PEOPLE vs.

PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued
nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in
favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and
specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the
civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing
of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of
P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and
violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however,
dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch
31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on
07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP
Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the
proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed
with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87. In a resolution dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate
action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that: WON the violation of BP. 22 has already been prescribed.
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime
in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the
subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326,
as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period
shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the
computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes likewise
applies to special laws, such as Batas PambansaBlg. 22.
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act
No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the
institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.
that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period of
prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City
on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance
with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such
procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by
petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of
BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus
be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March
2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy
of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by
the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already
prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The
running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco,
et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17] when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia
v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even
ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively

pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the
checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only
on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg.
22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED

RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV, and SUSAN
ALOA, respondents.
This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever controversial Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. The
question posed is whether the drawer of a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted under BP 22 even if the
check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due date. The burgeoning jurisprudence on the matter appears silent on this point.
Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloa Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May
1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured her that the check would be
sufficiently funded on the maturity date.
On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank dishonored the check because it was drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF).
On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City. [1] In addition to the details of the
issuance and the dishonor of the check, she also alleged that she made repeated demands on petitioner to make arrangements for the payment of
the check within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank, but that petitioner failed to do so.
Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from due
date thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due date,
it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. She also claimed that she already
assigned private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, as full payment for the bounced checks thus
extinguishing her criminal liability.
On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of
BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.
On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a petition for review of the 22 April
1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition in a one (1)-page resolution dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP, only resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal
complaint were cognizable for review by that office, citing Department Order No. 223.
On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999
as well as the order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26 October 1999
denying due course outright and dismissing the petition. According to respondent appellate court A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 x xx provides for appeal, via a petition for review x xx from judgment or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition for Review" of the ORSP
resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned in Rule 43 x xxx It is worth to note that petitioner in her three (3) assigned errors
charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion." The grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper in a petition for
certiorari x xxx Even if We treat the "Petition for Review" as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to allege the essential requirements of a special
civil action. Besides, the remedy of petitioner is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts x xxx (italics supplied)
First, some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions."
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh
v. Court of Appeals,[5] Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is
an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been
defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making."
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, we held that a voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel,
enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This is so because the
awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal; [10] and since their awards determine the rights of
parties, their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a
petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate
review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty prescribed
for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case.
Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to determine the specificity and adequacy of the
offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no ground to continue with
the inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.
In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the petition, in view of the novel legal question
involved, to prevent further delay of the prosecution of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any notion that procedural
technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.

Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of which reads Section 1.Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank x xxx (italics supplied).
An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank;
and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance, while in the
second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety (90) days
from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or
credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the
drawee bank at the time, while that involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when issued. Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day presentment period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express
element of the second offense.
From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for violation of the first paragraph of the offense.
Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple ground that the subject check was presented 166 days
after the date stated thereon. She cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads Sec. 2.Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee (italics supplied).
Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an element of the offenses punished in BP 22. She
asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a check to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one that is dishonored when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor occurred after presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day
period, no criminal liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum of money may be filed, if warranted." To bolster this argument, she relies
on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his treatise - \
Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an additional element of the offense defined in the first paragraph of
section 1 because it provides for the evidentiary fact of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit" which is an element of the offense defined in
said paragraph; otherwise said provision of section 2 would be rendered without meaning and nugatory. The rule of statutory construction is that the
parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting
each other. The same section cannot be deemed to supply an additional element for the offense under the second paragraph of section 1 because
the 90-day presentment period is already a built-in element in the definition of said offense (italics supplied).
We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, and must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to
the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes.
The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the
maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [20]
The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the offense. Since knowledge
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of
drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. [21] The term prima facie evidence
denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to
counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary. Neither
does the term prima facie evidence preclude the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or lack of credit.
Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when presented within
the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the author, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove insightful MR. ROMAN: x xxx Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under this Section? Would it be the maker or the drawer? How about
the endorser, Mr. Speaker?
MR. MENDOZA: Liable.

MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty of knowing at the time he endorses and delivers a check . . . .
MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of knowledge must be proven by positive evidence because the
presumption of knowledge arises only against the maker or the drawer. It does not arise as against endorser under the following
section (italics supplied).
MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check." The preposition is
disjunctive, so that any person who delivers any check knowing at the time of such making or such delivery that the maker or drawer has
no sufficient funds would be liable under Section 1.
MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability even as against endorser, for example, the presumption of
knowledge of insufficient funds arises only against the maker or drawer under Section 2.
MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of checks or bills of exchange would find it necessary since they
may be charged with the knowledge at the time they negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient funds in the bank or depository.
MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the check he was
aware that the drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover the check upon presentation. That evidence must be presented by the
prosecution. However, if the one changed is the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution because that fact
would be established by presumption under Section 2 (italics supplied).[24]
An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if
there is evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing deliberations that the
presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such
knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there
arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other
evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City
Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable by certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution must prove knowledge without
the benefit of the presumption, and she may present whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while e videntiary facts are those which tend to
prove or establish said ultimate facts.[25] Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element
of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such
knowledge.
It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion to file a criminal case when there is probable
cause to do so. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The
prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999 which dismissed the petition for review questioning
the resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31 August 1999 denying
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602
January 18, 2012
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal
prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on January 20, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon
City. They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each accused pay to the heirs of each
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus costs of suit.1
The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the
Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.2 Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of
PO2 Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand
Sayson, MoisesSayson, Jr., and JoselitoSayson, alleging:
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL by
then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 00-90719
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL by
then and there shooting him several times with a gun, hitting him on his face and chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 00-90720
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then
and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his back, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the States evidence of guilt as follows:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting
station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, BagoBantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband,
Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrellas son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan
Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, Estrellas other sons Joselito
Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrellas family and other visitors ate and
enjoyed themselves at the party (pp. 3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front
of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to
customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin
armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mothers warning. He went out and
advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with
the words Gusto mo unahin nakita? Moises replied huwag. Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon
even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot
on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a
burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime.
In turn, the appellants brief filed by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) rendered the version of the accused, to wit:

xxx [A]t about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on (a tricycle driver) saw accused Edwin Valdez
alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking along Corregidor Street
when Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a gun, block his (Edwins) way. Jun Sayson poked a gun at accused Edwin, shouting, Putanginamo, papatayin kita. The latter raised both his hands and said Wag kuya Jun, maawaka.
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year old child, was walking when his way was likewise blocked but this time, by the
siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their stepfather. Joselito twisted one of his (Eduardos) hands at his back while his (Joseltios) stepfather
held the other. Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He slumped
and bled. He asked Heidi to inform his family that he was hit. Heidi ran away. She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she
heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be dead. Ferdinand stopped firing. Accused Eduardos son approached him crying.
Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his service firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met General Jesus
Almadin, his commanding officer (CO). He reported the incident and sought for advice. He was told to take a rest and go back on (sic) the following
day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused Edwin Valdez likewise
surrendered.
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.9
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the States witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies;
challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Ruling
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide due to the failure of the informations to allege the
facts and circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the States witnesses (Susan Sayson, Marites Sayson and Estrella Sayson) did not really see the events as they
transpired; and that they wrongly identified the two accused as the persons who had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were
themselves the aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdezs insistence, holding thus:
In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to discredit the testimonies of witnesses Susan, Marites and Estrella. They claimed that
a perusal of Estrellas testimony would cast doubt on her statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-appellants
claimed that Estrella Sayson did not actually see who allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words Gusto mo unahin nakita? The accusedappellants also claimed that Estrella also failed to see who shot Moises. They likewise assailed the testimonies of Susan and Marites as being
incredible. They said that Susan testified that she was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could not speak; yet she was still able to
give her statement on the same day the incident allegedly happened. The accused-appellants also said that Marites testified that she was only
about five (5) meters away from them (accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle; but that, interestingly, she only learned from
her husband Joselito that the accused-appellants were looking for a certain Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her purported failure to see who between the accused-appellants
threatened Moises with the words Gusto mounahinkita? and who shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing Moises because
she was preventing him from approaching the accused-appellants, who were armed with short firearms. Estrella categorically stated that
she saw the accused-appellants alight from their motorcycle on March 1, 2000. She could not have been mistaken about the identity of the
accused-appellants for the simple reason that they are her neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants) father is her cumpadre. When the
incident happened, the accused-appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from where she and her son Moises were standing. She
also saw with her own eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots (approximately [9] shots) coming from where the
accused-appellants were standing.11
Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial courts findings of fact, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their
probative weight, as well as its conclusions, the Court accords high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CAs findings. 12 The justification for this is
that trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand observation of the demeanor, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The only time when a reviewing court was not bound by the trial courts assessment of
credibility arises upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that was overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome
of the case. No such fact or circumstance has been brought to the Courts attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory; and that inaccuracies noted in testimony may even suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been
rehearsed. To properly appreciate the worth of testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the individual words or phrases alone but seek out
the whole impression or effect of what has been said and done.15
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the aggressors who had attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated
during the trial that he dodged the bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand (one of the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim);
that he played dead to avoid being shot at again, and walked away with his terrified son only after the way was clear for them to leave; and that he
heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third victim) grappled for control of a gun, and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun and
Ferdinand.16
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.
It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the
trial court for determination based on the evidence on record.17 The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established
facts and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront
Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to
come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises: Gusto mounahinnakita?; that immediately after
Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen
Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody

shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots
fired at the three victims were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that
Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds entered Joselitos back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr.Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence
was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put together,22 the congruence between the testimonial recollections
and the physical evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the
felony.23 Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their
acts.24 Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accusedfrom the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We
are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both
accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their
acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack
that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one
after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his coconspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.25 Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly
inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the
informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially
insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 27 It encompasses a wide
variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the
appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the
actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or
aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information.28 In People v. Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the victims by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting
[them] on various parts of their bodies which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s] did not sufficiently set forth the facts and
circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused
from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing
alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an
attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he
is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United States v. Lim San: 30
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name,
but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in
the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at
all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged? not Did you commit a crime named murder. If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named. xxx. (emphasis supplied)
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the
accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is
a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the

offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the
offense proved.31 In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.32
We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.
Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.33 There being no circumstances modifying
criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum for each count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, MoisesSayson,
Jr., and JoselitoSayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO CHINGH Y PARCIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando) seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 convicting him
of Statutory Rape and Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On March 19, 2005, an Information for Rape was filed against Armando for inserting his fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his
minor victim, VVV, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about March 11, 2004 in the City of Manila, Philippines, [Armando], with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct upon a ten (10) year old minor child, [VVV], by then
and there pulling her in a dark place then mashing her breast and inserting his fingers in her vagina and afterwards his penis, against her will and
consent, thereby causing serious danger to the normal growth and development of the child [VVV], to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[3]
Upon his arraignment, Armando pleaded not guilty to the charge. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, VVV; the victim's father; PO3 Ma. Teresa Solidarios; and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the lone testimony Armando as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was only 10 years old at the time of the incident. On 11 March 2004 at around 8:00 p.m., along with five other
playmates, VVV proceeded to a store to buy food. While she was beckoning the storekeeper, who was not then at her station, Armando approached
and pulled her hand and threatened not to shout for help or talk. Armando brought her to a vacant lot at Tindalo Street, about 400 meters from the
store. While in a standing position beside an unoccupied passenger jeepney, Armando mashed her breast and inserted his right hand index finger
into her private part. Despite VVV's pleas for him to stop, Armando unzipped his pants, lifted VVV and rammed his phallus inside her vagina,
causing her to feel excruciating pain.
Threatened with death if she would tell anyone what had happened, VVV kept mum about her traumatic experience when she arrived home.
Noticing her odd and uneasy demeanor as well as her blood-stained underwear, however, her father pressed her for an explanation. VVV
confessed to her father about her unfortunate experience. Immediately, they reported the matter to the police authorities. After his arrest, Armando
was positively identified by VVV in a police line-up.
The genital examination of VVV conducted by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr.Baluyot) of the Philippine General Hospital's Child Protection Unit, in the
morning of 12 March 2004, showed a ''fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 o'clock position" in the child's hymen and "minimal bleeding from [said]
hymen laceration." Her impression was that there was a "clear evidence"' of "penetrating trauma" which happened within 24 hours prior to the
examination. The photograph of the lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly illustrated and buttressed Dr.Baluyot's medical report. [4]
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV. Under his version, in (sic) the night of 11 March 2004, he and his granddaughter were on their way to his
cousin's house at Payumo St., Tondo, Manila. As it was already late, he told his granddaughter to just go home ahead of him while he decided to go
to Blumentritt market to buy food. While passing by a small alley on his way thereto, he saw VVV along with some companions, peeling
"dalanghita." VVV approached him and asked if she could go with him to the market because she will buy "dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused her
request and told VVV instead to go home. He then proceeded towards Blumentritt, but before he could reach the market, he experienced rheumatic
pains that prompted him to return home. Upon arriving home, at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening, he watched television with his wife and children.
Shortly thereafter, three (3) barangay officials arrived, arrested him, and brought him to a police precinct where he was informed of VVV's
accusation against him.
On April 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 43, after finding the evidence of the prosecution overwhelming against the
accused's defense of denial and alibi, rendered a Decision convicting Armando of Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARMANDO CHINGH GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Statutory Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify private complainant [VVV] the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
as compensatory damages, fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs.
It appearing that accused is detained, the period of his detention shall be credited in the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the Decision before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119.
On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision finding Armando not only guilty of Statutory Rape, but also of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The decretal portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant is hereby
found GUILTY of two counts of rape and is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for the crime of statutory rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and,
for the offense of rape through sexual assault, the indeterminate penalty of 3 years, 3 months and 1 day of prision correctional, as minimum, to 8
years and 11 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the victim, a total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P80,000.00 as moral damages; and P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a grand total of P200,000.00 for the two counts of rape.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED

In fine, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considering that the appeal opened the entire case for judicial review, the CA also found
Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault. The CA opined that since the Information charged Armando with two counts of rape:
(1) by inserting his finger in the victim's vagina, which is classified as Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; and (2) for inserting his penis in the private part of his victim, which is Statutory Rape, and considering that Armando
failed to object thereto through a motion to quash before entering his plea, Armando could be convicted of as many offenses as are charged and
proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with the credible, direct, and candid testimony of the victim, the elements of Statutory Rape and Rape Through
Sexual Assault were indubitably established by the prosecution.
Armando now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution[9] dated September 26, 2007, the Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. In their respective
Manifestations,[10] the parties waived the filing of their supplemental briefs, and instead adopted their respective briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Armando raises the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A, PARAGRAPH 1
(D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN SPITE THE UNNATURAL AND UNREALISTIC TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing the factual basis of his conviction, which in effect, mainly questions the credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution, particularly his victim, VVV.
Armando maintains that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that will overcome the presumption of innocence. Likewise, Armando
insists that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him based on the unrealistic and unnatural testimony of the victim. Armando claims that VVV's
testimony was so inconsistent with common experience that it deserves careful and critical evaluation. First, it was so unnatural for VVV to remain
quiet and not ask for help when the accused allegedly pulled her in the presence of several companions and bystanders; second, VVV did not resist
or cry for help while they were on their way to the place where she was allegedly abused, which was 300 to 400 meters away from where he
allegedly pulled her; third, VVV could have run away while Armando was allegedly molesting her, but she did not; fourth, Armando could not have
inserted his penis in the victim's organ while both of them were standing, unless the victim did not offer any resistance.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their
candor and behavior on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its
assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.[11]
From the testimony of the victim, VVV, she positvely identified Armando as the one who ravanged her on that fateful night of March 11, 2004. VVV
clearly narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the accused. Notwithstanding her innocence and despite the thorough cross-examination
by Armando's counsel, VVV never faltered and gave a very candid and truthful testimony of traumatic events. VVV's testimony was corroborated
and bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene Baluyot that the victim's genital area showed a fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 o'clock position in her
hymen.[12]Dr.Baluyot concluded that an acute injury occurred within 24 hours prior to the examination and that the occurrence of rape within that
period was very possible.[13] Also, the age of VVV at the time the incident occurred, which was 10 years old, was duly established by her birth
certificate,[14] her testimony,[15] and that of her father's.[16]
Time and again, this Court has held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true.[17] A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her.[18] Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone
testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.[19]
On the other hand, Armando admitted that he saw VVV on the date of the incident, but denied the accusations against him and merely relied on his
defense that he was watching TV with his family when barangay officials arrested him.
Armando's defenses were also unavailing. His contention that it was unnatural and unrealistic for VVV to remain quiet when he pulled her from her
companions and why she did not cry for help or run away when he was allegedly ravaging her deserves scant consideration. Clearly, the reason
why VVV did not shout for help was because Armando told her not to shout or talk.[20] Likewise, the reason why VVV did not run when Armando was
molesting her was because his finger was still inside her private part.[21] Moreover, Armando's argument that he could not have inserted his penis in
the victim's organ while both of them were standing is preposterous. It is settled that sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps
uncomfortable, is not improbable.[22]
Armando tendered nothing but his bare denial and contention that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. Aside from this, he presented
no more evidence to substantiate his claims. Jurisprudence dictates that denial and alibi are the common defenses in rape cases. Sexual abuse is
denied on the allegation that the accused was somewhere else and could not have physically committed the crime. This Court has always held that
these two defenses are inherently weak and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence in order to be believed. As negative defenses,
they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the complainant.[23] Consequently, Armando's bare denial and alibi must fail against the testimony
of VVV and her positive identification that he was the perpetrator of the horrid deed. Unmistakably, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Armando had carnal knowledge of VVV.
Anent Armando's conviction for the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.

The CA correctly found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. From the Information, it is clear that Armando was being
charged with two offenses, Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, and rape as an act of sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando was charged with having carnal knowledge of VVV, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under
paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A, and he was also charged with committing an act of sexual assault by inserting his finger into the genital of VVV
under the second paragraph of Article 266-A. Indeed, two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was established that Armando inserted
his penis into the private part of his victim, VVV. Second, through the testimony of VVV, it was proven that Armando also inserted his finger in VVV's
private part.
The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged with two counts of rape. Although two offenses were charged,
which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object
to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting
out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense." Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the Information, he can be
convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm the CA's imposition of Reclusion Perpetua for rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A. However, We modify
the penalty for Rape Through Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610,
or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and
prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article III, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
x xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.[25]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to
other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one through coercion, intimidation or
influence engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. [26]
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations[27] of R.A. No. 7610 defines "Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching,' either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. [28]
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law,
Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, [29] for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prisionmayor,considering that VVV was below 12 years of
age, and considering further that Armando's act of inserting his finger in VVV's private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the
appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which isreclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault,
which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A.
No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353,
R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition."[30]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the
law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.
Hence, Armando should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to Armando's civil liabilities, the CA correctly awarded the following damages: civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages for Rape under paragraph l(d), Article 266-A; and civil indemnity of P30,000.00 and moral damages also of P30,000.00 for Rape under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In line, however, with prevailing jurisprudence, we increase the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 and PI
5,000.00, for Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A and Rape under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, respectively, to P30,000.00 for each count of
rape.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A, Armando Chingh y Parcia is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua; and for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay VVV the total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral

damages, and P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. LAOG
G.R. No. 178321
October 5, 2011
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for
murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant ConradoLaog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,
[2]
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead
pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly caused her
death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA. [3] The second Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and hitting with a
lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such defenseless situation,
did then and there have carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same
incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was
corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice
paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was
holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning,
appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down.When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but
appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter
covered her body with thick grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on
the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and
bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with
grass. At that point, AAA passed out.[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.
[7]
When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where
she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was
her uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a
woman waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind
her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately approached
her and saw that her face was swollen, with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet.He asked AAA what happened to her, and AAA
uttered, Si Tata Coni referring to appellant who is his son-in-law.[10] With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home.[11]AAA was later brought
to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the
whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went
to Buenavista where they found Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already bloated. [12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings
are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen; desquamation and
bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from the
nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4]
punctured wounds at the chest of the victim cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head and trunk. [13]
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case
No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for Jennifers funeral and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes
were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he went wild that same night and
struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape.[15]

Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the
evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his
house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was the time when he went wild after seeing his wife with
another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the scene of the crime.[16]
The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock
in the afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA
and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following
morning, at around six oclock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San
Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused ConradoLaog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused ConradoLaog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, the case was referred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.] 2162M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual damages. The exemplary
damages awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction for both crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution dated August
22, 2007, we required the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties submitted separate
Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised the following
errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT .
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of
AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the prosecutions main witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends
that the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of the crimes charged. According to him, AAAs narration that he
waylaid them while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident premeditation since there was no evidence that
the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that
for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been
shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak
and unable to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAAs testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on how, after she
was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfathers farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a
question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts [24] and absent any substantial
reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers

findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would
have affected the outcome of the case.[25] This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court. [26]
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing
and was herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the
trial courts evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer to the trial courts firsthand observations on AAAs deportment
while testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to recount the
ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were constantly
fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man she was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct, the emotion building up
inside her came to the fore and she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her testimony. Thus, in deference to her
agitated situation, this Court has to defer her direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue with her aborted questioning, this
time, composed and collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished. [27]
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut
short her initial direct examination. However, during the next hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward
manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before
raping her. We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that youre not able to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason
why you did not reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by ConradoLaog, sir.

Q: In what manner were you waylaid by ConradoLaog?

A: ConradoLaog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.

x xxx

Q: Where were you when you were hit?

A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.

Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by ConradoLaog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.

Q: Now, what happened next, if any?

A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.

Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was ConradoLaog when you heard Jennifer crying?

A: He was beside me, sir.

Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.

Fiscal:
Q: And what was ConradoLaog doing?

A: He approached Jennifer, sir.

Q: Then, what happened next?

A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.

Q: And what happened to Jennifer?

A: She fell down, sir.

Q: What did ConradoLaog do next?

A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.

Q: After ConradoLaog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?

A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.

Q: And after that, what did ConradoLaog do?

A: He came back to me, sir.

Q: When ConradoLaog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.

Q: And what happened to you?

A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.

Q: Then, what happened to you?

A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my blouse and my bra.

Q: After that, what did he do next?

A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.

Q: Then, what happened?

A: He sucked my breast, sir.

Q: And after that?

A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: For how long did the accused ConradoLaog insert his penis into your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: After that, he stood up, sir.

Q: And where did he go?

A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.

Q: And after that, what did you do?

A: I fell unconscious, sir.

Q: Now, if ConradoLaog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform and when asked his name, answered: ConradoLaog.

x xxx[28]
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with
his children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively
identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant
whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[29] AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the one who
attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives
by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her identification of
appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own uncle would
harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime
and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed.[30]There is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify
falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence.[31]
In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that -It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration
by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the
accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during
the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant
admitted that his house was more or less only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added
reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial and alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses
cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she testified on being very weak that she even passed out after
she was raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten
and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra were merely lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments were
just pulled down, which therefore explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this matter
raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details
and collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses
declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a
witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. [35] It cannot be
overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal
officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient
to convict. Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is
not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear,
unequivocal and credible, as what we find in this case.

While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should
not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties. The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a
special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with
homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,(4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In
a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary
if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;[] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar,
particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in
connection with her detention and was killed subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof. Considering that the prosecution was able to prove
each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape. x xx[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado,
in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,[43] explained that composite crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules
on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave
felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite
crimes although composed of two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by
reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is
liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for
help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His
carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may not be
easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as
with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in
this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where
the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De
Leon,[45] we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason
of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of
the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or
more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight
physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.[47] Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing
to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery
applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized
treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded
them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such
treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery
forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder
but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime.[50] It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was
dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to
render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although
not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the
superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack caught the victim offguard rendering her defenseless.[52]
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The
penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No.
9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect
of this case is concerned.While the trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA)
are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article
2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for
the rape, this circumstance would justify the award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:

x xxx

Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know her?

A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.

Q How are you related to [AAA]?

A Her mother and my wife are sisters.

Q So she is your niece-in-law?

A Yes, sir.

x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the
determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Citing our earlier ruling in the case
of People v. Catubig, this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not
alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no
longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even
if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are the following
sections of Rule 110:

x xxx

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230,
even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the
Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely
affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even
if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light
of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised
Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the
Philippines v. HeracleoAbello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in
the second set arePeople v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the
difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

x xxx

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages taking into account simply the attendance of
an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is
to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously
and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant
associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross
fraudthat intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer
and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus,
in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v.
CristinoCaada, People of the Philippines v. PepitoNeverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary
damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages.
Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he application of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimijuris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of
exemplary damages to set a public example or correction for the public good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle
would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her
several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her
undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position, covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field
-- was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more
stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.[58] In line
with current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial
court.

We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral
damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim.[59] Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred
for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount ofP25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been
stipulated by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further
proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. [61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant ConradoLaog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With
Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages andP30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. MAMARUNCAS

G.R. No. 179497
01/25/12
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this controversy. The well-known rule, though subject to certain
recognized exceptions, is that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. Hence, [u]nless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial courts assessment must be
respected.
Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which affirmed with
modification the July 19, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting
RenandangMamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and PendatumAmpuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following Information4 for murder was filed against Mamaruncas, BagindaPalao (Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and
Ampuan.
That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, except for
others whose cases are still under preliminary investigation, conspiring with and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with
deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R. Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardio respiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock
Multiple gunshot wound which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan
(Abdul), remains at large. Appellants pleaded not guilty6 and trial proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief and substantiated by the transcripts of stenographic
notes of the proceedings, are as follows:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain Nito were working on vehicles inside
Baudelio Batoons auto repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
BagindaPalao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan. BagindaPalao wore desert
camouflage fatigues; while his two (2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. BagindaPalao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest
warrant and told the latter he was serving it against Batoon.
The arrival of BagindaPalaos group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their work and observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter after he [Batoon] [finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been
working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victims stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palaos gun,
causing the two of them to grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio
Batoon, shot from behind Batoons right thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also standing behind Baudelio Batoon,
followed up by shooting Batoons left arm pit with a .45 cal. [homemade] pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished [him
off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything. From their
vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector GracianoMijares, then Commanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile Force Company, was riding a civilian car
along the highway, heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied by his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard
the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop the car. They alighted and
proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person
already lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were doing and to drop their firearms,
at the same time announcing that they (Mijares group) were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. During the exchange of gunfire, BagindaPalao ran behind the
Batoon house, while RenandangMamaruncas and PendatumAmpuan ran towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit
Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were then
captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to BagindaPalao; but he escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were eventually placed under detention.
BaudelioBatoon was brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victims body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of
BaudelioBatoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflicted at close range due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder
burns.7
Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows:
Accused RenandangMamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married, carpenter and a resident of Piagapo, Lanaodel Sur. On the morning of
February 1, 1996, he was in Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan City to see a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the
Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he went to the house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about going to a movie and returned to the
Tambacan terminal in order to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid Sultan arrived with PendatumAmpuan on board a car
driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go with them because he will collect some money and afterwards they will have some enjoyment. He
agreed and sat at the rear seat behind the driver. Abdul Wahid was at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to Baraas.
They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and PendatumAmpuan alighted. Before walking away, Abdul Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.]

