Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
L-24693
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals
is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public
needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision,
to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived
or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the genera
welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that
is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. 7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio
Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks
of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the
existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere
for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the
"ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring
these transients and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all
times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government." It would appear therefore that the
stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the
validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped
with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy
and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a
license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public
dance
halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on
days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person
from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or
visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national
or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which,
it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where
such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
THEUNITEDSTATESvs.LUIS TORIBIO
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial
court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in
the information, without a permit from the municipal treasure
of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large
cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of
Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends
that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147
do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle
without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31,
32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed
for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before
issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall
require for branded cattle the production of the
original certificate of ownership and certificates of
transfer showing title in the person applying for the
permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as
may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the
animals for which permit to slaughter has been
requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos
shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless
such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for
draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be
given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind
which is not fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record
of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and such
record shall show the name and residence of the
owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of
radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or
cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the
animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued
and the date on which such permit is issued. Names
of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the
record, together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter
shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial
treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same
under the name of the owner, together with date of
permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption or killing for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle
except upon permit duly secured from the municipal
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the
doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was
reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the
former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of
eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police
powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and unqualified may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his
use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of
property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and
regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under
the governing and controlling power vested in them
by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent
domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever
the public exigency requires it; which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor. The power we allude to is
rather the police power, the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain
placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of
carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an
appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is
not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State
of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or
limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to
be determental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation
to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the
public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for
doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the
exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of
the statute under consideration were imposed not for private
purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general
welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the
sovereign police power which every State possesses for the
general public welfare and which "reaches to every species of
property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a
virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the
total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections
September 1, 1927
ANGELLORENZO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, respondent-appelle.
MALCOLM, J.:
The purpose of this appeal is to induce the court to set aside
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
sustaining the law authorizing the segregation of lepers, and
denying the petition for habeas corpus, by requiring the trial
court to receive evidence to determine if leprosy is or is not a
contagious disease.
The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was in the usual
form. Therein it was admitted that the applicant was a leper. It
was, however, alleged that his confinement in the San Lazaro
Hospital in the City of Manila was in violation of his
constitutional rights. The further allegation was made that
leprosy is not an infectious disease. The return of the writ
stated that the leper was confined in the San Lazaro Hospital
in conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the
Administrative Code. But to this was appended, for some
unknown reason, the averment that each and every fact of
the petition not otherwise admitted by the return was denied.
Although counsel for the appellant makes mention of the form
which the return of the writ of habeas corpus took, so as not
to complicate matters unnecessarily, we prefer to give
attention only to so much of the return as is contemplated by
law and to disregard the rest as surplusage. The petitioner not
having traversed the return, the only issue is whether the
facts stated in the return as a matter of law authorized the
restraint (Code of Civil Procedure, chap. XXVI; Code of
Criminal Procedure, secs. 77 et seq.).
The Philippine law pertaining to the segregation of lepers is
found in article XV of chapter 37 of the Administrative Code.
Codal section 1058 empowers the Director of Health and his
authorized agents "to cause to be apprehended, and
detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous persons in the
Philippine Islands. "In amplification of this portion of the law
are found provisions relating to arrest of suspected lepers,
medical inspection and diagnostic procedure, confirmation of
diagnosis by bacteriological methods, establishment of
hospitals, detention camps, and a leper colony, etc.
In its simplest aspects, therefore, we have this situation
presented: A leper confined in the San Lazaro Hospital by the
health authorities in conformity with law, but with counsel for
the leper contending that the said law is unconstitutional, and
advancing as the basis for that contention the theory to be
substantiated by proof that human beings are not incurable
with leprosy, and that the disease may not be communicated
by contact.
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the
legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police power
which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was
place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave
health problem. The methods provided for the control of
leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. The assumption
must be that if evidence was required to establish the
necessity for the law, that it was before the legislature when
of
the
Case:
3.
4.
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
YNOT vs IAC
FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No.
626-A which orders that nocarabao and carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another; such violation shall
besubject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to
be distributed to charitableinstitutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
InspectionCommission may see fit for the carabeef and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal
Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.On January
13, 1984, Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the
police stationcommander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having
been transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626A. He issued a writ for replevin
, challenging the constitutionality of saidEO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule
on the validityof the law on the ground that it lacked authority
to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this
petition for review filed by Petitioner.ISSUE:Whether or not
police power is properly enforcedHELD: NO. The protection of
the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in
the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of
thegeneral welfare. As long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare,its regulation under the
police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at
bar, E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase) but NOT the
same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the
means employedand the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing. The challengedmeasure is
an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve thecarabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is
whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan,
represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is
contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted
with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit
a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the
same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously
given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1.
Title of Ordinance. This Ordinance shall be known and
may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of
Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. Definitions of Terms (a)
'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment selling to
the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to
dance. (b) 'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or
establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and
where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and
professional dancers are employed. (c) 'Professional
hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman
employed by any of the establishments herein defined to
entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with
them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any woman who
dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee
or remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the operator or
by the persons she dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include
the owner, manager, administrator or any person who
operates and is responsible for the operation of any night
club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3. Prohibition in the
Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits. Being the
principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of
their other adverse effects on this community as explained
above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls
shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within
changed one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is
thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to
construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of
the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. " 21Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is
a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, 22 in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public
needs, 23 to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling,
occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave
defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that
would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom
certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so
again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue
of a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local
Government Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration
of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first
paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of
the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it
by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein; ..." 26 There are in addition provisions that may have a
bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus
the sangguniang bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants,
beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging
houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist
transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist
inns of international standards which shall remain under the
licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism
which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the
taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate
public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or
massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and
operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses
and other forms of entertainment; ..." 27 It is clear that
municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise
in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that
petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses
to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no
such businesses could legally open, would be subject to
judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs
subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more
than a temporary termination of their business. During such
time, their employees would undergo a period of deprivation.
