I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Administrative Law That branch of modern law under which the executive department of the government acting in
a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting
the well-being of the community, as under laws regulating public corporations, business affected with public interest,
professions, trade and calling, rates and prices, laws for the protection of the public health and safety and the
promotion of the public convenience and advantage.
Administrative Code of 1987
Sec. 1.Title. - This Act shall be known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular
statute, shall require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay subdivisions or
other forms of local government.
(2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the
different forms of local governments.
(3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the Constitutions
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
(7) Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any
instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its name or
designation.
(8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include
any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a bureau regardless of actual
name or designation, as in the case of department-wide regional offices.
(9) Office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a department
or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons,
whose functions are defined by law or regulation.
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or
adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons, the principal powers of which are
exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council.
(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law
with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges and then monetary authority of the State.
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities eitherwholly, or, where applicable as in the case
of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or

controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of Budget, the Civil Service Commission,
and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

Sec. 16 Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
Kinds of Administrative Law
1.
2.
3.
4.

Statutes setting up administrative authorities

The body of the doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of determinations and
regulations of such administrative authorities
Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities in pursuance of the purposes for which
administrative authorities were created or endowed
Determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative authorities in the settlement of controversies
arising in their particular fields.

The 1987 Administrative Code did not entirely repeal or modify the Revised Administrative Code and special
legislations because what the 1987 Code repealed or modified are only those all laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly (Sec. 27
Book VII of AC of 1987)
Administrative Codes in question depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause.
2 Administrative Codes
1.
2.

General laws
Between the codes and special legislations on specific subject matters,
Special legislations will prevail as an exception to the former

Statutory principle: General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable .
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affair of individuals
for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or
such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Presumption: is that special statutes are exceptions to general law because they pertain to a special charter granted
to meet a particular set of conditions and circumstances
Sources of Administrative Law:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Constitution
Statutes creating administrative bodies
Court decisions interpreting the charters of administrative bodies
The body of rules, regulations and orders issued by administrative agencies

CASES:
1. Mecano v. COA (Reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses)

F - Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. Reimbursement for his expenses on
the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC.
I WON RAC was repealed by AC 1987?
H RAC was not repealed by AC 1987. As a gen. rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not
substitute for the first act and will continue so for as the two acts are the same from the time of first enactment. Thus,
before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the
new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.
It is settled that repeal of a statute by implication is not favoured.
It is clear that the earlier law is culled(Cull select from a group) in a general repeal clause. In the absence of an
expressed repeal, there will be an implied repeal only if the later law and the earlier law are clearly and convincingly
irreconcilable. However, there is no implied repeal in this case because the later and earlier laws can be reconciled
through a reasonable construction of a statute.

2. Leveriza . IAC (Contract of Lease)

F - Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:
Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25
years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc.,
over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of
land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which
Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C
with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present
litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still
valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado was ineffective and asks the
court to annul Contract A because of the violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by
virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the
Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid.
I - There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether
or not said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners
with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA
and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A
H YES. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically for the purpose of
operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of
said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such eventuality, the consent of
the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and
conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and conditions of the contract. Said
paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions herein agreed upon shall
be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the
consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of
CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
H Cancellation of contract is valid.
It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the
government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the
power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an
entity duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested
in it, which in this case is RA 776.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its
creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on these properties that the Administrator
must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any
person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real
property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of
properties acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of
the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions
contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the Director of the CAA does not need the prior
approval of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in the execution of Contract C.
3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot execute without
approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, citing the Revised Administrative Code, which provide that Under 567 of the Revised Administrative
Code, such contract of lease must be executed:
(1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or
(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real property
belonging to the RP under its administration even without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act
776, which reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general control and supervision of the Department
Head, the Administrator shall have, among others, the following powers and duties:
xxxxxxxxx

(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport and all
government aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such
power and duties as: (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or
private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and
easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other real
property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the President of the Philippines.
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in
the fact that the real property subject of the lease in Contract C is real property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the
government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the
power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an
entity duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested
in it, which in this case is RA 776.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its
creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on these properties that the Administrator
must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any
person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real
property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of
properties acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of
the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions
contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the Director of the CAA does not need the prior
approval of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in the execution of Contract C.
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation
must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable; that specific statute prevails over a general ; and that where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.

3. Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Dev. Bank Employees (Voluntary Arbitrator)
F - From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE)
arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision
and the MOA on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers.
Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBEs Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to
submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no
Position Paper had been filed by LDB. Without LDBs Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to
prohibit her from enforcing the same.
I - WON a voluntary arbitrator is an instrumentality
H - Instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus the term governmental agency or instrumentality are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which the government acts or by which certain
government act or function is performed.

Since a voluntary arbitrator performs quasi-judicial functions, he/she does performs a state function pursuant to a
governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code. Thus, he/she falls in the
contemplation of the term instrumentality.
In VolkschelLabor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary
arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework
vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

4. Iron and Steel Authority v. CA (expropriation proceedings, eminent domain, non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of RP)
F - Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and
steel industry in the Philippines.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which
is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among
other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC,
Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of
public located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), Letter of
Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of
the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also
directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days
from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to
initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject
public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA commenced eminent domain
proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City, praying that it be placed in possession of the property involved
upon depositing in court representing ten percent (10%) of the declared market values of that property.
A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the
land occupied by MCFCs fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA
expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which
had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion.
The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the
provision of the Rules of Court stating that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil case.
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.

ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the same time, however, the
Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to have ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a
public purpose, considering that the parties had not yet rested their respective cases.
Hence this Petition for Review.
I - WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term.
RP is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of
ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or justify the
dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties,
functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into GRP and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity
or agency of the Republic.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate
user of the properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually successful.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first
instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein.
Inc. Agency (GOCC, SSS, GSIS, LANDBANK, PUP
1.
2.
3.

Look at the charter is the charter prescribes the government to enter.

Apply the Corporation Code Articles of Incorporation
In the absence look for the Gen. Law

5. IgnaciaBalicas v. Fact-Finding and lntelligence Bureau (FFIB) (neglect of duty)\

F - Respondent BALICAS, PENRO senior environmental management specialist, monitored the implementation of the
CHS Project Development to check compliance with the terms and conditions in the ECC. She conducted another
monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both instances, she noted that the project was still in the
construction stage hence, compliance with the stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a
follow-up monitoring is proper. It appeared from the records that this August 23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the
last one conducted by the DENR. Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding investigation
was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly
filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the local government
of Antipolo. The charge against petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to monitor and inspect the
development of CHS, which was assumed to be her duty as DENR senior environmental management specialist
assigned in the province of Rizal.
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not conducted, claiming that she monitored the
development of CHS as evidenced by 3 monitoring reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of due
diligence, insisting that the tragedy was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse did not occur in Cherry
Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of the subdivision.

I WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty

H The petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision affirming the Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioner IGNACIA
BALICAS from office is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners REINSTATEMENT to her position with back pay and
without loss of seniority rights is hereby ordered.
In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfully prescribed duties of
petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent on the specific duties of a senior environmental management
specialist. Internal regulations merely speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.
The responsibility of monitoring of housing and land development projects is not lodged with the DENR but with the
HLURB which is the sole regulatory body for housing and development. Hence there is no legal basis for a government
employee under DENR be held liable for gross neglect of duty pertaining to another agency.
Regulatory Agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate
matters affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a
collective body such as a commission, board or council.

6. Malaga v. Penachos (Bidding and award of the project)

F Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against the Chairman and members of the PBAC (Pre-qualification, Bids
and Awards Committee) on the ground of their refusal to accept the documents submitted without just cause that
resulted of not being included in the pre-qualified bidders and unable to participated on the scheduled bidding. Also
asking not to grant the awards of the project pending resolution of their complaint.
I WON ISCOF is covered by PD 1818
H- Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) as a chartered institution as well as instrumentality is covered by PD 1818.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework
vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges
and then monetary authority of the State.
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is covered by PD 1818. However, it must be noted that this law was
not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies.

7. Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan (Corrupt Practice of the petitioner as a public officer)

F Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3 (b) RA 3019 as amended, known as
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.
The Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Institute, a component of the DOST employed
petitioner as Project Manager to supervise the construction of the JICA Bldg. at the DOST Compound BicutanTaguig.
I WON the accused is a public officer
H The accused falls under the non-career service category of CSC pursuance to the definition of Sec. 2 (b) RA 3019
includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary whether in the career service and
non career service. Hence, he is a public officer.

Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual
nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with
reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of
governmental power, officer includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or
exercise that function.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Adminstrative Agencies

2003 Bar Exams: Validity of abolition of long-standing Bureau under DILG by the President
The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG provided it is done in good faith because the
president has been granted the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office and
the executive departments to effect economy and promote efficiency and the power includes the abolition of
government offices.

1. Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner IsabeloCrisostomo was the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), appointed by
the President of the Philippines (Pres. Marcos) on July 17, 1974. During the incumbency of petitioner, 2
administrative cases were filed against him for: 1.) illegal use of government vehicles, 2.) misappropriation
of construction materials belonging to the college, 3.) oppression and harassment, 4.) grave
misconduct, 5.) nepotism and dishonesty.
Administrative cases were filed with the Office of the President and subsequently referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation. Charges of violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3(e), RA 992 Sec. 20-21 and RA 773 Sec.
14 were filed against him in the Office of the Tanodbayan. On June 14, 1976, 3 information for violation of Sec.
3(e) of the Anti-Graf and Corruption Practices Act (RA 3019) were filed against the Petitioner. The information
alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahaykubo which was intended for the college and construction
materials worth P250,000 more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the college as his personal
and family driver.
On October 22, 1976, Petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to RA 3019 Sec. 13,Dr. Pablo
T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer in charge on Nov. 10, 1976 and then Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978 PD 1341 was issued by Pres. Marcos, converting the PCC into a PUP. Mateo continued as the
head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980 as
President for a term of 6 years.
On July 11, 1980 the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges
against him and ordered the reinstatement of the latter. By virtue or reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the
salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
Cases filed before the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on the ground that they had become
moot and academic.
Moot and Academic - An action is considered moot when it is no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involving have become academic or deed as when subsequent events have undertaken the
position and the court has nothing left to resolve.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for execution of judgment; particularly the part
ordering his reinstatement to the position of President of PUP and the payment of his salaries and benefits during
the period of suspension. Motion was granted. However, Pres. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting
President of PUP following the expiration of the term of office of Dr.NemesioPrudente who had succeeded Dr.
Mateo.
In his return, the sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP,
although Dr.Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult the President of the Philippines. Petitioner
assumed the Office of the President of PUP.
On May 18, 1992, People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the writ of
execution before CA. CA issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the petitioner to cease and desist from
acting as President of PUP.
On July 15, 1992, the 7 th Division of CA rendered decision and set aside the writ of execution rendered by the
trial court payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner was disallowed. Hence, petition before SC
Issue: W/N PD 1314 which converted the PCC into PUP, did not abolish the PCC
Held: Petitioner argues that PD 1314 did not abolish PCC, and PUP is merely continuation of the existence of the
PCC and could be reinstated to his former position.

PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the former PCC into PUP. What took place was a change in
academic status of the education institution not in its corporate life.
As petitioner correctly points out when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization
and to replace it with another one, lawmaking authority says so.
But the reinstatement of Petitioner could not be ordered because PD 1437 had been promulgated fixing the
term of the office of the President of the State Universities and Colleges into 6 years, renewable for another 6
years and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbent who were not reappointed.

10

Ruling: CA decision modified by setting aside the orders of TC with regard to the non payment of the salaries and
benefits which the Petitioner failed to receive during his suspension.
With the result petitioners term was cut short. Hence, the petitioner became entitled only to
retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay.

2. Viola vs. Alunan, III (Cesar G. Viola, Chairman, Brgy. 167 Zone 15 Dist. II Mla. vs. Rafael Alunan III, Sec. of
DILG)
Facts: Petitioner brought an action against Respondent, Alex David, President/Secretary General of the National
Ligangmga Barangay, and Leonardo Angat, President of the City of Manila Ligangmga Barangay to RESTRAIN them
from carrying out the election for the questioned positions.
Local and National Liga 1.)President, 2.) Executive Vice-President, 3.) 1 st VP, 4.)2nd VP, 5.)3rd VP, 6.)Auditor, 7.)
5 Directors
Contention: Petitioners contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those provided in the
Local Government Code (RA7160) Section 493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of Presidentt,
Vice-President, and 5 members of Board of Directors in each chapter at the Municipality, City, Provincial,
Metropolitan Political Subdivisions and National Levels.
Issue: W/N additional positions have been created without authority of law according to Petitioner?
Held: Contention is untenable. Creation of these positions was actually made in the constitution and By-laws of
the Ligangmga Barangay w/c was adopted by the 1st Barangay National Assembly on Jan. 11, 1994.
The creation of additional positions in the National Ligangmga Barangay and its chapters is authorized by the
LGC pursuant to Sec. 493 The board shall create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter.
Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but to the board of
the Liga at the National Level as well.
The creation by the board of the National Liga of the positions of 1 st, 2nd, and 3rd VP was intended to provide
uniform officers for the national chapters.
Additional positions to be created pursuant to Sec. 493 of LGC need not be limited to the appointive positions
because management positions are not necessarily limited to appointive positions.
Ruling: Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED.

3. Louis Barok Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission

Facts: Petitioners raised in Court that EO 1 which created the PTC should be declared unconstitutional and to
enjoin PTC from performing its functions.
The petitioners alleged contention: that EO 1 violates separation of powers as it encroaches the power of
congress to create Public Office and appropriate funds for its operation.
Petitioners: They also asserted the fact that the role of the President in the 1987 Constitution does not include
the power to create an entirely / new public office.
Respondents contested that EO 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create Public Office because
the Presidents executive power and control necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct investigation to
ensure laws are faithfully executed.
Issue: 1. Does EO 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of Public Office?
2. Whether it violates the equal protection clause?
Held: There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Because
whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will the very source of the funds for the
commission. And thus be subject to auditing rules and regulations.

11

The Chief Executive power to create Ad Hoc investigating Committee is valid. Having been constitutionality
granted full control of the Executive Department, which respondents belong. The legality of investigation is
sustained. However, Petitioners contend that EO 1 violated the equal protection clause because it does not apply
to all members of the same class such intent of focusing only in previous administration as the sole subject of PTC.
It must be cover all administrations previous to that former Pres. Arroyo.
Ruling: Petition Granted. EO 1 declared unconstitutional insofar it is violative of the equal protection clause.

4. KapisananngmgaKawaning Energy Regulatory Board vs. Commissioner Fe Barin of Energy

Regulatory Commission
Facts: RA 9136, known as EPIRA (for electric Power Industry Reform Act) was enacted on June 8, 2009 and took
effect on June 26, 2009. Sec. 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB (Energy Regulatory Board) and
creation of ERC (Energy Regulatory Commission).
At the time of filing the petition, the ERC was composed of:
1.
2.