revolver with instructions to remain in the car and [keep] watch. At first he refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted the gun. Abdul Wahid
and Pendatum walked to the shop leaving the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard three gunshots. He moved to the rear seat
where the door was open and saw policemen, who arrived and surrounded the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his hands as a sign of
surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen shot him on the forearm and chest below the
right nipple. He lost consciousness and regained it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as BagindaPalao. PendatumAmpuan is not known as Abdul Wahid
Sultan.
He also declared that the statement of JuanitoGepayo that only Abdul Wahid Sultan and PendatumAmpuan entered the shop and shot
BaudelioBatoon is true and that the testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the victim is not true. He denied any part in the shooting to death
of BaudelioBatoon.
Accused PendatumAmpuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a resident of Piagapo, Lanaodel Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about
6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City for Iligan City on board a passenger Armakjeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the Gaisano Superstore and at
exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the store and went to the upper storey to shop. When he came out, he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they
walked to the MaharlikaTheater but then Bessah expressed the intention to go home to Marawi City. He accompanied Bessah to the Tambacan
terminal. Then he proceeded to the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan
which is South of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayed overnight at his Uncle Alis house. At about 9:00 a.m., the following day, February 1,
1996, he left the house of his uncle. Outside, he met BagindaPalao, who was looking for a certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help
him collect a debt. They went to the terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to wait while he will look for Baser
inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned without having found Baser and once again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. A little
later, Baginda returned on board a car driven by one AminolaBasar. They went to the Tambacan terminal but again did not find Baser. Instead, they
saw RenandangMamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to Baraas to collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and they proceeded
to Baraas. The car stopped at a place near a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in the car because he was going out to collect
the debt. Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten minutes later, he heard shouting followed by gunfire. He stepped out of the car to
verify and saw BagindaPalao [shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the police led by Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key and
arrested them except BagindaPalao who escaped. They were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the sustained wounds when mauled
by the children of the victim but in another breath he admitted that his injury was a gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross fire as the
police shot RenandangMamaruncas. He was inside the car when he was hit. He further admitted that BagindaPalao is known as Abdul Wahid
Sultan. He denied shooting Baudelio Batoon.8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC debunked appellants defense of denial and held them guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing of Baudelio Batoon
(Baudelio). It gave full faith and credence to the evidence of the prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and
rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the
crime of murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presence of any other
aggravating circumstances and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the corresponding accessory
penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs of BaudelioBatoon the sums of:
P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;
P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
P100,000.00 for and as moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such detention shall be credited in full in favor of said accused in the
service of their respective sentences.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court. By Resolution dated January 31,
2000, the Court resolved to accept the appeal. In view thereof, appellants were required to file their brief. Appellants thus filed their brief on
November 20, 2000 while the OSG submitted the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee on May 2, 2001. Later, however, consonant with this Courts
pronouncement in People v. Mateo the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. Said court ruled that the inconsistencies
in the prosecution witnesses testimonies pointed out by the appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative
weight of said testimonies. Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuans name in the Information, the court went on to hold that such
error was only a formal defect and the proper correction of which was duly made without any objection on the part of the defense. The CA likewise
held that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Judgment dated July 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants RenandangMamaruncas and PendatumAmpuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of BaudelioBatoon the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P66,904.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the CA.

By Resolution20 dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from
notice. In their respective manifestations, the parties opted to adopt the briefs they earlier filed as their supplemental briefs.
In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:
That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt; and
The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective.22
The basic thrust of appellants first assignment of error is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants contend that the trial court
anchored its finding and conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp.
GracianoMijares (Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent in their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable. They question the prosecution
witnesses identification of Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and aver that the same only leads to the logical conclusion that said
witnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue that Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to him as he was arraigned as Abdul Wahid
Sultan alias Pendatum Ampuan.
On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision, opines that inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters in
the testimony of a prosecution eyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also contends that whatever defect the information subject of appellant
Ampuans arraignment has had been cured with the latters consent during the trial.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the credibility of witness Gepayo anchored on the following grounds: (1) there
was serious inconsistency in his testimony on whether he knew Ampuan before the incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident without
giving any assistance to his fallen employer as well as his immediate return to work thereafter is contrary to human nature and experience; (3) while
he testified that appellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects during the encounter, he failed to identify him in court; and, (4) in his
affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person but later on testified to the contrary.
Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.
The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the incident is inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of
Gepayos testimony. The inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the
nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. What matters is that there is
no inconsistency in Gepayos complete and vivid narration as far as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the
principal assailants are concerned. The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details,
they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.
It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting incident and did not render assistance to his wounded employer. To
appellants, this reaction is contrary to human nature. We believe otherwise. This imputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarily diminish the
plausibility of Gepayos story let alone destroy his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior. Surely, he was
afraid that they might kill him because the malefactors were then armed with guns. Thus, he would not dare attempt to stop them and stake his life
in the process. At any rate, it is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience
which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn.
The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants cause. As the CA correctly pointed out:
x xx We agree with the prosecutions observation that although he did not positively identify appellant Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was
however, able to point out that there was a third person who accompanied assailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victim during the
incident. This is also bolstered by Insp. Mijares[] testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their guns at the victim who was already lying
prostrate on the ground.
In any event, even without Gepayos identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of another prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly
points to Mamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions, presented the warrant of arrest to your father, what happened
thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir
Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x xx his name[,] he answered that he is Renandang Mamaruncas)
x xxx
Q: After this RenandangMamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at the bench inside the Courtroom and when he was asked x xx his
name, he answered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)

Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material details are straightforward and consistent with each other. They
personally saw appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable doubt
the identities of both appellants, along with their co-accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and the same person in his affidavit and yet later
on testified to the contrary, this Court finds the same inconsequential and will not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent case,
this Court reiterated that as between an affidavit executed outside the court and a testimony given in open court, the latter almost always prevails. It
emphasized therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. Such discrepancies do not
necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete. They do not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details
of the event narrated by the affiant. Thus, our rulings generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to be inferior to in court testimony.
The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers who supplied the names of the suspects in Gepayos affidavit. 31
Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial court was substantially defective considering that it
accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person when in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to
comprehend the Information read to him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants failed to raise the issue of the defective Information before the trial
court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their
pleas of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the Information. Objections as to matters of form or substance in the [I]nformation cannot
be made for the first time on appeal. Records even show that the Information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but
appellants did not comment thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:
Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from [Renandang] Mamaruncas and the word and, it should be
Bagindo [sic] Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias PendatumAmpuan be erased as corrected.
COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.33
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the facts sufficiently prove that treachery was employed by
appellants. The attack on Baudelio was so swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or
defend himself. As ruled by the trial court:
In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case when the victim was completely without any weapon from the
inception of the assault. At the moment when PendatumAmpuan and RenandangMamaruncas shot him, BaudelioBatoon was not in any position to
defend himself. And when Abdul Wahid shot him while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly defenseless. 34
Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the presence of treachery.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary x xx [as it] may be shown through
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop of Baudelio at the same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio from
behind, hitting the latter at his left armpit while Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio fell to the ground face down, Abdul shot him
at the back. These consecutive acts undoubtedly showed appellants unanimity in design, intent and execution. They performed specific acts with
such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design in the commission of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA considering that they are based on existing evidence and
reasonable
conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the
Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Though the rule is subject to exceptions, no
such exceptional grounds obtain in this case.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only muster mere denial. As ruled in various cases by the Court,
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. As between the
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery. Murder, as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia,
attended the killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is enough to qualify a killing as murder
punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. Since only the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC and the CA properly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides:

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, said award is increased
to P75,000.00. Anent the award of moral damages, the CA correctly imposed the amount of P50,000.00. These awards are mandatory without
need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.
Anent the award of actual damages, the victims widow testified that the family spent a total of P66,904.00 relative to the wake and burial of the
victim. However, the claim for said amount is supported merely by a list of expenses personally prepared by the widow instead of official receipts. To
be entitled to an award of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable x x x. A list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as
a matter of course in business transactions. Thus the Court deletes the lower courts award of actual damages. Nonetheless, since entitlement of
the same is shown under the facts of the case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded in lieu of actual damages to
the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds
that pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the trial court. Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of
documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly income of P20,000.00 and P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a
six-wheeler truck operator, respectively. The trial court made a conservative estimate of P500.00 a day as the net income from the truck alone after
making reasonable deductions from its operation. Thus, ranged against the daily minimum wage then prevailing in Region X which is P137.00 per
day pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03, this case undoubtedly does not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can
be given despite the lack of documentary evidence.
The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven qualifying circumstance of treachery. The CA however awarded
exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P25,000.00. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this
amount to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which found appellants
RenandangMamaruncas and PendatumAmpuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages;
5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
WONINA
M.
BONIFACIO,
JOCELYN
UPANO,
VICENTORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,
Petitioners,- versus -REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI,
BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order [1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for
libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in particular,
former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), [4] a criminal complaint,[5] before
the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John
Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez
Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively,
the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) a wholly owned subsidiary of
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) who had previously purchased traditional preneed educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by
which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address
of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6] under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible
to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he
was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly
derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan. [8] He cited an article
which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation
because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos
benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta
tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us
start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again
convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who
joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x [9] (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13)
separate Informations[11] charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was
raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such
trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the
public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity,
character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso
Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull
us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as
Annex F of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused
as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones

responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with
the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by
Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13]reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in
court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under
Article 353 of the RPC.[14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash [16] the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not
punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the
offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction
where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material
was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin
v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the
commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged
libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, [20] insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on
the public respondent. It citedBanal III v. Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was
printed and first published in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover,
the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases,
any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment. [22]
By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the
public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue.

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,[24] the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such
trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the
public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and
for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website
accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information [25] which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent
because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid
the venue of the case in the place where the offended partyaccessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration [26] having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed
the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT;
and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING JURISDICTIONAL
DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]
With the filing of Gimenezs Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to
thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended
Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, [29] as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. [30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of
Appeals.[31] The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal
questions.[32]
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to
abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the
RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the
RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of theprovince or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. [33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended,
specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public
officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and
first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending
article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of
the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by
Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the
province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or
composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation
of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed ( People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under
that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue
of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal
and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De
Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal
action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-oftown libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act
No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness
of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by
spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This precondition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as
there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of
the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites
author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant
may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory
article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts
pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private
person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of
residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin,
and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed
by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their
respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the
libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.

JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1,
General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the Decision2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner
issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses
Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the
drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses
Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6231.3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal complaints were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to
exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended
until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent
motions were denied in the Order10 dated October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed as
SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying
the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.14

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not
pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as
incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the
value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks
are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but
rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the sale
stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why
the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be
declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be
deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR
COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE
NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22,
SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the
petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from
the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the
court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been issued for account or for
value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the
dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the
bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which
would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases
is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the
checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The
checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing
on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in
the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an
issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.22

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of
the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.23 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.24

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents
are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him,
and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.

In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
to support the checks is in itself an offense.25

In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by
respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In
resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores
will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the
primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has
been issued."

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt
- though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

xxxx

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum
prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.28

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground
of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising
from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the
defense in the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.

The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of
the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether
petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of
sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and
merits of a partys defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better
ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their
respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defenses available to the accused should be
invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs NELSON BAYOT y SATINA, Accused-Appellant.

