1

A.C. No. 7298

June 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.
RES OLUTIO N
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation
of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which
threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax
evasion and falsification of documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for
Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005,
complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF
Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation and
Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation
conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client,
submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged
illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless.
Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to
explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to
work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating
his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the
following threat to the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will
be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages to the tune of millions under
established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to
other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of
income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of
Documents

4. Cancellation of business license to operate

due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure
to pay the above amounts as settlements in the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).1
Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted
ethical standards, complainant filed an administrative
complaint2 with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an
Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and
Counterclaims)3 claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson,
complainant's legal counsel, also played an important part in
imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against
him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no
certification against forum shopping and was motivated only to
confuse the issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way
of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to
endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public
Functions4 and for violation of the Notarial Law.5
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but
respondent failed to appear.6 Both parties were thereafter required
to submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation7 of Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his
position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 0494 requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent.
On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.8 On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said
Resolution and the records of the case.9 Thereafter, on 18 August
2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration
(for Modification of Decision)10 reiterating his claim of damages
against complainant in the amount of four hundred million pesos
(P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the "false,
malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic],
malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and false
suit."11
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the
Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)12alleging

that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position
paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered
mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due
process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering
his position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of
the 26 May 2006 Resolution13 of the IBP Board of Governors and
the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that
he filed his position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a
copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page
of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21
December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the same
document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to
respondent on the same date. 14
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his
petition before this Court for his failure to attach a certification
against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was
originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994,
issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the
Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made
effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to
include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to
become Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Said rule states that a violation
thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.16
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors
took against complainant his failure to attach the certification
against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently
dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and,
accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to
the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

2
The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of
disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against
forum shopping requirement, complainant's subsequent compliance
with the requirement, and the merit of complainant's complaint
against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,17 dwelt on the sui
generis character of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification
against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is
required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same
respondent, because such other proceedings or "action" is one that
necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be
attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against
forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another
action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum

shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints

constitutes abuse of court processes,19 which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.20 Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum
shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among
lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the
courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent
undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious
time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing
situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting
resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.21
It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of
attaching a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment
complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be
avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of
conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints
considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." 22 Thus, if the
complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification
against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary
action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with
ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification
of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
as possible."23
At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the
requirement cured the supposed defect in the original complaint.
The records show that complainant submitted the required
certification against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he
filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss
the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent
justifies the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny
authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly
contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's

success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must

always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 24 In particular,
Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file
or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to
compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases
against the lawyer's client.25
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its
Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that
should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement,
he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages,
as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating
Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of
accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,
obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from
making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret
calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with
extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a
duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence.
Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the
fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose
the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. 26
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27 we held that "[a]n accusation
for blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly
substantiated, would entail not only respondent's disbarment from
the practice of law, but also a possible criminal
prosecution."28 While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for
lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the
present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he
wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out
massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with
boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the
truth, to report to the government commission of offenses
punishable by the State."29 He further asserts that the writing of

3
demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws
allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

SO ORDERED.

filed a Petition to Modify Decision and/or Petition for

Reconsideration, 4 which was opposed 5 by petitioner.

G.R. No. 40457 May 8, 1992

Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite
obvious that respondent's threat to file the cases against
complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the
latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not respondent's
intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied
promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if payment of the
claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and
tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant
to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer
may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps
necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case
contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a
threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have
nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter
was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant
to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication
executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The
privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used
it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance
with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical
standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be
imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of
his overzealousness to protect his client's interests. Accordingly,
the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The
26 May 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio
is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted
out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH VI,
GEMINIANO F. YABUT and AGUEDA ENRIQUEZ
YABUT, respondents.
Ramon O. Nolasco and Manuel N. Camacho for petitioner.

The Petition to Modify Decision and/or Reconsideration is

predicated on the following grounds:
1. That there was no stipulation or agreement of the parties on the
award of attorney's fees;
2. That Miguel Enriquez, not being a general partner, could not
bind the partnership in the Sales Agreement he signed with
plaintiff; and

Felipe C. Magat for private respondents.

3. That defendant Geminiano Yabut already withdrew as partner
and president of La Mallorca as of September 14, 1972.
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mobil
Oil Philippines, Inc. questioning (1) the Order of respondent Court
of First Instance, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal, promulgated on
November 20, 1974 declaring its earlier Decision dated July 25,
1974 as null and void insofar as it concerned private respondents
Geminiano F. Yabut and Agueda Enriquez-Yabut, and (2) the Order
promulgated on February 20, 1975 and denying petitioner's Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and Appointment of Special
Sheriff.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 8, 1972, petitioner filed a complaint 1 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against the partnership La Mallorca and its
general partners, which included private respondents, for collection
of a sum of money arising from gasoline purchased on credit but
not paid, for damages and attorney's fees.
On December 22, 1972, petitioner, with leave of court, filed an
Amended Complaint 2 impleading the heirs of the deceased
partners as defendants. During the hearing held on April 1, 1974,
after petitioner had presented its evidence, the parties agreed to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record
adduced by petitioner but "to exclude past interest in the amount of
P150,000.00 and to award nominal attorney's fees." Consequently,
on July 25, 1974, a Decision 3was rendered in favor of the
petitioner and against defendants. Private respondents thereafter

On November 20, 1974, respondent court issued its disputed

Order 6 declaring its decision null and void insofar as private
respondents were concerned on the ground that there was no
evidence to show that the counsel for the defendants had been duly
authorized by their respective clients to enter into a stipulation or
facts, a compromise agreement or a confession judgment with
petitioner, a ground never raised by the parties. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification,7 seeking the
reconsideration of said order or, if not reconsidered, clarification
from respondent court as to whether or not there will be further
proceedings for reception of private respondents' evidence in court.
Respondent court denied the motion, as well as petitioner's Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and Appointment of Special
Sheriff, by way of the Order dated February 20, 1975. Hence, this
petition.
The issue presented before Us is whether or not public respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring null and void its earlier decision of July
25, 1974.
We find merit in the instant petition.
In the Order of November 20, 1974, 8 respondent court declared
the decision dated July 25, 1974 null and void for the following
reason:
There is no evidence on record to show that
the attorneys of record for the defendants
had been duly authorized by their respective

