G.R. No.

156273

October 15, 2003

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA ROTEA, namely: ESPERANZA R. EDJEC,

BERNARDA R. SUELA, RUBY C. ROTEA, BERNARDA R. ROTEA, ELIA R. VDA. DE LIMBAGA,
VIRGINIA R. ARBON, ROSALINDA R. ARQUISOLA, CORAZON ROTEA, FE R. EBORA,
CARIDAD ROTEA, ANGELES VDA. DE RENACIA, JORGE ROTEA, MARIA LUISA ROTEAVILLEGAS, ALFREDO R. ROTEA, represented by his heirs LIZBETH ROTEA and ELEPETH
ROTEA; LUIS ROTEA, represented by his heir JENNIFER ROTEA; and ROLANDO R. ROTEA,
represented by his heir ROLANDO R. ROTEA JR., petitioners,
vs.
MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA, petitioners herein, are the successorsin-interest of the former registered owners of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lahug, Cebu City,
designated as Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters under TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T13694, and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097 square meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107) T-13695. 1
In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of respondent Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 above described
among other parcels of land for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport. 2 To entice the landowners
to cede their properties, the government assured them that they could repurchase their lands once
Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport.3 Some of the landowners
executed deeds of sale with right of repurchase in favor of the government but many others,
including the owners of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 herein mentioned, refused the offer because the
payment was perceived to be way below the market price. 4
On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the purchase of the lots necessary for the expansion and
improvement of Lahug Airport irredeemably broke down, the Civil Aeronautics Administration as the
successor agency of the National Airport Corporation filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other subject realties, docketed
as Civil Case No. R-1881.
On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 condemning
Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other lots for public use upon payment of just compensation. 5 Petitioners
predecessors were paidP7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential
damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. No appeal was taken from the Decision
on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, and the judgment of condemnation became final and
executory.6 Thereafter, the certificates of title for these parcels of land were issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. 58691 for Lot No. 916 and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No.
920, which under RA 6958 (1990) were subsequently transferred in favor of respondent MCIAA. 7

At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport
ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was opened for incoming and outgoing flights. 8 Lots Nos.
916 and 920 which had been expropriated for the extension of Lahug Airport were not utilized. 9 In
fact, no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-ininterest.10 Hence, petitioners wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging
them for the exercise of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920. 11 Their pleas were
not heeded.12
On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu
City against respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-20015. In the main, petitioners averred that they had been convinced by the
officers of the predecessor agency of respondent MCIAA not to oppose the expropriation
proceedings since in the future they could repurchase the properties if the airport expansion would
not push through. MCIAA did not object to petitioners evidence establishing these allegations.
When the civil case was pending, one Richard E. Enchuan filed a Motion for Transfer of Interest
alleging that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over
Lots Nos. 916 and 920.13 The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) also sought to
intervene in the civil case claiming that it leased in good faith Lot No. 920 from the predecessor
agencies of respondent MCIAA and that it built thereon its Regional Equipment Services and its
Region 7 Office.14
On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and granted them the right to
repurchase the properties at the amount pegged as just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but
subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH. 15 The trial
court opined that the expropriation became illegal or functus officio when the purpose for which it
was intended was no longer there.16
Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 64456.
1vvphi1.nt

On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on the ground that the
judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was unconditional so that the rights gained
therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of ownership in fee simple. 17 The appellate court
cited Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan18which held that mere deviation from the public purpose for
which the power of eminent domain was exercised does not justify the reversion of the property to its
former owners, and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 19 which is
allegedly stare decisis to the instant case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as the
former dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881. 20
On 28 November 2002 reconsideration of the Decision was denied.

21

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the case at bar since
what was involved therein was the "right of reversion" and not the "right of repurchase" which they
are invoking. They also differentiate Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals22 from the instant case in that the landowners in the MCIAA case offered inadmissible

evidence to show their entitlement to a right of repurchase, while petitioners herein offered evidence
based on personal knowledge for which reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived whatever
objection it might have had to the admissibility thereof. Finally, petitioners allege that their right to
equal protection of the laws would be infringed if some landowners are given the right to repurchase
their former properties even as they are denied the exercise of such prerogative.
On the other hand, respondent MCIAA clings to our decisions in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan
and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals. According to respondent MCIAA
"there is only one instance when expropriated land may be repurchased by its previous owners, and
that is, if the decision of expropriation itself provides [the] condition for such repurchase."
Respondent asserts that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without conditions,
thus, no repurchase could be validly exercised.
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with, there exists an undeniable
historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of
the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their
properties at the termination of the airports venture. 23 Some acted on this assurance and sold their
properties;24 other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its
course until finally coming to terms with respondents predecessors that they would not appeal nor
block further the judgment of condemnation if the same right of repurchase was extended to
them.25 A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with the
ownership of their lands.26
In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court in Fery v. Municpality of
Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the
rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated when the public purpose
for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent
case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,27 we declared that the government acquires only such rights in
expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is
ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose
is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only
use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns
to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary x x x x If, upon the
contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course,
the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by
the expropriation proceedings x x x x When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains
no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner x x x x28