Plaintiff-App
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6 th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal
Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed
against AAA,[3] thus, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of indemnity
from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the amount ofP50,000.00.
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information[4] dated 29 December 1997, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old, against her will. [5]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay AAA the amount ofP40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that AAAs testimony as regards her ordeal
was simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no inconsistency in her testimony. Further, AAAs
declaration that she was raped by appellant was corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina at 6:00 oclock quadrant of
the crevice, which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates the sweet heart
defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellants claim of being AAAs lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the consequence of his
dastardly lust. AAAs immediate response of reporting the rape incident carries the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship
between appellant and AAA, the latter would not have pursued this case. It bears stressing that despite appellants repeated plea for the dismissal of
the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for the violation of her womanhood.[6]
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.[7] In light, however, of
this Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[8] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution [9] dated 4
October 2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity
from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly
observed that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA. It further held
that other than the self-serving declaration of appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate
such claim. Even the testimony of appellants daughter, who claimed that her father and AAA are maintaining an illicit relationship, could not be given
any considerable weight. Aside from the fact that appellants daughter could not point to any other circumstance supporting her claim, except for one
incident when she allegedly saw her father and AAA holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped of
bias and partiality considering that she is the daughter of appellant. In the same way, her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of
sexual intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the time of the commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore,
be in a position to state with certainty that there was no struggle on the part of AAA. Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a mere
conclusion of fact.[10]
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006, [11] Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of
Appeals that appellant died at theNew Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellants Certificate
of Death.[12]
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of
Appeal[13] dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution[14] dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals
also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now determine its effect to this present appeal.
Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal
liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime. [15]
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as
civil, liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,[16] which was cited in a catena of cases, [17] had laid down the following
guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x
e)

Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.[18]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as
the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
[19]

Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v. Paniterce,[20] it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants
appeal. Appellants appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not
appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex
delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling
in People v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding
appellant guilty of the crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 isSET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs BRINGAS BUNAY y

DAM-AT,Accused-Appellant.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Luna, Apayao tried and found the accused guilty of qualified rape in its decision dated December 11,
2001, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, BRINGAS BUNAY y DAM-AT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
as charged against him, this court hereby sentences said accused to suffer the Supreme Penalty of DEATH.
The accused is further ordered to pay the victim, AAA, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand ( P75,000.00) by way of
civil indemnity plus exemplary and moral damages of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00).
The accused is ordered to be immediately shipped to New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, for imprisonment thereat
while awaiting the review of this decision by the Supreme Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[1]
On December 13, 2001, the accused was committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, per the certification issued on August
14, 2002 by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.[2]
The conviction was brought for automatic review, but the Court transferred the case to the CA for intermediate review on November 9,
2004,[3] conformably with People v. Mateo.[4]
On August 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the accused for qualified rape in C.A.-G.R. No. CR HC No.
00758,[5] viz:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao, Branch 26 in
Criminal Case No. 5-2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Following the CAs denial of his motion for reconsideration, the accused now appeals to the Court.
On April 20, 2010, the Court received the letter dated April 15, 2010 from Bureau of Corrections Assistant Director for Operations Rodrigo
A. Mercado, advising that the accused had died on March 25, 2010 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa City. The report of Dr. Marylou
V. Arbatin, Medical Officer III, revealed that the immediate cause of death had been cardio-respiratory arrest, with pneumonia as the antecedent
cause.
On June 22, 2010, the Court required the Bureau of Corrections to submit a certified true copy of the death certificate of the accused.
By letter dated August 16, 2010, Armando T. Miranda, Chief Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison, submitted the death certificate of
the accused.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal in this Court totally extinguished his
criminal liability. Such extinction is based on Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
xxx
The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based exclusively on the crime for which the accused was
convicted
(i.e., ex
delicto),
because
no
final
judgment
of
conviction
was
yet
rendered
by the time of his death.
Only civil liability predicated on a source of
obligation other than the delict survived the death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil action. [6]
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the appeal of the accused is dismissed, and this criminal case is considered closed and
terminated.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,
- versus JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,
Appellant.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court [2] (RTC)
Joint Decision[3] datedJuly 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later
reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. [4] The agent gave the police appellants
name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in
Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in
Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that
would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on
suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.[5]
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio
Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[6]
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of
Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01)
[or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as Shabu, a regulated drug without any permit or license
from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He
maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that
the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his
clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation. [9]
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment [10] convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.[11]
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of
the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. [13]
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of
the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and
the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate
courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the
accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[14]

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the
validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he
raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates
that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. [15]
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful.[16]
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [17] Said proscription, however, admits
of exceptions, namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Search of evidence in plain view;
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and Frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. [19]
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or
attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.
[20]
Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot
be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. [21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had
probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.[22]
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19,
2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called
up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a
Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and
when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu.
When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug.[23] The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence
of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora carrying shabu.This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to
effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires,
in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.[24] We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v. Tudtud,[26] and People v. Nuevas.[27]
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with
a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The
informant then pointed to the team members the woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her
and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves.[28]
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the
neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting
to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in
illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a
new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two
men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the
contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.[29]
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo
mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting
stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police
accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons
would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police

approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag
turned out to be marijuana leaves.[30]
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the
showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of
the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it
not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v. Lising,[34] People v. Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances
that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court,
except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.[38]
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police
Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the tipped information on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from
the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day
(May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a
warrant.[39]
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted,
despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case.
As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. [40]
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41]
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if
we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal
search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which
they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the
more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means.[42]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held
for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA,
P/S INSP. LORIEMAN* L. MANRIQUE,
and RODIE J. PINEDA @ Buboy,
Accused.

The Case
G.R. No. 193833 is an appeal1 from the Decision2 promulgated on 30 June 2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 11 June 2010 by the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC. No. 03119. The appellate court affirmed the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision4 of Branch 143 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3393 for Kidnapping (for Ransom), 03-766 for Robbery, and 04-1311
also for Robbery.

The trial court found appellant PO1 Froilan L. Trestiza (Trestiza) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659), and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages to Irma Navarro (Navarro) and Lawrence Yu (Yu).
P/Insp. Lorieman L. Manrique (Manrique) and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez (Pineda) were likewise found guilty of the same crime by the trial court, and
adjudged the same sentence as Trestiza. The trial court acquitted Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda in Criminal Case Nos. 03-766 and 04-1311.

The Facts
The following charges were brought against Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda on 20 November 2002:

Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping

That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, PO1 FroilanTrestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, both active members of the Philippine National
Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of them armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with one PO2 [Reynel] Jose, a member of the Philippine National Police, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma Navarro, or otherwise deprive them of their liberty by then and there kidnap without legal grounds for the
purpose of extorting money for their safety and immediate release as in fact said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 as ransom
money from them.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions

That on or about the 16th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1)
Pistol Glock 21 bearing SN 035481 with thirteen (13) rounds of live ammunitions and without the corresponding license or permit thereof, which he
carried outside of his residence.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 15 April 2004, Trestiza was acquitted of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 02-3394.7 The Affidavit of Arrest stated that the serial number of
the firearm seized was 035481, while the firearm itself had a serial number of BRG-768. The trial court rejected the explanation that the difference
between the serial numbers was a mere typographical error.

An order8 of the trial court dated 16 April 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3393, 02-3394, 03-766 and 04-1311 recounted the circumstances involved
in the filing of the charges againstTrestiza, Manrique and Pineda.

Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping against accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson (PO1 Trestiza),
PS/Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique (PS/Insp. Manrique) and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez (Pineda) and Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions against accused PO1 Trestiza alone were filed before this Court on 20 November 2002. Surprisingly, however, SPO2
[Reynel] Jose was not included as an accused in the Kidnapping case although in the original Information, Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos mentions
him as someone who mutually helped all the other accused in the willful, unlawful, felonious kidnapping of private complainants Lawrence Yu y Lim
(Yu) and Ma. Irma Navarro (Navarro). A Motion for Reinvestigation dated 21 November 2002 was then filed by all three accused while a separate
Motion for Reinvestigation and/or Preliminary Investigation dated 22 November was filed by accused PS/Insp. Manrique.
Then Acting Presiding Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos issued the Order dated 26 November 2002 granting the Motions filed by all accused. In the
said Order, he directed the Public Prosecutor to conduct a Preliminary Investigation of the cases filed and to furnish the Court with his Report within
sixty (60) days from said date.

On 21 February 2003, Public Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos filed a Motion to Withdraw Information of Kidnapping with Ransom and to Admit
Information for Robbery with attached Resolution dated 03 January 2008. He pointed out therein that after he conducted a preliminary investigation,
he found no probable cause exists to warrant the indictment of the accused for the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom. He added that they should be
charged instead for the crimes of Robbery and Grave Threats. The Court set the hearing of this Motion to 06 March 2003.

On 03 March 2003, private complainants appearing through Private Prosecutor Teresita G. Oledan filed an Urgent Motion to Hold Withdrawal of
Information for Kidnapping Charge with Entry of Appearance as Private Prosecutor. They alleged in said Motion that they were not furnished clear
and certified true copies of the Resolution dated 03 January 2003 to enable them to file their Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Withdraw.

On 05 March 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Makati Branch 135 sent a letter dated 26 February 2003 addressed to the Branch Clerk of this
Court ostensibly transmitting the Release Order of PO1 Trestiza dated 22 February 2003 together with other pertinent documents in connection with
Criminal Case No. 02-3394, which was duly approved by the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge of said Court.

The Order of Release dated 22 February 2003 signed by Judge Ibay directed the Jail Warden of Makati Police Station, Makati City to discharge
from his custody the person of said accused as the latter was able to file the corresponding bail bond in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos
(PHP200,000.00) thru the Plaridel Surety and Insurance Company provided there exists no order in any other case to the effect that he shall remain
confined under your custody. He set the arraignment of the accused on 14 March 2003 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.

Before the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Withdraw at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of 06 March 2003, the Private Prosecutor filed her
Opposition thereto at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of said date. She alleged therein that while the Motion to Withdraw filed by Public Prosecutor
Marcos prays for the withdrawal of the Information for Kidnapping with Ransom and the substitution thereof with an Information for Robbery, the
latter Information was filed immediately with the Criminal Cases Unit of the Office of the Clerk of Court on the same date that the Motion to
Withdraw was filed with this Court on 21 February 2003. Subsequently, said Information for Robbery was raffled to RTC Branch 57 on 03 March
2003 yet there was a scheduled hearing of the Motion to Withdraw on 06 March 2003. She added that the complainants were in a quandary why the
alleged substituted Information for Robbery was raffled to another Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-766, when this Court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the original cases filed. The same case was thereafter consolidated with this Court on 26 March 2003 as per Order dated
24 March 2003 rendered by the Honorable Reinato G. Quilala, Presiding Judge thereat. Accused PS/Insp. Manrique, PO1 Trestiza, and Pineda
posted bail in this case, which was duly approved by Judge Ibay, while accused SPO2 Joses bail was approved by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 133.

At the hearing to the Motion to Withdraw, then Acting Presiding Judge Abad Santos gave counsel for the accused time within which to file his
comment/objection to the Urgent Motion to Hold Withdrawal of Information for Kidnapping filed by the private complainants, furnishing the Private
Prosecutor a copy thereof, who was given the same number of days to file her Reply, if necessary. The Court likewise ordered the
re-commitment of all three (3) accused, who were then present at that hearing, to the custody of the Makati City Jail despite the fact that they have
already posted bail, considering that the Motion to Withdraw was still pending resolution.

Counsel for the accused filed his Comment to the Opposition dated 10 March 2003 alleging that the same did not bear the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor who has direct control and supervision over the Private Prosecutor as provided for under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Said
Comment, to his mind, is thus a mere scrap of paper which did not deserve any consideration by the Court.

On 13 March 2003, the Court was furnished by the private complainants a copy of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January
03, 2003 but Released on February 20, 2003which they filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

xxx

On 29 May 2003, accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion for Withdrawal of Original Information
claiming that said Original Informations have subsequently been amended by the Public Prosecutors Office and just needs the court/judge[s]
approval of the Motion to Withdraw Complaint and for Admission of the Amended Information. Moreover, they averred that the City Prosecutors
Office has approved the findings of the reinvestigating Assistant City Prosecutor on the downgrading of the original complaint. Both accused prayed
that said motion be heard on 28 May 2003.

On 9 June 2003, the Private Prosecutor filed an Ex-Parte Opposition to Accuseds Motion for Withdrawal of Original Information with Motion for
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against accused SPO2 Jose. She alleged therein that it is true that one of the accuseds right is the right to speedy
trial. However, where, as in this case, the stench of something fishy already was evident when suddenly the robbery case as amended by
Prosecutor Marcos and more recently affirmed by Prosecutor Sibucao, there should be further in-depth investigation as the circumstances on how
the three accused were able to post bail without the knowledge and approval of this Honorable Court, which had already acquired jurisdiction over
the case. In fact, a Petition for Review from the Resolution of Prosecutor Sibucao denying the Private Complainants Motion for Reconsideration of
the 03 January 2003 Resolution of Prosecutor Marcos duly approved by the City Prosecutor has been seasonably filed. She further alleged that, the
Urgent Motion allegedly filed by accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique does not include accused SPO2 Jose, also a member of the Police
Force. However, the records show that the latter also post bail for the Robbery case and was in fact outside the Chamber of this Honorable Court
when the hearing was being conducted. However, when she went out to look for him, SPO2 Jose was able to do a Houdini and disappeared from
view. Private Prosecutor Oledan prayed for the deferment of the proceedings herein until the final resolution of the Petition for Review.

Referring back to the Urgent Motion to Resolve by accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique, considering that the latter prayed for it to be heard
on 28 May 2003, but filed said Motion the following day only, the same was then set for hearing on 10 June 2003. On the same date, the Private
Prosecutor furnished the Court a copy of their Petition for Review which they filed with the Department of Justice. In the meantime, the Branch Clerk
of this Court issued a Certification to the effect that Acting Presiding Judge Abad Santos was on official leave until 15 July 2003 and that there is an
Urgent Motion to be resolved. Pairing Judge Manuel D. Victorio, acting on the Urgent Motion, issued the Order of even date directing the City
Prosecution Office to submit to the Court the complete records of its Preliminary Investigation within five (5) days from notice, thereafter the same
shall be considered for resolution.

On 23 June 2003, accused PO1 Trestiza filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution of the Pending Motion to Resolve, reiterating the grounds
stated in his previous Motion.

Before the issue could be resolved by the Pairing Judge, however, the Honorable Estela Perlas Bernabe, took over this Court as Assisting Presiding
Judge, after the Honorable Salvador S. Abad Santos requested the Supreme Court to be relieved of his assignment herein. Judge Bernabe issued
the Order dated 27 June 2003 holding in abeyance the Resolution of the Prosecutions Motion to Withdraw Information for a period of sixty (60) days
from the filing of the Petition for Review by private complainants with the Reviewing Office. On 08 July 2003, she denied the Motion to Dismiss
Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession of Firearms filed against accused PO1 Trestiza on the grounds that the allegations raised by said
accused are defenses proper for determination in a full-blown trial and set the pre-trial of the same to 24 July 2003. Trial on the merits for this
particular Criminal Case ensued until the Prosecution rested its case and said accused filed his Demurrer to Evidence on 05 March 2004.