4
clients, including present movants, to enter
into a stipulation of facts or a compromise
agreement of confession of judgment. Ant
any settlement or confession of judgment
which an attorney may enter for his client
without any written authority cannot bind
the client. To be sure, the stipulation of facts
which amounts to or approximates a
compromise agreement, or waives a right or
practically confesses judgment, entered into
by a lawyer without the consent and
conformity of his clients, is an absolute
nullity. This precisely is what appears to be
the stipulation of the movants, as well as the
other defendants as the records show. In
view of the conclusion thus reached, it
would appear that there is no necessity to
discuss the other grounds raised by the
movants.
The records show that the petitioner had already adduced evidence
and formally offered its evidence in court; that at the hearing of
April 1, 1974, for the presentation of defendants' evidence, the
parties through their counsels, 9 mutually agreed to the waiver of
the presentation of defendants' evidence on one hand, and the
waiver of past interest in the amount of P150,000.00 on the part of
the plaintiff and the payment of only nominal attorney's fees, thus
the respondent court issued the following Order:
Calling this case for hearing today, the
parties pray the Court that they are
submitting the case for decision on the basis
of the evidence thus presented but to exclude
past interest in the amount of about
P150,000.00 and to award nominal
attorney's fees.
Finding the said motion in order, let
judgment be rendered in accordance with the
evidence so far presented. 10
The foregoing Order is not a stipulation of facts nor a confession of
judgment. If at all, there has been a mutual waiver by the parties of
the right to present evidence in court on the part of the defendants
on one hand, and waiver of interest in the amount of P150,000.00
and the stipulated attorney's fees of 25% of the principal amount on
the part of the plaintiff, except a nominal one.

The counsels of the parties in this case had the implied authority to
do all acts necessary or incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of their clients of their clients
who were all present and never objected to the disputed order of
the respondent court. They have the exclusive management of
the procedural aspect of the litigation including the enforcement of
the rights and remedies of their client. Thus, when the case was
submitted for decision on the evidence so far presented, the
counsel for private respondents acted within the scope of his
authority as agent and lawyer in negotiating for favorable terms for
his clients. It may be that in waiving the presentation of defendants'
evidence, counsel believed that petitioner's evidence was
insufficient to prove its cause of action or knowing the futility of
resisting the claim, defendants opted to waive their right to present
evidence in exchange for the condonation of past interest in the
amount of around P150,000.00 and the award of a nominal
attorney's fees instead of the 25% stipulated in the Sales
Agreement and Invoices. In fact, when counsel secured a waiver of
the accumulated interest of P150,000.00 and the 25% stipulated
attorney's fees, the defendants were certainly benefited.
Parties are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel in
procedural matters. Mistakes of counsel as to the relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence or mistakes in the proper defense,
in the introduction of certain evidence, or in argumentation are,
among others all mistakes of procedure, and they bind the clients,
as in the instant case. 11
Having obtained what defendants bargained for and having
wrongly appreciated the sufficiency or insufficiency of petitioner's
evidence, private respondents are now estopped from assailing the
decision dated July 25, 1974.
Records would show that private respondents have not submitted
any evidence or pleading to contest the authority of their counsel to
waive as he did waive presentation of their evidence in exchange
for and in consideration of petitioner's waiver of past interest and
the stipulated 25% of attorney' fees.
Even if We construe the Order of April 1, 1974 to be based on an
oral compromise agreement, the same is valid for as held in the
case of Cadano vs. Cadano 12 an oral compromise may be the basis
of a judgment although written evidence thereof is not signed. It
has been said that the elements necessary to a valid agreement of
compromise are the reality of the claim made and the bona fides of
the compromise. 13

The validity of a judgment or order of a court cannot be assailed

collaterally unless the ground of attack is lack of jurisdiction or
irregularity in their entry apparent on the face of the record or
because it is vitiated by fraud. If the purported nullity of the
judgment lies on the party's lack of consent to the compromise
agreement, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to have it
reconsidered, and if denied, to appeal from such judgment, or if
final to apply for relief under rule 38. 14 It is well settled that a
judgment on compromise is not appealable and is immediately
executory unless a motion is field to set aside the compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, in which case an appeal
may be taken from the order denying the motion. 15
Moreover, We do not find the grounds relied upon in private
respondents' Petition to Modify Decision to be meritorious.
Mr. Miguel Enriquez automatically became a general partner of the
partnership La Mallorca being one of the heirs of the deceased
partner Mariano Enriquez. Article IV of the uncontested Articles of
Co-Partnership of La Mallorca provides:
IV. Partners. The parties above-named,
with their civil status, citizenship and
residences set forth after their respective
names, shall be members comprising this
partnership, all of whom shall be general
partners.
If during the existence of this co-partnership,
any of the herein partners should die, the copartnership shall continue to exist amongst
the surviving partners and the heir or heirs
of the deceased partner or
partners; Provided, However, that if the heir
or heirs of the deceased partner or partners
elect not to continue in the co-partnership,
the surviving partners shall have the right to
acquire the interests of the deceased partner
or partners at their book value based upon
the last balance sheet of the co-partnership,
and in proportion to their respective capital
contributions; And, Provided Further, that
should a partner or partners desire to
withdraw from the co-partnership and the
remaining partners are not willing to acquire
his or their shares or interest in the copartnership in accordance with the foregoing