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, respondent Chiongbian sought to enforce an alleged

right of repurchase over her properties that had been expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. This
Court did not allow her to adduce evidence of her claim, for to do so would unsettle as to her
properties the judgment of condemnation in the eminent domain proceedings. We also held therein
that Chiongbians evidence was both inadmissible and lacking in probative value The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to
the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would
return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for
which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the
Lahug Airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court
of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a
written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
proceedings but a contract of sale x x x x To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a
compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines
prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the
judgment of a court which has long become final and executory x x x x And even assuming for the
sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement
acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was admissible x x x x Aside from
being inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also
inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x x x29
We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,
and do not overrule them. Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as regards
the properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, must be
commensurate to the facts that were established therein as distinguished from those extant in the
case at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case
we have preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase in
favor of petitioners.
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling portion in the
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 validating our discernment that the expropriation by the
predecessors of respondent was ordered under the running impression that Lahug Airport would
continue in operation As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although
Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of
the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to
Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence
was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the
Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of the
Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the
said departments or agencies. In the absence of such showing, the Court will presume that the
Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation (emphasis supplied).30
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While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of
public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the
trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its
understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful
statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would
remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference
further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the
expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the
expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners
herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of
the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the
premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as
contained in the body thereof.31
Significantly, in light of the discussion above, the admission of petitioners during the pre-trial of Civil
Case No. CEB-20015 for reconveyance and damages that respondent MCIAA was the absolute
owner of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 does not prejudice petitioners interests. This is as it should be not
only because the admission concerns a legal conclusion fiercely debated by the parties 32 but more
so since respondent was truly the absolute owner of the realties until it was apparent that Lahug
Airport had stopped doing business.
To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance in the case at bar of standing admissible
evidence validating the claim of petitioners as well as the portions above-quoted of the Decision in
the expropriation case volunteered no less than by respondent itself, takes this case away from the
ambit of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 33 but within the principles
enunciated in Fery as mentioned earlier. In addition, there should be no doubt that our present
reading of the fallo of the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 so as to include the statements in the
body thereof afore-quoted is sanctioned by the rule that a final and executory judgment may
nonetheless be "clarified" by reference to other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. In
Republic v. De Los Angeles34 we ruled This Court has promulgated many cases x x x wherein it was held that a judgment must not be read
separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. Hence x
x x the decision of the court below should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety to get
the true meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof x x x x Neither is this Court inclined to
confine itself to a reading of the said fallo literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a decision
should be interpreted and construed in harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof x x x x As stated in
the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true intent and meaning
of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in
its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not
merely in the fallo thereof x x x x The foregoing pronouncements find support in the case of Locsin,
et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil., 87, 91-92, wherein this Court allowed a judgment that had become
final and executory to be "clarified" by supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted and
which, when supplied, in effect changed the literal import of the original phraseology x x x x This is
so because, in the first place, if an already final judgment can still be amended to supply an omission
committed through oversight, this simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an

already final decision, the fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with the body of such
final decision x x x x [I]f an amendment may be allowed after a decision has already become final x x
x such amendment may consist x x x either in the x x x interpretation of an ambiguous phrase
therein in relation to the body of the decision which gives it life. 35
We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights of the State and petitioners to the expropriated
Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority36 is correct in stating that one would not find an express
statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would
return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose
for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as
the Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in
the judgment of condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary
nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned
properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the
trial courts underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it
granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin37 to the implied trust
referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to
secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is
established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos.
916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of
Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to
reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their
properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation
was authorized.
Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by Art. 1454 is not
perfect, the provision is undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by an expert on the law of trusts:
"The only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is to decide whether in the
numerous and varying fact situations presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property
and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant." 38 Constructive trusts are fictions of
equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy
any situation in which the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest.39
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to
transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary.40 Of course, the
"wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself
do equity."41 Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the
plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to
reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would
if he proceeded on the theory of rescission.42 In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may also

be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the
extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts. 43
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case,
respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil
Code, "When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the
parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received x x
x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect
to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to
return x x x x"
Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and
920 to petitioners who shall hold the same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of
DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries of a constructive trust must restore
to respondent MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916
and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e.,P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with
consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise
pay respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties
and the monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent that petitioners will be
benefited thereby. The government however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have
obtained from the parcels of land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests
that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a matter
of justice and convenience, the law considers the fruits and interests as the equivalent of each
other.44
Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, "If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement
shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," the creditor being the person who stands to receive
something as a result of the process of restitution. Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not have
to settle as part of the process of restitution the appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which
is the natural consequence of nature and time.
Petitioners need not also pay for improvements introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, as the
disposition of these properties is governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law. As
for the improvements that respondent MCIAA may have made on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any,
petitioners must pay respondent their prevailing free market price in case petitioners opt to buy them
and respondent decides to sell. In other words, if petitioners do not want to appropriate such
improvements or respondent does not choose to sell them, the improvements would have to be
removed without any obligation on the part of petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent
MCIAA for whatever it may have tangibly introduced therein. 45
The medium of compensation for the restitution shall be ready money or cash payable within a
period of three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date that the amount to be returned by
petitioners is determined with finality, unless the parties herein stipulate and agree upon a different
scheme, medium or schedule of payment. If after the period of three hundred sixty five (365) days or
the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of payment such amount owed is not settled, the

