished
the Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved
more than three years after the return of the last census of our population; and (c) it
apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.
Admitting some allegations but denying others, the respondents aver they were
merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege
to be constitutional. The respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners
have no personality to bring this action; that a duly certified copy of the law creates
the presumption of its having been passed in accordance with the requirements of the
Constitution (distribution of printed bills included); that the Director of the Census

submitted an official report on the population of the Philippines in November, 1960,

which report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the principle
of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution..
After hearing the parties and considering their memoranda, this Court reached the
conclusion that the statute be declared invalid, and, aware of the need of prompt
action, issued its brief resolution of August 23, partly in the following language:
Whereas such Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said constitutional provision in
several ways namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger
number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato
with a bigger population got three only; . . .;
Whereas such violation of the Constitutional mandate renders the law void;
Therefore, without prejudice to the writing of a more extended opinion passing
additionally on other issues raised in the case, the Court resolved, without any
dissent, forthwith to issue the injunction prayed for by the petitioners. No bond is
needed.
What with the reservation announced in the resolution, and what with the motion for
reconsideration, this is now written fully to explain the premises on which our
conclusion rested.
Personality of the petitioners. Petitioners are four members of the House of
Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan, and the
provincial governor of Negros Oriental. They bring this action in behalf of themselves
and of other residents of their provinces. They allege, and this Court finds, that their
provinces had been discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were
given less representative districts than the number of their inhabitants required or
justified: Misamis Oriental having 387,839 inhabitants, was given one district only,
whereas Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants, was given two districts; Negros Oriental and
Bulacan with 598,783 and 557,691 respectively, were allotted 2 representative
districts each, whereas Albay with 515,961 was assigned 3 districts.
The authorities hold that "citizens who are deprived of as full and effective an elective
franchise as they are entitled to under the Constitution by an apportionment act, have
a sufficient interest to proceed in a court to test the statute. (18 Am. Jur. 199.)
Therefore, petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved
provinces have personality to sue.
In Stiglitz vs. Schardien (Ky) 40 S.W. (2d) 315, the right of a citizen to question the
validity of a redistricting statute was upheld. The same right was recognized in Jones
vs. Freeman (Okla.) 146 P. (2d) 564, the court saying that each citizen has the right to
have the State apportioned in accordance with the Constitution and to be governed by
a Legislative fairly representing the whole body of electorate and elected as required
by the Constitution.

17

Colegrove vs. Green, 328 .U.S. 549, on which respondents rely, appear to be
inconclusive: three against three. The seventh justice concurred in the result even
supposing the contrary was justiciable."
The printed-form, three-day requirement. The Constitution provides that "no bill
shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof
in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage,
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment."
Petitioners presented certificates of the Secretary of the House of Representatives to
show that no printed copy had been distributed three days before passage of the bill
(on May 10, 1961) and that no certificate of urgency by the President had been
received in the House.
The respondents claim in their defense that a statute may not be nullified upon
evidence of failure to print, because "it is conclusively presumed that the details of
legislative procedure leading to the enrollment that are prescribed by the Constitution
have been complied with by the Legislature." They further claim that the certificates of
the Secretary of the House are inadmissible, in view of the conclusive (enrolled-bill)
presumption, which in several instances have been applied by the courts. In further
support of their contention, Sec. 313(2) of Act 190 might be cited.1
On the other hand, it may be said for the petitioners, that such printed bill requirement
had a fundamental purpose to serve2 and was inserted in the Constitution not as a
mere procedural step; and that the enrolled-bill theory, if adopted, would preclude the
courts from enforcing such requirement in proper cases.
We do not deem it necessary to make a definite pronouncement on the question,
because the controversy may be decided upon the issue of districts-in-proportion-toinhabitants.1awphl.nt
Population Census. According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law,
make an apportionment (of Members of the House) within three years after the return
of every enumeration, and not otherwise." It is admitted that the bill, which later
became Republic Act 3040, was based upon a report submitted to the President by
the Director of the Census on November 23, 1960. It reads:
I have the honor to submit herewith a preliminary count of the population of the
Philippines as a result of the population enumeration which has just been completed.
This is a report on the total number of inhabitants in this country and does not include
the population characteristics. It is the result of a hand tally and may be subject to
revision when all the population schedules shall have been processed mechanically.
The Census of Population is the first of a series of four censuses which include
housing, agriculture and economics in addition to population. These four censuses
together constitute what is known as the Census of 1960. Like population, the housing
and agricultural censuses are undergoing processing, while the economic census is
now under preparation.

Until the final report is made, these figures should be considered as official for all
purposes.
Petitioners maintain that the apportionment could not legally rest on this report since it
is merely "preliminary" and "may be subject to revision." On the other hand,
respondents point out that the above letter says the report should be considered
"official for all purposes." They also point out that the ascertainment of what
constitutes a return of an enumeration is a matter for Congress action. This issue
does not clearly favor petitioners, because there are authorities sustaining the view
that although not final, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be
considered official, in the sense that Governmental action may be based thereon even
in matters of apportionment of legislative districts (Cahill vs. Leopold [Conn.] 108 Atl.
2d 818). (See also Elliott vs. State, 1 Pac. 2d 370; Ervin vs. State, 44 S.W. 2d 380;
Herndon vs. Excise Board, 295 Pac. 223; Holcomb vs. Spikes, 232 S.W. 891.)
Apportionment of Members. The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty
Members of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective
inhabitants." In our resolution on August 23, we held that this provision was violated
by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a
bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while
Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants
than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having been
assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with
903,224 got three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less
inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one
member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the
only instances of unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3
whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then,
Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants
got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less
inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
Such disproportion of representation has been held sufficient to avoid apportionment
laws enacted in States having Constitutional provisions similar to ours. For instance,
in Massachusetts, the Constitution required division "into representative district . . .
equally, as nearly as may be, according to the relative number of legal voters in the
several districts." The Supreme Judicial Court of that state found this provision
violated by an allotment that gave 3 representatives to 7,946 voters and only 2
representatives to 8,618 voters, and further gave two representatives to 4,854 voters
and one representative to 5,598 voters. Justice Rugg said:
It is not an approximation to equality to allot three representatives to 7,946 voters, and
only two representatives to 8,618 voters, and to allot two representatives to 4,854
voters, and one representative to 5,596 voters. . . .
Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment has been before the courts, it has
been held to be contrary to the Constitution. It has been said to be "arbitrary and
capricious and against the vital principle of equality." Houghton County v. Blacker, 92
18

Mich. 638, 647, 653; 16 LRA 432, 52 N.W. 951; Giddings vs. Blacken, 93 Mich. 1, 13,
16 LRA 402, 52 N.W. 944; Barker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 197, 18 LRA 567, 32 NE 836,
33 NE 119; Denney v. State, 144 Ind. 503, 535, 31 LRA 726, 42 N. E. 929.
Other cases along the same line upholding the same view are these:
1. Stiglitz v. Schardien, supra, wherein twelve districts entitled to but six were given
twelve representatives, and twelve districts given twelve only were actually entitled to
twenty-two.
2. Jones v. Freeman, supra, wherein districts entitled to only 3 senators were given 7,
and districts entitled to 15 were assigned seven only.
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing
conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship,
consider the question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to
review by the courts.
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not
one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.
(Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 18 L.R.A. 567, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836; State ex rel.
Morris v. Wrightson, 22 L.R.A. 548, 56 N.J.L. 126, 28 Atl. 56; Harmison v. Ballot
Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S. E. 394)

An injunction to prevent the secretary of state from issuing notices of election under
an unconstitutional apportionment act gerry-mandering the state is not a usurpation of
authority by the court, on the ground that the question is a political one, but the
constitutionality of the act is purely a judicial question. (State ex rel. Adams County v.
Cunningham, 15 L.R.A. 561, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724.)
The fact that the action may have a political effect, and in that sense effect a political
object, does not make the questions involved in a suit to declare the
unconstitutionality of an apportionment act political instead of judicial. (State ex rel.
Lamb v. Cunningham, 17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 48.)
An unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the courts,
notwithstanding the fact that such statute is an exercise of political power. (Denney vs.
State ex rel. Basler, 31 L.R.A. 726, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929.)
The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates
for the house of delegates is a judicial question for the courts, although the statute is
an exercise of political power. (Harmison v. Ballot Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va.
179, 31 S. E. 394.) [3 L.R.A. Digest, p. 2737.)
Conclusion. For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that
Republic Act 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the
political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. (Indiana-Parker v.
Powell (1882) 133 Ind. 178, 18 L.R.A. 567, 32 N. E. 836, 33 N. E. 119; Denney v.
State (1896) 144 Ind. 503; 31 L.R.A. 726, 42 N. E. 929; Marion County v. Jewett
(1915) 184 Ind. 63, 110 N. E. 553.) (Kentucky-Ragland v. Anderson (1907) 125 Ky
141, 128 Am. St. Rep. 242, 100 S. W. 865.) (Massachusetts-Atty. Gen. v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Comrs., etc.)
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political
situation does not render it political instead of judicial. (Lamb v. Cunningham, 17
L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90.) .
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no
excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end
does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the
existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will
opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the
Constitution.
Needless to say, equality of representation3 in the Legislature being such an essential
feature of republican institutions, and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not
with a clear conscience stand by to give free hand to the discretion of the political
departments of the Government. Cases are numerous wherein courts intervened
upon proof of violation of the constitutional principle of equality of representation.
19

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO
GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA,
ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES
LOPEZ
AND
CECILIA
MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,respondents.
Gamboa & Hofilea Law Office for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the
Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on
December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of
stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which,
pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3,
1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and
Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby
separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south
and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west,
north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of
this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a
majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall
appoint the first officials of the province.

SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite
herein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our
Constitution, it is expressly mandated that
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must
exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites
are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at
least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five
hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the
Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive
years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother
province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the
general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring
income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during
which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a
supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein
that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as
scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the
legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed
upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte,
namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador
Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the
end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action will be
ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they asked that the effects of
the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall
have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that
petitioners have brought out.
20

Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot

the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be
enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to
desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January
3, 1986.
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of
Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new province of
Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of
mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to
schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire
Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the same time
making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect,
being a patent legal nullity;
And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial
Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for
expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo
pp. 9-10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the
issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus
curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2,
1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in
Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986
resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to comment,
not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their
Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should
be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is not void on
its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable
demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state
that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond
question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution
because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with.
Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the
proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of
Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte,
de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as
referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents

maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking
and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61),
particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:
1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed
considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the
expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when
certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as
respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from
the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible
constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such
a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one
of validity. ...
3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are
indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a
parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to
ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who
shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will
be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a
matter of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves.
To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They
may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons,
and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of
the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To
rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional
construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give
rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from
provisions in pari materia.
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force
in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local
Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that
the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local
Government Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners
insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would
only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than
the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard,
point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new
province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise
an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.
21

As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot
and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3,
1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that
out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation
of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes
cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of
the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as
"Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation
of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province
created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case
should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of
the new province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear
to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.

Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by
Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated
July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have
the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines
1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8

Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of

Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in
connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the
Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros
Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the
petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from
ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not
longer deserve further consideration.

2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3

Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it
expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:

7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South
and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the
West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or less.
(Emphasis supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were
defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and
Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby
separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a new province
to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south
and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West,
North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.

3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9
4. Manapla......................................................................112.9
5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5
6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6

8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4
9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5
10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)
This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose
it may serve him.
(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new
municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact
that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the
new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth
the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the
uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of the entire
municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D",
22

Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the
portions derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos
City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This
area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers,
representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the
Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and
Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers using
as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density:
1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit
"C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of
petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No.
3644, reads:
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the
creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such
plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new province.

recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries
of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will
abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about
a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the
unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly
scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the
commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by
whatever branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with
favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative
measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would
violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that
this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is
done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court,
nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its
attention.
On the merits of the case.

However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant
change in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite
plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected."

Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of
Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves
around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of
the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:

It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and
towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as
violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI
thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by
the creation of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance, the
voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have been
allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance
with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new
province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be
viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born,
deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its
creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as
there has been fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to
the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant
petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and
should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative
that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the
unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can
be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will
demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted
from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said
constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two
component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of
the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the
authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be
a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The
alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our
23

Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be

observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to
a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the
Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no
different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be
dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged
by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and
motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper
subject of judicial inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to
say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court
cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained
changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and
approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news
articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3,
1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be
reckoned in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to
respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this
Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In
said case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from
existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was
participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the new
municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is,
however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case
is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable
leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression
unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed
prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve
the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly
interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary,
et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is
acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when
certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected."

It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs.
Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the
strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this
Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar
or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no
ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the
ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case
of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May
31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he
therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not
include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended to
ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to
Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant
case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the
present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein
were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local
autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer
retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter
under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated
problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is
the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and
lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to
the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form
the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities
will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the
removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing
province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes
easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province
necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental
and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province
as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or
for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be
affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that
may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned
from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the
24

plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and
twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas,"
what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption
will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary
Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in
said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative
fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or
restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new
province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily
affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained
apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed
province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong
challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added
in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area
affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is
misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province
is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent
province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners.
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del
Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established
Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No
controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the
Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will
lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole
province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing
territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned
and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with
the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a
separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a
substantial alteration of boundary.
As contended by petitioners,
Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional
provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to
each other. A Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two
provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or
units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered.

It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its
boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the
voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its
boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this
case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it
is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive
pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the
ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to
an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from
participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation
of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners
that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on
Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters
of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that
this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no
legal effect for being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null
and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The
Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We
find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas
Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del
Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify
the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the
new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof,
must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be
announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to
settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested,
the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a
suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation,
distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an
amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the
province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not
even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government
Code, as earlier discussed.
25

It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted

by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a
territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate
the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be
more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only
about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative to
the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte.
Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of
the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least
3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the
land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the
submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three
mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new
province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated
therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The
use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and
in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has
reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the
political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means
(a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or
adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when
employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes
physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of
particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with
or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p.
110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous"
is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the
legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory"
embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that
the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with
"land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the
meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words
are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p.
664).

It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but
which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be
said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet)
whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred
by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in
secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple
gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from
guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local
strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of
this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in
the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be
made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the
motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or
unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent
events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the
Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the
patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the
continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their
faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed.
Despite the setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they
valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is
assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the
petitioners herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of
the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an
artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the
statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an
entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in
the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A
construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of
the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).
26

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781

October 6, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN,
and
LUZON
FARMERS
PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786

October 6, 2000

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE
KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795

October 6, 2000

ALAGAD
(PARTIDO
NG
MARALITANG-LUNGSOD),
NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO),
and
LUZON
FARMERS'
PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-

KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN,
AFW,
ANG
LAKAS
OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE
KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must
be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is
mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement
election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by
unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions,
which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations
which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution 1 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; 2 and
27

(2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution 3 of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national,
regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections
may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election
and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members.4 In
effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman
and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of
party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this
statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by
this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House
of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.
2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en
banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to
Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners
and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition

Number
of Percentage
Votes Obtained Total Votes

1. APEC

503,487

5.5%

Rene
M.
Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

Leonardo
Montemayor

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

Diogenes S. Osabel

Nominees
Silos

Q.

28

Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
4.
VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802

3.33%

Eduardo P. Pilapil

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.60%

Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.57%

Patricia M. Sarenas

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.54%

Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut
Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered
186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on
September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional 9 seats
must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to
enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the
House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest
sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system."
(Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos.
1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the
Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and
motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on
the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions
are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
29

13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP

The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously
promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations,
one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the
Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it
proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12
other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of
38" private respondents.10

24. ATUCP

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners
on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list
system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only
parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the
party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

25. NCWP

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

26. ALU

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up,"
the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining
38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified
parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the
Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two
percent threshold?

20. VETERANS CARE

21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP

27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled
the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors:
urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2%
'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the
legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission
from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list
representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin
majority -- with three commissioners concurring 11 and two members12 dissenting -affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the
proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of
petitions for correction of manifest errors."
30

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote

requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented
its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this
statutory threshold.

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers
for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were
filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two
per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made
respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list
seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system.

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the
assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted
additional seats.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from
this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U.
Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana,
for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private
respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P.
Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General
Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective
Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the
following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

The Courts Ruling

First
Issue:
Whether
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

the

Twenty

Percent

The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of

Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant
in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall
comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives,
as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of partylist seats would be 52, computed as follows:
31

208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated
seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is
"No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to
be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature
enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together
with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties,
organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such
allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the
exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent
them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that
the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict
application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list
complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power
to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said
earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions

participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section
11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally,
That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether
to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. 17 Our task now, as
should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless
declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected
and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent
portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point
that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must
have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to
qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the
votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this
will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given
32

by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they
will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the
party-list system, Mr. President."18

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and

encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:

"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of
the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single
party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will
open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty. x x x."24

"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based

at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think,
patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more
particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage
of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes
gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Twoand-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of
500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to
two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three.
So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many
sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat
system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not
have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should
work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. 21 But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might
be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the

seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group,
no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the
entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the threeseat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how
many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to.
The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according
to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those
that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more
than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats
"proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion
of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first
seat.25 Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes
cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled
to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This
proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise,
33

however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A
receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6
percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party
B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law,
all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the
spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered
nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.90

6. AKO

239,042

2.72

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.71

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.68

The Niemeyer Formula

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.64

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.45

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.21

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.16

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.12

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by
multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes
obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered
by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the
number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining
to be allocated

seats

Total
3,429,338
13
32
7
52
No.
of
additional
No. of votes of
seats
of
party
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party,
x
=
party concerned
concerned
those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our
(Integer.decimal)
Total no. of votes of
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
qualified parties
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer
formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
party-list system.
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in
election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would
be as follows:
the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the
Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There
Party
Number of Guaranteed
Additional
Extra
Total
are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by
Votes
Seats
Seats
private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law
1. APEC
503,487
1
5.73
1
7
discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already
mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty
2. ABA
321,646
1
3.66
1
5
system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely
inapplicable to the Philippines.
3. ALAGAD
312,500
1
3.55
4
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes
in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the
4.
VETERANS 304,802
1
3.47
4
Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances
FEDERATION
between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
34

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which
demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical
solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to,
we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional
representation" into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or
amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat
each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
"first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled
to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot
be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the
votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of
the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second
party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first
party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always
be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off,
because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off
could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of
facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 27 that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in
effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party
can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this
Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of
facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only
basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes
shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number
of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to
which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number
of first party

of

votes
=

Total
votes
party-list system

for

Proportion
of
votes
first
party
relative
total votes for party-list system

of
to

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first
party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled
to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment
of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein
18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In
35

such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed
the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
1wphi1

No.
first party

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is
entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.

Additional
seats
for
concerned =
party (ABA)

Additional
seats
for
concerned =
party (ABA)

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:

Additional
seats
=
for concerned
party

Total
No.
for party-list system

of

of

votes

Total
No.
for party list system

No.
of
concerned party

of

votes
x

No.
of
vites
first party (APEC)

of

No.
of
ad
seats
allocate
the first party

321,646
x1=

.64 or 0 additional seat,

rounding off is not to be appli

503,487

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be
as follows:
Organization

Votes
Garnered

%age of Initial
Total
No.
Votes
of Seats

Additional
Seats

1. APEC

503,487

5.50%

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

321,646
/
503,487 * 1 =
0.64

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

312,500
/
503,487 * 1 =
0.62

4.
VETERANS 304,802
FEDERATION

3.33%

304,802
/
503,487 * 1 =
0.61

5. PROMDI

2.79%

255,184

votes

of

No. of additional
seats allocated
to
the first party

of

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional
=
seats
for concerned
party

No.
of ABA

of

x
No.
first party

the firs

of

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

votes

votes

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number
of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the
same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For
example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast.
According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly
higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats
as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal
number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,
therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six
percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

No.
of
concerned party

of

votes

of x

No.
of
additional
seats
allocated to

255,184

36

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

7. NCSFO

238,303

2.60%

8. ABANSE!

235,548

2.57%

9. AKBAYAN!

232,376

2.54%

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

COOP- 189,802

2.07%

PINAY

12.
NATCCO

503,487 * 1 = proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in
0.51
excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two
239,042
/ additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a
503,487 * 1 = party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation.
0.47
But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work
within such extant parameter.
238,303
/
503,487 * 1 = The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party
0.47
(APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the
legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different
321,646
/
formula and methodology.
503,487 * 1 =
0.47
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We
say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify
RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be modified to reflect the
changes willed by the lawmakers.
232,376
/
503,487 * 1 = Epilogue
0.46
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirtyeight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to
215,643
/
a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two
503,487 * 1 =
percent threshold and proportional representation.
0.43 1
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec
194,617
/ effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in
503,487 * 1 = the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent
0.39
any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
28
189,802
/ lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.

503,487 * 1 = Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
0.38
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their
discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
13. COCOFED
186,388
2.04%
1
186,388
/ such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
503,487 * 1 = jurisdiction.29
0.37
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related
laws,30 cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for
end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
its approval and enactment by the legislature.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat,
provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or
an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
37

any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal

showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a
total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the
"proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements
imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it
remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some
time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite
form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives
should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir
them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in
adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under
the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the
remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

38

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

The Case

EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589

objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW),

represented
herein
by
its
secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT
AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS
& HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others
under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO
NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO;
PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN
MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO
(PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA
DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP;
and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment
of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to
the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties
and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party
w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate
in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other
registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March
26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance
the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in
this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional
representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.
39

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact
that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and
coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply
with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law?

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified
List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification
cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing
on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing,
however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed
as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition
within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec
may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in
open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper
because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course
of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution
3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven
the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally
resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
40

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in
the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that
certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House
of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision
sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms.
Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was
to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third
or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained:
"The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in
each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually
in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
41

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may
do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent
with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies."

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis
supplied.)

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the

Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to
our people in the legislature."35

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The
party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the partylist system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to
become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
42

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive,
it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented
under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that
words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are
associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General
submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that
any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could
participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino
citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the
super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list
system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests
of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor,
Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of
bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is

that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from
the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the
number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the partylist system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate,
as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State
cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social
justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never
gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and
who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the nonmarginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance
of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to
enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law
43

could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker
of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions

benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus,
there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their
individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and
purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941
is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied
plainly and simply.

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.

Fourth Issue:

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary

source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation,
such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being
construed. 47

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it
seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG
as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized
and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in
clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted
to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will

Grave Abuse of Discretion

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,

violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the
May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of
getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll
watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the partylist election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic
Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination
of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved
groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa
Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
44

Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition,
then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The following discussion is also pertinent:

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in
its work.

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS

GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate
that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a
priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a
religious sect as a political party."58

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In
other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly
situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following
quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is,
the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
53

Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the
following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides
to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will
that also not fall within this prohibition?

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni
Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA

7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation
of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section
2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x
x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

45

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list
system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation
of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only
illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to
enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2
of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the
youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to
give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party,
national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61

tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the
prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all.
Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery
of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment.
Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and
the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED
to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for
seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit
to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
1wphi1.nt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until
after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such
46

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO
A.
AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent
democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a
democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant
in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public
policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning
candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so
noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.
Among others, Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of
candidacy, viz:.

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a
petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter lacked the

residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section

6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition
was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed
another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This
time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the
dismissal of the disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein
petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2,
1995, 5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1,

1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28,1995 7 and Affidavit of

Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against respondent
AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative
in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED. 9

(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3)
candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered
thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another
candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten
(35,910) votes. 10

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That
I will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;
That the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my
knowledge. 1

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution
dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation
of petitioner.
47

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's

proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15,
1995 is now made permanent.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the
proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of
votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati,
until the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have
been resolved by the Commission.

Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election
returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be
immediately be proclaimed.

The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate

implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise
directed to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to
calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in
the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED. 11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift
order of suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and
Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of
whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is
lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en
banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the
case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend
its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be
heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be
studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati
City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of
residence. Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent

SO ORDERED. 13

assailing the orders dated May 15,

1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued
by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the following errors for
consideration, to wit:
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari

14

A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER
THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND
THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER
FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION
17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION
HAS
TO
BE
JUDICIOUSLY
REVIEWED
AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR
IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND
DESPITE THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING
THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF
ONLY NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
D

48

THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY

REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR
AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF
PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING
QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF
YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON
WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED
AS
SUBSTITUTE
WINNER. 15
I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May
8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications to run for member of the House of Representatives. He claims that
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of
jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave
abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning
candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate
to the House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest
number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for
either the Senate or the House only when the latter becomemembers of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been

and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a
member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the
Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is
ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension
of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's
contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been
established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election,
the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646
to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates Section 6 states:
proclaimed

16

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a
candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the
suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt
is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest
that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the
application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on
ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicileof choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a
period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for election

law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

49

this Court held that

the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with
"domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court there held: 20
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives

19

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of

residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain
the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding
the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially considering that
the provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,

eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of
residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers
or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community"

from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community

for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs
of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met
by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given
period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by
choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the
threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a
period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative
District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was
domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the
May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he

was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at
various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of
his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged
lease agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed
Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the
kind
of
permanency
required
to
prove
abandonment
of
one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years,
and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l)
year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or
to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in
Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the
condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate
that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to
50

acquire's new residence ordomicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for

Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear
and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the
conditions stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or
otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which
the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for
the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As
the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:

The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order
instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate
receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.

[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do
better. 29

thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed
could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been
disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been
different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the
campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The
nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be
to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These requirements are hardly met by

the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change

of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of
clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District
of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, thedomicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one
year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks
basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from
part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.
That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new
Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of
taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC
did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the
Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a
place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first
prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election
law purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III

To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the
qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the
democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings
behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead
not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the

In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one
end to the other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid,

votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate provided the

people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith that at the time of
the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes
cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the
next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to
this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving
the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
this Court held that votes cast in favor of a noncandidate in view of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a
ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in the canvassing of
election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent
votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a
candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the
proclamation of the only candidate left in the disputed position.
Then in Ticson v. Comelec,

33

51

we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the

candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the
event the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible. We held
in Geronimo:
In Geronimo v. Ramos

34

[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally

guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

we made a turnabout from our previous ruling

in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified
candidate fall within the category of invalid or non-existent votes because a
disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law," reverting
to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
However, in Santos v. Comelec

the

more

recent

cases

of Labo,

Jr. v. Comelec

36

The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate
was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings
Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of
the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for
the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest number
of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who
is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not
possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election as provided by law,
the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position
cannot assume the vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).

35

Abella
v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the
ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be
declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be
declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our
pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramosthat:
In

that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent
disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import
of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

we

declared

in

the

latest

case

of Labo,

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of
city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner
Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification
case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to
petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from
voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to
be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of
finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
actingC.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes
(Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)

52

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed
in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning
v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the
votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and
void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty
resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect
petitioner Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo
turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office.

cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality

of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring
herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's
Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks
the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic
government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those
laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they
dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as
petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership
in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the
voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our
Order restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the
next highest number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of
Makati City is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to
the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number
than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of
Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot,
in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an
election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the
remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view
supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English court
decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though

obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number

that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically,
the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to
proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover,
even in instances where the votes received by the second placer may not be
considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so
volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should
the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner
among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than
the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an
election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes
53

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility
of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor
on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order
be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on

the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the
COMELEC's
Head
Office
in
Intramuros,
Manila
on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning
respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as
a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is
not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte
in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on
her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred
that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which
she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated
that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
54

Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of

disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District
of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of
Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can
be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner
wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on
the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she
interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in
the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails
to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she
cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the
case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations
which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended
primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that
case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks
to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in
the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating
candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency
in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness
to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from
her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of
the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her

letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters
thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro
Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994
which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she
filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to
be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her
55

residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented
any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention
to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District
of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on
January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24,
1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant reexamination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's

proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives
56

as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting
the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual

to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man
may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and
a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to
the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
57

which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and
events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8.
RESIDENCE
IN
THE
CONSTITUENCY
WHERE
I
SEEK
TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence
in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted
down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries
in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she
could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution
of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that
petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades
except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided
in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,

following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have
served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC
stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention
of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who
left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers
himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or
lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially
in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to
his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation
why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome
by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting
its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
58

jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional

commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese
School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born
in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up
in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in
different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting
well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they
were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil
Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot
be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both
terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is
one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of
physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.
59

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or

residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part
of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive
act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from
one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move
his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and
the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to
live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences
(as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the
domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and
the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent
with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times
they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that
"[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could
not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs.Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province
of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of
the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we
are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
60

decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the
Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to
the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the
marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return
of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily
have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix
as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places
as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The

provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the

intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear
is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission
to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested
in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila
merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh
heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
61

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified

time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on

grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public
by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

SO ORDERED.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a

limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent
of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from
with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case,
the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial
bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to
reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P.
881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for
us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly
deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes
of the past.

62

Republic
SUPREME COURT

of

the

Philippines

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 163619-20 November 17, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA, TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLOS BOADO, FERNANDO CALONGE, SALVADOR CARRERA,
BENITO CARRERA, DOMINGO CARRERA, and ROGELIO DE
VERA, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO
CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR MAYOR, TESS
DUMPIT-MICHELENA, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLOS BOADO, FERNANDO CALONGE, SALVADOR CARRERA,
BENITO CARRERA, DOMINGO CARRERA, and ROGELIO DE
VERA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the 9 March 2004
Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Second
Division and the 7 May 2004 Resolution 3 of the COMELEC En Banc in
SPA 04-0154 and SPA 04-016.5
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled the certificate of candidacy of
Tess Dumpit-Michelena ("Dumpit-Michelena") on the ground of material
misrepresentation. The COMELEC En Banc denied Dumpit-Michelenas
motion for reconsideration for late filing.
The Antecedent Facts

Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the

municipality of Agoo, La Union during the 10 May 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De
Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo
Carrera ("Boado, et al.") sought Dumpit-Michelenas disqualification and
the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of
material misrepresentation under Sections 746 and 787 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 ("Omnibus Election Code").
Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of
Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. ("Congressman Dumpit") of the Second
District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al.
claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and was a registered voter of
Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her
registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on 24 October
2003. Her presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only
after she filed her certificate of candidacy. Boado, et al. presented, among
other things, a joint affidavit of all barangay officials of San Julian West to
prove that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of the barangay.
Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in
San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman
Dumpit, a residential lot on 19 April 2003. She even designated one
Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential house. DumpitMichelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in
San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in the area.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
In a Resolution issued on 9 March 2004, the COMELEC Second Division
ruled, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions are hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby adjudged to be a non-resident of Brgy.
San Julian West, Agoo, La Union for purposes of the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. Accordingly, her Certificate of
Candidacy is hereby CANCELLED on the ground of material
misrepresentation under Sections 78 and 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code, as amended, in relation to Comelec Resolution No. 6452.
SO ORDERED.8

63

The COMELEC Second Division held that Boado, et al. established by

convincing evidence that Dumpit-Michelena is not a bona fide resident of
San Julian West, Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division found
that among the neighbors of Dumpit-Michelena who executed affidavits in
her favor, only one is a resident of San Julian West. The others are from
other barangays of Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division
noted that several affiants who declared that Dumpit-Michelena resides in
San Julian West later retracted their statements on the ground that they
did not read the contents of the documents when they signed the
affidavits.
Dumpit-Michelena moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division.
In a Resolution issued on 7 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc denied
Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc
ruled that the motion for reconsideration was filed three days after the last
day of the prescribed period for filing the motion.
Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.
The Issues
The issues raised in the petition are the following:
1. Whether Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration was filed on
time;
2. Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and
3. Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
On Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration
We rule that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration for late filing.
Resolution No. 64529 provides:

(3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution,
order and ruling.
Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the
Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall,
within two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en
banc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for
reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three
(3) days from the certification thereof.
In this case, the Resolution cancelling Dumpit-Michelenas Certificate of
Candidacy was promulgated in open court on 9 March 2004. DumpitMichelenas counsel was present during the promulgation. Following
Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452, Dumpit-Michelena had until 12 March
2004 within which to file her motion for reconsideration. However, while
Dumpit-Michelena claims to be familiar with Resolution No. 6452, she
filed her motion for reconsideration on 15 March 2004. This is because
during the promulgation of the cases on 9 March 2004, the COMELEC
Second Division issued an Order10 which states:
On call of these cases today for promulgation, counsels for the
respondent appeared. There was no appearance for the petitioners.
Counsel manifested that they filed a manifestation and motion and an
urgent motion holding in abeyance the promulgation of the resolution of
these cases. The motions to hold in abeyance the promulgation is hereby
denied. However, the respondent may file a motion for reconsideration
within five (5) days from receipt of the decision if the decision is adverse
to their client. (Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, the COMELEC committed an oversight in declaring that
Dumpit-Michelena had five days within which to file her motion for
reconsideration. The COMELEC overlooked Resolution No. 6452. For her
part, Dumpit-Michelena only followed the period provided in the Order.
She filed her motion for reconsideration on 15 March 2004 since 14
March 2004 fell on a Sunday. This Court can hardly fault her for following
the COMELEC Order.
On Denial of Due Process

SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a

decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be filed within three
64

Dumpit-Michelena asserts that she was denied due process when the
COMELEC summarily resolved the disqualification case against her
without giving her a fair opportunity to submit additional evidence to
support her case.
Resolution No. 6452 delegates the reception of evidence in
disqualification cases to field officials designated by the COMELEC. 11 The
summary nature of disqualification proceedings is provided under Section
5(A)(6) of Resolution No. 6452 which states:
6. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies,
the parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence including their position paper or memorandum
within a period of three (3) inextendible days;
The position paper or memorandum of each party shall contain the
following:
a. A "Statement of the Case", which is a clear and concise statement of
the nature of the action, a summary of the documentary evidence and
other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the
controversy;
b. A "Statement of the Issues", which is a clear and concise statement of
the issues;
c. The "Argument" which is a clear and concise presentation of the
argument in support of each issue; and
d. The "Relief" which is a specification of the judgment which the party
seeks to obtain. The issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included in
the Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a
summation of the parties pleadings and documentary evidence, the
Commission may consider the memorandum alone in deciding or
resolving the petition.
In these cases, Dumpit-Michelena filed a motion for the inhibition of Atty.
Marino V. Salas ("Atty. Salas"), the Provincial Election Supervisor and
hearing officer designated to receive the evidence of the parties. She
alleged that Boado, et al.s counsel was the former Regional Director of
the COMELEC Regional Office and undue influence might be exerted
over Atty. Salas. In the meanwhile, she submitted a "semblance of a
memorandum if only to insure x x x that she would be able to convey her

opposition to the petitions filed against her." 12 Dumpit-Michelena alleged

that she wanted to submit her evidence to a hearing officer who would not
be biased and would not be inclined to side with Boado, et al.
Without resolving the Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Salas forwarded the records
of the case to COMELEC Manila. However, to obviate suspicion of
partiality, Atty. Salas did not make any recommendation as required under
Resolution No. 6452.
We rule that there was no denial of due process in the cases before the
Court.
Section 5(A) of Resolution No. 6452 provides:
7. The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of
the filing of the answer. The Hearing Officer concerned shall personally or
through his authorized representative submit to the Clerk of the
Commission his Hearing/Case report(s) indicating his findings and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing
and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;
8. Upon receipt of the records of the case [indicating] the findings and
recommendations of the Hearing Officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and
calendar the same for raffle to a division;
9. The division to whom the case is raffled shall, after evaluation and
consultation, assign immediately the same to a member who shall pen
the decision within five (5) days from the date of consultation.
Resolution No. 6452 is clear. The hearing officer is only designated to
hear and receive evidence. His conclusions are merely recommendatory
upon the COMELEC. Dumpit-Michelena knew fully well that the entire
records of the case would be forwarded to COMELEC Manila for the
resolution of the cases. She had all the opportunity to present her
evidence to support her stand. Instead, she chose to file a Memorandum
which she described as one "done in half-hearted compliance with the
rules."13 She may not claim now that she was denied due process
because she was unable to present all her evidence before the hearing
officer.
On Residency Requirement
65

Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the

residency requirement.
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the qualifications
for elective provincial, city, municipal andbarangay officials shall be those
provided for in the Local Government Code. Section 39(a) of the Local
Government Code of 199114 states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
The concept of residence in determining a candidates qualification is
already a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used
synonymously with domicile.15 In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives,16 this Court declared:
x x x The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with
domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for
congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the committees concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period
of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22,
1986, p. 87)

xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that resident has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. Delos Reyes: Domicile.
M[r]s. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. Delos Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to
the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as
domicile.
Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and registered
voter of Ambaracao North, Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has
already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thus qualified
to run for the position of mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter
of San Julian West on 24 October 2003.
Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing
her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she
eventually built a house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the
right to vote or to be voted for an office. 17 Further, domicile of origin is not
easily lost.18 To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be
concurrence of the following requirements:
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.19
Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin continues. 20 To effect change, there
66

must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.21 The

intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 22

Resolution dated 7 May 2004 of the COMELEC En Banc with

MODIFICATION that Tess Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration
was not filed late.
SO ORDERED.