SUBJECT:
Phasing out and Replacement of
Dilapidated Taxis
Old and
arbitrary
and
unreasonable
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged
BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old
and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
Issues:
1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the
assailed Guidelines;
2.whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid
exercise of police power?;
Ruling:
1.Authority of the PNP Chief
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of
government are distributedamong three coordinate and
substantially independent departments: the legislative,
theexecutive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance
of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere.The power to make laws the legislative power
is vested in Congress. Any attempt toabdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that delegata
potestas non potest delegari delegated power may not be
delegated.The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative
power,
however, is not absolute andinflexible. It admits of exceptions
. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain
persons, municipalcorporations, towns, boards, councils,
commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus anddirectors.
Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate
necessary rules andregulations.Act No. 1780 delegated upon
the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1)
toapprove or disapprove applications of any person for a
license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal
protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2)
torevoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to
issue regulations which he maydeem necessary for the proper
enforcement of the Act.By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the
PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).Consequently,
the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and,
therefore,assumed the latters licensing authority.
Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the
issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and
explosives in accordancewith law. This is in conjunction with
the PNP Chiefs power to issue detailed implementing policies
PADILLA, J.:
These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve
simple issues. if these issues have apparently become
complicated, it is not by reason of their nature because of the
events and dramatis personae involved.
The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First
Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a
finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack
of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge
[Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing
had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila,
Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the
Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R.
No. 115044:
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing
Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue
the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in
favor of Associated Development
Corporation (ADC).
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor
Lim to explain why he should not be cited
for contempt for non-compliance with the
order dated 28 March 1994.
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the
previous order directing Mayor Lim to
immediately issue thepermit/license to
Associated Development Corporation (ADC).
The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon
motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on
9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to
immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the
jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive
secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games
and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to
hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been
issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated
II
Anent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to
operate the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the pertinent
laws is in order.
1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress
on 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The Municipal
Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate
wagers or betting by the public on boxing,
sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog
races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating
on any sporting or athletic contests, as well
as grant exclusive rights to establishments
for this purpose, notwithstanding any
existing law to the contrary.
2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954,
entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque
Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its
Violation". The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to
jai-alai are as follows:
Sec. 4. No person, or group of
persons other than the operator or
maintainer of a fronton with legislative
franchise to conduct basque pelota games
(Jai-alai), shall offer, to take or
arrange bets on any basque pelota game or
event, or maintain or use a totalizator or
other device, method or system to bet or
gamble on any basque pelota game or
event. (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of
a fronton with legislative franchise to
conduct basque pelota games shall offer,
xxx
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
xxx
Facts:
This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
andregulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) thesupervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."The
statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
Education. Its functions asspecified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:"(a) To determine and prescribe
requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;x x x(f) To accept applications for certification for
admission to a medical school and keep a registerof those
issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the
amount of twenty-fivepesos each which shall accrue to the
operating fu
nd of the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools:"Admission requirements.
The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
offense involving moral turpitude andwho presents (a) a
record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts;
order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of whichno one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps theonly issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation betweenthe
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission
to medical school on the onehand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand.This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of thepractice of medicine in all
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS
Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an
unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on
his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of
Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 the response
to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is put in
issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners,
spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista,
for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal
protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of private
motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and
holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to
5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00
a.m. of the day after the holiday." 2 Motor vehicles of the
following classifications are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T
(Truck); (e) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC
(Tourist Cars). 3 Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio,
then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then
Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on
June 11, 1979, Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed
"the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation
of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles"
found violating such Letter of Instruction. 4 It was then alleged
by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the
LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision
banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair,
discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and
thus
in
contravention
of
the
equal
protection
clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a
denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to use
and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel
and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on weekends and holidays," inviting attention to the fact that others
not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." 6 It
would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No.
39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and
cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being
violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative
power." 7 It is to be noted that such Memorandum Circular
does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of
impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation
of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for
ninety days whichever is longer.
This Court gave due course to the petition requiring
respondent to answer. There was admission of the facts as
substantially alleged except, as previously noted, that the ban
starts at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of
a holiday and as to the mention of a Willy's Kaiser jeep being
registered in the name of a certain Teresita Urbina, about
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42)
of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of
the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity
of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower
court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and
the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council).
MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels
and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.8
2. Souvenir Shops
4. Art galleries
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this
right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate
sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed
that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene
any fundamental state policy as contained in the
Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make
this choice.73 Their right to liberty under the due process
clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government, as long as they do
not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and
restraint the exception.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
Protection Clause
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the
business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.
. . .
. . .
C.
. . .
. . .
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels
and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4
(iv), which provides that:
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its
limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be
construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising
out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a
general rule in statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount
to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic
and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly
applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new
rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.114
. . .
Implied repeals are those which take place when a
subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to
those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing
them. Such repeals have been divided into two general
classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or
irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the
two can remain in force and those which occur when an act
covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to
be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is
sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the
legislative will should prevail.118
. . .
Conclusion
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business
of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It
built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed
as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel.
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading
as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the
City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited
establishments,
be
declared
invalid
and
unconstitutional.
declaring
the
Ordinance
void
and
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower
court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra
vires and therefore null and void.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
Protection Clause
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the
business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.
Conclusion
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general
welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation
and maintenance of such establishments.