Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza

Author(s): HERMAN DE DIJN

Source: Studia Leibnitiana, Bd. 22, H. 2 (1990), pp. 138-150
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40694146
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138 Herman De Dijn

Naturalism, Freedom and Eth

By

HERMAN DE DIJN (LEUVEN)

Rsum

La conception naturaliste de l'homme comme conatus n'est pas lie chez Spinoza une conceptio
thique utilitariste, goste ou hdonique. Au contraire, et paradoxalement, elle est susceptible
s'accommoder d'une pense thique qui, son stade le plus dvelopp, consiste en de trs haut
vertus et des sentiments religieux levs. Ceci n'est possible que parce que le conatus est interpr
comme capable d'une activit libre. Cette libert est conue, non pas comme une ralisation, par l
volont, de valeurs qui sduisent sans ncessitation, mais comme une activit manant de mani
spontane ou quasi-automatique d'une source autonome, c..d. non dtermine par l'extrieur.

1. The problem discussed in this paper is not new. I found a clear formulation of it
this passage of an article by J. Thomas Cook1:

"The recent emphasis upon the naturalistic reading of Spinoza seems fundamentally right to m

but it is hard to escape the sense that in reading him in this way we fail to do justice to the breadth
his vision. Specifically, it is difficult for many of us to understand or take seriously Spinoza's clai

about the ethically salutary, emotionally satisfying effects of understanding when we constr

understanding in anything like a natural-scientific way. If we think of rational understanding on

scientific model, what do we make of Spinoza's conviction that the person who rationally und

stands nature and him/herself as a part thereof is e o ipso a wise, good, strong, free and pio

person? And if Spinoza's vision is a vision of nature understood scientifically, what are we prosa
and secular-minded twentieth-century types supposed to do with that element of affective religios
- bordering on the ecstatic - which is so undeniably present in Spinoza's view?".

I will not directly discuss the insights of Cook's interesting paper, with which I am ve
much in agreement. I would rather, in my own way, try to clarify the interesting problem

presented to us in this quote. I take the understanding of this subject to be crucial f

an understanding of Spinoza.

2. The most basic "moral" distinction for Spinoza is the distinction between free ma
and slave2. To be a slave, is not to be powerless. Even in order to persevere in existe
and to develop oneself as a slave, one needs real power. Yet, the effects which ar
produced by a slave, are not produced by himself alone3. Whether in a state of slavery
of freedom, a human being is always a mind , i. e. a power to think . A power t
think is a power to produce sequences of ideas, affects, desires (and again ideas, et
Slaves do not control this power; they are only a partial cause of the thought-effec
they produce4. They produce these effects in cooperation with other things. The sequen
of effects cannot be explained here on its own; it does not follow autonomously, as th

1 J. Thomas Cook: Self-knowledge as self-preservation, in: Marjorie Grene & Debra Nails (ed
Spinoza and the Sciences, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 191.
2 See the titles of Ethics IV and V; see also IV P 67 Sch (and passim).
3 See III P 1 in combination with passages like: IV P 23 + P 66 Sch (etc.).
4 See III Def 1 in combination with passages like: IV P 23 (etc.).
Studia Leibnitiana, Band XXH/2 (1990)
Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart

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Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza 139

outflow of one principle (think of the difference between an association of thoughts
and the sequence of thoughts which is a proof).
It is almost impossible not to begin one's life as a slave5. Slaves have no objective view
about external things, about themselves, and about how everything hangs together.
Therefore their affects and desires may be such that they desire and do what is objectively

harmful and even self-destructive for the sort of complicated organism they are6. Even
when their desires and doings lead to self-preservation and self-enhancement, this hap-

pens more or less accidentally. So human beings are almost inevitably under external
influence. That's why, sooner or later, their lifes turn into "a sickness unto death"7. Some,

however, may be so powerful, and lucky enough to find such arrangements of circumstances, that they can change from being slaves to being free men (at least for certain
episodes in their lives)8. This happens when, in appropriate circumstances, "innate"
capacities are "activated" and start their autonomous and automatic development9.
A free man possesses a power of thinking producing a flow of activity not interfered

with from outside. He develops desires and activities which are not simply positive
("accidentar increase in power), but self-enhancing in a special way. The life of a free
man is characterized by effects which are not only positive, but autonomous. Therefore, he is reaching a "niveau d'actualisation optimum" l0. The sequence of effects of his

mental power can be explained "by himself alone", this is "by God in so far as He is
considered to constitute the essence of the human mind"11. The sequence of his ideas,
experiences, thoughts, affects, desires forms a kind of "consistent" succession of activities, linked together "intrinsically"; one needs no reference to "the common order of
nature" to understand why they are there12.

