Megaprojects as an Instrument of Urban Planning and Development: Example of

Belgrade Waterfront Project

Slavka Zekovi, Tamara Marii, Miodrag Vujoevi
Institute of Architecture and Urban and Spatial Planning of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia

Presenting authors email address: slavka@iaus.ac.rs

Biography of Presenting Author:
Slavka Zekovi, scientific adviser at the Institute of Architecture and Urban & Spatial Planning of Serbia
She was a researcher at the Yugoslav Institute of Urbanism and Housing in Belgrade. She obtained her PhD in
Regional Industrial Development and Planning at the University of Belgrade. She has participated in several
international research projects in urban planning and urban development and is a member of the Serbian
Engineering Chamber, the Serbian Association of Spatial Planners, and the Serbian Commission for Plans.
Abstract:
The research is devoted to the analyses of the theoretical and methodological backgrounds of urban planning
trends from the perspective of megaprojects (MPs), with specific reference to the Belgrade Waterfront Project
(BWP). In analysis we combined a contextually appropriate approach, some elements of the phronetic planning
approach and the heuristic approach to planning and development of megaprojects. BWP induced a change of the
institutional framework (the introduction of specific legal and policy instruments), as a key source of future
changes in the metropolitan tissue. Preliminary impact assessment of the BWP indicates the following: slow
development & economic effects, low transparency, social inequalities, marginal social mobilization and weak
networks between the key actors, public funds overuse, limitation of government independence in law-making,
displacement impacts, high public financial risk, strong urban transformations, environmental impacts, mediumtechnological modernisation, etc. The research highlights the differences in the political, institutional, social and
economic environment that shape the BWP. It provides recommendations for future research and application, for a
continuing in-depth & sensitivity analysis for managing the undesirable consequences of the BWP, including the
determination of the interplay between different pools of powers that are important in urban planning, governance
and the implementation of MPs ('from power to tower').
Keywords: Megaproject, Belgrade Waterfront Project, Urban Planning and Development.
Introduction
Megaprojects are considered as large-scale capital investments focused on a single purpose, and they may also be
seen as multi-purpose or hybrid. They include infrastructure projects (bridges, tunnels, highways, railways,
airports, seaports...), energy projects (power plants, dams, oil extraction...), science projects, and aerospace
projects. Kennedy et al. (2014), have classified MPs into: 1) infrastructure for basic services, 2) economic
development (by property development and commercial activities), 3) transport infrastructure, and 4) urban
redevelopment. Urban megaprojects mainly refer to public buildings, urban infrastructure, large sporting events
and, recently, to mixed use waterfront redevelopment. Revitalisation of urban waterfronts is one of the instruments
which urban policy makers use to redevelop cities into effective economies. This research is devoted to the
analysis of MPs as instruments in the development of post-socialist cities, which are shaped by a mix of economic
interests, socio-political and ideological frameworks.
Huge investments and large and diverse risks & impacts of megaprojects have led to a higher interest in the
planning and management of megaprojects among researchers (Altshuler and Luberhoff 2003, Davis and Dewey
2013, Fainstein 2009, Flyvbjerg 2009, 2014a, Gellert and Lynch 2003, Kennedy et al. 2011). The key studies of
megaprojects worldwide (del Cerro Santamaria, 2013, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, Kennedy, 2013) show that the
difference between the dominant regions of the global North-West 1 and the global South-East is not as large
as one might think. Megaprojects usually involve exceptional forms of governance, and do not go through the
normal channels (Kennedy et al. 2014). The issues of high risks and uncertainty, cost underestimation and
overruns, the pressure of ruling elites, low or inadequate public informing, lack of transparency, weak public
support, social and environmental impacts are present in a similar manner in countries with different political and
1

This is just a more precise North-South division in terms of macro-regionalisation.

institutional systems and level of economic development. Neoliberal globalisation is dominating as, according to
Flyvbjerg (2013), the increasing number of megaprojects is supported by a mixture of national and supranational
government, private capital and development banks.
In post-socialist countries, the change of political system created new power relations between different groups
involved in urban development; increased private capital influence by enabling public-private partnerships, and, as
Bodnar and Veres (2013) claim, made large-scale urban development even more under-determined than suggested
by literature. This paper will analyse the sensitivity of urban research to the discontinuity of conceptual
frameworks in a transitional context of the post-socialist city. The research first presents the theoretical
backgrounds followed by the key approaches to megaprojects in urban planning, and highlights their role and
common features, and, finally, focuses on the experience of the Belgrade Waterfront Project (BWP).

