GROUP 7

Abquiren, Illysa Jane T.

Crisostomo, Rafael Rufo B.
Daweg, Shamira Y.
1. The remedies of the aggrieved party in fraudulent registration are the
following:
i.

Appeal
Must be brought 15 days from notice of judgment.

ii.

Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration

Must be brought within 15 days from notice of judgment

iii.

Petition for Relief of Judgment

Must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken.

iv.

Petition for Review or Petition for Reopening of the Decree

of Registration
Must be filed in the proper Regional Trial Court a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than
one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration.

v.

vi.

Action for Reconveyance

An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four
years from the discovery of the fraud and if it is based on an implied or
a constructive trust it prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over
the property
However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is in possession of the property.
Action for damages
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter one year
from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages

if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. (Ching vs CA 181 SCRA 9)
vii.

Action for Compensation form the Assurance fund

Shall be instituted within a period of six years from the time
the right to bring such action first occurred: Provided, That the
right of action herein provided shall survive to the legal representative
of the person sustaining loss or damage, unless barred in his lifetime;
and Provided, further, That if at the time such right of action first
accrued the person entitled to bring such action was a minor or insane
or imprisoned, or otherwise under legal disability, such person or
anyone claiming from, by or under him may bring the proper action at
any time within two years after such disability has been removed,
notwithstanding the expiration of the original period of six years first
above provided.

viii. Reversion
If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four
(4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

2.

ix.

Cancellation of the decree of registration and Torrens title

due to extrinsic fraud
May be filed not later than 1 year from and after the date of
entry of such decree of registration.

x.

Annulment of Judgment
If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four
(4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

xi.

Quieting of title
An accion reivindicatoria may be availed of within 10 years from
dispossession.

xii.

Criminal Action
Art. 313 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes in two months.
No, it does not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Case law provides that in order for it to be an extrinsic fraud, a ground

to set aside a judgment for the issuance of a registration decree and Torrens
title. The Fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation must be
committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby the defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.

In our present case, the fraud only involves the misrepresentation of

the defendant as the owner of the property. He did not do anything which
prevents the petitioner or the defeated party from presenting fully and fairly
his side of the case.
3.

The contention of the petitioner is wrong.

In a case decided by the Supreme Court (Rivera v. Moran 48 Phil 836),

they held that. Petition for a review under section 38 is a remedy separate
and distinct from a motion for a new trial under section 145 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and in our opinion the right to the remedy is not affected by
the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may
have been presented.
4. No the contention of the petitioner is bereft of merit.
In the case of Eland Phil. Vs Garcia the Supreme Court held that;
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of
registration may be filed "not later than one year from and after the
date of entry of such decree of registration." Giving this provision a
literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for
review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered.
However, it has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time
after the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of
one year from the entry of the final decree of registrationfor, as noted
in Rivera v. Moran, there can be no possible reason requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging
his claim for fraud..
The Supreme Court hold that a petition for review under section
38, supra, may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court's
decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the
final decree of registration.
Appyling this principle to the present case. The Respondent does
not need to wait for any final decree of registration to raise the
reopening of the previous proceeding.
5.
With regard to the last claim of the petitioners, their contention that
they must be regarded as innocent purchasers for value within the meaning
of the section 38 cannot be sustained.
In the case of Rivera v. Moran 48 Phil 836, the Supreme Court opined
that. They acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had
been entered; the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and to

appear that they were aware of the fact. In these circumstances they can
hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith. It is further to be
observed at that time, the petitioner could have acquired no interest valid as
against third parties until their title thereto had been duly entered in the
Torrens register in the office of the register of deeds; section 59 of the Land
of Registration Act provides that "the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the land."
Persons, who acquire their interest in the land after the registration of
the same has been ordered, but before the entry of final decree, are not
innocent purchasers for value within the meaning of section 38 of the Land
Registration Act.
Therefore, it follows that the lower court did not exceed its jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the petition for review and in reopening the case.
6.
The fraud needed to justify the review of decree of registration is
extrinsic or collateral fraud
In the case of Roxas v. CA (G.R. no 118436 March 21, 1997.) The
Supreme Court held that, for fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be
extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. 26 Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their
opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a
review of a decree of registration.
7.
No. In the case of Libudan v.Palma Gil (G.R. No. L-21163 May 17,
1972).The following averments do not constitute extrinsic fraud.
(a) That the applicant surreptitiously procured its survey in his own
name;
(b) That at the trial, the applicant and his successor-in-interest
submitted a fabricated new tax declaration showing a greater area and
improvement than that shown in the original tax declaration;
(c) That neither the applicant nor his alleged successors-in-interest
have ever been in actual possession of the property in question since time in
memorial;
(d) That the substituted applicants presented themselves as the true
heirs of the applicant when in fact they are not.
(e) That at the trial, the applicant presented forged document or false
or perjured testimony all these do not constitute valid grounds for the
reopening of the decree as they go into the merits of the case.

In the same case the Supreme Court reiterated the the distinction of
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished
from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes
the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of
forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the
case."
The enumerated averments are acts of applicants in litigation during
the trial, they used fabricated instruments and perjured testimony, which did
not affect the presentation of the case, but did not prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.
Applying these principles, it is understood that said misrepresentations
are actually intrinsic frauds and not extrinsic frauds.
Nos. 8, 9 & 10
a. False
b. False
c. True
d. True
e. False
f. False
g. True
h. False
i. True
j.

True