THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125027. August 12, 2002.]

ANITA MANGILA , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA
GUINA , respondents.

People's Law Office for petitioner.

R.D. Bagatsing & Associates for private respondent Guina.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent Guina filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Mangila.
Summons, however, was not personally served on Mangila on the allegations that she had
transferred residence and that she had already left the country. Without recourse to
service by publication, Guina filed a motion for a writ of preliminary attachment and the
trial court granted the same. Here in issues are: the propriety of the implementation of the
writ of attachment, and the venue of the case.
AECacS

The Court ruled against the correctness of the writ's implementation on the ground that at
the time, jurisdiction over Mangila had not been acquired. The summons was served later
than the implementation of the writ of attachment and the same does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction. On the issue of venue, wherein the case was filed in a
place other than that stipulated by the parties, the Court ruled the same is proper where
the agreement does not preclude other venues. However, bringing the case to the venue
where the sole proprietorship business is found, there is improper venue. Sole
proprietorship business has no separate juridical personality that could file a suit in court.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; WRIT OF ATTACHMENT; ISSUANCE AND
IMPLEMENTATION; WHEN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ACQUIRED.
As a preliminary note, a distinction should be made between issuance and implementation
of the writ of attachment. It is necessary to distinguish between the two to determine
when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired to validly implement
the writ. This distinction is crucial in resolving whether there is merit in petitioner's
argument. This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A
party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies
under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the
grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." This
phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint which is the moment that marks "the
commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons is
served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had: "It
goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant - issuance of summons, order of attachment and
writ of attachment - these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless
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jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's authority.
Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's
affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by
Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy
of the complaint . . . ." (Italics supplied.) Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However,
once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to
act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the
defendant.
2.
ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SERVICE OF PLEADINGS; SERVICE BY PUBLICATION,
EXPLAINED. The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service
could not be effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that
whenever the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation . . . ." Thus, if petitioner's whereabouts could not be
ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her given address, then
respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by
publication on petitioner. Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was
abroad at the time of the service of summons, this made petitioner a resident who is
temporarily out of the country. This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, Rule
14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication.
CHcETA

3.
ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; WRIT OF ATTACHMENT; ENFORCEMENT; SUMMONS
BELATEDLY SERVED DOES NOT CONFER A RETROACTIVE ACQUISITION OF
JURISDICTION. The alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to
have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce
such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service
of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by
publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of
summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because
the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
4.
ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE; AGREED VENUE THAT IS NOT MADE EXCLUSIVE
DOES NOT PRECLUDE OTHER VENUES. The Rules of Court provide that parties to an
action may agree in writing on the venue on which an action should be brought. However, a
mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing
a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.
Thus, absent words that show the parties' intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a
particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional
requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and
enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered
merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
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5.
ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUNDS; IMPROPER VENUE;
PRESENT AS CASE WAS FILED IN THE PLACE WHERE SOLE-PROPRIETORSHIP BUSINESS
IS FOUND. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal
actions is "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." In the
instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San Fernando,
Pampanga while private respondent resides in Paraaque City. However, this case was
brought in Pasay City, where the business of private respondent is found. This would have
been permissible had private respondent's business been a corporation. However, as
admitted by private respondent in her Complaint in the lower court, her business is a sole
proprietorship, and as such, does not have a separate juridical personality that could
enable it to file a suit in court. In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file
a suit in court. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit
by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits,
register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not
vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend
an action in court.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERLY FILED IN CASE AT BAR. Although petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment in the lower court, petitioner expressly stated that
she was filing the motion without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. At that time,
petitioner had not been served the summons and a copy of the complaint. Thereafter,
petitioner timely filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Rule 16,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion to dismiss may be filed "[W]ithin the
time for but before Petitioner even raised the issue of improper venue in his Answer as a
special and affirmative defense. Petitioner also continued to raise the issue of improper
venue in her Petition for Review before this Court. We thus hold that the dismissal of this
case on the ground of improper venue is warranted. The rules on venue, like other
procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the
impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this
objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose where
to file the complaint or petition.
SEcTHA

DECISION
CARPIO , J :
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The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 108, Pasay City. The trial court upheld the writ of attachment and the
declaration of default on petitioner while ordering her to pay private respondent
P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per annum, 25 percent attorney's fees and costs of
suit.