1. Research objectives and methodology

The key research objectives are the analyses of the theoretical backgrounds of urban planning from the stand-point
of the role of megaprojects as an urban development instrument. Furthermore, the research will analyse in detail
the BWP and its potential development impacts.
The theory and methodology of urban planning and megaprojects faces complex issues: the social
contextualization of urban planning and governance, investment and regulations. Since the 1970s and 1980s, under
pressure of globalisation, cities have started economic transformation according to the new Post-Fordist
development, characterized by the shift from industrialization to different types of high-technology development,
management, different services, etc. According to Scott and Storper (2015), the complexity of the causes of
urbanization and the different nature of urban development are linked to the political goals. National and global
politics shape the urban theory of global/world cities (Sassen 2008, Cochrane 2006, Brenner 1998, 2004, Scott and
Storper 2015). Cities can be understood in terms of a theoretical framework that combines the processes of
agglomeration/polarization, land uses and human interactions in conditions of the existence of the urban
similarities and differences.
Castells (1972), Lefebvre (1970) and Harvey (1973) supported a concept of the city as a theatre of class struggle,
centred on land markets as urban machines for distribution of wealth, and they have supported citizens rights to
urban space. Urban growth is realised by infrastructure development ('urban growth machine', Molotch 1976).
Brenner (1999), Cochrane (2006) and Harvey (2012) suggested the re-conceptualization of older concerns on
urban politics and governance. Harvey (2012) pointed to neoliberal domination on the changing nature of political
governance scales (from cities over states to the global level).
Kennedy et al. (2014) point to the development of megaprojects as opposed to economic development policies.
In accordance to new political-economic doctrines, the reorganizations on national level gave new inputs for urban
governance. Harvey (1989) identified the shift from managerial into entrepreneurial governance, i.e. from the
focus on urban services to the promotion of economic growth. These intentions are realized through megadevelopment projects, speculative construction and political economy of place. The hypothesis of
entrepreneurialism and state spatial rescaling are a shift between capital and territory from national to urban
scale, which is important for urban megaprojects (Brenner 2004). Bauman (1998) calls megaprojects great war on
space independence.
Top-down urban planning approach by megaprojects opens research of urban governance, tools for identifying the
key actors, their knowledge and interaction. Many researchers point to a top-down approach to planning urban
MPs and to the bottom-up public resistance to claiming urban spaces (Flyvbjerg, et al. 2002; Davis and Dewey
2013; Kennedy, et al. 2011). Sellers (2002) criticized the central role of international business elites and the
influence of external capital on urban-policy making. This is important for preventing conflicts between private
and public property, economic interests and social requirements. Swyngedouw (1996) indicates that the state seeks
to attract capital through place-based interventions in urban regions. He argued that large urban development
projects have less democratic and more elite-driven priorities. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) argued that MPs
normally require special authorizing, funding, revenue, land acquisition, and regulatory actions by two or more
government levels. Political impulses are very important in the creation of urban MPs. The top-down approach
offers no possibilities for democratic negotiations. Hansen (2014) has argued that ...where the prime-minister can
control local projects as if hes playing in his own private Lego-land, pointing to the MP in Istanbul.

