CATEGORICAL RELATION

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2011.

Relation as Such. Even though normally, when we refer to relation in philosophy, we are
talking about the predicament or category relation (which is one of the nine accidents
enumerated by the Stagirite), relation, as such, does not imply anything real, nor does relation, as
such, imply any imperfection. Relation, as such, does not imply anything real (there are what are
called logical relations), for as Aquinas writes, relation differs from the other genera in this that
the latter by their very nature imply that they are something [real1] as for instance, quantity
implies something real. But relation does not imply anything real in its very nature; hence there
are relations which do not exist in the order of reality but only in the logical order, which does
not happen in the other genera.2
Relation, as such, does not imply any imperfection, since the essence of a relation merely
implies a reference to another; it does not imply that this reference is something accidental.
Therefore, there are not just predicamental or categorical relations, which are accidents and
therefore imply imperfection, but we learn in supernatural theologys study of the Divine Trinity
that there are subsistent relations. The concept of relation abstracts from imperfection: The
concept of relation in itselfin no way designates an accident, for the to other is not indicative
of inherence. In itself, therefore, the concept of relation abstracts from all imperfection, and that
is why we are able to speak, in supernatural theology, of divine relations, which are not accidents
but subsisting relations.3 Aquinas states: But if we consider the essential elements of
whatsoever genus, each and every other genus except to another (relation) connotes
imperfectionAnd consequently there remain only two modes of predicating of God; that of
substance and that of relation.4
Logical Relations and Real Relations. A real relation is different from a relation of reason
or a logical relation. A relation is real if it exists independently of the mind, as, for example, the
relation of father to son. A relation is logical if it depends upon the consideration of the mind, as,
for example, is the case in the logical relation between the subject and predicate of a proposition.
The predicamental or categorical relations studied in metaphysics are real relations.5 There are
1

Quodlibet., 1, a. 2.
Quodlibet., 9, a. 4. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 28, a. 1.
3
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, p. 252.
4
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.
5
Joseph Owens writes: For St. Thomas, a real relation in creatures is confined to the one category of relation:
every real relation is in a determined genus; but non-real relations can make the circuit of all being(De Veritate,
q. 21, a. 1, ad 3. For him, something relative secundum esse is a relation, either real or merely conceptual; while
something relative secundum dici is not a relation, but is something absolute that is related to something else either
by a superadded real distinction or by a relation of reason. See In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 (ed. Mandonnet, I,
709); De Potentia, q. 7, a. 10, ad 11(J. OWENS, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1963,
p. 189). In their critique of transcendental relations Tomas Alvira, Luis Clavell, and Tomas Melendo state: Since
the 15th century, the term transcendental relation has been appearing in some philosophical works. It is supposed to
be an order towards another, which is included in the very essence of something, e.g., the order of potency towards
act, of matter towards form, of the will towards the good, and of the intelligence towards being. What is supposed to
be involved here is not an accidental relation but one which is identical with the very essence of some reality. Some
2

