Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 2
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 3
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original
version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the
measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not
denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the
foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the
Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and
dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However,
he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress
because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the
House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance
contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said
that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited
the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize
Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is
created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of
allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and
absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears
allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage,
he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to
take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He
then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of
the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent
of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 5 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to
the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not
yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law
should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He
further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on
dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano, 6 already
had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual
citizenship.7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a
law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is
without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. 8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. 9 Congress was given a mandate to
draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes
dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not
needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for
determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not
set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a
distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 4
during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a
Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in
his
petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. 6 He claimed
that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to
pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to
Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally
in
Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding
that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.7chanrobleslaw
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised
by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in
consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the
qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while
petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had
taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his
Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons
who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year
residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted
in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus,
having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove
that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible
to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent. 8 Private respondent
filed
an
Urgent Ex-parte Motion
to
Defer
Proclamation.9
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 5
private
respondent
filed
Petition
to
Annul
raises
the
following
due course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election
Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on
him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by
registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why
registered mail as a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that
private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1) 15 and (4),16 Rule 23 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's certificate
of
candidacy
should
have
been
denied
outright.
We
are
not
convinced.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 6
the
very
essence
of
this
Commission's
Rules
of
Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow
to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at
promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition
of
every
action
and
proceeding,
x
x
x
x
are
not
persuaded.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 7
place,
coupled
with
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention. 27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian
citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. 29 Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we
had the occasion to state, thus:cralawlawlibrary
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he
did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made
it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his
birth.31chanrobleslaw
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.
He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September
13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of
choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to
prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It
found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of
RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that
he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied
by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish
his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 8
12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of
fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant
case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual
determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions,
we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings
on
the
sufficiency
of
evidence. 33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding
the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan,
Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial
compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on
Elections,34 we held:cralawlawlibrary
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of
the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.35chanrobleslaw
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that
he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately
proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to Section
78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due
course to COCs, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 9
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application,
he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He
further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they
have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact
led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private
respondents
family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article
172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition
for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
DECISION
The
antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 10
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration, 13 petitioner questioned the foregoing
order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted
that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application
had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B
office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant
(petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he
applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition 15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused
cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the
court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order
disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who
had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under
R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account
of
said
naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition, 16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act
of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet reacquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his
criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not
left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where
he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be
adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for
falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 11
the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and
retain to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law
using
both
re-acquisition
and
retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of
the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance
under
the
new
law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation
of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent
with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it
becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is
expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at
the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the
letter-reply dated January 31, 2011 22 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to
his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed
by
Section
2
of
R.A.
9225.
These
contentions
have
no
merit.
CHAIRMAN
(SEN.
DRILON).
Prior
to
the
effectivity.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 12
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of
this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born
citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act
are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you
mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, lets say, American
citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born
citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to
know
this
distinction,
Mr.
Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely
retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who
lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act
63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the
effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the
Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine
citizenship
upon
the
effectivity
of
the
act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying
to
future
instances. So
thats
the
distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, no, because natural-born
citizens
are
only
qualified
for
a
specific
THE
CHAIRMAN
(SEN.
DRILON).
That
is
correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. Its one of
the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman
Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act
63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to
the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required
oath
of
allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 13
With
SO ORDERED.
costs
against
the
petitioner.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 14
MARIA
ZOILO
KELLEY
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 15
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January
2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy
of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her
having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives
Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding
the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by
Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan
Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name
of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a
copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie
Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during
the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack
of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion
for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 16
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides
that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824
was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this
Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on
who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in
the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 17
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 18
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 19
that
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 20
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and
Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate
of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the
last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to
the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan,
were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements
in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the
originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court provides:
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 21
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge
the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father.The failure of such requirement rendered
the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
[33]
In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of
both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that
might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished
the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event
the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,
nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed,
by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this
Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated
by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of
their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the
means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 22
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256
of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, [36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before
August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and
non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest
and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the
private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate
that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also
affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While,
indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of
civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 23
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of
the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national
law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on
successional rights and family relations. [40] In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law [41] and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property
laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members
of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and
the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil
law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 24
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St.
Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became
engaged while they were students at the University of the
Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe,
Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in
1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three
children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and
myself lived together with our mother at our family's house
on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the
liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with
four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my
nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that
he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of
January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 25
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father.The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he
got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member
of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure
a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with
the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help
the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is
that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day,
month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than
it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states
that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 26
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for
the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity,
the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential
and
vice-presidential
election
contest
under
the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan
F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case
before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48]must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G.
R.
No.
161824,
entitled
Victorino
X.
Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 27
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and
ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the
lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCRIloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and
the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport
No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on
5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the Philippines 8but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario
de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 28
who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days
after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
(Brian) on 16 April 1992. 12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna)
and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998
and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American
citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December
2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July
2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed
back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his
estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe
blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving
mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. 19 The
couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the
next semester;20 coordination with property movers for the relocation of
their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As
early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and
without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed 25 while her
husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well
as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she
and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 29
docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9
May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer
natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. 63 Following this
line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a
natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American citizen. 65 According to Elamparo, naturalborn citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner
was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6)
years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise
insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year
residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine
citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is
qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief
that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition
as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be
filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the
BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not
contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make
false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 30
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC
regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications for:
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 31
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 32
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of
her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First
Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she
has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The
COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive
portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy
of MARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
SONORA
POELLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the
present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders
were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders
from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter,
oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second
Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First
Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 33
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 34
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 35
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny
to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as
a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of
absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by
the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23
are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations,
are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be
established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is
suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution,"
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course
on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications,
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such
prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are
self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against
which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding
under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations
regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are not mentioned in the
enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution, 109 they then cannot be
citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner
admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot
rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen
when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to
say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural
filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is
neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there
is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents
were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden
to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if
not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities
are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule
128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the
fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born
in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child
born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and
5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child
producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 36
against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there
were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against
only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures.
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments,
that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population
in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are
the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the
foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned
in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines
is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99%
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate
more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's
parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based
are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible,
as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to
the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every
foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of
being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a
yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign
parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines
on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers
for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in
the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by
whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a
foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%.
Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do
not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines
thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or
believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising
abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless
just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two,
foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't
make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to
sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings.
Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are
not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While
the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it
should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.115
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 37
Sr.
Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr.
Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the
children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child.
Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino
mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr.
Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the
hands of the Legislature?
Sr.
Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international
law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage"
are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit
specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate
and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children
with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated
primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too
few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were
already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 38
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article
XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x"
and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon
the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions,
legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even
though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption
court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis
v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be
adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in
rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the
res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners
herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over
the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners. 120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing
the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies
on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 026-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children"
and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws
and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is
erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 39
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having
to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not
by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is
the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of
the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the
1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that
petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in
her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her
"foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a
foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted
principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on
principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and
the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation." 128 These are the
same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as
embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by
this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied
the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on
our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in
accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every
child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 40
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of
which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first
is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to
the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to
have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall
be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is
known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on
the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of
the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that
their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the
1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of
the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines
had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 41
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the
1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent
with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual
certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the
matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making.
We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which
calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court
that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them
legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift
foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them secondclass citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only
plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the
matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET,
follows:
140
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit 144 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he
will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural
citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was
obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that
natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It
is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are
only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen
and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this
Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 42
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may
ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule,
recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected." 148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that
petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to"
in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her
adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a naturalborn Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names
of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the
biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled
to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation
that it is an amended issue." 150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court,
the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency
or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated
in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality
of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an
adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it
cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or
not petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in
her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have
been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In
answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a
beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival
on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006
with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine
Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for
petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot
issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in
April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the
U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006
e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address;
final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing
sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated
that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 43
and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was
purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the
spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he
stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family
home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by
the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and
Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had
been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites,
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was
no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all
the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the
earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines
was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved
by the
BI. In this
regard,
COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During
the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of
an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent
resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American
(without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very
different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence
presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence
prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing
that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence.
In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work
was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes
v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had
not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship
issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said
that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 44
by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply
to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence
has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of
petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was
false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of
residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus,
according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true
the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from
April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period
of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the
COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that
the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the
sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the
evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat,
would include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence
made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period
of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that
petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that
domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in
reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay
permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident
for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide
anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the
COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation
in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for
purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months
in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the
media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist
Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in
the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the
media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the
SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1
September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when
she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the
question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in
the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be
said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012
COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 45
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan
City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in
Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough
to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of
One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family
lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills
was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that
her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to
secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are
"Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States
Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a
Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in
Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home. 170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention
to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to
consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for
Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner
for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions
of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased
with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 46
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 47
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the
trial of the case shows:
GREGORIO
vs.