The Court agrees with the COMELEC Second Division that DumpitMichelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile.
Among the documents submitted by Dumpit-Michelena is a Special
Power of Attorney23 authorizing Clyde Crispino ("Crispino") to "apply,
facilitate and follow up the issuance of a building permit of the beach
house" she intended to put up in her lot. She also authorized Crispino to
help her caretaker oversee the lot and the construction of the beach
house. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC Second Division, a
beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be
considered a place of residence.
In addition, the designation of caretaker with monthly compensation
of P2,50024 only shows that Dumpit-Michelena does not regularly reside in
the place. The Deed of Absolute Sale states that Dumpit-Michelena is a
resident of Naguilian, La Union25 while the Special Power of Attorney
states that she is a resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No.
6 Butterfly St. Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Metro Manila. Dumpit-Michelena
obviously has a number of residences and the acquisition of another one
does not automatically make the most recently acquired residence her
new domicile.
We considered the affidavits submitted by Dumpit-Michelena where the
affiants retracted their previous affidavits stating that Dumpit-Michelena
was not a resident of San Julian West. The affiants alleged that they
signed the first affidavits without knowing their contents. However, the
COMELEC Second Division pointed out that Boado, et al. also submitted
affidavits with the affiants repudiating their previous affidavits that DumpitMichelena was a resident of San Julian West. The Court is inclined to
give more weight to the joint affidavit of all the barangayofficials of San
Julian West attesting that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of
their barangay.
Hence, the COMELEC Second Division did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in cancelling Dumpit-Michelenas Certificate of Candidacy.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution
dated 9 March 2004 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
67

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

The Facts

G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN.
TEOFISTO
T.
GUINGONA,
JR.
FERNAN, respondents.

filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and important
reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this
Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the
Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as
exceptions to this rule.

and

and

SEN.

SEN.

FRANCISCO

S.

MARCELO

B.

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At
the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
own constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for she sovereign acts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or
even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of
the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition forquo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of
Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the
Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents
and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor
general submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the
Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on
September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition
and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on
September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction 1 to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a

Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)

1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all classified by petitioners
as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F.
Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco
S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago.
By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged
to the "minority."

68

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session
day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but
still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit
that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate
shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members."

Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in

common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter
pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot
exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide
for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full
discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of
selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no
question involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even
the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court
to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not
even any legislative practice to support the petitioners' theory that a senator who
votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority
leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on
the various important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it
has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of
judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a
provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of
Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the
validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the
tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who
was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling
exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration,
however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue
hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that
this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this
country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that
no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter
69

other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective
settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if
this Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered. 17
In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said
that "it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.'
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a
particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members
did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly
within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was
also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
wrote that the Court "had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the
factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous
pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castaeda 23 that "the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon
the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the function
of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character
are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the nonjusticiability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers
characteristic of the presidential system of government the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1)
those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department;
2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and
3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving
rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are
apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere but only within such sphere
each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of

the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability
or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area
allocated thereto by the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met,
or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being
one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed by the
Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such
issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under
the presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system
of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have
neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but
are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and
defend the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky.
589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional
limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope
of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of
the Court. Daza v. Singson,26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses
of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which each chamber
was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue was
justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it involved "the legality,
not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as
prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." The
Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions
questioning, an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the
70

wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the
Court refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that
said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral
tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective
members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire into a
decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled
bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was
properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural
rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further
that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the
Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern.
It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
discretion were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a wellknown constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They
claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded"
judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court

has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question:
In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or
its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote
of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority"
and "minority," as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority"
in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships.
Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority
leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the
legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate
President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the
minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan
and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear
support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of
more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which
were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the
first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen.
71

Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority,

then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo
J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to
assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the
minority. 39 This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority
leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would also show that the "majority"
in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most
number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a
lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may
also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," 41 not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser
would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not
as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind,
themethod of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to
determine the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated
and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. 45Pertinent to the instant case
are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their
duties.

Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal
vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices
and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any
rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province
of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before
the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body 49 at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for
such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court
has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold the
very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of
the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for
this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of
the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department,
this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made
with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII
72

of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty
not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested.
Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity
tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of
Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51

Fourth Issue:

. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches:
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions,
first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power 52 by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be
brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped,
intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57

Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is
restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate,
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that
he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused
of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the
laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this
case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining
who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the
73

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25895 July 23, 1971

FELIZARDO
S.
PACETE, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,respondents.
Petitioner in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The question raised in this mandamus and prohibition proceeding, whether the filing
of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments, without its
being thereafter acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad
interim appointment, is not a new one. That was put to us in Altarejos v. Molo. 1 As

set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the answer must be in the
negative. The confirmation stands; it must be given force and effect. As we
decided then, so we do now. As a consequence, petitioner, as will be more
fully explained, has made out a case for mandamus and prohibition. He is
entitled to the remedies prayed for.
The facts are undisputed. In his suit for mandamus and prohibition filed with this Court
on April 4, 1966, petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the
then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his
duties as such. As his appointment was made during the recess of Congress, it was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. On May 20
of that year, he was unanimously confirmed. As a matter of fact, two days later, he
was sent a congratulatory telegram by the then Senate President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, who was likewise the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments. 2 More

than nine months after such confirmation, to be exact on February 7, 1966,

the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition,
through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position
as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been bypassed. Petitioner was taken by surprise and sought clarification from the

principal respondent, the then Secretary of the Commission on

Appointments. 3 He was informed that on May 21, 1965, a day after his
confirmation, one of the members of the Commission on Appointments, the
then Senator Rodolfo Guanzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was
filing a motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment
of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of
derogatory information which he had received. 4Respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of
Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice
of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated
the confirmation of the appointment in question ... ." 5 Respondent Secretary
of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he
should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly
confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise
named respondent as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's
salaries. 6
Petitioner would buttress his plea for prohibition against the enforcement of the
directive of respondent Secretary of Justice for him to vacate his position
and mandamus to compel respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
to issue to him the certificate of confirmation on the ground that the letter of the then
Senator Guanzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an
appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by
the body as a whole. It is his contention that the confirmation of his appointment had
become final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the
Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965. 7 He further submitted "that the power

to approve or disapprove appointments is conferred by the Constitution on

the Commission on Appointments as a body and not on the members
individually. The Commission exercises this power thru the vote of the
majority of the members present at a quorum as provided by Section 10 of its
Rules. Once an appointment is approved by that majority, the approval
becomes an act of the Commission and it cannot be changed, voided,
vacated or set aside except by the same Commission acting thru the required
majority. A mere motion to reconsider it, unless approved by said majority,
has no force and effect. To contend otherwise is to make the will of a single
member prevail over the will of the Commission and to make that member
more powerful than the very Commission of which he is only a part." 8
In a resolution dated April 13, 1966, this Court required respondents to answer such
petition. In the answer of respondent Secretary of the Commission filed on May 18,
1966, the dismissal of the suit was prayed for on the ground that there was a recall of
the confirmation of petitioners appointment upon the filing of the motion for
reconsideration by Senator Ganzon. It was likewise alleged as a special defense that
there was no infringement of the Constitution, the question involved being merely one
74

of interpretation or construction of the rules of the Commission involving its internal

business which cannot be made a subject of judicial inquiry. 9 The respondent

Secretary of Justice as well as respondent Disbursing Officer of the

Department of Justice, in the answer filed on their behalf on May 21, 1966 by
the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo,
admitted the facts, but sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
with the notification of respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments that petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed,
respondent Secretary of Justice had no alternative but to give it full faith and
credence coming as it did from the agency entrusted by the Constitution with
the power to confirm. 10
At the hearing scheduled on July 20, 1966, the parties after arguing were given an
additional period of ten days within which to submit memoranda of authorities. In
petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his
confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular
session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965, as no rule of the Commission as to a
motion for reconsideration could have the force and effect of defeating the
constitutional provision that an ad interim appointment is effective "until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next session of
the
Congress." 11The memorandum submitted for the respondents squarely

disputed such contention on the view that there could be no confirmation in

the constitutional sense until a motion for reconsideration had been turned
down, invoking at the same time the principle of the respect to be accorded
the actuation of an independent constitutional agency like the Commission on
Appointments.
which
interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any
appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members
present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened
and submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on
any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of
such a motion." Our holding was that the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. There
was a need for its being duly approved. Hence, as set forth at the outset,
petitioner must prevail.
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo,

12

1. Altarejos v. Molo was an original action for mandamus to compel respondent

therein as Secretary of the Commission on Appointments to issue a certificate of
confirmation of petitioner's appointment as Provincial Assessor of Masbate. He was

extended an ad interim appointment on July 24, 1964. He took his oath of office and
qualified as such on August 1, 1964. His appointment was then submitted to the
Commission on Appointments during the regular session of Congress in 1965. It was
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1965. On same day, a
member thereof, Congressman Jose Aldeguer, filed with its Secretary, respondent
Molo, a motion for reconsideration. The next day, there was a motion by the then
Senator Francisco Rodrigo that all pending motions be laid on the table. It was
approved. Then came the adjournment on May 20, 1965. Subsequently, about a week
later, Congressman Aldeguer withdrew his motion for reconsideration.13
This Court gave full attention to the argument that motion for reconsideration of
Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of
petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. It
rejected it. The Chief Justice, who spoke for the Court, explained why: "This pretense
is devoid of merit. Respondent's theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion were approved, and
hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence
of a majority of the members present is necessary. It is inconsistent with Rule 21 of
the Revised Rules of the Commission, reading: "... Resolution of the Commission on
any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more
than none * (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any
motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final

His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision,

the vote of a majority of the members present in favor of the motion for
reconsideration is necessary to "reopen" the appointment and, hence, to
"recall" its confirmation - and to require a resubmission of the appointment for
confirmation." 15 Moreover, in holding that this Court "cannot escape the
conclusion that petitioner's appointment as Provincial Assessor of Masbate"
had been duly confirmed, the Chief Justice likewise noted the categorical
answer of the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments to a question by
Senator Almendras as to the effect of motions for reconsideration unacted
upon after adjournment. Thus: "In case of an adjournment sine die, the
motions for reconsideration are considered as not approved and therefore the
motion for reconsideration are not valid for of any effect whatsoever." 16 When
the question was repeated by Senator Almendras, who did not want to leave
any doubt on the matter, this was the reply of the Chairman: "The ruling of the
Chair is reiterated. In case of an adjournment sine die, the period for filing the
motion for reconsideration having expired, under Sec. 22, then the motion for
reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and, therefore,
has no effect whatsoever. The confirmation, therefore, will stand." 17
disposition of such a motion." 14

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that this Court is committed to the principle
that a mere motion for reconsideration to a confirmation duly made which is not
approved cannot have the effect of setting aside such confirmation, a principle that is
based not merely on the express language of Rule 21, but a reflection of the settled
75

interpretation of the Commission on Appointments speaking through its Chairman.

While on certain aspects not material, the facts of this case may be distinguished,
from Altajeros v. Molo, there being no motion to lay on the table and no withdrawal of
such motion for reconsideration, the principle that calls for application cannot be any
different. What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a
motion for reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved.
2. The Altarejos ruling possesses the merit of interpreting Rule 21 of the Commission
on Appointments conformably to the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on
the appointing power of the President. The first one reads: "The President shall
nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of
colonel, of the Navy and air forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments." 18 The other provision is worded,

thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." 19
A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative
requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in
session and when it is in recess. In the former the President nominates, and only
upon the consent of the Commission Appointments may the person thus named
assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at
once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of
time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the
appointment is effective "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress." 20
The constitutional requirement is clear. There must either be a rejection by the
Commission on Appointments or nonaction on its part. No such thing happened in this
case. Petitioner, as pointed out, had instead in his favor a unanimous vote of
confirmation. He could thus invoke constitutional protection. For respondents to argue
that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in
the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is
provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a
move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the
minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is
indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the
constitutional prescription. Rather it makes a mockery of what is therein ordained.
Petitioner's stand is thus unassailable.

3. Nor does the insistence of respondent Secretary of the Commission on

Appointments, in his answer, that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court, elicit approval. It would extend the boundaries of the political question
doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private
rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and executive orders are not beyond
the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the
Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction
sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public office. It
certainly can be inquired into in an appropriate case, although the utmost deference
should be paid to the interpretation accorded it by the Commission on Appointments
itself. In the terse language of Justice Brandeis, speaking of the rules of the United
States Senate, which, under its Constitution, has the task of confirmation: "As the
construction to be given to the rule affects persons other than members of the Senate,
the question presented is of necessity a judicial one." 21 The task becomes

unavoidable when claims arising from the express language of the

Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism
that under the circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what
the fundamental law ordains.
Such an approach, it is heartening to note, is implicit in the memorandum on behalf of
respondent Secretary of Justice, submitted by the then Solicitor General Barredo.
Thus: "Although the Commission On Appointments is not a power in our tripartite
system of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. (Cf. Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139) Its actuation in the exercise of its power to
approve appointments submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt
from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process. (Cf.
Morero vs. Bocar, 37 O.G. 445)." 22As due process is impressed with both

substantive and procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus

not unduly limited.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation
prayed for by petitioner. The incumbent Secretary of Justice is prohibited from giving
any further force and effect to the Department of Justice directive of February 7, 1966
advising petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge in view of the
communication received from then Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,
inasmuch as the right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly
confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

76

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO
E.
TAADA,
and
RONALDO
B.
ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing
their petition for certiorari and prohibition. Basically, their contention is that when the
Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano) moved for the approval of the conference
committee report on the bill that became R.A. No. 8240, leading the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P.
Arroyo asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?", the Chair allegedly ignored him and
instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question "What is that,
Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question or a point of order which, under the rules of
the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to
adjourn.
The contention has no merit. Rep. Arroyo did not have floor. Without first drawing the
attention of the Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did
not hear him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority Leader's
motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved. Rule XVI, 96 of the Rules of
the House of Representatives provides:
96. Manner of Addressing the Chair. When a member desires to speak, he shall
rise and respectfully address the Chair "Mr. Speaker."
The Rules of the Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI, 59 says:
59. Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and request the President or
the Presiding Officer to allow him to have the floor which consent shall be necessary
before he may proceed.
If various Senators wish to have the floor, the President or Presiding Officer shall
recognize the one who first made the request.

shows that after

complaining that he was being "hurried" by the Majority Leader to finish his
interpellation of the sponsor (Rep. Javier) of the conference committee report
Rep. Arroyo concluded and then sat down. However, when the Majority
Leader moved for the approval of the conference committee report and the
Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up
again and, without requesting to be recognized, asked, "What is that, Mr.
Speaker?" Apparently, the Chair did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention
was on the Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to ask if there was any
objection and, hearing none, declared the report approved and brought down
the gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, "No, no, no, wait a minute," and
asked what the question was. Only after he had been told that the Chair had
called for objection to the motion for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo
register his objection. It is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored.
He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from
the Chair.
Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21, 1996

Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr. Speaker?'') he was raising
was a question of privilege or a point of older. Rule XX, 121 of the Rules of the
House defines a question of privilege as follows
Sec. 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties, conduct,
rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members,
collectively or individually.
while a point of order is defined as follows
Points of order or questions of order are legislative devices used in requiring the
House or any of its Members to observe its own rules and to follow regular or
established parliamentary procedure. In effect, they are either objections to pending
proceedings as violative of some of those rules or demands for immediate return to
the aforementioned parliamentary procedure. 2
Petitioners further charge that there was a disregard of Rule XIX, 112 and Rule XVII,
103 of the Rules of the House which require that the Chair should state a motion and
ask for the individual votes of the members instead of merely asking whether there
was any objection to the motion. As explained already in the decision in this case, the
practice in cases involving the approval of a conference committee report is for the
Chair simply to ask if there are objections to the motion for approval of the report. This
practice is well-established and is as much a part of parliamentary law as the formal
rules of the House. As then Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino explained in 1957
when this practice was questioned:
MR. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
77

somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes
in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder
what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe
that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial
compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying
"Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is
approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to
divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that
the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here,
and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair
can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.3

what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what
petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the
disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240, the
rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well settled that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.
WHEREFORE, the motion for rehearing and reconsideration is DENIED with
FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration of the ruling of the
Chair declaring the conference committee report approved. It is not true he was
prevented from doing so. The session was suspended, obviously to settle the matter
amicably. From all appearances, the misunderstanding was patched up during the
nearly hour-long suspension because, after the session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo
did not say anything anymore. As the Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows, the session was thereafter adjourned.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate, and certified by the respective secretaries of both houses of Congress
as having been finally passed. The following day, the bill was signed into law by the
President of the Philippines.
Finally, petitioners take exception to the following statement in the decision that "The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House." 4 They

contend that, following this ruling, even if only 10 members of the House
remain in the session hall because the others have gone home, the quorum
may not be questioned.
That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted in the decision, at 11:48
a.m. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo questioned the existence of a quorum, but
after a roll call, it was found that was one. After that, he announced he would again
question the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the conference report. Hence,
the statement in the decision that the question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the conference committee
report on what later became R.A. No. 8240 was railroaded through the House of
Representatives. Nor is there any need for petitioners to invoke the power of this
Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting R.A. No.
8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that is
78

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 22041

September 11, 1924

JOSE
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta
&
Zaragoza
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.

ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,

for

petitioner.

MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth
Senatorial District. The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the
Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier, Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe
de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre,
Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmea,
Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion
Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago
Lucero, all members of the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the
Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante, Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate,
and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the
respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from
the first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows:
Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as
he is hereby declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de
Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the debate regarding the
credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;
Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived
of all of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year
from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four;
And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator
appointed by the Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be
furnished said Governor-General for his information.

The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is

unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To
issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing
the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and
injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the
petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from
exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into
effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the
respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has
pressed the same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us, we
desire first of all to say that looking through the form of the action to the substance,
this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the
Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. May the Supreme Court of the
Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator
Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the other interesting questions which
have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here
suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of public law. It is here only
necessary to recall that under our system of government, each of the three
departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another department.
The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power
to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the
Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department
has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative
enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the
courts restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general rule
of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers,
to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which
therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the
legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was
right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil
Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
79

190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass.,
468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De
Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land
Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L.
R. A., 582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel.
Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187
N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.)

process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and
refuses to execute the Acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government? May not the
House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case
could this court interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance
with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from
sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the
public wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court?

The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous and
instructive. They are found among the decisions of our own court, of the United States
Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to the chief
executive rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary to explain that the same
rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief executive likewise govern the
relations of the courts to the legislature.

These questions answer themselves.

The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. GovernorGeneral and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was
an original application made in this court praying for a writ ofmandamus to the
Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as provided by law. The
Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the
court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have no
jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the
executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The demurrer
was accordingly sustained and the complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this
decision reliance was placed on the cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867],
4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we will now
proceed to notice.

It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be
had against Andrew Johnson, as President, it may be granted against Andrew
Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution
of an Act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its execution by the
President. . . .

State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra,
concerned a bill praying the United States, Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General
Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from executing certain Acts of
Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court said the single
point which required consideration was this: Can the President be restrained by
injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional?
He continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the
Executive Department.Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial
Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to
its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its
possible consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse
obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its

xxx

xxx

xxx

We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President
in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by
us.

Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on
account of being written by Judge Cooley, related to an application for mandamus to
the Governor to compel him to perform a duty imposed upon him by statute. Judge
Cooley, in part, said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been carefully apportioned between
three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers
alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of
the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute
each a restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action of the
department which controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is
had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion for conflict,
controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting
within its proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an
unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their proper province, because
they are only applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called
upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the
officers of the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if they are
disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by
impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct
80

the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its
equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to the
courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they
have been rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the
Legislature could in like manner override executive action also, the government would
become only a despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it would be readily
cancelled that no court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making
laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though
the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws . In these
cases the exemption of the one department from the control of the other is not only
implied in the framework of government, but is indispensably necessary if any useful
apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other course
than that which leaves the head of the executive department to act independently in
the discharge of his duties might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to
something worse, should the courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the
executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we should concede, if jurisdiction was plainly
vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient reason for
failing to pronounce it, especially against an officer who would be presumed ready and
anxious in all cases to render obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is
involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to pronounce
judgments which may be disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to
place him in position where, in a matter within his own province, he must act contrary
to his judgment, or strand convicted of a disregard of the laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns specifically the right of
the judiciary to control bymandamus the action of the legislature. French vs. Senate of
the State of California, supra, was an original proceeding in mandamus brought by
the petitioners who were duly elected senators of the state to compel the Senate of
California to admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that the petitioners had
been expelled without hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ was denied, Mr.
Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the pleader, they
do not make a case justifying the interposition of this court. Under our form of
government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution. .
..
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra,
Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon,

Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of opinion by
the United States Supreme Court. The record discloses that it was the firm opinion of
the late Chief Justice that the court should not assume jurisdiction of the proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the principles
laid down in some of the preceding authorities have been the subject of adverse
criticism. It is said that the fallacy of the argument lies in the statement that the three
departments of the government are independent of each other. "They are independent
in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province and perform the duties that
the law requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge of
what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which duties shall be
exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at
least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to
the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is
directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing
a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus, pp. 926-927.) But these
were arguments which should have been presented years ago in this court, and which
when recently presented by counsel in his argument for the petitioner in the case of
Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the court.
It is now too late to go back and revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact
this would be not only impracticable but impossible since at least two decision of the
United States Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses the
power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any
particular action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of
either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular government as we know it
in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of
the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we
would be justified in having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or
against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but against the
secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs
the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of
the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are
mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body.
Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectable presented of the
court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the
Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do
another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears
that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.
(Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood,supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand,
no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to exercise a power
81

that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or
convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not
prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will create
discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous consequences
are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to
unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should
offer no means by a decision for any possible collision between it as the highest court
in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate department,
or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the
Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine
representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature.
These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the GovernorGeneral." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine
Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either
House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House
may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to
"suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two
Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power
granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is
the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses
of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive
member of the Legislature.

While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is inserted
so that the vital question argued with so much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed,
and so that there may be at least an indication of the attitude of the court as a
restraining force, with respect to the checks and balances of government. The
Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the
government, takes no affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire system
suggests the thought that no action should be taken elsewhere which would
constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard for the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly
behavior does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of
his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for
the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this
conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is
not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the
judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a
jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation and of administration giving
heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be
sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of
action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So
ordered.

It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long history
suspended a member. And the reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or
fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of
representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the
legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but
suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being
afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filed
but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified
expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to
exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by
local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in the
comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when
we had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief
Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was there announced is
equally applicable to the instant proceedings.

82

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144

October 28, 1960

SERGIO
OSMEA,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA,
FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO,
ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO,
FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.
Antonio
Y.
de
Pio
in
his
own
behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own
behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should
not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of
which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr.,
Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of
Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech,
entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District
of Cebu stated the following:.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are

now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that
regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be
bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am
afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your
administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a
serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which
is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose
said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen
Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by
Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for
such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to appear
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena
duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent
papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., fails to do so to require him to
show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee
shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated
his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his
allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and
Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action
and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and
required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently
aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the
imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to
perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself,
submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day
before closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De
Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao) 1 filed their answer,
challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of
Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No.
175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on
83

July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose members are the sole respondentshad
thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered
before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President
which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the
House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations.
There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to
produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended
from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his
privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded
the dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmea,
Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave
him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he
ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for
which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline
therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other
business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional
position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1
of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII,
sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken
in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to

discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its
extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question
before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United
States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using
the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most
infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents,
Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting
words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of
Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but
invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds'
Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or
could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed
opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to
take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution
No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59
was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a
suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice
may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its
Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had
already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of
the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired
84

vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S.
620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5 And it has been
said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have
agreed to a particular measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it
is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own
rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security
against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holtvs. Somerville,
127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex
parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell,
196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of
Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28
N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas.
1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south
Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio,
who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the
House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had
intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments
pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this
Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle is well established
that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by
the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate
is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.)
[Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford
vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make
defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California
declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even
the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house
thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by
the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an
express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the
general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for
any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec.
768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in
every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its
high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of selfprotection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the
exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision
authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of
the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate
is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house
thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative
functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they
may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at
bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due
to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of
that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which
it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to
state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic
illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief
Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders. 8 And in several
instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been
considered.9
85

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the

Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate,
suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of
the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The
Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the
resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say
the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then
functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator
Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its
members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes,
expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint
"without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . .
who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the
Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because
no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported
to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it
session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore,
the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic. 13 Of course,
there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members
of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a
justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs.
Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political
law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues
as were deemed relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any
means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer
particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by
the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and
maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General,
who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power
which were granted to it by the Jones Law 10; whereas now the Congress has the full
legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion
that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of
suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent
legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as
already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in
1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation
can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment
of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one
of their members to jail.12
86

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 128055

April 18, 2001

MIRIAM
DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can
go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed against her for
alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana
after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's
request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April
1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against
petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for
clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted
thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the following
aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein
Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia
Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go
Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi
Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin,
Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo
Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne

Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are
disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed,
respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen
Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or
until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon
manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided
to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment
on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that
she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition
and Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a
motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court
taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment
and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from
the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting
the temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to
accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the
country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her
motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R.
No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she
87

purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were

conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to
reset petitioner's arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under
consideration and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her
position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government
position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety
(90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.

On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of
the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to
dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases,
docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.

"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate
President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the
Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein
ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court of the action taken
thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari,
docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its
14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the
nullification thereof.

"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation
of the suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the
same may be lifted at that time." 2

Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice
Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing
the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32
amended informations, and from proceedings with her arraignment on 12 April 1993
until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP
and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably
therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one information under
Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable
Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one
Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September
1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st
July 1995 motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for
reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of
Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to
suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan
to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from
the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same
to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the
suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer may no longer be put at
issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
"xxx

xxx

xxx
88

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career
service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no
ifsand buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court
in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.
In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered
to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as
the validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there
is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it
to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not
been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or
the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to
quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court x x x .'
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act
3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to
present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117
of the Rules of court.

"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that
the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code,
should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding
by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal
proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged
in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a
presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific
crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set
out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case
before the Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the
Court has been called upon to resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1)
In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2)
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure
order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from
Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident
for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of
the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March
1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4)
in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by
the Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order
allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal
Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not
explained why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation
89

and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal
presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The

Court ruled:

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained
therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving
applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified
aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which

deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for
disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from
the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations
of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore,
petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.
The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.

(1) She was a public officer,

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order
of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides
that each
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution
in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed
the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his

Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also
in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been
couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the
light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an
arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to
either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court
should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two
branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific
constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial
intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the
manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided
by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for
90

future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner. WHEREFORE, the

instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

91

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530

August 12, 1916

THE
UNITED
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose
Varela
y
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Calderon

for

appellant.

SYLLABUS

1.
EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS;
JUDICIAL NOTICE. The courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to
take notice of what the law is and, to enable them to determine whether the legal
requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well
as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals.
2.
ID.; ID.; PAROL EVIDENCE. When the legislative journals show with
certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous
respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be
admitted to show a different date of adjournment.
3.
OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION. Where a person takes a direct
part in the illegal importation into the Philippine Islands of a large quantity of opium
and profits thereby, a penalty of two year's imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 is not
excessive.

TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte
with the crime of illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring
together and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to
wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and
introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the
value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said

accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did

receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in
the transportation, receipt and concealment of the same after the said
opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had been unlawfully
brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from
a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately.
(Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in
Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed
upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000.
Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to
him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of
error) and are greatly multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat
changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the
elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are
these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6,
1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal
evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that
the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914
was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must
be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null
and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is
admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the GovernorGeneral's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged
with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is
the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two
others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative
journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take
judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in the
reversed order.
92

Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform
the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the
Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative
Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things,
"that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately
stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to
keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission." On page
793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary and special
sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved.
Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine
Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of
Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine
Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other
things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of
its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this
mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of
1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28,
1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of
the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of
the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court
may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states,
when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for
its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313
[as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides
that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative
body that may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by
the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or
printed by their order:Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a

copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due
enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact
question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative
journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill
became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348,
and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated
cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of
the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals
are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published
by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was
passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when
such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which
embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is
maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation
or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the
other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand
these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and
character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood to be
that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to influence the
belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes
the fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order to
establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the
records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and
to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature,
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
93

Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and

independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his
argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was
stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words,
the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to
effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as
here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that
of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and
making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral
evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account
of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these
considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity
and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken
away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of
the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable
than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private
individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping,
W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the
State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases
upon this question; and, out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in
which any court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the
legislature, as recorded in the journals required to be kept in each of its
branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if
reasons for the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not
generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are
apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity
of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent
character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to
them; they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or
at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited
numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in

support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a
single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed
or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the
Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow
the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez
y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo,
twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to
Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo,
engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and
warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's
invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to
Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto
Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release of
the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were
delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned
street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery.
Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of
merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from
Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants,
and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so
consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April,
1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the
customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the serial
number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to
arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on the morning
of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant,
Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's
office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and shortly
thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's
bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed
him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the
vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of
twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver
them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was
94

complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place
designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the
customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date
before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was
found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded
to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry
numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on
Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed
the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by
him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents,
accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here
found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and
entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were
empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five
empty tins, each corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels,
were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further
search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no
one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was
discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the
customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on
Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner
was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's
agent it was learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Garcia.
When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the
agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After
discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected
three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the
customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to
contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and
securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A
comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty
ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that
they were in every way identical in size, form, etc."

in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of

opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire
importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no
doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed
the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the
barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood,
contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the
three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of
opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of
April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several
opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had
been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of
handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the
profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had
delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs
agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several
large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle
General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At
first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the
between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted
this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during
the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a
wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a
letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the
arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter
arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but
that he had destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him.
On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from
Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez
y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter
that this opium was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the
name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these
barrels of wine."

While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso
on the morning of April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything
unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and
taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret
service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation

The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these
fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any question of a doubt,
notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to
him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a
direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The
95

penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the

decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs. So ordered.

96

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section
one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation
of the following:.

February 28, 1963

CASCO
PHILIPPINE
CHEMICAL
CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central
Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni
&
Jamir
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.

The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

for

petitioner.

CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for
refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609,
otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the
Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.
Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues,
used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main
raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned
margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase
of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying
upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3,
1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a
similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the
refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve
said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for
petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the
provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by
petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the
Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision
should be construed as "ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have
erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea"
and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic
resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through
its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce
when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a
fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture
of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however,
that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club,
Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is
well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead
of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
97

Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.

98

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29658

November 29, 1968

ENRIQUE
V.
MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.
Vicente
Rodriguez,
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

for

appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has served as
captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess
a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls
for an interpretation of the following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966
(Republic Act 4864):
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may
be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the rank
of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate
who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in
1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of
Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting
chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo
Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for
"failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for
the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the
post and called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of
1967 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into
existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the metropolitan newspapers
that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications
which applicants should possess.

The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent
include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor might
appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as
captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for
appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent
on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent
refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified
persons."
The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own
phrasing, as follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR
(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD
since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons
qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local
police service on a professional level," 1 and contends that a bachelor's degree does
not guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the
other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel
"meets the test of professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still we do not see how the
requirement of a college degree as additional qualification can run counter to the
avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of
such additional qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's
argument lies in its assumption that the choice is between one who has served long
and loyally in a city police agency and another who, not having so served, has only a
bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case. The issue rather is whether,
within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one
should have educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's
degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act which provides:

99

Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five years of
satisfactory service in a provincial, city or municipal police agency although they have
not qualified in an appropriate civil service examination are considered as civil service
eligibles for the purpose of this Act.

department for at least three years need not have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is
that such person need not even be a high school graduate. If such be the case would
there still be need for a person to be at least a high school graduate provided he has
had at least eight years of service as captain in the AFP?

In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of
satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil service eligible, so must a
person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree.