two aspects in a predicamental or categorical relation, namely, the aspect esse in and the aspect
esse ad: a) the aspect in (esse in), inherence, by which predicamental relation is an accident
which has the same kind of existence as other accidents; b) the aspect towards (esse ad),
towardness, by which predicamental relation is formally constituted, and is an accident of a
genus all its own, distinct from other accidents.6 The predicamental or categorical accident
relation implica, come ogni accidente, un soggetto; si d quindi linerenza (esse in) alla
sostanza; c tuttavia, un elemento formale che consiste nellorientamento verso (esse ad) un
termine precisamente laliquid dellad aliquid.7
Mutual Relations and Non-Mutual Relations. Shallo on mutual and non-mutual relations:
A real relation is called mutual, if both subject and term are really referred to each other, on
account of a real foundation in both, e.g., A and B may be mutually referred to each other on
account of a similarity of features, character, etc., in both; teacher and pupil are mutually related
on account of a continuous new exercise and activity on both sides in communicating and
receiving knowledge.
A real relation is non-mutual, if the basis or the foundation of the reference is found in
one of the extremes. Such is the relation between the Creator and the creature. The creature has a
real relation to God, founded in its complete dependence on Him for all that it has. God, on the
contrary, is not really referred to the creature, for the creatures existence implies no new reality
in God which could be the basis of a real relation on His part.8
H. D. Gardeil on mutual and non-mutual relations: The accidental division is that of
mutual and non-mutual. A mutual relation is bilateral, that is, bilaterally real: to the real relation
authors even go as far as asserting that the relation of creatures to God ought to be included within this type of
relation and not among the accidents at all. St. Thomas Aquinas himself, however, maintains that it is an accident
creatures have as a consequence of receiving the act of being from God.
The use of the term transcendental relation gives rise to a serious difficulty. It is tantamount to acknowledging
the reality of a relation identical with the absolute content of things, which is only possible in the intratrinitarian
relations identical with the divine essence. Besides, in the examples mentioned (potency, matter, will and
intelligence), it would be quite improper to speak of relations, (i.e., of real relations), since none of the realities
mentioned is a being properly speaking, but only a constitutive principle, and cannot therefore be an apt subject of a
relation.(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 70).
The position against transcendental relation, advocated by Owens, Alvira, Clavell, Melendo, and also by
Carlos Cardona in his La relazione della creatura a Dio, in C. Cardona, Metafisica del bene e del male, Ares, Milan,
1991, pp. 39-61), works upon the monumental study on relation by A. Krempel (A. KREMPEL, La doctrine de la
relation chez St. Thomas dAquin, Vrin, Paris, 1952). Joseph Owens gives a pro-Krempel critique of transcendental
relations in his An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, explaining: Matter, essence, faculties, for instance, though
absolute, can be understood only as principles, and so only in relation to substance, to being, to operation. The
intellect cannot conceive these principles except as related by reason to their corresponding actualities. It does not as
it were devise the relations and then attribute them to their subjects, as it attributes the relation of species to an
already known man, but has to conceive the subjects as related in its very first notion of them as subjects. In later
Scholasticism this situation gave rise to the mistaken concept of a transcendental relation, that is, of a real relation
really identical with an absolute reality. It was called transcendental because it was regarded as really present in
various categories. It became solidified in the Thomistic tradition through John of St. Thomas (1589-1644). It makes
the impossible identity of absolute reality and relative reality in creatures. On its history, see Krempel, pp. 645-670;
cf. pp. 4, 170-179, and 361-366(J. OWENS, op. cit., p. 189).
6
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 201.
7
J. VILLAGRASA, Metafisica II: La comunanza dellessere, APRA, Rome, 2009, p. 282.
8
M. SHALLO, Lessons in Scholastic Philosophy, Peter Reilly, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 156.

of subject to term corresponds a real relation of term to subject, as father to son and inversely.
The non-mutual relation is unilateral, real from one side, logical from the other. In knowledge,
for example, there is a real relation of intellect to thing known, for the intellect depends upon the
thing for its knowledge; but the relation of thing to the speculative intellect is only a relation of
reason (or logical), because the thing is in no way affected simply by being known. Again, the
relation is real from creature to Creator, but not real in reverse order, from Creator to creature.9
Koren on mutual and non-mutual relations: A predicamental relation is called mutual or
bilateral if to the real relation of the subject to the term there corresponds a real relation of the
term to the subject. Otherwise the relation is non-mutual or unilateral. For example, to the real
relation of father to son (a relation of paternity) there corresponds in the son a real relation to the
father (a relation of filiation); hence these relations are mutual. But while there is a real relation
of the intellect to the thing known, because in knowing the intellect depends upon the thing
known, the relation of the thing known to the intellect is purely logical, because by becoming
known a thing does not change; hence, the real relation of the intellect to the thing known is nonmutual. Likewise, the relation of the creature to the Creator is real in the creature but logical in
the Creator.10
Categorical or Predicamental Relation. Categorical or predicamental relation11 is that
accident whose nature is a reference or order of one substance towards another. It is that
reference of one being towards another being, the order that a being has with respect to other
beings distinct from it. Examples of relations include paternity, sonship and filiation. Paternity,
for example, is the accident that links father to son. Although it is based on the fact that the
father gave life to his son, paternity is itself no more than a mere relation or reference which does
not intrinsically add a new characteristic or property to the fathers substance.
Subject, Term, and Foundation. In a real predicamental relation we distinguish between
the following: 1. the subject, (which is the person or thing in which the relation resides; it is that
which is related); 2. the term (to which the subject is related); and 3. the foundation for the
relation (or the basis of the order between the subject and the term; it is that because of which the
subject is related to the term). In the case of relation of sonship, for example, the subject is the