To reach the stage of freedom is like being able to concentrate all of one's power of
thinking "in oneself, to develop all the "implications" of what is there, and to revel in this

development. It is to produce in reality (in the reality of one's life as an existing mind)

the effects "involved" in one's "eternal essence" (the amount of effects God can only
produce "through us", in so far as he is us)13. The model of free activity is here clearly
the activity of a scientist who understands something "in a geometrical way", by deducing
all the conclusions implied in the true premises14.
As to the change in human life from slavery to freedom, we can form the following
5 See passages like V P 39 Sch and TEI, p. 21 ( 44) (all page-references to works of Spinoza are
to Edwin Curle/s translation of The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. I, Princeton, 1985).
6 IV P 20 Sch.
7 See TEI, p. 9 ( 7): "like a man suffering from a fatal illness".

8 See passages like II P 29 Sch + V P 39 Sch (etc., e. g. IV P 38).

* For innate , see: III Aft. Def. 1 Exp.; for activated , see: II P 29 Sch (in combination with
II P 38 ff.). For the idea as a whole, see also: TEI, p. 17 ( 31).
10 See: A. Matheron: Individu et Communaut chez Spinoza, Paris, 1969, p. 92.
11 II Pli Cor.

12 IIP 29 Sch.

lJ Concerning the relation between eternal essence and existing essence , and the presence or
the first in the second, see passages like: V P 23 Dem (to be read in combination with the succeeding

propositions, especially V P 29 Dem, V P 31 Dem); II P 11 Cor; V 40 Cor + Sch; etc.

" concerning the geometrical way or thinking, see my conceptions of pnuosopnicai mewoa in

Spinoza: logica and mos geometricus, in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. XL (1986), pp. 55-78.

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140 Herman De Dijn

rough picture15. Man is born ignorant of hi

an immature slave. He badly needs external h
grow from infant to adult). So he must be v
a certain stage of development as a slave, s
"innate" capacities and give them free reig
things are at the same time absolutely nec

dependence upon them and involvement w

transition from slave-maturity to freedom.

Matheron has nicely described and analyz

slavery to freedom16. Characteristic of all the

link ideas and desires more or less "consisten

this effort doesn't really succeed ("consistenc
intellectual desires). Characteristic of all the
the desiring, i. e. a certain self-conception, a
for oneself.
The first stage of man's desiring is the stage of finalistic-anthropocentric illusion (as
described in the Appendix of Ethics I). In this stage man is completely under the spell of

hope and fear concerning external forces; these, whether real or illusory, are always
pictured anthropomorphically, i. e. after the wrong picture man here has of himself (as a
free will attracted towards the transcendent good).

The second stage is the stage of egoistic-instrumentalist desire17. Thanks to scientific

understanding, the myths (of the previous stage) are exploded, and man now thinks to be
able to live a rational life, i. e. a life in the service of a clever enhancement of pleasure,
aided by science and technique, and including the appropriate amelioration of socio-political organisation. In this stage, rational thinking is seen basically as a means to an end
which is pleasure for its own sake. It is true that one is now no longer trying to organize
one's life in terms of a superstitious view of oneself and of Nature. Yet, this second stage
is not real freedom or autonomy either. The pleasures one is after no longer seem to be
linked to the fascination for certain idols (which one can identify with); they are now the
pleasures of an agreeable, diversified life. But these new pleasures still mean an essential

dependence on things outside, however much one succeeds in planning the desired
outcomes by means of science and technique. Moreover, the desires one has, are still
related to the search for such pleasures as are associated with an inadequate view about
oneself and one's connection with the Whole. However much one seems to have escaped
the old anthropocentrism, de facto also in this stage one conceives oneself as the center
of the world.
It is clear that, at this second stage, there is no real interest in rational thinking itself.
However much science is developed, it is considered only as a necessary, not an intrinsically important activity. The interest in intellectual affairs is very vulnerable here. Yet, this

stage allows, and even requires many people to engage frequently and extensively in
rational thinking. In this way a third stage becomes possible, at least for a certain number
of individuals: the stage of real freedom.
15 The picture is based on passages like: II P 13 Sch; II P 29 Sch; V P 39 Sch (see also IV 38 + 39
4- Sch).
16 See: A. Matheron, o. c, pp. 84 ff.
17 See: A. Matheron, o. c, pp. 85 ff. Matheron constructs what he says here out of an understanding of the difference between Hobbes and Spinoza (pp. 87).