5
provisions, the co-partnership shall not
thereby be dissolved, but such retiring
partner or partners shall only be entitled to
his or their shares in the assets of the copartnership according to the latest balance
sheet which have been drawn prior to the
date of his or their withdrawal. In such
event, the co-partnership shall continue
amongst the remaining partners. 16
As to respondent Geminiano Yabut's claim that he cannot be liable
as a partner, he having withdrawn as such, does not convince Us.
The debt was incurred long before his withdrawal as partner and
his resignation as President of La Mallorca on September 14, 1972.
Respondent Geminiano Yabut could not just withdraw unilaterally
from the partnership to avoid his liability as a general partner to
third persons like the petitioner in the instant case.
This is likewise true with regard to the alleged non-active
participation of respondent Agueda Yabut in the partnership. Active
participation in a partnership is not a condition precedent for
membership in a partnership so as to be entitled to its profits nor be
burdened with its liabilities.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the court a quo erred in
issuing the Orders of November 20, 1974 and February 20, 1975
nullifying the decision dated July 25, 1974 and dismissing the
complaint against private respondents Geminiano Yabut and
Agueda Enriquez Yabut.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of November 20, 1974 and February
20, 1975 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision
dated July 25, 1975 is reinstated and declaring the same valid and
binding against private respondents Geminiano Yabut and Agueda
Enriquez-Yabut. With costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]
JOSE

A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NATALIO

PANGANIBAN
and
ATTY. JUANITO
P.
NOEL, respondents.
RES OLUTIO N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by
complainant Jose A. Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M.
Panganiban and Atty. Juanito P. Noel. Complainant charges that
respondent lawyers reneged in their duties and obligations towards
him as their client, especially in the complainants right to appeal
to the higher court after losing his case in the lower courts. The
allegations in the complaint dated February 12, 1996[1] in support
of the accusations are as follows:
1.
Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T.
Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert
Montano, na ang Judge ay si Honorable Severino De Castro, Jr.
na ang kaso ay Recovery of possession with damages. Itoy
iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 95-73739 na ang
Judge naman dito ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. Si
Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang abogado ko.

submitted for decision. Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum

ay submitted for decision;
7.
Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, Bakit may
ibinigay na zerox copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking
kalaban sumagot si Atty. Noel, at sinabi sa akin Tsekin mo sa
court. Gayon nga ang aking ginawa. At bumalik ako kay Atty.
Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may decision na. Sinabi ni Atty.
Noel na: Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo, magkano ang inilagay
nila? Sa palagay ko ay hindi lang trenta mil (P30,000.00) pesos
ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang isinagot ko;
8.
Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng motion
for reconsideration, sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang na
nila yun kaya dapat umapila na lang tayo. Sinabi ko kay Atty.
Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa Supreme
Court para parehas ang laban; Na bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko
dito ang decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa RTC, at ang petsa
ng decision ng RTC na tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.

...
4.
Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court
room ay nagtanong sa akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: Mr. Roldan
nasaan nga pala yung resibo na ibinigay ni Tessie sa iyo na
nagbigay ka ng down payment na Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986. Agad akong sumagot at
sinabi ko sa kaniya, Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi
ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay ko sa inyo kasama iyong resibo
ni Tessie Dalusong, na akoy magbigay ng Ten Thousand Pesos
bilang downpayment sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad
siyang sumagot Wala kang ibinibigay sa akin!
5.
Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Ibigay ninyo sa
akin ang folder at ako ang hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong.
Tumulong din si Atty. Noel, at nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty.
Noel Sayang hindi na natin maipasok ito, hindi na kasi pwedeng
magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya. Di ko alam kung bakit hindi niya
ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na nagpapatunay na ako ang
unang nakabili ng bahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Maynila).
6.
Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako
sa sinasabi ni Atty. Noel no Rebuttal pero nagtaka ako
kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay malinaw na ang aking deklarasyon
at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi na raw dapat mag
rebuttal i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga sinabi ng
Judge na: Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days

9.
Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa Court of Appeal
makaraan ang ilang buwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at
Atty. Panganiban, noong November 13, 1995 ang decision subalit
tinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban
noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong ko ang sekretarya ni
Atty. Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng
sekretarya ay Nasa probinsiya maraming inaasikaso doon. Agad
kong sinabi: Hindi ba fifteen days lang para maka-apila sa
Supreme Court. Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi Isang buwan daw
yun para sagutin.
10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty.
Panganiban) na sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin
na ninyo ang apilasyon sa Supreme Court, itoy madalas kong
sabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kayat ibinigay niya ang bagong
office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre Rm. 134, 1564 Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila.
11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel
gaya noong Dec. 1, 1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7,
1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon pang huling linggo ng November ay
sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang sekretarya (si Zeny at Marie
Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin kay Atty. Noel sa
Supreme Court.

6
12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa
office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco 3rd Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila.
Tinanong ko ang kaniyang sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel,
sinagot ako ng sekretarya at sinabing Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel
kung yari na yung apilasyong ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose Roldan)
hindi po niya ako sinasagot.
13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang
alamin ang katotohanan nabatid ko noon lang, na akoy natalo ng
walang kalaban-laban, pagkat nag-laps na o lampas na ang
panahong ibinibigay ng batas para makapag-payl ng apilasyon sa
Supreme Court.
14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa
aking kaso ni Atty. Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko
sila ng Damages na halagang one hundred fifty thousand
(P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang alisan ng karapatan na
makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.
In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban
avers that he was neither aware nor did he participate in the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose
A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano and in the
appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43;
they do not have a lawyer-client relationship because he is on leave
in the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was
designated Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and during his
incumbency as such, and up to the filing of this administrative
complaint in 1996, he is still on leave as law practitioner because
he was elected Mayor of Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995 election;
probably, complainant included him as respondent because he
thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of Atty.
Juanito P. Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant
might have seen him or they might have talked casually in the law
office from which he was on leave in his practice of law because
he drops there from time to time to meet visitors from Laurel who
are living and who have problems in Metro Manila; and he has not
received any single centavo from the complainant.
In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges:
Sometime in 1994, he agreed to represent complainant in
recovering a one-half portion of the ground floor of a house located
at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila which complainant bought
from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her daughter
Teresita Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession was filed on February 8,
1994 with the RTC but upon the effectivity of the law expanding