NORBERTO
GURAY,
NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,
ET
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in
civil case No. 1442 of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual
capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of the
municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of
municipal president of said municipality, a petition against Norberto Guray
asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said
municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not
resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said
Administrative Code.
AL., respondents.
Mabanag and Primicias, Gibbs and McDonough, and Mariano Alisangco for
appellant.
Sison and Siguion and Franciscco Ortega for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of res
judicata and dismissing the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said
Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others, with costs against the
petitioner.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered
upon Gregorio Nuval's petition for the cancellation of Norbeto
Guray's name on the election list of Luna is conclude and
constitutes res judiata in the present case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the
time of his election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in
said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the
petitioner is entitled to hold the office in question.
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437
and 438 of the same Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, and Judge E.
Araneta Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion,
Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna from
Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable, Norberto Guray's name
remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was
elected to the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes,
Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal
council of Luna, acting as the municipal, Norberto Guray, elected to the
office of municipal president of the said municipality of Luna for the next
triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo
warranto as provided in section 408 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3387, asking that Norberto Guray be declared
ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the election as
required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be
eligible to an elective municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or
not the judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of
Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as
to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto,
which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act. No. 3387 is of a summary character and the judgment
rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before
the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 48
may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower
judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity
as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered
candidate for the office of the president of said municipality, against
Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality.
The present proceedings of quo warranto was intreposed by Gregorio Nuval
in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the office of municipal
president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the
same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since
it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an
identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil
Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756,
par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or
the litigious matter was the conclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from
the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo
warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter in
his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected.
Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or
the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that
Norberto Guray had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality
of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceedings
of quo warranto, the case of this action is that Norberto Guray has not the
one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the office of
municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of
causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a)
Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850). And as in the case of the petition for
exclusion and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no
identity either of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or
causes of action, there is no res judicata.1awphi1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the
judgment rendered in the case on the petition of Gregorio Nuval asking for
the cancellation of Norberto Guray's name in the election list of Luna is
conclusive and constitutes res judicata in the present case.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 49
In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not
Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the
general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of
municipal president of Luna, Province of La Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed
the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his
residence from the municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more
established his residence in the municipality of Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a
state and acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of
his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence"
(20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is
synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of
Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate
in the municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter
municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law, and for such
purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his personal
presence in said municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of
the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction
was such municipality, Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in
said municipality until the 6th of February, 1928 when he filed his
resignation from his office, which was accepted on the same date. The fact
that his family moved to the municipality of Luna in the year 1926 in order
to live there in view of the high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his
children studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on afternoons
after hours he went home to the municipality of Luna and there passed the
night with his family, are not in themselves alone sufficient to show that
from said year he had transfered his residence to said municipality, since
his wife and children lived with his father-in-law, in the latter's house that
only in the month of January, 1927, did he begin the construction of a
house of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied by
himself or his family, His aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own
explanation given to the provincial treasurer, were made for purpose of
visiting his sick father. His own act in recording in his cedula certificates for
the years 1927 and 1928 issued by himself in his favor as municipal
treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was that municipality, and in
taking out a new cedula in the municipality of Luna of February 20, 1928,
and having the date of its issuance surreptitiuosly put back to January 15
1928, show that until the date of his resignation he did not consider himself
as a resident of the municipality of Luna. The fact that his wife and children
lived in Luna not in his own house but in that of his wife's father since the
year 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence, since a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the former
(20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences at the
same time.
The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the
appellee in his brief. Doctor Apacible never had abandoned his legal
residence in the Province of Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been
living with his family in the City of Manila, taking out his cedula certificates
here, but he never exercised the right of suffrage here. Norberto Guray
abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring it to
the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements
of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction
is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the latter.1awphi1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and
in law Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the
Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire another in the municipality of
Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he filed his resignation from the office
of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and which
resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna
in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal
residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to
the office of municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and
quashed and, in consequence, he has no right to take possession of said
office, petitioner Gregorio Nuval being the one legally elected to said office
with a right to take possession thereof, having secured second place in the
election. With costs against the respondent. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Ostrand,
Villamor, J., dissents.
