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COURT PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT-San Carlos City v. OSCAR LLAMAS, 447 SCRA 60, December 16, 2004,
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Oscar Llamas was a cash clerk in the regional trial court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan. His brother was a
judge in one of the branches therein. A complaint for immorality was filed against Llamas brother judge.
The said case was filed by employees working in the same office where Llamas works. Thereafter, Llamas
became belligerent and hostile towards his office mates.
His co-workers and superiors testified that Llamas often drinks at work; frequently absents himself; alters
his daily time report; show hostile attitude by banging things in the office; and some other hostile acts.
The court personnel eventually filed a complaint against Llamas for being discourteous, disrespectful, and
for his unbecoming conduct. Llamas did not appear during the hearing but he submitted his counteraffidavit.
ISSUE:
WON Llamas should be disciplined.
RULING:
Yes. Llamas was not able to overcome the substantial evidence presented against him. The Supreme Court
also castigated Llamas misplaced loyalty as public officer. As a public servant, Llamas owes his loyalty, not
to his brother or to any other family member; but, rather, to the institution of which he is a part and,
ultimately, to the public he is sworn to serve. Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this
reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By
the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render
inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency. Government service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no
place therein.
2. J/SR. SUPT. JOSUE G. ENGAO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DILG Secretary JOSE D. LINA,
JR., and CHIEF SUPT. ARTURO W. ALIT, 493 SCRA 323, June 27, 2006, GARCIA, J.
FACTS:
CHIEF SUPT. ARTURO W. ALIT occupied the position of Jail/Chief Superintendent, Deputy Chief, Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Department of the DILG. He was then designated Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the Bureau in view of the resignation of the BJMP Director. On the other hand, JOSUE G. ENGAO
held the position of Jail Senior Superintendent of the BJMP.
Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 4 of the Office of the President, a seniority lineal list of names of
eligible candidates for the position of BJMP Director was submitted to the DILG Selection Board for Senior
Executive Positions (SB-SEP) and of the eleven (11) candidates interviewed, the Board ranked Alit first,
being the only one who fully met the CSC Qualification Standards for the position in question, more
particularly, the one-year experience requirement as Chief Superintendent. Consequently, DILG Secretary
Jose D. Lina recommended the appointment.
Despite Secretary Lina's recommendation, the President still appointed petitioner Engao. After being
sworn into office, Engao appeared to have assumed the post of BJMP Chief.
Alit instituted quo warranto proceedings against Engao before RTC of Quezon City claiming that the
latter's appointment was highly irregular and illegal due to his lack of the minimum qualifications required
for the position.
ISSUE:
WON Engao was unqualified for the contested position for lack of the minimum qualifications.
RULING:
Yes. While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation
that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law.
Where the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office or position, courts may determine
whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title thereto may be
declared void.

A public office is not a property and there is no such thing as a vested interest in a public office. No one
can be said to have any vested right in a public office or its salary. It is only when salary has already been
earned or accrued that said salary becomes private property and entitled to the protection of due process.
The right to salary and other emoluments arising from public employment is based on one's valid
appointment or election to the office itself and accrues from the date of actual commencement of the
discharge of official duties. Petitioner Engao, albeit lacking in qualifications, was nonetheless appointed as
Director of the BJMP but the appointing authority recalled his appointment owing to some legal issues
respecting his qualification. He was, then, a de facto officer, and thus, he is entitled to some form of
compensation.
3. SALVADOR H. LAUREL v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, GR NO. 145368, April 12, 2002,
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was
subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A
controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the
petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was
denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for
certiorari.
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since
ExpoCorp is a private corporation.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is a public officer.
RULING:
Yes. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
Even if Laurel did not receive any compensation it must be remembered that a salary is a usual but not a
necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere
incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a
naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of
Laurel as NCC Chairman may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an
office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office,
nonetheless.
NCC being defined as an ad hoc body is of no moment. The true test, regardless of the designation by the
creating law, is that if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government
and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties
pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be
changed, it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person
who performs the duties from an officer.
4. Reyes v. Belisario, 596 scra 31 (2009)
5. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED v. APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, 282 SCRA125, November 18, 1997,
ROMERO, J.
FACTS:

Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for
dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas
receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.
Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two
complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on
July 3and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for
its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel.
The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself
had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee
recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos
issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
ISSUE:
WON the due process clause encompasses the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry.
RULING:
No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute
right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if
he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when
the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed
analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.
Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven, as in this case,
that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers
and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
6. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, et al. v. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
et al., 360 SCRA 718, July 10, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
- Security of Tenure in a Public Office; No Vested Right to a Public Office; Power to Create
and Destroy Public Office
FACTS:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently
ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential
Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The
employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial
review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates
their constitutional right to security of tenure.
ISSUE:
WON the petition has merit.
RULING:
No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception
is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive department, the president
may deactivate them pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the

Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis
of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create
and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations have always exceeded
P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF
Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB
never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the
abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed,
there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or
its salary.
7. JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, 174 SCRA 245, JUNE 23, 1989, CRUZ, J.
- Citizenship of a Public Officer; Disqualification for Public Office
FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of
Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation because
apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was
forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but that participating in the
Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to American laws. He also
assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of
time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
RULING:
No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He
lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship,
that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation
proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best,
he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact
that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to
this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
8. JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAUL R. LEE, 257 SCRA 727, June
28, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship.
Petitioner contends that his active participation in the elections had divested him of American citizenship
under the laws of the US, and restored him of his Philippine citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation
under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.

However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous
attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
WON Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
RULING:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential
Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor.
The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1)
filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application
is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the
filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to
be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
In addition to that, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a naturalized American does not effectively
recover his Philippine citizenship as citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by direct grant by law
(CA 63) which was not invoked by the petitioner.