In the meantime, without any word yet as to the outcome of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ relative to Criminal Case No. 02-3393,
Judge Bernabe issued the Order dated 28 August 2003, directing the City Prosecution Office to conduct a re-assessment and re-evaluation of the
evidence presented and to submit its report and recommendation within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of said Order. The Resolution of the
subject Motion was again held in abeyance.

On 02 March 2004, the Prosecution filed a Motion to Resolve (Motion to Withdraw Information of Kidnapping) with attached Order dated 19
February 2004. It alleged therein that it conducted a thorough re-assessment and re-evaluation of the evidence obtaining in this case in compliance
with the Order of this Court dated 28 August 2003 and maintains that the correct and appropriate charges to be filed against accused should be for
ROBBERY and GRAVE THREATS but for two (2) counts each, and NOT for KIDNAPPING as initially filed. Thus, it prayed for this Court to be
allowed to withdraw the present Information for Kidnapping considering that the appropriate charges of two (2) counts of Robbery and two (2)
counts of Grave Threats in lieu of the charge of KIDNAPPING have already been filed with the proper Courts.

To justify the Prosecutions withdrawal of the Information for KIDNAPPING, Public Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang states, in the Order attached to the
said Motion, that, to wit:

A careful re-evaluation of the pieces of evidence adduced by both parties shows that the offense of Kidnapping shall not
prosper against all the accused. As correctly stated in the Resolution issued on February 20, 2003, one of the essential
elements for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized under [Article] 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is that [the] offender must be a private individual which does not obtain in the case at bar as
respondents Trestiza, Manrique, and Jose are public officers being police officers who at the time the complainants were
allegedly divested of their cash money and personal belongings by herein respondents, were conducting a police operation to
enforce the provision of the Dangerous Drug Law (R.A. 9165).

All accused were in the place of the incident to conduct such operation is shown not only by the existence of coordination
between them and the police authorities but also by the declaration of the complainants that they were able to verify the plate
number of the vehicle of the accused from the Makati Police Station.

Hence, they should be charged with the offense of Robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code and
Grave Threats as recommended by this Office in its Resolution issued on February 20, 2003. Considering that there are two (2)
complainants, the respondents should be charged with two (2) counts of Robbery and Grave Threats.

The Prosecution filed on the same date a Motion to Amend Information and to Admit Attached Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 02-766
alleging that the Criminal Information therein for Robbery should only be limited to private complainant Yus complaint and not to Navarros. Counsel
for the accused, Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria, filed an Urgent Motion to calendar the hearing of the Motion to Amend Information and to Admit Amended
Information which the Court granted in its Order dated 25 March 2004.

In the meantime, Criminal Case No. 04-1311 for Robbery which was filed on the strength of the Complaint of Navarro was consolidated with similar
cases pending before this Court, upon the Order dated 12 March 2004 by the Honorable Ma. Cristina J. Cornejo, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch
147.

After study, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping under Criminal Case No. 02-3393;
2. To [sic] GRANT the Motion to Amend Information for Robbery; [and]
3. To [sic] Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against SPO2 Jose in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 until after the Information
relative thereto shall have been duly amended by the Prosecution.

In its Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping, the Public Prosecutor argues in essence that the crime of Kidnapping could not be possibly
committed by the accused as they, except for one, are police officers, who at the time the complainants were divested of cash and other personal
belongings were conducting a police operation to enforce the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This to the mind of the movant runs counter

to the provisions of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The Court finds this unmeritorious. Even a public officer can commit the said crime within the context of the aforesaid legal provision. This is settled
in our jurisprudence in the case of People vs. ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, et al. (GR No. 123979[,] December 3, 1998) which provides in
part:

The fact alone that appellant Pillneta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant Sandigan a member of the PNP
would not exempt them from the criminal liability of kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim,
appellants did so neither in furtherance of official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in
relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their coappellant Santiano and Chanco.

Even an eminent jurist, Justice Florenz B. Regalado elucidates on this point clearly:

This article provides that the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are committed by private individuals obviously
because if the offender is a public officer the crime is arbitrary detention under Art. 124, but passing sub silentio on the matter of
kidnapping. It should be understood however, that the public officer who unlawfully detains another and is punishable by Art.
124 is one who has the duty to apprehend a person with a correlative power to detain him. If he is only an employee with
clerical or postal functions, although the Code considers him as a public officer, his detention of the victim is illegal detention
under this article since he is acting in a private, and not an official, capacity. If a policeman kidnaps the victim, except when
legally authorized as part of police operations, he cannot also be said to be acting in an official capacity, hence he is to be
treated as a private individual liable under this article. (underscoring ours)

From the purpose and the formulation of R.A. 18 and R.A. 1084, it can be deduced that the legislative intendment was to put all
forms of kidnapping under Art. 267 when Congress amended it together with Art. 270. There appears to have been some
oversight, however, in the related articles and these will be discussed at the proper juncture. (Florenz B. Regalado, Pages 488
and 489, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition, March 2000)

As to whether or not the accused were indeed engaged in the performance of a legitimate police operation at the time the private complainants
were allegedly deprived of their liberty and personal belongings is a matter which at this stage can only be considered as a defense that calls for
further factual support in the course of judicial proceedings. Was there a Mission Order? Are there documents to show that police-topolice coordinations were indeed made? Are there corroborations to these claims whether documentary or testimonial? The need for further
evidence supportive of this claim gains significance in the light of the emphatic assertions to the contrary by the private complainants and their
witnesses.

As there appears to be probable cause for the inclusion of accused SPO2 Jose in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping considering that the
latter was specifically mentioned in the body of the Information as someone who conspired, confederated and mutually helped the other accused in
this case, the Court resolves to await for the Prosecution to amend the same before issuing a Warrant of Arrest against said accused.

Lastly, the Court finds the sought amendment of the Information for Robbery to be well-taken.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping [under Criminal Case No. 02-3393];
2. GRANT the Motion to Amend Information for Robbery;
3. Hold in abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against accused SPO2 Jose in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 until after the Information
relative thereto shall have been duly amended by the Prosecution.
Set these cases for arraignment on 27 April 2004 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. The Amended Information for Robbery duly attached in the Motion
is hereby ADMITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria (Atty. Austria) withdrew as counsel for Manrique and Pineda. Atty. Austria also manifested that he would file an Omnibus
Motion relative to the 16 April 2004 Order of the trial court. The arraignment was reset to 25 May 2004,9 which was further reset to 28 June
2004,10 19 July 2004,11 23 August 2004,12 and finally on 31 August 2004.13

Atty. Austria filed his Omnibus Motion for Trestiza: motion for reconsideration of the 16 April 2004 Order, motion to quash the informations, and
motion to allow Trestiza to post bail.14 Complainants opposed the Omnibus Motion.15 The corresponding reply16 and rejoinder17 were also filed. In its
19 August 2004 Order,18 the trial court denied the Omnibus Motion. It ruled that the trial court has the authority to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information relative to a criminal case filed before it. Moreover, the quashal of the informationsagainst the accused goes into the determination of
the nature of the arrest, which, in turn, goes into the merits of the case. Finally, the charge of kidnapping is a non-bailable offense.

When the case was called for arraignment, Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda all pleaded not guilty to the following charges:
Criminal Case No. 02-3393:

That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PO1Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, both active
members of the Philippine National Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of them armed with firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with one PO2 Reynel Jose, a member of the Philippine National
Police, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma Navarro, or otherwise
deprive them of their liberty by then and there kidnap without legal grounds for the purpose of extorting money for their safety
and immediate release as in fact said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 as ransom money from them.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 03-766:

That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PO1Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique,
PO2 Reynel Jose, all active members of the Philippine National Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a private individual[,] all
of them armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to gain by means of force
and violence or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob and divest Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria
Irma Navarro of the following items to wit:

a. One (1) piece of necklace (gold) with pendant amounting to P50,000.00;

b. Two (2) pieces bracelet (gold) worth more or less P70,000.00;

c. One (1) Rolex watch worth P270,000.00;

d. One (1) mens ring worth P15,000.00;
e. Two (2) cellphone[s] described as Nokia 9210 & 3310;
f. One (1) Philip Chariole [sic] watch worth P150,000.00;
g. One (1) Philip Chariole [sic] bracelet worth P75,000.00;
h. One (1) solo diamond studded [sic] (3K) worth P500,000.00;
i. One (1) womens ring gold worth P12,000.00;
j. One (1) necklace gold [sic] worth P20,000.00;
k. One (1) [sic] cellphone[s] described as Nokia 7650 & 8855; and,
l. Cash money amounting to more or less P300,000.00

to the damage and prejudice of the said complainants.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 04-1311:

That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent of gain and by means of force and violence or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob and divest Irma Maria A. Navarro of the following items to wit:

a. One (1) Chariol (sic) watch

b. One (1) Gold ring
c. One (1) Chariol (sic) bracelet
d. One (1) pair diamond earring (sic)
e. One (1) gold necklace
f. One (1) cellphone 7650 Nokia
g. One (1) cellphone 8855 Nokia
h. Cash money amounting to P120,000.00

to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.

CONTRARY TO LAW.19

The trial court set the case for pre-trial conference on 14 September 2004,20 which was reset to 20 September 2004.21 The parties stipulated on the
following:

1. That on November 7, 2002, the three (3) accused, Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda were using an Adventure van with plate no. XAU-298;

2. That Loriemar Manrique was the team leader of the group comprising [sic] of Rodie Pineda and Reynel Jose on November 7, 2002;

3. That the incident started at the Hotel Intercon located in Makati City;

4. That Loriemar Manrique is a member of the PNP Drug Enforcement Agency;

5. That accused Froilan Trestiza was the driver of the Adventure van bearing plate no. XAU-298 on November 17, 2002;

6. That after the operation was conducted, there was never any occasion that the accused Froilan Trestiza communicated with any of the
complainants;

7. None of the items allegedly lost by the complainants were recovered from accused Froilan Trestiza.22

The trial court summarized the testimonies during trial as follows:

The prosecution sought to establish its case by presenting the following witnesses: Ma. Irma A. Navarro, Lawrence Yu y Lim, PO2 Rodolfo
Santiago, PO3 Rosauro P. Almonte, John Paul Joseph P. Suguitan, Angelo Gonzales, PO3 Edward C. Ramos, Schneider
R. Vivas, PSInsp. Salvador V. Caro, and Chief Insp. Roseller Fabian.

The Prosecutions main evidence relies heavily upon the accounts of Irma and Lawrence who testified respectively as follows:

On November 7, 2002 at about one oclock in the morning, Irma and her boyfriend Lawrence, both twenty-two (22) years old at the time of the
incident, were at the Where Else Disco in Makati attending a party. They stayed thereat for around thirty (30) minutes only. Irma however, went out
ahead of Lawrence. When she was about to proceed to where Lawrences Honda ESI car was parked, she noticed that the said car was blocked by
another vehicle which was a Mitsubishi Adventure van. Three (3) armed men later on emerged from the said van. As she was about to open the
door of the Honda ESI, somebody hit her in [sic] the nape. When she turned her back, she saw the three (3) men in the company of Rodie Pineda
alias Buboy (Pineda). She knew Pineda because the latter was her sister Cynthias kumpare, Pineda being the godfather of Cynthias child.
Furthermore, she saw Pineda in their residence the night of November 6, 2002 as he visited his [sic] sister. She asked Pineda what was happening
but the latter replied pasensya na, mare, trabaho lang (Bear with me, mare, this is just a job).

She was told that the three (3) whose identities she later on learned as Capt. Lorieman Manrique, PO2 Reynel Jose and PO1 Froilan Trestiza, were
policemen. She asked why she was being accosted but she was handcuffed by Manrique. She was ushered inside the Honda ESI. Pineda asked
her where Lawrence was but she was left inside the car with Jose while Pineda, Trestiza andManrique on the other hand went away apparently to
look for Lawrence. Pineda and Manrique later on went back inside the Honda ESI. They drove later with Jose behind the wheels [sic] while Pineda
occupied the passenger seat. They followed the Mitsubishi Adventure van which was then driven by Trestiza. Unknown to Irma, Lawrence was
already inside the van at the time. They just drove and drove around (umiikot), passing through small alleys as they avoided major routes. She was
asked later by Pineda to remove her jewelry. She was able to remove only her earrings as she was in handcuffs. Pineda himself removed her
Philip Chariolle [sic] watch and bracelet. Her necklace and ring followed. All these were later on turned over by Pineda to Manrique. Her bag where
her wallet containing the amount of P120,000.00 was likewise taken.

Her two (2) cellphones, a 7650 and an 8855, were likewise taken by Pineda. They stopped several times at the side streets and the accused would
talk to each other. Pineda would stay with her inside the vehicle while Jose would go out and talk to the occupants of the Mitsubishi Adventure.
Later on, she and Lawrence were brought together inside the Mitsubishi Adventure van. It was there that they were told that they will not be
released if they will not be able to produce one million pesos. These were all uttered by Jose and Manrique. It was somewhere in Blumentritt, San
Juan where all the accused stopped for the last time. She was crying all the while.