Commissioner Fe Barin
Dept. Commissioners Carlos Alindada, Leticia Ibay, Oliver Butalid and Mary Anne Colayco
Commissioners assumed office on Aug. 15, 2009

Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the guidelines
reflects the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the ERC employees vis--vis Civil Service rules.
Nov. 5, 2005, KERB sent a letter to the commissioners stating their objection to the commissioners stand that
Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement of the ERC
employees.
Contention:
KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERBs character, it merely changed the ERB
name to ERC and expanded functions and objectives.
Commissioner Barin replied to KERB, the creation of a placement committee is no longer necessary because
there is already a prescribed set of guidelines for recruitment of personnel.
KERB filed a petition to enjoin Termination of Petitioners ERB employees
Issue: 1. W/N Sec. 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional?
2. W/N Commissioners of the ERC were correct in disregarding and considering merely suppletory in character
the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB employees.
Held:

All laws enjoy the presumption of Constitutionality. To justify the nullification of law, there must be a clear and
convincing breach of the constitution.
Power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it
the power to abolish. Pres. Aquino, then exercisingly her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing EO 172
on May 8, 1987.
The question whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent.
Sec. 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB
ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are intended
to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.

Ruling: Impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure DOES NOT arise in the abolition of an
office.
There is no occupant in an abolished office, where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak.
Petition is DISMISSED.

12

5. Commission on Human Rights Employees Association vs. Commission on Human Rights

Facts: On Feb. 14, 1998, Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998.
It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to all constitutional officers enjoying fiscal autonomy.
Last portion of Art. 33 covers the appropriations of CHR.
CHR, through its Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recina and other Commissioners promulgated resolution No A98047 adopting an updating and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of 10 additional plantilla positions
1.
2.
3.

Director IV salary grade 28 for the CARAGA Region Office

4 Security Officer II salary grade 15
5 Process Servers salary grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners

By virtue of Resolution No A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional
source of funding, for said staffing modification .among the positions collapsed were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Atty. III
4 Atty. IV
Chemist III
3 Special Investigator I
Clerk III
Accounting Clerk II

CHR forwarded said staffing position and upgrading scheme to the DBM, but DBM Sec. Benjamin Diokno denied the
request on the ground that Being a member of the fiscal autonomy, group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of DBM.
This would elevate the field units to
denied.

a bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one previously

In light of DBMs disapproval, the CSC-NCR Office, through a Memorandum, recommended the CSC Central Office
that the subject appointments be rejected.
CHREA, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of CSC-Regional Office.
CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to
evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
CHREA filed Motion for Reconsideration but CSC-Central Office denied, CHREA elevated it to CA which affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office. (Rule in favor of Central Office)
Petition before SC.
Issue: Can the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation and
collapsing of plantilla positions which approval of DBM?
Held:
Contention: Petitioners contention that CA gravely erred when it held that under 1987 Constitution, the CHR
enjoys Fiscal Autonomy. And it includes the action taken by it in collapsing, upgrading and reclassification of
positions.
Respondent CHR said that petitioner has no locus standi because no official written record in the commission
recognizing the petitioner as bona fide organization of its employees nor there is anything in the records to show
that its president, MarcialSachez Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR.
CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, creating and collapsing plantilla
schemes without approval of DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.
SC: Proper Party is one who has sustained an injury as a result of the act complaint of. Here, petitioner, which
consist of rank and file employees of respondent CHR protests that the upgrading, reclassification and collapsing of

13

positions benefited only select few in the upper level position in the commission. This sufficiently meet the injury
test.
The regulatory power of DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as
well. DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and POSITION CLASSIFICATION of the
National Government (RAC of 1987 Sec. 3 Chapter I Title 17).
The approval of DBM must first sought prior to implementation of any or upgrading of positions in government.
From the 1987 Consti.and the Administrative Code, it is clear that CHR is not among the class of Constitutional
Commissions, NOR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal Autonomy freedom from outside control and limitations, it is a constitutional grant, not obtainable by
membership.
CHR is not a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy.
Salary Standardization law, for this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the
salary standardization law.
Ruling: Petition GRANTED, decision of CA reversed and set aside.

Reorganization of Administrative Agencies

a. Definition of Reorganization
b. Presidents power to reorganize; basis
c. Power of other agencies to reorganize; limitations

Reorganization is the process of restructuring the bureaucracys organizational and functional set up, to make it
more viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and to make it more responsive to the needs of its public
clientele as authorized by law.

Is a means used by the legislature to reorganize or abolish offices which t may do so directly or indirectly
by authorizing an executive department or agency to reorganize its office.

The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG provided it is done in good faith because
the president has been granted the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office
and the executive departments to effect economy and promote efficiency and the power includes the abolition
of government offices.

1. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary

Facts: Petitioner represented by Rep. Muji S. Hataman, Respondent is Hon. Eduardo Ermita, and the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform Hon. Rene Villa.
Petitioner (AMIN) assail the constitutionality of EO 364 and 379 both issued in 2004, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition EO 364 issued by GMA on Sept. 27, 2004 which transforming the DAR into Dept. of Land
Reform (DLR).
EO 379 amending EO 364 which states that National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) shall be
attached agency of the DLR
Contention:
Petitioner contends that 2 Presidential issuances are unconstitutional for violating:
1.
2.
3.