The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in
issue in this case), section 10 of the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning
is clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of
those seeking appointment as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original
provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section
12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read:

The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish

between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of
service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of
apolice agency only. On the other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the
precise gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph of which states:
Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in
accordance with Civil Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses
the above educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case shall such
appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid cause, and with the
approval of the Civil Service Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of
civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such
credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary,
by providing that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally
appointed2 chief of police "[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a
college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable
requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a bachelor's degree, in
addition to service either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or in the National
Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or as a captain
in a city police department for at least three years, would be to create an "absurd
situation" in which a person who has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI
is in law considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police or has been a
captain in a city police agency for at least three years. From this it is concluded that
"the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary
record and Police Captain for at least 3 years in a City Police Agency) is the
bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP
or in the NBI must have been rendered, but an admission of the existence of the
ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the conclusion
that it is only in cases where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the NBI
that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the
petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain in a city police

Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. No chief of a

police agency of a province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a
member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police
administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine
Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of captain or
inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for
appointment to the position of chief of the police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a fouryear college degree course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration
or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in
accordance with Civil Service Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses the
above educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment exceed beyond
six months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both educational
and service qualifications that the following exchanges of view were made on the floor
of the house of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a
Police Agency, provides that the chief of a police agency of a province or a chartered
city should be at least a member of the Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's
degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a municipality should be at
least a holder of a four years' college degree or holder of a bachelor's degree in Police
Administration or Criminology.
At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these minimum requirements;
but I find such requirement very rigid because it would not allow a man to rise from
the ranks. Take a policeman who rose from the ranks. He became a corporal, a
sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go higher? If he merited it, he
should also be appointed chief of police of a city or municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to this provision of the bill
because it is a very high qualification. However, somebody insisted that in order to
professionalize our police system and also to attain a high standard of police
100

efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college degree. The point which
the gentleman is now raising was brought up by one Member in the sense that a
policeman who rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even after serving for
fifteen or twenty years in the police force, cannot become chief of police for lack of a
college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I assure him that if he
brings it up during the period of amendments, I will consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my amendment. My only
regret, however, is that because I made a number of proposed amendments, I will not
be ready to submit them immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the
sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement contained in the
bill that objections were expressed, but while it was agreed to delete this requirement
during the period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill
6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. 5 It is to this substitute bill that
section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous
phrase "and who has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at
least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the
Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the
phrase, "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high
school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the

law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer
of this opinion personally and painstakingly read and examined the enrolled bill in the
possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the President and found that the
text of section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of
the Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate Arturo M.
Tolentino and Speaker of the House of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on
page 16 thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and Inocencio B.
Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text
of the Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts.
As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark:9
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has
received in the form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that
it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bill which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the house of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face,
a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent department
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of
the legislature met in conference committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police
with exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its presence in section 10
of the Act.11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that except for that vagrant
phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher" a high school graduate, no matter how long he has
served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years irrespective of the branch of service
where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A.
101

degree, completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective
Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel?
Not to mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given
the Congressional Commendation the highest award ever conferred in the history
of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still
we would be hard put reading it in the law because it is not there. The inclusion of
desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and
unless such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recomment the inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break with the
past, and merely carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits
within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which interpreting law is
inescapably making law.12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither
qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila.
Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty and therefore may
not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to
costs.

102

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the
House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments
on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was
referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the
City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of
Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of
Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN
ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS
YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO
MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA
FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal Board,respondents.

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20,
1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate
proceedings as having been acted upon.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates
for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of
Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for
respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which
became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and
Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20,
1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment,
which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of
Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back
to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate
President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed
copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto
by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No.
4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July
5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed
into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually
passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through
the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of
the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill
duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill
as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further
clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that
the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and
therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill
a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances
he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been
103

returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the
owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard
the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police
to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the ViceMayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A.
Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to
compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of
Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members
of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since
it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of
that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on
an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the
petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting
Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called
Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other
law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as
Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with
previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and
highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions
of United States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of
whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in
this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing
opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil.
Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill"
doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the
decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress
proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance
thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives"
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices
Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case
involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view
of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory
was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the
reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino
Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and
affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as
amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of
Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled
bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or
by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the
case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment
thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both
Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and
secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this
procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that
the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for
his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval,
because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where
such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to
whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the
statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the
presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the
contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a
bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should
sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding
officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated
enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution,
104

is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs.
Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department
to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the
same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether
the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is
present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of
a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said
Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of

its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall
be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a
co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a
reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]
very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has
"passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of
the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a
result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In
such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed
by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did
105

not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the
Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by
the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called
Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated
April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

106

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554

October 4, 1966

2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at P7,200 from July
1
to
December
29,
1965
and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:

PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman
Ozaeta
and
Felixberto
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

MEMBERS

Serrano

INC., petitioner,

for

petitioner.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly
incorporated and organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members
are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of
the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative,
seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in
audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134
(approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present
Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor
General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual
salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present
compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers and
members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly provided that
"the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides "that the salary increase of the
President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966
(Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following items for the House of
Representatives:
SPEAKER
1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December
29,
1965
and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00

1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . .

P 16,000.00

2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . .

165,600.00.

Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase
in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by
Republic Act 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14,
of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall,
unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand
two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances,
and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the
case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who
took part in the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30,
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of
said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners
(Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines summarized above, the then Auditor General
requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law involved
(Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion
on the matter be sought from the Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition).
Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the
PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or before
January, 1966, and before the Justice Secretary could act, respondent Aguiluz, as
former Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress, respondent
Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the
limits of the Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to
institute the action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of
107

the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the answer alleges that
the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional provisions, insofar as
present members of the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965,
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is that the
expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved
the increase suffices to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless
of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their
counsel, need not give pause. As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to
restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965;
Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405,
December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24, 1965; Iloilo
Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover,
as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an
unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as
parties defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts sought to be enjoined were the
respondents' passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the Representatives'
increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors
were indispensable or proper parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does
Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as
respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased compensation to the
members of the House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the
term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the nonexpiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the
approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators
yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to
provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to
elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such
measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Taada & Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the
increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional
provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and

Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the
plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for
Representatives thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
"term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members of
the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section
14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the
Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must
have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. Such
disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact
that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body;
responsibility therefor is not apportionable between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego
(Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative
power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that the
Legislature should be bicameral in form, initially recommended that the increase in the
compensation of legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the term of
office of all members of the Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the
committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual
compensation of four thousand pesos including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective
residences when attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise
fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature
that approved such increase. (Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral
legislature, was carried over and made more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional
provision, which read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after the
expiration of the term of office of the Members of the National Assembly who may be
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (Aruego, 1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article
VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of
such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental
law, the limitation assumed its present form:

108

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the
restriction has not been altered. From the first proposal of the committee on the
legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present, the intendment of the
clause has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of the Legislature
that approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or
bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its
adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the
1940 amendments to the Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the
terms not only of the Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the
increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all the members of the
Congress" instead of specifying "all the members of the Senate and of the House".
This is a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying the
component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a
unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of the" before
"House" in the provision being considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the
Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter expression "of the
Senate and the House". It was grammatically correct to refer to "the members of the
Senate and (the members) of the House", because the members of the Senate are
not members of the House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the House"
would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the
Senators, as well as that of the Representatives, must all expire the Constitution
would have spoken of the "terms" (in the plural) "of the members of the Senate and of
the House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the Constitution does in section
14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As previously observed, the use of the
singular form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the
Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit, and this
conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, "until the expiration of the full
term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before
the effectivity of the increased compensation would subject the present members of
the House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the Constitution prior
to its amendment. It may well be wondered whether this was not, in fact, the design of
the framers of the 1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original
limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum delay of six (6) years and a

minimum of four (4) is necessary before an increase of legislators' compensation can

take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election, two
assemblymen's terms, of 3 years each, had to elapse under the former limitation in
order that the increase could become operative, because the original Constitution
required that the new emolument should operate only after expiration of the term of
assemblymen elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an
assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as amended, the
same interval obtains, since Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the legislature
on its last session just prior to an election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under
the original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving
assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added. Once again an
identical period must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of the
Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a given election four of the
approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935
were to approve an increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be
effective until after the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected
in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years
after 1935. Under the present Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964
with the participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be collectible
until December 30, 1969, since the said Senators' term would expire on the latter
date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to
approve the increase in compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year
term), the new compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four years
later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the
approval of the increase) would end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions
immediately preceding the elections in November of that year, the higher
compensation would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later,
because the most recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators
chosen by the electors in November of 1963, and their term would not expire until
December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the
amended constitution can not be just due to accident, and is proof that the intent and
spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been maintained
unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument that
by requiring members of the present House to await the expiration of the term of the
Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are placed
in a worse position than under the Constitution as originally written.
109

The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval
of increases of compensation just before an election by legislators who can anticipate
their reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be
nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of the constitutional
mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation
may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642
(1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased
compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be
held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the
items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642)
purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are
declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing
in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act
No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before
December 30, 1969. No costs.

110

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a
co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

February 3, 2000

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who
is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on
two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called
upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of
legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of
House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the
police power of the State.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when

allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has
the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise
of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first
task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Governmentexecutive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general
law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without

representation.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his

suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the
people.

Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same, . . .

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of
the U.S. Congress.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity
from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be
tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
111

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during
his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within
carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to
wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of
the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next
session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions
is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which states, inter
alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they
did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted
ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration
of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he
fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for
official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex,
Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of
Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accusedappellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison
in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison
premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)
establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP
reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
112

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the
Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities,
bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the
proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well,
without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is
a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear
that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go
after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of
an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say
that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona
fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he
has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.

1wphi1.nt

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills,

Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an]
inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration
Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents."
Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills
and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his
mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints
upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional
equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.7The organs of government may
not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not
prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on
the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme
Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant
is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others
who are validly restrained by law.
113

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious

discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a
person
to
prevent
the
free
exercise
of
his
power
of
locomotion.11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As
a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to
the accused.12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any
prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his
own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss
of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any
exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society.16Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job
of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to
provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's
claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

114

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905

August 3, 1966

NICANOR
T.
JIMENEZ,
ET
AL., plaintiffs
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

and

appellants,

Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the
President, the communication began with the following paragraph:

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly
elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow
me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain
vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to
our people to expose.1wph1.t

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned,
the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is
not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This
motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present
appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged
communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was
a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned
publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is
to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second
paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political buildup" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President
in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that
Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover,
the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of
National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are
"available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN)
of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND.
To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS
to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel
Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare
Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt.
Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of
CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence
network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools
of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
115

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to
talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2)
typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary
Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt
to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to
his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression
that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had
gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in
abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the
President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano
delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to
rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian
support.

possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs'
action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners.
We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of
entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed
Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that
the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the
defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation,
to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them
from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being
the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that
said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware
of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the
"planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies
that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they
could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2)
that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of
National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no
Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or
retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed
Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies
mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they
belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving
civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of
law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be
dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout
the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from
holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action
for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the
unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked
by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the VargasArellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
116

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
HOMOBONO
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent

ADAZA, petitioner,

ESCOLIN, J.:
The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order are: [1] whether or not a provincial
governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can
exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and [2] whether
or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost,
can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of
governor if the said office is vacated.
The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor
for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who
likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May
14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates,
while respondent lost.
Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 1 and
since then he has discharged the functions of said office.
On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental
before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor
on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this
petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office
for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his
term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective
official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an
elected member of Parliament.

Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have

abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had
reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa
elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume
the office of governor.
1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from
holding any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear
and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not
hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. ...
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity.
The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet
member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not
within the province of the Court to determine.
A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest and the benefit of the
people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the
law may impose" and "he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his holding of more than one office." 4 It is therefore of no avail to petitioner
that the system of government in other states allows a local elective official to act as
an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in
whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices
specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be
said that within the purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility
exists in the nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is
understood in common law, the incompatibility herein present is one created by no
less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner
has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been
discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional
provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to
occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a
mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioner's election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should
be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-governorship when he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed
runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of
the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides
that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence
from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan
117

Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided

in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The reason the position of vice-governor was not included in
Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is explained by the following interchange between
Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said legislation:
MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the proposed amendment it would cover
only governors and members of the different sanggunians? Mayor, governors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunian or
barangay officials. A vice-governor is a member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.
MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local officials?
MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation ...
MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-governor, the vicemayors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They
are covered by the provision on members of sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings,
February 20, 1984, p. 92, Rollo]
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas
Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the governorship
was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of
the same Local Government Code, which reads as follows:
SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:
1] x x x
2] He shall:
a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the cases
provided for in Section 48, paragraph 1 6 of this Code;
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

118

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D.
ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G.
ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R.
ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY,
JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO
JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S.
RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M.
TOLENTINO,
and
FERNANDO
R.
VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying,
respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion
for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election
contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time
composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely:
Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R.
Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A.
Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S.
Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but
including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the
Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party
and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the
respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the SenatorsMembers thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein.
Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case,
had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same
Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T.
Paterno, another respondent in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on

both the petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition.
Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the
respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now
complained of.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET
Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by
Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative
respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms
of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and
that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the
questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's
Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members
of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is
a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining
members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to
fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would
remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended
that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it
119

held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ...
shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that
Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that the constitutional

provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of

decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed
by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to
Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an
unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded
from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing
violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding considerationthat the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by
no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be
at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of
the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election
contest.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition
of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well
120

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR.
EMIGDIO
A.
BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be
appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the
request of the dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in
the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached
by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review
and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs.
Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the
acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as
well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude"
into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our
Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two
branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question"
doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a
decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination
by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond
judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was
either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts
refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of
legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be

recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary
power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable
controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted,
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to
ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the
fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial
power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the
executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts
are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and
legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action,
as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the
power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the
canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc
filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the
Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
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parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein

(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR.

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA

Congressman

Chairman

Associate Justice

2nd District Nueva Ecija

Supreme Court

LDP

ISAGANI A. CRUZ

Member

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR.

Associate Justice

Congressman

Supreme Court

1st District Davao del Sur

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO

Member

JOSE E. CALINGASAN

Supreme Court

Congressman
Member

LDP

1st District

ANTONIO H. CERILLES

Benguet LDP

Congressman
Member

Member

4th District Batangas

Congressman

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON

Member

LDP

Associate Justice

HONORATO Y. AQUINO

Member

Member

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

Congressman

(formerly GAD, now NP)

1st District Palawan

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of
memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.

LDP

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by
a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal
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insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby
delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's
lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme
Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991,
to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only
the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with
truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among
the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of
the contested ballot 1Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets'

nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to
neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March
14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by
Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on

February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del
Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman
Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having
invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as
those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also
a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a
meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously
confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about
the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of
Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where
party membership is a prerequisite. 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice
Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives,
during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.
The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House
of Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to
the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is selfexplanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development'
and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in
the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously
scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78
promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its
promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be
confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the partylitigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin
of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal
requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be
deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in
favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. MelencioHerrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G.
Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a
conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of
the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is
extremely difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to
preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial
task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being
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prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the
performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the
merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the
1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of
three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can
dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In
this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive
role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should
divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their
independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should
have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No.
21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET
Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated
task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the
chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No.
25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the
House of Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had
voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura
to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel
the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled
for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the
decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the
Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being
of the opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and
derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice,
in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to
resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices
Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the
Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole
judge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by
purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption
of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their
respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that,
to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every
member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative
term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent
disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera,
Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties
therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its
membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the
Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal
cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to
the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep.
Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,
otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by
Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M.
Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed
Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
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1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw
the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was

the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be

designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and
discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal;

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the
inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states
no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or
order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of
Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume

and discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the
respondents to comment 5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to

enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its

proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to
replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and
rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the
HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered
on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members.
Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments
as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political
party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his

legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party
affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision
mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely
nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is
"purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership
in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-ofRepresentative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the
petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated
by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the
Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of
Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its
decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the

Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit,

to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate,
the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the
Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent
Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that
Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because
after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation
reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman
Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e.,
to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal
through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority
party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It
provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the
provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now
125

based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead

of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest
political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as
follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes
and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the
Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible
for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang
Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11
of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is
a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the
Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was
to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the
election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution
as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent
bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and
control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must

be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is
not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to
the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987
Constitution as the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners
Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the
electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these
tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the
Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal
or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional
restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating
since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the
government. Would that ruling still be valid?

126

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate
departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are
constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I
would like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil.
139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the
Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress,
devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power
to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a
separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the
invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with
respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have
this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this
rule because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the
Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the
House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from
both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these
bodies are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the
Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice ConcepcionCommissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral
tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in
the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they
are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment
from an political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we
could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of

this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be
independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the

framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if
the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral
tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura
from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in
favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the
House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme
Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate
may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party"
and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member
of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation
of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in
the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof
127

that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case
fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a
valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House
Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact,
two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the
congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation
to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the
latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J.
Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be
stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman
Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the
tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own
free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a
pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the
LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General
of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the
HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for
the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That
stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute
Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in
the Bondoc case.

withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura

as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is
entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The
decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding
the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the
Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also
set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that
decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the
parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano
A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his
rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives.
The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the
House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court,
as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to
protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official
of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in
Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by
the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly
interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of
the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI,
1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge"
of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and
void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives
128

EN

BANC

[G.R.

No.

103903.

September

11,

1992.]

MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G.

TIOZON, Petitioners, v. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of the
House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA TUAO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen.
Services Division of the House of Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA,
as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT, Respondents.
Luis
Sevilla,

H.
Hechanova,

Dado,

Ballicud

&

Associates

for Petitioners.
for

respondent

Raul

Daza.

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL;
SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS MEMBERS. Under Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its
members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the
appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas
certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House
Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas proclamation.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; WRIT OF PROHIBITION; NOT
INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR ACTS ALREADY CONSUMMATED. A writ of
prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already
expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; DE FACTO OFFICERS; ENTITLED
TO EMOLUMENT FOR ACTUAL SERVICES RENDERED. As a de facto public
officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of
office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de
facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

ROMERO, J.:

On February 18, 1992, Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of

Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same congressional
district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the
latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since
October
16,
1974.
Petitioners allege that Hr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his
status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13,

1992, Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time
to file their comment for a period of thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the
said motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992, manifested their opposition to the 30-day
extension of time stating that such extension was excessive and prayed that
respondent instead be granted only 10 days to file their comment. On May 5, 1992,
the
Court
noted
the
manifestation
and
opposition.
On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the
recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. 1
On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact
that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a
permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the
District Director, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., 2 he
had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. 3
On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuao, as OIC of the General Services Division, Mrs.
Rosalinda G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives and
Commission on Audit, filed their comment. They contend that if indeed Congressman
Daza is a greencard holder and a permanent resident of the United States of America,
then he should be removed from his position as Congressman. However, they opined
that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and correct status as a
greencard holder. Until he files his comment to the petition, petitioners prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted.
4
Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the COMELEC
(SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become
129

moot should this Court find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was
granted a US non-immigrant visa, asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss
SPC
No.
92-084.
5

Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know subject (sic) still has his
greencard.
No
he
has
not
applied
for
citizenship.
Sincerely,

On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

(sic)

Sgd.

The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Daza
should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of
Section
68
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.

District

Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising the
functions of his office being a permanent resident alien of the United States at the time
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections. To buttress
their contention, petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court of Appeals. 6

We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992
8 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the
duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal.
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to
cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election 9 or a quo
warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas
proclamation. 10 Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to
provide for acts already consummated. 11 Fourth, as a de facto public officer, 12
respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office
because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto
officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 13

In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners

presented to us a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration
and
Naturalization
Service
(INS)
which
reads:
7
File

No.

A20

Date:

968

Nov.

618

5,

1991

LOS914732
Geraghty,

OLoughlin

Attn:

David

386

N.

St.

Paul,

and

Kenney

C.

Street

Minn.

chanrob1e s

virtual

Daza,

G-343

(Rev.

8-20-82)N

Hutchinson

Wasbasha

SUBJECT:

Form

Director

55102-1308
1aw

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT
and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.

library

Raul

A.

Your request was received in this office on _________; please note the paragraph(s)
checked below:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

10.

[XX]

Other

remarks:

chanrob1e s

virtual

1aw

library

Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful
130

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

"SO ORDERED."4

EN BANC
G.R. No. 137004

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES

to DISMISS the instant petition for utter lack of merit.

July 26, 2000

ARNOLD
V.
GUERRERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., as the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, 11th Congress, HON. ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, as the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, 11th
Congress, RODOLFO C. FARIAS and GUILLERMO R. RUIZ, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It assails the Order of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, dated
May 10, 1998, in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227, which dismissed the petition filed
by herein respondent Guillermo C. Ruiz to disqualify respondent Rodolfo C. Farias
as a candidate for the elective office of Congressman in the first district of Ilocos Norte
during the May 11, 1998 elections. It also assails the Resolution dated May 16, 1998,
of the COMELEC En Banc, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
Ruiz and dismissing the petition-in-intervention filed by herein petitioner Arnold V.
Guerrero.
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify
respondent Farias as a candidate for the position of Congressman. 1 Ruiz alleged
that Farias had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11,
1998 polls, despite his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Ruiz
averred that Farias failure to file said Certificate violated Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code2 in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 2577, dated January 15,
1998. Ruiz asked the COMELEC to declare Farias as a "nuisance candidate"
pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code 3 and to disqualify him from
running in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as in all future polls.
On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC,
substituting candidate Chevylle V. Farias who withdrew on April 3, 1998.
On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the
COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Farias.
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC decided Case No. SPA 98227, disposing as follows:

In dismissing Ruizs petition, the Second Division of the COMELEC stated, "[T]here is
none (sic) in the records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of
without the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be
cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified."5
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally
of votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Farias got a total of 56,369 votes representing
the highest number of votes received in the first district. Farias was duly proclaimed
winner.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias
could not validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter was not the official
candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino(LAMMP), but was an
independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent
candidate. Thus, Farias certificate of candidacy claiming to be the official candidate
of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V. Farias was fatally defective, according to Ruiz.
On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC
Case No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of the
Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely
affected by Case No. SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that Farias, having failed to
file his Certificate of Candidacy on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of
March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution provided for
under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code6 and thus, Farias disqualification
was in order. Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first
district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and special elections called for, but
disallowing the candidacy of Farias.
On January 6, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruizs motion for
reconsideration and Guerreros petition-in-intervention in Case No. SPA 98-227. The
decretal portion of its Resolution reads:
"PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Commission (En Banc)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the Order of the Commission
(Second Division) and thereafter, DISMISS this instant motion for reconsideration for
lack of jurisdiction (italics in the original) without prejudice to the filing of a quo
warranto case, if he so desires.
"SO ORDERED."7
Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the following grounds:
131

A.....THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND

ACTED IN EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO RULE
ON THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE CANDIDACY OR PURPORTED
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT FARIAS.
B.....THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ACTED IN EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN TOSSING THE DUTY
TO RULE ON THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE CANDIDACY OR
PURPORTED CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
FARIAS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET) CONSIDERING THAT THE LATTER (HRET) OBVIOUSLY LACKS
JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE THEREBY UNDULY CREATING A
VACUUM AND RENDERING PETITIONER WITHOUT A REMEDY.
C.....THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ACTED IN EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT RENDERING A
RULING, BASED ON THE FACTS AS STATED IN ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION
DATED JANUARY 6, 1999 (Annex "B" hereof) DISQUALIFYING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FARIAS AS A CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESSMAN OF THE FIRST
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF ILOCOS NORTE DURING THE MAY 11, 1998
ELECTIONS, PREMISED ON ITS FINDINGS THAT "THERE IS NONE IN THE
RECORDS TO CONSIDER RESPONDENT (FARIAS) AN OFFICIAL CANDIDATE
TO SPEAK OF WITHOUT THE FILING OF SAID CERTIFICATE, HENCE, THERE IS
NO CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY TO BE CANCELLED, CONSEQUENTLY, NO
CANDIDATE TO BE DISQUALIFIED."
D.....THE RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ACTED IN EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT CALLING A
SPECIAL ELECTION TO FILL-UP THE VACANT POSITION OF CONGRESSMAN OF
THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF ILOCOS NORTE DUE TO THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF RESPONDENT FARIAS AS A CANDIDATE THERETO
AND WHO APPEARS TO HAVE OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES
CAST IN THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS.
We find pertinent for our resolution this issue:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination
of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farias is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?
In its assailed resolution, the COMELEC had noted that respondent Farias had taken
his oath and assumed office as a Member of the 11th Congress and by express
mandate of the Constitution,8 it had lost jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or
invalidity of the certificate of candidacy of Farias amounted to grave abuse of
discretion on its part. He claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to
uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections. 9 He relies on Gallardo v. Judge
Tabamo, Jr., 218 SCRA 253 (1993), which reiterated the doctrine laid down

in Zaldivar v. Estenzo, 23 SCRA 533 (1968), that the COMELEC has exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of an electoral
exercise.
A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding. 10 It is the proper
remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.11 But for an action for
certiorari to prosper, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion. This means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.12
In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
when it held that its jurisdiction over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the
assumption of office of respondent Farias as Representative for the first district of
Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid
a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation
and assumption of the position by Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET
has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of
the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.13 Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over
the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
However, petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article
VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 14Consequently, he claims that any issue which
does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory qualification under the
Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET, according to him.
This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive. Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be
read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire
debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.15 There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated. For firstly, the drafters of the fundamental
law, in making no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must have
132

intended no distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there
are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgivers
intent.16
Petitioner further argues that the HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid
proclamation of the winning candidate. He contends that if a candidate fails to satisfy
the statutory requirements to qualify him as a candidate, his subsequent proclamation
is void ab initio. Where the proclamation is null and void, there is no proclamation at
all and the mere assumption of office by the proclaimed candidate does not deprive
the COMELEC at all of its power to declare such nullity, according to petitioner. But as
we already held, in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET.17 The reason for
this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of
jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.
Whether respondent Farias validly substituted Chevylle V. Farias and whether
respondent became a legitimate candidate, in our view, must likewise be addressed to
the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to
the Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress
shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members".18
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

133

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 150605

December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO
M.
CODILLA,
SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities
as
Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the
people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to
petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal
alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not
subject to the discretion of any official of the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents
Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House
of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on
Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the dulyelected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the
name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and
against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully
holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for
the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14,
2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent
Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8,
2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly
with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification1 against the petitioner for
indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte,
in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the
petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc
to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matagob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates, 2Danilo D.
Maglasang,3 Cesar A. Laurente;4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio

T. Salvera;5 (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police
Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;6 and (d) Photographs showing government dump
trucks, haulers and surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and
surfaced through the intercession of the respondent.7 The case was docketed as SPA
No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the
hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the
Regional Director of Region VIII.8 On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division
sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against
him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for
investigation.9
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had
yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the
list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results
showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as
intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second
Division.10 Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against
respondent is very strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission
to set the hearing of the disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the present disqualification case
moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.11
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing
evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against
him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to
the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the
pleading.12 The records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received the
motion.
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte
Order13 directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of
"the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification."14 It also directed
the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of
the Clerk of the Commission. 15 As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner
even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as
against respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes.16
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his
proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for
disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24,
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2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification
with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the
summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter
only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him
that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was
directed to investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of
the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance. 17 Petitioner
further alleged that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the
municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his authority,
participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the
following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga; 18 (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes
of the Regular Session of Barangay Monterico; 19 (c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;20 (d)
Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;21 and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.22
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,23 alleging
that (a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and
hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that
he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification and after
personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24,
2001; and (c) that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division
suspending his proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary
evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and
requested the setting of a hearing on his Motion.24
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. 25 On June 4, 2001,
petitioner submitted his Memorandum26 in support of his Motion assailing the
suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due
process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is
patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his
proclamation as winning congressional candidate be expediently made, even while
the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He
attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of
certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre;27 (b) Certification
issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; 28 (c) Copy of certification issued by
Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;29 (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and
Pepito Restituto;30and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion,31 Igmedio Rita32 and Gerardo
Monteza.33 Respondent Locsin's memorandum also contained additional affidavits of
his witnesses.34
Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved.
Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect
solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A
copy of said Resolution was sent by faxto the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in
the afternoon of the following day.36

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were
declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001,
respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for
Member of the House of Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL
LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the
legislative district for said office."37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on
June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a
Motion for Reconsideration38from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the
Motion for Reconsideration.39 Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that
the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the
basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in
adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in
promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing
therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent
Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration.40
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation,41 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the
validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second
highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the
Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation
of Locsin and that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin
can only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the
Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of
Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the
votes of Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation42 stating that he was
deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the
documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his
Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC
Second Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance
with his prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he
submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses43 which he claims would refute and
substantially belie the allegations of petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A
Reply,44Rejoinder45 and Sur-Rejoinder46 were respectively filed by the parties.
Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for
declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for resolution.

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From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner

Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman,
dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla.47 Commissioners Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting
opinions48 to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr.
was the ponente of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered
the disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence
presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in
petitioner's favor. Equally worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented
and voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he
people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. x x x." 49
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote
and Opinion and Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second
Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void.
The dispositive portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to
REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June
1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the
petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of
losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla,
promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the
Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing
and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and,
thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent"
and the concurrent order for "the Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to
immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained

the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of
election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of respondent Codilla are
"considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable
decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this
resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its ministerial
duty to proclaim the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections for that position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate
the office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth
legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and
guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria
L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the
proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative of election
laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the
Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been
issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner
Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the provincial Board of
Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith
the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the
Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the
basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this
resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the
highest number of votes in the elections for the position; and
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(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office
of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative
district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through
the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion
Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001,
and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of
nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the
verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken together now
stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases;
and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner
Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner
Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission
En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who
joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the
majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead,
each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and
the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote
an explanation on his vote."50
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by
Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason,
Jr.51
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her
proclamation. Instead, she filed a "Comment and Manifestation" 52 with the
COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision
was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by
House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B.
Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation
of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the
HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House.53 Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged
speech to the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she
declared that she will not only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the
COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her position.54
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order55 constituting the
members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid
decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and "proclaim the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a

Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the

House of Representatives x x x, based on the city/municipal certificates of canvass
submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x."
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of
votes cast in the district.56 On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before
Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.57
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru
respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001
COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and
proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.58 Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and
responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which
position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I
therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of
Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including
all physical facilities and staff support." On the basis of this letter, a
Memorandum59 dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy SecretaryGeneral Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no
legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated and now final and executory
COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x."
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy
of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, 60 no action was taken
by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the
assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter 61 addressed to
respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party
President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and
Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of
Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of
whatever remedy is available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise
undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it.
However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech,
inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly defy
and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same
congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the
HOUSE's liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC
decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the
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Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously." (emphases

supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has
become final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has
become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as
its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the
COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of
the records of the House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the
House and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further
contends that respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public
office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her
premature proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc.
He alleges that the action or inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his
lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.
In his Comment,63 public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will
not lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a
ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the
House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is
nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the
House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House
member.
In his Comment,64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in
reading the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take
her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint
Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in compliance with the
opinions65 rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive
Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET
which is the sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House. He also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of the
House of Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled
by mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of
Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET
which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that
this Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative
department without grossly violating the principle of separation of powers. She
contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member of
the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function but a legislative prerogative,

the performance of which cannot be compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer

for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed against the Speaker and SecretaryGeneral because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement the
resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending
before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction
then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House of
Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a preproclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to
hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first be heard by a
COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge"
decision because of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the
case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has
been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case
filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs.
Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated therein are not proper
grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the
HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late."67
In his Reply,68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the
COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to
seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that
the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation
which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate
proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for
annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg.
88169 and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De
Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to
refer the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and
implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and
does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to
determine who will sit as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of
legislative power but is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin
by the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity
of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
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Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of
respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 340270 sets the procedure for disqualification cases
pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of
qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be filed any day
after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any
candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89,
95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;

(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten (10)
legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to
Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties
shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidences
including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of
the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission
through the fastest means of communication, his findings, reports and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and
reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall
immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to a
division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same
to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date of
consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election
Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for
disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity
to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with
this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the
summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
when service has been completed, viz:

2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.

"Rule 14. Summons

xxxxxxxxx

Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the
server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel
and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it,
accompanied with the proof of service.

(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the
offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number which
must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt and must bear the year and
prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED)
No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;

xxxxxxxxx

Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the

manner provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines."

139

Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the
Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of
the Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from
the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete
records of the case.

especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own
motion.

(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the
service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.

Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission

without proof of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected."

The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner.
They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its
corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted
petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his
disqualification because he never received summons.71 Petitioner claims that prior to
receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001,
directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never
summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to
obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division
by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was
able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section
72 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this
Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office." (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the
elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to
conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner
was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however,
respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's
proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy
was served to the petitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that no
registry receipt was attached to prove such service. 72 This violates COMELEC Rules
of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of
the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice,

The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
place of the hearing of the motion.

Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and
service of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not
a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6
of R.A. No. 664673 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the
complainant or any intervenor", viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with
the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong." (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected.
Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a
mere scrap of paper.74 It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most
Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a
copy of the Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt 76 was attached
evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not
appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC
Second Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly,
the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second
Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most
Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by
registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only
when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the
COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the
petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification.
Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
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"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2 nd Division), pursuant
to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No.
6646 xxx and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
respondent, if winning, until further orders."77 (emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is
strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended
his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the
petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his
disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for
disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically
enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the
Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of
evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings,
reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing
and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May
25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were
allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead,
the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification
against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits
attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer;
and (c) the respective memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although
intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main
disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to
present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence
which are unavailable during the hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension but which may be available during the hearing for the disqualification
case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to
support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and
refute the disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the
COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon
consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the
evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of
the challenged Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held:

"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC
(Second Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the
parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion.
This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of
the issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record
of any hearing on the urgent motion for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it
was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the
Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the
Commission en banc had the opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits. This
time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of
evidentiary documents from both sides."78 (emphases supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his
arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said
Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of
procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is
null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and
factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose
of directing the suspension of his proclamation. 79 He urged the COMELEC Second
Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the
suspension be lifted.80
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner
is not based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based
on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the
petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave
credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the
COMELEC en banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions
based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this
lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second
Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified."81
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence
coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he
was charged.82
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be
disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
office"
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To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be

proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given
money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other
material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the
extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to
induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him.
Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his
current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using
during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned
by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel
and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob
Leyte, well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which
acts were executed without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing
or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the
voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said
respondent."83
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these
allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) tenwheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings "Ormoc City
Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the
property owned by the Codilla family.84
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that
they saw white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and
sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then
scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.85
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City
Government of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel
for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the
City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will
be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but
Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr.
who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to
deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla."86
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the
petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City
Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded
mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic)

congressman during election."87 His statement is hearsay. He has no personal

knowledge of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the
purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same could be said about the
affidavits of Randy T. Merin,88 Alfredo C. De la Pea,89 Miguel P. Pandac,90 Paquito
Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios, 91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,92 Abner Casas,93 Rita
Trangia,94 and Judith Erispe95 attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the
Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses 96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly
worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6,
Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the
cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the
petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a
ground to disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses
against the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money
or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant,
public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or
cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or
community in order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against
any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant
for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
xxxxxxxxx
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or
controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under
any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility,
apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political subdivisions,
agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity
x x x."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses
are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.97 They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the
alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
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offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission
may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the
fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which
shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the
decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification
case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the
petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution
excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin
received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was
proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of
June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not
able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived
of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray"
and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two
dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the
position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes,
to the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming,

however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the
COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the
petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the
next highest number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be
considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot
be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides.99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers
of government.100
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that
the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not
only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be
executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and
Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special
proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission
en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and
Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following their
promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or
resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five
(5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all
other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, 101 issued in relation to the finality of
resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or
division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
143

(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the
Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification
cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final
and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,
citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the
election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall tally and
count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall
be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or
repealed."
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the
petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for
Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution
or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (emphases
supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled
doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not
be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 102 In every
election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will
must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a
candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office,
no one can be declared elected in his place.103 In Domino v. COMELEC,104 this Court
ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates because
in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.
xxxxxxxxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes,
and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the
election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the
elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and
meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice."105
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal
circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on
election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified
based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage
and as such, the votes cast in his favor should not be considered.106
This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,107 this
Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the
election, based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified
winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity.
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Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul
her proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of
jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum
to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner
argued that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and
in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote
getter.'" (emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second
Division's directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is
premature considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and
executory."108 Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a
central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en
banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was
properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to
review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division,
viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-

Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may
be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or
ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution
or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be
verified and shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence
or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the
running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case
to the Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the
resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification
thereof." (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC
en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as
it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends
its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has
no jurisdiction in the instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her
election and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.109
We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
145

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this
Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House
of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue
regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This
is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of
respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a
petition for quo warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility
of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in
question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent
Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the
elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a
loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto
proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to

law."112 For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of
the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionaryon the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a
well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.113
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by
respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by
all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign
of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken
his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative

of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
146

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19721

In due course, the Commission on Appointments was constituted pursuant to the

Constitution, on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties in each
House of Congress, as follows:

May 10, 1962

CARLOS
vs.
JORGE TAN, JR., respondents.

the Nacionalista Party, twenty-nine (29) affiliated with the Liberal Party and one (1) not
affiliated with any political party, elected Congressman Daniel F. Romualdez as
Speaker of said chamber.