MPs use multi-governance institutional arrangements because social response is important for their development.
According to Kennedy et al. (2014), decision-making about MPs involves multiple actors with conflicting interests
and multi-level governance. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) argued that citizens are typically kept at a substantial distance
from megaproject decision-making.
As instruments of urban planning and development, megaprojects include high-technology, sophisticated and nonstandard technology, contemporary design (iconic buildings), and ICT management. MPs are initiated by global
economic restructuring and policy-makers, and supported by neoliberal urban development policies, often with
transnational financial support by top-political structures.
MPs include substantive changes in the legal, economic and political framework. They have special power and
special status, an inherent and exceptional nature, and a special regime of implementation (Altshuler and
Luberoff 2003). Kennedy et al. (2014) argued that MPs are not always planned in advance, but integrated ex post
into planning documents. Policy makers are particularly attracted to MPs (Flyvbjerg 2003). Mayors often promote
the city renaissance of a world class/global city via MPs. MPs represent a mode of urbanisation (Roy 2003)
and a collateral instrument against illegal, irregular and informal construction in cities of the 'South'.
Flyvbjerg (2009) indicated that a major problem in megaproject policy is misinformation about the costs &
benefits, and high risks. The megaproject paradoxincludes risky scenarios, underestimated costs, overestimated
benefits and revenues, undervalued environmental impacts, overvalued economic effects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003), as
well as legal and ethical issues. Flyvbjerg (2014b) argued about the iron law of megaprojects - exceeding the
budget & time-frame, a lack of accountability, and delays. This situation of underestimating costs and
overestimating benefits, and systematically underestimating risks is the so-called survival of the unfittest, i.e.
building the worst projects instead of the best. Flyvbjerg (2009, 2013) believes that MPs have a trend to break
sooner or later, i.e. that after the break projects are reorganized with the attempt to fix problems and deliver
some version of the planned solution. Megaprojects managed according to the break-fix model are disasters
waiting to happen (Flyvbjerg 2014b).
Fainstein (2009) claims that MPs always include a transformation of land uses. Gellert and Lynch (2003) think
that projects transform landscapes.in a very visible way'', and that MPs require coordinated flows of
international finance capital. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) argue that MPs include a lot of commitments of
public resources and contain threats to some interests and values because key actors promise large benefits to
others.
The so-called 'planning fallacy' of the MPs is a phenomenon which includes underestimated costs and the required
time, and overestimated effects. It usually implies the invalid or deceptive arguments or misinterpretation of
judgement in MPs predictions.
The key challenges, risks and uncertainties in planning MPs are: 1) Structural complexity and complex nature of
MPs; 2) External shocks (transition, global economic and financial crisis, economic risks, collapse of real estate
markets, public policies, societal impacts, political shifts, weighted average cost of capital, confronted interests of
social actors); 3) Stakeholders (their objectives and relationships: waste of time, loss of money and credibility); 4)
Governance and its relationship with risk management; 5) Changes of formal contract conditions induce financial,
economic or political costs; 6) Fuzzy capabilities of actors involved; 7) Introduction of new legal and financial
instruments, etc. In general, it should be emphasized that a number of various risks in MPs ought to be identified,
considered and managed.
In analysing the BWP we combined a contextually appropriate approach, some elements of the phronetic
planning approach, as well as the heuristic approach to planning megaprojects. These approaches focus on the
syncretic forms of urban and development policies and the current discourse analysis in Serbia (Zekovi et al.
2015a).
2. Case study of the Belgrade Waterfront Project
2.1. General description
As a result of a number of exogenous and endogenous factors, there has been a collapse of strategic thinking,
research and governance in Serbia for almost three decades. In developmental terms, after the socio-economic
growth and development in the 1980s, the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, regional wars, international
isolation and sanctions, Serbias economy collapsed, experiencing only occasional spells of recovery. Serbia is one