The Facts
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Petitioner Anita Mangila ("petitioner" for brevity) is an exporter of sea foods and doing
business under the name and style of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina
("private respondent" for brevity) is the President and General Manager of Air Swift
International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding
business.
Sometime in January 1988, petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of private
respondent for shipment of petitioner's products, such as crabs, prawns and assorted
fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Petitioner agreed to pay
private respondent cash on delivery. Private respondent's invoice stipulates a charge of 18
percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts. In case of suit, the same invoice
stipulates attorney's fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit. 3
On the first shipment, petitioner requested for seven days within which to pay private
respondent. However, for the next three shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner
failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109,376.95. 4
Despite several demands, petitioner never paid private respondent. Thus, on June 10,
1988, private respondent filed Civil Case No. 5875 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for collection of sum of money.
On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriff's Return showing that summons was not
served on petitioner. A woman found at petitioner's house informed the sheriff that
petitioner transferred her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out
further that petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam. 5
Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioner's departure from the Philippines as
done with intent to defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary
Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of Preliminary
Attachment 6 against petitioner. The following day, the trial court issued a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.
The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from their counterparts in
RTC, Pampanga. Thus, on October 28, 1988, Sheriff Alfredo San Miguel of RTC Pampanga
served on petitioner's household help in San Fernando, Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with
the Order, Affidavit and Bond. 7
On November 7, 1988, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment 8 without
submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she
had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the summons. Hence, petitioner claimed
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person. 9
In the hearing of the Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment on November 11, 1988,
private respondent sought and was granted a re-setting to December 9, 1988. On that
date, private respondent's counsel did not appear, so the Urgent Motion to Discharge
Attachment was deemed submitted for resolution. 1 0
The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment on January 13, 1989 upon
filing of petitioner's counter-bond. The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of
jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.
On December 26, 1988, private respondent applied for an alias summons, which the trial
court issued on January 19, 1989. 1 1 It was only on January 26, 1989 that summons was
finally served on petitioner. 1 2
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On February 9, 1989, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of
improper venue. Private respondent's invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates
that "if court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection . . . the agreed venue for
such action is Makati, Metro Manila." 1 3 Private respondent filed an Opposition asserting
that although "Makati" appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an
inadvertence by the printing press whose general manager executed an affidavit 1 4
admitting such inadvertence. Moreover, private respondent claimed that petitioner knew
that private respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati. 1 5 The lower
court, finding credence in private respondent's assertion, denied the Motion to Dismiss
and gave petitioner five days to file her Answer. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this too was denied.
Petitioner filed her Answer 1 6 on June 16, 1989, maintaining her contention that the venue
was improperly laid.
On June 26, 1989, the trial court issued an Order setting the pre-trial for July 18, 1989 at
8:30 a.m. and requiring the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs. Meanwhile, private
respondent filed a Motion to Sell Attached Properties but the trial court denied the motion.
On motion of petitioner, the trial court issued an Order resetting the pre-trial from July 18,
1989 to August 24, 1989 at 8:30 a.m..
On August 24, 1989, the day of the pre-trial, the trial court issued an Order 1 7 terminating
the pre-trial and allowing the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte on
September 12, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. The Order stated that when the case was called for pretrial at 8:31 a.m., only the counsel for private respondent appeared. Upon the trial court's
second call 20 minutes later, petitioner's counsel was still nowhere to be found. Thus, upon
motion of private respondent, the pre-trial was considered terminated.
On September 12, 1989, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
terminating the pre-trial. Petitioner explained that her counsel arrived 5 minutes after the
second call, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes, and was late because of
heavy traffic. Petitioner claims that the lower court erred in allowing private respondent to
present evidence ex-parte since there was no Order considering the petitioner as in
default. Petitioner contends that the Order of August 24, 1989 did not state that petitioner
was declared as in default but still the court allowed private respondent to present
evidence ex-parte. 1 8
On October 6, 1989, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and scheduled
the presentation of private respondent's evidence ex-parte on October 10, 1989.
On October 10, 1989, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion stating that the presentation of
evidence ex-parte should be suspended because there was no declaration of petitioner as
in default and petitioner's counsel was not absent, but merely late.
On October 18, 1989, the trial court denied the Omnibus Motion. 1 9
On November 20, 1989, the petitioner received a copy of the Decision of November 10,
1989, ordering petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per
annum, 25 percent attorney's fees and costs of suit. Private respondent filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal but the trial court denied the same.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

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On December 15, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the decision of
the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of
attachment and sustained the filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the declaration of default on petitioner and concluded that the trial court did
not commit any reversible error.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 5, 1996 but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in a Resolution dated May 20, 1996.
Hence, this petition.