the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case

was transferred to the MTC. From the evidence of the defendant,
he honestly saw no need to present a rebuttal evidence. The MTC
rendered a decision dismissing the case on the alleged ground that
the identity of the subject matter of the action was not clearly
established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila
(Branch 43) and not with the Court of Appeals as stated in
paragraph 9 of the complaint. On November 13, 1995, he received
a copy of the RTC decision dated October 10, 1995, affirming the
decision of the MTC. Through the telephone, he informed the
complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainant
instructed him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which
actually refers to the Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme
Court as complainant claims. He advised the complainant that he
could find no error in the said decision and a further appeal would
be frivolous and without merit and requested the complainant to
come over so that he could discuss the matter with him. Whenever
the complainant went to the law office, he failed to see him
because the latter was still attending court hearings. The
complainant asked for the records of the case which was given by
his secretary. Complainant never returned the case folder to him,
neither did he call up by phone, or see him personally. He then
assumed that the complainant had hired another lawyer to handle
the appeal. He was surprised when he received on July 18, 1996 a
copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 19, 1996,
requiring them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A.
Roldan.
We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. After hearing, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Manuel A. Quiambao submitted his
Report and Recommendation dismissing the complaint against
Atty. Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a
Resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP adopted and approved
the said Report and Recommendation.
We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or nonexistence of lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Panganiban
and the complainant.
From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears
that Atty. Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates.
However, Atty. Panganiban went on leave from the practice of law
since October 18, 1993 when he was designated as acting mayor of
Laurel, Batangas[2] due to the indefinite leave of absence filed by
the mayor and by reason of his election as mayor of the said
municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he secured the

services of Atty. Panganiban on January 6, 1994.[3] It is thus clear

that Atty. Panganiban was not an active associate of the law firm,
since at that time, he was already on leave from the practice of
law. Moreover, the complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages was
prepared and signed by Atty. Noel alone and not in any
representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the said
civil case in the RTC, it was Atty. Noel who represented the
complainant. Not once did Atty. Panganiban appear for the
complainant nor did he sign any document pertaining with the
aforesaid case. Necessarily, the complaint against Atty.
Panganiban must be dismissed.
As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.
The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a
deliberate attempt to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to
the prejudice of complainant and (2) whether it was correct for
Atty. Noel to refuse to file a further appeal of the case to the Court
of Appeals by way of petition for review despite the manifest
desire of the complainant to do so.
Anent the first issue.
Complainant insists that Atty. Noels failure to present in
evidence the receipt dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause.
The receipt shows that complainant made a partial payment
ofP10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price of the subject property.
Complainant claims that this piece of document proves that
complainant bought the subject property ahead of the defendants
who bought it only on July 30, 1986. Thus, to the mind of the
complainant, the non-presentation of the subject receipt is
suppression of evidence.
Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts
that the same was mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists
that said receipt did not exist during the preparation and filing of
the complaint and even during the presentation of evidence.
Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have been alleged in the
complaint to show that complainant bought the subject property
ahead of the other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that
the receipt was given to him, the same cannot be used as evidence
because the receipt shows that it was signed by one Romeo
Dalusong who is not a party to the sale; neither does it appear in
the receipt that Romeo was acting in a representative capacity.

7
A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight
of this issue.
It appears that the subject property was subjected to a
double sale by the same seller. The Deed of Sale of the
complainant is dated November 28, 1986 while that of the other
buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant claims that actually
the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as evidenced by the
subject receipt. Complainant however failed to take possession of
the subject property as the same is already in the possession of the
other buyer. Complainant filed an ejectment case [4] against the
tenant of the other buyer but the same was dismissed for the reason
that complainant failed to show that he had proprietary right over
the property in question. Unable to take possession of the subject
property, complainant filed a case against the seller for the
annulment of the contract of sale, the Deed of Sale dated
November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the court awarded him
damages of P80,000.00.
Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a
Compromise Agreement.[5] The seller, agreed to sell one-half of
her duplex house which is the same property that was previously
sold to complainant on November 28, 1986, including all her
proprietary rights over the land, in the amount of P80,000.00.
Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the same
amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant
to the said compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and
Transfer of Right[6] in favor of the complainant was executed on
December 22, 1990 by the seller over the said property.
Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject
property as a result of the compromise agreement, complainant still
failed to take possession of the subject property, hence he filed a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages against the other buyer. It is in this case that complainant
claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject receipt. The
MTC dismissed the complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed it
again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to file a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, complainant filed the present administrative
complaint against him.
We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the
subject receipt was not in existence at the time he prepared the
complaint or even at the time of presentation of evidence. The
complaint was verified by the complainant stating the fact that he
caused its preparation, that he read the same and attested that the
contents thereof are true and correct. If complainants allegation

that he gave the receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering
the importance of the subject receipt to his case, he should have
called the attention of Atty. Noel that there was no allegation of the
existence of the subject receipt.
We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing
evidence.
As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty.
Noels refusal or failure to file a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right
to file a further appeal because he was not informed immediately
of the result of the appeal to the RTC. Complainant insists that
Atty. Noel, through his secretary, called the complainant only on
November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt of the adverse RTC
decision and was given the impression that he has still one month
within which to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he
paid the respondents visits on December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to
follow up the filing of the appeal to the higher court but that he
was not able to talk to Atty. Noel; that it was only when he went to
the RTC that he learned that he lost the case because the period of
the appeal has lapsed.
Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on
November 13, 1995 and on the following day, he instructed his
secretary to contact the complainant to inform him of the adverse
RTC decision with the directive for the complainant to call up
Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was instructed by
the complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he
told the complainant that there is no need to appeal the case
because, first, the decision of the court is correct, and second, he
is obligated by the code of professional responsibilities to refrain
from filing a frivolous and unmeritorious appeal; that thereafter,
complainant went to his office twice, the last of this instance was
when complainant took all the records of the case and never came
back which led him to believe that complainant will not appeal the
adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel further states that, in any event,
his relationship with the complainant ended upon the issuance of
the decision and that the complainant should not expect that he
would still appeal the case.
We find for the complainant.