Principle of Separation of Powers.

Constitutional scheme and policies for Agrarian Reform.
Constitutionality right of the people in reasonable participation in decision making including through adequate
consultation.

Issue: W/N EO 364 and EO 379N is unconstitutional? Is the reorganization valid?

14

Held: The issued on the transformation of DAR into DLR became moot and academic because by virtue of EO 456
which issued on Aug. 23, 2005, DLR having reverted into its former name.
OSG on behalf of Respondent concedes that AMIN has a legal standing to file suit as member of Congress.
Petitioner averred that Executive which injures the institution of Congress which can be questioned by a
member of Congress, and Powers of Congress are impaired.
Co Petitioner Mamalo Descendants Organization Inc. (MDOI) alleges that it is concerned with the negative
impact of NCIP becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of Ancestral Domain claims filed with
its members.
MDOI raises no transcendental importance to relate to the merits of petition because of lack of any other party
with more direct and specific interest in the question raised.
AMIN contends that since DAR, NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed, merged not by
mere executive orders and reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the subject of statutes.
The Constitution confers, by EXPRESS provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and
offices in the President alone.
Pres. Justifies an executive action to carry out re-organization measures under broad authority of law.
Pursuant to AC of 1987 Sec. 39, states that: The President shall have continuing authority to re-organize the
administrative structure of the Office of the Pres. And he may take the ff actions:
Transfer agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

2. DrianitaBagaoisan vs. National Tobacco Administration represented by Antonio De Guzman and

PerlitaBaula
Facts: President ERAP issued on Sept. 1998 EO 29 entitled Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco
Administration (NTA) a government agency under the Department of Agriculture (DA).
Order was followed by EO 36 amending EO 29 by increasing from 400 to not exceeding 75 the positions
affected thereby.
In compliance therewith, NTA prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Patter (OSSP)
which was submitted to the Office of the Pres.
On Nov. 11, 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA, Batac (Petitioners) filed a letter appeal with CSC and
sought the assistance in recalling OSSP.
On Dec. 4, 1998, OSSP was approved by DBM subject to certain revisions.
On June 10, 1999, petitioners, all occupying different position of NTA Office in Batac, IlocosNorte, received
individual notices of termination of their employment effective 30 days from receipt thereof.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before RTC of BatacIlocosNorte. The RTC
ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP positions similar to their respective former assignments.
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by NTA was denied by RTC, then NTA filed on appeal with CA, and CA
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the TC.
Petitioners, elevated the matter to SC; SC denied for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error of CA, MR
denied. Petitioners submitted a Motion to admit Petition for en banc resolution.
Issue: Whether NTA may be re-organized by an executive fiat, not by legislative action
Held:
Contention:

15

Petitioners contention, re-organization through the issuance of EO cannot be done without the benefit of due
deliberation, debate and discussion of members of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines.
A public office is either created by the constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Where the office was
created by Congress, it may be abolished by them. The EXCEPTION, is as far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in the
executive department, the Pres. Power of control may justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office
and grant him the broad authority to carry out re-organization measures.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
3. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs. Civil Service Commission and
Violeta Garcia
Facts: In 1977, Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Law graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed
Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529 which she appointed under permanent status up to Sept. 1984
She was for 2 years designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan by virtue of EO
649 which authorized the restricting of the Land Registration Commission to NLTDRA.
Petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on Oct. 1, 1984 under Temporary
status for not being a member of the Bar.
She appealed to Sec. of Justice but her request was denied; MR was denied as well.
Petitioner was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the Service. While said
case was pending decision, her temporary appointment was renewed in 1985.
In Memorandum dated Oct. 30, 1986, minister and now Secretary of Justice notified petitioner of the
termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground she was receiving bribe money.
Appeal to Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred to appeal to the Merit System Protection
Board which denied on the ground that termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary
appointment. MR DENIED.
However, in Resolution dated June 30, 1988, the CSC directed Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy
Register of Deeds II because the new requirement of BAR membership would not apply to her but only to filling up
of vacant lawyer position on after Feb. 9, 1981. Since she had been holding the position from 1977-1984, she
would not be affected by EO 649.
NALTDRA filed present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution of the CSC.
Contention:
Sec. 8 and 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in LRC and transferred to NALTDRA and Garcia is not a
member of the Bar and she cannot be reinstated.
Issue: W/N Membership of the Bar is the qualification requirement for appointment of Deputy Register of Deeds
under EO 649?
Held: EO 649 authorized the re-organization of LRC into NALTDRA. It abolished all the positions and required new
appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.
Law mandates from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in LRC are deemed NONEXISTENT. After Abolition, there is No Occupant, No Tenure to Speak.
Its requirement of BAR membership for Deputy Register of Deeds is valid reorganization measure.
reorganization carried in good faith for the purpose to make bureaucracy more efficient.

4. EliseoSinon vs. Civil Service Commission, Dept. of Agriculture Re-organization Appeals Board and
Juana Banan
Facts: Prior to re-organization of then Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Private Respondent Banan was the
incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer of Region II, Cagayan.