CUNANAN, petitioner,

On the Part of the Senate

Nacionalista Party

Liberal Party

Hon. Alejandro Almendras

Hon. Eulogio Balao

Hon. Fernando Lopez

Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco

Hon. Genaro Magsaysay

Hon. Ferdinand Marcos

Hon. Cipriano Primicias

Hon. Camilo Osias

Hon. Jose Roy

Hon. Francisco (Soc) Rodrigo

Hon. Gil J. Puyat

Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa

PER CURIAM:
Gentlemen:
For your information and guidance, the resolution of this Court on even date is quoted
below:
In Civil Case G.R. No. L-19721 "Carlos Cunanan vs. Jorge Tan, Jr." the
facts are:
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan who claims to be a career employee, with more than
thirty (30) years in the government service was, on June 6 or 8, 1961, appointed by
the President of the Philippines as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thereupon, he
qualified and assumed the duties and functions of said office. On November 6, 1961,
the President extended to him an ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of
the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
On April 3, 1962, six (6) Senators and seven (7) members of the House of
Representatives, purporting to act as the Commission on Appointments, rejected
said ad interim appointment. On April 11, 1962, respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was
designated by the President as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and performed the
function of said office, without the consent of petitioner herein. Hence, soon thereafter,
or on April 27, 1962, petitioner commenced the present quo warranto proceeding
against respondent, contending that the latter's designation is invalid, the office of
Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, not being vacant when he was designated thereto, because
the aforesaid rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment is invalid for several
reasons.
When the first session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines opened on January 22,
1962, the members of the Senate were evenly divided into two (2) groups: there were
twelve (12) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, on the one hand, and on the
other were twelve (12) Senators affiliated with the Nacionalista Party and NationalistCitizens' Party. Hence, the Senate has been unable to elect a new Senate President,
and Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., who was President of the Senate during the
immediately preceding Congress, continued to hold said office in an acting capacity.
The House of Representatives, consisting of seventy-two (72) members affiliated with

On the Part of the House of Representatives

Nacionalista Party

Liberal Party

Hon. Jose M. Aldeguer

Hon. Eladio T. Balite

Hon. Wenceslao R. Lagumbay

Hon. Manuel T. Cases

Hon. Felix A. Fuentebella

Hon. Floro Crisologo

Hon. Rodolfo Ganzon

Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas

Hon. Agustin Gatuslao

Hon. Rasid Lucman
Hon. Apolonio V. Marasigan

147

Hon. Maximo Noel

On March 21, 1962, by the vote of twenty-nine (29) Congressmen affiliated with the
Liberal Party and twenty-five (25) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party,
forming what is commonly known as the "Allied Majority," declared vacant the seats of
the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in the Commission of
Appointments and re-elected, as members thereof for said Chamber, its former
representatives in said Commission, except Congressmen Ganzon, Lucman and
Lagumbay, in lieu of whom said "Allied Majority" elected Congressmen Jose Alberto,
Reynaldo Honrado and Jose Cojuangco, Jr. although still affiliated with the
Nacionalista Party, these three (3) Congressmen form part of the "Allied Majority". The
members of Congress who took part in the alleged session of the Commission on
Appointments on April 3, 1962, and rejected the ad interimappointment of petitioner
herein were:
(a) Six (6) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, namely: Hon. Eulogio Balao, Hon.
Mariano J. Cuenco, Hon. Ferdinand Marcos, Hon. Camilo Osias, Hon. Francisco
(Soc) Rodrigo, Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa;
(b) Four (4) Congressmen affiliated with the same party, to wit: Hon. Eladio T. Balite,
Hon. Manuel T. Cases, Hon. Floro Crisologo, and Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas; and
(c) Three (3) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, but identified with the
'Allied Majority': Hon. Jose Alberto, Hon. Reynaldo Honrado and Hon. Jose Cojuangco
Jr.
Was the rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment by the aforementioned
thirteen (13) members of Congress, purporting to act as the Commission on
Appointments, valid or not? The determination of this issue depends upon: (1) the
legality of the resolution of the House of Representatives of March 21, 1962, declaring
the seats of its twelve (12) members in the Commission on Appointments vacant; and
(2) the legality of the action of the House of Representatives in reconstituting the
membership of the Commission on Appointments for said House. In view of the
conclusion we have reached with respect to the first question, we deem it
unnecessary to pass upon the second question.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the same should be resolved in the
negative. The Commission on Appointments is it creature of the Constitution. Although
its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent
of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but
emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact,
the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. In order that the
members of the Commission could properly discharge their duties as such, it is
essential that their tenure therein be provided with a certain measure of stability to
insure the necessary freedom of action.
1wph1.t

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)

members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on

the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
THEREIN", necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it
that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but, also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of
a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of
their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to
declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments
held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by
the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
One thing, however, is to take these measures owing to changes of permanent
character in the representation of the political parties in the House, and another thing
for some members thereof affiliated with a political party to make common cause in
certain matters with members of the House belonging to another political party. In
other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more
or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called
"Allied Majority", does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of
the Commission for said House. Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments may
have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House.
The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional
organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of
Congress.
We are aware of the statements made on the floor of our Constitutional Convention
indicating the opinion of some officers thereof or delegates thereto that members of
the Commission on Appointments were to serve at the pleasure of the legislature. It
should be noted, however, that said statements were made with reference to the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature
under our original Constitution. The statements did not refer and do not necessarily
apply to the Commission on Appointments under the present Constitution, as
amended, for we now have a bicameral Congress, both Houses of which are
represented in the Commission on Appointments. If a House of Congress were free,
at any time, to declare vacant the position of its members in the Commission on
Appointments, such House could, in effect, paralyze the entire Commission, without
the consent of the other House. Such possibility could not have been countenanced
by the Constitutional Convention.
In his amended petition petitioner alleges that on April 27, 1962, his ad
interim appointment was confirmed by the "legitimate" Commission on Appointments,
in a meeting said to have been presided over by its chairman ex oficio, Hon. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr., and attended by six (6) Senators namely. Senators Almendras,
Lopez, Magsaysay, Primicias, Roy and Puyat and eight (8) Congressmen
namely, Congressmen Aldeguer, Lagumbay, Fuentebella, Ganzon, Gatuslao, Lucman,
Marasigan and Noel. Respondent has denied such allegation, but this cannot affect
our foregoing view.
148

Without prejudice to an extended decision later on, the Court holds, therefore, that the
resolution of the House of Representatives of March 21, 1962, declining vacant the
seats of the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in the Commission
on Appointments and appointing others in lieu of some of them, as well as the
rejection of the ad interim appointment of petitioner by thirteen (13) alleged members
of the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized, and the designation of
respondent Jorge Tan, Jr., as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on April 16, 1962,
when said office was not vacant, are null and void; that petitioner is entitled to hold
said office; and that respondent should vacate the same and turn it over to petitioner,
with costs against said respondent.
Mr. Justice Padilla voted to dismiss the petition, upon the ground that the effectivity of
petitioner's ad interim appointment expired on December 30, 1961, for the reasons
given in his concurring opinion inAytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-18313 (January 19,
1962).
Yours truly,
(SGD.)
Clerk of Court

PAULINO

S.

MARQUEZ

149

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP.
RAUL
A.
DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S
CAPACITY
AS
SECRETARY
OF
THE
COMMISSION
ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments
among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas
ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four
members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to
only 17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied
by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the
chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members
except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from
the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction,
we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner
and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. 4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the
doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of

the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent

150

political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party
and has not yet attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is
political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that
he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of
Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the
Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as
follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted
to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's
assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that
what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may
not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief
Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul
the election of two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the
ground that they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23
members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the
Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the minority
representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J.
Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man
composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner

came to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six
legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the
Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could not also
fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that
the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve.
The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom
of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the
requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling
the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was
a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we
are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by
the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate
and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority"
in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in
nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass
upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed
election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a
particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether
such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or
statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v.
Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization of the
Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice
of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
151

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less
persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who
caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable
obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this
proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the
respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For
another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where

serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance

to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same
policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five
members of the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not
being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be
characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from
the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority
would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully be
treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case
has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that
the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public
interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being barely six
months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before
us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an
alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the
matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and
the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective
positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper
disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by
the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly,
the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was

apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party.
Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the
House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was
called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber.
Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on
appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were
displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestration Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as
thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his
place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his
appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly
constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary
combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and
permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the
Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was
invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political
parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court
held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the socalled "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the
membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on
Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to
another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus
place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of
each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party
contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance
with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He
stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might
be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the
LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him,
that case expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political
alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The
creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no
less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That
change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the
reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
152

members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on

the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it
that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of
a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of
their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to
declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments
held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by
the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the
respondent (who was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development
has supervened to considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to
repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he
claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then
the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not
being a duly registered political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges
granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot
legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. 9

xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution,
is to give the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to
political parties who are duly registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner.
On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the
resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP
for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of

the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of
time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party
obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate)
would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as
long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself
would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of
the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for
the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal

Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was

raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments

and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in
both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members
in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no
less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A.
Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there
have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but
these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in
structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states
has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be
considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the
House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission
on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token,
the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The
independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party.
That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to
claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the
seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any
objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal

from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than
half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must
survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that
test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest
following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact
prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue
presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not
the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in
nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party
respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed
aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue
raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the
House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
153

Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent
and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled
by the House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies
directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly,
because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us
except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will
upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging
our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do
not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated
January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly
elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume
his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

154

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioners.

Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for Lorna L. Verano-Yap.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of
Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban,
Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan
(KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some
independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority
Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven
(11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on
Appointments. They were:
Hon.
Hon.
Hon.

Miguel
Romero
Antonio
V.
Rogaciano
Mercado
Hon.
Raul
Hon.
Alawadin
T.
Hon.
Jose

L.
R.
L.
Beltran,

Verano-Yap
LP
Imperial
IND
Lobregat
IND
Jr.
LB/Unido/NP

(pp. 115-116, Rollo.)

ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG

BAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor
Leader of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines;
HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP,
HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M.
MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON.
CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M.
BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as
Members of the Commission on Appointments for the House of Representatives
of the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
Hon.
Lorna
8.
Hon.
Carlos
9.
Hon.
Ma.
Clara
10.
Hon
Natalio
M.
11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB

LP
(Liberal
Party)
Cuenco
LB-Panaghiusa
LB
(Lakas
ng
Bayan)
Daza
LP
Bandon
Jr.
PDP-Laban
Cabochan
PDP-Laban

On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House
elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission
on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for
brevity) was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra
requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request
was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio
Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos,
Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor
Leader and over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority
membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political
alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as
follows:
1.
Hon.
Miguel
L.
Romero
2.
Hon.
Antonio
V.
Cuenco
3.
Hon.
Rogaciano
M.
Mercado
4.
Hon.
Alawadin
T.
Bandon,
Jr.
5.
Hon.
Jose
L.
Cabochan
6.
Hon.
Carlos
R.
Imperial
7.
Hon.
Maria
Clara
L.
Lobregat
8.
Hon.
Natalio
M.
Beltran,
Jr.
9.
Hon.
Carmelo
J.
Locsin
10.
Hon.
Luis
C.
Singson
11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP

LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP
LDP

(p. 122, Rollo.)

Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House
minority.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo
155

warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan,
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments
on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is
entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be
nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as
representative of the minority was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in
the Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the
minority party or parties in the House (p. 31, Rollo).
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on
Appointments as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine
(9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker,
the Majority Floor Leader, the members of the Commission on Appointments including
Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap
(who filed a separate Comment), alleged: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of
the Commission on Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction
of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in
consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition
"as a form of a political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of
March 3, 1989, 160 members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had
expressly renounced in writing their respective political party affiliations and formally
affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo). After its
petition for registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989 by the First
Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en
banc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that as
KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of
President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of
the Coalesced Majority of the members who would sit in the Commission on
Appointments.

eleven (11) other House members to the Commission on Appointments; (2)

respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the
Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp. 217-218, Rollo).
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues
involved may touch on the validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement
of the LDP or the LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs.
Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo).
The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on
Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, asex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)
After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that
the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it
does not, but because the revision of the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344,
December 21, 1989, where this Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of
the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were political in nature, it would
still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government."

itc-asl

Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no
better light than those already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission
on Appointments because: (1) the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap and

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was

based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may
be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were
apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition
party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House
156

membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of

proportional representation of the political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is
presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's
choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member
(petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership,
hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on
Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House
membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the
petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival,
respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the
Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their
party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their
election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced
Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

157

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

LAKAS-NUCD
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members

1.5

members

At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27, 1992, Senator Romulo
in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in his behalf of the LDP,
eight (8) senators for membership in the Commission on Appointments, namely
Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo. The
nomination of the eight senators 2 was objected to by Petitioner, Senator

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106971 October 20, 1992

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS
(LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners,
vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, respondents.

Guingona, as Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John Osmea, in

representation of the NPC. To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino
proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 3

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

. . . 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eight coming from the LDP, two
coming from NPC, one coming from the Liberal Party, with the understanding that
there are strong reservations against this proportion of these numbers so that if later
on in action in the Supreme Court, if any party is found to have an excess in
representation, and if any party is found to have a deficiency in representation, that
party will be entitled to nominate and have elected by this body its additional
representatives.

This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator Alberto Romulo and
Wigberto Taada from sitting and assuming the position of members of the
Commission on Appointments and to prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio
Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent
senators to sit as members thereof.

The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary arrangement and, inspite of
the objections of Senator Guingona and Osmea, to enable the Commission on
Appointments to be organized by the election of its members, it was approved. The
elected members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one
LAKAS-NUCD.

As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed of
the following members or Senators representing the respective political affiliations:

seats

On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President Neptali
Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from
recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eight senator elected
by the LDP, and Wigberto E. Taada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDPLABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed
compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the Senate,
consistent with the Constitution, 4 to combine their fractional representation in the

the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional

representation of each political party with elected representatives in the Senate, is as
follows:

Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides fro the creation of a

Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its membership, as follows:

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

LDP

NPC

LAKAS-NUCD
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 senator

15
5

senators
senators
senators

Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follow as:

No.
of
senators
of

Total no. of senators elected

political

party

12

Political Party/ Proportional

Political Coalition Membership Representatives
LDP
NPC

15
5

7.5
2.5

members
members

Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide

who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and
elected thereto.

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of

the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote except in
158

case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within the
session days of the Congress from their submission of all the members. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional representation of the various
political parties with elected senators in the senators in the Senate, each of these
political parties is entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission on
Appointments as stated in the first paragraph of this decision. 5 Each political party

has a claim to an extra half seat, and the election of respondents Senator
Romulo and Senator Taada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDP
majority is precisely questioned by the petitioners because, according to
them, it unduly increased the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in the
commission and reduced the membership of the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC
correspondingly. In view of the conflicting claims of each of the political
parties/coalition duly represented in the Senate to a fractional membership in
the Commission on Appointments, the election of respondents Senator
Romulo and Senator Taada has become controversial and its validity
questionable. Hence, this petition. It has been established that the legality of
filling up the membership of the Commission on Appointments is a justiciable
issue and not a political question. 6
We deem it necessary to resolve the respondents' argument as to the nature of the
instant petition. There is no doubt that the issues involved herein are constitutional in
nature and are of vital importance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a Commission on
Appointments. Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the
alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance 7 and the

"transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that they be

settled promptly and definitely brushing aside . . . technicalities of
procedure". 8
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, the instant petition may be regarded as
one of prohibition 9 wherein the Senate is claimed to have acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction when it designated respondent Senator Romulo as

eighth member of the Commission on Appointments, upon nomination by the
LDP, and respondent Senator Taada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that,
in both instance, LDP and LP are each entitled only to "half a member". In the
alternative, the petition may be regarded as one for mandamus, 10 in which it
is claimed that the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully excluded from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which each is entitled.
Considering the importance of the case at bar and in keeping with the Court's
duty under the Constitution to keep the other branches of the government
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws of the land, this Court has
decided to brush aside legal technicalities of procedure and take cognizance
of this case.

The issues for determination by this Court may be stated as follows:

1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Taada as
members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2) If said membership of the respondent senators in the Commission is violative of the
Constitutional provision, did the respondent Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in
electing the respondent Senators?
3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent Senate, acting through the
LDP majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining, prohibiting and restraining
respondent Senators from sitting as members of and participating in the proceeding of
the Commission on Appointments be issued?
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical
representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP 7.5
NPC .5
LAKAS-NUCD 2.5
LP-PDP-LABAN 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the
political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution
leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with
the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the
Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing
one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the
latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the
representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
On the claim of Senator Taada that under the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo
Taada, 11 and the cases of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be

elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the

physical impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership
must be rounded up into one senator; (b) being the sole elected senator of
his party, his party is entitled to be represented in the Commission on
Appointments; (c) having been elected senator, rounding up into one full
senator his fractional membership is consistent with the provision and spirit of
159

the Constitution and would be in full accord with the principle of republicanism
that emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked as a precedent in
support of incumbent Senator Taada's claim to a membership in the present
Commission on Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24 elected
senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
while Senator Lorenzo Taada, who belonged to the Citizen's Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of the Commission on
Appointments because he alone represented the minority party. Had there been
another senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of
who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition party would have arisen. In
the case of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the opposition
party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of proportional
representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the opposition was entitled to full
member (not a fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally nominated and
elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the present case, if there were
a political parties in the Senate, and We follow Senators Taada's claim that he is
entitled to full membership as lone representative of his party, We the anomaly of
having 13 senators, where the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Commission
on Appointments.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by
nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same
because it is not in compliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by
adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by
utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of
number impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect
more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater
share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to
impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.

Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any

political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the
number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission on
Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a

political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to
have a representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the
Commission on Appointments. This applies to the respondent Senator
Taada.
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected
senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally
claims seat in the Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to
the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the
Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution requires
is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the
Commission shall meet only while congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or
a majority of all its members "to discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution, Section 10
Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, provides as follows:
Sec. 10. Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall meet at either the
session hall of the Senate or the House of Representatives upon call of the Chairman
or as the Commission may designate. The presence of at least thirteen (13) members
is necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at least four (4) of the
members constituting the quorum should come from either house. . . .
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in
order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their composition is expressly specified
by
the
Constitution.
Among
these
are
the
Supreme
Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14 Commission on Election, 15 Commission

on Audit. 16 They perform their function so long and there is the required
quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on
Appointments may perform its functions and transact it s business even if
only ten (10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.
160

It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides for equal membership
from the Senate and the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments, the senators on the one hand, and the representatives, on the other,
do not vote separately but jointly, and usually along party lines. Even if Senator
Taada would not be able sit in the Commission on Appointments, the LP-LDPLABAN would still be represented in the Commission by congressman Ponce Enrile
who has become a member of the LP. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any
of the political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.
Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always twelve (12) senators in
the Commission on Appointments, the instant situation cannot be rectified by the
Senate in disregard of the rule on proportional representation. The election of senator
Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP majority by sheer force of
superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992
was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical
strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of
authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence
on the matter before this Court, We declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo
and Senator Wigberto Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments as
null and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a writ
of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Taada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of
members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents Senate
President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission
on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent
Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as
members of said Commission.
SO ORDERED.

161

EN BANC

thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and
have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%)
and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million
annually in government revenues;

June 18, 1987

G.R. No. L-75697
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI
ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA
COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson
Y.
Ng
for
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

petitioner.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and
purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was
promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days
after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code
providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie
Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine
Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's
opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by
the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to
file their Comment in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular
clauses as follows:

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per

annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180
Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie
houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide
displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and
theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the
Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated
investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not
only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than
75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features
constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the
youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote
their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to
curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright
laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of
the people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency
measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following
grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to
the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter
thereof;

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including,

among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation
162

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of

trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast
powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule
also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be
given practical rather than technical construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the
DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%)
of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or
disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the
municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the
tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the
video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The
tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a
tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of

the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled
distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles
explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the
DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive
enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all
its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the
latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and
oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious
question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes
is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely
venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in
the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature
acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous
and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure
prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around
P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on
retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the
30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theaterowners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the
admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is
a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the
need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the
legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation,
and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of
the DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists
a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
163

adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th
"whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with
dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering
that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said
Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the
question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue
delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to
the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion
as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the
authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period"
with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of
the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the
eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is,
among other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in
providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five
(45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a
permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the
BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or
other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased,
or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any
person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration
by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the
possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the
required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes
of the nature of an ex post facto law.

The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what
evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs.
Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that
when certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the
existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that
the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational
connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact
presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima
facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day
period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated
and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new
industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the
DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by
rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about
by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic
films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues
due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of
video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise"
of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have
proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and
expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and
exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be
the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the
rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which
rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
164

supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the
challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a
challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us
in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

165

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089

October 25, 1967

BARA
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay
Barrios and Fule for respondent.

for

LIDASAN, petitioner,

petitioner.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections, 1 is this: Is Republic
Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba,
reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from
said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the
same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del
Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be
elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are
parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15,
1967, the pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new
municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and
Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of
Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province
of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan,
a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified
voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September
20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains
dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.Second. The title of the
bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not
exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its
title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of
Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

166

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced
in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act, is bad.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The
title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur"8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected
by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in
the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a
two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic
Act 4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in
"the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the
incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton
and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away
"need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but
emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill.
Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding
increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality.
And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as
controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act
(Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional
upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to
the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the
bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating
said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs
thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth
in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The
lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is
neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of
Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village
of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act
to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,
however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the
following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to
wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the
Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of
Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and
control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of
the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one
object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the
statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the
decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been
a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary;
but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be
disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of
an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A.
539.
167

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those

affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich.
316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county.
The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The
title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which
legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared
unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference
to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with
the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the
municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the
province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that
where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the
parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives
the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not
be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the
jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic
Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may
stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would
have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact
the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute,
which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what
remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the
court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create
the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del

Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang,
Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly.
They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in
the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and
not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group
of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst
these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors
which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.
Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the
explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and
the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern
themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof.
That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into
law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the
municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate
population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still
apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume
that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be
formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an
independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the
income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation,
and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of
these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer
them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to
impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was
created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate
population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to
create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation
of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due
respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast
Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended
twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the
function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
168

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that
petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of
Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the
real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity
to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are
impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where
he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of
residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to
vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not
want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may
not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned
into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may
not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to
vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the
town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill
must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the
part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge
the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to
prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.

169

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same election.

EN BANC

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it
contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1)
of the Constitution, to wit:

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.

GABRIEL,
and
ROBERTO
R.
TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM
MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners
assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the
incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill
which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into
law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10,
1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the
conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided
under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting
population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of
these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law
resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject
matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since
Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one
subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically
Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific
provisions of the Constitution.

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an
increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in
Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that
Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

The contentions are devoid of merit.

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the
passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of
170

not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one
city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation
of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v.
Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated
in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect
that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong
and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike
down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by
the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from
the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision,
Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members
is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have
separate
legislative
districts,
the
assailed
Section
49
of
R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd
since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further
arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate
in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative
district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter
of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of
San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do
with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the
assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong,
Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could
hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

171

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ,
TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE
VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE
ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION,
CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON
MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN,
SOCORRO
BERNARDEZ,
and
PEDRO
GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal
Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.
Federico N. Alday for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a municipal
corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the

exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the
ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality being
devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling,
petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to
them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1. Title of Ordinance.

This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the [Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. Definitions of Terms
(a) 'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment selling to the
public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. (b) 'Cabaret' or
'Dance Hall' shall include any place or establishment where dancing is
permitted to the public and where professional hostesses or hospitality girls
and professional dancers are employed. (c) 'Professional hostesses' or
'hospitality girls' shall include any woman employed by any of the

establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at their

table or to dance with them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any
woman who dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or
remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the operator or by the persons she
dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the owner, manager, administrator or
any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any night
club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3. Prohibition in the Issuance and
Renewal of Licenses, Permits. Being the principal cause in the decadence
of morality and because of their other adverse effects on this community as
explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall
henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the
municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional
hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of
the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall
include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4. Revocation of Permits
and Licenses. The licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs,
cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued
to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are
hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them as
provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these
establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal.
Section 5. Penalty in case of violation. Violation of any of the provisions
of this Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three
(3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the discretion of the
Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person charged with
the management and/or operation thereof shall be liable for the penalty
provided herein. Section 6. Separability Clause. If, for any reason, any
section or provision of this Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no
other section or provision hereof shall be affected thereby. Section 7.
Repealing Clause. All ordinance, resolutions, circulars, memoranda or
parts thereof that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed. Section 8. Effectivity. This Ordinance shall take effect
immediately upon its approval; provided, however, that operators of night
clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation including professional
hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are given a period of
thirty days from the approval hereof within which to wind up their businesses
and comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 5 The grounds alleged follow:

172

1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a

lawful business, occupation or calling.
2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal
protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as
amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate touristoriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of
Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to respondent Judge, now Associate

Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court, who issued a restraining

order on November 7, 1975. The answers were thereafter filed. It was therein
alleged: " 1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to
regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night
clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938,
978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of petitioners' right to
due process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are
subordinate to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree No. 189, as
amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate
or prohibit night clubs." 7 There was the admission of the following facts as
having been established: "l. That petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil
Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal
Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de
la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner
Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That petitioners had invested large sums of
money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-lighted and have
no partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners
owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls therein to
engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That these
hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not
one of them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to
submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be infected with
venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the crime rate there is
better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then
came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for
certiorari by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court dismissed the petitions.
Its rationale is set forth in the opening paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last.
This in essence is why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized
as it has been by innuendos of sexual titillation and fearful of what the awesome
future holds for it, had no alternative except to order thru its legislative machinery, and
even at the risk of partial economic dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or
cabarets. This in essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good

government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and
social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of
Bocaue, Bulacan. The restraining orders heretofore issued in these two cases are
therefore hereby rifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose of the
grace period being to enable the petitioners herein to apply to the proper appellate
tribunals for any contemplated redress." 9 This Court is, however, unable to agree

with such a conclusion and for reasons herein set forth, holds that reliance on
the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed
ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as
follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is practically a reproduction of the

former Section 39 of Municipal Code. 11 An ordinance enacted by virtue

thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading
case of United States v. Abendan 12 "is valid, unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where
the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and
the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed
pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United States v.
Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where the present
Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by this Court: "The
general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the
main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this
class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is
much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant
with the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent
173

with the laws or policy of the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the
test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes
of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power
by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation." 16 It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in
this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the
case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and
property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those
therein employed.
It
was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO
REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first section insofar as pertinent reads:
"The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars,
saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement
within its territorial jurisdiction: ... " 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first section
was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " 20 The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as
Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the
above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far
as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was
not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was
followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, notprohibition. There
is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic
Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would
give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended.

17

" 21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is
a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 22 in the
language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the
great public needs, 23 to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling,
occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of
which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by
such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would
save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends
itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of
the recently-enacted Local Government Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a

reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first

paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang
bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein; ..." 26 There are in addition provisions that may
have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang
bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist
guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns
of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and
regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such
authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the
municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and
sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and
operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms
of entertainment; ..." 27 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit
the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is
to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant
licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject
to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
174

regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their

establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no
more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their
employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an
undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be
susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for
the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power,
were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be
avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the
picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due
process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its
resolute stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. The
commitment to such an Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that
character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the
judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the weight of its support to measures that can
be characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power. Reference is made
by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a misapprehension as to what was decided by this

Court. That was a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid

objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit
motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in
order precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and
immorality. This is an entirely different case. What was involved is a measure
not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in the aforesaid ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must
be a factual foundation of invalidity, it was likewise made clear that there is no
need to satisfy such a requirement if a statute were void on its face. That it
certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious and
under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court
dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of
1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No costs.

175

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 94571

April 22, 1991

Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the
repeal or amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism
of the legislative body and not this Court.
In Gonzales,5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of
certain provision particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990,
R.A. No. 6831. This Court, in disposing of the issue, stated

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget &
Management, HON. ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National
Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination

of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle
in appropriate cases.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.

Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,1 while
the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.2
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled
"Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of
the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines may bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised. 3 Indeed, even a
taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections
31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and that
charge being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between
the Upper House of Congress and the executive department that may be taken
cognizance of by this Court.
The questions raised in the instant petition are
I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990 BUDGET
VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE
CONSTITUTION?6

OF

SECTION

29(l),

ARTICLE

VI

OF

THE

There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may
properly take cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the great and sincere
piety professed by every President and every Congress of the Philippines since the
176

end of World War II for the economic welfare of the public schoolteachers always
ended up in failure and this failure, he stated, had caused mass defection of the best
and brightest teachers to other careers, including menial jobs in overseas
employment and concerted actions by them to project their grievances, mainly over
low pay and abject working conditions.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February Revolution, especially
keen among public schoolteachers, which at present exacerbate these long frustrated
hopes.
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that tried vainly to
respond to the needs of the teachers, the central problem that always defeated their
pious intentions was really the one budgetary priority in the sense that any proposed
increase for public schoolteachers had to be multiplied many times by the number of
government employees in general and their equitable claims to any pay
standardization such that the pay rate of teachers is hopelessly pegged to the rate of
government workers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed the prospect of a
significant pay increase for teachers.
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest priority for
public schoolteachers, and by implication, for all teachers, would ensure that the
President and Congress would be strongly urged by a constitutional mandate to grant
to them such a level of remuneration and other incentives that would make teaching
competitive again and attractive to the best available talents in the nation.
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching competed most
successfully against all other career choices for the best and the brightest of the
younger generation. It is for this reason, he stated, that his proposed amendment if
approved, would ensure that teaching would be restored to its lost glory as the career
of choice for the most talented and most public-spirited of the younger generation in
the sense that it would become the countervailing measure against the continued
decline of teaching and the wholesale desertion of this noble profession presently
taking place. He further stated that this would ensure that the future and the quality of
the population would be asserted as a top priority against many clamorous and
importunate but less important claims of the present. (Journal of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the
1990 budget. It plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for debt services is
inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, viod (Art. 7, New Civil Code).7
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it
does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it
the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.

As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets.
This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the
previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than
the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO
INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE
APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO
GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN
LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES
OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, provides:
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests,
which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall not
exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at
the exchange rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are
incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred
under this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the
approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year thereafter, all in
United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of
every regular session, to report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and
indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees extended, and the purposes and
projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the
guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino owned
or controlled corporations and similar purposes.
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal
177

and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they shall become
due.

c. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or financial institutions and

guaranteed by the Republic of the Philippines;

However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81

amending Section 6, thus:

d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by government-owned or

controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions.

Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for whose account
advances were made by the National Treasury will revert to the General Fund.

Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in order to enable the
Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures,
securities or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
under the authority of this Act, the proceeds of which are deemed appropriated for the
projects, all the revenue realized from the projects financed by such loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of
indebtedness, shall be turned over in full, after deducting actual and necessary
expenses for the operation and maintenance of said projects, to the National Treasury
by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation concerned, which is hereby appropriated for the purpose as
and when they shall become due. In case the revenue realized is insufficient to cover
the principal, interest and other charges, such portion of the budgetary savings as
may be necessary to cover the balance or deficiency shall be set aside exclusively for
the purpose by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or governmentowned or controlled corporation concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a
deficiency, such amount necessary to cover the payment of the principal and interest
on such loans, credit or indebtedness as and when they shall become due is hereby
appropriated out of any funds in the national treasury not otherwise appropriated: . . .
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. All expenditures for (a) personnel retirement
premiums, government service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures,
(b) principal and interest on public debt, (c) national government guarantees of
obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically appropriated; Provided, that no
obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus automatically
appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments.
and PD 1967, which provides:
Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on
foreign or domestic loans, or foreign or domestic loans whereon creditors make a call
on the direct and indirect guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines, obtained by:
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which were relent to governmentowned or controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions;

Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances
made out of the appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines shall
make the proper recommendation to the Minister of Finance on whether such
advances shall be treated as equity or subsidy of the National Government to the
institution concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program of the
Government.
In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990," which
accompanied her budget message to Congress, the President of the Philippines,
Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
Sources Appropriation
The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require P132.1 billion of
new programmed appropriations out of a total P155.3 billion in new legislative
authorization from Congress. The rest of the budget, totalling P101.4 billion, will be
sourced from existing appropriations: P98.4 billion from Automatic Appropriations and
P3.0 billion from Continuing Appropriations (Fig. 4).
And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed
for debt service. In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set
aside the said amount of P98.4 Billion with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3
Billion to be determined and fixed by Congress, which is now Rep. Act 6831.9
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees
of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February,
1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President
Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by
Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has
not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in
the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be
enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3,
Article XVIII which provides

b. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government financial

institutions the proceeds of which were relent to public or private institutions;
178

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of

instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24,
Article VI of the Constitution,i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
(Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by
Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said
decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows

Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation,11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section
3,
Article
XVIII
of
the
Constitution
recognizes
that
"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers
to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be
recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent
with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the
amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign
loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made
available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic
enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and
necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the
Solicitor General as he argues
. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable
turn of market conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower
rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into

arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt to
asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation
obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what
has been previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are
usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in
layman's parlance, "basket" of foreign exchange and interest rateassumptions which
may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the
basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine
Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time
this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the
meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed
payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-tototal expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate
payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against
the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without
the person of Marcos.13
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the
requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the
Constitution which requires, among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills
authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved by the
President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate
that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees
appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the
legislative million The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be
passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they
should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon.
Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs.
Ericta,14 this Court had this to say
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in
which legislative process can go forward . . .

179

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy . . .

priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and
by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into
expenditure levels.

The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as whole . . .

Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget
and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line
with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development
Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).