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Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza 141

The third stage of human conatus is "nicht blo [ . . .] das Streben nach Selbsterhaltung durch Vernunft [...], sondern vor allem [. . .] das Streben nach Selbsterhaltung

der Vernunft"18. It is the life of desiring related to "innate affection(s) of our

essence" 19 : i. e. to the spontaneous development of pure intellectual thinking for its own

sake, and to the "active" joy going with it. This is the life of freedom, a kind of
self-determined activity, which involves a special kind of self-awareness, and which can
lead to explicit self-knowledge as part of the non-personal God-Nature. This Spinozistic

conception of self-determination and self-knowledge seems fundamentally different

from the picture of freedom and of the self as presented by Descartes and Leibniz (and
indeed most other modern philosophers). The opposition concerning these conceptions
mirror strong oppositions concerning views about the Whole of Nature and man's place

therein.

3. Spinoza's free man has a life of desire prompted by "innate" affections of the mind20.

These can be none other than adequate ideas and accompanying active emotions21. A
mind possessing adequate ideas is an intellect capable of engaging in reasoning, in

demonstrations, in which one understands things sub specie aeternitatis22. The

intellect no longer conceives things from the point of view of anthropocentric illusion; it

conceives things from a detached perspective, which allows seeing them as they really
are. If sufficiently unhindered, human power to think can now develop itself fully,
follow "son cours naturel"23: it's going from one adequate idea to another, a self moving
mental activity no longer determined or impeded by external factors, almost an automaton spirituale 24. "L'effort pour comprendre [. . .] n'est rien d'autre que le conatus parvenue son plein panouissement et son plus haut degr d'efficience"25.
In intellectual activity, man feels a new, active joy26; it is accompanied by a desire for
more and more understanding27. A conversion has taken place from a life of passivity
to a life of activity, i. e. a life of understanding. When our mind becomes quasi
automaton spirituale, this is like a home-coming, like the return into one's natural
element28 : "Le dsir de connatre est la vrit du dsir d'tre"29.

In so far as one understands adequately, one is also aware of what one is doing, and so

one gets a new kind of self-esteem30. To understand things sub specie aeternita18 I could not trace the reference for this quote.

'MIIAff.Def. l.Exp.
zuIIIAff.Def.l.Exp.

21 For a description of the "emotional" life of a free man, see: IV P 66 and following.

22 II P 44 Cor 2; VP 29 Sch.
23 A. Matheron, o. c, p. 248.

24 For the expression automaton spirituale , see: TEI, p. 37 ( 85): like a spiritual automa-

ton".

25 A. Matheron, o. c, p. 252.

26 III P 58 + IV P 52 Dem.

27 IV P 26.

28 About the theme of "home-coming" in the TEI, see Th. Zweerman: Spinoza's Inleiding tot de
Filosofie. en vertaling en structuuranalyse van de Inleiding der Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione;

benevens een commentaar bij deze tekst, Doctoral Dissertation, Leuven (Louvain), Institute of
Philosophy, 1983, pp. 313 ff.
29 A. Matheron, o. c, p. 253.
30 IV P 52.

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142 Herman De Dijn

tis must be the same for any intellect. So, par

free man feels towards himself, concern a self
from the activity of any other intellect: it is no
is a particular thing31. Once one is "truly" one
self (with its inevitable identifications with ex

riches, pleasures, salvation). Viewed from the

rale " for what is transcendent; the " deside

possible), the "new" desiderium naturale

oneself. But from this new perspective, it is

enormous frantic activity and affective investm

It is important to understand this new activity

a certain sense, the activity of understanding is
in adequate thinking, one is not engaging in th

only) way to escape ordinary life, or because

thinking, one is not geared towards pleasur
reward32. Yet, in another sense, the activity o

if this is supposed to mean that underneath thi

an Other (an End external, transcendent vis

with a strange fascination). Such an "end in itse

lose itself in the pursuit of the end (even thou
become indifferent, so that the fascination no
not to be understood in terms of such striving
geared towards an end which he cannot not h
deviated by external factors), because he is thi

What a free man strives for is not a good wh

(only) useful; neither is it a good from which h
which he might lose sight of or turn away from

man is not the result of an absence (a privat

kind of automatism, pouring itself out in a f

anymore between what one does and wh

Spinoza no distinction between intellect and wil

intellect and desire.