of the most undeveloped European countries (belonging to the inner peripheries of Europe) with miserable
development prospects (Vujoevi et al. 2010). The integration into EU is highly questionable, and
Europeanization outside the Union with its limited support seems a more plausible future perspective. Under the
circumstances of a primitive post-socialist/proto-capitalist transition, a poorly developed institutional and
democratic culture represents a particularly crippling handicap. Within this, planning has been played down to the
role of the junior partner of the market, which is equally underdeveloped. As a result of widespread systematic
and programmed mobilization of interests and bias, paralleled by corruption, manipulation and clientelism, public
discourse on key strategic issues of development has been debilitated and directed to less relevant aims and
purposes (Vujoevi 2003). Neoliberal ideological and political mantras (e.g. liberalization, marketisation, deetatisation) dominate the public scene, although recently with a larger number of sceptics concerning the main
direction of the institutional and development changes.
In such circumstances, large investments of an already over-indebted country into an expensive elitist megaproject
of the inner-city waterfront redevelopment could hardly be expected to receive wide expert and public support.
However, the idea of the Belgrade Waterfront megaproject has already been announced to the public and media in
April 2012, in accordance with the fast-lane approach to investors, with political statements that the Tower
Belgrade will certainly become a new trade-mark of the capital city and Europe. Agreement on Cooperation
between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of United Arab Emirates (in February
2013) has been verified by the National Parliament of Serbia. A model and billboards promoting the BWP
appeared in January 2014. The world presentation of the BWP was held at the MIPIM (Le march international
des professionnels de limmobilier) in March 2014. The Serbian government, in June 2014, founded the Belgrade
Waterfront Company to mobilise public funds for the BWP implementation.
The BWP was not planned in advance, but integrated ex post into the Master plan of Belgrade by amendments
verified in September 2014, while the Spatial plan of the Belgrade waterfront was adopted in January 2015.
However, the BWP has been poorly linked with the long-term goals of the Master plan of Belgrade. It is a Dubaiinspired project of the old city's waterfront redevelopment with little public resistance. Bancroft (2015) argues that
the BWP embodies the promise of Belgrade's return to the world stage. In March 2015, the Academy of Serbian
architects adopted a Declaration on the BWP, with arguments against the project.
In accordance with the specific ordinance (2006, 2012), the BWP is verified as a national priority, which illustrates
a dominant model of public-private partnership with a national/metropolitan influence, despite the influence of an
international private investor. The main legal precondition for the realisation of the BWP was the adoption of a lex
specialis a Law on establishing the public interest and the special procedures of expropriation and issuance of
construction permits for the BWP implementation in April 2015. But, from the constitutional point of view it is
rather questionable if development of such commercial project could be deemed to be in the public interest even
with the enactment of a special law stating it is so (Bojovi&Partners 2015). Another legal precondition was a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade Waterfront Capital Investment LL,
Beograd na vodi, d.o.o. and Al Maabar International Investment LLC (from the UAE), without an open tender
process. After public pressure, JVA was finally made public on the website of the Serbian Government in
September 2015. The Ministry of Building, Traffic and Infrastructure has issued construction permits for the first
two towers and their construction has already started.
Stakeholders have different interests and norms due to a ''Faustian pact'', which sacrifices anything to satisfy a
limitless desire for power (i.e. selling the old urban soul for high towers, shopping malls and luxury flats).
Absence of accountability is evident in the BWP decision-making. Monitoring and control systems are
insufficient, as well as the approaches for evaluating main social, economic and environmental impacts.
The main goal of the BWP is to activate the great potential of the waterfront and develop a modern urban centre,
thus promoting an international image of the city of Belgrade. The key objective of the Belgrade Waterfront Spatial
Plan (2015) is to transform a neglected area into a modern city centre spatially integrated, socially acceptable
and economically viable. The general objectives are: 1) Not to disturb the river Sava biodiversity, nor the existing
landscape and architectural values; landscape improvement; revitalisation of cultural heritage, while emphasizing
the value of the existing building stock; 2) To provide better life quality to all citizens; 3) To create and affirm a
globally recognisable tourist destination; 4) To create and affirm a modern commercial offer; 5) To construct
infrastructure systems and connect them to major traffic and utility infrastructure. The operational goals of the
Project include: flood protection, finalization of a new public transport system (especially railways), regeneration
of all infrastructure, protection of cultural heritage, and new places for gathering.

