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Ronald Richards, Esq. Bar#176246

Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C.
P.O. Box 11480
Beverly Hills, CA 90213
Telephone (310) 556-1001
Fax
(310) 277-3325
Email: ron@ronaldrichards.com

Attorneys for Ramanathan Prakash

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LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD A. MOSS

Richard A. Moss, SBN 42329
E-Mail: thefinn@nnosslaw.com
William C. Fleming, Jr., SBN 208176
E-Mail: wfleming@nnosslaw.com
255 South Marengo Avenue
Pasadena, California 91101-2719
Telephone: (626) 796-7400
Telecopier: (626) 796-7789

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Attorneys for Alexander Popov

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SACRAMENTO DIVISION

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CASE# CR Nos. 08-427-MCE

DEFENDANT RAMANATHAN
PRAKASHS AND ALEXANDER
POPOVS MOTION IN LIMINE TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATED TO
SUBSTANTIVE COUNTS TO WHICH
THEY WERE NOT INDICTED BY THE
GRAND JURY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff
v.
RAMANATHAN PRAKASH;
ALEXANDER POPOV, et al.

TRIAL DATE: MAY 31, 2011

Defendant

The defendant RAMANATHAN PRAKASH, by and through his attorneys,

Ronald Richards, Esq., of the Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, APC, and
ALEXANDER POPOV, by and through his attorney Richard Moss, hereby move in
limine to preclude the evidence referenced in the governments trial brief concerning the

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charges against the other defendants whom have plead guilty and are not subject to this

trial. This evidence should be excluded on the following grounds:

1. The evidence is not relevant to the crimes charges.

2. It should be excluded under FRE 403 as impermissible FRE 404(a)(1)

evidence.

Dated: May 24, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C.

/s Ronald Richards
__________________________
RONALD RICHARDS, ESQ.
Attorneys for defendant,
RAMANATHAN PRAKASH

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INTRODUCTION
The governments trial brief unleashed another surprise,

One consequence of these resolutions is that not all of the

health care fraud counts remaining in the Superseding

Indictment are alleged against the defendants proceeding to

trial. In particular, Popov, Prakash and Le Chabrier are not

named in Counts 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.

While the government anticipates introducing evidence

relating to these counts, they will not be referenced in the

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governments proposed jury instructions and verdict form.

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(See Govt Trial Brief 2:23-25, 3:1-4.)

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Since the evidence against Dr. Popov and Dr. Prakash amounts to pocket change
as to the substantive counts, the government is trying to win the trial by introducing
evidence of OTHER PEOPLES SUBSTANTIVE crimes that have nothing to do with
these two defendants. The defendants vehemently object to this evidence of other crimes
being introduced at all, and request a 403 Hearing to exclude the reference to those
charges or the evidence related to those charges.
The defendants have offered to stipulate that there was health care fraud
committed to avoid any undue prejudice or confusion to the jury which would certainly
result should the government be allowed to introduce evidence of crimes charged against
other defendants but which were specifically NOT charged against these defendants.
There is a reason these defendants were not charged with such crimes and as such there
should not be mention made or evidence introduced concerning those uncharged crimes
which would certainly confuse the jurors and result in prejudice. There is ZERO
probative value in the introduction of any such evidence as the defendants have already
offered to stipulate that such fraud existed. There is no reason to have to attempt to prove
it directly or otherwise and to do so would prejudice the defendants.
The issue is knowledge, not whether there was a fraud committed. This additional
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evidence is irrelevant and is simply being offered to increase the scope of these

defendants currently alleged offenses which have limited scope, as conceded by the

government.

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APPLICABLE LAW
First, the evidence is not relevant under FRE 401. It does not prove the existence
of any fact related to prove the guilt of Dr. Popov and Dr. Prakash.
Second, under FRE 403, the evidence should be excluded. Under FRE 403,

although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

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jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of

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cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Fed. R. Evid. 403 permits the trial judge to

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exclude evidence otherwise admissible because the probative value is substantially

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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. U.S. v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 13 Fed. R.

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Evid. Serv. 1661 (11th Cir. 1983).

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In applying Fed. R. Evid. 403 as the basis for the exclusion of otherwise relevant

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evidence, the judge should confront the problem explicitly, acknowledging and weighing

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both the prejudice and the probative worth of the tendered evidence. U.S. v. Robinson,

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530 F.2d 1076, 2 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The better and more

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preferred practice is for the trial judge, in applying Fed. R. Evid. 403, to enter a written

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finding as to the balance between the probative value of evidence against its potential for

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unfair prejudice, but failure to do so does not require reversal. U.S. v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d

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102, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1030 (7th Cir. 1979).

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In determining the admissibility of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the court

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should also consider the effect of a limiting instruction in offsetting any possible

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prejudice. U.S. v. Smith, 685 F.2d 1293, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 795 (11th Cir. 1982).

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As it relates to a criminal defendant, the term "unfair prejudice," in the rule

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allowing for the exclusion of probative but unfairly prejudicial evidence speaks to the

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capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring guilt

on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. Fed. R. Evid. 403; U.S.

v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 336 (10th Cir. 1999).

Although a trial court may choose to analyze evidence admissibility by assessing

the effect of other rules of evidence first, it is equally acceptable to perform an analysis

first under Fed. R. Evid. 403. U.S. v. Benavidez-Benavidez, 217 F.3d 720, 54 Fed. R.

Evid. Serv. 303 (9th Cir. 2000).

Simply presenting evidence of other defendants crimes diverts the trier of facts

attention to those crimes with no defenses or attorneys and unfairly prejudices the

defendants who are facing trial and have entered not guilty pleas.

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Dated: May 24, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

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Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, A.P.C.

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/s Ronald Richards
__________________________
RONALD RICHARDS, ESQ.
Attorneys for defendant,
RAMANATHAN PRAKASH

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