16

Petitioner EliseoSinon occupied position of Fisheries Extension Specialist II in BFAR in the same region.
However, the re-organization of the MAF into Department of Agriculture with the issuance of EO 116 called for the
evaluation of 29 positions of Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) in Region II, Cagayan. Petitioner is included but
Banan is excluded.
Thus, Respondent Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of qualifications. And was reevaluated. And Sinon was displaced by Banan and the resolution was approved by Sec. of Agriculture, Carlos G.
Dominguez.
However, on Aug. 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II Cagayan as approved by the
Regional Director GumersindoLasam on the basis of 1st evaluation.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal to CSC, then DARAB Resolution Set Aside. Banan filed an MR which she pitted her
qualifications against Sinon. And granted Banans MR.
Sinon filed MR, but CSC denied it. Hence, Petition before SC to assailed the resolution of CSC.
Issue: W/N CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the rating or qualification of
petitioner.
Held:
Contention:
Petitioners argued that CSC revoked the appointment that the petitioner received early and which deemed
permanent by virtue of the approval of the Regional Director of the Dept. of Agriculture.
CSC departed from its power which is limited only to REVIEW and hence encroached upon the appointing
power exclusively lodged in the appointing authority.
Under RA 6656 Sec. 6, In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any
re-organization, there shall be created a placement committee in each department or agency to assist the
appointing authority in placement of personnel.
Placement committee was charged with the duty of exercising the discretionary functions as the appointing
authority.
Purposes of Re-organization is the process of restructuring the bureaucracys organizational and functional
set-up to make it more viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and make it more responsive to
the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.

5. Luis B. Domingo vs. DBP and CSC

Facts: Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on permanent status
from Feb. 1979 to Dec. 1986.
On Dec. 3, 1986 EO 81, the Revised Charter of IBP was passed authorizing the re-organization of DBP.
Pursuant to the Executive Order, DBP issued Board Resolution allowing the issuance of Temporary Appointments to
DBP Personnel in order to fully implement the re-organization. Such Temporary Appointments issued had max.
period of 12 months.
Petitioner was issued a Temporary Appointment on Jan. 2, 1987 for a period of 1 year which was renewed for
another period up to Nov. 30, 1988.
A Memorandum issued by the Final Review Committee, Petitioner got a performance rating of Below Average
by reason of which his appointment was made lapse.
Petitioner, together with certain Evangeline Javier filed with CSC a joint verified complaint against DBP for
illegal dismissal. Complainants alleged that dismissal constitute violation of Civil Service Law against issuance of
Temporary Appointments to permanent employees, as well as of their right to Security of Tenure and due process.

17

On Nov. 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution directing the re-appointment of Mr.Domingor and Ms. Javier as
Senior Training and Career Development Officer and Research Officer or any such equivalent rank under staffing
pattern of DBP.
DBP filed a MR, then CSC issued resolution setting aside its previous resolution and affirming the separation of
Petitioner. Hence, Petition before SC.
Issue: Does the validity of the re-organization implemented by DBP violates petitioners right to Security of
Tenure?
Held: Petitioner contends that government re-organization to terminate the services of government employees
cannot be valid ground pursuant to the ruling of Dario vs. Mison.
Petitioner also maintains that average and below average efficiency ratings are not valid grounds for his
Termination from Service.
He also contends that he should be afforded a day in court pursuant to the requirements of procedural due
process.
1.

2.
3.

Re-organization is recognized a valid ground for separation of Civil Service Employees, subject ONLY to the
condition it be done in good faith.
Constitution and Sec. 33 and 34 of EO 81 and Sec. 9 of RA 6656 states that all those not appointed in the
implementation of said re-organization shall be deemed separated from service.
Appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to the Merit and Fitness requiring Public Officers
and Employees to serve with the highest degree.
There is no violation of due process even no hearing was conducted as long as the party was given a chance to
present his evidence and defend himself.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

6. Aida D. Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission, Hon. TeofistoGuingona, Jr. and Hon. Salvador
Enriquez, Jr.
Facts: Aida Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for Career
Executive Service Eligibility and a CESO Rank.
On Aug. 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility and on Sept. 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
However, on Oct. 1, 1993, Respondent CSC passed resolution abolishing the Career Executive Service Board
and turn it to Office for Career Executive Service of CSC.
The said resolution became an impediment to the appointment of the Petitioners as Civil SERvice Officer, Rank
IV. Petitioner filed a petition to annul the Resolution of CSC.
Issue: Whether CSC has the power to abolish the Career Executive Service Board?
Held: Petitioner contends that CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished the CESB, an
office create by law.
CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it legally authorized the transfer of Public Money.
Respondent contends that the integration of the CESB into the CSC is authorized by law pursuant to Sec. 12(1),
Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of 1987 Admin. Code.

CESB was created by PD 1 on Sept. 1, 1974. Therefore, CESB was created by law, it can only be abolish by the
legislature. Creation and Abolition of Public Officer is primarily a legislative function.
Legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of CESB.
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity.
On the contrary, Legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CSB.