It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in

following up the status of the case. From the time, complainant
filed the case with the MTC up to the time he appealed with the
RTC, complainant was vigilant with his rights constantly in contact
with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore that upon receipt of
the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noels version is
to be given credence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just
allowed the time to appeal to lapse. As correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner in his Report:
Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over
the same subject matter, including a case of ejectment, a case of
annulment of contract of sale with damages, a case of action for
recovery of ownership and possession, an appeal to the Regional
Trial Court, and he did not seem perturb that he lost it (the appeal)
and did not find it essential to discuss the matter with his lawyer
for possible remedial action? That is, as claimed by his lawyer?
...
As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the
claim that the complainant followed up his case several times with
his office (outside of the two occasions that he conceded the
complainant did so), the complainant was precise in detailing the
circumstances which described how he tried his best to seek the
presence of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were dates, detailed
circumstances, and specific places. Given the character which had
characterized the effort of the complainant to seek appropriate
legal remedies for his complaints, the assertions would be
consistent, that is, that he made great efforts to find Atty. Noel.
We note that the complainant was informed about the
adverse RTC decision within the 15-day prescriptive period to
appeal. As stated elsewhere, Atty. Noel received the adverse RTC
decision on November 13, 1995 and the complainant was informed
about the adverse RTC decision on November 24, 1995. Hence,
complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty.
Noel failed to ensure that the client was advised appropriately.
Atty. Noel entrusted entirely with his secretary the duty to inform
the complainant about the adverse decision. And the secretary
informed the complainant rather late and worse with the wrong
information that the complainant has still a month within which to
file an appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the prescriptive period
to appeal without complainant having availed of the said remedy.
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

8
[7]

If only Atty. Noels position of not filing an appeal because it

would only be frivolous has been properly communicated to the
complainant at the earliest possible time so that the complainant
would be able to seek the services of another lawyer for help, it
would have been commendable. A lawyers duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. [8] But as it
was, Atty. Noels negligence as afore-discussed robbed the
complainant of the opportunity to at least look for another lawyer
for professional help and file an appeal, after all, it is the client
who finally decides whether to appeal or not an adverse decision.
We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he
should not be expected to file an appeal for the complainant
because their lawyer-client relationship ended with the RTC
decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until
the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act of his
client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such
time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his
client.[9] Second, Atty. Noel admitted that complainant instructed
him to file an appeal with the higher court. Even assuming that
their contract does not include filing of an appeal with the higher
courts, it is still the duty of Atty. Noel to protect the interest of the
complainant by informing and discussing with the complainant of
the said decision and his assessment of the same. A lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.[10]It is
the obligation of counsel to comply with his clients lawful
request. Counsel should exert all effort to protect the interest of his
client.
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed
on an errant lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the facts of the case.[11] In cases of similar
nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand,
[12]
fine of five hundred pesos with warning, [13]suspension of three
months,[14] six months[15] and even disbarment[16] in aggravated
case.
The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to
his duties as a lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We conclude that a suspension from the practice of
law for one month is just penalty under the circumstances.
Complainants claim for damages cannot be entertained in
the present disbarment case as it is not the proper forum. It is not
an ordinary civil case where damages could be awarded.[17] A

disbarment case is a proceeding that is intended to protect the

Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers; to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable,
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[18] It has
been emphasized in a number of cases that disbarment proceedings
belong to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a
criminal action.[19]
Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M.
Panganiban is DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noel is SUSPENDED
for one month with a warning that a repetition of the same would
be meted a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to respondents personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30712 February 6, 1991
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION and THE
FIELDMENS INSURANCE CO., INC., defendants-appellants.
Panfilo M. Manguera & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal originally filed with the Court of Appeals but
certified to this Court for disposition since it involves purely
questions of law, from the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, * Branch IX, dated June 23, 1964, in Civil
Case No. 51712, ordering the defendants-appellants herein to pay,
jointly and severally, to the plaintiff-appellee the sum of
P124,242.47, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid and denying plaintiff s
prayer for attorney's fees. With respect to the cross-claim of
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the said court ordered Visayan
Packing Corporation to pay Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. such
amount which the latter may pay to the plaintiff-appellee with
interest at 12% per annum until fully paid, and attorney's fees
equivalent to 10% of the amount, paid by Fieldmen's Insurance
Co., Inc. to the plaintiff-appellee. With costs against the
defendants-appellants.

As gathered from the records, the antecedent facts of this case are
as follows:
Plaintiff Reparations Commission (Repacom, for short) is a
government entity created by virtue of Republic Act No. 1789,
with offices at the 5th Floor, Development Bank of the Philippines
Building No. 2, Port Area, Manila while the defendants, Visayan
Packing Corporation (Vispac, for short) and the Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc. (FICI, for short) are corporations duly
organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines, with
offices in Bacolod City, Philippines and Singson Bldg., Plaza
Moraga, Manila, respectively.
On May 19, 1960, plaintiff Repacom adopted Resolution No. 262
awarding to the defendant Vispac by way of a contract of
conditional purchase and sale subsequently executed on November
15, 1960 (Exhibit "A") the following reparations goods with a total
F.O.B. value of P1,242,424.67 (Exhibit "A-2"): one (1) Cannery
Plant, divested from M/S "Estancia"; two (2) Fishing Boats M/S
"SONIA" and M/S "ANA LARES", 75 G.T. and one (1) Fishing
Boat M/S "SALVADOR "B"", 100 G.T.; including all its
corresponding accessories and appurtenances. These reparations
goods were delivered to the defendant Vispac, on May 30, 1960
(Exhibit "A-2").
Attached with said contract and forming part thereof is the
questioned Schedule of Installment Payments, herein reproduced,
as follows:
SCHEDULE OF INSTALLMENT
PAYMENTS
NAME OF USER VISAYAN PACKING
CORPORATION
ADDRESS Bacolod City
NATURE OF CAPITAL
GOODS/SERVICES One (1) Cannery Plant
and appurtenances; Two (2) Fishing Vessels,
75 G.T. M/S "SONIA" and M/S "ANA
LARES" and one (1) fishing vessel "M/S
SALVADOR B", 100 G.T., together with all
equipment and appurtenances.