Spontaneity does not mean indifference. In

activity, wants it to continue, and cannot but

longing, all hope and fear have gone. The pr

cannot mean there is any sense of other

out of his activity. And in his joy and desir

no fascination; as before the Fall). One can a
egocentric as that it is completely selfless (li
children).
The joy of thinking and the concomitant desire to continue the flow of reasoning is not
the full picture of the life of freedom. Because he lives in the real world, a free man has to
31 See: Wallace Matson: Death and Destruction in Spinoza's Ethics, in: Inquiry 20 (1977), p. 414.
32 For the relationship between "virtue" ( = "acting by the guidance of reason": IV P 24) and

"reward" see: V P 42.

33 See: A. Matheron, o. c, p. 247; pp. 256-7.

34 II P 49.

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Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza 143

organize not only his thought, but also the persistence of it in an environment which is
sometimes even hostile. Therefore a free man must also attempt to organize circumstan-

ces and other people (free men and slaves). It is the whole sequence of thoughts,
feelings, desires, and organizing activities which form the real life of a free intellect35. As
Matheron puts it again rightly and succinctly: a life of reason consists of "connatre pour
mieux organiser le monde afin de mieux connatre encore"36.

What does it mean to say that intellectual activity is immediately experienced as

"valuable", and how is this related to what is seen when things are seen sub specie
aeternitatis ?

From the detached viewpoint, from the perspective of eternity, the appeal certain
things had for us, disappears: one now considers them under "the cold light" of reason. A
free man can direct this "cold" gaze equally towards his own nature. Can he derive from

what he sees either acceptance or rejection of himself? How could, from what can be
seen or understood by any intellect, follow acceptance or rejection of a particular thing
or activity (or even sort of activity)37? Yet, there is self-acceptance related to understanding: Spinoza explicitly speaks about the self-esteem one has in knowing38. Even
in the world of pure thinking, there is at least one point where there is still evaluation: a
thinker cannot escape the appeal reasoning has for him as an activity. So it seems that

the desire to continue understanding cannot come from what one sees in the

detached view, but from the experience of one's activity of thinking. A free man
cannot really detach himself from his detachment. Yet, the reason why a free man cannot

escape the appeal of reasoning is not that it appears to him as a shining, overriding
value for which, if necessary, he has to sacrifice himself. The reason is that he is this
activity, which de facto experiences itself "in" him as joy and conscious desire to
continue itself. The conscious desire is really the vis a tergo which works itself out,
unhindered, as in an automaton.
It is important here to stress again the difference between the desire and activity of
a free man (in Spinoza's sense) and the desire and activity of a slave (as sublimated by the
Christian philosophers). The absorption of a free man in his activity cannot be confused
with the clinging of a slave to his illusions and identifications (in endless fluctuations of

hope and fear, exultation and despair). But neither should it be confused with the

supposedly free desiderium naturale for a transcendent Principle or Value. The

self-consciousness and desire of a free man are but a kind of "tonality" accompanying the
free-flowing activity of understanding. There is a sort of "commitment" of a free man

in his activity (of detachment); but it is a kind of unselfish, non-delusioned, "free"

commitment.

Being a quasi-"spiritual automaton" of deductive understanding, a man of reason

cannot of course want to engage in a contradiction, or to doubt what cannot be doubted.

Being a free man, a man of reason cannot allow amongst his activities acts which are
incompatible with the flow, even if this would bring about death39. It is not because
rational thinking and acting is such a shining end that one has to be prepared to even die
35 See (e. g.): IV P 73 Sch; V P 20 Sch; V P 39 Sch; etc.
JO A. Matheron, o. c, p. 253.
/ In se" nothing is perfect or imperfect, good or bad, ... ; see I App; IV Pref .
"" lv r :>/.