She later on felt the call of nature, prompting her to ask permission if she could possibly relieve herself. She was accompanied by Pineda to a
nearby Shell gas station in San Juan. When they returned to where they stopped, she was asked as to whom she could possibly call so that the
money that the accused were asking will be produced. The accused later on asked Lawrence to make a call using his cellphone with speaker
phone. Lawrence was able to get in touch with his friends John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales. The latter was told that Lawrence figured in an
accident and that he needs money badly. Lawrence and his friends agreed that the money the two will produce will be brought to the Caltex gas
station along Ortigas corner Wilson Street inGreenhills. They proceeded to the said place later where they waited for the friends of Lawrence. She
was told later by Manrique that she better pray that the transaction pushes through. Manriquefurther warned her against reporting the incident to
anyone lest her whole family will be held liable. She was even shown by the accused the picture of her child. She was cursed by Jose. Trestizaon
the other hand told her that Lawrences transaction should better push through.

The two, John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales, later on arrived at the gas station. Lawrence took from them what appears to be a package and
handed the same to Pineda. Manrique thereafter called Pineda asking positive na ba? to which Pineda replied yes. The amount raised by the
friends of Lawrence was one hundred eighty thousand pesos (Php 180,000.00). They (Irma and Lawrence) were later brought to the Star Mall
along Edsa. Their captors warned them not to report the matter to the authorities otherwise they will face dire consequences. The items taken from
Irma like the cash money, jewelry and cellphone were placed by the men inside the console box of the Mitsubishi Adventure. When they reached
Star Mall, the men talked to them for thirty minutes. Again, they were warned about the consequences of their reporting the incident to the police.
Irma was told that the men knew her address, the members of her family and that they have the picture of her child. She was likewise warned not to
report the matter to her father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a policeman, otherwise her daughter with Lawrence will be the one [to] bear the
consequences (anak ko ang mananagot). They were released after thirty (30) minutes. Lawrence had to plead for their gasoline from the accused
and he was given Php 100.00.

Irma decided not to tell her mother about the incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence however made a report to the Makati police station in the
evening of 7 November 2002 where he was shown a coordination sheet pertaining to the plate number of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy Pineda
in the meanwhile kept on calling them (Irma and Lawrence) demanding for their balance of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). Irmas mother
however soon learned of the incident because of a newspaper item. Her father likewise learned of the incident and lost no time in contacting
authorities from the CIDG. They (Irma and Lawrence) were later investigated by the CIDG people to whom they gave their sworn statements on
November 14, 2002. As Buboy Pineda continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that date. Boodles
of money were dusted with ultra-violet powder. On the same date, Buboy Pineda called Lawrence for purposes of meeting him that night in order to
get the remaining money. The entrapment operation which was conducted along the New World Hotel, and participated in by PO2 Almonte, was
successful as Buboy Pineda was arrested. Recovered from the possession of Pineda were a gold necklace without a pendant; a
Nokia cellphone model 7650; a Toyota corolla car with plate number PNG 214 color red and one (1) ignition key. The necessary acknowledgment
receipt was duly signed by the said accused. A pawnshop ticket was likewise recovered from his possession.

Lawrence on the other hand narrated that during that fateful day of 7 November 2002 at around 1:30 oclock in the morning, as he was stepping out
from the Where Else Disco, he was suddenlysandwhiched [sic] by two (2) persons, Manrique and Trestiza. Pineda whom he likewise knew, held a
gun and pointed the same to him. He was later on lifted through his belt and loaded to a yellow Mitsubishi Adventure. He was made to occupy the
passenger seat at the back while Trestiza drove the said vehicle. Manrique occupied the seat beside Trestiza. He asked the accused who they were
and he was told that they were policemen. At the time, Trestiza was wearing an outfit which was hip hop while Manrique was wearing a polo which
was button down. He was cursed and told to shut up. He was asked to bow down his head as they drove along. He remembers that the accused
dug into his pockets and his valuables consisting of cellphones, a 9210 and a 3310models [sic] respectively, including his wallet, cigarettes, watch
bracelet, ring, necklace and a pair of earrings, were taken from him. He later on saw his Honda ESI car. He noticed that the Mitsubishi Adventure
they riding was following the said Honda ESI. Manrique later asked him how much money did he have. When replied that his money was inside his
car, Manrique allegedly retorted imposible. They later on stopped in Mandaluyong near an open canal. He was asked again by Manrique about his
money. At that point, another man whose name he later on learned was SPO2 Reynel Jose, boarded also the Mitsubishi Adventure. Jose asked him
about his money. When he replied that his money was inside his car, Jose got mad and boxed him on his face. They later on resumed driving
around. When they stopped again, Jose asked him whether he has thought of the money. When he again replied that the money was inside his car,
he was boxed repeatedly by Jose. Manrique and Trestiza were seated in the front seats but did not do anything.

They resumed driving again. Jose asked him again about the money. When he gave the same response, Jose put a plastic material over his head
which made him unable to breath [sic]. Jose strangled him, prompting him to shout later okay na,
okay na. Sige na, sige na magbibigay na ako (Okay, okay. I will give.). Jose stopped strangling him and immediately removed the plastic material
over his head. Jose remarked that had he cooperated earlier, he would not have been hurt. Trestiza and Manrique told him that he should not have
kept the matter long. Later on, the four (4) men had a brief huddle. He was later on approached by them
saying okay na ha, isang milyon na (Okey ha, its one million). He could not recall however who in particular made the remark. He was later on
instructed by Manrique to call certain persons with the information that he figured in [an] accident. He was made to use his 9210 model phone as
the same had a speaker thus enabling the accused to listen to the conversation. He tried to get in touch with his siblings but failed. He was able to
contact later on his friends John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales who were then inLibis. He told his friends that he needed money very badly as
he had an accident. He instructed his friends to proceed to the area given by Manrique which was at the Caltex gas station alongOrtigas corner
Wilson Street in Greenhills.

Later on, Irma and Lawrence were allowed to be together inside the Mitsubishi Adventure. It was at that point where they were told to produce the
amount of One Million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) that night so they will be released. These very words were uttered by Jose and Manrique. Irma
later on asked permission to answer the call of nature and she was accompanied by Pineda to the Shell gas station in San Juan where she relieved
herself. Upon arriving at the said gas station, Lawrence was directed to drive his Honda ESI car. He was in the company of Pineda while Irma on
the other hand was with Manrique, Trestiza and Jose inside the Mitsubishi Adventure. While Irma was inside the Mitsubishi Adventure, she was told
that if the person contacted by Lawrence will not show up, they will not be released and if Lawrence will escape, she will be finished
off. Manrique thereafter told Irma to better pray that the transaction will push through. She was warned that if she reports the incident, her family will
be harmed. The said accused had her childs picture at the time. Jose was cursing her. Trestiza on the other hand was seated at the driver side of
the Mitsubishi Adventure van and remarked that Lawrences transaction should push through so that they will be released.

Not long after, Lawrence alighted from his car and stood beside the vehicle. His friends vehicle later on arrived. Lawrence approached the vehicle
that has just arrived and took something. Pineda remained seated in Lawrences car while smoking. The door of the said car was open at the time.
Lawrence thereafter walked back to where Pineda was and handed to him a package. It was already around 4: or 4:30 in the morning. Lawrences
friends thereafter went away, prompting Pineda to call Manrique. Manrique allegedly asked positive na ba? to which Pineda replied yes.

The amount raised by the friends of Lawrence was one hundred eighty thousand pesos (Php 180,000.00). They (Irma and Lawrence) were later
brought to the Star Mall along Edsa. Their captors warned them not to report the matter to the authorities otherwise they will face dire
consequences. The items taken from Irma like the cash money, jewelry and cellphone were placed by the men inside the console box of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. When they reached Star Mall, the men talked to them for thirty minutes. Again, they were warned about the consequences of
their reporting the incident to the police. Irma was told that the men knew her address, the members of her family and that they have the picture of
her child. She was likewise warned not to report the matter to her father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a policeman, otherwise her daughter
with Lawrence will be the one [to] bear the consequences (anak ko ang mananagot). They were released alongEdsa after thirty (30) minutes.
Lawrence had to plead for their gasoline from the accused and he was given Php 100.00.

Irma decided not to tell her mother about the incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence however made a report to the Makati police station in the
evening of 7 November 2002 where he was shown a coordination sheet pertaining to the plate number of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy Pineda
in the meanwhile kept on calling them (Irma and Lawrence) demanding for their balance of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). Irmas mother
however soon learned of the incident because of a newspaper item. Her father likewise learned of the incident and lost no time in contacting
authorities from the CIDG. They (Irma and Lawrence) were later investigated by the CIDG people to who they gave their sworn statements on
November 14, 2002. As Buboy Pineda continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that date. Boodles
of money were dusted with ultra-violet powder. On the same date, Buboy Pineda called Lawrence for purposes of meeting him that night in order to
get the remaining money. The entrapment operation which was conducted along the New World Hotel, and participated in by PO2 Almonte, was
successful as Buboy Pineda was arrested. Recovered from the possession of Pineda were a gold necklace without pendant; a
Nokia cellphone model 7650; a Toyota corolla car with plate number PNG 214 color red and one (1) ignition key. The necessary acknowledgment
receipt was duly signed by the said accused. A pawnshop ticket was likewise recovered from his possession.

Early in the morning of the following day at the CIDG, Lorieman Manrique went to the said office looking for his co-accused Froilan Trestiza. He
(Manrique) was arrested thereat when the private complainants who happened to be there as they were giving additional statements identified him
(Manrique) through a one-way mirror. Trestiza was likewise arrested later as he was identified by his co-accused Rodie Pineda. During the
arrest, Trestiza was found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm for which the corresponding charge was filed. He (Trestiza) was likewise the
subject of the complaint sheet filed by Irma and Lawrence and was likewise identified by his co-accused Pineda as one of the cohorts in the
kidnapping of the former.

The Defense on the other hand presented the following version:

Private complainants Irma Navarro and Lawrence Yu were known to accused Rodie Buboy Pineda, a freelance dance instructor prior to his
incarceration, and a godfather to the child of Irmas sister, since 1997. The two (Irma and Lawrence) are known to Pineda as suppliers of prohibited
drugs, particularly Ecstasy, blue anchors, and yeng-yen. The two, Irma and Lawrence have been distributing these drugs to various customers who
[sic] frequented bars and disco pubs. Pineda has been transacting with the two, particularly Lawrence, for a profit. Realizing later that his
involvement with the group of Lawrence has become deeper and deeper, Pineda thought of causing the arrest of the latter. He (Pineda) soon
decided to report the matter to the police authorities and contacted forthwith his long-time acquaintance, now his co-accused Froilan Trestiza on
November 6, 2002 at 10:30 in the evening. At that time, Trestiza was a policeman under the Special Action Unit, Group Directors Office of the
National Capital Region. Pineda and Trestiza, who have known each other for the past ten years, used to be dancers at the Equinox Disco along
Pasay Road. Upon learning the information from Pineda, Trestiza contacted his classmate PO2 Rolando de Guzman of the Philippine Drugs
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who in turn referred Trestizato Captain Lorieman Manrique who was then the Deputy Chief of the Special
Enforcement Unit of the PDEA, Metro Manila Regional Office. Manrique was called later by Trestiza throughcellphone and they agreed to meet the
same night, at around midnight, at the parking lot of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Manrique prepared a Pre-Operation sheet for a possible
narcotics operation. He likewise gave [the] plate number of the vehicle he was then driving which was a Mitsubishi Adventure van with plate number
HAU-298.

During their ensuing meeting, Manrique was with PO2 Reynel Jose. Pineda and Manrique talked to each other. Manrique later on briefed Pineda
and Jose. Trestiza was about three to five meters away from the three (3). After the briefing, Manrique asked Trestiza to drive the Mitsubishi
Adventure. Manrique told Trestiza that the buy-bust operation has been pre-coordinated with the Makati police. Manrique later joined Trestiza inside
the Mitsubishi Adventure while Jose and Pineda were outside as though waiting for someone. Irma and Lawrence later on arrived and they talked to
Pineda and Jose. Pineda introduced Jose to Irma and Lawrence as the buyer. Jose was only wearing a t-shirt at the time and it seemed Lawrence
and Irma doubted him. Jose told the two that he has the money with him and he would like to buy drugs. Irma however whispered something to
Lawrence prompting the latter to vascillate [sic]. From where they are seated inside the Mitsubishi Adventure, Trestiza and Manrique could see what
were [sic] going on among Irma, Lawrence, Jose and Pineda. Later on, Jose approached Trestiza and Manrique and told them that the prearranged signal is when he (Jose) scratched his head. According further to Jose, his scratching of his head will mean a signal to Trestiza to drive
towards them the vehicle. As Jose later on scratched his head, Trestiza drove the vehicle towards the group as instructed. Manrique thereafter
alighted and effected the arrest of Irma and Lawrence. Irma went hysterical and was loaded into the Honda ESI while Lawrence was made to board
the Mitsubishi Adventure. It was at that point when two (2) mobile cars arrived with policemen on board. A commotion immediately ensued between
the police men aboard the mobile cars and Manriques men. Firearms were drawn and poked against each of the men (nagkatutukan ng baril). Jose,
however, later on showed what appeared to be a document to the men aboard the mobile car. One of the men later on made a call through his radio
and then left afterwards.