Johns
and
Romualdez,
JJ.,
concur.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 50
This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered
in this case on December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and another rendered
affirming the judgment appealed from.
In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res
judicata, as the movant does not adduce any new argument in support
thereof, and inasmuch as this court has already discussed question at
length, we find no sufficient reason to grant the motion on said grounds.
As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is
the one who has been legally elected to the office of municipal president of
Luna, La Union, and entitled to take possession thereof, having received
second place, we consider them meritorious, for the reason that 408 of the
Election Law, providing the remedy in case a person not eligible should be
elected to a provincial or municipal office, does not authorize that it be
declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from section 479 of
the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason,
furthermore, that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who
have obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented their certificates of
candidacy may be certified as elected to municipal offices. Elective offices
are by nature different from the appointive offices. The occupation of the
first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the second depends on
the will of the authority providing for it. In quo warranto proceedings
referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the
eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring
to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the
court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has
been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case,
the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to
declare who is entitled to occupy the office.
In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in
this case on December 29, 1928, should be, and is hereby, amended,
eliminating from the dispositive part thereof, the holding that Gregorio
Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so as to read as follows:
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto
Guray to the office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby
declared unlawful and quashed and, consequently, that he has no
right to take possession of said office, with costs against said
respondent.
So ordered.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 51
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18,
1931.
[G.R.
No.
43314.
December
19,
1935.]
&
Opisso
Hilado
for Appellant.
for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER. To effect the
abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen,
with a declared or provable intent that it should be ones fixed and
permanent place of abode, ones home. There is a complete dearth of
evidence in the record that M ever established a new domicile in a foreign
country.
2. INHERITANCE AND INCOME TAXES. As Ms legal domicile at the time
of his death was the Philippine Islands and his estate had its situs here, the
inheritance and income taxes here involved were lawfully collected.
DECISION
BUTTE, J.:
"II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will,
certified copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a
part hereof, by virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his
only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of
the
State
of
New
York,
United
States
of
America.
"III. That on February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special
administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed
by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same
being designated as case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition
marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition was filed by Ida M.
Palmer, asking for the probate of said will of the deceased Arthur Graydon
Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a
decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked
Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and made parts
hereof.
"V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and
only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order
issued by the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit
EE is hereto attached and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing
for the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter
dated February 28, 1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody,
copy of which marked Exhibit FF is hereto attached and made a part
hereof.
"VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted
principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties,
as are more fully shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the
special administrator with the court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of
which inventory marked Exhibit GG is hereto attached and made a part
hereof. This stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of
said
properties
for
the
purpose
of
the
inheritance
tax.
"VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for
the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return,
certified copy of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a
part
hereof.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 52
"VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional
period from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which
marked Exhibit II is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also
prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said
deceased
Arthur
Graydon
Moody.
"IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals
filed with the court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is
hereto
attached
and
made
a
part
hereof.
"X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed
to the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which
marked Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the
letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding
paragraph. Said answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a
part
hereof.
"XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the
attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN
is
hereto
attached
and
made
a
part
hereof.
"XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again
replied in a letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part
hereof.
"XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest
the sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on
January 19, 1932, making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39
covers the assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41
covers the assessment for income tax against said estate.
"XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled
the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
"XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the
hearing
of
the
present
case.
"Manila,
August
15,
1933."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting
principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and
personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at
P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of
inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death
was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this
record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere else. In his
will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the
formalities of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to
his
sister,
Ida
M.
Palmer,
he
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in
the Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last
Will
and
Testament
.
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The substance of the plaintiffs cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of
his
complaint
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied,
assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible
personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and
the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the
value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as
aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property
without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of
the
Philippine
Islands."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue
of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation
of inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine
Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be
exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any shares, obligations, or bonds
issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in
the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in
any partnership, business or industry established in the Philippine Islands or
of any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to
the following tax:"
x
It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 53
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I wish to know as soon as possible now (as to the purchase) for I have
very recently decided either to sell or put in a line of school or office
supplies . . . before I go to the necessary investments in placing any side
lines. I concluded to get your definite reply to this . . . I have given our New
York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and
this will give you plenty of time . . . anything that kills a business is to have
it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid." He
wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the
same line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after
these letters were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been
immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the
Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the
Philippine
Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had
adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was
physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his
death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there
although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he
wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live
there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he
established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains
no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where
in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home.