39 IV P 72 Sch.

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144 Herman De Dijn

for it. A free man thinks of nothing less th

himself" he encounters death, it is because h

powerful than himself ("What had to be don

God"). It is because understanding is not an
death (in pursuing his activity) without bein
The human intellect not only develops a n
Spinoza, it can and should do this in the co
which we today would call a version of a n

understood objectively how everything, i

man can become "une partie totale" 41 of N
out independendy from die cooperation of a
man is such a "partie totale" in which th
self-contained way.
This objective understanding of one's plac
free-thinking activity. On it's own this is sim
But, according to Spinoza, "dramatic" effec
gets suitably connected with the experien
intellectual activity42. At such moments we

parts of Nature, but we can experienc

Life43. With a shock we realize that the

intimately aware of, is the activity of Life i

end in view. For this realization or exper

This experience is an experience of ultim

God-Nature45. It is only because the flow of

concatenation of ideas, but also a concatenat
(indeed a peculiar kind of self -experience), t
describes as effects of knowledge of the thir

4. Spinoza's conception of a free man is cl

relation between free activity and the Whol
conceptions of freedom47. Spinoza is well aw
conception about their freedom and its relat
centric and finalistic conception is so strong
Leibniz) succumb to it.
The ordinary (e. g. Christian) picture of fre
40 IV P 67.

41 J. Moreau: Nature et individualit chez Spinoza et Leibniz, in: Revue Philosophique de Louvain,
76 (1978), p. 453.
42VP36Sch.

^ About the notion or Lite in Spinoza, see the well-known study or S. Zac: L idee de vie dans la
philosophie de Spinoza, Paris, 1963.
44 VP 36 Seh.
" V P 32.

46 See V P 32 and following.

47 It is rare to find a philosopher who questions the necessity of this relationship and

conceptual coherence of these ideas of freedom and their supposed metaphysical correlates. A
interesting example of such questioning: P. F. Strawson: Freedom and Resentment, in P. F. Stra
Freedom and Resentment and other Essays, London, 1974, pp. 1-25.

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Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza 145

of the world as created by a Personal God who made creation to contain also other
free-willing beings whose end it is to freely serve the creator. In this picture the life of man

is considered to be the outcome of an activity produced by the will as illuminated by the

intellect, but as attracted (and not necessitated) by the Good. There may be variations in
this picture, e. g. acceptance or rejection of contra-causal freedom (Descartes as against

Leibniz); but the fundamental differences always remain: between intellect and will,

between necessitation and attraction.

Leibniz is well aware of his difference with Spinoza, who "divested God of intelligence
and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates of necessity3'48. For Leibniz,
action is not the quasi automatic, joyful outflow of activity from its source. It is the

realization of a value through will and desire. The will, which is by nature geared
towards the good, must conform itself to it, without being necessitated. This is real
freedom. But since Leibniz rejects contra-causal freedom, he must find another way to
allow for the difference between necessitation and attraction. Attraction by a norm or
value does not make sense, but for the awareness of other possibilities not conforming to
the norm; furthermore, the possibilities must have a ground in reality. The solution is
Leibniz' doctrine of the metaphysical contingency of Creation as dependent upon the free

Choice of God amongst an infinity of (- logically speaking -) equally possible worlds.

God's free choice incorporated the free choices of all individuals (not conflicting with
causal necessity, but with the absence of logical possibilities)49. God's reality seems here to
be divided between intellect and will; even He seems to have to play the game of desiring
the Good (could he have been attracted by the opposite?). In other words: God is man in
disguise; this is still anthropomorphism. And is Leibniz not also wrong about intelligence?

Instead of seeing it as the spontaneous production of the truth, he interprets it as

fundamentally dependent on the will as directed towards, attracted by unreachable goals,
the truth, which is but a modification of the Good. This makes the activity of understanding itself into a mere form of human delusion.

As we have seen, there is also the position of a utilitarian-hedonist who no longer

believes in myths or gods, but who strives, as much as possible, and with the help of
science and technique and social engineering, to improve his situation. He knows that
everything can be understood as a machine which strives to continue in existence. Highly
developed machines like men do this, equipped with a certain intelligence and certain
capacities of manipulation, in their strivings for pleasureful experiences. A hedonist
knows he himself is such a highly developed machine, which cannot refrain from being
this striving for as much pleasure as possible. But, although partly true, this naturalistic
picture of man betrays the incapacity of a utilitarian-hedonist to really let go of the old
view of the self, and to see one's true self at work in rational activity as such. This
naturalistic position is full of contradictions. A hedonist knows Nature is not there for
him, yet he cannot but act as if it were the case. He rejects the old view of the self as
attracted by Value, and sees himself as a machine for the production of pleasant experiences. Yet, what he in fact strives for are not just pleasures (as he claims them to be), but
48 Leibniz: Theodicy. Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil
(transi. E. M. Huggard), London, 1951, p. 348 ( 371).