In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it
reaches him except enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its
enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have been given the
opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion essentially
legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid delegation.16
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential
terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in
order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and
other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as
guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate
law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to
enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures
or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the
books of the Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four
major phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch
and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary

With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic
projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and
foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the
Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for
all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulatesan appropriation act precisely
following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization
therefor already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967.
Precisely in the fight of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts
and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof
upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon
such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its
wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies theimplementation or execution of the
legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process
covers the variousoperational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation
authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,
the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases,
the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise
this phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the
Treasury for allotments from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter
in advance of payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of
Treasury, upon receiving official billings from the creditors, remits payments to
creditors through the Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund established for government
security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual
performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired
180

and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency
budgets were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown,
petitioners insist nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue
delegation of legislative power to the executive on the alleged ground that the
appropriations therein are not exact, certain or definite, invoking in support therefor
the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution under which the case of State v. Moore,
69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska,
however, our Constitution does not require adefinite, certain, exact
or "specific appropriation made by law." Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution
omits any of these words and simply states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes
any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees.
In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as
by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as
by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions
of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific
public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the
present.17

Interest
Payments

P36,861

P18,570

P55,431

Principal
Amortization

16,310

15,077

31,387

P53,171
========

P33,647
========

P86,818
========

Total

18

as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31
of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations,
unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus
merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing
this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues
raised. As to whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more
especially the enormous amount that had been incurred by the past administration,
which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political
decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom
and sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President
Corazon C. Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing for the Fiscal Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering
the estimated obligation that will be incurred by the national government during the
fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the proposed budget, P86.8 is set aside for
debt servicing as follows:
1wphi1

National
Service
(in million pesos)

Government
Expenditures,

Debt
1990

Domestic
Foreign
Total
RA 245, as RA
4860
amended
as amended,
PD 1967
181

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S.
MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P.,
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD,
M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S.
ZIGA,
M.P.,
and
ROGELIO
V.
GARCIA.
M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and
VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is
the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as
members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of
constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the
Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of
the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF
PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE
CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES
FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT
TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY
THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE
PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER

AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September
19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from
the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He
further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will
not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the
Comment. This, they did, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the
administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance
"until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General
filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the
abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot
and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F.
Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom have
gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all,
not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to
manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect
condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot
and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great
disservice to national interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny
public respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new
182

Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987,
carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section
24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent
reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The
case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in
support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering anunconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United
States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761,
Emphasis supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA
333, We said that as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere
cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act
or approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and
categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the
enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an
item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be
allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if
there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in
particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation
and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the
constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and
disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury
[Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)];
the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the
requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards
designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by
petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres.
Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations,
results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary
performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well
expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political
and personal expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents that

paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section

16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one
branch of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of
duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
183

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight
Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot
directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the
control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other
of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution
apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three
departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The
courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases,
but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative.
Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they
must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative
enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the
legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that
the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty
to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do
in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to
render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the
judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control
over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and
because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their
representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61;
People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.]
409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of

Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its
authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the
legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1
of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution,
and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has
exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We
have earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon
cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their
"sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution
brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his
cohorts. A provision which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this
sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.
184

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,

HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her
capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.

G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A.
GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON.
VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.

Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.

Roco, Buag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A.
Gonzales and Edgardo Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
(Lamp).

G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994

QUIASON, J.:

RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES,

Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO
J. ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of the Philippine Senate, all of
whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own behalf and in representation of
Senators HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
JOSE D. LINA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL- ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M.
TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAADA and FREDDIE N.
WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT,
impleaded
herein
as
an
unwilling
co-petitioner, respondents.

Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of authority
between the Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and
the sword. Providing the focus for the contest between the President and the
Congress over control of the national budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial
intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the claim that
Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities,
and by several Senators on the claim that the President has committed grave abuse
of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power.

G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate
and as taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as
National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate
and
as
taxpayers,petitioners,
vs.

I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to
realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same
to have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day,
the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the
bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
185

In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and
Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the
special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the
Special
Provision
of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo
J. Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance,
and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman,
(d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto Taada (a copetitioner in G.R. No. 113174), together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a nonstock domestic corporation, sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the COA.
Petitioners Taada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine Senate and
taxpayers, while petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They
challenge the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the
appropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this
petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special
provision added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations
for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders to enjoin
respondents Secretary of Budget and Management, National Treasurer and COA from
enforcing the questioned provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to
grant said provisional reliefs on the time- honored principle of according the
presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of regularity to official acts.

In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions,
the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate
Justice Irene Cortes to submit their respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which
they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms
v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No.
113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political
(i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal
standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales
v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the
entire membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the
presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was
authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which
reads as follows:
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines
contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General
Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No.
19186) and For Other Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been
recognized (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976];
Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632
[1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate
President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized
by
the
Senate
itself.
Likewise,
the
petitions
in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the
purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes
a preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential
veto and the conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
186

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority
vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of
the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional
Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1366 [1974]).

COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND

For
Fund
development

New
Appropriations,
Current Operating Expenditures

Personal
Services
Operating
Expenses

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative
but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress
(Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.

1.
Developments

This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as
such having a substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said
that there was the requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to
raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate
is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive
Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the
corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in his office (Memorandum, p. 14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec.
27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on
policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In
the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the
exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of
P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries." Said Article provides:

of
P

countrywide
2,977,000,000

by

Purpose

Capital
Other

Total
Outlays

A. PURPOSE

To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:

requirements
projects

Maintenance
and

Projects

For
P250,000,000

P2,727,000,000

TOTAL
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000

Countrywide
P2,977,000,000
NEW

Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by
officials concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives,
P12,500,000
each;
Senators,
P18,000,000
each;
Vice-President,
P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a
revolving fund to be administered by a government financial institution (GFI) as a trust
fund for lending operations. Prior years releases to local government units and
national government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the government
financial institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities released
from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and
Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than
five (5) days after the beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects
and activities by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget and Management
shall submit within thirty (30) days after the end of each quarter a report to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases
made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of the projects, locations,
implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p. 1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and
identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund
is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
187

appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution
(Rollo, pp. 78- 86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power
of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President.
The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of
appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to
be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and
credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the
purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation
of the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994,
the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the
members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund
was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other
projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding
under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals
and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular
projects or activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is
innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must
take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of
the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven
allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of Congress, with the
members close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for "horse-trading,"
getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had
to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to
cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a
recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and
their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their
respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses

Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which
P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the
appropriation for the House of Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of which
P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated for current operating expenditures (GAA of 1994,
pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries,
Salaries/Wage,

Total
=======

Permanent
Contractual/Emergency
Salaries

and

Wages

153,347
6,870
160,217

Other Compensation

Step
Increments
Honoraria
and
Commutable
Allowances
Compensation
Insurance
Premiums
Pag-I.B.I.G.
Contributions
Medicare
Premiums
Bonus
and
Cash
Gift
Terminal
Leave
Benefits
Personnel
Economic
Relief
Allowance
Additional
Compensation
of
P500
under
A.O.
53
Others

Total
Other
Compensation

01
Total
Personal
Services
=======

1,073
3,731
1,579
1,184
888
14,791
2,000
10,266
11,130
57,173
103,815
264,032

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses

02
03
04
05
06
07
08
14
15
17
18

Traveling
Expenses
32,841
Communication
Services
7,666
Repair
and
Maintenance
of
Government
Facilities
1,220
Repair
and
Maintenance
of
Government
Vehicles
318
Transportation
Services
128
Supplies
and
Materials
20,189
Rents
24,584
Water/Illumination
and
Power
6,561
Social
Security
Benefits
and
Other
Claims
3,270
Training
and
Seminars
Expenses
2,225
Extraordinary
and
Miscellaneous
Expenses
9,360
188

23
Advertising
24
Fidelity
Bonds
29
Other

Total
Maintenance
and

Total
Current
=======

and
and

Publication
Premiums

Insurance
Services

Other

Operating

Operating

Expenditures

Expenditures

261,557
143,643

06
Transportation
Services
178
07
Supplies
and
Materials
55,248
10
Grants/Subsidies/Contributions
940
14
Water/Illumination
and
Power
14,458
15
Social
Security
Benefits
and
Other
Claims
325
17
Training
and
Seminars
Expenses
7,236
18
Extraordinary
and
Miscellaneous
Expenses
14,474
20
Anti-Insurgency/Contingency
Emergency
Expenses
9,400
23
Advertising
and
Publication
242
24
Fidelity
Bonds
and
Insurance
Premiums
1,420
29
Other
Services
284,209

Total
Maintenance
and
Other
Operating
Expenditures
557,234

Total
Current
Operating
Expenditures
1,165,297
=======

405,200

(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)

1,325
89,778
200,415
464,447

(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)

The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries,
Salaries/Wages,

Total
Salaries
=======

Permanent
Contractual/Emergency
and

Wages

The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:

Other Compensation
Step
Honoraria
Allowances
Compensation
Premiums
Pag-I.B.I.G.
Medicare
Bonus
Terminal
Personnel
Allowance
Additional
Others

Total

01
=======

Increments

4,312

and

Commutable
4,764
Insurance
1,159
5,231
2,281

Contributions
Premiums
and

Cash

Gift
Benefits
Relief

Leave
Economic
Compensation

of

P500

Other
Total

under

Compensation
Personal

Services

35,669
29

A.O.

21,150
53
106,140
202,863
608,063

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses

02
03
04
05

Repair
Repair

Traveling
Communication
and
Maintenance
and
Maintenance

of
of

Expenses
Services
Government
Government

139,611
22,514
Facilities
5,116
Vehicles
1,863

4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of Congress may

realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expenses category provide
the total of said allocation is not exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided into
expenditures for salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits,
maintenance expenses and other operating expenses. In turn, each member of
Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a proportionate share of the
appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for one items of
expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item to
another item of expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92),
claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.
Said section provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations: however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to augment items in an
appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation.
189

The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of

Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994,
which provides:
Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no
change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in this Act
and
other
appropriation
laws
unless
in
cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized
to realign the savings as appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the
members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings
in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so
because they are the ones who know whether there are savings available in some
items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses
that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment.
Before giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of
expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the
GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of
Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt
service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the
Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding. They invoke
Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this
Court held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it
does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it

the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets.
This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the
previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than
the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt
Service) of the GAA of 1994 which provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay for
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department of
Finance shall submit a quarterly report of actual foreign and domestic debt service
payments to the House Committee on Appropriations and Senate Finance Committee
within one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article. According to the
President's Veto Message:
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of Congress to reduce the
debt burden by decreasing the appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion
190

of the Special Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. This must be addressed by
revising our debt policy by way of innovative and comprehensive debt reduction
programs conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are
automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the constitutionality of such
automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the
case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N.
Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.," G.R. No.
94571, dated April 22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the reason that the GAA is
not the appropriate legislative measure to amend the provisions of the Foreign
Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines:PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay for
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for
said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18).
The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the
item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of an item
veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191
SCRA 452 (1990). In that case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus:
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section
55
of
the
1989
Appropriations
Bill
(Section
55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding about
it, thus:
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to
veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?

The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the
present case, are stated as follows:
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section
55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the President
objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power
but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of
that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that
"provisions" are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the
term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the
purpose of the President's veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress
cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions
inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the President in the
exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt
service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is
an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment
policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a
separate law, not in the appropriations law.

191

The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the
same as it will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State,
254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is
why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on
the Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning
the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely
parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto
power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a
general
appropriations
bill
(1987
Constitution,
Art.
VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to
specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit
(Beckman,
The
Item
Veto
Power
of
the
Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the
U.S. Congress on August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State
Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions,
restrictions and limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional
Convention added the following sentence to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935
Constitution:
. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more items of the same, the
President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular
item or items to which it relates . . . .
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto
separately not only items in an appropriations bill but also "provisions".
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned sentence added to
Section 11(2) of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following provision:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless
it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (Art.
VI, Sec. 25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section 16(2) of
the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the
disallowance of the power of the President to veto a "provision".

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein"
and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that
any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision"
which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of
"inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an
appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt
with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae,
commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the
exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an
unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards,
supra., thus:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers
conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by
including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate
legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . .
cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general
appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving
unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the
operation of government.The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity
from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over
substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to
be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature
would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a coequal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . .
We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to
infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation
than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of the
legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that,when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be
treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general
appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the
general appropriation bill with veto-proof "logrolling measures", special interest
provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or "riders", substantive
pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
192

Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provision on
the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate
funds for debt payment without complying with the conditions for automatic
appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and
the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative Code of 1987 and
P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The
writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be done in
contravention of the laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on
debt service, including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item
"shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of
the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and have a
direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation
is the power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So.,
2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed
separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto
of the Special Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso
therein requiring that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall
be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of
the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
G.R. NO. 113174
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388
1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed
special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed are the following:

an authorized government depository bank for the operational expenses of these

projects/services. The net income of the Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall
be remitted to the National Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund. The
implementing guidelines shall be issued by the Department of Budget and
Management (GAA of 1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following:
12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and Colleges are
authorized to use their income from their extension services. Subject to the approval
of the Board of Regents and the approval of a special budget pursuant to Sec. 35,
Chapter
5,
Book
VI
of
E.O.
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development, instructional
materials and work study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of State Universities and
Colleges derived from tuition fees and other sources as may be imposed by governing
boards other than those accruing to revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and
1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust receipts pursuant to Section 40,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited with the National Treasury and
recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and
P.D. No. 1437 for the use of the institution, subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI
of E.O. No. 292L PROVIDED, That disbursements from the Special Account shall not
exceed the amount actually earned and deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a
cash advance on such income may be allowed State half of income actually realized
during the preceding year and this cash advance shall be charged against income
actually earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case
shall such funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of salaries, wages or
allowances, except as may be specifically approved by the Department of Budge and
Management for income-producing activities, or to purchase equipment or books,
without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines pursuant to Letter of
Implementation No. 29.

Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University subject to Section 13 of

the special provisions applicable to all State Universities and Colleges shall be equally
shared by the University and the University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).

All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees, charges and receipts
intended for private recipient units, including private foundations affiliated with these
institutions shall be duly acknowledged with official receipts and deposited as a trust
receipt before said income shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No.
292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).

xxx xxx xxx

The President gave his reason for the veto thus:

(J. 3) Leyte State College

Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, Section

44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution, all income earned by all Government offices and agencies shall accrue
to the General Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund Policy enunciated

(H. 7) West Visayas State University

Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human Resources Development
Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State College derived from the operation of its
LSC House and HRDC shall be constituted into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in

193

by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise,
the creation and establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by substantive
law pursuant to Section 66 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and
Section 45, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.

Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of national roads and bridges,
a maximum of thirty percent (30%) shall be contracted out in accordance with
guidelines to be issued by the Department of Public Works and Highways. The
balance shall be used for maintenance by force account.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and existing law, I

have noted the proliferation of special provisions authorizing the use of agency
income as well as the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds.

Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund appropriated herein to be
applied across the board to the allocation of each region shall be set aside for the
maintenance of roads which may be converted to or taken over as national roads
during the current year and the same shall be released to the central office of the said
department
for
eventual
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance of
the said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for the
maintenance of existing national roads.

I would like to underscore the facts that such income were already considered as
integral part of the revenue and financing sources of the National Expenditure
Program which I previously submitted to Congress. Hence, the grant of new special
provisions authorizing the use of agency income and the establishment of revolving
funds over and above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act shall effectively
reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same time, increase the
level of expenditures of some agencies beyond the well-coordinated, rationalized
levels for such agencies. This corresponding increases the overall deficit of the
National Government (Veto Message, p. 3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
disallowed by his veto the "use of income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the
Western Visayas State University and Leyte State Colleges when he allowed other
government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to use their income for their operating
expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions
while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government
agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that
purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the "one-fund
policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the
Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget
and Management's Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways, the President
vetoed the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30%
maximum ration of works to be contracted for the maintenance of national roads and
bridges. The said paragraph reads as follows:
2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for the maintenance
and repair of roads which are provided in this Act for the Department of Public Works
and Highways shall be released to the respective Engineering District, subject to such
rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Department of Budget and
Management. Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be exempt from
budgetary reserve.

No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses shall be made, except

as
authorized
by
law
or
upon
direction
of
the
President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:
While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to impose certain
restrictions contained in some special provisions, I am equally aware that many
programs, projects and activities of agencies would require some degree of flexibility
to ensure their successful implementation and therefore risk their completion.
Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations derail and impede
program implementation but they may also result in a breach of contractual
obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show that for practical intent
and purposes, maintenance by contract could be undertaken to an optimum of
seventy percent (70%) and the remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account.
Moreover, the policy of maximizing implementation through contract maintenance is a
covenant of the Road and Road Transport Program Loan from the Asian Development
Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD)
Loan
for
the
Highway
Management
Project
(IBRD
Loan
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the government to encourage
and maximize private sector participation in the regular repair and maintenance of
infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined second paragraph of
Special Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public Works and Highways (Veto
Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in
policy of Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down the
condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance should be
contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study, believed that
194

contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more

efficient, economical and practical.

also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
[1964]).

The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specified how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative
and 30% by contract.

4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.

The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions,

conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the
items to which they relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense
(Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this special provision. He
merely argued that the provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched practice
of the government to maximize contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 8586). That is not a ground to veto a provision separate from the item to which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH
is therefore unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the President
vetoed the special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance
with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:
12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed Forces of the
Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health (GAA of 1994, p.
748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of medicines
to a standard formulary, "it is believed more prudent to provide for a transition period
for its adoption and smooth implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines"
(Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP
should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by
Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that
requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a rational system of
procurement and distribution." The President believes that it is more prudent to
provide for a transition period for the smooth implementation of the law in the case of
purchases by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11
(Education Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, cannot justify his veto of the
provision on the purchase of medicines by the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of
medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without

In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President vetoed the
underlined proviso of Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the
prior approval of Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds,
as
well
as
the
entire
Special
Provisions
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall be given for the
acquisition of AFP assets necessary for protecting marine, mineral, forest and other
resources within Philippine territorial borders and its economic zone, detection,
prevention or deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to support diplomatic moves
aimed at preserving national dignity, sovereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, That the
said modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of Organization and
Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of
six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored
personnel carriers (GAA of 1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition
violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if
allowed, "shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to
cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special
Provision No. 3 are conditions or limitations related to the item on the AFP
modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or
legislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the
legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form
of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive actions. The form
may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, or
affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This device represents a
significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared
administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The
Executive
on
a
Leash,
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of
separation of powers.
195

However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the
validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because
the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What
Congress cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to
the exercise of that power (of the President as Commander-in-Chief) through
provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds
for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage
of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the
new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads:
2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, to use savings in the appropriations provided herein to
augment the pension fund being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA of
1994,
p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be
covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to
Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to
use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a
condition or limitation which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation that it
could not be separated therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.

Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section
25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the
general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be
exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the payment of
separation benefits but it added the following Special Provision:
1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation authorized herein
shall be used for the compensation of CAFGU's including the payment of their
separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence allowance for the 11,000
members who will be deactivated in 1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and procedures for
the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994, p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval
pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A.. No. 6758. He gave the following reasons for
imposing the condition:
I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in proposing the amendment
of Special Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However, it is premature at this point in time
of our peace process to earmark and declare through special provision the actual
number of CAFGU members to be deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that the
number to be deactivated would largely depend on the result or degree of success of
the on-going peace initiatives which are not yet precisely determinable today. I have
desisted, therefore, to directly veto said provisions because this would mean the loss
of the entire special provision to the prejudice of its beneficient provisions. I therefore
declare that the actual implementation of this special provision shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's
when it appropriated the money for payment of the separation pay of the members of
thereof. The President, however, directed that the deactivation should be done in
accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the peace and order situation in
the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an
administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's
command
to
dissolve
the
CAFGU's
(Rollo,
G.R.
No.
113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair or
withhold expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the
Appropriations Act nor other legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No.
113888, pp. 15-16).
196

The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines, who should determine when the services of the
CAFGU's
are
no
longer
needed
(Rollo,
G.R.
No.
113888,
pp. 92-95.).
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is
put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505
[1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress
has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes
mandatory on the part of the President to implement the project and to spend the
money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the
Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President in
effect exercises a veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a
matter of fact, the Constitution does not say anything about impounding. The source
of the Executive authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the
authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which
ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President
desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An
example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project,
substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President
to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential
Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law
Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes; Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and
Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686 [1973).
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that
would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle
for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law
considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a
provision
in
an
appropriations
act
cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.

(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress added the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriations for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations
for (a) printing of decisions and publication of "Philippine Reports"; (b) Commutable
terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and payment of
adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating
expenses of the courts' libraries, including purchase of books and periodicals; (d)
purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; (e) necessary
expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual
employees, for judicial administration; (f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's
Electronic
Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in
international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable
transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks
of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in
accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-deofficio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary and
allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for
under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit is hereby authorized,
subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to use savings
for the payment of fringe benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and
personnel of the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing
197

rules and regulations to augment items of appropriation in the Office of the

Ombudsman from savings in other items of appropriation actually released, for: (a)
printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training and information materials;
(b) repair, maintenance and improvement of OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities;
(c)
purchase
of
books,
journals,
periodicals
and
equipment;
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials
and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe
benefits as may be authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB
pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and (e) for other official
purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p.
1174; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is
hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, to augment any item of appropriation in the office of the CHR from
savings in other items of appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, training materials and educational publications;
(b) repair, maintenance and improvement of Commission's central and regional
facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment, (d) payment of
commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials and employees
who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits, as may be
authorized by law for officials and personnel of CHR, subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions included
in the GAA of 1994. He noted that:
The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which states that "no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law." I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the
said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the wellestablished principle on compensation standardization (Veto Message, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA
and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law.

In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse,
be treated as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the condition that the
implementation of the budget of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by
the President."
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit derived from sources
authorized by the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not
exceeding Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund
which shall be used for maintenance, operating and other incidental expenses to
enhance audit services and audit-related activities. The fund shall be deposited in an
authorized government depository ban, and withdrawals therefrom shall be made in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and implementing rules and
regulations:PROVIDED, That any interests earned on such deposit shall be remitted
at the end of each quarter to the national Treasury and shall accrue to the General
Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Commission on Audit shall submit to the
Department of Budget and Management a quarterly report of income and
expenditures of said revolving fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation,
applicability and operation of use of income and revolving funds. The Veto Message
stated:
. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special provisions authorizing
the use of income and the creation of revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations
should be discouraged. However, I take it that these authorizations have
legal/statutory basis aside from being already a vested right to the agencies
concerned which should not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is,
however, imperative need to rationalize their implementation, applicability and
operation. Thus, in order to substantiate the purpose and intention of said provisions, I
hereby declare that the operationalization of the following provisions during budget
implementation shall be subject to theguidelines to be issued by the
President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65
and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of
this Act (Veto Message, p. 6; Emphasis Supplied.)
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that in the
implementation of DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of 5%
and 3% "shall be subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated
by the Executive pursuant to existing laws." The condition was imposed because the
provision "needs further study" according to the President.
The following provision was made subject to said condition:
198

9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%) of the
amount for infrastructure project released by the Department of Budget and
Management shall be deducted by DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed
engineering and construction supervision, testing and quality control, and the like,
thus insuring that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the released fund is available
for direct implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school
buildings, health centers, day-care centers and barangay halls, the deductible amount
shall not exceed three percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision shall subject the government
official or employee concerned to administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction under
Sections
43
and
80,
Book
VI
of
E.O.
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President
imposed the condition that allocations for specific projects shall be released and
disbursed "in accordance with the housing program of the government, subject to prior
Executive approval."
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for the specified projects
shall be set aside for corollary works and used exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation
and construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems,
facilities and amenities in the area:PROVIDED, That any road to be constructed or
rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications and standards set by the
Department
of
Public
Works
and
Highways
for
such
kind
of
road: PROVIDED,FURTHER, That savings that may be available in the future shall be
used for road repair, rehabilitation and construction:
(1) Maharlika Village Road Not less than P5,000,000
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) Not less than P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig) Not less than P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the implementation of
various projects in resettlement areas, Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P7,500,000) shall be allocated to the Dasmarias Bagong Bayan resettlement area,
Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona Relocation Center Area (Gen.
Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and
Services, all of which will be for the cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH
standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) shall
be set aside for the asphalting of seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San
Jose
Del
Monte,
Bulacan
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).

The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of the special
provision on revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by
the
President
pursuant
to
Section
35,
Chapter
5,
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2
and
3
of
the
General
Provisions
of
this
Act"
(Rollo,
G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the
DPWH on the mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said
Department "be subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by
the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and
(c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can be released only "in accordance
with the housing program of the government subject to prior Executive approval"
(Rollo,
G.R.
No.
113888,
pp.
10-11;
14-16).
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation
of the items on which the said conditions were imposed, should be done in
accordance with existing laws, regulations or policies. They did not add anything to
what was already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be
subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative
guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by
the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed
(1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper
steps" to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147
[1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those remedies can be used
only when respondents have acted "without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave
abuse
of
discretion,"
(Revised
Rules
of
Court,
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special
Provision on the appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision
in Gonzales? How can we say that Congress has abused its discretion when it
appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the amount appropriated for
education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from a part
of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its enactment
since the court's interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent
that the construed law purports to carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270
199

[1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as statutes
(Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad laws and
should be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the
veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein
appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities
of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it
prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special Provision
No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of
medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

200

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

RUFINO
R.
TAN, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 109446 October 3, 1994
CARAG, CABALLES, JAMORA AND SOMERA LAW OFFICES, CARLO A.
CARAG, MANUELITO O. CABALLES, ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. and BENJAMIN
A.
SOMERA,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
JOSE U. ONG, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
Rufino R. Tan for and in his own behalf.
Carag, Caballes, Jamora & Zomera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. 109446.

Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
In G.R. No. 109446, petitioners, assailing Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-93,
argue that public respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying
SNIT to general professional partnerships.
The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
The Court has given due course to both petitions. The parties, in compliance with the
Court's directive, have filed their respective memoranda.
G.R. No. 109289
Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act
No. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net
Income
Taxation
Scheme
for
the
Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No.
109289).
The full text of the title actually reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections
21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.
The pertinent provisions of Sections 21 and 29, so referred to, of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as now amended, provide:
Sec. 21. Tax on citizens or residents.

VITUG, J.:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.
109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the
National
Internal
Revenue
Code
and,
in
G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93,
promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation
of the amendatory legislation.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Simplified Net Income Tax for the Self-Employed and/or Professionals Engaged in
the Practice of Profession. A tax is hereby imposed upon the taxable net income as
determined in Section 27 received during each taxable year from all sources, other
than income covered by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section by every
individual
whether
a citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in the Philippines who is self-employed
or practices his profession herein, determined in accordance with the following
schedule:
Not over P10,000 3%

In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment of Republic Act

No. 7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

Over
P10,000
P300
but not over P30,000 of excess over P10,000

9%

Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Over
P30,000
P2,100
but not over P120,00 of excess over P30,000

15%

Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
201

Over
P120,000
P15,600
but not over P350,000 of excess over P120,000

Over
P350,000
of excess over P350,000

P61,600

20%
30%

Sec. 29. Deductions from gross income. In computing taxable income subject to
tax under Sections 21(a), 24(a), (b) and (c); and 25 (a)(1), there shall be allowed as
deductions the items specified in paragraphs (a) to (i) of this
section: Provided, however, That in computing taxable income subject to tax under
Section 21 (f) in the case of individuals engaged in business or practice of profession,
only the following direct costs shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Raw materials, supplies and direct labor;
(b) Salaries of employees directly engaged in activities in the course of or pursuant to
the business or practice of their profession;
(c) Telecommunications, electricity, fuel, light and water;
(d) Business rentals;
(e) Depreciation;
(f) Contributions made to the Government and accredited relief organizations for the
rehabilitation of calamity stricken areas declared by the President; and
(g) Interest paid or accrued within a taxable year on loans contracted from accredited
financial institutions which must be proven to have been incurred in connection with
the conduct of a taxpayer's profession, trade or business.
For individuals whose cost of goods sold and direct costs are difficult to determine, a
maximum of forty per cent (40%) of their gross receipts shall be allowed as
deductions to answer for business or professional expenses as the case may be.
On the basis of the above language of the law, it would be difficult to accept
petitioner's view that the amendatory law should be considered as having now
adopted a gross income, instead of as having still retained the netincome, taxation
scheme. The allowance for deductible items, it is true, may have significantly been
reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to
the amendment; limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither
discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of the matter is
still that various deductions, which are by no means inconsequential, continue to be
well provided under the new law.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent
log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any
one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even
fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such
publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of

legislation. 1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have

been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium

of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional
mandate.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it
imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets,
however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule
even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires
that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371).
Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve
the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and
future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging
to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR,
197 SCRA 52).
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the
legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach 2 in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by

and large, the present global treatment 3 on taxable corporations. We certainly

do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, in the
process, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those
covered by the amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature primarily
lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate),
coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into
those matters which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of
course, where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to
confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its
plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage,
however, has not been demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable
distance in this controversy before us.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process
clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent
or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is
so evident to us.
G.R. No. 109446
202

The several propositions advanced by petitioners revolve around the question of

whether or not public respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating
Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out Republic Act No. 7496.
The questioned regulation reads:
Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership The general professional partnership
(GPP) and the partners comprising the GPP are covered by R. A. No. 7496. Thus, in
determining the net profit of the partnership, only the direct costs mentioned in said
law are to be deducted from partnership income. Also, the expenses paid or incurred
by partners in their individual capacities in the practice of their profession which are
not reimbursed or paid by the partnership but are not considered as direct cost, are
not deductible from his gross income.
The real objection of petitioners is focused on the administrative interpretation of
public respondents that would apply SNIT to partners in general professional
partnerships. Petitioners cite the pertinent deliberations in Congress during its
enactment of Republic Act No. 7496, also quoted by the Honorable Hernando B.
Perez, minority floor leader of the House of Representatives, in the latter's privilege
speech by way of commenting on the questioned implementing regulation of public
respondents following the effectivity of the law, thusly:
MR. ALBANO, Now Mr. Speaker, I would like to get the correct impression of this bill.
Do we speak here of individuals who are earning, I mean, who earn through business
enterprises and therefore, should file an income tax return?
MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. This does not apply to corporations. It
applies only to individuals.
(See Deliberations on H. B. No. 34314, August 6, 1991, 6:15 P.M.; Emphasis ours).
Other deliberations support this position, to wit:
MR. ABAYA . . . Now, Mr. Speaker, did I hear the Gentleman from Batangas say that
this bill is intended to increase collections as far as individuals are concerned and to
make collection of taxes equitable?
MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker.
(Id. at 6:40 P.M.; Emphasis ours).
In fact, in the sponsorship speech of Senator Mamintal Tamano on the Senate version
of the SNITS, it is categorically stated, thus:
This bill, Mr. President, is not applicable to business corporations or to partnerships; it
is only with respect to individuals and professionals. (Emphasis ours)
The Court, first of all, should like to correct the apparent misconception that general
professional partnerships are subject to the payment of income tax or that there is a
difference in the tax treatment between individuals engaged in business or in the
practice of their respective professions and partners in general professional

partnerships. The fact of the matter is that a general professional partnership, unlike
an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a corporation for income tax
purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer.
The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt,
but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their
distributive shares of partnership profits. Section 23 of the Tax Code, which has not
been amended at all by Republic Act 7496, is explicit:
Sec. 23. Tax liability of members of general professional partnerships. (a) Persons
exercising a common profession in general partnership shall be liable for income tax
only in their individual capacity, and the share in the net profits of the general
professional partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled whether
distributed or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid in accordance
with the provisions of this Title.
(b) In determining his distributive share in the net income of the partnership, each
partner
(1) Shall take into account separately his distributive share of the partnership's
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit to the extent provided by the pertinent
provisions of this Code, and
(2) Shall be deemed to have elected the itemized deductions, unless he declares his
distributive share of the gross income undiminished by his share of the deductions.
There is, then and now, no distinction in income tax liability between a person who
practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership
(whether registered or not) with others in the exercise of a common profession.
Indeed, outside of the gross compensation income tax and the final tax on passive
investment income, under the present income tax system all individuals deriving
income from any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably the same manner
and under a common set of rules.
We can well appreciate the concern taken by petitioners if perhaps we were to
consider Republic Act No. 7496 as an entirely independent, not merely as an
amendatory, piece of legislation. The view can easily become myopic, however, when
the law is understood, as it should be, as only forming part of, and subject to, the
whole income tax concept and precepts long obtaining under the National Internal
Revenue Code. To elaborate a little, the phrase "income taxpayers" is an all
embracing term used in the Tax Code, and it practically covers all persons who derive
taxable income. The law, in levying the tax, adopts the most comprehensive
tax situs of nationality and residence of the taxpayer (that renders citizens, regardless
of residence, and resident aliens subject to income tax liability on their income from all
sources) and of the generally accepted and internationally recognized income taxable
base (that can subject non-resident aliens and foreign corporations to income tax on
their income from Philippine sources). In the process, the Code classifies taxpayers
into four main groups, namely: (1) Individuals, (2) Corporations, (3) Estates under

203

Judicial Settlement and (4) Irrevocable Trusts (irrevocable both as to corpusand as

to income).
Partnerships are, under the Code, either "taxable partnerships" or "exempt
partnerships." Ordinarily, partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are
subject to income tax (and thus alluded to as "taxable partnerships") which, for
purposes of the above categorization, are by law assimilated to be within the context
of, and so legally contemplated as, corporations. Except for few variances, such as in
the application of the "constructive receipt rule" in the derivation of income, the income
tax approach is alike to both juridical persons. Obviously, SNIT is not intended or
envisioned, as so correctly pointed out in the discussions in Congress during its
deliberations on Republic Act 7496, aforequoted, to cover corporations and
partnerships which are independently subject to the payment of income tax.
"Exempt partnerships," upon the other hand, are not similarly identified as
corporations nor even considered as independent taxable entities for income tax
purposes. A general professional partnership is such an example. 4Here, the

partners themselves, not the partnership (although it is still obligated to file an

income tax return [mainly for administration and data]), are liable for the
payment of income tax in their individual capacity computed on their
respective and distributive shares of profits. In the determination of the tax
liability, a partner does so as an individual, and there is no choice on the
matter. In fine, under the Tax Code on income taxation, the general
professional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere mechanism or
a flow-through entity in the generation of income by, and the ultimate
distribution of such income to, respectively, each of the individual partners.
Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the
above
standing
rule
as
now
so
modified
by
Republic
Act
No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual
income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of
the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal
footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who
practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a
general professional partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

204

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 144104

June 29, 2004

LUNG
CENTER
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor
of Quezon City,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, of the Decision1 dated July 17, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 57014 which affirmed the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
holding that the lot owned by the petitioner and its hospital building constructed
thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of real property tax.
The Antecedents
The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity
established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. 2 It is the
registered owner of a parcel of land, particularly described as Lot No. RP-3-B-3A-1-B1, SWO-04-000495, located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District,
Quezon City. The lot has an area of 121,463 square meters and is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261320 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of
the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for
canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use
the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their
professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building
along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the
corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial
purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical
services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from
paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.
On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were
assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of
Quezon City.3 Accordingly, Tax Declaration Nos. C-021-01226 (16-2518) and C-02101231 (15-2518-A) were issued for the land and the hospital building,
respectively.4 On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption 5 from real

property taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The petitioners request was denied, and a petition was, thereafter, filed
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity)
for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under
Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real
property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively
used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve
charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such,
is exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the
petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes.6
The QC-LBAAs decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA, for brevity) 7 which ruled that the
petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its real properties were not actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real
property tax exemption under the constitution and the law. The petitioner sought relief
from the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
CBAA.8
Undaunted, the petitioner filed its petition in this Court contending that:
A. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER AS NOT ENTITLED
TO REALTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT ITS LAND, BUILDING
AND IMPROVEMENTS, SUBJECT OF ASSESSMENT, ARE NOT ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
B. WHILE PETITIONER IS NOT DECLARED AS REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPT
UNDER ITS CHARTER, PD 1823, SAID EXEMPTION MAY NEVERTHELESS BE
EXTENDED UPON PROPER APPLICATION.
The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable
institution is not altered by the fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical
services to them, leases portions of the land to private parties, and rents out portions
of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives income to be used
for operational expenses. The petitioner points out that for the years 1995 to 1999,
100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of the hospitals 282-bed capacity,
60% thereof, or 170 beds, is allotted to charity patients. It asserts that the fact that it
receives subsidies from the government attests to its character as a charitable
institution. It contends that the "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does not
necessarily mean "solely." Hence, even if a portion of its real estate is leased out to
private individuals from whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a
charitable institution, and its exemption from the payment of real estate taxes on its
real property. The petitioner cited our ruling in Herrera v. QC-BAA9 to bolster its pose.
The petitioner further contends that even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the
payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking tax exemption under the
1987 Constitution.
205

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner is not a
charitable entity. The petitioners real property is not exempt from the payment of real
estate taxes under P.D. No. 1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it
failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the said property is actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. The respondents noted that in a
newspaper report, it appears that graft charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against the director of the petitioner, its administrative officer, and Zenaida Rivera, the
proprietress of the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center, for entering into a lease
contract over 7,663.13 square meters of the property in 1990 for only P20,000 a
month, when the monthly rental should be P357,000 a month as determined by the
Commission on Audit; and that instead of complying with the directive of the COA for
the cancellation of the contract for being grossly prejudicial to the government, the
petitioner renewed the same on March 13, 1995 for a monthly rental of only P24,000.
They assert that the petitioner uses the subsidies granted by the government for
charity patients and uses the rest of its income from the property for the benefit of
paying patients, among other purposes. They aver that the petitioner failed to adduce
substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and 170 beds in the hospital are
reserved for indigent patients. The respondents further assert, thus:
13. That the claims/allegations of the Petitioner LCP do not speak well of its record of
service. That before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first impression
is that it is pay-patient and required to pay a certain amount as deposit. That even if a
patient is living below the poverty line, he is charged with high hospital bills. And,
without these bills being first settled, the poor patient cannot be allowed to leave the
hospital or be discharged without first paying the hospital bills or issue a promissory
note guaranteed and indorsed by an influential agency or person known only to the
Center; that even the remains of deceased poor patients suffered the same fate.
Moreover, before a patient is admitted for treatment as free or charity patient, one
must undergo a series of interviews and must submit all the requirements needed by
the Center, usually accompanied by endorsement by an influential agency or person
known only to the Center. These facts were heard and admitted by the Petitioner LCP
during the hearings before the Honorable QC-BAA and Honorable CBAA. These are
the reasons of indigent patients, instead of seeking treatment with the Center, they
prefer to be treated at the Quezon Institute. Can such practice by the Center be called
charitable?10
The Issues
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is a charitable
institution within the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and (b) whether the real
properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partially granted.

