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ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION Vs.

MAYOR OF MANILA

Balbosa and Atenta


Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association suing the Mayor of City of Manila in his capacity charged with the general
power to enforce of ordinances in the city. The challenged ordinance was approved on June 14, 1963
by the then Vice-Mayor Hermini Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila.
The challenged ordinance tends to be violative to the due process clause as its enforcement is beyond
the power of the Board of City of Manila regulating motels on the ground that in the revised charter of
the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable insofar as it would impose P6,000.00
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motel; requires the strict filling up
of prescribed form during checked ins and allowing parts of the hotels and motels open for inspection
by authorities.
The City board answered the allegations contending that the imposition of such ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power, aims to curb immorality and only the guests or customers not before the
court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary
to law.

The lower court declared the challenged ordinance unconstitutional and therefore null and void, hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 violative to the due process clause.
Ruling:
NO. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.
This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable
of powers,4extending as it does "to all the great public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general
welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it
to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.

PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.


HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON. RODOLFO S.
MILADO, Department of Labor and Employment Mediator-Arbiter for Region VIII,
Tacloban, City, and PHILPHOS MOVEMENT FOR PROGRESS, INC. (PMPI), respondents.
Facts:
Respondent, PHILPHOS Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI), filed with the Department
of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. It was not opposed by petitioner, PHILPHOS, but submitted a position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter stating that its management welcomed the creation of supervisory
employees union provide the necessary requisites of law were properly observed and prayed for
the exclusion of its superintendents and professional/technical employees from the PMPI
supervisory union.
Respondent, Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of
a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. PMPI then filed an amended
petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees.
The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the
amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. MediatorArbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification
election among the supervisory, professional, technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS
appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not that PHILPHOS was denied due process in the proceedings before
respondent Mediator-Arbiter.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no denial of due process.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable
opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a

hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not, instead, it opted
to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity
to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

G.R. No. 139465

October 17, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,


vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and
MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by
the USA. On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Court dismissed the petition at bar and ordered
the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He
assails the decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value
which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of
an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of
fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher
objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine
Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government
and the rights of an individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and
hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.

VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch
necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has
encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal
branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings."2
a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing petitioners
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing of
Reply. private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event
that petitioner's Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed a Motion to Expunge from the
records petitioner's Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow
Continuation and Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby
resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
The Supreme court held that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
First. P.D. No. 10693 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an
extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers,
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by
the extraditee.
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their
intent. and in light of its object and purpose."
The suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any
other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and
is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes
should not go unpunished;
the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of
extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial.
Third. the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as
the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with
the Philippines. The reason for the rule is that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which
enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before
it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."
Fourth. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. the process of

extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His
guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing
evaluation.
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that
accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a
valid treaty."15
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards.17 In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt for conviction18 while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing
of the existence of a prima facie case." Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.20
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards
in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
Fifth. The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and
temporary detention.
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the
accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition
court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation
stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the
appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondents liberty is merely hypothetical.

Sixth.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law . . ."
A prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and
when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be
"condemned to suffer grievous loss." The extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the
petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his
extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The
extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations."An

extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards
that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to
a valid treaty." In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice
and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental
fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no
denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar
promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 4 ARANAL


MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO
ARCA, respondents.
FACTS:
City Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila signed by petitioner Mayor Antonio
Villegas. The said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in
any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical
assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in
their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who
are not paid monetarily or in kind.
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition,
declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. In his petition, private respondent contends that it is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life,
liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Petitioner argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void because it is an exercise of
the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 violates due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
RULING:
The court ruled that Ordinance No. 6537 violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens

within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Tanada vs Tuvera
Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion
which orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect. The petitioners are now before the supreme court again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must
be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court has come to
the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that
a law effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would
be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. Consequently, the Supreme Court has no choice but to pronounce that under Article
2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere,

as a requirement for their affectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.

SANDOVAL VS HRET
Facts: On 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates
for the Member of the House of Representatives, the Board of Canvassers of the
Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas proclaimed protestee Sandoval
[herein petitioner] the winning candidate for the Office of the Member of the
House of Representatives.
Protestant Lacson-Noel filed a Petition of Protest on 29 May 2007, and
alleged in substance that "the results [of the election] do not reflect the true will
of the voters as they are but products of various fraudulent and illegal acts,
schemes and machinations employed by Sandoval, with the connivance or
conspiracy of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs).
On the other hand, Sandoval contends that it is protestant Lacson-Noel
who is guilty of violating "election laws, rules and regulations, and which, on the
other hand, resulted to the loss of legal and valid votes in his favor.
The petitioner filed several motions and despite the opposition, the tribunal
granted the same with the necessary warning that no further extension shall be
given. Despite the warning, Sandoval once more prayed for leave to present
additional expert witnesses but it was denied. Thereafter, a motion for partial
reconsideration was filed and was also denied and declares the respondent
Josephine Veronique Lacson-Noel the duly elected Representative of the Lone
District of Malabon City-Navotas
Hence, an appeal alleging that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not admitting petitioner's formal
offer of evidence, thereby denying him due process.
Issue: WON the petitioner was denied of the due process.
Ruling: Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an
additional period of time within which to make his formal offer of evidence.
However, a review of the proceedings will reveal that the HRET acted in
accordance with its rules of procedure and well within its jurisdiction.
Based on the narration of facts, the HRET was not a denial of petitioner's right
to due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. To be heard does not
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.

Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is


accorded, there is no denial of due process.
It is quite clear from the foregoing narration of how the proceedings were
conducted that petitioner was given all the opportunity to be heard. So many
hearing dates were set for his presentation of evidence, but he merely wasted a
good number of those days. He was granted an extension of time so he could file
his formal offer of evidence, but he still failed to fulfill his responsibility.
DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-11390

March 26, 1918

EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO vs. VICENTE PALANCA


FACTS:
This action was instituted by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon
various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question was
executed by the original defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for
a debt owing by him to the bank. The debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at
the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties
to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which
was about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the
mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died
without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was
made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time, a copy of the summons
and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, Amoy city, Empire of China.
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. The cause
proceeded in usual course and the defendant not having appeared, judgment was taken against him
by default. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff where it was recited that publication
had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having been given
mail. The court found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with
interest. However, the payment contemplated in the order was never made; so the court ordered
the sale of the property and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant Engracio, wherein the applicant
requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment rendered, and to vacate all
the proceedings subsequent thereto as these were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action, but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject of the action?
2. Was due process observed?
RULING:
1. Yes. Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a
mortgage foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action
primarily from the statutes organizing the court.
Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible
object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. The jurisdiction of the court
over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon
the following conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within
the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an
obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the
proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the
purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be
granted in this proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property.
Thus, these following propositions relative to the foreclosure proceeding against the
property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself personally to
the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power
which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired
and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can
be enforced against the property itself.
2. Yes. The Court stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to send the notice
to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such
irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the
clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as
amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if
proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This
in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification
which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be
in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under
certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for
its condemnation and sale.

As to a judicial proceeding, the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following


conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding;
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
On Jurisdiction:

The word "jurisdiction" may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of
action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or
(2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to
its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from
the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the
property is recognized and made effective.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary
submission of the defendant or by the personal service of process upon him within the territory where the
process is valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal
process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at
all.
The process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of
law requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process within the
State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal
liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this point, being based upon
the constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands.
Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who
is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and
the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193;
43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.)

In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken
without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly hold that,
assuming the judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper
remedy was by an original proceeding and not by motion in the causeThe conclusions stated in
this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is accordingly
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

CASE 8:

G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and


NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National
Labor Union (NLU) while no members of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were
laid off. NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid for:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the
Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. Laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the
CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Whether the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial. (YES)
RULING:
The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the
trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion


Facts:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of
the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to
guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
Private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner, the
Secretary of Justice requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.

In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999
(but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons the prematurity of the request, the confidentiality of the papers and the letter was
addressed to a body that did not handle such extradition proceedings.
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively) Honorable Ralph C. Lantion heard the case in the
RTC of Manila. The Secretary of Justice was then asked to maintain status quo.
Issue:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action
from the U. S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the
papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a
third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be
tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government
has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a
fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to
be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410). Petitioner contends that the United
States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys.
The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that everything it refuses

to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that
the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the
information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial.

Lao Gi vs Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 81798 December 29, 1989
Facts:
On September 3, 1958 the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 finding
Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr.
is a Filipino citizen born on November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug
of Guagua, Pampanga. However on October 3, 1980 the Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147,
series of 1980 cancelling Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 and setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno
Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A motion for reconsideration
of said Opinion was denied by the Minister of Justice on February 13, 1981.
On March 9, 1981 a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children. Respondents filed a motion
to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long
settled under Opinion No. 191 series of 1958, but was subsequently opposed by a private prosecutor and
also the CID special prosecutor. In this case, it appears that petitioners are charged with having entered
the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the
immigration authority at a designated port of entry.
Petitioners said that the CID has no authority to deport them. They filed a petition for preliminary
injunction but was denied by the CFI of Manila. They argued that they werent subject to immediate
deportation. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Lao Gi was denied of due process?
Ruling:
Yes.
The immigration code provides that there must be a determination of the existence of the ground
charged, particularly illegal entry into the country, and it is only after hearing that an alien can be

deported. Deportation itself is a harsh process, which is why due process must be observed. In the same
law, it is provided that: No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under the rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hearing must be in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the issuance of search warrants, warrants of arrest, bail, motion
to quash, and the trial. Private prosecutors cannot intervene in deportation proceedings in order to avoid
harassment and oppression, hence there are special prosecutors tasked to prosecute deportation.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned order of the respondent CID
dated September 28, 1982 is hereby set aside and is hereby directed to continue hearing the deportation
case against petitioners. No costs.

Case no. 11 AGABON VS. NLRC (11-17-2004)


Facts:
Petitioners Virgilio and Jenny Agabon, employed as gypsum board and cornice
installers by private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc., engaged in the selling
and installing ornamental & construction materials, were dismissed for abandonment of
work. Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because private respondent refused to
give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis. Private
respondent maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their
work, and they also sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners
advising them to report for work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claims, after which, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in their favor. However, upon
appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision. On appeal to the CA, it ruled that the dismissal
was not illegal because the petitioners abandoned their work but ordered the payment of
money claims.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners dismissal is illegal due to the violation of the statutory due process
Rulings:
Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead
argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because
they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a

valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees
last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld
but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became
known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination
under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due
process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. Constitutional due
process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the
Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated
without just cause after notice and hearing.
***notes:
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of
the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known
address.

12 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan 11-19-01


Facts:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its
constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue:
WON RA No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. It violates the due process clause for its vagueness, it violates the constitutional right of
the accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him
2. It violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by
lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of
plunder
Ruling:
The Court holds the validity of RA 7080 (Plunder Law) and dismissed the petition to declare
the law unconstitutional for lack of merit.

1.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must
define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
2.
Petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents
the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts
constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has
in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount
of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.

Notes:
Mens Rea - the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a crime, as opposed to
the action or conduct of the accused.
RA 7080 is in relation with RA 7019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The former
enumerates the crime and offenses that is also punishable in the latter Act, the only difference is that
in the Plunder Act the wealth accumulated by the accused should be at least 50 million pesos.