GOD, VALUE, AND NATURE. Fiona Ellis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. IBSN 9780-19-871412-5.

(Forthcoming, Journal of Religion)

Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College
Perhaps the most strident debate in philosophy today is over what is called naturalism. And in
philosophy of religion there is immense work on the scope and credibility of a particularly
strident, strict form of scientific naturalism in contrast with traditional theism. Fiona Ellis offers
a brilliant assessment of both the nature and justification of naturalism as well as providing us
with a nuanced new look at the naturalism-theism debate. On the one hand, she amasses and
extends a critique of scientific naturalism with its inability to account for normativity and
consciousness, while she also develops and defends a theistic (broadly Christian, but her work
would impact a wide array of theistic positions) metaphysic. The result is a form of theistic
naturalism, a term which would seem to be a contradiction from the vantage point of naturalists
hostile to theism, but it is a term that Ellis vindicates in her careful, nuanced engagement with
current metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory.
Her overview of the current state of play in the philosophy of nature is highly
recommended (in the Introduction and the first three chapters). The literature abounds with
hyper-naturalist claims (the progeny of Quine) who are prepared to see philosophy as either
altogether displaced by the natural sciences or as given only a minimal role (Quine, for example,
grudgingly allowed for philosophy of science, but little else). Building on the work of John
McDowell, David Wiggins, AkeelBilgrami, and others, Ellis points out the unacceptable
procrustean consequences of austere naturalism, and the abundant reasons for adapting what she
calls expansive naturalism. The first half of the book contains a helpful, fair-minded critique as
well as the articulation of a form of theism that avoids the charges of being (from a naturalistic

point of view) irredeemably weird (63), alien (64), spooked (66), occult and magical
(74). I was surprised to see this documentation of so much odd, bellicose, sometimes bizarre
naturalistic rhetoric, e.g. God is too spooky to be part of our ontology (86). In chapter four,
Enhanced Nature, Ellis invites us to take leave of reductive naturalism and in chapters five and
six, Gods Otherness: Some Problematic Models and God and Value, theism is advanced as a
fitting, coherent and cohesive metaphysic with the idea of God being no stranger than values and
the cornucopia of objects and properties that McDowell and other sensible naturalists
countenance. Our understanding of nature can be expanded to appreciate how Gods action in
the world (as creator and sustainer) enhances our understanding of what is natural. Chapters six
and seven, God and Value and The God of Christianity take shape in Elliss case that
Christian theism involves more than ethics or value theory. There is a telling, engaging treatment
of Levinas.
The thrust of Elliss position in the book, as made clear in the Introduction and the final
chapter Expansive Naturalism III, is more invitational than commanding. That is, her goal is
not (it seems) to devise compelling arguments that would require naturalists to accept theism and
the project of theology. Rather, the goal is to provide reasons for self-described naturalists to not
flat out reject theism and to provide reasons why an expansive naturalists might find theology
enriching, just as theologians might find expansive naturalism enriching. Here is the start of the
final paragraph in which she describes how, while a strict naturalist will find theology nearly
impossible, an expansive naturalist should be open to the very live and enriching possibility of
theology:
It will be difficult to appreciate [a theology of a God who enriches nature], and perhaps
impossible for the kind of philosopher who remains locked within the parameters of

scientific naturalism. However, the expansive naturalist has escaped these parameters, and
to the extent that he shares at least some of the aspirations of the theologian, he may come to
see that the theologians reasoning makes some kind of sense, and that there is significant
common ground to their respective endeavours. (204)
As Ellis continues note the measured tone of the invitation she is articulating for dialogue
between the expansive naturalist and the theologian:
At this point, and in the spirit of his expansive naturalist approach, he may be persuaded to
enter into dialogue with the theologian. If my conclusions are justified then he can forsake
such a task only at the risk of compromising his insights and robbing theology of a
fundamental philosophical resource. After all, he offers the prospect for demonstrating that
belief in God is intellectually respectable, and that this conclusion can be appreciated by
those who have taken on board the lessons of the best naturalistic philosophy of our time.
(201)
In the last line of this admirable book, Ellis seems to harken back to some of her
observations on Plato in which she records how many naturalists think of Plato and the Platonic
in disparaging terms, the enemy of all respectable naturalists. It turns out that some element of
grounded Platonism Plato reigned in by his student Aristotleis acceptable to the Fiona Ellis,
the expansive naturalist: It is at this point, I would contend, that we truly combine the wisdom
of Plato and the sanity of Aristotle (204).
I whole heartedly recommend this book to any of the many philosophers at work on
naturalism today and especially to those who are exercised by the debate between naturalism and
theism.