The key outcomes of the Belgrade Waterfront Spatial Plan include: elimination of inadequate content (some
existing buildings); connection with the wider territory; contact with river and integration of both Sava river
banks; creation of multi-purpose area in the Sava amphitheatre; maintenance of identity, values and spatial
potential, especially viewpoints. This represents a potential generator of new urban activities.
2.2. Potential development impact of the BWP
The decision-making regarding megaprojects in Serbia is exclusive and elite-driven. This is visible: 1) by
innovations in the existing Planning and Construction Act (PCA), 2) by appreciation of the new lex specialis
(expropriation for private elite-housing and commercial purposes for the BWP, and its addendum in December
2015), 3) by verification of the megaproject as a national strategic priority (the Ordinance 2006, 2012), and with
the possibility for public funding, 4) by property development regulation, 5) local communities are excluded from
decision-making and not enough informed about future activities; which opens confrontation, public debates and
the possible modification of the plans and projects, 6) citizens do not know whom to trust: politicians, the mayor,
bureaucrats, foreign investors, managers, local NGOs or experts. Political leaders and the mayor of Belgrade
provide majority of the information regarding the BWP. Dogan (2015) argued that a strong national initiative in
this project represents a top-down approach to the regeneration of the wider Savamala district. Eror (2015) argued
that ''its a state-driven model called top-down or hyper gentrification.
Megaprojects can serve as catalysts for introducing new policy instruments, as in the case of the BWP - the
introduction of a special purpose spatial plan for the megaproject zone in the historical urban core of Belgrade,
with a special regime, special project status, the new model of public funding of the project and PPP.
The BWP envisages the construction of two million m on 177.27 ha: 6,128 flats (one million m), commercial
spaces (a main tower 210m high, a shopping mall, several tall buildings), social, cultural, recreational and free
spaces. There are predictions about cleaning the riverfront, old buildings, railway infrastructure, abandoned ships,
environmental clean-up, etc. Total investment varies from 3.1 billion EUR to eight billion USD. Implementation
of the BWP foresees three phases during the period of 8-30 years, with the engagement of domestic companies and
development of new services.
Possible development impacts of the BWP include intensive social impacts (raising social inequalities,
gentrification, involuntary resettlement, networking of the key actors), intensive impacts on national level (overuse
of public funds, limiting the State in making laws that are incompatible with the BWP interests), displacement
effects, high public financial risk, strong urban transformations, intensive demographic growth (17,700 new
inhabitants), low development and economic effects, low transparency and public participation, environmental
impacts, medium-technological modernisation and others (Table 1). Policy makers promoted the BWP,
emphasizing its role in creating employment, promoting tourism, using domestic inputs, improving productivity,
growth competitiveness, high-quality services, etc. Expected employment in the BWP varies from 13,169 to
200,000 employees, with 22,000-25,000 employees in the construction phase.
Table 1. A preliminary impact assessment of the BWP
Development impacts
Development effects
Transparency and public participation
Raising social and spatial inequalities
Gentrification
Demographic impacts
Displacement effects
Environmental impacts
Economic effects
Government independence in law-making
Public financial risk
Urban and spatial transformations
Technological modernisation
Regulatory regime impacts

High

Intensity
Medium

Low
x
x

X
X
X
X
x
x
X
X
X
x
X

Level
National, Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
National, Local
National
National
Local
Local
National