right of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916
and 920 and/or the latters improvements as set forth herein shall be deemed forfeited and the
ownership of those parcels of land shall vest absolutely upon respondent MCIAA.
Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses
in favor of petitioners as decreed in the assailed Decision of 12 April 1999 of the trial court. It is not
sound public policy to set a premium upon the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good
faith, as in the present case, albeit the decision to resist the claim is erroneous. 46
The rule on awards of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is found in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interests;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's valid and demandable claim;
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(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
As noted in Mirasol v. De la Cruz,47 Art. 2208 intends to retain the award of attorneys fees as the
exception in our law and the general rule remains that attorneys fees are not recoverable in the
absence of a stipulation thereto.

In the case at bar, considering the established absence of any stipulation regarding attorneys fees,
the trial court cannot base its award on any of the exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208. The records
of the instant case do not disclose any proof presented by petitioners to substantiate that the
actuations of respondent MCIAA were clearly unfounded or purely for the purpose of harassment;
neither does the trial court make any finding to that effect in its appealed Decision.
While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorneys fees in cases of clearly unfounded civil actions, this
exception must be understood to mean those where the defenses are so untenable as to amount to
gross and evident bad faith. Evidence must be presented to the court as to the facts and
circumstances constituting the alleged bad faith, otherwise, the award of attorneys fees is not
justified where there is no proof other than the bare statement of harassment that a party to be so
adjudged had acted in bad faith. The exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorneys fees
under Art. 2208, par. (11), demands a factual, legal or equitable justification that would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64456 dated 20 December 2001 and its Resolution of 28 November 2002 denying
reconsideration of the Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12 April 1999 in Civil Case No. CEB-20015 is
MODIFIED IN PART by (a) ORDERING respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) TO
RECONVEY to petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea, namely: Esperanza R.
Edjec, Bernarda R. Suela, Ruby C. Rotea, Bernarda R. Rotea, Elia R. Vda De Limbaga,
Virginia R. Arbon, Rosalinda R. Arquisola, Corazon Rotea, Fe R. Ebora, Caridad Rotea,
Angeles Vda. De Renacia, Jorge Rotea, Maria Luisa Rotea-Villegas, Alfredo R. Rotea,
represented by his heirs, namely: Lizbeth Rotea and Elepeth Rotea; Luis Rotea, represented
by his heir Jennifer Rotea; and Rolando R. Rotea, represented by his heir Rolando R. Rotea
Jr., Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097
square meters in Lahug, Cebu City, with all the improvements thereon evolving through
nature or time, but excluding those that were introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, which
shall be governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law;
(b) ORDERING petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea TO PAY respondent
MCIAA what the former received as just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916
and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No.
920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947.
Petitioners must likewise PAY respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses that the latter may
have incurred in sustaining the properties and the monetary value of its services in managing
the properties to the extent that petitioners will secure a benefit from such acts. Respondent
MCIAA however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels
of land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts
they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime;

(c) ORDERING respondent MCIAA TO CONVEY to petitioners the improvements it may

have built on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, in which case petitioners SHALL PAY for these
improvements at the prevailing free market price, otherwise, if petitioners do not want to
appropriate such improvements, or if respondent does not choose to sell them, respondent
MCIAA SHALL REMOVE these improvements WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION on the part of
petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for them;
(d) ORDERING petitioners TO PAY the amount so determined under letter (b) of this
dispositive portion as consideration for the reconveyance of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, as well
as the prevailing free market price of the improvements built thereon by respondent MCIAA,
if any and desired to be bought and sold by the parties, in ready money or cash PAYABLE
within a period of three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date that the amount under
letter (b) above is determined with finality, unless the parties herein stipulate a different
scheme or schedule of payment, otherwise, after the period of three hundred sixty five (365)
days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of payment and the amount so
payable is not settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of respondent
MCIAA to so reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the improvements shall be DEEMED
FORFEITED and the ownership of those parcels of land shall VEST ABSOLUTELY upon
respondent MCIAA;
(e) REMANDING the instant case to RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City for purposes of determining
the amount of compensation for Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to be paid by petitioners as
mandated in letter (b) hereof, and the value of the prevailing free market price of the
improvements built thereon by respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold
by the parties, and in general, securing the immediate execution of this Decision under the
premises;
(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right of the Department of Public Works and
Highways to its lease contract until the expiration of the lease period; and
(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for litigation
expenses against respondent MCIAA and in favor of petitioners.
This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of intervenor one Richard E. Enchuan on his
allegation that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over
Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.