The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner may be re-stated as follows:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT WAS IMPROPERLY-ISSUED AND SERVED;
II.
WHETHER THERE WAS A VALID DECLARATION OF DEFAULT;
III.
WHETHER THERE WAS IMPROPER VENUE.
IV.
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS
OBLIGED TO PAY P109,376.95, PLUS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 2 0

The Ruling of the Court

Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment
Petitioner ascribes several errors to the issuance and implementation of the writ of
attachment. Among petitioner's arguments are: first, there was no ground for the issuance
of the writ since the intent to defraud her creditors had not been established; second, the
value of the properties levied exceeded the value of private respondent's claim. However,
the crux of petitioner's arguments rests on the question of the validity of the writ of
attachment. Because of failure to serve summons on her before or simultaneously with the
writ's implementation, petitioner claims that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction
over her person and thus the service of the writ is void.
As a preliminary note, a distinction should be made between issuance and implementation
of the writ of attachment. It is necessary to distinguish between the two to determine
when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired to validly implement
the writ. This distinction is crucial in resolving whether there is merit in petitioner's
argument.
This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit
may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules
of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy
"at the commencement of the action or at anytime thereafter." 2 1 This phrase refers to the
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date of filing of the complaint which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the
action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or
even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 2 2 this Court clarified the actual time
when jurisdiction should be had:
"It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant issuance of summons,
order of attachment and writ of attachment these do not and cannot bind and
affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive
process or his voluntary submission to the court's authority. Hence, when the
sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as
explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to
said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint . . ."(Italics supplied.)

Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
involves three stages: rst, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ
is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant be rst obtained. However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. 2 3
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988
and implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on
January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the implementation of the writ of
attachment.
The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a
motion for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action." However, on the
day the writ was implemented, the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously
with the implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was
shown in the records of the case, the summons was actually served on petitioner several
months after the writ had been implemented.
Private respondent, nevertheless, claims that the prior or contemporaneous service of
summons contemplated in Section 5 of Rule 57 provides for exceptions. Among such
exceptions are "where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted
service despite diligent efforts or where the defendant is a resident temporarily absent
therefrom . . ." Private respondent asserts that when she commenced this action, she tried
to serve summons on petitioner but the latter could not be located at her customary
address in Kamuning, Quezon City or at her new address in Guagua, Pampanga. 2 4
Furthermore, respondent claims that petitioner was not even in Pampanga; rather, she was
in Guam purportedly on a business trip.
Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on petitioner after
her personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private respondent could not
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ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other
recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be
effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the
defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation . . ." Thus, if petitioner's whereabouts could not be ascertained after the
sheriff had served the summons at her given address, then respondent could have
immediately asked the court for service of summons by publication on petitioner. 2 5
Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the
service of summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the country.
This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, 2 6 Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication.
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be
deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot
enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her
person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the
service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or
by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. 2 7 The subsequent service
of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person
because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.

Improper Venue
Petitioner assails the filing of this case in the RTC of Pasay and points to a provision in
private respondent's invoice which contains the following:
"3.
If court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection, an additional
equivalent (sic) to 25% of the principal amount will be charged. The agreed venue
for such action is Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines." 2 8

Based on this provision, petitioner contends that the action should have been instituted in
the RTC of Makati and to do otherwise would be a ground for the dismissal of the case.
We resolve to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue but not for the reason
stated by petitioner.
The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on
which an action should be brought. 2 9 However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an
action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. 3 0 The
parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that
show the parties' intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will
allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed.
Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. 3 1 In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an
agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. 3 2
In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are
no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the
parties that Makati is the "only or exclusive" venue where the action could be instituted. We
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therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this case
could be filed.
Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the proper venue for this case.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal actions is
"where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." 3 3 The exception to
this rule is when the parties agree on an exclusive venue other than the places mentioned in
the rules. But, as we have discussed, this exception is not applicable in this case. Hence,
following the general rule, the instant case may be brought in the place of residence of the
plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (private respondent herein).
In the instant case, the residence of private respondent (plaintiff in the lower court) was
not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was alleged was the postal address of her sole
proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only when private respondent testified in
court, after petitioner was declared in default, that she mentioned her residence to be in
Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City.
In the earlier case of Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc., 3 4 the reverse happened. The plaintiff in
that case was Tyson Enterprises, Inc., a corporation owned and managed by Dominador Ti.
The complaint, however, did not allege the office or place of business of the corporation,
which was in Binondo, Manila. What was alleged was the residence of Dominador Ti, who
lived in San Juan, Rizal. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig. The
Court there held that the evident purpose of alleging the address of the corporation's
president and manager was to justify the filing of the suit in Rizal, Pasig instead of in
Manila. Thus, the Court ruled that there was no question that venue was improperly laid in
that case and held that the place of business of Tyson Enterprises, Inc. is considered as its
residence for purposes of venue. Furthermore, the Court held that the residence of its
president is not the residence of the corporation because a corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders.
In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San
Fernando, Pampanga 3 5 while private respondent resides in Paraaque City. 3 6 However,
this case was brought in Pasay City, where the business of private respondent is found.
This would have been permissible had private respondent's business been a corporation,
just like the case in Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc. However, as admitted by private
respondent in her Complaint 3 7 in the lower court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and
as such, does not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in
court. 3 8 In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. 3 9
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the personality of the owner of the enterprise. 4 0 The law merely recognizes the existence
of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a
single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits,
register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. 4 1 The law does not
vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend
an action in court. 4 2
Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file this case, the sole proprietorship is not
the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta Guina in her personal capacity. In fact, the
complaint in the lower court acknowledges in its caption that the plaintiff and defendant
are Loreta Guina and Anita Mangila, respectively. The title of the petition before us does
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not state, and rightly so, Anita Mangila v. Air Swift International, but rather Anita Mangila v.
Loreta Guina. Logically then, it is the residence of private respondent Guina, the proprietor
with the juridical personality, which should be considered as one of the proper venues for
this case.