Impact
evaluation
+ and + and + and +
-

Due to the complexity of the BWP, it would be difficult to provide proof for such possible impacts and their exact
scopes (developmental, economic, social, urban/regional, environmental and others). The lack of a feasibility
study for the BWP and the lack of data are reasons for the insufficiently reliable and quantified assessment of its
highly localised effects.
Total investment in capital infrastructure and utilities is 400 million EUR. The cost of activating the location is
between 790 million EUR (The Belgrade Waterfront Spatial Plan 2015) and one billion EUR (Kontrapress 2014).
The expropriation costs will reach 7.1 million EUR, and land development of public land around 275 million EUR
(Bojovi&partners 2015). The Belgrade Waterfront Spatial Plan (2015) states that the revenues from urban
development land and participation for infrastructure are 1.03-1.33 billion EUR (participation in utilities 470-650
million EUR, land development fee 480-590 million EUR, and participation of Public Utilities Enterprises 80-90
million EUR), while the potential revenue from urban land (land value) varies from 168 to 336 million EUR. The
expected project benefits do not include property tax, capital gain tax, real estate transfer tax, levies, income tax,
fee for use of public goods and others.
Some open regulatory issues may have potential impacts on the development effects of the BWP, such as: 1) The
Decision of Serbia's Commission for State Aid is a moot point. The Stabilization and Association Agreement
(2008) and EU regulations prohibit the disturbance of competition by state aid for the elite-housing and
commercial spaces; 2) No pre-feasibility study (Art. 11-116 of the PCA, and the Ordinance of Pre-Feasibility
Study, 2012), no scientific analysis, and no urban study; 3) A discrepancy in choice of institutions included into
the evaluation of the urban construction land: according to lex specialis that is fiscal authority, but according to the
JVA these are the experts for the real estate assessment; 4) Unclear dynamics of investment, total sum, and agreed
(disproportionate) share of the strategic partner in the financing of the buildings in the BWP. Three billion EUR
should be invested through a strategic partner, i.e. the buyers of flats and commercial spaces. There is a real risk
from the lack of finances (''too little, too late''); 5) The regulatory regime implicates public risks and costs, an
inverted order in the preparation of the pre-feasibility study and different appraisals, implementation
postponement, and 6) Discrepancies in the Law on accepting the agreement between the governments of the
Republic of Serbia and United Arab Emirates with the Constitution (Art. 6 of the Law states that agreements,
programmes and projects according to this law are not subject to public tender, while the Constitution in Art. 16
prescribes that international agreements must be in accordance with the Constitution; and in Art. 82 the economic
model in Serbia is based on market economy, open and free market).
The introduction of specific legal and policy instruments in Serbia under neoliberal economic pressures is a key
source of the future change in the metropolitan tissue by the BWP. Potentially negative development impacts of
the BWP in some legal aspects of the urban construction land might comprise: 1) Leaseholds of public urban land
without fees to the subject of the lease - the Company BW (by Decree/Regulation, 2011); 2) Right of lease to the
BW Company based on the rent agreement will be converted into the right of ownership (after constructing
building/s and one month after obtaining a use-permit); 3) Conversion of the right of leasehold into the right of
ownership without any fee, with a primary goal - supporting an ownership over the most expensive urban land
"without money" and then selling it; 4) The BW Company can transfer the right of ownership to other parties
without a fee. Legal alienation of public urban land without a fee is possible in accordance with different laws
(including lex specialis); 5) The obligation of Serbia and the City of Belgrade to finance and build all external and
internal capital infrastructure till December 31, 2019 (Art. 9.1.1. of the JVA) - although the prime-minister has
claimed that no public money would be spent in the BWP. 6) An enactment of necessary legislation allowing full
set-off of all land development fee against public land development costs on the project level. Land development
fees covered by the Plan and JVA will be governed by a separate agreement between the City of Belgrade and
national institutions. If Serbia does not fulfil contractual obligations, it has to pay damages to the strategic partner;
7) The final calculation of the costs between investors and the City of Belgrade will be made after completing the
construction of all planned facilities (Art. 16), but without a stated period when it should be completed (20202045); 8) Serbia could not change the BWP plan without the approval of a strategic partner. A partner can change
some parts of the plan; 9) Serbia has an obligation to adopt the necessary changes to other laws that are desirable
according to the JVA. Serbian government should refrain from amendments to the laws in accordance with the
JVA. The JVA can limit the independence of the national government in passing the laws, and 10) a strategic
partner will provide loans to Serbia for cleaning locations and infrastructure (130 million EUR) under commercial
conditions.
Multiple agents have already appeared in the BWP related to its strategic planning and governance. Project
promoters emphasize good governance, transparency and participation, but citizens are mainly excluded from the
decision-making (including low level of public informing). The public is sceptic or negative, and the intellectual

