1. Vda.

De Tangub v CA
Facts:
RufinaTangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao
del Norte in March, 1988 an agrarian case for damages by reason of their unlawful
dispossession, as tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia
Martil. On August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint
declaring that the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been
transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform by virtue of Executive Order No. 229. On
appeal to the CA, the appellate court agreed with the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was correct in dismissing the case. It being a
case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the
"special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more
particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the
adjudicatory powers of the Department.

2. Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA

Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two
parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of
land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community.
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying
the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the
Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By
way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After
the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The landholding of
SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory
acquisition of the property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural
purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the
occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.
The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire
property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657
Held:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We
cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need
to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage

property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational

responsibility that needs to be answered now.

3. DAR VS. CUENCA

FACTS

Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La

Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota
City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the
landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also
stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the subject
land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for
Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405.
Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with
authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and
should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that Executive Order No. 405
amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that
then President Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF
COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.
Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio. The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to
cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding
with the determination of the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the
CA a petition for certiorari assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent
Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of
Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority,
the court a quo also had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the
rights of the parties.
ISSUE
Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and
within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court
RULING
Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments
and reliefs prayed for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged
unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage.
Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may
be gleaned from the following averments. The main subject matter raised by private
respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation. Note that no amount
had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke
the courts function of determining just compensation. To be sure, the issuance of the Notice
of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land
under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the
CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be
ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional
or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

4. Cabral v CA
Facts:
On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the BARC for
the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles issued in favour of private
respondents. The patents and titles covered portions of the property owned and registered
in the name of petitioner. On February 11, 1990, Regional Director EligioPacis issued an
order dismissing the petition for cancellation of Emancipation Patents. The Regional Director
likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration dated July 11, 1990. Consequently,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of
the Regional Director and claiming denial of due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate
court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction to decide on the petition
Held:
The DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case. It is amply clear
from the provisions of CARL and other pertinent rules that the function of the Regional Office
concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws while that of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD
is the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The first is essentially executive. It pertains to
the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. Thus, the Regional Director is primarily tasked with
implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations within the responsibility of the agency, as
well as the agency program in the region. The second is judicial in nature, involving as it
does the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.

5. Isidro v CA

Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In
1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter,
allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy
of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land
upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the
same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from
petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of
said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into
a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court
dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by
civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of
MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil
courts
Held:
No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being
agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as
previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are
not contrary to law, are even more important.

6. Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

Facts:

The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on
execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and
subsequently sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos
now substituted by his heirs and represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de
Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.

Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within
the reglementary period. On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a Petition for Injunction
and Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case
No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private
respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become
useless".

The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the
gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited
with the Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a
Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to
redeem his land. The petition was dismissed.

Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with
the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who
tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season".

On May 7, 1992 private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation

of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction
against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan.

The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention
pending the resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time
filed with the DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion
was granted and intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the
P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly
constituted tenant of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed these orders of the
DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even
when the question of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts?

Held:

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
SECTION 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,

Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law),
as:
(d)
Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending
parties for the ownership of the subject property.

In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a
dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885),
we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the
following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval
and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands
into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian

relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of
agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition
for injunction in the first place.

The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an
incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the
main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the
leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court,
which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing
the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed before it on the
specific issue of ownership.

7. Sta. Ana vs. Carpo

8. Laguna Estate vs. CA (FULL CASE)

FACTS: On 12 December 1989, some 234.76 hectares of agricultural land situated in
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna belonging to the Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation (SRRDC, hereafter) was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
through its adjudicatory arm, public respondent DARAB, under the compulsory acquisition
scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and subsequently,
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) numbered 00130422, 00130423 and
00130424 with TCT Nos. C-168, C-167 and C-169 334 were issued and award to farmersbeneficiaries, private respondents herein, namely: Rosa T. Amante, et al., Rogelio O. Ayende,
et al. and Juan T. Amante, et al., respectively. The compulsory acquisition and distribution of
the said 234.76 hectares of land in favor of private respondents were effected by virtue of
the Decision dated 19 December 1991 issued by public respondent DARAB in DARAB Case