18

Commissions power to re-organza is limited to offices under its control.

The essential autonomous character of CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent commission.
Attachment purpose is inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy program and
coordination.
Ruling: Petition GRANTED.

Reason / purposes for creating administrative agencies

Common types of administrative agencies

III. POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Legislative, Judiciary, Executive are the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances among them.
-

While one branch is not to invade the domain of the other, no one branch can act without any participation
or check from the other branches which the Constitution recognizes and permits.
Administrative falls to Executive Department

2 Most Important Powers

1.

Quasi-legislatve or rule-making power promulgate IRR

The authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.

2.

Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power interpret and apply such regulations

Power to a wit of execution for the enforcement of decision
The power of the administrative authorities to make determination of facts in the performance of their
official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the fact so found.

Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance.
Discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment.

Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations:

1.

Legislative Rule designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; it is in the
nature of subordinate legislation.
a.

2.

Supplementary Regulation intended to fill in the details of the law and to make explicit what is only
general (IRR of Labor Code)
b. Contingent Regulation issued to enforce or suspend the operation of a law, after the ascertainment
by the administrative agency of existence of a particular contingency.
Interpretative Rule those which purport to do no more than interpret the statute being administered for
proper observance by the people (BIR Circulars)

Requisites for validity of administrative rules and regulations

19

1.
2.
3.
4.

Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law

Conform to the standards that the law prescribes
Must be reasonable
Must be related solely to carrying into effects the general provision o the law

CASES:
1. Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission
It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute
and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
It is beyond the power of the commission to impose because it results in discrimination and violation of constitutional
rights. The results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. The commissions permission amounted to a
prohibition.

2. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez

I WON the Sec. of Agriculture has the power to remove the directors and officers of a cooperative
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Sec. of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the powers of the
KBPMBPBM who are authorized to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Sec. 8 of
PD175 which grants him the power to supervise and regulate cooperatives. This section does not give him that right
The administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. Theses powers should be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.

3. Sen. Robert Jaworski v. PAGCOR

SAGE
The grant of franchise is stated in a clear and unequivocal language, hence the grantee must abided by the limits set
by its franchise and strictly adhere to its term and conditions.

4. RCPI v. NTC
Doctrine is settled that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body.
The EO neither grant the power to impose fines on public utilities which have failed to render adequate service to its
customer nor expanded the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency.

5. Matienzo v. Abellera
In the grant of the authority, there was no mention of time limitation. Hence, to determine whether a board or
commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for
which it was created and that which is incidentally necessary for the full implementation of the legislative intent should
be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriation means are
deemed given.

20

6. Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.

I WON CDA has adjudicatory powers
It can be gleaned from RA 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which
consist of policy making. Registration, fiscal and technical assistance to coop and implementation of cooperative laws.
There was no grant of adjudicatory powers to CDA.

7. LLDA v. CA
Re: Open Dumpsite
I Does LLDA have the power and authority to issue ceases and desist order
H
While it is fundamental that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of
its expressed powers. (toothless paper agency)

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER (RULE MAKING POWER)

Legislative power
Power to make, alter, and repeal laws.
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Non-delegation of legislative power
Power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or
authority.
Exception to the doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative power
a. Delegation to the President (e.g. Sec. 23(2) (war) and 28(2) (tariff rates), Art. IV, Constitution)
b.
Delegation to the local governments (e.g. Sec. 48, Local Government Code)
c.
Delegation to the people
d.
Delegation to the Supreme Court (e.g. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution)
e.
Delegation to Administrative Agencies.
Cases:
1. US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908) (criminal case, penalty impose, non-delegation of legislative power)
Lesson: Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of the legislature.
F Respondent was charged with a violation of par. 70 and 83 of Circular 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs,
published in OG and approved by the Sec. of Finance and Justice. That being the capt. of the Lighter Maude he was
moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden in Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew,
and without steam, sail, or any other external power.
I WON the penalty for violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature?
H - Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of the legislature. In the case of The
Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal., 491), it was ruled that
harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statutes authorizing them to do so, the court
saying: "Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulations with
reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter
purely in the hands of the legislature."
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority . Where the sovereign power of the
State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made
until the constitution itself is changed.

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This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

2. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) (Probation, undue delegation of legislative power)

Lesson: Old Probation Law violated the doctrine of non-delegation when it placed the discretion to the local
governments the decision to allocate for the salary of the probation officer.
F Respondent Judge ad interim of the Branch of CFI, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng
for probation in his criminal case.
I WON Act 4221 is unconstitutional, as undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces.
H Act 4221 is declared unconstitutional and void due to the inequality from unwarranted delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards. Sec. 11 creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed such as statute adjudge unconstitutional because of their effect in operation and denying equal protection of
the law.
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among 3 independent branches of
government. The power to make laws is vested in the legislature. Any attempt to delegate this power is
unconstitutional on the principle of potestas delegate non-delegaripotest (a delegated power cannot be
delegated).The rule however is not absolute and inflexible. An exception sanction by immemorial practice permits
delegation to local authorities.
The PA does not fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary
power. What is granted is a roving commission which enable the provincial board to exercise arbitrary discretion. By
Sec. 11 of Act 4221, the legislature does not seemingly in its own authority extend to the benefits of the PA to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
If the provincial does not wish to have the act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline the appropriate
needed amount for the salary of probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
board.
The legislature has not made the PA contingent upon specific facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial
board. It leaves the operation or non-operation of law upon the provincial board. The Act is unconstitutional.

3. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988) (Death and burial benefits of an employee
who is allegedly not an overseas workerbut nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction
Lesson: 2 tests explained. Also, the reason for the delegation.
F Vitaliano Saco was a Chief Officer of the MV Eastern Polaris who was killed in accident in Tokyo Japan. Widow sued
for damages under EO 797 and MC 2 of POEA, the latter awarded the sum of 192K for the death of her husband (180K
for death benefit and 12K for burial expenses). The petitioner challenged the decision of POEA on the ground that no
jurisdiction over the case as the deceased husband was not an overseas worker.
POEA was created under EO 797, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their
rights. It vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employeeemployer relations arising out or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino Contract workers, including
seamen.
MC 2 by POEA prescribed an standard contract to be adopted by foreign and domestic shipping companies in hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
I WON MC 2 is a violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power
Even if there is no expressed provision, delegation can be sustained if the exercise of power is pursuant to the
implementation of the purpose for which it is created.

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The standard contract is valid for it passed the tests of valid delegation of legislative power.
SCs words: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have
to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it
the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
4. Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995) (Retirement benefit of a government employee)
Lesson: High degree of detail not necessary in a law that delegates power to administrative agencies to exercise
subordinate legislation.
F Petitioner Rabor is a utility worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. Entered in the service at the age of 55.
Alma Pagatpatan an official in the Office of the Mayor advised Rabor to apply for his retirement because he had
already reached 68 years of age and 7 months, 13 years and 1 month of government service.Rabor responded to the
advice by exhibiting Cert. of Membership issued by GSIS Statement at the bottom service extended to comply 15
year service requirement in order to avail the retirement benefit given to the employees of the Government. The
Regional Director respond that his service is non extendible and the City Mayor furnished the copy of letter to
petitioner and advised him to stop reporting for work.
I WON Rabors employment should be extended
H - SCs words: Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be
implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed
and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It
is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in
respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated
legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or
enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined in the present Civil Service law - found in
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977."
For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is

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covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of
many provisions of the present civil service law.
The standards may either be expressed or implied. If the former, non-delegation is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole.
The CSC was acting as a central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards
and guidelines for efficient, responsible and effective personnel administration of the government. It was also
discharging its function of administering the retirement program for government officials and employees and of
evaluating qualifications for retirement.
It is difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee reached the age of
65 years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the provisions of the present Civil Service Law.
The physiological and psychological processes associated with the ageing of human being are in fact related to
efficiency and quality of service that may be expected from individual persons.
5. Re:
case)

Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel (same with US v Barrias

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a.
b.
1.
2.

Delegation of legislative power to Administrative Agencies

Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers of administrative agencies
Kinds of rule-making power
Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority (subordinate legislation)
Rule-making by the constructuion and interpretation of a statute being administered (interpretative legislation)
3 kinds:

Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law

Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the request of a government agency or official
Intyerpretation in adversary proceedings
3. Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue shall go into effect (contingent legislation)
c.

Reasons for delegation of legislative power

Delegation of legislative pwer has become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This has led to the observation
that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

d.

e.
1.
2.

The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing complexity of the tast of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activites and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
What can and cannot be delegated
What can be delegated Legislature may properly delegate to administrative agency any legislative power other than
the making, altering or repealing of a law, the determination of legislative policies and objectives to be achieved, and
the formulation and promulgation of a defined and binding rule of conduct. It can delegate the discretion as to how
the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fill in details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise
police power, and to fix rates. To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass the competence and sufficiency of
standard tests.
What cannot be delegated Doctrine of separation of pwers prohibits the delegation of that which is purely legislative
in nature. This consists of the power to make the law, or to determine what the law shall be, and to alter or repeal it.
Test to determine validity of delegation
Completeness test The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Case:

1.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Lessons: (1) Clarifying the 2 tests. (2) It is unlawful for congress to exercise veto on the IRRs of an administrative
agency.
SCs words:
On the 2 tests: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2)
the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the
above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing the delegated power to the President to fix revenue
targets:

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SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of
the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following
percentages:
Excess of Collection of the
Excess the Revenue Targets

Percent (%) of the Excess

Collection to Accrue to the Fund

30% or below

15%

More than 30%

15% of the first 30%

plus 20% of the
remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue
collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC
for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted
by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies
revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case
of the BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC
for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus,
the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the
DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of
all relevant factors affecting the level of collectionas provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under
this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
On legislative veto: The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006,
it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding
of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns postenactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to
determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception
of public interest.
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

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a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations.
Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise
of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can
give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts
that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress
to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI,
c. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is
thru legislative supervision. Supervision connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
congressional committee regardingexecutive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional
scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.
In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules
and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to
bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

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