9
DATE OF COMPLETE DELIVERY May
30,1960
TOTAL F.O.B. COST P1,24 2,424.67
AMOUNT OF FIRST INSTALLMENT
(10% of FOB COST

MANILA, PHILIPPINES 1960

VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION
REPARATIONS
END-USER COMMISSION
BY: BY:

P1,24,242.47)
DUE DATE OF 1ST INSTALLMENT May
30,1962

HERNAN DE LA RAMA RODOLFO

MASLOG
President & General Manager Chairman

TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL YEARLY

INSTALLMENTS
RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT
(3%) PER ANNUM
NO. OF DATE DUE AMOUNT
INSTALLMENTS
1 May 30, 1963 P131,085.07
2 " " 1964 P131,085.07
3 " " 1965 P131,085.07
4 " " 1966 P131,085.07
5 " " 1967 P131,085.07
6 " " 1968 P131,085.07
7 " " 1969 P131,085.07

(Ibid., Exhibit "A-1", p. 11)

Defendant-appellant FICI is impleaded as bondsman for the
principal defendant Vispac, under Surety Bond No. 4122 (Exhibit
"B") issued by the former on May 30, 1960, to guarantee "faithful
observance and compliance by the principal of all its obligations"
recited in the Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of
Reparations Goods (Exhibit "A") and in the annexed Schedule of
Payments (Exhibit "A-1 ").
On September 27, 1962, Repacom filed a complaint for specific
performance with the court a quo against Vispac seeking collection
of the amount of P124,242.47 allegedly due on May 30, 1962 as
payment of the 1st installment of the reparations goods and
impleaded the FICI as defendant.
In its answer dated November 8, 1962, Vispac claimed that the
Schedule of Payments (Exhibit "A") is vague and ambiguous with
respect to the date when the first installment falls due and that by
reason thereof, the ambiguity should be construed against
Repacom, the party which drafted the contract.
Thus, while Repacom maintains that the 1st installment is due on
May 30, 1962, Vispac, on the other hand, argues that it is due on
May 30, 1963.

8 " " 1970 P131,085.07

9 " " 1971 P131,085.07
10 " " 1972 P131,085.07

On January 13, 1964, Repacom and Vispac submitted a

"Stipulation of Facts" and both prayed that this case be submitted
for decision after their respective memoranda have been filed. FICI
joined with this move and request of the principal parties.

Pertinent provisions of said Stipulation of Facts are quoted as

follows:
paragraph 1
That in order to abbreviate proceeding they
have agreed that the transcript of notes taken
in Civil Case No. 51713, The Reparations
Commission vs. Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc., Branch III, CFI, Manila, be submitted
as evidence in the above entitled case. This
agreement stemmed from the fact that both
Civil Case 51712, the case now being
litigated and Civil Case No. 51713
mentioned earlier in this paragraph are both
collection cases instituted by the Reparations
Commission against the defendant, The
Visayan Packing Corporation and the
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., based on
similar Contracts of Conditional Purchase
and Sale, drafted in the usual standard form
and containing practically the same standard
provisions and stipulations.
paragraph 2
That Civil Case No. 51713 has already been
decided on March 27, 1963 granting relief
for the plaintiff, The Reparations
Commission as prayed for, a copy of said
decision is hereto attached and marked
Annex "A" for purposes of identification and
is hereby made an integral part of this
Stipulation of Facts.
paragraph 3
That Civil Case No. 51712 refers to
reparations goods, denominated, one (1)
cannery plant, two (2) fishing boats, M/S
"Sonia" and M/S "Ana Lares", 100 G.T.
including all its corresponding accessories
and appurtenances, which is the subject
matter of a Contract of Conditional Purchase
and Sale dated November 15, 1960 entered
into by and between the plaintiff Reparations

10
Commission as Conditional Vendor and the
defendant, The Visayan Packing Corporation
as Conditional Vendee, the legality and due
execution of which is not disputed by the
herein parties, a copy of which contract
together with its annex "B" were introduced
in evidence by plaintiffs as Exhibits "A" and
"A-1" respectively and were admitted by the
Court without objection on the part of the
defendants. That, likewise, there were
introduced in evidence and admitted by the
Court without objection on the part of the
defendants as additional exhibits, Exh. "A2" (Date of complete delivery as it appears
in Annex "B" [May 30, 1960]; Exh. "A-1";
Exh. "A-2", amount due in the sum of
P124,242.47; Exh. "A-4", date of first
installment as it appears in Annex "B" (Exh.
"A-1") and as Exh. "B", FICI Bond No.
4122.
On the basis of the said Stipulations of Facts and the pleadings
submitted by the parties, the court a quorendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
hereby renders judgment ordering the
defendant to pay, jointly and severally, to the
plaintiff the sum of P124,242.47 with
interest at the legal rate from the date of
filing of the complaint until fully paid. The
plaintiffs prayer for attorney's fees is denied,
inasmuch as there is no showing that the
defendants were motivated with bad faith in
failing to pay plaintiffs claim.
With respect to the cross-claim of defendant
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the Court
hereby orders defendant Visayan Packing
Corporation to pay defendant Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc., such amount which the
latter may pay to the plaintiff by reason of
this judgment, with interest at 12% per
annum until fully paid, and attorney's fees
equivalent to 10% of the amount paid by
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., to the
plaintiff. With costs against the defendants.

From said decision, Vispac and FICI filed on July 24, 1964 and
July 27, 1964, respectively, a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision. On August 8, 1 964, the court a quo issued its order
denying the said motion.
Feeling aggrieved, Vispac and FICI appealed the case to the Court
of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 34552-R.
After the parties have submitted their respective briefs, Repacom
on April 28, 1965; Vispac on January 2, 1965; and FICI on January
15, 1965, the case was submitted for decision on September 6,
1965. In a resolution promulgated June 14, 1969, the Court of
Appeals ** certified the instant case to this Court for proper
disposition for being pure question of law.
While Vispac and FICI raised several issues, the focal issue
involved in the instant case, as correctly stated by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, is the interpretation of the Schedule of
Payments (Exhibit "A-1 ").
It is the contention of the Repacom that under the abovequoted
Schedule of Payments, the amount of P124,242.47 representing the
1st installment without interest, which is equivalent to 10% of the
entire F.O.B. costs, has already become due and demandable on
May 30, 1962. However, Vispac and FICI argue that as there are
two dates given for the first installment in the said Schedule of
Payment, the lst installment should be on May 30, 1963
considering that it was Repacom which prepared the contract and
therefore such ambiguity should be taken against the latter which
caused the ambiguity.