All these considered, private respondent should have filed this case either in San Fernando,
Pampanga (petitioner's residence) or Paraaque (private respondent's residence). Since
private respondent (complainant below) filed this case in Pasay, we hold that the case
should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Although petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment in the lower court,
petitioner expressly stated that she was filing the motion without submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court. At that time, petitioner had not been served the summons and a
copy of the complaint. 4 3 Thereafter, petitioner timely filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 4 on the
ground of improper venue. Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion
to dismiss may be filed "[W]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim." Petitioner even raised the issue of improper venue in his
Answer 4 5 as a special and affirmative defense. Petitioner also continued to raise the issue
of improper venue in her Petition for Review 4 6 before this Court. We thus hold that the
dismissal of this case on the ground of improper venue is warranted.
The rules on venue, like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action
and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given
unrestricted freedom to choose where to file the complaint or petition. 4 7
We find no reason to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED on the grounds of improper venue and invalidity of
the service of the writ of attachment. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. 5875 is hereby dismissed without prejudice to refiling it in the proper venue. The
attached properties of petitioner are ordered returned to her immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Puno and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., is on leave.
Footnotes

1.

Penned by Justice Quirino Abad Santos, Jr. with members justices Nathanael de Pano,
Jr. and B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz; Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25119.

2.

Penned by Judge Priscilla Mijares.

3.

Rollo, p. 97.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Records of Civil Case No. 5875, p. 9 (hereinafter Records).

6.

Ibid., p. 23.

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7.

Rollo, p. 98.

8.

Records, p. 31.

9.

Rollo, p. 11.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Records, p. 86.

12.

Ibid., p. 91.

13.

Ibid., p. 97.

14.

Ibid., p. 102.

15.

Ibid., p.100.

16.

Ibid., p. 131.

17.

Ibid., p. 161.

18.

Rollo, p. 13.

19.

Records, p. 182.

20.

Rollo, pp. 13-14.

21.

Section 1, Rule 57, Rules of Court.

22.

204 SCRA 343 (1991).

23.

Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 260 (1992).

24.

Rollo, p. 102.

25.

UCPB v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001. Sec. 14. Service upon defendant
whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service, may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and
for such time as the court may order.

26.

Sec. 15.
Extraterritorial service. . . ., service, may, by leave of court, be effected
out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6 or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the
court may deem sufficient. . .
Sec. 16.
Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. when any action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who
is temporarily out of it, service, may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.

27.

See note 25.

28.

Supra, note 13.

29.

Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure:

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Sec. 4.

When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply . . .

(b)
Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action
on the exclusive venue thereof.
30.
31.

Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. UCPB, 347 SCRA 542 (2000).

Supena v. Dela Rosa, 267 SCRA 1(1999) citing Philippine Banking Corporation v.
Tensuan, 230 SCRA 913 (1994); Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
267 SCRA 759 (1997).

32.

Ibid.

33.

Rule 4, Section 2.

34.

119 SCRA 367 (1982).

35.

Records, p. 31.

36.

TSN, October 24, 1989, p. 2.

37.

Records, p. 1.

38.

Yao Ka Sin Trading v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 763 (1992) citing Jariol, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 188 SCRA 475 (1990).

39.

Juasing Hardware v. Hon. Mendoza, 201 Phil. 369 (1982), also cited in the Yao Ka Sin
Trading case.

40.

Ibid.

41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid.

43.

Records, p. 31.

44.

Ibid., p. 107.

45.

Ibid., p. 131.

46.

Rollo, p. 1.

47.

Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc., see note 34.

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