H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics), B. Herder, St. Louis
1967, p. 180.
10
H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, p. 220.
11
Studies on relation: N. D. GINSBURG, Metaphysical Relations and St. Thomas Aquinas, The New
Scholasticism, 1941, pp. 238-254 ; C. G. KOSSEL, Principles of St. Thomas Distinction Between the Esse and
Ratio of Relation, The Modern Schoolman, 1945-46, pp. 19-36, 93-107 ; C. G. KOSSEL, St. Thomas Theory of
the Causes of Relation, The Modern Schoolman, 1945-1946, pp. 151-172 ; C. G. KOSSEL, The Problem of
Relation in Some Non-Scholastic Philosophies, The Modern Schoolman, 23 (1946), pp. 68-81 ; J. F.
ANDERSON, Creation as Relation, The New Scholasticism, 24 (1950), pp. 263-283 ; S. BRETON, Lesse in
et lesse ad dans la mtaphisique de la relation, Angelicum, Rome, 1951 ; A. KREMPEL, La doctrine de la
relation chez St. Thomas dAquin, Vrin, Paris, 1952 ; C. CARDONA, La relazione della creatura a Dio, in C.
Cardona, Metafisica del bene e del male, Ares, Milan, 1991, pp. 39-61 ; F. WILHELMSEN, Creation as a Relation
in St. Thomas Aquinas, in F. Wilhelmsen, Being and Knowing, Preserving Christian Publications, Albany, NY,
1995, pp. 135-168 ; G. VEZZOSI, Sulla relazione in San Tommaso. In dialogo con Krempel, Sapienza, 53 (2000),
pp. 443-451.

son, the terminus will be the father and mother (parents), and the foundation or basis would be
generation (what causes the son to be related to his parents is their having begotten him).12
Conditions Required for a Predicamental Relation. Four conditions must be fulfilled
before a predicamental relation can arise. They are the following: 1)There must be a real subject.
This is evident because a real relation can refer only a real subject to a term ; 2) There must be a
real term because a real relation exists independently of the mind; hence it cannot refer the
subject to something which exists only in the mind ; 3. There must be a real foundation, for if the
foundation does not exist outside the mind, it is clear that the relation cannot exist independently
of the mind ; 4) The subject must be really distinct from the term; otherwise either the subject or
the term would exist only in the mind; hence there could be no question of a relationship
independently of the mind.13
Types of Real Relations. There are as many types of relations as there are distinct classes
of bases on which they depend: (a) Relations according to dependence in being arise whenever
the very existence of one reality depends upon another. The most proper case is the relation of
the creature to the Creator. Creatures receive being from God, and this gives rise to their real
relation to God. A similar relation exists between human knowledge and the objects known,
since our knowledge is measured by external reality and adjusts itself to it. In both examples, the
relation is not mutual. Only the relations of the creature to the Creator, and of knowledge to the
known reality, are real. The inverse relations are only relations of reason: God does not depend
on creatures, and things are independent of mans knowing them.
(b) Mutual relations based on action and passion, such as that of a son to his parents
(sonship) and of the parents to the son (paternity), that of the ruler to the citizens (government),
and of the subjects to the authority (submission to authority). These relations are mutual since
they are rooted in the same basis (transient causality) which entails a modification of both
extremes: action in the one and passion in the other. This is the root of the distinction between
these relations and those arising from dependence in being. The latter are not mutual, since in
their case, there is no real modification in one of the extremes.
(c) Relations according to fittingness based on quantity, quality, and on the substance.
Relations based on quantity arise because certain quantities are used as measurement for others.
Relations of quantitative equality or disequality, relations of distance, and the like, are examples
of this type. One country, for instance, is twice the size of another. These dimensive relations are