On the first issue, we hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the
context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a
charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be considered include
the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws,
the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character
of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and
occupation of the properties.11
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently
with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing
their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them
to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of government. 12 It
may be applied to almost anything that tend to promote the well-doing and well-being
of social man. It embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of
man.13 The word "charitable" is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick.14 The test of
a charity and a charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether an
enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in
law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which,
subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the
President of the Philippines with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human
Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people
principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the
Philippines. The raison detre for the creation of the petitioner is stated in the
decree, viz:
Whereas, for decades, respiratory diseases have been a priority concern, having
been the leading cause of illness and death in the Philippines, comprising more than
45% of the total annual deaths from all causes, thus, exacting a tremendous toll on
human resources, which ailments are likely to increase and degenerate into serious
lung diseases on account of unabated pollution, industrialization and unchecked
cigarette smoking in the country;
lavvph!l.net

Whereas, the more common lung diseases are, to a great extent, preventable, and
curable with early and adequate medical care, immunization and through prompt and
intensive prevention and health education programs;
Whereas, there is an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce existing programs,
strategies and efforts at preventing, treating and rehabilitating people affected by lung
diseases, and to undertake research and training on the cure and prevention of lung
diseases, through a Lung Center which will house and nurture the above and related
activities and provide tertiary-level care for more difficult and problematical cases;
Whereas, to achieve this purpose, the Government intends to provide material and
financial support towards the establishment and maintenance of a Lung Center for the
welfare and benefit of the Filipino people.15
206

The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of
Incorporation, thus:
SECOND: That the purposes for which such corporation is formed are as follows:
1. To construct, establish, equip, maintain, administer and conduct an integrated
medical institution which shall specialize in the treatment, care, rehabilitation and/or
relief of lung and allied diseases in line with the concern of the government to assist
and provide material and financial support in the establishment and maintenance of a
lung center primarily to benefit the people of the Philippines and in pursuance of the
policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by providing them
specialized health and medical services and by minimizing the incidence of lung
diseases in the country and elsewhere.
2. To promote the noble undertaking of scientific research related to the prevention of
lung or pulmonary ailments and the care of lung patients, including the holding of a
series of relevant congresses, conventions, seminars and conferences;
3. To stimulate and, whenever possible, underwrite scientific researches on the
biological, demographic, social, economic, eugenic and physiological aspects of lung
or pulmonary diseases and their control; and to collect and publish the findings of
such research for public consumption;
4. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on lung
consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding, information and
reporting facilities for and in aid of the general purposes or objects aforesaid,
especially in human lung requirements, general health and physical fitness, and other
relevant or related fields;
5. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers and
medical and technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation of
services to lung patients;
6. To assist universities and research institutions in their studies about lung diseases,
to encourage advanced training in matters of the lung and related fields and to
support educational programs of value to general health;
7. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial and/or
city and local levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities for the
purpose of achieving a more effective programmatic approach on the common
problems relative to the objectives enumerated herein;
8. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local
foundations and organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be given
to the organization;
9. To extend, whenever possible and expedient, medical services to the public and, in
general, to promote and protect the health of the masses of our people, which has
long been recognized as an economic asset and a social blessing;

10. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the lung or pulmonary afflictions and
maladies of the people in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor and
needy, all without regard to or discrimination, because of race, creed, color or political
belief of the persons helped; and to enable them to obtain treatment when such
disorders occur;
11. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and carried
on to promote the general health of the community;
12. To acquire and/or borrow funds and to own all funds or equipment, educational
materials and supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise and to dispose of and
distribute the same in such manner, and, on such basis as the Center shall, from time
to time, deem proper and best, under the particular circumstances, to serve its
general and non-profit purposes and objectives;
lavvphil.net

13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and dispose
of properties, whether real or personal, for purposes herein mentioned; and
14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the
accomplishment of any of the powers herein set forth and to do every other act and
thing incidental thereto or connected therewith.16
Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in
general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without
discrimination. After all, any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be
injured or wounded and become a subject of charity.17
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and
its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients,
whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the
government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private
benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. 18 In Congregational
Sunday School, etc. v. Board of Review,19 the State Supreme Court of Illinois held,
thus:
[A]n institution does not lose its charitable character, and consequent exemption
from taxation, by reason of the fact that those recipients of its benefits who are able to
pay are required to do so, where no profit is made by the institution and the amounts
so received are applied in furthering its charitable purposes, and those benefits are
refused to none on account of inability to pay therefor. The fundamental ground upon
which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit
conferred upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the
burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens.20
As aptly stated by the State Supreme Court of South Dakota in Lutheran Hospital
Association of South Dakota v. Baker:21

207

 [T]he fact that paying patients are taken, the profits derived from attendance upon
these patients being exclusively devoted to the maintenance of the charity, seems
rather to enhance the usefulness of the institution to the poor; for it is a matter of
common observation amongst those who have gone about at all amongst the
suffering classes, that the deserving poor can with difficulty be persuaded to enter an
asylum of any kind confined to the reception of objects of charity; and that their honest
pride is much less wounded by being placed in an institution in which paying patients
are also received. The fact of receiving money from some of the patients does not, we
think, at all impair the character of the charity, so long as the money thus received is
devoted altogether to the charitable object which the institution is intended to further.22
The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be
devoted to public trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit.23
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner
does not lose its character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or
donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government. As held by the State
Supreme Court of Utah in Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County:24
Second, the government subsidy payments are provided to the project. Thus, those
payments are like a gift or donation of any other kind except they come from the
government. In both Intermountain Health Careand the present case, the crux is the
presence or absence of material reciprocity. It is entirely irrelevant to this analysis that
the government, rather than a private benefactor, chose to make up the deficit
resulting from the exchange between St. Marks Tower and the tenants by making a
contribution to the landlord, just as it would have been irrelevant in Intermountain
Health Care if the patients income supplements had come from private individuals
rather than the government.
Therefore, the fact that subsidization of part of the cost of furnishing such housing is
by the government rather than private charitable contributions does not dictate the
denial of a charitable exemption if the facts otherwise support such an exemption, as
they do here.25
In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income,
including the subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for
the operation of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its
operations.
Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the
second issue, that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities
are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption

is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments

must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken.26 As held in Salvation Army v. Hoehn:27
An intention on the part of the legislature to grant an exemption from the taxing power
of the state will never be implied from language which will admit of any other
reasonable construction. Such an intention must be expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms, or must appear by necessary implication from the language
used, for it is a well settled principle that, when a special privilege or exemption is
claimed under a statute, charter or act of incorporation, it is to be construed strictly
against the property owner and in favor of the public. This principle applies with
peculiar force to a claim of exemption from taxation . 28
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically
provides that the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges:
SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock
corporation organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and
pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments and
equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the
Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and
benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same
further deductible in full for the purpose of determining the maximum deductible
amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended.
The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes,
charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung
Center.29
It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax
exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
If the intentions were otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration
of tax exempt privileges under Section 2:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the
familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways.
One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters.
...
208

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of
restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings
of the human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon
that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.30
The exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable
presumption is that the State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at
all, and that unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the favor
would be intended beyond what was meant.31
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques,
non-profit
cemeteries,
and
all
lands,
buildings,
and
improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.32
The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only.33 As
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, explained: ". . . what is exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those
exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes."34
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as
follows:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax:
...
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, andexclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.35
We note that under the 1935 Constitution, "... all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from
taxation."36 However, under the 1973 and the present Constitutions, for "lands,
buildings, and improvements" of the charitable institution to be considered exempt, the
same should not only be "exclusively" used for charitable purposes; it is required that
such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such purposes.37
In light of the foregoing substantial changes in the Constitution, the petitioner cannot
rely on our ruling in Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which was

promulgated on September 30, 1961 before the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions took
effect.38 As this Court held in Province of Abra v. Hernando:39
Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The
present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and
improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly"
used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The
change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on
past decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not
added. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands,
buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from
taxation.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled
to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof,
that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties
are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
"Exclusive" is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred
from participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude;
as enjoying a privilege exclusively." 40 If real property is used for one or more
commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is
subject to taxation.41 The words "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be
substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to the Constitutions
and the law.42 Solely is synonymous with exclusively.43
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable
purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the
income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for
tax-exempt purposes.44
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real
property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While
portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of
medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are
being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of
the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the
business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center." Indeed, the petitioners
evidence shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28
for 1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as
those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such
taxes.45 On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and
209

portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are
exempt from real property taxes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due
hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to
private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for
by law.
SO ORDERED.

210

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION

On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift
Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction
over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994

FIRST
LEPANTO
vs.
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
INC., respondents.

CERAMICS,
and

MARIWASA

INC., petitioner,
MANUFACTURING,

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the
conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus,
called for.

WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is hereby DENIED,

for lack of merit.
Private respondent is hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt hereof within which to file its comment to the petition. 1
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993, petitioner decided not
to file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in
nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition before this Court.
Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1993, for the following
reasons:
I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's
decision in BOI Case No. 92-005, which has become final.
II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this Honorable Court cannot be
amended or superseded by Circular No. 1-91. 2
Petitioner then concludes that:
III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case. 3

Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated December 10, 1992
in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application
to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed
a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano
Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon
rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.

Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court
of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and QuasiJudicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court
because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O.
226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed
directly with this Court, to wit:

Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to comment
on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue. On
February 17, 1993, respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from
implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on
March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing
any preliminary injunction.

Judicial
relief.

All
orders
or
decisions
of
the
Board
(of Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be
executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely
affected shall stay such an order or decision; Provided, that all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision.
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or
"irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of
E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1211

91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4)
years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted below:

Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of
providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies
for the benefit of the bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P.
129 of unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to attend to more important
tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as quoted in our decision
in Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4is "less concerned with the decisions of

1. Scope. These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the
Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions
of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies are the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Special Agrarian Courts under RA
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission.
2. Cases not covered. These rules shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders of the National Labor Relations Commission or the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under the Labor Code of the Philippines, the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, and other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the
courts is prescribed or allowed by statute.
3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. The appeal of a party affected by a final
order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency
shall be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of law or mixed questions
of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the
aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the
Court of Appeals, to wit:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders,
awards
of
Regional
Trial
Courts
and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular
individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies,
momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental
authority and its impact upon fundamental rights.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 5 this Court noted that

B.P. 129 did not deal only with "changes in the rules on procedures" and that
not only was the Court of Appeals reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers
were also broadened by Section 9 thereof. Explaining the changes, this Court
said:
.
.
.
Its
original
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus, which theretofore could be exercised only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was expanded by (1) extending it so as to include the
writ of quo warranto, and also (2) empowering it to issue all said extraordinary writs
"whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction was also
extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but also "all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in
this connection that the text of the law is broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly
stated exceptions have no reference whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed,
the intention to expand the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is further
stressed by the last paragraph of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only
the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines
and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals." 6
However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the country is far from
perfect. During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos
regime, the lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious
lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of
some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to
promote.

212

In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order or decision.

brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court
has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals
only from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts may be
appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari within fifteen
(15) days from notice of judgment in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court
shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present
procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional
Commission (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on
Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof. 7

substantive law and those arising from procedural law:

Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P.
129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of
Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it
has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled
jurisprudence. 8 In Inciong v. de Guia, 9 a circular of this Court was treated as

law. In adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a

sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and
Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court
quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the
contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a
common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the
circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary." 10
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article
82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and
in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be

The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11 distinguished between rights created by a

Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance
of normal relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their invasion. 12
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI
should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this
agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e.,
fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found
in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular
does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second
sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals
from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is
now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is
one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these
agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which
are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More
importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of
the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly
excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations
Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to
the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the

appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals
despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P.
129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no
reason
why
BOI
should
be
excluded
from
Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar
as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI
are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
213

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July
19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

214

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA
G.
FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V.
AGUSTIN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from
the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case
No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private
respondent from administrative charges for inter aliagrave misconduct committed by
him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that
petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he
allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the
Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including
those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his
official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for
some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties
and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case
against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section
19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential

Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed
under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution
finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the
approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After
private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered
that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he
inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus
F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the
February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private
respondent from the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) 1pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is
absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the
Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its
aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the
power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of
Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability
of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among
others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law."
215

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these
relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure
questions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its
own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers,
functions, and duties.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with
due process. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. All previsionary orders at the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be
final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory
authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by
the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it,
including those rules with respect to the availability or non-availability of appeal in
administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.

Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she
definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted
ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be
unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the
differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court
applying Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo
IV vs. Ombudsman, et al. 3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 4 were
original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al. 5 was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then
came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al., 6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al., 7Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, 9 which were
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et
al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately
followed byConstantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. 11 which was a
special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the
issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving
the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application
of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special
original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or
alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some
seemingly obiter statements in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and
clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary
action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action forcertiorari under
Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a
criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the
fact, which does not appear to have been seriously considered before, that the
administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the
Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses
imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act
No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the
amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all
adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases
216

were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those
of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two
respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the
Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from
which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals,
both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and
that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November
17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule,
however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the
case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall
explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions; the
courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance
evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a
legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the
statute,
governs
in
a
case
before
them
for
judgment. 12
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not
raised in the pleadings, 13 the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions.
It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter
a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction
in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the
proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. 14
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate
court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own
motion. 15 The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any
point in the case where that fact is developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognized
right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto
should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following
resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an
appeal bycertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order (Re:
Motion for Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled

"Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A,
EDSA, Quezon City," which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for
grave misconduct, among others.
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the
Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed
by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took
into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in
light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law
shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994,
237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-91 and Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the
1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved in
this case, and the foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn the
constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court
deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved
before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their position
and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding
pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with
such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have
presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this
Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not
violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is
proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
"as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in
which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of
the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate
217

jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition

for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law
of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule
45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly
involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision
cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated
therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the
courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating
that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such
provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated
judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for, in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the
revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A person desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention
only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing
for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the
purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended
limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by
recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review
on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies 20 are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure
for quasi-judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary"
quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high

constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank
should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even
includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the
latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the
Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both,
we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are
usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the
Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared
than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation
covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts.
Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to
jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or
"acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence
as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have
already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some
statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved,
hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and
when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As
a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case
susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance
of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for
that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate
jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could
even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the
Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for
the resolution of the present case. 22
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short
of passing upon the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private
respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be
absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and
unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid,
but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should
not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two
decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned
Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some statements
218

therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the
same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained inFirst Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. 23 was intended to give this Court a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court. 24
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the
difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this
case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative
background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference
Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version
of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by
the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed of the approval of the final
version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law
by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the
deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this
Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also
reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B.
No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that
the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the
matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator
Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light

of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence
in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the
Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed
that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals
through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari. 27
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever
referred to this Court for its advice and consent. 28
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to
appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this
Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in
essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes
which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and
those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context
and substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive
is
frequently
a
question
of
great
difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right,
the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only.33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by
219

which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is
that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by
substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of
procedure which relate to the remedy. 34
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of
the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as
impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent
tribunal to administer that remedy. 35
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases
from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they
are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the
case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdictionex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the
Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),
together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance
implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme
Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as
a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to
submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or
records as it may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.

220

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

G.R. No. 115781 August 25, 1994

ARTURO
M.
TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.

KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,

EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO TAADA,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, respondents.

G.R. No. 115525 August 25, 1994

G.R. No. 115852 August 25, 1994

JUAN
T.
DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO,
as Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of
Internal
Revenue;
and
their
AUTHORIZED
AGENTS
OR
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

PHILIPPINE
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF
REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 115543 August 25, 1994

COOPERATIVE
UNION
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, respondents.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994

RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS
OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA
L.
DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS,
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

AIRLINES,
FINANCE,

and

INC., petitioner,
COMMISSIONER

OF

INTERNAL

G.R. No. 115873 August 25, 1994

G.R. No. 115931 August 25, 1994

PHILIPPINE
EDUCATIONAL
PUBLISHERS
ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
and
ASSOCIATION
OF
PHILIPPINE
BOOK-SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY
V. CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. GUILLERMO
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners in G.R. No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S. Roco.

INC.,

Villaranza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.

Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
221

Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedon From Debts Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible
Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices for petitioners in G.R.
No. 115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Reve A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.

MENDOZA, J.:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of
the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic
Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6,
1994 of this Court, as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?
1. 1
2. 4
3. 5
4. 10
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
1. Art. VI, 28(1)
2. Art. VI, 28(3)

These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be
explained not all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all
provisions of the Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable.
The other departments of the government are equally charged with the enforcement
of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because,
although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not
passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No.
1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into
law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition
that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in
the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several
bills 1 were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend

certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the valueadded tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means
Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No.
11197, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF
TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993
and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after
third and final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its
Committee on Ways and Means.
222

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending

approval of S. No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE
IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129,
taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It
finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On
the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its
members, with one abstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference
committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994),
recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630,
be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees."
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the
House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The
enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5,
1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No.
7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it
took effect, although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow
time for the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1,
1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its
members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H.
No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art.
VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in two

respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by

the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American
version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as
having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee
will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and
not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect
of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treatyratifying power 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House

overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are
dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested
not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise of
the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the
exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no
justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the
Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the
Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has never
been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.
In the United States, the validity of a provision ( 37) imposing an ad valorem tax
based on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of
1909, was upheld against the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which
originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is

the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill

emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the
whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions.
In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting clause of a
tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently
accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments
to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the
schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in
the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the
power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its
own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House.
223

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197
but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was
merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is
really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting
clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would
seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the
result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as
a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the
Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7,
1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time
of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the
VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the
House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a
substitute of those earlier bills.
Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to
propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No.
1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same

day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again
on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
"except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless"
clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except"
clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in
order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is
dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as
to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether
doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days
before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President.
Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the
convening of Congress in emergency session. 11
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings
on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported
by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the
House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been
certified by the President as urgent. 12
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses
only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days
before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days,
also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because
there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget
deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the
factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second
and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's
certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when
no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and
third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time
needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law under Art. VII, 18, or the existence of a national
emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under
Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be
at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves
doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of
review.
224

Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and
not H. No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering.
When the matter was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210
the pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the
bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not
found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were
"surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that
in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind
closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of
the give and take that often mark the proceedings of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference
Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on
conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present.
Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the
suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely
of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the
incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by
ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own
limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William
Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the
United States.
In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held
in executive sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in

November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then
a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close the
meetings. 14
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it
has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to
make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to
which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a
difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal
originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now
altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new
bill. . . . 15
The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to
the subject of the House and Senate bills. 16

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee
to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House
bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment

consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose

several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of
a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the
bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the
approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the
legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference
Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House
of Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of
a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference
Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The following
provisions are cited in support of this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives
on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a
conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their
composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in
accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be
signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed
with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the
Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House does not agree
with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may
be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except
when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on
225

any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the
conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are
distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session
period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above
provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of
conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the
effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of
these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from
the Jefferson's Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed
to them. . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though
germane to a question in issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable,
resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as
supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports
include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the
committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in
the Jefferson's Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house. Thus, Art. VI, 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers
were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report
because the Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of
changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and
capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We
cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules
of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
"parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have
no concern." 19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the

Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are

concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must
have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there
would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the
compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by
each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not
approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then
again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly
satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for
the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For
if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to
study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after
three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred
to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the
House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into
consideration" the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated
the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee
Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after
appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The
allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress
is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the

rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but
also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not
been obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled"
in the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now
to depart from this rule.
we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of
the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was
no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case

23

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
"enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.
226

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art.
VI, 26(1) which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H.
No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions
from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference
Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its
title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is 103, which originally read:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT
were those of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from
the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in the near future," in consideration of the
payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, 103 of the NIRC now
provides:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the
VAT is concerned.
The question is whether this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in
the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No.
1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states
that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this
is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist
that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the

NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill
should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon
the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if
they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not
know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in
the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass
unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title
of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise
under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D.
No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner
that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to
consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its
provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed. 24
It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by
special law, in view of 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically
modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.
This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by
mere implication resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in
consideration of the fact that a franchise is a contract which can be altered only by
consent
of
the
parties.
Thus
in Manila
Railroad
Co.
v.
25
Rafferty, it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the

payment of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did
not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes except
those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be
amended by a general law.
In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's
franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from
the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to
do under Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise
for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress when the common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
227

A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit
organization of newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in
the Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible
Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of
bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their rights under
4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.
The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously
granted to the press under 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was
subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to the circulation
income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the possibility that the
exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary
of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's
power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power
to grant tax exemption because this is vested in Congress and requires for its
exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's duty is

to execute the law.

103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the
transactions previously granted exemption were:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription
and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended 103 by deleting (f) with the result that print media
became subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later,
however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary
of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting
the "circulation income of print media pursuant to 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others."
The exemption of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still
subject to the VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond
the authority of the Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even
with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print media there is still an
unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on
the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of
paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has
effectively been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press
freedom in these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area
of press freedom. The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law
abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its

importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general
regulation by the State. It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws.
He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must
answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must
pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . 27
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.
What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print
media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers,
Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that
within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving
broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but
we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any
censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a valueadded tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less
targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption
previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in
these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been
delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system.
The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only
privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in
support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory
taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was clear either from the
background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 28the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross

receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which had a

circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not
based on the volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent
of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers
in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less
than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in
serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well
known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long,
and the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana respondent by taxing what
Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a tax on
lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their
circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." 29 The
case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power
to destroy.
228

invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been
singled out because everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and
paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in
that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the
privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal
property" by eliminating the residents' incentive to get goods from outside
states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was
exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state
legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of
paper and ink used for publication. The law was held to have singled out the
press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the
press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an
"intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had
a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so. In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because
the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000
of paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only
a handful of publishers pay any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant
amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.
In the other case

30

it was held that a law

which taxed general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious,
professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory because while the
tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group within
the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e.,
between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the
law became "entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press."
More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,

32

These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the
press creates risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the
statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing
the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than
P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been shown

that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The
fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales.
Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast
media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving
printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of
broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.
The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of
newspapers are immune from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in
the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was "one single in kind, with a long

history
press."

of

hostile

misuse

against

the

freedom

of

the

On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First

Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States
and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable
economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 35
34

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the
removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious
articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought
and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free Exercise of Religion

Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax
on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.
This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the
law, 37 although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to

the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The case
ofAmerican Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and the
PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this
Court held that an ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license
fee on those engaged in the business of general merchandise, could not be
applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This
Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 39 in which it was held that, as a
license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer,
the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed
as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For
that reason, it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress
their exercise." 40
But, in this case, the fee in 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed
for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of
registration. The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is
designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the
payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales
made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one
not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground
that it offends the free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the
Constitution to be without merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the
Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that the
increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT
would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to
education, science and technology (Art. II, 17) to be untenable.
229

B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment

of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the
guarantees of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect"
which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need
to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately
demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also
violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right
to due process and that equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different
treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus:
"[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a
momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that
commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause." 41
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial
intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on
the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and
impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For
the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners
and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate
the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so
fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates
the requirement that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and]
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." 42Petitioners in G.R. No.

115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure,

Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International
Monetary Fund, that "VAT payment by low-income households will be a
higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by
higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners
contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption
goods of those who are in the higher-income bracket, which before were
taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities,
which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a
higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is
pressed by respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and
services as possible particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income

groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The
goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higherincome groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or
held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial,
commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist
buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business establishments, with annual
gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents,
removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the
other hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for Research and

Communication cities a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on
inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the
lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning
P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments,
any discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and
middle-income group in society harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union
of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise.
On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of exemption of
producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while
maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the
constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII,
15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a
policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in
choosing the subject of taxation.44
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
(CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its
members by as much as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On
the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No.
115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their
profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while
purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers in question, still
falls short of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating the
question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is
required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This
is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of
laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and
political inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion of the right to "quality
education" (Art. XIV, 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

should have laid to rest the

questions now raised against the VAT. There similar arguments made against
the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were held to be hypothetical,
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran

45

230

with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be
"hearsay and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely
expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as provided in the
original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law
should have shifted to Congress.
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA
that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of
contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional
provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." It is
enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 46
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of
the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a
valid consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we

do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed

above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general,
but only by a specific, law.
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract,
hypothetical form because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court
does not only adjudicate private cases; that public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" 48 or

ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing
requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, 1, 2 the Court has a
"special function" of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling
cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully
developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact
of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded.
Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being
asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having
done in these cases to sit as a third legislative chamber to review
legislation.
We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is
duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the
performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle
of separation of powers. Art. VIII, 1, 2 is cited in support of this view:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall
said so in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each. 50
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 51
This conception of the judicial power
cases 52 of this Court following Angara.

has

been

affirmed

in

several

It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's
intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That
duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art.
VIII, 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases," and nothing but "cases."
That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of
discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the
essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run
only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are
called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear
to be the opinion of the day.
_______________________________
In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in
the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes
beyond those prescribed by the Constitution have been observed is precluded
by the principle of separation of powers;
231

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor
interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an
education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected
under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of
prospective relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

232

Republic
SUPREME COURT

of

the

Philippines

I. This Honorable Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of Section 110(A)(2)

and Section 110(B) of the NIRC, as amended by the EVAT Law, imposing limitations
on the amount of input VAT that may be claimed as a credit against output VAT, as
well as Section 114(C) of the NIRC, as amended by the EVAT Law, requiring the
government or any of its instrumentalities to withhold a 5% final withholding VAT on
their gross payments on purchases of goods and services, and finding that the
questioned provisions:

G.R. No. 168056 (ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et
al. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita); G.R. No. 168207
(Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, et
al.); G.R. No. 168461 (Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. vs. Cesar
V. Purisima, et al.); G.R. No. 168463 (Francis Joseph G. Escudero vs. Cesar V.
Purisima, et al); and G.R. No. 168730 (Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia,
Jr. vs. Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al.)

A. are not arbitrary, oppressive and consfiscatory as to amount to a deprivation of

property without due process of law in violation of Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution;

EN BANC
G.R. No. 168056 October 18, 2005
Agenda for Item No. 45

RESOLUTION

B. do not violate the equal protection clause prescribed under Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution; and
C. apply uniformly to all those belonging to the same class and do not violate Article
VI, Section 28(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

For resolution are the following motions for reconsideration of the Courts Decision
dated September 1, 2005 upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9337 or
the VAT Reform Act1:

II. This Honorable Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of Section 110(B) of
the NIRC, as amended by the EVAT Law, imposing a limitation on the amount of input
VAT that may be claimed as a credit against output VAT notwithstanding the finding
that the tax is not progressive as exhorted by Article VI, Section 28(1) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

1) Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners in G.R. No. 168463, Escudero, et al.,
on the following grounds:

Respondents filed their Consolidated Comment. Petitioner Garcia filed his Reply.

A. THE DELETION OF THE "NO PASS ON PROVISIONS" FOR THE SALE OF

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND POWER GENERATION SERVICES CONSTITUTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.
B. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9337 GROSSLY VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVE ON EXCLUSIVE ORIGINATION OF REVENUE BILLS UNDER 24,
ARTICLE VI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.
C. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9337S STAND-BY AUTHORITY TO THE EXECUTIVE TO
INCREASE THE VAT RATE, ESPECIALLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECTIVE
RECOMMENDATORY POWER GRANTED TO THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.
2) Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner in G.R. No. 168730, Bataan Governor
Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., with the argument that burdening the consumers with
significantly higher prices under a VAT regime vis--vis a 3% gross tax renders the
law unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive and inequitable.
and
3) Motion for Reconsideration by petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers,
Inc. in G.R. No. 168461, on the grounds that:

Petitioners Escudero, et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not
even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement
between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950
on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power
generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT
burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to
the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact
that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the
absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because "a House
provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist."
Such argument is flawed. Note that the rules of both houses of Congress provide that
a conference committee shall settle the "differences" in the respective bills of each
house. Verily, the fact that a no pass-on provision is present in one version but absent
in the other, and one version intends two industries, i.e., power generation companies
and petroleum sellers, to bear the burden of the tax, while the other version intended
only the industry of power generation, transmission and distribution to be saddled with
such burden, clearly shows that there are indeed differences between the bills coming
from each house, which differences should be acted upon by the bicameral
conference committee. It is incorrect to conclude that there is no clash between two
opposing forces with regard to the no pass-on provision for VAT on the sale of
petroleum products merely because such provision exists in the House version while it
233

is absent in the Senate version. It is precisely the absence of such provision in the
Senate bill and the presence thereof in the House bills that causes the conflict. The
absence of the provision in the Senate bill shows the Senates disagreement to the
intention of the House of Representatives make the sellers of petroleum bear the
burden of the VAT. Thus, there are indeed two opposing forces: on one side, the
House of Representatives which wants petroleum dealers to be saddled with the
burden of paying VAT and on the other, the Senate which does not see it proper to
make that particular industry bear said burden. Clearly, such conflicts and differences
between the no pass-on provisions in the Senate and House bills had to be acted
upon by the bicameral conference committee as mandated by the rules of both
houses of Congress.
Moreover, the deletion of the no pass-on provision made the present VAT law more in
consonance with the very nature of VAT which, as stated in the Decision promulgated
on September 1, 2005, is a tax on spending or consumption, thus, the burden thereof
is ultimately borne by the end-consumer.
Escudero, et al., then claim that there had been changes introduced in the Rules of
the House of Representatives regarding the conduct of the House panel in a
bicameral conference committee, since the time of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance2 to act as safeguards against possible abuse of authority by the House
members of the bicameral conference committee. Even assuming that the rule
requiring the House panel to report back to the House if there are substantial
differences in the House and Senate bills had indeed been introduced afterTolentino,
the Court stands by its ruling that the issue of whether or not the House panel in the
bicameral conference committee complied with said internal rule cannot be inquired
into by the Court. To reiterate, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure."3
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the
constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of
Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected
with VAT.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 24 All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Section 24 speaks of origination of certain bills from the House of Representatives
which has been interpreted in the Tolentino case as follows:
To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important

to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole At
this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct
bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate.
Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can
propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House.
...
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.4
Clearly, after the House bills as approved on third reading are duly transmitted to the
Senate, the Constitution states that the latter can propose or concur with
amendments. The Court finds that the subject provisions found in the Senate bill are
within the purview of such constitutional provision as declared in the Tolentino case.
The intent of the House of Representatives in initiating House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705
was to solve the countrys serious financial problems. It was stated in the respective
explanatory notes that there is a need for the government to make significant
expenditure savings and a credible package of revenue measures. These measures
include improvement of tax administration and control and leakages in revenues from
income taxes and value added tax. It is also stated that one opportunity that could be
beneficial to the overall status of our economy is to review existing tax rates,
evaluating the relevance given our present conditions. Thus, with these purposes in
mind and to accomplish these purposes for which the house bills were filed, i.e., to
raise revenues for the government, the Senate introduced amendments on income
taxes, which as admitted by Senator Ralph Recto, would yield about P10.5 billion a
year.
Moreover, since the objective of these house bills is to raise revenues, the increase in
corporate income taxes would be a great help and would also soften the impact of
VAT measure on the consumers by distributing the burden across all sectors instead
of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers.
234

As to the other National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provisions found in Senate Bill
No. 1950, i.e., percentage taxes, franchise taxes, amusement and excise taxes, these
provisions are needed so as to cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. As we said
in our decision, certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax and
excise tax would no longer be VAT exempt, thus, the consumer would be burdened
more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a
need to amend these sections to soften the impact of VAT. The Court finds no reason
to reverse the earlier ruling that the Senate introduced amendments that are germane
to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to
the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory
power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance
in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and
evaluation, as well as policy making.
There is no merit in this contention. The Court reiterates that in making his
recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of
Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His
function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. Congress granted
the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely,
whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary
of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can
go forward.There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion
as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not
delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will
to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is
to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to use the GDP as a
benchmark to determine economic growth is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.
With regard to petitioner Garcias arguments, the Court also finds the same to be
without merit. As stated in the assailed Decision, the Court recognizes the burden that

the consumers will be bearing with the passage of R.A. No. 9337. But as was also
stated by the Court, it cannot strike down the law as unconstitutional simply because
of its yokes. The legislature has spoken and the only role that the Court plays in the
picture is to determine whether the law was passed with due regard to the mandates
of the Constitution. Inasmuch as the Court finds that there are no constitutional
infirmities with its passage, the validity of the law must therefore be upheld.
Finally, petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc. reiterated their
arguments in the petition, citing this time, the dissertation of Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga in his Dissenting Opinion.
The glitch in petitioners arguments is that it presents figures based on an event that is
yet to happen. Their illustration of the possible effects of the 70% limitation, while
seemingly concrete, still remains theoretical. Theories have no place in this case
as the Court must only deal with an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory.5 The Court will not intervene absent an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.6
The impact of the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax will ultimately depend on
how one manages and operates its business. Market forces, strategy and acumen will
dictate their moves. With or without these VAT provisions, an entrepreneur who does
not have the ken to adapt to economic variables will surely perish in the competition.
The arguments posed are within the realm of business, and the solution lies also in
business.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property
right. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a
property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is
a mere statutory privilege.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a
statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot
remove.
As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of
law. Prior to the enactment of multi-stage sales taxation, the sales taxes paid at every
level of distribution are not recoverable from the taxes payable. With the advent of
Executive Order No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it was only then
that the crediting of the input tax paid on purchase or importation of goods and
services by VAT-registered persons against the output tax was established. This
continued with the Expanded VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716), and The Tax Reform Act of
1997 (R.A. No. 8424). The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a
privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law can limit. It should be stressed
that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.7
235

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due

process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the
right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable.8 As adeptly stated by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in her
Concurring Opinion, which the Court adopts, petitioners right to the input VAT credits
has not yet vested, thus

WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH

FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
(The Justices who filed their respective concurring and dissenting opinions maintain
their respective positions. Justice Dante O. Tinga filed a dissenting opinion to the
present Resolution; while Justice Consuelo Ynares- Santiago joins him in his
dissenting opinion.)