No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001-00, entitled Juan T. Amante, et al. vs. Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corp.
It appears that the aforesaid agricultural lands in Bgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna are isolated
and/or separated from the rest of the municipality of Cabuyao, and the only passage way or
access road leading to said private respondents agricultural lands is the privately owned
road network situated within the premises of petitioners CSE and LEDC. Subject to
reasonable security regulations, the subject road network is open to the public. But after
private respondents were awarded the aforesaid agricultural lands under the CARP Law,
petitioners CSE and LEDC prohibited and denied private respondents from utilizing the
subject road network, thereby preventing the ingress of support services under the CARP
Law, provisions for daily subsistence to, and egress of farm produce from, Bgy. Casile where
the farmlands awarded to private respondent are located.
On motion by private respondents, an Order dated 25 May 1993 was issued by public
respondent (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-0001-00, directing the unhampered entry
and construction of support services coming from the national government, and other
provisions for the use and benefit of private respondents in Bgy. Casile, and giving private
respondents a right of way over the subject road network owned by petitioners. The decretal
portion of the said order reads:
Order is given to the Philippine National Police (PNP) in coordination with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) for Cabuyao, Laguna, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) for Laguna, and the DAR Regional Office to ensure that support services like farm to
market roads and training center for the CARP beneficiaries of Barangay Casile, Municipality
of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna coming from the National Government are allowed to be
constructed unhampered, agricultural products like pineapple, coconut and papaya fruits,
vegetables, corn and palay of said beneficiaries [private respondents] are given free access
to the markets and construction materials for their homes and provisions for their daily
subsistence are allowed to enter Barangay Casile using the access roads as herein indicated
Annex A which forms part of this Order and that lives of the said beneficiaries are protected
from harm especially while travelling to and from Barangay Casile. (Underscoring Ours)
The implementation of the aforesaid 25 May 1993 order of public respondent, however, was
opposed and prevented by petitioners CSE and LEDC claiming that the subject road network
belong to petitioners and C. J. Yulo & Sons, Inc. and not to SRRDC, and therefore, is not
covered by the said Order.
On 22 June 1993, private respondents filed a motion to amend order, praying that
petitioners CSE and LEDC, as well as C. J. Yulo & Sons, Inc., be impleaded in the abovementioned Order dated 25 May 1993 of public respondent so that said order can be properly
implemented.
On 8 July 1993, public respondent DARAB issued an Order also dated 8 July 1993 requiring
petitioners CSE and LEDC to submit their respective comments on private respondents
aforesaid motion to amend the 25 May 1993 order of public respondent in DARAB Case JC-RIV-LAG-0001-00. Attached in said order are copies of public respondent DARABs Order dated
25 May 1993 and private respondents said motion to amend order.

Petitioner LEDC responded to public respondents Order dated 8 July 1993 by sending a letter
dated 15 July 1993 to public respondent, while petitioner CSE filed its Opposition To Amend
Order dated 15 July 1993 to private respondents aforesaid motion to amend order, to while
private respondents filed a Consolidated Comment.
On 21 September 1993, public respondent DARAB sent a Notice of Hearing and Summons to
petitioners CSE and LEDC, directing them to appear for hearing on 1 October 1993 before
public respondent DARAB.
Petitioner LEDC nor its counsel failed to appear at the aforementioned scheduled hearing,
but it filed a Special Appearance to Quash Summons and later, an Amended Special
Appearance to Quash Summons, for the sole purpose of objecting to its [public respondent
DARAB] jurisdiction and quashing the summons in the aforementioned DARAB Case,
allegedly for having been issued unlawfully, arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion.
During the hearing, petitioner CSE manifested that public respondent DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.
After hearing the arguments and manifestation of the parties present thereat, public
respondent directed private respondents to file their final memorandum, and petitioner CSE,
to submit its final reply or comment thereon. Only private respondents complied.
On 7 October 1993, petitioner CSE instead filed the present petition for prohibition praying
for the issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction commanding
public respondent DARAB to desist from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid
DARAB Case NO. JC-R-IV-0001-00, and a writ of prohibition commanding said public
respondent to permanently desist from conducting furtherproceedings in said DARAB
Case. Said petition was docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 32257 and raffled to the Fifth Division of
this Court.
On 4 November 1993, petitioner CSE amended its petition by impleading private
respondents herein, in compliance with this Courts resolution dated 18 October 1993.
In the meanwhile, after evaluating the respective positions of the petitioners and private
respondents herein, public respondent DARAB issued its assailed Order dated 23 November
1993 (pp. 119-135, Rollo) in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-0001-00, re-affirming the efficacy of its
Order dated 25 May 1993 and directing petitioners not to impede the complete
implementation of the 25 May 1993 Order of the same public respondent DARAB, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the efficacy of the Order of this Board dated May 25,
1993, remains valid. Accordingly, the Laguna Estates Development Corporation and the
Canlubang Sugar Estate are hereby ordered not to impede, under paid of contempt, the
complete implementation of the Order of this Board dated May 25, 1993 and this Order.
In reiteration, the Philippine National Police x x x is hereby deputized x x x to implement the
Boards Order so that Petitioners [private respondents herein] are allowed to transport their
agricultural products and the National government, NGOs and the Church are allowed to