Manrique later on instructed Trestiza to drive towards Edsa on their way to Camp Crame. Along the way, Manrique conducted a tactical
interrogation against Lawrence and Irma about their drug-related activities. Upon reaching SM Megamall, however, Manrique told Trestiza to pull
over. Manrique talked to Lawrence, Irma, Jose and Pineda. Trestiza remained inside the van. Trestiza, however, overheard that Lawrence was at
that point was talking about his supplier of ecstasy. Thereafter, Manrique briefed anew Pineda and Jose in the presence of Irma and Lawrence. It
was understood among them that Lawrence will wait for his alleged supplier whose name was allegedly Jojo at the Caltex gas station along Wilson
Street in Greenhills. Lawrence told Manrique that this Jojo was really a big-time supplier of ecstasy and cocaine. Upon arriving at the gas station,
the group waited for Lawrences supplier for an hour but nobody appeared. Manrique became impatient and went to where Lawrence
was. Manrique later told his men that Lawrence might have alerted his supplier. He (Manrique) then decided to bring the two (Irma and Lawrence)
to CampCrame. Trestiza, however, pointed out to Manrique that nothing was taken from the possession of the two. Manrique conferred anew with
Jose. Jose remarked that the items could have been thrown away. It was later on decided that Irma and Lawrence will just be released. The two
were indeed released near the [Manuela] Complex along Edsa.
Trestiza was later on arrested by the CIDG operatives in the early morning of November 16, 2002 at the parking lot of the Club 5 Disco. A gun was
poked at him and he was shoved inside a vehicle. He was boxed and placed on handcuffs. He was not shown any warrant of arrest. He told the
arresting officers that he is also a policeman. He was brought later to Camp Crame. While at Camp Crame, he was shown to his co-accused Pineda
and the latter was asked di ba sya yung nag-drive noong may operation laban kina Irma Navarro? (Is he not the one who drove during the operation
against Irma Navarro?). He (Trestiza) asked the authorities what were the grounds for detaining him but his queries were not answered. His watch,
wallet and cellphone were taken. Later on the same day, Irma arrived in Camp Crame. The authorities thereat talked to Irma, afterwhich, a
policeman told her eto yung itinuturo ni Buboy na nag-drive. (This is the one pointed to by Buboy as the one who drove). Several days later, all the
accused were presented to the press by the office of General Matillano. The Philippine Daily Inquirer covered the story and later on came out with
an article entitled We Were Framed.

The defense likewise presented PO2 Rolando de Guzman who corroborated the claim of Trestiza that he was called by the latter concerning the
information given by Pineda. No further evidence was presented.23

The Trial Courts Ruling

In its Joint Decision24 dated 24 July 2007, the trial court found Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.

The trial court concentrated its ruling on the credibility of the witnesses. It found the testimonies of the prosecution credible, with their versions of the
incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. On the other hand, the defenses testimonies taxed the credulity of the trial court. The trial
court raised numerous questions about the defenses story line:

x x x But this leads the court to wonder: if indeed Pineda was so bothered by his involvement with the group of Lawrence, why did he spill the beans
against Irma and Lawrence only? Did he not state that it was a group that he was transacting with? Who were the other members of this group?
What were their activities that were so dark and clandestine so as to make him suddenly shudder and opt for a change of life? These were not
answered by Pinedas testimony.

Also, while Manrique presented what appears to be a Pre-Operation Coordination Report, thus creating at first glance the impression that theirs was
a legitimate police operation, this still does not detract from nor diminish the credibility of the complainants claim that they were subsequently
abducted and money was demanded in exchange for their release. For even if the court is to indulge the claim of the defense that the complainants
were indeed drug-pushers and undeserving of this courts sympathy, the nagging doubt about the existence of a prepared police operation as
whatManrique and his co-accused refer to, persists. For one, the said Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet appears to be unreliable. Aside from the
fact that the same was not duly authenticated, the failure of the defense, particularly accused Manrique, to summon the signatories therein who may
attest to the existence and authenticity of such document was not at all explained. Second, all the accused narrated about their almost-fatal
encounter with another group of policemen while they were allegedly in the act of conducting the supposed buy-bust operation against the
complainants. This event, to the view of this court, only invites the suspicion that the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet was dubious if not actually
non-existent.

The accused likewise claimed that they released the two later along Edsa as nothing was found on them. The manner of the release, however,
raises several questions: why were the complainants who were earlier suspected of being drug-pushers not brought to the police precinct? Did not
Lawrence volunteer the name of his alleged supplier earlier during the tactical interrogation? Why were they unloaded just like that along Edsa at
that ungodly hour? Was there an incident report on the matter considering that Manrique was mindful enough earlier to first secure a PreOperation/Coordination sheet?25
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 finding the accused PO1 FROILAN TRESTIZA Y
LACSON, P/INSP LORIEMAN L. MANRIQUE and RODIE PINEDA Y JIMENEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of KIDNAPPING for RANSOM, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In
addition thereto, they are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the private complainants the sums of PHP 300,000.00 as actual damages, and PHP
300,000.00 as exemplary damages. All the accused are ACQUITTED in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-766 and 04-1311 both for Robbery respectively.

Send the records of this case to the archives in so far as accused PO2 Reynel Jose, who continues to be at large, is concerned. Let, however, a
Warrant of Arrest be issued against him.
SO ORDERED.26

On the same date as the promulgation of its decision, the trial court issued an Order of Commitment27 of Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda to the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections.

On 27 July 2007, Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda filed a Motion for New Trial and for Inhibition. Two witnesses, Camille Anne Ortiz y Alfonso (Ortiz)
and Paulo Antonio De Leon y Espiritu (De Leon), allegedly intimate friends of Navarro and Yu, will testify as to the circumstances which took place
in the early morning of 7 November 2002. Their testimonies, if admitted, will allegedly result in the acquittal of Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda.
These witnesses are not known to the accused, and they could not have been produced during trial. Moreover, the accused are of the belief that
trial court judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles acted with bias against them. She allegedly made an off-the-record remark and stated that the
prosecution failed to establish what they sought to prove, but then later on questioned the existence of the defenses Pre-Operation/Coordination
Sheet in her decision. Judge Galapate-Laguilles also failed to resolve the Petition for Bail, and failed to point out discrepancies in the testimonies of
the defenses witnesses, particularly those regarding the arrests of Trestiza,Manrique, and Pineda.

The prosecution opposed the Motion for New Trial and Inhibition.28 De Leon shared a cell with Manrique since July 2003, while the trial was
ongoing, and hence De Leons supposed testimony should not be considered newly discovered evidence. On the other hand, Ortizs narration of
events in her affidavit is full of inconsistencies. The prosecution likewise questioned the credibility of the witnesses who allegedly heard
Judge Galapate-Laguilles off-the-record remark. One was Trestizas relative, while the other was a security escort who was supposed to stay
outside the courtroom. Finally, the motion itself was filed late. The supplement to the motion, to which the affidavits of the additional witnesses were
attached, was filed two days after the finality of the trial courts decision. Copies of the decision were furnished to both prosecution and defense on
24 July 2007, which was also the date of promulgation. The Motion for New Trial and Inhibition was dated 27 July 2007, while the Supplement to the
Motion which included the witnesses affidavits was dated 10 August 2007.

The trial court held hearings on the twin motions. On 3 October 2007, the trial court issued an Order 29 denying the Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition. The evidence presented was merely corroborative, and the prosecution was able to prove its case despite the judges alleged off-therecord equivocal remark.

On 19 October 2007, Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda filed a notice of appeal.30 The Order denying the Motion for New Trial and for Inhibition was
received on 18 October 2007, while the Motion for New Trial and for Inhibition was filed on 27 July 2007 or three days after the promulgation of the

Decision on 24 July 2004. The trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal.31 In their brief filed with the appellate court, Trestiza, Manrique,
and Pineda assigned the following errors:

The trial court erred in convicting accused Trestiza despite the fact that he was not part of the alleged conspiracy in that it was not stipulated during
the pre-trial that he was just the driver and was not part of the team. Besides, he did not perform any act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of private complainants Lawrence Yu and Irma Navarro as their demeanor in the witness
stand show hesitation indicative of guilt of fabrication and their testimonies lack spontaneity and were not straightforward.

The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales as they alleged facts
and circumstance that are contrary to human nature and experience.

The trial court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact that the complainants were arrested in a legitimate operation as evidenced by the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet which was authenticated by accused-appellant Manrique. 32

The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 30 June 2008, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.

In its recitation of facts, the appellate court quoted from the Peoples Brief for the prosecution and from the trial court for the defense. The appellate
court ruled that Trestizas contention that he was just the driver of the van and never communicated with the witnesses deserves scant
consideration. Yu identified Trestiza as one of the two men who sandwiched him as he left Where Else Disco, and insisted that Yu cooperate with
Jose when Jose asked Yu for cash. Trestizas acts thus show that he acted in concert with his co-accused in the commission of the crime. The
appellate court relied on the trial courts assessment of the reliability of the prosecutions witnesses, and gave credence to their testimonies. The
appellate court declared that all the elements of kidnapping for ransom are present and thus affirmed the trial courts decision:

In any event, it was established that all the elements constituting the crime of kidnapping for ransom in the case at bar are present. The elements of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 7659 are as follows: (a) intent on
the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is
extorting ransom for the release of the victim (People vs. Raul Cenahonon, 527 SCRA 542). Here, Navarro and Yu testified how they were abducted
at gun point from the parking lot in Makati and confined inside the car and van respectively; that they were both handcuffed, hence, deprived of their
liberty and that appellants made a demand for them to deliver a certain amount in exchange for their release.

In fine, the Court rules and so holds that appellants guilt for the offense of kidnapping for ransom has been proven beyond moral certainty of doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.33

Trestiza alone filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 of the appellate courts decision. In his Motion, Trestiza claimed that he alone, through counsel,
filed an appeal brief. Trestiza further claimed that the stipulations made during pre-trial established Trestizas limited involvement, that is, he was
merely a driver of the vehicle when the alleged crime took place, he never communicated with the complainants, and none of the items allegedly
taken from the complainants were recovered from Trestizas possession. The trial court did not mention nor discuss these stipulations in its decision.
Even the trial courts finding of facts shows Trestizas participation was merely that of an invited driver in a legitimate Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency (PDEA) drug bust operation. Moreover, the testimonies of witnesses of both prosecution and defense establish that Trestiza was a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) when he allegedly committed the crime. Under the circumstances, Trestiza claimed he should be held liable
only for Arbitrary Detention. Finally, Trestizasidentification was not only improper for being suggested, but his warrantless arrest should also be held
invalid.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a comment opposing Trestizas Motion for Reconsideration. The stipulations do not discount
that Trestiza conspired with his co-appellants Manrique and Pineda in committing the crime charged. The apprehension and detention of Navarro
and Yu were clearly effected for the purpose of ransom; hence, the proper crime really is Kidnapping with Ransom. Trestiza filed a Reply to the
Comment35 on 20 October 2009.

The appellate court denied Trestizas Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 11 November 2009.36 An examination of the appellants brief
showed that the brief was filed forTrestiza, Manrique and Pineda. The appellate court found no compelling reason to warrant consideration of its
decision.

Trestiza still filed a Notice of Appeal37 of the appellate courts decision on 10 January 2010. The appellate court initially denied38 Trestizas Notice of
Appeal due to late filing, but eventually granted39 Trestizas Motion for Reconsideration40 of the 16 February 2010 resolution denying his Notice of
Appeal.

Trestiza filed the present supplemental brief41 before this Court on 15 August 2011. In his brief, Trestiza emphasized that Yu was apprehended by
agents of the PNP and PDEA on 30 June 2011 during a raid of an illegal drugs laboratory. Yu was charged with the crime of manufacturing,
possessing, and selling illegal drugs under Sections 8, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Issues

Trestiza raised the following arguments against the appellate courts decision:

I. The supervening event involving the apprehension of Lawrence L. Yu as the head of a big-time drug syndicate throws his credibility as a witness
beneath the abyss of morass and decay that must be now totally discarded.

II. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-entitled case is consistent with the innocence of [Trestiza] rendering the evidence presented
insufficient and without moral certainty to support a conviction.

III. At the very least, the equipoise rule finds application in the case at bar, taking into consideration the supervening event that demolished the
credibility of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.

IV. The Constitutional presumption of innocence of [Trestiza] has not been overwhelmed by the tainted testimony and total lack of credibility of
Lawrence L. Yu and, in light of the supervening event, could not now be overcome by questionable testimonies presented by the prosecution.

V. The conviction of an innocent man is a great injustice that affects the very foundations of humanity.

VI. It was not sufficiently shown that all the accused in the above-entitled case conspired in committing the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and the
same was not proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

VII. [Trestiza] has no malicious or evil intent in acquiescing to drive the vehicle used in the buy-bust operation.

VIII. [Trestiza] is innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.42

The Courts Ruling

At the outset, we declare that the 30 June 2011 arrest of Yu has no bearing on the present case. The two cases are independent of each other and
should be treated as such. Yus innocence or guilt regarding his 30 June 2011 arrest does not affirm or negate the commission of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom against him.

Warrantless Arrest
These are the circumstances surrounding Trestizas arrest: Pineda had been contacting Yu to follow up on the balance on the ransom. Pineda was
then arrested pursuant to an entrapment operation conducted in the early morning of 16 November 2002 at New World Hotel. During the
investigation at Camp Crame, Pineda revealed that Trestiza could be found at Club 5 in Makati. Pineda and Yu accompanied the arresting team to
Club 5. Yu pointed out Trestiza to the arresting team while Trestiza was on his way to his black Hummer.43

Trestiza questioned the legality of his warrantless arrest in an Omnibus Motion44 filed before his arraignment. In its Order dated 19 August 2004, the
trial court stated that the quashalof the informations on account of Trestizas illegal arrest is not warranted. The determination of the nature of the
arrest goes directly into the merits of the case, and needs a deeper judicial determination. Matters of defense are not grounds for a Motion to
Quash. The trial court, however, did not make any ruling related to Trestizas warrantless arrest in its 24 July 2007 Decision.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when warrantless arrests are lawful.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

It is clear that Trestizas warrantless arrest does not fall under any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113. However, Trestiza failed
to make a valid objection to his warrantless arrest.