It should be remembered that prior to Rep. Act No. 9337, the petroleum dealers input
VAT credits were inexistent they were unrecognized and disallowed by law. The
petroleum dealers had no such property called input VAT credits. It is only rational,
therefore, that they cannot acquire vested rights to the use of such input VAT credits
when they were never entitled to such credits in the first place, at least, not until Rep.
Act No. 9337.
My view, at this point, when Rep. Act No. 9337 has not yet even been implemented, is
that petroleum dealers right to use their input VAT as credit against their output VAT
unlimitedly has not vested, being a mere expectancy of a future benefit and being
contingent on the continuance of Section 110 of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1997, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9337.
The elucidation of Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban is likewise worthy of note,
to wit:
Moreover, there is no vested right in generally accepted accounting principles. These
refer to accounting concepts, measurement techniques, and standards of presentation
in a companys financial statements, and are not rooted in laws of nature, as are the
laws of physical science, for these are merely developed and continually modified by
local and international regulatory accounting bodies. To state otherwise and recognize
such asset account as a vested right is to limit the taxing power of the State.
Unlimited, plenary, comprehensive and supreme, this power cannot be unduly
restricted by mere creations of the State.
More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative
policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was
passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the
legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. As stated
in Carmichael vs. Southern Coal & Coke Co.:
If the question were ours to decide, we could not say that the legislature, in adopting
the present scheme rather than another, had no basis for its choice, or was arbitrary
or unreasonable in its action. But, as the state is free to distribute the burden of a tax
without regard to the particular purpose for which it is to be used, there is no warrant
in the Constitution for setting the tax aside because a court thinks that it could have
distributed the burden more wisely. Those are functions reserved for the legislature.9
236

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE
LEUTERIO,
ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget
and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National
Treasurer, respondents.
A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA April 15, 1992
REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P.
ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O. REYES, JR. and GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR
READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY PENSION.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain
provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who
are currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in
representation of all other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals similarly situated.
Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo
Carague as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon.
Rosalinda Cajucom, the Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondents are sued in
their official capacities, being officials of the Executive Department involved in the
implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the Annual Appropriations Law.
We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and
decide the petition on its merits.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:

On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have
rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or
who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired
Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was
receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21,
1957) which provided that:
Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals is increased or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for
purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a
Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-four had ceased to be such to
accept another position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the time of
his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to
such increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional
Commissions under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595.
On November 12, 1974, on the occasion of the Armed Forces Loyalty Day, President
Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement benefits to
the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment
features of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on
January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act
No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which
authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the
officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the
retirement pension of officers and enlisted men was subsequently restored by
President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909 was also issued providing
for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who
have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces
who number in the tens of thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in
years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary
and the Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the
reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act
No. 3595. Congress was under the impression that Presidential Decree 644 became
law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory
237

note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the need to
reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said retirement pensions and
privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional Commissions, in
order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the time when
the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide
recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the petitioner retired Chief
Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding
Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and
P2,333.33 respectively.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the
ground that according to her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's
collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization
of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not
grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under
existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our
civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P.
Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a
letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which we treated as Administrative Matter No. 91-8225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of their monthly pensions
in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential
Decree 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no
valid publication pursuant to Taada v. Tuvera, (136 SCRA 27 [1985]) and 146 SCRA
446 [1986]). Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared for
the first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14)
purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September 5, 1983. Since
Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect of law, it therefore did not
repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request.
The dispositive portion reads as follows:

XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY

A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts,
adjudication of constitutional questions appealed and other cases, operation and
maintenance of the Judicial and Bar Council in the Supreme Court, and the
adjudication of regional court cases, metropolitan court cases, municipal trial court
cases in Cities, municipal circuit court cases, municipal, court cases, Shari'a district
court cases and Shari'a circuit court cases as indicated hereunder P2,095,651,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions.
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriation for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations
for: (a) printing of decisions and publications of Philippine Reports; b) commutable
terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and any
payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement, and
other operating expenses of the courts' books and periodicals; (d) purchase,
maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; e) necessary expenses for the
employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial
administration; f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in
international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable
transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks
of Court, Court Administrator, Chief of Offices and other Court personnel in
accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorneys-deoficio; PROVIDED, that as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increases in salary and
allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY
1992; Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P.

Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes and Guardson Lood are GRANTED. It is hereby
AUTHORIZED that their monthly pensions be adjusted and paid on the basis of RA
1797 effective January 1, 1991 without prejudice to the payment on their pension
differentials corresponding to the previous years upon the availability of funds for the
purpose.

xxx xxx xxx

Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill
for Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment
of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein

appropriated for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the
payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Supreme Court
entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-8225-C.A. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

Activities and Purposes

1. General Administration and Support Services.

The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:

238

a.
General
administrative
Services
P
43,515,000
b.
Payment
of
retirement
gratuity
of
national
goverment
officials
and
employees
P
206,717,000
c.
Payment
of
terminal
leave
benefits
to
officials
and
employees
antitled
thereto
P
55,316,000
d.
Payment
of
pension
totired
jude
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000
(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992)
C. COURT OF APPEALS
For
general
administration,
of
personnel
benefit,
benefits
adjudication
of
appealed
and
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000

administration
and
the
other
cases

Special Provisions.
1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court in accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Presiding Justice may be authorized to use any
savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court of Appeals for purposes of: (1)
improving its compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency in any
item of its appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and payment of adjusted
pension rates to retired justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No.
91-8-225-C.A. (page 1079, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein
appropriated for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the
payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Court of Appeals
entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter
No. 91-6-225-C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT
For
general
fund
operational
and
as indicated hereunder P500,000,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:
xxx xxx xxx

1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the payment of
back salaries and related personnel benefits arising from decision of competent
authorityincluding the Supreme Court decision in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225C.A. and COA decision in No. 1704." (page 11649 Gen. Appropriations Act, FY 1992;
Emphasis supplied)
On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and
the entire Section 4 the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines
and the Lower Courts (General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, page 1071) and the
underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for
the Court of Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article
XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments (page 1164, General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this
Honorable Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the
foregoing appropriations for the payment of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively nullified the veto of the
President on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic increase
in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting Republic Act
No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions
was further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297:
"they would erode the very foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and
enforce strictly the policy and standardization of compensation. We should not permit
the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement pensions
under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority
of our civil servants."
Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:
1) The subject veto is not an item veto;
2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;

adjustment
special

for
requirements

4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of
this Court that the veto constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the
adjusted pensions pursuant to the Court's resolution.
On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 918-225-CA with G.R. No. 103524.
The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.
I
239

It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of

law must prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons including the highest official of this land
must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three branches of
government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither
Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the
other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of
laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation
and application to cases and controversies.

The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or
not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or
paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is
generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it
can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President
is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable
parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto
power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or
revenue measure.

The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate
what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing
to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go beyond their
constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself or any of its
branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial
duty was emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:

The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The
power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority over the other
department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also
provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)

We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An itemin a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon,supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money
dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125,
etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed, 312) declared "that
an"tem" of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put
into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)
We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must
have been the basis of the disputed veto.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to
enable the Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been
inadequately funded by the specific items for the different branches, departments,
bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems
placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain
officials would be paid when they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which
were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into
vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the
vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement
payments, by transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and
240

not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to
another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount
may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund
adjustment" itself which is the item. This was not touched. It was not vetoed.
More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in
the 1992 Appropriations Act were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck
something else.
What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no
President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or
her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory
judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices
which privilege was extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by
Republic Act No. 3595.
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which
repealed Republic Acts 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of
pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was surreptitiously restored
through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of
Justices and Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the
repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and
budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in the
1992 General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990
veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was
not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be
effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced from 1951 to 1975,
so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any
effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain
provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic
Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never
achieved that purpose because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
The case of Tada v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986])
specifically requires that "all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective
only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the Court's
answer to the petition of Senator Lorenzo Taada and other opposition leaders who
challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which, while never published, were being
enforced. Secret decrees are anathema in a free society.
In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA
secured certification from Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office
that the April 4, 1977 Supplement to the Official Gazette was published only on
September 5, 1983 and officially released on September 29, 1983.
On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has
already categorically spoken in a definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not
immediately or soon thereafter published although preceding and subsequent decrees
were duly published in the Official Gazette. It now appears that it was intended as a
secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION" as the notation on the face of the original
copy thereof plainly indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that the decree was published
in the back-dated Supplement only after it was challenged in the Taada case as
among the presidential decrees that had not become effective for lack of the required
publication. The petition was filed on May 7, 1983, four months before the actual
publication of the decree.
It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975.
Moreover, the publication was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it
was done in 1977 when the now demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977
supplement was actually published and released only in September 1983. The belated
publication was obviously intended to refute the petitioner's claim in the Taada case
and to support the Solicitor General's submission that the petition had become moot
and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and
that, consequently, it did not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting
Justices (including Justice Lood, whose request for the upgrading of his pension was
241

denied on January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid their monthly pensions
on the basis of the latter measure, which remains unchanged to date.
The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so
as to assure stability in legal relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163
SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other decisions of this Court, the ruling and principles set out in
the Court resolution constitute binding precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita Kamaganak
Association, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16
May 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution)
The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not
countenance as they undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive
has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not
within its powers to pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or
defining what the law is and whether or not it violates a provision of the Constitution.
As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by
Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay the retirement pensions under
these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every year.
Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions
identifying funds and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions
pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in the
statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the government to pay the
adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA
1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its
authority. The President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is merely to
execute the laws as passed by Congress.
II
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use
the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of
benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of
fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may
not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary.
The Court has on various past occasions explained the significance of judicial
independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982]), it ruled:
It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or implicitly certain
powers. These they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. . . .
A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal
imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable
them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. . . . It is an
added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any
fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their
conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The
independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance
transcending that of a purely personal right. (At pp. 338-339)
The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain
mandate of the Constitution on fiscal autonomy. The OSG Comment reflects the same
truncated view of the provision.
We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only
does it allocate less than one percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the
22,769 Justices, Judges, and court personnel all over the country but it also examines
with a fine-toothed come how we spend the funds appropriated by Congress based on
DBM recommendations.
The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:
The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman to submit budget proposals in accordance with parameters it
establishes. DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each agency to defend its proposals
during DBM budget hearings, submits its own version of the proposals to Congress
without informing the agency of major alterations and mutilations inflicted on their
proposals, and expects each agency to defend in Congress proposals not of the
agency's making.
After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the
President, the tight and officious control by DBM continues. For the release of
appropriated funds, the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman are
instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare Work and Financial Plans and
requests for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves these plans and
requests and on the basis of its approval authorizes the release of allotments with
corresponding notices of cash allocation. These notices specify the maximum
withdrawals each month which the Supreme Court, the Commissions and the
Ombudsman may make from the servicing government bank. The above agencies are
242

also required to submit to DBM monthly, quarterly and year-end budget accountability
reports to indicate their performance, physical and financial operations and income,
The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when
importuned for needed funds, to release additional allotments to the agency. Since
DBM always prunes the budget proposals to below subsistence levels and since
emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal year, the Chief Justices,
Chairmen of the Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make pilgrimages
to DBM for additional funds to tide their respective agencies over the emergency.
What is fiscal autonomy?
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates
of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence end flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We
now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations
Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make
adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the
judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to
it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal
restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.

Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court
upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or
any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court
stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been
granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and
those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use
of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of
powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or
branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for
augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are
clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto
impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's
appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued
pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions
have been enacted by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel.
Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the
world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on retirement are
founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the
statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary
becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst,
44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose
of which is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and
to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only those who have
retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by illness or
accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From
the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year
Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
243

As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices
of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the
pension rates. Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to
afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910
providing that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis
of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation
allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme
Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers
the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the highest
monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree
was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of
Judges and Justices, supra)
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers
are unduly favored is, again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted
men number in the tens of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be
immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men retire at a much
younger age some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the
benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas
arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should first be directed
to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision
is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful
of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of
protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of
the Judiciary.

The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any
institution given the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President
and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the
exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither
may it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be
removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and court
personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The
President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated
by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's
supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We
cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or quasijudicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only
independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative
Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution)
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former
Justices of this Court and the ground that there should be no "grant of distinct
privileges" or "preferential treatment" to retired Justices ignores these provisions of
the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional
system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these
provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement
benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds,
raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are
already leading private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the
United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one
hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to
bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done
under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p.
16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are
unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their
charter, learned in the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in
the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent
the government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared
before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners
toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
244

All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize
them as engaging in "robbery" is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so
because the argument is unfounded.

the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The
resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is
likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.

If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state
that the then quality of research in that institution has severely deteriorated.

SO ORDERED.

In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v.
Topeka but Citizen's Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka
City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved
the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose
of building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads
improve their services. The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a
municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times
since that ancient period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money
may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban
and agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What
was "robbery" in 1874 is now called "social justice." There is nothing about retirement
benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or
encyclopedia which could not even spell "loan" correctly. Good lawyers are expected
to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the
Judiciary requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope
with the everyday living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that old
age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No.
92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their
intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no
longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years
of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government
as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with
the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now
that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his
bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to
luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be
effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of
their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE
as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act
are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and
regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for
245

U.S. Supreme Court

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)

No. 80-1832

Argued February 22, 1982

Reargued December 7, 1982
Decided June 23, 1983*
462 U.S. 919
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes either House
of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch,
pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. Appellee-respondent
Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a
nonimmigrant student visa, remained in the United States after his visa had expired
and was ordered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause
why he should not be deported. He then applied for suspension of the deportation,
and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to 244(a)(1) of the Act,
which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation,
ordered the suspension, and reported the suspension to Congress as required by
244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution pursuant to
244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension, and the Immigration Judge reopened the
deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground
that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, but the judge held that he had no authority to rule
on its constitutionality, and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to the House
Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed, the
Board also holding that it had no power to declare 244(c)(2) unconstitutional.
Chadha then filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the Court of Appeals,
and the INS joined him in arguing that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Court of
Appeals held that 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, and accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease taking any steps to
deport Chadha based upon the House Resolution.
Page 462 U. S. 920
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in No. 80-1832 under 28
U.S.C. 1252, which provides that "[a]ny party" may appeal to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of "any court of the United States" holding an Act of Congress
unconstitutional in "any civil action, suit, or proceeding" to which the United States or
any of its agencies is a party. A court of appeals is "a court of the United States" for

purposes of 1252, the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or proceeding," the
INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and
the judgment below held an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes
of deciding whether the INS was "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in
1252, the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision
prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. An agency's status as an
aggrieved party under 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree
with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S. 929-931.
2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of 244. Section 406 of the Act
provides that, if any particular provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of the
Act shall not be affected. This gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend
the validity of the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to depend upon whether the veto
clause of 244(c)(2) was invalid. This presumption is supported by 244's legislative
history. Moreover, a provision is further presumed severable if what remains after
severance is fully operative as a law. Here, 244 can survive as a "fully operative"
and workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto. Pp. 462 U. S.
931-935.
3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 244(c)(2), since he has
demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 79. Pp. 462 U. S. 935-936.
4. The fact that Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him does not
preclude him from challenging the constitutionality of 244(c)(2), especially where the
other avenues of relief are at most speculative. Pp. 462 U. S. 936-937.
5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under 106(a) of the Act, which provides that
a petition for review in a court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure
for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens within
the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings" under 242(b) of the Act.
Section 106(a) includes all matters on which the final deportation order is contingent,
rather than only those determinations made at the deportation
Page 462 U. S. 921
hearing. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged
veto, the final deportation order having been entered only to implement that veto.
Pp. 462 U. S. 937-939.
6. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. From the time of the House's
formal intervention, there was concrete adverseness, and prior to such intervention,
there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS
and Chadha. The INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that
the INS would have deported him absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. Moreover,
Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when a Government
agency, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that
the statute is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S. 939-940.
246

7. These cases do not present a nonjusticiable political question on the asserted

ground that Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the
Naturalization and Necessary and Proper Clauses of the Constitution. The presence
of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically
invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the
constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by the courts
simply because the issues have political implications. Pp. 462 U. S. 940-943.
8. The congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S.
944-959.
(a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, 1 -- requiring all legislative powers
to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives -and 7 -- requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate, before becoming law,
to be presented to the President, and, if he disapproves, to be repassed by two-thirds
of the Senate and House -- represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power
of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an integral part of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers. Pp. 462 U. S. 944-951.
(b) Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to 244(c)(2) was essentially
legislative in purpose and effect, and thus was subject to the procedural requirements
of Art. I, 7, for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and
presentation to the President. The one-House veto operated to overrule the Attorney
General and mandate Chadha's deportation. The veto's legislative character is
confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants; i.e.,absent the
veto provision of 244(c)(2), neither the House nor the Senate, or both acting
together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the
Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively
Page 462 U. S. 922
delegated authority, had determined that the alien should remain in the United States.
Without the veto provision, this could have been achieved only by legislation requiring
deportation. A veto by one House under 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt
at amending the standards set out in 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of 244 as applied to
Chadha. The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto further
manifests its legislative character. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority
to the Attorney General until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. Finally,
the veto's legislative character is confirmed by the fact that, when the Framers
intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its
prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the
procedure for such action in the Constitution. Pp. 462 U. S. 951-959.
634 F.2d 408, affirmed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 462 U. S. 959. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, post, p. 462 U. S. 967. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 1013.
Page 462 U. S. 923
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of
the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the
constitutionality of the provision in 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
66 Stat. 216, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of Congress,
by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
I
Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He
was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa.
His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should
not be deported for having "remained in the United States for a longer time than
permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8
U.S.C. 1252(b), a deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge on
January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable for overstaying his visa,
and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of
deportation under 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1), at
the time in question, provided:
"As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion,
suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for
suspension of deportation and -- "
"(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in
paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United
Page 462 U. S. 924
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the
date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a
person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. [Footnote 1]"
After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of deportation, the deportation
hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the
hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results of a character
investigation conducted by the INS, the Immigration Judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered
247

that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The Immigration Judge found that Chadha
met the requirements of 244(a)(1): he had resided continuously in the United States
for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme
hardship" if deported.
Pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(1), the Immigration Judge
suspended Chadha's deportation and a report of the suspension was transmitted to
Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides:
"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the
requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his
discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is
suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement
of the
Page 462 U. S. 925
facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with
the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day of
each calendar month in which Congress is in session."
Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation
was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1254(c)(2), to veto [Footnote 2] the Attorney General's determination that
Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2) provides:
"(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
subsection -- "
"if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close
of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported,
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in
substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney
General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure
at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If,
within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation
proceedings. "
Page 462 U. S. 926
The June 25, 1974, order of the Immigration Judge suspending Chadha's deportation
remained outstanding as a valid order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed
by the record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority reserved to it under
244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th Congress. This was the final session in
which Congress, pursuant to 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's
determination that Chadha should not be deported. The session ended on December
19, 1975. 121 Cong.Rec. 42014, 42277 (1975). Absent congressional action,
Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been canceled after this date and his
status adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien. See 8 U.S.C. 1254(d).

On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary

Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, introduced a
resolution opposing "the granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six]
aliens," including Chadha. H.Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; 121 Cong Rec. 40247
(1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On
December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further consideration by the
House Committee on the Judiciary and submitted to the House of Representatives for
a vote. 121 Cong.Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and was not made
available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it was voted
on. Ibid. So far as the record before us shows, the House consideration of the
resolution was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the floor that
"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens
contained in the resolution [Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory
requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the
committee that their deportation should not be suspended."
Ibid.
Page 462 U. S. 927
The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. [Footnote 3] Since the
House action was pursuant to 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Art. I
legislative act; it was not
Page 462 U. S. 928
submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his action.
After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in
the United States, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings to
implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to terminate the
proceedings on the ground that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Immigration Judge
held that he had no authority to rule on the constitutional validity of 244(c)(2). On
November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House action.
Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, again
contending that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to
declare unconstitutional an act of Congress," and Chadha's appeal was dismissed.
App. 55-56.
Pursuant to 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a), Chadha filed a petition for review
of the deportation order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position before the
Court of Appeals and joined him in arguing that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. In light
of the importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both the Senate and
the House of Representatives to file briefsamici curiae.
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that the House was
without constitutional authority to order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed
248

the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport this alien
based upon the resolution enacted by the House of Representatives." 634 F.2d 408,
436 (1980). The essence of its holding was that 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of
our jurisdiction over the appeal in No. 80-1832, 454 U.S. 812 (1981), and we now
affirm.
Page 462 U. S. 929
II

The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport Chadha. As we have set
out more fully, supra, at 462 U. S. 928, the INS concluded that it had no power to rule
on the constitutionality of that order, and accordingly proceeded to implement it.
Chadha's appeal challenged that decision, and the INS presented the Executive's
views on the constitutionality of the House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS
brief to the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's decision to comply with the
House action ordering deportation of Chadha. The Court of Appeals set aside the
deportation proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to cease and desist from
taking any steps to deport Chadha, steps that the Attorney General would have taken
were it not for that decision.

Before we address the important question of the constitutionality of the one-House

veto provision of 244(c)(2), we first consider several challenges to the authority of
this Court to resolve the issue raised.

At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any party" within the grant of
appellate jurisdiction in 1252, we hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the
Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. It is
apparent that Congress intended that

Page 462 U. S. 931

Appellate Jurisdiction

this Court take notice of cases that meet the technical prerequisites of 1252; in other
cases where an Act of Congress is held unconstitutional by a federal court, review in
this Court is available only by writ of certiorari. When an agency of the United States is
a party to a case in which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it
is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal under 1252. The agency's
status as an aggrieved party under 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive
may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. The appeal
in No. 80-1832 is therefore properly before us. [Footnote 6]

Both Houses of Congress [Footnote 4] contend that we are without jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832. Section 1252 provides:
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment,
decree or order of any court of the United States, the United States District Court for
the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding an Act of Congress
unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or
any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is
a party."
Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 417 U. S. 742, n. 10 (1974), makes clear that a court of
appeals is a "court of the United States" for purposes of 1252. It is likewise clear that
the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or proceeding," that the INS is an
agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and that that
proceeding held an Act of Congress -- namely, the one-House veto provision in
244(c)(2) --unconstitutional. The express requisites for an appeal under 1252,
therefore, have been met.
Page 462 U. S. 930
In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the congressional parties [Footnote 5] direct
attention, however, to our statement that "[a] party who receives all that he has sought
generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from
it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 445 U. S. 333 (1980).
Here, the INS sought the invalidation of 244(c)(2), and the Court of Appeals granted
that relief. Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought from
the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore cannot appeal from the
decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.

B
Severability
Congress also contends that the provision for the one-House veto in 244(c)(2)
cannot be severed from 244. Congress argues that, if the provision for the oneHouse veto is held unconstitutional, all of 244 must fall. If 244 in its entirety is
violative of the Constitution, it follows that the Attorney General has no authority to
suspend Chadha's deportation under 244(a)(1), and Chadha would be deported.
From this, Congress argues that Chadha lacks standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the one-House veto provision, because he could receive no relief
even if his constitutional challenge proves successful. [Footnote 7]
Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of a statute are to be
severed
"'[u]nless it is evident that
Page 462 U. S. 932
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not.'"
249

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 424 U. S. 108 (1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 286 U. S. 234 (1932). Here,
however, we need not embark on that elusive inquiry, since Congress itself has
provided the answer to the question of severability in 406 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, note following 8 U.S.C. 1101, which provides:
"If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
(Emphasis added.) This language is unambiguous, and gives rise to a presumption
that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or of any part of the
Act, to depend upon whether the veto clause of 244(c)(2) was invalid. The oneHouse veto provision in 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of the Act as that
language is used in the severability clause. Congress clearly intended "the remainder
of the Act" to stand if "any particular provision" were held invalid. Congress could not
have more plainly authorized the presumption that the provision for a one-House veto
in 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of 244 and the Act of which it is a
part. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419, 303 U. S. 434 (1938).

Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of certain
aliens in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act
provided that an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's decision to
the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.
In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of aliens eligible for
suspension of deportation. In addition, however, Congress limited the authority of the
Attorney General to suspend deportations by providing that the Attorney General
could not cancel a deportation unless both Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent
resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. A ct of July 1, 1948,
Page 462 U. S. 934
ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent resolution in the 1948
Act proved almost as burdensome as private bills. Just one year later, the House
Judiciary Committee, in support of the predecessor to 244(c)(2), stated in a Report:

The presumption as to the severability of the one-House veto provision in 244(c)(2)

is supported by the legislative history of 244. That section and its precursors
supplanted the long-established pattern of dealing with deportations like Chadha's on
a case-by-case basis through private bills. Although it may be that Congress was
reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such reluctance
is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of severability raised by 406.

"In the light of experience of the last several months, the committee came to the
conclusion that the requirement of affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress
in many thousands of individual cases which are submitted by the Attorney General
every year is not workable, and places upon the Congress and particularly on the
Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot assume. The new
responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent
resolution mechanism] are of purely administrative nature, and they seriously interfere
with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time,
interfere with the legislative work of the House."

Page 462 U. S. 933

H.R.Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949).

The Immigration Act of 1924, ch.190, 14, 43 Stat. 162, required the Secretary of
Labor to deport any alien who entered or remained in the United States unlawfully.
The only means by which a deportable alien could lawfully remain in the United States
was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented
to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I, 7, of the Constitution.
These private bills were found intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill
introduced by Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant permanent
residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:

The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the Attorney General's
suspension of an alien's deportation was incorporated in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub.L. 414, 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. Plainly, Congress' desire to
retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation, but must be viewed in the
context of Congress' irritation with the burden of private immigration bills. This
legislative history is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of severability raised by
406, because there is insufficient evidence that Congress would have continued to
subject itself to the onerous burdens of private bills had it known that 244(c)(2)
would be held unconstitutional.

"It was my original thought that the way to handle all these meritorious cases was
through special bills. I am absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in
this House that it is impossible to deal with this situation through special bills. We had
a demonstration of that fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before this
House. The House consumed 5 1/2 hours considering four bills, and made no
disposition of any of the bills."

A provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance "is fully
operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, at 286 U.
S. 234. There can be no doubt that 244 is "fully operative" and workable
administrative machinery without the veto provision in 244(c)(2). Entirely
independent of the one-House veto, the

81 Cong.Rec. 5542 (1937). Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id. at 5574,
but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Cong.Rec. 8992-8996 (1938).

Page 462 U. S. 935

administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to
suspend an alien's deportation under 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of
this delegated authority is preserved, since all such suspensions will continue to be
250

reported to it under 244(c)(1). Absent the passage of a bill to the contrary, [Footnote
8] deportation proceedings will be canceled when the period specified in 244(c)(2)
has expired. [Footnote 9] Clearly, 244 survives as a workable administrative
mechanism without the one-House veto.
C

status from nonimmigrant to permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028
(CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present challenge, he will not be deported,
and will automatically become eligible to apply for citizenship. [Footnote 10] A person
threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutional
validity of the process which led to his status merely on the basis of speculation over
the availability of other forms of relief.

Standing

We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks standing because a
consequence of his prevailing will advance

Jurisdiction

Page 462 U. S. 936

It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under 106(a) of the Act,
8 U.S.C. 1105a(a). That section provides that a petition for review in the Court of
Appeals

the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation-of-powers dispute with

Congress, rather than simply Chadha's private interests. Chadha has demonstrated
"injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent
or redress the claimed injury. . . ." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 79 (1978). If the veto provision violates the
Constitution, and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be canceled.
Chadha therefore has standing to challenge the order of the Executive mandated by
the House veto.
D
Alternative Relief
It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the constitutional question
presented by these cases because Chadha may have other statutory relief available
to him. It is argued that, since Chadha married a United States citizen on August 10,
1980, it is possible that other avenues of relief may be open under 201(b), 204,
and 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b), 1154, and 1255. It is true that Chadha may
be eligible for classification as an "immediate relative" and, as such, could lawfully be
accorded permanent residence. Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the decision of
the Court of Appeals in these cases, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub.L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, under which the Attorney General is authorized to grant
asylum, and then permanent residence, to any alien who is unable to return to his
country of nationality because of "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race."
It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a prudential bar to our
consideration of the constitutional question presented in these cases. See Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). If we could
perceive merit in this contention, we might well seek to avoid deciding the
constitutional claim advanced. But, at most,
Page 462 U. S. 937
these other avenues of relief are speculative. It is by means certain, for example, that
Chadha's classification an immediate relative would result in the adjustment Chadha's

"shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of
deportation . . . made against aliens within the United States pursuant to
administrative proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act."
Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by 244(c)(2) takes place
outside the administrative proceedings conducted under 242(b), and that the
jurisdictional grant contained in 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional
challenge.
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 392 U. S. 216 (1968), this Court held that
" 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations
Page 462 U. S. 938
made during a proceeding conducted under 242(b), including those determinations
made incident to a motion to reopen such proceedings."
It is true that one court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar to
Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (CA3 1981). [Footnote 11] However,
we agree with the Court of Appeals in these cases that the term "final orders" in
106(a) "includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather
than only those determinations actually made at the hearing." 634 F.2d at 412. Here,
Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final
order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the
House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was satisfied that the House
action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his decision to suspend
deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts.
This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not bar Chadha's appeal.
There, after an order of deportation had been entered, the affected alien requested
the INS to stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien
sought review in the Court of Appeals under 106(a). This Court's holding that the
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did
251

not attack the deportation order itself, but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with
it.'" 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 213, quoting
Page 462 U. S. 939
Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in contrast, Chadha directly
attacks the deportation order itself, and the relief he seeks -- cancellation of
deportation -- is plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals had jurisdiction under 106(a) to decide these cases.
F
Case or Controversy
It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy but "a friendly,
nonadversary, proceeding," Ashwander v. TVA,297 U.S. at 297 U. S. 346 (Brandeis,
J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass. This argument rests on the fact
that Chadha and the INS take the same position on the constitutionality of the oneHouse veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a
person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney General of the
United States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
A case or controversy is presented by these cases. First, from the time of Congress'
formal intervention, see n 5, supra, the concrete adverseness is beyond doubt.
Congress is both a proper party to defend the constitutionality of 244(c)(2) and a
proper petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). Second, prior to Congress' intervention,
there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS
and Chadha. We have already held that the INS's agreement with the Court of
Appeals' decision that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's
"aggrieved" status for purposes of appealing that decision under 28 U.S.C.
1252, see supra at 462 U. S. 929-931. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with
Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the INS would have deported Chadha
absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
"Chadha has asserted a concrete controversy, and our decision will have real
meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be deported; if we uphold 244(c)(2),
Page 462 U. S. 940
the INS will execute its order and deport him."
634 F.2d at 419. [Footnote 12]

Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning
the adjudication of these cases in the absence of any participant supporting the
validity of 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by
inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress. We have long held that
Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of
government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs
that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392
U.S. at 392 U. S. 210, n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
G
Political Question
It is also argued that these cases present a nonjusticiable political question, because
Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause,
U.S.Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.Const., Art. I,
8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress' Art. I power "To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization," combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it
unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress
over aliens under Art. I, 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is
Page 462 U. S. 941
challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible
means of implementing that power. As we made clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 (1976):
"Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative
jurisdiction, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), so long as the exercise of
that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction."
Id. at 424 U. S. 132.
A brief review of those factors which may indicate the presence of a nonjusticiable
political question satisfies us that our assertion of jurisdiction over these cases does
no violence to the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v. Carr,369 U. S.
186, 369 U. S. 217 (1962), a political question may arise when any one of the
following circumstances is present:
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."
Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of
the Baker factors by asserting that Chadha's claim is "an assault on the legislative
252

authority to enact Section 244(c)(2)." Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 48. But if
this turns the question into a political question, virtually every challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute would be a political question. Chadha indeed argues that
one House of Congress cannot constitutionally veto the Attorney General's decision to
allow him to remain in this country. No policy underlying the political question doctrine

United States extend. On the other hand, we cannot be unmindful of the

consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the
Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private
interests of vast magnitude, and which has been . . . deposited in the public
archives, as an act of Congress, . . . did not become a law."

Page 462 U. S. 942

Id. at 143 U. S. 669-670 (emphasis in original).

suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance
with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts.
[Footnote 13]

Other Baker factors are likewise inapplicable to this case. As we discuss more fully
below, Art. I provides the "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
of Baker for resolving the question presented by these cases. Those standards
forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial "policy determinations" or any showing of
disrespect for a coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted,
244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that statute is for this Court
to resolve, there is no possibility of "multifarious pronouncements" on this question.
It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be termed "political." But the
presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not
automatically invoke

The contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined, and we are
satisfied the parties are properly before us. The important issues have been fully
briefed and
Page 462 U. S. 944
twice argued, see 458 U.S. 1120 (1982). The Court's duty in these cases, as Chief
Justice Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U. S. 404 (1821), is
clear:
"Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we
can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty."
III

Page 462 U. S. 943

the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional

authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues
have political implications in the sense urged by Congress.Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), was also a "political" case, involving as it did claims under a
judicial commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but not
delivered. But

We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under 244(c)
(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption
that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a
challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained:

"courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some
action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."
Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 217.
In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the
question whether
"a bill signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of
the Senate, presented to and approved by the President of the United States, and
delivered by the latter to the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does
not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been passed by
Congress. . . ."
". . . We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from the performance of which
it may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the
enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of the

"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined,

the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are
we vested with the power of veto."
TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 437 U. S. 194-195 (1978).
By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives
-- or the hallmarks -- of democratic government, and our inquiry is sharpened, rather
than blunted, by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with
increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and
independent agencies:
"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional
veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from
1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between
1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970
through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions
253

Page 462 U. S. 945

were included in eighty-nine laws."
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind.L.Rev. 323, 324 (1977). See
also Appendix to JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, post at 462 U. S. 1003. JUSTICE
WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one-House veto is a
useful "political invention," post at 462 U. S. 972, and we need not challenge that
assertion. We can even concede this utilitarian argument, although the long-range
political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable. It has been vigorously debated, and it
is instructive to compare the views of the protagonists. See, e.g., Javits & Klein,
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 455 (1977), and Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible
Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev. 253 (1982). But policy arguments
supporting even useful "political inventions" are subject to the demands of the
Constitution, which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how
those powers are to be exercised.
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the
respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process.
Since the precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the resolution of
these cases, we set them out verbatim. Article I provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senateand House of Representatives."
Art. I, 1. (Emphasis added.)
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United
States. . . ."
Art. I, 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added.)
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
Page 462 U. S. 946
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed
by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill."
Art. I, 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added.)
These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the
separation of powers. We have recently noted that

"[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in

the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 124. Just as we relied on the textual provision
of Art. II, 2, cl. 2, to vindicate the principle of separation of powers in Buckley, we
see that the purposes underlying the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, 7, cls. 2, 3, and
the bicameral requirement of Art. I, 1, and 7, cl. 2, guide our resolution of the
important question presented in these cases. The very structure of the Articles
delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of
separation of powers, and we now turn to Art. I.
B
The Presentment Clauses
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all
legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted
by the Framers. [Footnote 14] Presentment to the President and the Presidential
Page 462 U. S. 947
veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure
that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I,
7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the
simple expedient of calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote," rather than a "bill."
2 Farrand 301-302. As a consequence, Art. I, 7, cl. 3, supra at 462 U. S. 945-946,
was added. 2 Farrand 304-305.
The decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified power to nullify
proposed legislation by veto was based on the profound conviction of the Framers
that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully
circumscribed. It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both
Houses and the President. In The Federalist No. 73 (H. Lodge ed. 1888), Hamilton
focused on the President's role in making laws:
"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the
rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of
themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but
ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence."
Id. at 458. See also The Federalist No. 51. In his Commentaries on the Constitution,
Joseph Story makes the same point. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States 614-615 (3d ed. 1858).
The President's role in the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers' careful efforts
to check whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,
improvident,
Page 462 U. S. 948
254

or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role in the legislative process was
described later during public debate on ratification:
"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to
the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body."
". . . The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive
is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in
favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence,
or design."

Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single House was antithetical to the
very purposes of the Constitution. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing
for only one legislative organ, he warned:
"[W]e shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of
sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of
government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality
that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to
be, solicitous to avert."
The Federalist No. 22, p. 135 (H. Lodge ed. 1888).

The Federalist No. 73, supra, at 458 (A. Hamilton). See also The Pocket Veto
Case, 279 U. S. 655, 279 U. S. 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 272
U. S. 123 (1926). The Court also has observed that the Presentment Clauses serve
the important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is grafted on the
legislative process:

This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the fallibility of human nature
later commented on by Joseph Story:

"The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the Senate
and of the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the
President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are
the members of either body of the Legislature, whose constituencies are local and not
countrywide. . . ."

Page 462 U. S. 950

Myers v. United States, supra, at 272 U. S. 123.

C
Bicameralism
The bicameral requirement of Art. I, 1, 7, was of scarcely less concern to the
Framers than was the Presidential veto, and indeed the two concepts are
interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of
the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized
their belief, already remarked
Page 462 U. S. 949
upon in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be
enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation's elected
officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral
legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court, commented:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes, sometimes in an Executive,
sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory &
practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be
neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into
distinct and independent branches. In a single house there is no check but the
inadequate one of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it."
1 Farrand 254.

"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the dominion of strong
passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature]

feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a
question long enough under its own view to see and mark it in all its bearings and
relations on society."
1 Story, supra, at 383-384. These observations are consistent with what many of the
Framers expressed, none more cogently than Madison in pointing up the need to
divide and disperse power in order to protect liberty:
"In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches, and
to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common
dependence on the society will admit."
The Federalist No. 51, p. 324 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (sometimes attributed to "Hamilton
or Madison" but now generally attributed to Madison). See also The Federalist No. 62.
However familiar, it is useful to recall that, apart from their fear that special interests
could be favored at the expense of public needs, the Framers were also concerned,
although not of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states. Those states
feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would work to their
disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical
of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. See 1 Farrand
176-177, 484-491. It need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise, under
which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states,
allayed the fears of both the large and small states. [Footnote 15]
Page 462 U. S. 951
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral
requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional
255

functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the
Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident
laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the
legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in
separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the
power of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto, thereby precluding
final arbitrary action of one person. See id. at 99-104. It emerges clearly that the
prescription for legislative action in Art. I, 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision
that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.

operated in these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's
deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States.
Congress has acted, and its action has altered Chadha's status.

IV

Page 462 U. S. 953

The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal
Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to
assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to
its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable
objectives, must be resisted.

delegated authority, [Footnote 16] had determined the alien should remain in the
United States. Without the challenged provision in 244(c)(2), this could have been
achieved, if at all, only

Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
at 424 U. S. 121, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally
identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the
Constitution has delegated to it. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S.
394, 276 U. S. 406 (1928). When the Executive acts, he presumptively acts in an
executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II. And when, as here,
Page 462 U. S. 952
one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively acting within its assigned
sphere.
Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless establish that the challenged
action under 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I,
7, apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I. See infra at 462 U. S. 955, and nn. 20, 21.
Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative
power depends not on their form, but upon "whether they contain matter which is
properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect." S.Rep. No. 1335,
54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897).
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to 244(c)(2) reveals
that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power
defined in Art. I, 8, cl. 4, to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House
took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize
one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien
whose deportation otherwise would be canceled under 244. The one-House veto

The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is confirmed by the
character of the congressional action it supplants. Neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in 244(c)
(2), either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the
Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of
legislatively

Page 462 U. S. 954

by legislation requiring deportation. [Footnote 17] Similarly, a veto by one House of
Congress under 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the
standards set out in 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of 244 as applied to Chadha.
Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.
[Footnote 18]
The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in these cases further
manifests its legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy, timeconsuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to
the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow
deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not
disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can
be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I.
Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deportation -- that is,
Congress' decision to deport Chadha -- no less than Congress' original choice to
delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral
passage followed by presentment to the
Page 462 U. S. 955
President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is
legislatively altered or revoked. [Footnote 19]
Finally, we see that, when the Framers intended to authorize either House of
Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they
narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action. There are four
provisions in the Constitution, [Footnote 20] explicit and unambiguous, by which one
House may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's
veto:
256

(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate
impeachments. Art. I, 2, cl. 5;

obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the
President; but it is crystal

(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment on
charges initiated by the House, and to convict following trial. Art. I, 3, cl. 6;

Page 462 U. S. 959

(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove
Presidential appointments. Art. II, 2, cl. 2;
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by
the President. Art. II, 2, cl. 2.
Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House,
independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit,
unambiguous terms. [Footnote 21]
Page 462 U. S. 956
These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore
the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but
important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. These
exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of them authorize the
action challenged here. On the contrary, they provide further support for the
conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied, and for the conclusion that
the veto provided for in 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the
powers of the Legislative Branch.
Since it is clear that the action by the House under 244(c)(2) was not within any of
the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally
Page 462 U. S. 957

clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings, and debates that
the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The records of the Convention
and debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to
define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states
and the people. There is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation
by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention
impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived
under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go
unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the
proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with
explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the
President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). With
all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet
found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject
to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.
V
We hold that the congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act,
and that it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the
standards prescribed in Art. I. [Footnote 22] The bicameral requirement, the
Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto
were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people
from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To
preserve those
Page 462 U. S. 958
checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the
power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted
by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express
procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. [Footnote 23]
The veto authorized by 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient
shortcut; the "sharing" with the Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in
this manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely practical terms, it is
257

Bowsher v. Synar, 476 U.S. 714 (1986)

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States held that Congress
assignment of certain functions under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act to the
Comptroller General of the United States violated the doctrine of separation of powers
because by its assignment of such functions, Congress was reserving the removal
power
of
an
officer
charged
with
execution
of
the
laws.

EN BANC

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of
an officer charged with execution of the laws except by impeachment.

G.R. No. L-15138

of

the

Philippines
COURT

July 31, 1961

BILL
MILLER, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

Facts. Respondents, Congressman Synar and the National Treasury Employees

Union, challenged the constitutionality of Congress assignment of certain functions to
the Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Act). Respondents
claimed that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The Act consisted of a
three-tiered procedure to control spending. The Comptroller General is nominated by
the President and removable only by impeachment or by joint resolution of Congress.
A three-judge district court held that the Act was unconstitutional because it imposed
executive functions on the Comptroller General and that those functions could not be
exercised
by
an
officer
removable
by
Congress.

G.R. No. L-15377

Issue. Whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United
States of certain functions under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act violated the
doctrine of separation of powers

VICENTE
ROMERO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANGEL HERNANDO ETC., and SIA SENG, respondents-appellants.

Held. Yes. Judgment of the district court affirmed. Congress cannot reserve for itself
the power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws except by
impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer
answerable only to Congress would reserve in Congress control over the execution of
the laws because those functions assigned to the Comptroller General entail
interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate which is
the very essence of execution of the law. The Constitution forbids Congress to
execute
laws.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

Dissent. The practical result of the removal provision reveals that the Comptroller
General is unlikely to be removed by Congress because removing the Comptroller
General requires a feat of bipartisanship more difficult than that required to impeach
and convict. Therefore, there is no real danger of aggrandizement of congressional
power.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

Discussion. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids Congress from directly and
indirectly giving the legislative branch executive authority.

July 31, 1961

NUMERIANA
RAGANAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY, MACARIO TAN, and SERGIO TAN, defendantsappellees.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-16660

G.R. No. L-16781

July 31, 1961

July 31, 1961

CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY, and LAO KANG SUY, petitioners-appellees,

vs.
ATANACIO
A.
MARDO,
JORGE
BENEDICTO,
and
CRESENCIO
ESTAO, respondents-appellants.

G.R. No. L-17056

July 31, 1961

FRED
WILSON
&
CO.,
INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MELITON C. PARDUCHO, ETC., and MARIANO PABILIARE, respondentsappellees.
R.
L.
Resurreccion
for
Paciano C. C. Villavieja for respondents-appellants.

petitioner-appellee.

258

BARRERA, J.:
These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here
treated together in this single decision because they present but one identical
question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and
submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the
authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it
confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said
Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and
manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to
October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without
being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as
separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer
Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to
file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a
petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from
proceeding with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. The court then required the
Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and
1241, as implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from
violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were
denied by the court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard. Thereafter, the
court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as
Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued
pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts
of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from
violations of labor standards. The question of venue was also dismissed for being
moot, the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition previously filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De
Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7, 1958.
From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents Hearing
Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us.
In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading
Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager
thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4,
1955, for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours
and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment

for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed their
answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof was started before Chief
Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before trial of
the case could be terminated, however, Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case
No. 26826)), to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition of the
case, on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, as
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956, in relation
to Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering them to
adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or unconstitutional. As prayed for, a preliminary
injunction was issued by the court. After due hearing the court rendered a decision
holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void and therefore, granted the
writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued.
From this decision, the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to us, as it involves only questions of law.
In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee
Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was employed by
appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service
she was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave
pay. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. To
said complaint, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should, under
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of
Labor; and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a
claim for separation vacation, sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff
(appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the court
dismissed the case, relying on the provision of Section 25, Article VI of Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A and on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Arca, et al. (G.R. No.
L-12249, May 6, 1957). From this order, appellant Raganas appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but said court certified the case to us.
In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the
Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for
recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an
answer. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him
and counsel. Upon his petition, Romero was allowed to present his evidence.
Thereafter, a decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer in favor of Romero. Upon
the latter's motion for execution, the records of the case were referred to Regional
Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution, being the
officer charged with the duty of issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng
should be given a chance to present his evidence, refused to issue the writ of
execution and ordered a re-hearing. As a consequence, Romero filed with the Court of
First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No. Br. II-35) praying that an
order be issued commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator to immediately
issue a writ of execution of the decision in Wage Case No. 196-W. To this petition,
259

respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that
it states no cause of action, but action thereon was deferred until the case is decided
on the merits. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the rules and
regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A. After hearing,
the court rendered a decision ordering, inter alia, respondent Regional Labor
Administrator to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution, as enjoined by
Section 48, of the Rules and Regulations No. 1 of the Labor Standards Commission.
From this decision of the Court of First Instance, Sia Seng and Regional Labor
Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal that
the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition, in spite of the fact that the decision
sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearing officer who had
no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. 20A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc.,
alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning
Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was summarily
dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also
claimed that during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. He
prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that said regional office
"being purely an administrative body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said motion to dismiss
having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred
Wilson & Co., Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for certiorariand prohibition, with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 41954) to
restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case, and praying,
among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it vests original and
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice)
on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor, be declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court granted
a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed
answer and the case was heard. After hearing, the court rendered a decision
declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241,
Plan No. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in
1956' (Res. of May 6, 1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v. Vicente Area,
G.R. No. L-12249). It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. 20-A is
valid.".
Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly to us from this decision.
The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take
cognizance of the subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI
of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted:
25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims

arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not
restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity
leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay,
vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help.
Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:
(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;
(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on
working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and
maternity leave of employees and laborers; and .
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment
for medical services of domestic help.
Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of
Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to
settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely
or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit
to such settlement, the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court.1
It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting
money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new
conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. The
question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our Constitution
and applicable statutes.
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which
created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was
empowered
(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be
necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the
government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of theExecutive Branch of the
National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241),
which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly
provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus,
judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature
may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative
functions.2 But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that
260

would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they
are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of
jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.3
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when
clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such
conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No.
L-14837 and companion cases, June 30, 1961);
. . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize
the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to
the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan.
Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are
vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The
Commission was not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these
their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices
created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have intended to
grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body, as the
Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of
justice any other agency of the Government. (Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. vs.
Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L-4465, July 12, 1951; Surigao Consolidated vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs. Shreveport,
287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed 175, and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur
921-922.) (Emphasis supplied.)
But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of
the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of
Republic Act No. 997, as amended. It is, in effect, argued that Reorganization Plan
No. 20-A is not merely the creation of the Reorganization Commission, exercising its
delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and
duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided
in the enabling act.
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this
argument reads as follows:
SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the
President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed
approved after the adjournment of the said session, and those of the plan or plans or
modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the
Second Session, shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy
session days of the Congress following the date on which the plan is transmitted to it,

unless between the date of transmittal and the expiration of such period, either House
by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any, modification thereof.
The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise, be approved
by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period.
It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to
Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a
resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended
that, independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier
in this opinion), said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of
Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision.
Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in
this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution
No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its
passage by the National Assembly (Congress), except when the President shall have
certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec.
21-[a], Art. VI).
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large
on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and
if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on
its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within
twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by
adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by
the President within thirty days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the
Constitution).
A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the
Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is
in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first, consent or approval is to be manifested
by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case, the
contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and
separate action by each House of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and wellunderstood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold
separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).
261

Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any
measure, as that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement
presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in
counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the
Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action
taken by Congress. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent
opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to
eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our
Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To
sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental
scheme four democracy.

(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before
the Regional office No. 3, is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction at first
issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs. SO
ORDERED.

Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to the
specific method of passaging laws prescribed in Section 21[2] of our Constitution) and
in England (under whose parliamentary system the Prime Minister, real head of the
Government, is a member of Parliament), the procedure outlined in Section 6(a)
herein before quoted, is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making
power, to preserve the control of the legislature and its share in the responsibility for
the adoption of proposed regulations.4 The procedure has ever been intended or
utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or enacting any law or measure by
the legislature, as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases
other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of
no effect.
This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel &
Shipyards Corporation v. Arca et al., G.R. No. L-12249, dated May 6, 1957,
considering that the said case refers to a claim before the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization of
the Department of Labor.
WHEREFORE
(a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L15138 is hereby affirmed, without costs;
(b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G.R. No.
L-16781 is hereby affirmed, without costs;
(c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from
in case G.R. No. L-15377 is set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, without costs;
(d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
directing the Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of
the Regional Office No. 2, is hereby reversed, without costs; and .
262

SUPREME
Manila

COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820

July 18, 1950

JEAN
L.
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine
BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons,respondents.

ARNAULT, petitioner,
Senate,

and

EUSTAQUIO

J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo
Taada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his
confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a
resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount;
Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further
order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8,
such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to
the Senate or to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here,
may be briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for
the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was
paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the
Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged
interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was
all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of
the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The
Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to
purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January

1, 1939. The occupation Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option
by tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing
it in court on June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to
P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for
P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed
to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of
P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said
payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would
entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down payment of
P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said
estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On
May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to
Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine
months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of P110,000
each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000
expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount
then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold,
conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration
by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5,
1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a
notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of
purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of
P90,000 within the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of
Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new
one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed
to the Supreme Court.1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs
that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,
accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as
follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the
aggregate sum of five million pesos;

263

WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October
31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by
virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine
Government in 1939;

the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave
rise to the present case.

WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to
purchase the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had made
tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact
is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made
in Japanese military notes during the occupation;

Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the
disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws
were being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted
in a purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be excused from making
answer which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my
constitutional right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable
Members of this Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of
my position.

WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single
centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a
deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven
hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of the recission of the contract
through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five
members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine
whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price
involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other
facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have
the power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and
may require any official or employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the
Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee
shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the
adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L.
Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that
involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying
to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two
estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were
delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he
opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank
in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same
occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred
to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of

At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:

At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of

the committee, interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten
statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own
statement, did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no
laws were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what
steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the
questions, saying that it would incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with
other people.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because
you would be incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money
that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account
for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong,
interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified as follows:

264

The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29,
1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what
did you do with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver
these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000
which you cashed on October 29, 1949?

Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.

Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was
still here in the Philippines?

The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000
was a Filipino?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to
whom you delivered this big amount of P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.

The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered
the big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?

The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the
Philippines gave you the verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving
these P440,000?

The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?

Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.

Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this
big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1- million paid to Burt?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why
that certain person should receive these P440,000?

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.

Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.

The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain
person without receipt?

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could
I meet him.

The CHAIRMAN. By cable?

The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.

The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?

The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of
the two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates?

Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.

265

Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949,
you knew already that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection
is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.

know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know
their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person?
What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller.
He walks very straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave
the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you
never came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which
approved and read to him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt
consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted
by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the
Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President
of the Senate propounded to him the following interrogatories:

The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times,
you never were able to find out what was his name?

1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is
impossible for you not to remember not only because of the big amount of money you
gave to him without receipt, but also by your own statements you knew him as early
as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other
deliveries of money to him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in
December 1949?

Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of
course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't

Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer
alleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

266

allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against

himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of
counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the
name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could]
not remember his name. That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of
the person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the
name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer
will be self-incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your
former claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your reason
now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be
self-incriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your real reason for
refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you
do not remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the
accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .

Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can
you say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name,
you cannot answer the question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating?
What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to
answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have
no means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without
communication with the outside. How could I answer the question? I have no
knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It
does not incriminate the witness.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The
question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be

excused from making further answer, please.

xxx

Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the
President of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal
the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public
official you might render yourself liable for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a
private individual you might render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did
you make those statements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to
whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ? We are giving
you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that your
answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or you are just trying to
make a pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.

xxx

xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate
Committee on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to
this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to
give, as requested. I cannot change anything in those statements that I made
because they represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do
with the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you
gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you
gave the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging because during
the investigation you told us: "I do not remember his name." But, now, you are now
saying: "My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first,
second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the
question. I beg to be excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in
nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not remembering the name of the
person has not been included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you
remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?

The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and
explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it.
That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough
to write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of
distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show
cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator
Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicit information from
him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the
petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the
267

Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his past activities dating
as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the
post liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In
view thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired
information from the witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did
you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the
name of that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short
time ago and, on the other hand, you remember events that occurred during your
childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove
quoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or
to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and
directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of
October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault
regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters
related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18,
1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged
consideration because it is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time this Court is called upon to
define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for
contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an
important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.

Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to
lay down the general principles of law which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the
Government in three independent but coordinate Departments Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the Congress, which
consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member.
(Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the
Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision
empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for
contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the legislative power
is shared by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and
the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the
legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore
be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than
the Congress of the United States or any State Legislature. Our form of Government
being patterned after the American system the framers of our Constitution having
drawn largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this case,
properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of
our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
(McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for
contempt any other person. (Andersonvs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But
no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless
his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of
legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature,
we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider.
268

It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created
by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by
the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as
to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a
questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than
P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also
involved government agencies created by Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a
result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has
recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of
Justice or any other department head from discharging functions and exercising
powers other than those attached to his own office, without ]previous congressional
authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of the
Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in
transactions in which the Government is a party, more particularly where the decision
lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the
President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big
landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without
previous congressional confirmation.2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in
support of his contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because
such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or
impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee
has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as to what
legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to
force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its
report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this
atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it
can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to
stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of
that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and
argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the
Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the investigation had
not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee
had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as
required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16, his committee was
empowered and directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to continue its
examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his

committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending
the completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the
measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is
finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness
to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in
it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every
question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may
not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of
the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be
propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In
other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to
any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the
Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute
the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot
control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to
review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to
qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if
it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary
was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said
case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in Re
Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter
under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that
where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from
a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass
upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to
make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of
discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution
of the issue under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer
which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter
under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the
validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee,
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among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it
is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the
question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or
materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not
necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a
witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is
that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the
Committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it
to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside
from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower house and by
the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is
completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to
prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after
completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to
determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no
reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry
there in question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to
charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in
considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the
value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a
member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining
Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena and asked,
among others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities,
known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United
Senate senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the
interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for
contempt of the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in that case was whether the
committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the
Court held that the committee did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The
resolution directed the committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is,
speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill
now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when

ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures
might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers
would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations,
while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate
within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is
incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there
is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the
validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the
committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume
that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in
instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand,
there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the
parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing
that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice
himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of
Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for
the deal until and unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shall
taken such measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong
that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As
we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That
certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the constitutional
guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that
subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.],
1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the
petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of
Representatives of the United States related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and Company had had an interest in
the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a
federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their
creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the
bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination
and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including
the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House
directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history of said real-estate pool
and the character of said settlement, with the amount of property involve, in which Jay
Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement,
with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme
Court of the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the
resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was
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one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate
and the trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the
United States and other creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding.
And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation "the House
of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a
power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government,
because the power was in its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and
applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general power
of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually
possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has
jurisdiction, and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry
relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it
is not within the range of this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the
constitutional separation of government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court
found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it
is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a
questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within
the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor of
Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was pending
adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on the
subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after
the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have
taken such measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong
that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has
evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies
to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land
is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40
Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is'
criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure
to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it
assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke and Co.,
with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the orderliness
of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but
before Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against
Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The
House was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary
and unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the
investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s
indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the great
administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that
the particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded
for all government deposits, that the facts connected with one such default revealed

the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such considerations had not
been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of
the particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose
exercise was customary and familiar in legislative practice. Instead of assuming the
character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry, place in its proper
background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the
legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the
demand of the court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the
results that may be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a realestate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation but one to be determined only after
an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities,
determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such
disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or judicial power,
cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court can predict, prior
to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521;
61. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded
its power in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the
Southern District of New York, who had written, published, and sent to the chairman of
one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and
purposes of the committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of
alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to make
inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The court
recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had implied power to punish a
person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without
constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while
offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its
proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts
and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to
the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's
writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and vexatious letter, while here
the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to answer questions
pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and jurisdiction
to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has
implied power to punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case
is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's ) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to
commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which
ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice
Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De
los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929,
Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while the latter
was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was
then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to
attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of
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the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House
adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of
Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of
twenty-four hours. That resolution was not complied with because the session of the
House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was
reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently
arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the
ground that the term of imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be
extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred; and
Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature
had no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the
Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief
Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions,
concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had
inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of
commitment could only be executed during the particular session in which the act of
contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no
decisive pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based
mainly on the following passage in the case of Anderson vs.Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to
exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that
imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of
the two limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that
is, that the power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited
to imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of
the body in which the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is
limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final
periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular
session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such
penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is
enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be
conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a
menace to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which
contempt was committed.

If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the
legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof
must perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from
Cooley's Constitutional Limitationsand from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect.
Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the case before us, the
members composing the legislative body against which the contempt was committed
have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the
petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied
upon by Justice Malcolm areobiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of
trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United
States for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested
for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by
the Speaker, and then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the
penalty was not involved in that case. The question there was "whether the House of
Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against themselves,
under any circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives
had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in
favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs.Gordon, the question presented was whether
the House had the power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district
attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict
punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The
court held that the House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not
obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not endanger the preservation of
the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that ground alone,
and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the
petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra.
There it appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a
select committee of five senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and
nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty
became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused
to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of
the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a subpoena
commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the
subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse
for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted
a resolution, "That the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant
commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the body of the
said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the
bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter
under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to
propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order of
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the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in
Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and
discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation
and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the witness was
that the case ha become moot because the investigation was ordered and the
committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March
4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority
to the period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later
and amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places
as it might deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither
House can continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end
of the session without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill
constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows
that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation
or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the same with the House of
Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single Congress:
but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body whose
members are elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats
of one third only become vacant at the end of each Congress, two thirds always
continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or
resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body,
may continue its committees through the recess following the expiration of a
Congress;" and, after quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says:
"The Senate, however being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees
during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the
select committee having this investigation in charge has neither made a final report
nor been discharged; nor has been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its
activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it
may, it is certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to
that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being so,
and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become
moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P.
Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L.
ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become
moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition by the
Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into
effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we
think a judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited.

What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the
witness from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing
body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats
of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the
next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of
the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term
of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was
constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The
resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first session
of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in
May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives,
we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the
Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end
of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to
perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing
relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power
is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which
is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally
be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this
proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its competence to make.
That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as
a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The
Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess.
By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by
the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the
obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his
liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate,
which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function
involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session
in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to
273

perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate
means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish
for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have
to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the
contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an
absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may
be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in
prison for life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the
power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations
are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might
thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He
contends that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be a public official be (witness) might be
accused of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter might accuse
him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery
to afford him safety. At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that
no laws were violated, and that all requisites had been replied with; but at the time he
begged to be excused from making answers "which might later be used against me."
A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he refused to
answer questions concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy
in his dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of the
money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to
account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that
his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any receipt, he
turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance
with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person
had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and
Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the
P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or
three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a
male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height.
Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I don't
remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't
remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is
the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His
insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would
incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is
unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and
is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable."

(12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L.
ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in
investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was
sitting at a table with said men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two
questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of
cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are sitting?" (2)
"Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman
of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said
questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the
witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the first question
propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second
question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of
the United States among other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely
because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in
this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason
to the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional
privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction,
we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person
might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate
him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the
whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness.
Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a
direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to
claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he
is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23
N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his
own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge
to decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his
clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent
authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent
274

of course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this case has been
vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently
recreant to his duties and obligations to the Government which protects those rights
under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other,
and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former
must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen
may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in
Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which
awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for
the security." Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may
not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is
no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is restrained were made for his
welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered,
with costs.

275

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6749

July 30, 1955

JEAN
L.
ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo
E.
Torres
and
Solicitor
Jaime
De
Los
Angeles
for
appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring
that the continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid
Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is
illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of
discretion in considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to
whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate
committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer
has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and
discharged.
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the
Philippines. The purchase was effected on October 21, 1949 and the price paid for
both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines
adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine
"whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price
involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts
the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the investigation conducted by
the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was asked to
whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee
refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15,
1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time
when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the
person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. In G.R.
No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee herein questioned the validity of the confinement so
ordered, by a petition for certiorari filed in this Court. He contended that the Senate of

the Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he delivered P440,000., that the Legislature lacks
authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the legislative session, and
that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an incriminating
question which the appellee is not bound to answer. All the abovementioned
contentions were adversely passed upon by the decision of this Court, so his petition
for release was denied.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitionerappellee executed an affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his
life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess
D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit to the said Senate Special
Committee, the latter subjected petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess
D. Santos, and after said investigation and questioning the Committee adopted
Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND
ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE
NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL
HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines, transcending
divisions of party and faction in the national interest, adopted a Resolution ordering
the detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of contempt of the Senate by
revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of P440,000 in connection with the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal, and by answering other pertinent questions
in connection therewith;
WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said Jean L.
Arnault, and the report thereon rendered by the Senate Special Committee on the
said deal, the Senate holds and finds that, despite numerous and generous
opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation, the said Jean L.
Arnault has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person
to whom he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to answer other pertinent
questions in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault
has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the
Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since
become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L.
Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having been
held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault
should have given the information which he had withheld and continues
contumaciously to withhold;
276

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L.
Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the
Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be
condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct
investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by
any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to whom the
said Jean L. Arnault gave the amount of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and the further information which the Senate requires
and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and contumaciously withholds, is
required for the discharge of its legislative functions, particularly so that adequate
measures can be taken to prevent the repetition of similar frauds upon the
Government and the People of the Philippines and to recover said amount; and
WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and mercy, the
Senate holds and finds that the said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and contumacious
defiance of the legitimate authority of the Senate, is trifling with its proceedings,
renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of the Supreme Court, is his
own jailer, because he could open the doors of his prison at any time by revealing the
truth; now therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and find, as it hereby
holds and finds, that Juan L. Arnault has not purged himself of contempt of the
Senate, and has in no way altered his situation since he has committed to coercive
not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th day of May, 1950; and that
Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of Prisons to hold the said Jean L.
Arnault, in his custody, and in confinement and detention at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive imprisonment, until he should have purged himself of
the aforesaid contempt to the satisfaction, and until order to that effect, of the Senate
of the Philippines or of its Special Committee to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates deal.
Adopted, November 8, 1952 . (Exhibit 0)
In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, petitionerappellee alleges: (1) That the acquisition by the Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates was not illegal nor
irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to the
Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the
Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period
longer than arresto mayor, as this is the maximum penalty that can be imposed under
the provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) that petitioner-appellee
purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that the one to
whom he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence in
corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate is not justified in finding that the petitionerappellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that
the legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement may

be considered as having been accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for

petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial to
the government and is neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To our minds,
two questions are decisive of this case. The first is: Did the Senate Special Committee
believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court review
said finding? And the second is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the
continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate
Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?
On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and
refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the
amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not materially charged
since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special
Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the
persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent
questions related to said amount." It is clear and evident that the Senate Committee
did not believe petitioner's statement that the person to whom he delivered the
abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The court a
quo, however, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that the
"petitioner has satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D. Santos actually and
physically existed in the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate
Committee is not borne to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that the
Senate abused its discretion in making its conclusion and that under these
circumstances the only thing that could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his
release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial
department for investigation and prosecution as the circumstances warrant.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental
discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the
legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means it may employ to
promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means are necessary and
appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts
cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only
means or even the best means possible to attain the end sought, for such course
would best the exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial department. It
has been said that the methods, regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain
results consistent with the public welfare are purely of legislative cognizance, and the
determination of the legislature is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of
the constitutional rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation
277

of a constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion has
been properly exercised. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 901-902).
These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to
do, much in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the
judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of
the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct
conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the
Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are
when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been
an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among
three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority
from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the popular will. Each
has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera, et al 65 Phil., 56; See
also Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139)
All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior
to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has
been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of
the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty
or property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been
extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard personally
and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering
his continued confinement.
The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippine
Senate have the power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued
confinement of the petitioner? In the supposition that such power and authority exist,
was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name Jess D.
Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that
the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D.
Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440, 000 was delivered, and,
in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and contumaciously
in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity. Although the resolution
studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to
coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation
of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This may be inferred from the
confining made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and
contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a
way, therefore, the petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified
by the language of the resolution, wherefore the issue now before Us in whether the
Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the
circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for
determination.

In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201,
Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had
ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a
question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i.e., by
reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is now contended by petitioner
that if he committed an offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body,
because he refused to reveal the identity of the person in accordance with the
demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish him, for the
punishment for his refusal should be sought through the ordinary processes of the
law, i. e., by the institution of a criminal action in a court of justice.
American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to
punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by
the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions
(Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of the United
States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in its earlier decision
(See Marshal vs. Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two
decades ago held that such power and authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs.
MacCraken (294 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was whether or not
the Senate could order the confinement of a private citizen because of the destruction
and removal by him of certain papers required to be produced. The court said:
First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to punish for
contempt may never be exerted, in the case of a private citizen,
solely qua punishment. The argument is that the power may be used by the legislative
body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the performance of its
duties; that the power to punish ceases as soon as the obstruction has been removed,
or its removal has become impossible; and hence that there is no power to punish a
witness who, having been requested to produce papers, destroys them after service
of the subpoena. The contention rests upon a misconception of the limitations upon
the power of the Houses of Congress to punish for contempt. It is true that the scope
of the power is narrow. No act is so punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the
performance of the duties of the legislature. This may be lack of power, because, as in
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, there was no legislative duty to
be performed; or because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37
S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, the act complained of is
deemed not to be of a character to obstruct the legislative process. But, where the
offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process, the fact that the
obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal has become impossible is
without legal significance.
The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was exerted by
Congress as early as 1795; and since then it has been exercised on several
occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution, by the colonial assemblies, in
intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the Continental
Congress and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204, 5 L.
ed. 242, decided in 1821, it was held that the House had power to punish a private
citizen for an attempt to bribe a member. No case has been found in which an exertion
278

of the power to punish for contempt has been successfully challenged on the ground
that, before punishment, the offending act had been consummated or that the
obstruction suffered was irremediable. The statement in the opinion in
Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F. 279
Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, supra, upon which MacCracken relies, must be read in the
light of the particular facts. It was there recognized that the only jurisdictional test to
be applied by the court is the character of the offense; and that the continuance of the
obstruction, or the likelihood of its repetition, are considerations for the discretion of
the legislators in meting out the punishment.
Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional privilege, but with
vindication of the established and essential privilege of requiring the production of
evidence. For this purpose, the power to punish for a past contempt is an appropriate
means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col. Cas. 296, Fed. Cas No.
10375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions expressed from time
to time in congressional debates, in opposition to particular exercise of the contempt
power concerned, not the power to punish, as such, but the broad, undefined
privileges which it was believed might find sanction in that power. The ground for such
fears has since been effectively removed by the decisions of this Court which hold that
assertions of congressional privilege are subject to judicial review.
Melbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, supra; and that the power to
punish for contempt may not be extended to slanderous attacks which presents no
immediate obstruction to legislative processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521,
61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L.R. A. 1917F, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 731 supra.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said
power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to
base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and
authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it
must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete,
independently of the other's authority and power. And how could the authority and
power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with
the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. The process by which a
contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise
its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by
which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment
which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the
legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a
necessary concommitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do
with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the
legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the
legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be
supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a
mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations,
the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs.
Gordon, supra).
The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of
contempt, because he says he has already answered the original question which he
had previously been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be
considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should
have testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry.
No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this
would be repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as
that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate
Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person whose
identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of
the petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act
further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the
intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation.
The act of defiance and contempt could not have been clearer and more evident.
Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be
claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary power.
One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the
period of imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law
punishment for contempt, i. e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now
entitled to be released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was
originally confined by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he
executed his affidavit and thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate
Committee. The latter passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he
presented the petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e., five
months after the last resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner committed
another contempt. It is not true, therefore, that the petitioner's punishment is beyond
the full period prescribed in the criminal law.
Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coersive nature, in the
sense that the Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact
which the petitioner had obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippine Senate
has not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record, it is
improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the
legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for
the issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the
petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to
279

be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitionerappellee.

280