elite is quiet. The protests of citizens and NGOs, as well as different guerrilla activities reflect insufficient
transparency and democracy in the planning of the post-socialist urban development by the BWP.
3. Recommendations for future research and application
In many regions of the South-East neoliberalized state policies support urban development compatible with elite
tastes and consumption that promotes socio-economic inequalities, thus enabling global finance capital to shape
the city (Watson 2012). This privatization of planning, as Shatkin (2011) calls it, through mega-projects tends to
undermine the public administration of urban space and replace local authority with private governance. Recent
research of mega-projects in cities of the South (Kennedy et al. 2014) also showed the decreased significance of
local government within the state territorial organisation (local governments usually were not driving the process
of economic development).
To overcome these problems, we suggest an alternative approach (to the current practice) in the BWP planning
and appraisal process that considers the use of the following instruments: more transparency, real public
participation, performance specifications, better regulatory framework with explicit determination of the regime
(and elimination of policy risks before decision-making), less use of private international risk capital, compilation
of pre-feasibility study and appraisals, public promotion of independent peer-review of the pre-feasibility study,
public bid for possible involvement of the private sector in financing the capital city infrastructure, and limitation
of the state guarantee in the JVA. Performance specifications include a goal-driven approach in preparation of the
feasibility study and decision-making, which is different than the traditional technical-driven approach.
This alternative approach is closer to the general context of the countries in the North-West and key instruments
in their planning systems. The alternative approach should include:
a) more transparency in decision-making, with real and wide participation of different stakeholders; greater
transparency in decision-making and more public participation are often applied in the North-West, based on a
long tradition of democracy principles in planning, on the one side, and possibility for the active stakeholders'
involvement in ''policy re-design'' (as well as in decision-making), on the other. More transparency should imply
formulation and evaluation of alternatives, but in the case of the BWP there was no alternative - just one solution investor proposal that was accepted through the (traditional, centralised, technocratic) top-down approach in
planning and decision-making. Outdated and often inappropriate in the context of changing urban environments
(Watson 2009), bureaucratic approaches are still predominantly used in the major part of Global South (UNHabitat 2009).
b) performance specifications imply a goal-driven approach in preparation of the feasibility study and decisionmaking, which differs from the traditional technically-driven and top-down approach in decision-making (e.g. in
the BWP). In the planning of capital urban projects significant elements are democratic legitimacy (both top-down
and bottom-up simultaneously), technical and economic rationality, social and environmental acceptability. The
performance specifications should derive from key objectives of policies/plans and public interests. There are
significant differences among countries whose planning and legal systems differ (e.g. in Europe differences might
arise from common law and European civil law). Traditional technical solution-driven approach in decisionmaking of MPs characterises the Global South-East, but sometimes also appears in the Global North-West''.
c) setting better regulatory framework involves elimination of policy risks and/or their inclusion before decisionmaking, as well as abandoning the practice of ignoring risks, underestimating costs and overestimating benefits;
d) less use of private international risk capital, with its share of 67% in the BWP (but, not in real funding the
BWP); involvement of the private sector in investment and implementation of the project, with avoidance of risk
capital;
e) the pre-feasibility study is required by national regulative, as well as independent peer-review of the prefeasibility study;
f) public bid - in the BWP case there was no public bid for the competition in which other potential bidders could
participate with the Republic of Serbia and the City of Belgrade in creation, realisation and common funding of the
project;
g) limitation of the state guarantees to lenders for funding the private luxury housing and commercial office space,
especially in joint project funding with the state/ministry and the City of Belgrade;
Opportunities for improvement exist in all mentioned parts of the alternative approach in the North-West and the
South-East, especially regarding more transparency, performance specifications (prioritise a goal-driven
approach), and better regulatory regime.
Table 2. Preliminary assessment of differences between traditional and ''alternative'' approach to planning MPs
Type of tools/instruments

Alternative approach

Traditional/conventional approach

Transparency and public

participation in decision-making
Performance specification

Increased, with bottom-up approach

Better regulatory framework

Improvement of regulatory
framework

Pre-feasibility study

Required, including independent

peer-review
Inclusion of risks, acceptable level
of public risks (eliminating state
guarantee to lenders for funding
private luxury housing and
commercial space)