12

Nella manualistica tomista, alle volte si parla di quattro elementi della relazione: oltre ai tre presupposti sopra
menzionati, si aggiunge un quarto elemento, che sarebbe la stessa relazione. Ci si capisce come reazione a Occam,
che negava che la relazione aggiungesse qualche novit agli estremi (il soggetto e il termine di essa). certamente
vero che quando il soggetto, il termine e il fondamento della relazione esistono nella realt, anche la stessa relazione
qualcosa che esiste nella realt, e non solo nella mente; altrimenti non avrebbe senso annoverarla tra le categorie,
che sono modi di essere. Ciononostante, non logico considerare la relazione come un elemento della relazione:
sarebbe assurdo, come dire che la casa un elemento della struttura della casa. Al tempo stesso, non sembra
opportuno parlare di elementi della relazione, poich la relazione una realt diversa dal fondamento e dagli
estremi, che in nessun modo la compongono(M. PREZ DE LABORDA and L. CLAVELL, Metafisica, EDUSC,
Rome, 2006, pp. 103-104).
13
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 220.

mutual relations, since either of the extremes has a quantity capable of being measured by that of
the other.
Analogously, relations based on quality are relations of qualitative similarity or
dissimilarity. For instance, two things can be similar or dissimilar in terms of whiteness,
hardness, and any other quality.
Relations based on substance are the relations of identity and of diversity. For example:
two drops of water are identical substances, and so are two birds, two men, and so forth.14
Foundation of Predicamental Relation. Grenier explains that a predicamental relation has
a twofold foundation, namely, material or remote, and formal or proximate: The remote
foundation is something necessarily required for relation, but from which relation does not
immediately result; v.g., generative power in Peter who is a father is the remote foundation of
paternity.
The proximate foundation is that from which relation immediately results; v.g.,
generative action is the proximate foundation is paternity.
The proximate foundation of relation is of three kinds.15 This is evident from the fact
that a thing can be related to another in three ways: a) the quantity of a thing can be related to
another: thus we have the first foundation, which is unity and number ; b) a thing can receive
something from another, or it can give something to the other: thus we have the second
foundation, which is action and passion ; c) the perfection of a thing can be measured by
another; thus we have the third foundation, which is measure and the measurable.
1) First foundation: unity and number. The kind of unity with which we are concerned
at present is not quantitative or predicamental unity only, but quasi-ontological quantity, i.e., any
predicament in as much as it has the formal aspect of unity, and consequently of multitude; v.g.,
there is a certain unnamed relation of dissimilarity between Peter as naked and Paul as dressed
on account of the negation of unity as regards the predicament of habit. Similarly, there is a
certain unnamed relation as regards multiplication of the predicament where between Peter who
is in one place and Paul who is in another place.
The principal relations which are founded on unity and number may be considered: a) as
regards substance: thus we have identity and diversity ; b) as regards quantity: thus we have the
relations of equality and inequality ; c) as regards quality: thus we have the relations of
similarity and dissimilarity.
2) Second foundation: action and passion. Action and passion found in relation, not only
in as much as they are actually being produced (in fieri), but also in as much as they are already
produced (in facto esse). In other words, action and passion are foundations of relation, because,
when they are produced, they leave a subject changed; v.g., when Peter paints a picture, he has

14
15

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

In Metaph., I. V, I. 17.