49 See: A. Burms and H. De Dijn: Freedom and logical Contingency in Leibniz, in: Studia
Leibnitiana, Band XI/1 (1979), pp. 124-133.

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146 Herman De Dijn

pleasures linked to certain ideas of objects an

adherence to the old way of life and the old

Spinoza's metaphysics is much closer to the

to the theism of a slave or the modern me

conception strangely combines with a view o

tible with the utilitarian-hedonistic picture

Human nature is seen here as the inevitable
Activity - but the activity of human life is

spontaneous, joyful production of underst

view, the pursuit of pleasure is not seen as b

slavery.

Should we say then - as has been suggested51 - that Spinoza's free man resembles the
sage of the Stoics who is capable of taking the point of view of the Whole? In a certain

sense this is true: in so far as he understands things sub specie aeternitatis , man
takes the point of view of the Whole, sees things as God's own Intellect sees them. But
in another sense the comparison is false. For the Stoics, to take the point of view of the
Whole meant to live in accordance with nature, to care as Nature itself would care (for
the harmony of the Whole). For Spinoza this is nonsense; it is again a version of
anthropomorphism. Nature doesn't care, it simply acts. A free man "cares" about himself
(in a non-deluded way); he desires his activity to continue52. Yet, this does not mean
Spinoza's free man has no intimate relationship with Nature. He can know that his life
of autonomous activity is part of the overall purposeless activity of God-Nature, that his
life is only one of the infinitely many concrete effects of the unbounded Life-force, that it

is Deusquatenus... This knowledge can be accompanied with experiences of great

joy and acceptance, with an intellectual love for the impersonal God-Nature, who loves
nobody, yet loves us i n our love.

Strange and paradoxical as it may seem, Spinoza's naturalistic conception of man as

conatus is not linked with instrumentalism, egoism or hedonism. On the contrary it can
seemingly accomodate the highest virtues and religious sentiments: friendship, courage,
acceptance, . . . 53. This is undoubtedly related to his conception of the "life of reason" as
a life which escapes the delusions of the Self and of its Utopian disguise (the Good).
It is perhaps even more strange and paradoxical to learn that Spinoza himself recognized that there are other non-Spinozistic forms of morality and religiosity which as a
matter of fact also produce real salvation. Reading his Ethics, it seems as if there is only
one way of life which is "in accordance with our nature", and produces real joy and
happiness: the life of reason of a free man. But in his Theologico-Political Treatise, he
admits that the religion of purified Christianity, a religion preaching a personal God ( !),
can lead to a form of salvation. There is no reason to think Spinoza to be dishonest
50 This critique is especially applicable to Hobbes, see A. Matheron, o. c, p. 87 ff.

51 See e. g. N. Rotenstreich: Conatus and Amor Dei: The Total and Partial Norm, in: Revue
Internationale de Philosophie 31 (119-120), 1977, p. 124 (Rotenstreich^ comparison is made with
many qualifications).
52 There is a striking difference in this respect between the Stoical and the Spinozistic attitude with
respect to suicide.
53 See: IV P 67 and following; V P 32 and following.

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Naturalism, Freedom and Ediics in Spinoza 147

here54. If we look carefully at the sort of life evangelical Christians are supposed to live,

maybe we can understand a little how it too can provide real happiness. Purified
Christianity induces in its believers attitudes of unselfish obedience to God, whom they
trust without any fear, and serve in works of justice and charity. Through these attitudes

they reach a sort of acquiescentia in se ipso , comparable to the internal peace of

a free man in his activity55. What seems analogous in both kinds of salvation is the
internal peace, joy and acceptance provided by a non-self-centered, out-flowing, joyful
activity, which escapes the misery of ordinary, conceited and deluded self-awareness.
In the kind of "universal" religiosity Spinoza sees exemplified in purified Christianity,
it is not the practice of autonomous rational activity which is the lever of salvation. What
saves good Christians has nothing to do with philosophizing, or science, or theology. It is
the consistent non-selfish, yet joyful practice of charity and justice which "does the trick"

(even though the practice is related to what are "in se" inadequate beliefs, but held
non-dogmatically and "in good faith"). The religious practice is not a practice of
self-negation, but an innocent concentration on the requirements of daily life and of
the needs of those around us. Obviously, this sort of practice might be related to other
religions as well.