and the balance within a period not

exceeding 10 years. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in the Schedule of Payments, Exhibit "A-1", the
amount of P124,242.47, now being claimed by the Repacom from
Vispac, represents the 1st installment or initial payment without
interest as said amount is equivalent to 10% of the total F.O.B. cost
of the reparation goods received by Vispac which is P1,242,424.67.
Exhibit "A-2" of the Schedule of Payments specifically states the
date when the reparations goods in question were delivered which
was on May 30, 1960. This particular date was not denied by
Vispac as per their Stipulation of Facts. Consequently, as reflected
in the Schedule of Payments, Exhibit "A-1 ", the 1st installment
without interest in the amount of P124,242.47 representing 10% of
the F.O.B. cost of reparations goods, became due and demandable
on May 30, 1962, or exactly 24 months from the date of the
complete delivery of the reparations goods to Vispac.
The rest of the schedule clearly refers to the payment of the
balance of the sales on credit which in accordance with law
(Section 12, Rep. Act 1789) must be paid within a period not
exceeding ten (10) years, and chargeable with interest at 3% per
annum. Said schedule of payment for the balance i.e., after
payment of the first installment is, in turn, payable in ten (10)
equal yearly installments, as follows:
Term: Ten (10) equal yearly installments
Rate of Interest: Three per cent (3%) per
annum

The petition is devoid of merit.

No. of Date Due Amount

Section 12, Republic Act 1789, reads as follows:

Installments

Section 12 Terms of Sale

1 May 30, 1963 P131,086.07

Capital goods and complimentary services

disposed to private parties as provided for in
sub-section (1) of Section 2 hereof, shall be
sold on a cash or credit basis under the rules
and regulations as maybe determined by the
Commission. Sales on credit basis shall be
paid in installments. Provided that the lst
installment shall be paid within 24 months
after complete delivery of the capital goods

2 " " 1964 P131,086.07

3 " " 1965 P131,086.07
4 " " 1966 P131,086.07
5 " " 1967 P131,086.07

11
6 " " 1968 P131,086.07
7 " " 1969 P131,086.07
8 " " 1970 P131,086.07
9 " " 1971 P131,086.07
10 " " 1972 P131,086.07
While it is a statutory and decisional rule in this jurisdiction that
the contract is the law between the contracting parties (Art. 1306,
Civil Code; Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines,
22 SCRA 674 [1968]; Phil. American General Insurance v. Mutuc,
61 SCRA 22 [1974]; Herrera v. Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA
360 [1986]; Syjuco v. CA, 172 SCRA 111 [1989]), there is a
proviso that nothing therein must be contrary to law, morals, good
customs public policy, or public order (Art. 1306, Civil Code;
Lagunsad v. Soto, 92 SCRA 476 [1979]). To sustain the contention
of Vispac and FICI that the 1st installment should be due on May
30, 1963, instead of May 30, 1962. would render the said
installment payment unenforceable as it would run counter to the
provision of the said law (Section 12, R.A. 1789) which
specifically provides that "the 1st installment shall be paid within
24 months after complete delivery of the capital goods", or on May
30, 1962, the complete delivery thereof having been made on May
30, 1960.
Finally, it is basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be,
and not what it is called by the contracting parties Novesteras v.
CA, 149 SCRA 48 [1987]).
Having disposed of the main case, discussion of other ancillary
issues raised by the appellant Vispac becomes unnecessary.
As to the issue of FICI's liability arising from its issuance of Surety
Bond No. 4122 dated May 30, 1960, it will be noted that FICI
interposed for the first time, on appeal, the defense that Surety
Bond No. 4122 has already expired. FICI did not allege any
defense to the effect that Surety Bond No. 4122 has already
expired either in its answer to the complaint dated October 26,
1962 nor in the entire proceedings below. In fact, it adopted as its
own whatever defenses its co-defendant-appellant Vispac may
interpose (Rollo, Record on Appeal, FICI, p. 25; p. 44). It is settled
jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the

basic rules of fair play, justice and due process Dihiansan v. CA,
153 SCRA 713 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987];
Dulos Realty & Development Corp. v. CA, 157 SCRA 425 [1988];
Ramos v. IAC, 175 SCRA 70 [1989]; Gevero v. IAC, G.R. 77029,
August 30, 1990).

The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which
modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D.
Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.

Anent the contention of FICI that the trial court erred in ordering
Vispac to pay to FICI attorney's fees equivalent to only 10% of the
amount due despite the fact that Vispac bound itself to pay to FICI
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amount due but in no
case less than P200.00 as per their Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit
"1-FICI"), it has been held that a stipulation regarding the payment
of attorney's fees is neither illegal nor immoral and is enforceable
as the law between the parties (Santiago v. Dimayuga, 3 SCRA 919
[1961]), as long as such stipulation does not contravene law, good
morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Polytrade
Corp. v. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187 [1969]; Social Security
Commission v. Almeda, 168 SCRA 474 [1988]).
Considering, therefore, that the 20% attorney's fees provided under
the parties' Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI") is not contrary
to the existing jurisprudence on the matter *** and is not
considered excessive nor unconscionable, the same should be
awarded to FICI.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with the
modification that the amount of the attorney's fees due from Vispac
to FICI should be 20% of the amount due as per Indemnity
Agreement.
SO ORDERED.

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of

nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568.
Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de
Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to
petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their minor child and
the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by
petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval
of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On
November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora
Pineda was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were wellcompensated.3 They, including their relatives and friends, even
availed of free products and treatments from petitioners
dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed
petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which
the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them
several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for
settlement."6
Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a
motion

G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006

for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.8
VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS
AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL
MARIANO,Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5

million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2
million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1
million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio
and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this recourse.
The issues raised in this petition are:

12
(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the
claim for additional legal fees and
(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the
necessary petition as an incident of the main action in which his
services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client.
The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of
nullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for
the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to collect P50
million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were
demanding was additional payment for legal services rendered in
the same case.
Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and
respondents was governed by the principle ofquantum
meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves." 10 The
recovery of attorneys fees on this basis is permitted, as in this
case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of
attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents
an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the
legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it
avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning
their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force
lawyers to resort to it.11

name in the minds of some people. The vernacular has a word for
it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and
not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere
incident.12
Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They
could not charge petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an
express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash,
checks, free products and services from petitioners business all
of which were not denied by respondents more than sufficed for
the work they did. The "full payment for settlement" 13 should have
discharged petitioners obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of
attorneys fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court
and they participate in the fundamental function of administering
justice.14 When they took their oath, they submitted themselves to
the authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees to
judicial control. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CA
G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of
additional attorneys fees in favor of respondents is
hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.