not the same relation to the picture as he had before he painted it, but rather he is related to it as
artificer to artifact.
3) Third foundation: measure and the measurable. From this foundation results the
relation of the dependence of one thing on another, as on the measure of its being; v.g., the
relation of the creature to God, the relation of the speculative intellect to an object actually
known.
Predicamental relations which result from the third foundation are real on the side of one
term, and unreal on the side of the other term, i.e., they are non-mutual or unilateral relations;
v.g., the relation of the creature ot God as Creator is real, but the relation of God to the creature
is only logical: creatures are essentially dependent on God, but God is in no way dependent on
creatures.16
Real Distinction of Predicamental or Categorical Relations from Their Subject, Term and
Foundation. Predicamental or categorical relations, which are accidents, are really distinct from
their subject, term and foundation: Predicamental relations are really distinct from their subject
because the subject and the relation are related to one another as real potency and act. Moreover,
things which can be separated are really distinct. Now predicamental relations can be separated
from their subject; for instance, a man will acquire a relation of paternity by an act of
reproduction and lose it by the death of his offspring.17
Predicamental relations are really distinct from their term. For the subject and the term
of a predicamental relation are really distinct; the relation is a determination of the subject; hence
it follows that the relation is really distinct from the term.
Predicamental relations are really distinct from their foundation. For otherwise there
could be no question of a real relation, because the foundation of a relation is always something
absolute,18 whereas the relation itself is totally relative. Hence, either there are no real relations
or they are really distinct from their foundation.19 Moreover, sometimes it is possible to separate
the relation from its foundation. For example, between identical twins there is a real relation of
similarity based upon their physiognomy. The death of one will destroy this similarity, but its
foundation, this particular physiognomy, will remain in the survivor.20
Accidental, Essential and Numerical Division of Predicamental Relation: 1) Accidental
division. a) Relation is accidentally divided into mutual relation and non-mutual relation.
A mutual relation is a relation to which there corresponds in another extreme a relation
of the same entity, i.e., of the same order; v.g., paternity, sonship.
16

H. GRENIER, op. cit., pp. 203-204.

Cf. In I Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 2.
18
One real relation cannot be the foundation of another real relation because a relation needs to be supported by
something more perfect in being than itself. Moreover, if a relation could give rise to another real relation, this
relation again could give rise to a third, and so on to infinity.
19
Cf. De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 9.
20
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
17

A non-mutual relation is a relation to which there corresponds in another extreme not a

relation of the same entity, but of another entity; v.g., corresponding to a real relation of the
speculative intellect to an object of knowledge there is, on the side of the object of knowledge,
only a relation of reason to the intellect.
b) Mutual relation may be a mutual relation of the same denomination (relatio mutua
aequiparantiae) or a mutual relation of different denomination (relatio mutua disquiparantiae).
A mutual relation of the same denomination is a relation to which corresponds in
another extreme a relation of the same entity and of the same species; v.g., the relation of
likeness between two white objects.
A mutual relation of different denomination is a relation to which corresponds in another
extreme a relation of the same entity, but not of the same species; v.g., paternity and sonship.
2) Essential division. Since predicamental relation is a relation to a term which results
from a foundation, its essential or specific division is derived from the restriction of the
foundation to the term, i.e., predicamental relation is divided according as the foundation is
related to the terms of the relation.
If the foundation is considered, we have four sources of the essential division of
relation: 1) unity and number; 2) measure and the measurable; 3) action; 4) passion.
Since action and passion do not belong to the same supreme genus, the relations which
derive from them are specifically distinct; v.g., paternity, which derives from active generation,
is specifically distinct from sonship, which derives from passive generation.
If the term is considered, we find that relations are essentially or specifically distinct
when their terms are essentially distinct; v.g., the relation of likeness which one white object has
to another white object is specifically distinct from the relation of unlikeness which this white
object has to a black object.
3) Numerical division. The numerical distinction of relations is derived from the
numerical distinction of subjects, according to the principle: an accident which is specifically one
cannot be numerically multiplied in the same subject. Thus, for example, in Peter, the father of
four children, there is only one relation of paternity which, according to its aspect towards, i.e.,
its towardness, is terminated in four terms, but which, according to its aspect in, i.e., its
inherence, is only one relation in Peter.21
The Properties of Relations. 1) Relations as such have no contraries: even relations
which are most opposed can exist simultaneously in one and the same subject; v.g., paternity and
sonship in one and the same man.
2) Relation as such does not admit of degrees; v.g., Peter who is the father of four sons
is not a father to greater degree than Paul who has only one son.
21

