Case 64.

FORTUNE LIFE vs. COA

FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum
of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and
tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA. COA disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under the
Local Government Code. Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied. Consequently, the
petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. Later on the COA issued its decision denying the
petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the LGC only municipal or city governments
are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting
the LGUs failure to comply with the requirement of publication under the Government Procurement
Reform Act. The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion
for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received
by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. ary Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12,
2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on
August 19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and
verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.
ISSUE: WON the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes is applicable.
HELD:
NO. Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for
review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule. As to
the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order. Such appeal is
on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a
prima facie showing that the rtc committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification
of the challenged judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the COMELEC and COA.
The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions of fact
cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64
are also different. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration
on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14,
2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it
had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was
25 days too late. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.
Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
Others Issues:
rule on proof of service >

grave abuse of discretion of COA

Petitioner did not comply with the rule on proof of service

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with the
requirement on proof of service. The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section
13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the
registry receipt. Compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or
both are not submitted. Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by
one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail. The
petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the
registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves.
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit
The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit. The petitioner insists on having fully
shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered
by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more than a
year in resolving the motion for reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the

Constitution; (3) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences;
(4) the matter involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the
Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi
L. Mendoza made it appear that they knew the Local Government Code better than former Senator
Aquilino Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently
disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. One, the supposed delays taken by the COA
in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And,
lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA
Commissioners own did not matter, for it was the latters adjudication that had any value and
decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority
for that purpose.
Case 64.5 OSMEA vs. COA
FACTS: In preparation for the palaro in 1994, the City engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc.
(WTCI) and Dakay Construction and Development Company (DCDC) to construct and renovate the Cebu
City Sports Complex. Osmena, then city mayor, was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
(Sanggunian) of Cebu to represent the City and to execute the construction contracts.
While the construction was being undertaken, Osmena issued Extra Work Orders to WTCI and to DCDC but
these were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior authorization from the
Sanggunian. Nevertheless, the work proceeded on account of the extreme urgency. The Palaro was
successfully held at the Cebu City Sports Complex.
Thereafter, WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in the construction and
renovation of the sports complex. A Sanggunian member sponsored a resolution authorizing Osmena to
execute the supplemental agreements but the other Sanggunian members refused to pass the resolution.
Thus WTCI and DCDC could not be paid prompting them to file two separate collection cases before the
Regional Trial Court.
The RTC found the claims meritorious, and ordered the City to pay for the extra work performed. The RTC
likewise awarded damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees. Affirmed on appeal. To satisfy the
judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the required appropriation ordinances. The City Auditor
disallowed the payment of litigation expenses, damages, and attorneys fees to WTCI and DCDC. Osmena
and the members of the Sanggunian sought reconsideration of the disallowance. COA modified the City
Auditors decision by absolving the members of the sanggunian from any liability. Osmena filed an appeal
against this Decision.
COA then issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the notices of disallowance.
Osmena received a copy of the Decision on May 23, 2008. Eighteen days after or on June 10, 2008,
Osmena
filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision. The COA denied it. The Office of the
Mayor of Cebu City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June 29, 2009. A day before,
however, Osmena left for the United States of America for his checkup after his cancer surgery in April
2009 and returned to his office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmena filed
the present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COAs Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution
of June 8, 2009.
ISSUE: WON the time should be counted from his actual knowledge, or the receipt by the mayors office.
HELD:
YES. Relaxation of procedural rules to give effect to a partys right to appeal
See Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
From time to time, the court has recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the most compelling
reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice
We find Osmenas reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the service of the June 8,
2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of the
Mayor of Cebu City, we consider July 15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as the effective date
when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were
to rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmena of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the
merits of his case.

Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified, and a verification
requires the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer that he has read the petition
verification requires the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer that he has read the
petition and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that
Osmena was out of the country to attend to his medical needs, he could not comply with the requirements
to perfect his appeal of the Decision of the COA.
Less impt issue: WON he should be solely liable for the damages and interests acquired.
We find that the expenses incurred for change and extra work orders were necessary and justified.
The COA considers the change and extra work orders illegal, as these failed to comply with Section III, C1
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594. Reviewing the facts of the
case, we find that the prevailing circumstances at the time the change and extra work orders were
executed and completed indicate that the City of Cebu tacitly approved these orders, rendering a
supplemental agreement or authorization from the Sanggunian unnecessary. None of these officials
present voiced any objection to the lack of a prior authorization from the Sanggunian or a supplemental
agreement.
We find it unjust to order the petitioner to shoulder the expenditure when the government had already
received and accepted benefits from the utilization of the sports complex, especially considering that the
City incurred no substantial loss in paying for the additional work and the damages awarded.
64.4 PORMENTO vs COMELEC
FACTS: The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the
President from any reelection. Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections
held on May 10, 2010. (see sec4 a7 of the constitution),
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification.
However, his petition was denied by the COMELEC in division. His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc. So he filed the instant petition for certiorari. However,
under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final
order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Petitioner did not pray for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections.
ISSUE: WON there is an issue at all.
HELD:
NO. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a
persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed
upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. One of the essential requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking
in this case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes nonjusticiable. An action is considered moot when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court
to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly
elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that
elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his
reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.