5. Spinoza's naturalism is of a very peculiar kind. It sees all activity, also all human
activity as forms of life produced by an unbounded Life-force, acting without any end in
view. But the force of life typical for human nature is not understood here as a drive for
pure "biological" survival, taking the concrete form of a drive for pleasure. It is under-

stood as a force trying to produce a concatenation of internally related "rational"

activities (including highly "moral" and "religious" feelings and desires). Although the
truth of the human con a tu s is the endeavour of rationality, this does not imply that
there was an end in Nature after all: i. e. to produce this marvellous organism capable of
taking everything in its own hands in function of a glorious future where man will be god
to man. The rationality of human beings is seen here as just one of the many life- forms of

Nature's purposeless and center-less production. The unselfish caring for one's own
rationality is as it were the experiential counterpart to this naturalistic truth.

What seems most typical for Spinoza is not that he was the first to develop a radical
naturalistic philosophy as a worldview best adapted to the new sciences; nor that he made
rational understanding into the centre of a new morality ("une thique de la connaissan-

ce" as Jacques Monod called it); but that he intertwined these two so as to create a
morality of rationality as the origin of all real virtues and even of a kind of religiosity.
This morality and religiosity are fundamentally different from the traditional Christian
picture of morality and religiosity, interpreted in terms of freedom of the will as separated

from and at the same time attracted by transcendent Value. The Spinozistic notion of
54 See: H. De Dijn: Over de interpretare van de Schrift volgens Spinoza, in: Tijdschrifi voor Filosofie
29 (1967), pp. 693-699; see also my critical review of the book of A. Tosel: Spinoza ou le crpuscule
de la servitude: Essai sur le Trait Thologica-Politique, Paris, Aubier 1984, in Studia Spinozana 1

(1985), pp. 417-422.

See also the beautiful study by R. Caillois: Spinoza et l'Athisme, in: Emilia Giancotti (ed.): Proceedings of the First Italian International Congress on Spinoza (= Spinoza nel 350 Anniversario della
Nascita), Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1985, pp. 3-33.

55 See: H. De Dijn: Over de interpretane van de Schrift . . . , p. 694 (reference to TTP VII,
Gebhardt - edition of the Spinoza Opera vol III, p. 111).

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148 Herman De Dijn

freedom, blending so well with his natura

moral-religious traditions, which never m

py the center of moral and religious practice

6. In the above comparison of Spinoza and

Spinoza says in Ethics IV. The perspective of

activity is - if anywhere - (rather) describ

clearly talks about longing for an end (th
and there can be no doubt that Spinoza is
Preface: "... we desire to form an idea of m
may look to ..."). This raises questions suc
desire Spinoza is talking about here, and the
what is the relationship between the persp
Ethics} These questions must be answered in
to a deeper understanding of Spinoza and of

I can do no more than make some suggesti

and V, hoping these suggestions hold up to f
What is presented in Book IV is the picture
of the means to reach that ideal ( = the prece
these precepts of reason are, what a man of
what characterizes him, what his desires and

this picture is presented in a Book bearin

Notice also that concerning this ideal, Spin
longing for it, produce their own misery5
handbook of precepts or guidelines (a kind
who are in the paradoxical situation of long

"abstractly" 57 or remember having been in th

a paradoxical situation because the very l

realization (which - as spontaneity - is be

rim"-morality; it concerns a state inbetween p

can be compared with the state of desirin

opposed to being spontaneous59.

The longing for the ideal described in Book

strives for the ideal as a good for him and u
(even the knowledge of God is presented her

towards the ideal, man shows he has not y

separate entity). Knowledge (even of God) i
of selfforgetfulness and unconcern in the ac
favourably with the self which is under the
hedonistic self. At least his strivings are base
human power and affectivity.
It is in Ethics V that we have to look for
56IVP17Sch.
57IVP62Sch.