extend life-sustaining support services like credit facilities, construction of training centers,
school buildings, farm-to-market roads and even chapels and churches using the so-called
M-1 Gate or China Gate and the roads outlined in Annex A of the Order dated May 25, 1993.
The board further takes notices of the efforts of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
acquire another right of way that is less prejudicial to the respondents herein [petitioners
herein], and may upon proper motion disolve (sic) this present order, in the event that such
other right of way should materialize in the future.
On 26 November 1993, We issued a resolution in CA-G. R. SP No. 32257 directing herein
respondents to submit their respective comments on the amended petition of petitioner
CSE, and the latter, to file its reply thereto, and thereafter, the petition shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. In the meanwhile, a temporary restraining order was issued
directed to public respondent DARAB requiring it to desist from conducting further
proceedings in the aforementioned DARAB Case.
On even date, petitioner CSE filed with this Court an Urgent Motion For Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, pp. 109-117) to enjoin public respondent DARAB
and/or its representatives or persons acting for and its behalf from conducting further
proceedings in the aforementioned DARAB case, and from enforcing or implementing the
assailed Order dated 23 November 1993 of public respondent DARAB.
On 1 December 1993, petitioner LEDC filed its present petition for certiorari and prohibition
which seeks to annul the aforesaid Order dated 23 November 1993 of public respondent
DARAB, and to prohibit respondents herein or persons acting on their behalf from
implementing or enforcing said order. The petition was docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 32709
and was originally raffled to the Sixth Division of this Court.
On 7 December 1993, the Sixth Division of this Court issued a resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
32709, directing the herein respondents, including the Director General of the PNP, to file
their respective comments on the petition, and in the meantime, a temporary restraining
order was issued directing all respondents and all persons and entities acting on their behalf
to cease and desist from enforcing against petitioner LEDC the Order dated 23 November
1993 of public respondent DARAB in the aforementioned DARAB Case.
As heretofore stated, in a resolution dated 4 February 1994 issued by the Sixth Division of
this Court, both petitions were consolidated and assigned to this Courts Fifth Division for
decision on the merits.
The dispute between the petitioners and private respondents started when the former
denied or prohibited the latter to use the subject road network leading to the farmlands of
private respondents in Bgy. Casile. This spawned the issuance of public respondent DARABs
order dated 25 May 1993 which directed the PNP in coordination with the DAR regional,
provincial and municipal offices to ensure the unhampered entry and construction of support
services for the benefit of private respondents free access to the subject road network to
allow the entry of construction materials, daily subsistence provisions in their farmlands and
the exit of their farm produce going to the markets. This was followed by the assailed order
dated 23 November 1993 reiterating the efficacy of its earlier 25 May 1993 order and

directing petitioners not impede the complete implementation of both orders of public
respondent DARAB.[5]
On the basis of the foregoing facts, on November 10, 1994, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision that denied and/or dismissed both petitions. [6]
Hence, the present recourse.[7]
The issue raised is whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant private respondents who
are beneficiaries of an agrarian reform program or tenants of adjoining landholdings a right
of way over petitioners network of private roads intended for their exclusive use.
We resolve the issue in favor of petitioners. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over such
issue. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties.[8] In Heirs of Herman Rey Santos vs. Court of Appeals, [9] citing Morta, Sr.
vs. Occidental,[10] we held :
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be
essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. [11]
Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without
tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian
issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. [12]

9. ALANGILAN REALTY & DVT CORP vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 180471

FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Batangas City (Alangilan
landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an Application and/or Petition for
Exclusion/Exemption from CARP Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with MARO-DAR. It
averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject
landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance, which was approved by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas
Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance, reclassifying the landholding as residential.
Petitioner thus claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP.
On May 6, 1997, then DAR denied petitioners application for exemption. The DAR Secretary
noted thatthe Alangilan landholding remained agricultural, reserved for residential. It was
classified as residential only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural at
the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. The qualifying phrase reserved for
residential means that the property is still classified as agricultural, and is covered by the
CARP.
On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary.
Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the OP decision
but CA dismissed the petition. The CA noted the report of MARO, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO), and Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the Alangilan landholding
was devoted to agricultural activities prior to the effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988
and even thereafter. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Alangilan landholding is subject to the coverage of CARP,
notwithstanding that the property has been converted to non-agricultural uses by the zoning
ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to the law.
HELD: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural,
reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential in 1994. However,
contrary to petitioners assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the
nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR
Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not
denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase
reserved for residential is not a land classification category.Indubitably, at the time of the
effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was
bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994,
reclassifying the landholding as residentia. If, indeed, the landholding had already been
earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no
necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance.
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the subject landholding had already
been converted into residential use prior to June 15, 1988. The court noted that the subject
landholding was still being utilized for agricultural activities at the time of the filing of the
application for exemption. The ocular inspection, jointly conducted by the MARO, PARO and
RARO, disclosed that the landholding was planted with mangoes and coconuts.
Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally
accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The factual findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official
position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full
respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed.In this
case, petitioner utterly failed to show justifiable reason to warrant the reversal of the
decision of the DAR Secretary, as affirmed by the OP and the CA.

10. CONCHA vs. RUBIO, GR 162446

FACTS: The controversy involves the determination of who between petitioners and
respondents are qualified to become beneficiaries over a portion of land with an aggregate
area of 33.5006 hectares, more or less.The subject landholding was placed under the
Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
the government. On June 16, 1993, a Notice of Coverage was sent to the landowners.On
March 24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their
identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to become
beneficiaries over the subject landholding. On April 26, 1995, the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR) approved the landowners application for conversion. On August 9, 1999, the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decisiondismissing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the issue involving
the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by CARP.
HELD: The conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to identify who between
the parties should be recognized as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a
purely administrative function of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared
that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, to wit:
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP
beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a
Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the
courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the
issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the
administrative agency. x x x
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies such as the DARAB
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts. Care should be taken so that
administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set
by the enabling law for each agency. In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped its legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioners and respondents in
deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in dispute. The CA
thus erred in affirming the decision of the DARAB, which was rendered in excess of
jurisdiction