In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their

lawyers fees was not meant to collect what was justly due them;
the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks
already given to them was an act of unconscionable greed which is
shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members
of an honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice.
It is respondents despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the
Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a
decision[2] and resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order of
the trial court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to dismiss
private respondents complaint for support and directed the parties

to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity

testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante
sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin,
for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe
in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe
decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock,
Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed
by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins
support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested
to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having
fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old
Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot,
Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg.
This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin
because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at
least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship
started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also
because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What
started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults
eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe)
became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining
the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways
and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to
bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated
the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by
referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop [7] where
she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another
erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family

13
went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June
2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his
because
their
last
intimacy
was
sometime
in
1998.[8] Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family.
On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf
and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge
Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through
Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no alternative
but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her
body.[9] Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the
acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The
CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was
actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should
have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel
vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness
to consider any proposal to settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of
an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature
on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father.[14] In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed
criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S.
Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his
name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in
the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint
and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.

In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a

complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition
and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its
face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary
right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the
delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the
primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts
alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had
amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave
birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted
that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered
Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the
childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by
the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel
and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual
relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents
have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel.
If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin
has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give
support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and
denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth
certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also
claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for
support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly
proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an
unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first
establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 283[17] in
relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule
105[19] of the Rules of Court.

The petitioners contentions are without merit.

The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action
for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who
had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an
action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, [20] we allowed the
integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to
claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to
support and successional rights from the putative or presumed
parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is
necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the
action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of
action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the
action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although
petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in
our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz,
et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain
ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of
this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always
that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes
of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there

14
is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to
a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases,
and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural
child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has
not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his
coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings
for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or
mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than
inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them
remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate
to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not
recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving
paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed
under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of
DNA testing as a means for determining paternity has actually
been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our
past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the
appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of three
eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness

identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as

the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the
fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so
steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA
because DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would)
still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative
father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of
Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress.

in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex

offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators?
How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the
Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then
presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we
affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a
lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of
Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure,
no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception
of identical twins.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and

authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002
with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape
and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes
of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should

consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused

charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts persist(ed)

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or

15
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The
blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system,
so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d
469) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and
reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly
to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and
reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory
DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as
evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a
rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the accused
Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory
extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the
testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as
embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of

extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It

does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of
object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the
realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, [28]hair,
[29]
and other bodily substances.[30] We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as
pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,[31]expulsion of
morphine from ones mouth[32] and the tracing of ones foot to
determine its identity with bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v.
Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a womans
genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify
his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his
penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive
and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA
testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly
acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy
persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the
proposed national computerized identification system embodied in
Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of
searches and seizures,[37] and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination
is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason
that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case,
an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit
to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner
herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered
to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the
United States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in

1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread

general acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State
Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into
their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so
commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure
has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged
paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of
the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had
the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of
paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirtyfive-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and
liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such
acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to
section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health
law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and
in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or
administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be
rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the court to
vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the
date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to
establish a support order) relating to the child in which either
signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which
the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the
expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment,
either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in
court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests
or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance
with this article. Neither signators legal obligations, including
the obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment,

16
may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment
except for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to
rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the
alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that
an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis
of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate
the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a
copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the childs
birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry
operated by the department of social services pursuant to section
three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition,
if the mother of the child who is the subject of the
acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to
title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court shall
immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support
enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the
mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or
through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security
act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family
Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or
reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more
genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion
or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA
tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an
accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal
department of health and human services and performed by a
laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the
commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in
the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the
father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon
a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests
of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married

woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic

marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to
section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be
received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of
rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules
where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and
that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed
waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or
report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or
tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a
child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test
pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision
(a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if
offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If
the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court
may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test,
if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the
funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such
test be apportioned between the parties according to their
respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does
not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially
unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought
to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W.,
was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time
of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of
Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York
Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said
judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through
a genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case,
G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social

Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s

father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while
ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing nonmodifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of
the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA
testing that such support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can
be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this
lawsuit entered into their support agreement(current testing
methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999%
accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into
the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant
obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first
reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur
until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in
1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less
than a decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods
could exclude some males from being the possible father of a
child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular
male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement
between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was
a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that
time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every
contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on
whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but
rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only
sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the
option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity
eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of
proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have
included the use of DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to
mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or
identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or
identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility;
presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion,
shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or

17
tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not limited to,
determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human
leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNAidentification profiling, to
determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father
of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to
submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any
other remedies available, the court may do either of the following:

In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme Court

upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after
trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given.
Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and
support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It
was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court
remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld.

(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.

The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme Court of

South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could
be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established
non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of
Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have the default
judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering
Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for
child support. The Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy
against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d)
Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a
default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose
Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his
wages.

(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless
good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be
conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a
nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to,
the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx

xxx

(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person

described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and
theDNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as
provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the
analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a
probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory
shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the
putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more
putative fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in
subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the
court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child
support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7.
(emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that
DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the
blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable
jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.

In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another case

decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if
paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child
support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing
established someone other than the named individual to be the biological
father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v.
Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court
which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to
submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[52] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of
Appeals[53] where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what
was meant by grave abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the
rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive
it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action for
certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial
officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any
arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent
court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and
resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment.
As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being
firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers
who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA
testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such
ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of
DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take
this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid
means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CAG.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.