There is no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in
any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any
affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there.
The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return
to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His
short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that
he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the
Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moodys
continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and
reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious
departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he
doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined,
because his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on the
day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the
Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the
place of their usual residence." The record before us leaves no doubt in our
minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant
describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 54
and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign
country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in
Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual
residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it
should be ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. There is a
complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a
new
domicile
in
a
foreign
country.
The contention under the appellants third assignment of error that the
defendant collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against
the Moody estate is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this
assessment, stated by the Collector of Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit
NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of P259,986.69 was
received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by the
Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The
appellant contends that this assessment involves triple taxation: First,
because the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the
years it was accumulated as surplus; second, that an inheritance tax on the
same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the same amount
is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the
collectors assessment, Exhibit II, that the collector allowed the estate a
deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already
been paid at the source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income
tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax or surtax that had
not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate, having
actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged
double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional
income tax in question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under
different statutes and we are not convinced by the appellants argument
that the estate which received these dividends should not be held liable for
the payment of the income tax thereon because the operation was simply
the conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the property of the
individual stockholders. (Cf. U. S. v. Phellis, 257 U. S., 171, and Taft v.
Bowers, 278 U. S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is
relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt
property
shall
be
included
as
income
subject
to
tax.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the
estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its
situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal domicile
up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Costs against
the Appellant.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 55
MELECIO
CLARINIO
UJANO, petitioner
and
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
appellant,
Tagayuna,
Arce
and
Tabaino
for
petitioner
and
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C.
Zaballero and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for oppositor and appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed
before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur.
He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero,
who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines for the United States of
America in 1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the Philippines on
November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay.
He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal,
Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of
$115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States of
America. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce
his allegiance to the U.S.A.1wph1.t
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the
ground that petitioner did not have the residence required by law six
months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Hence the present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment:
"One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the
applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he
applies for naturalization' [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This
'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization, has already been
interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise
known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives and
stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is
characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into
this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for
reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to
have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only
temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is
accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizen of
the United States of America, was admitted into this country as a
temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the
present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which
continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with
the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing
his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it
to be a correct interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63]
which requires that before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship
he "shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he
applies for naturalization." The word "residence" used therein imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term
cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been
admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other
words, the term residence used in said Act should have the same
connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by
foregoing the qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein.
The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship
is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come within
the purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 56
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for
review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo
Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green
card holder.
CASCANTE petitioner,
ON
ELECTIONS
and
MERITO
C.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective;
the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of
January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3)
petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No.
87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification
of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card
issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for
his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged
that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all
previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May
18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the
exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on
the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel)
does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of
his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his
having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As
the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code,
there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an
immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having
admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent
upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected
office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No.
84508.)
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 57
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito
Miguel, respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated
June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C.
Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to
dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals
ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further
proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case
questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of
the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the
petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy
of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code
are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No.
88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is
proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2)
whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident
of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18,
1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 58
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance
to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return
for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are
permitted to remain, are in general entitled to the
protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they
are permitted to remain are entitled to the safeguards of
the constitution with regard to their rights of person and
property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus
resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person the equal protection of the law, and the
protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a
livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So
an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the
Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public
office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless such person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 59
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there
permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come
and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court
believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses;
that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his
other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow
itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and
giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that
he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he
was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was
null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals
in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C.
Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs
against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 60
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be
issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy." 7
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
ELECTIONS
and
CIRILO
ROY
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 61
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 62
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 63
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 64
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and
"Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence
is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights
and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of
"the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a
given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless,
for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 65
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events
are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make
her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed
the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban
City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal
the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is
followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE
ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING
THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or
domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with
the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could
be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established
by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly
be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its
assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time
when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally
cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to
be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 66
Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,
following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived
in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semipermanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion
by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between
(actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who
has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with
his family in another municipality, has his residence in the
former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered
as an elector in the other municipality in question and
having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the
latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34
We explained that:
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 67
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 68
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 69
years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful
even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of
Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the
marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113
Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned
by any other penalty than the consequences that would be
visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to
that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos,
in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code
to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile"
appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family
Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code
and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by
the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different
in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one
thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 70
CONFLICTS | JAN14| 71