Risk analysis

Goal-driven approach

Mostly minor, with top-down

approach
Technical solution-based/driven
approach
Inversion between feasibility study
and choice of regulatory regime
(e.g. lex specialis decreases the role
of feasibility study)
Required, independent peerreview is rarely done
Ignores risks, unacceptable level of
public risks (e.g. the state guarantee
to lenders for funding private luxury
housing and commercial space)

Generally, we assume that tools of the alternative approach are mainly used in the regions of North-West, while
traditional instruments predominate in the South-East, although the differences among them are not as large as
many believe.
Recommendations for future research and application in practice are important for continuing an in-depth and
sensible analysis, so as to effectively manage the undesirable consequences of the BWP, and for the introduction
of more flexible and innovative urban land tools, such as: urban rezoning; tradable development rights;
infrastructure finance; regulatory arrangements of the Public-Private-Partnerships in property rights as legal tools
(community development agreements, community benefits agreements, planning agreements, re/negotiation,
covenants, easements, the concessions); the new financial instruments (low-risk municipal and government bonds,
high-risk financial derivatives); reinvestment; land value capture tax (Zekovi et al. 2015b).
The new approach in planning, governing and implementing MPs requires: 1) a more effective, efficient and
democratic approach in planning (transparency), as well as multi-disciplinary approaches, 2) an analysis and
critique of the conventional approach, 3) a search for a mode to overcome the theoretical and empirical
weaknesses of the conventional approach by recognising an acceptable level of public risks, institutional issues
and MPs' accountability, 4) analysis of the measures for systematic detection of underestimated project costs,
overestimated benefits and ignoring risks (by promoters and developers), 5) the introduction of measures for better
policies and planning, changing governance structures and methods, 6) determination of the interplay between the
different pools of power that are important in planning, governance and the implementation of MPs, and 7) a new
way for efficient public participation of different socio-economic actors and their networking.
4. Conclusions
The analysis highlights the differences in the political, institutional, social and economic environments that shape
the Belgrade Waterfront Project. At the same time, the BWP induced a substantial change of institutional
framework (introduction of specific legal and policy instruments) under neoliberal economic pressure, which
represents a key source of future changes in the metropolitan tissue. The heuristic assessment of the developmental
effects of the BWP especially highlighted the following: intensive social inequalities, marginal social mobilization
of the key actors and stakeholders, intensive impacts on national level, high displacement effects, high public
financial risks, strong urban transformations, low development effects, low economic effects, low transparency
and public participation, environmental impacts, medium-technological modernisation, etc.
We have indicated some alternative recommendations in the process of planning, governance and implementation
of MPs, which can support better development effects and result in better outcomes for the city. In the process of
planning and appraisal of the BWP, we suggest more transparency, performance specifications, the creation of a
better regulatory framework, and less use of private risk capital. The specific objective of the BWP requires
specific instruments, including legal, financial, economic, construction, environmental, different standards, and
more innovative and flexible urban land instruments significant for megaprojects. However, as Yiftachel (2006)
points out, planning and governance in non-western and non-northern societies should avoid pitfalls of
domineering universalism based on material and political settings of North-West countries (from which majority
of leading theories emerge), but create meso-level theories which would genuinely engage with the framing
realities of various south-eastern regions.

Decentralization of regulation powers is important from the standpoint of planning, decision-making, governance,
control, and the implementation of megaprojects. It provides recommendations for future research and application,
for a continuing in-depth & sensitivity analysis to manage/mitigate undesirable consequences of the BWP,
including determination of the interplay between different pools of powers that are important in urban planning,
governance and the implementation of MPs (from power to tower).
Acknowledgement
This paper is the result of research carried out within the scientific project Support to Process of Urban
Development in Serbia (SPUDS) funded by the SCOPES program of the Swiss National Science Foundation, and
the scientific project The role and implementation of the national spatial plan and regional development
documents in renewal of strategic research, thinking and governance in Serbia no. 47014 financed by the Ministry
of Education, Science and Technological Development of Serbia.

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