58 See e. g. the stress on "as far as possible", in IV P 50 Cor.

59 For an analysis of such states, see: J. Elster: Sour Grapes. Studies in the subversion of rationa

Cambridge (etc.), paperback 1985, pp. 43 ff.

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Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza 149

1-20 Spinoza describes what real freedom means, not abstractly, but in the real
world of inevitable affliction by emotions. Here he is no longer talking about precepts we have to follow in our longing. Here he indicates the operative remedies ^
which constitute real power, real freedom. The perspective is no longer prescriptive (as in

Book IV) but descriptive of real power, and of how it operates. Paradoxically these
remedies all seem to come down somehow to knowledge of oneself, more precisely of
one's emotions: is this not incompatible with the way we earlier described real freedom (in
terms of the selff orgetfulness, unconcern for oneself, etcetera, present in pure intellectual
activity)?

In order to clarify this, we have to investigate more closely what this knowledge is in
which freedom realizes itself. What Spinoza is talking about here, is not simply adequate
knowledge in general (not even about human emotions). The knowledge of the emotions

which gives real peace of mind, is rather a special way of reacting to one's own
emotions inevitably encountered in daily life61. These emotions become occasions for a
certain kind of thinking about oneself in which the impact of the emotions is defused
such that they n longer disturb the mind's autonomous activity; on the contrary, the
thinking in which this defusion happens can even turn into a contemplative experience. In
other words whatever happens to us, it becomes part of a mental life which is active,
joyful and peaceful, and which contains moments of "intuitive insight" and "intellectual
love of God"62.

The fundamental remedy against passivity (lack of freedom), consists in looking at

one's own concrete emotions sub specie aeternitatis : our own concrete thinking
and emotional life becomes a spectacle for ourselves in which - thanks to our adequate
thinking - we take a distance from these concrete emotions, yet without denying them.
(Compare with Spinoza's conception of adequate thinking as not denying sensory per-

ception).
How is it possible for such a special consideration of our own emotions to arise? The
focus of attention must shift from the frenetic occupancy (with what is felt as good or
bad) present in ordinary emotionality. Yet our attention may not lose contact altogether
with the emotion and obliterate it by a completely different act of consciousness. In other
words, in the distancing from it, the emotion must get defused, but something of it must
linger on; the real emotion gets caught up in a framework in which it appears in a new
light and affects us differently63.
Strawson has called our attention to the fact that most of us in certain circumstances

are capable of obtaining a distancing view of the turmoil of our own and other's
emotional life - in this view our lives do not become completely alien to us, but they
appear in a different light (often consoling or liberating). According to Strawson this sort
of detachment is inevitably isolated; it cannot mean much more than a momentary
amazement doomed to disappear when the usual involvements are resumed64. Spinoza
seems to suggest that such a distancing can in certain people occupy their minds more
60VP20Sch.
61 V P 4 Sch; P 6 Sch; P 10 Sch; P 15; etc.

62 VP 14-16.

OJ V 1J 4 beh.

64 See: P. F. Strawson: Freedom and Resentment, pp. 1-25; see also Strawson's critique on Spinoza
(which I do not endorse completely): P. F. Strawson: Liberty and Necessity, in: N. Rotenstreich and
N. Schneider (eds.): Spinoza. His thought and work, Jerusalem, 1983, pp. 120-129.

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150 Herman De Dijn

consistently, in such a way that whatever ha

contemplation of these occurrences. Whateve
life which is fundamentally undisturbed; t
which we normally are so prone in ordinary

It is not sufficient to acquire the habit o

aeternitatis ; - in and through the distancin

way with our own existential (emotional) rea
stic religiosity:

"My own eclipse, my own vices, my own sor

calculation and a pleasing wonder. The philosoph
these necessary conflicts, and an infinite life out

Only thus can we really break through ou

taking ourselves too seriously in our emotion
ourselves as modifications of God's overflo
"the original truth" about ourselves ("sentim

65 George Santayana: Ultimate Religion, in: Sep

memoriam B. D. S. diei natalis trecentissimi Hagae
66 V P 23 Sen. See also my paper on Spinoza's th

Knowledge in Spinoza, in: Edwin Curley and P

Directions. The Proceedings of the Chicago Spinoz

thanks for helpful discussions and/or remarks co
Cook, Manfred Walther, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Gi

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