H. GRENIER, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

The foundation of relation, however, admits of degrees; v.g., the degree of likeness
between two objects is proportionate to the degree of likeness of its foundations.
3) Relations are concomitant in the order of knowledge, that is to say, a relation can be
known if its opposite is known at the same time.
4) Mutual relations are correlatives (ad invicem convertuntur), that is to say, a mutual
relation in one extreme is explained by the relation corresponding to it in the other extreme, and
vice versa; v.g., paternity is explained by sonship, and sonship is explained by paternity.
5) Mutual relations are concomitant in nature (simul natura), for mutual relations exist
at the same time, in as much as one cannot exist unless it is terminated in another.22
Kants Denial of Real Relations and Merciers Refutation of Kant. True to his
transcendental idealism, Immanuel Kant maintained that relation was but an a priori subjective
category of the mind, not an extra-subjective really existing accidental category or predicament.
Contrary to this position Mercier defends the existence of real relations and critiques the Kantian
position: The proof that real relations exist lies in the fact that, whether we think or not, two real
things which each measure a yard in length are equal, that a relation of equality exists between
them; that two twin-brothers are really alike, apart from what anybody thinks. Hence in nature
itself there do exist real relations. The universe is made up of individual beings that are not
entirely absolute but which are interconnected with one another, long before we have any
knowledge of them, by a number of relations that constitute the order of the universe.
Opposed to this theory of relation stands Kants idealistic conception of relation as a
subjective category of the mind which appertains to phenomena only as the mind introduces it
into them. The argument he uses to support this view is that without a subjective operation of the
understanding we can never perceive a relation, there can be no relation for us; or, in other
words, because we are never aware of a relation except by a mental action, therefore it must be
that the mind introduces into phenomena the relations and laws which govern them. This
argument, however, sins through being ambiguous and is besides erroneous. In the first place,
whilst it may be true that a relation does not exist for us, that we do not know it as long as we
fail to apprehend its two terms and to perceive its foundation, nevertheless there are relations the
terms and foundation of which are anterior to any thought and in consequence are not due to the
mind. In the second place, besides all the arguments that militate against idealism in general, we
may urge against this idealistic theory of relation a special difficulty. Every relation considered a
priori, without application to anything real, is capable of being either affirmative or negative.
How then does it happen that in certain particular cases we adhere to one of such alternatives
instead of to the other? What, for instance, makes us judge that two particular phenomena are
alike rather than not alike? Even if the faculty of judging likeness and difference is an internal
law of the mind, the particular applications of such a generic faculty can only come from
external things themselves. And if this is so, it must be allowed that some relations have a real,
objective foundation that is independent of our minds and of its modes of knowing.23
22

H. GRENIER, op. cit., pp. 207-208.

D. MERCIER, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., London,
1938, pp. 502-503.

23

Logical Relations or Relations of Reason. We shall briefly consider relations of

reason, that is, relations that do not exist outside the mind. The study of this type of relations
will shed more light on the existence of real relations.
Every relation of reason lacks one or more of the elements required for a real relation.
One of the extremes (or both) may not be real, or one may not really be distinct from the other,
of the relation may not have a real basis in the subject. Some examples of this type of relations
are: (a) Relations among concepts, studied by Logic, such as the relation of species to genus, or
that of species to the individual.
(b) Then there are relations of identity, as when we say that something is identical to
itself. In this case, we consider the same reality as though it were two. Anything is certainly
identical to itself, but this is not a real relation, since only one extreme exists.
(c) There are relations with unreal extremes. We occasionally relate two things, one of
which, at least, is not real, as when we compare the present with the future, or two future events
with one another, or being with nothingness.
(d) There are relations of reason which arise when there is no real reciprocal relation
between two things. For example, the external world does not undergo any change when it is
known by man, since the act of knowing is confined to mans interior being. Consequently, the
object known is not altered by any relation towards the knowing subject; in contrast, there arises
a real relation of the subject with respect to the object.
The relations which the intellect attributes to God with respect to creatures are also
relations of reason. Evidently, all creatures have a real relation of dependence on God for He is
their Creator. However, the inverse relation is not a real one because God cannot be a subject of
a relation, for the simple reason that He has no accidents. Besides, the presumed basis of the
latter relation (God to creatures) Gods creative activity is not an accident distinct from the
Divine Essence.
The fact that there is no real relation towards creatures in God, does not mean that He is
a distant being who is not concerned about the universe. It simply implies that His being does not
depend on the world, and that no accident exists in Him by which He could be ordered towards
creatures. God is, however, intimately present in all creatures, conferring the act of being on
them. His nearness is much greater and closer than that which could be established through an
accidental relation.24

24

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 71-72.