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.45 Trestiza, being a policeman himself, could have immediately objected
to his warrantless arrest. However, he merely asked for the grounds for his arrest. He did not even file charges against the arresting officers. There
was also a lengthy amount of time between Trestizas arrest on 16 November 2002 and the filing of the Omnibus Motion objecting
to Trestizas warrantless arrest on 11 May 2004. Although it may be argued that the objection was raised prior to the entry of Trestizas plea of not
guilty in the kidnapping for ransom charge, it must be noted that the circumstances of the present case make us rule otherwise. Trestiza was
charged with two crimes at the time of his arrest: kidnapping with ransom under Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and illegal possession of firearms under
Criminal Case No. 02-3394. Trestiza did not question the legality of his warrantless arrest nor the acquisition of jurisdiction of the trial court over his
person, and fully participated in the hearing of the illegal possession of firearms case. Thus, Trestiza is deemed to have waived any objection to his
warrantless arrest. Under the circumstances, Trestizas Omnibus Motion in the kidnapping for ransom case is a mere afterthought and cannot be
considered as a timely objection.

Assuming arguendo that Trestiza indeed made a timely objection to his warrantless arrest, our jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the
view that Trestizas conviction is proper despite being illegally arrested without warrant. In People v. Manlulu, the Court ruled:

[T]he illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability.46

Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error.47 The fatal flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in view of a credible eyewitness account. 48

Kidnapping with Ransom

The trial courts findings of facts, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of
the parties, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded great weight, and even conclusive effect, unless the trial court
ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor and the deportment of the witnesses
as they testify.49 We see no reason to overrule the trial courts finding that Trestiza is guilty of kidnapping with ransom.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of
his liberty, shall suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.

Before the present case was tried by the trial court, there was a significant amount of time spent in determining whether kidnapping for ransom was
the proper crime charged against the accused, especially since Trestiza and Manrique were both police officers. Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code specifically stated that the crime should be committed by a private individual.50 The trial court settled the matter by citing our ruling in People
v. Santiano,51 thus:

The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant Sandigan a member of the PNP would not exempt them
from the criminal liability of kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of
official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have
acted in concert with their co-appellant Santiano and Chanco.

In the same order, the trial court asked for further evidence which support the defenses claim of holding a legitimate police operation. However, the
trial court found as unreliable the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet was not authenticated, and the
signatories were not presented to attest to its existence and authenticity.

The second to the last paragraph of Article 267 prescribes the penalty of death when the extortion of ransom was the purpose of the kidnapping. Yu
and Navarro were released only after they were able to give various personal effects as well as cash amounting to P300,000, with the promise to
give the balance of P1,000,000 at a later date.

Trestiza insists that his participation is limited to being a driver of the Mitsubishi Adventure van. Yu testified otherwise.

Direct Examination of Lawrence Lim Yu

Atty. Oledan:
Q: What happened [after you left Wherelse Disco]?

Witness:
A: As soon as I stepped out of the Wherelse Disco, somebody bumped me at my right side. And then later on, I was sandwiched by two (2) persons
and when I looked up, I noted the presence of one (1) man immediately in front of me holding a gun.

Q: And these men who sandwiched you and the third men [sic] who held the gun in front of you, would you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: Are they inside this Courtroom?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Will you please identify them?

A: The three of them, maam.

At this juncture, the witness is to pointing to the three (3) men, who are the accused in this case, inside the Courtroom.

COURT: (To the Accused) Again, for the record, please stand up, gentlemen.

At this juncture, the three (3) accused stood up.

COURT: (To Witness) Are you sure these were the three (3) men whom you are referring to?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, maam.

COURT: Make it of record that the witness pointed to accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza, PSINP Loriemar Manrique and Rodie Pineda.

ATTY. OLEDAN:
Q: (To Witness) Specifically, who among these three (3) sandwiched you?

WITNESS:
A: It was PO1 Trestiza and Capt. Manrique.

xxx

Q: What happened after you were brought inside the Mitsubishi vehicle?
A: Later on, Officer Trestiza and Capt. Manrique likewise boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure.

xxx

Q: Who was driving the vehicle?

A: It was Froilan Trestiza, maam.

xxx

Q: After [Reynel Jose] said [that had Yu cooperated earlier, he would not have been hurt] and the plastic removed from your head, what did [sic] the
two, Trestiza and Manrique, doing?
A: They told me the same thing. They told me that I should not have kept the matter long.

Q: What happened after that?

A: After that, Reynel Jose alighted again and we drove towards an area, which I know now to be within San Juan. Right in front of
the Tambunting Pawnshop.

Q: What happened at the Tambunting Pawnshop? Did the vehicle stop there?
A: The two (2) vehicles parked there beside each other.

Q: What happened when you were there at Tambunting Pawnshop?

A: After parking in front of the Tambunting Pawnshop, they boarded Irma and have her sat [sic] beside me. Then after which, the door at my left side
was opened.

Q: What else happened?

A: They told me not to make any move, that I just keep on sitting there. Afterwards, the men huddled with each other (nagkumpul-kumpol po sila).

Q: Where did they huddle?

A: They huddled in an area close to me, almost in front of me.

Q: Who among the accused huddled together?

A: The four (4) of them, maam.

Q: How long did they huddle?

A: For a while only, maam, around (10) ten minutes.

Q: After ten (10) minutes, what happened?

A: After ten (10) minutes, Buboy approached me.

Q: What did he say?

A: He told me that they thought my money would be One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

xxx

Q: So, after that huddle, after you were told by Buboy that okay na yong one million and that was confirmed by one of the three (3) men who
said isang million na, what happened?
A: I was talking to Buboy at that time and I was telling him, Why do you have to do this to me? You are the kumpare of the elder sister of Irma.

Q: What did Buboy say to that?

A: Buboy retorted, Pare, pasensya na, pera pera lang yan.

Q: After Buboy said that, what happened?

A: I told him that he need not do that, because if he needs money, I can always lend him.

Q: What did Buboy say?

A: After saying this to Buboy, he told me to just shut up and then he later on handed over to me a cell phone and told me to contact a person, who
can give me money.

Q: Who handed you your cell phone?

A: It was Froilan Trestiza, maam.

xxx

Q: After that, were you told to go home already?

A: Not yet, maam. Before letting us go, they threatened us. They reminded us that they have our IDs, the pictures of our children and the members
of our family.

Q: What did you do after that?

A: We just kept on saying yes because we wanted to go home already.

Q: What time was that?

A: It was almost daybreak (mag-uumaga na). I have no watch already at that time, maam.
Q: So, what did you do after that?
A: After that, Froilan Trestiza handed to me my sim card telling me that they will be calling me in my house concerning my alleged balance. 52

We agree with the appellate courts assessment that Trestizas acts were far from just being a mere driver. The series of events that transpired
before, during, and after the kidnapping incident more than shows that Trestiza acted in concert with his co-accused in committing the crime.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.53

Trestizas civil liability is joint and several with Manrique and Pineda. They are liable for the P120,000 taken from Navarro and the P180,000 raised
by Yu. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,54 Trestiza is also liable for P75,000 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime warrants the
imposition of death penalty; P75,000 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, without need of proof;
and P30,000 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C. No. 03119 promulgated on 30 June 2009, as well as
the Resolution promulgated on 11 June 2010, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Froilan L. Trestiza is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as the accessory penalties provided

by law. In addition to the restitution of P300,000 for the ransom, Trestiza is ordered to pay Lawrence Yu and Irma Navarro P75,000 as civil
indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages.

Costs against Froilan L. Trestiza.

SO ORDERED.

HO WAI PANG,

G.R. No. 176229

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

October 19, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules,
is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.[2]
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006 Decision [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming
the April 6, 1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused, namely, Law
Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,[5] Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin San Ho[7] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III[8] of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion for reconsideration
thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny
Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined
the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and
chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first
bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline
substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser
Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU)
while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first
found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the
chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of
Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of
the six accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted
a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. [10] The result of his examination[11] of the
white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed
inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were
turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples
were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[12] Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five
co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97.Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation [13] which the trial court granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave way
to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information [14] under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal
of the other Informations.[15] The Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the
country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as
SHABU, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, [17] all the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge
about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all the accused guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG, WU
HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended for having conspired to transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as
Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY
EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being
imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a less stricter penalty
than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No.
6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF
SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING
AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.[19]
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995. [20] Later,
all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal. [21] This Court, after being satisfied that the withdrawing appellants
were fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997.[22] Per Entry of
Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief [25] for the respondent People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and determination pursuant to this Courts
ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners
claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] which the CA denied in its Resolution[29] dated January 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE
CONSTITUTION.[30]

OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of
the accused as against himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He
claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding
evidence taken during such investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the
so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran,[33][a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Hence, petitioners claim
that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the
facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each case relied
on in rendering their respective decisions.Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes
of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And,
since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom
it presumed to have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the
country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it
need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the
Court held in People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by
the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be
decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the
right to confrontation,viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel crossexamined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it before the
court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as
compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the
absence of an interpreter.Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner,
through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should
know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function
and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision,
and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy
is not usually established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which
if taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have known each other prior to their
[departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused
Ho Wai Pang identified him as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel
agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by
the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks
in a restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San.
These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they have the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal
substances confiscated from the six accused were contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in
their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have
been perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused assiduously cooperating and mutually
helping each other in order to ensure its success.[37]
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.[38] [C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or
at least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime. [39] It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design.[40] The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his coaccuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime
committed.
Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were
found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him the
possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in
petitioners bag.[42]Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were still at the
counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU. [43] To us, this slight clash in Cincos
statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to Evidence in its Order[44] of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the
testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she
even testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was when
investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in
going to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of
Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that
at the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall
the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from the personal perception of the
witness and out of her personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.[45]
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness,
everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered. [46] Also, where there is nothing in the records which would
show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence
or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing
else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his coaccused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it
bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere
commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished
regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution.
It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.[47]
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the
country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be
recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.

[48]

The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be
imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00 to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section
20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659
could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the
accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x.

And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as
to him, a retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which
is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANSELMO DE LEON CUYO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Order1 issued by Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La
Union, in Special Civil Action Case No. 0001-10.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Anselmo Cuyo and Alejo Cuyo are estranged brothers. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal possession of firearms against Alejo. On 20
November 2003, petitioner appeared before Judge Samuel H. Gaerlan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, San Fernando City, La Union
with regard to the application for a search warrant by the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group (CIDG) for the search of the house of Alejo,
and, in the course of the proceedings, made untruthful statements under oath. Consequently, Alejo filed a complaint for perjury against petitioner.

On 25 August 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment of four (4) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. He was likewise ordered to pay private complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000 for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.2 Petitioner was not present during the promulgation of the judgment and was represented by his counsel instead.

On 28 August 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration3 of the Decision, but the motion was subsequently denied4 by the MTCC on 19
October 2009.

Petitioner received the Order of the MTCC denying his Motion for Reconsideration on 23 October 2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for
Probation5 on 5 November 2009.

On 6 January 2010, the MTCC issued an Order6 denying petitioners latter motion on the ground that it had been filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days as provided by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, or the Probation Law of 1976.7 The reckoning
date used by the MTCC in computing the 15 day period was the day of promulgation on 25 August 2009, tolled by the period from the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration to the receipt of the Order denying the motion on 23 October 2009. Thus, the MTCC stated:

It is note worthy (sic) that four (4) days has (sic) lapsed from August 25, 2009 when the decision was entered in the criminal docket of this court and
the time the motion for reconsideration was filed.

Since the period to apply for probation as provided for by law in (sic) only fifteen (15) days, the accused has only the remaining eleven (11) days of
the fifteen (15) days reglamentary period to apply for probation. The 11 day period from October 23, 2009 when he received the denial of his motion
ended on November 3, 2009.

The Motion for Probation was received by the court on November 5, 2009 when the decision has already become Final and Executory as of
November 3, 2009.

On 7 January 2010, petitioner moved for the reconsideration8 of the latter order, asking for a liberal interpretation of the rules with regard to the
computation of the period for applying for probation. He also filed on 10 January 2010 a Supplemental Motion9 to the Motion for Reconsideration
praying for the deferment of the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest or the recall of the warrant if one had already been issued.

The MTCC, however, denied the motion on 3 February 2010. Reference was made to Neypes v. Court of Appeals,10 wherein the appeal period was
sought to be standardized, by establishing the rule that a fresh period of 15 days was allowed within which to file a notice of appeal, counted from
the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration. The MTCC, however, did not view Neypes as applicable to
the case of petitioner. It believed that Neypes applied only to Rules 40, 42, 43 and 45 appeals and not to a Rule 122 appeal, all under the Rules of
Court.

Petitioner filed a Petition11 under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union alleging that the MTCC had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion for Probation. He asserted that the "fresh
period rule" established in Neypes should also be applied to criminal cases. Petitioner prayed for a liberal construction and application of the rules.
He also prayed that the RTC stay the execution of the Decision dated 25 August 2009, and that it recall the warrant of arrest issued pending the
resolution of the issues.

On 26 April 2010, the RTC denied the Petition and ruled that the application period had lapsed when petitioner neither surrendered nor filed a
motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court. In addition, the RTC ruled that petitioner failed to implead private
complainant Alejo Cuyo in violation of Rule 65, Section 5. This rule mandates that petitioner should join as private respondent the person interested
in sustaining the proceedings of the court.

Petitioner filed the present Rule 45 Petition for Review, assailing the Order of the RTC. He contends that the RTC erred in computing the 15-day
period provided in the Probation Law; and in dismissing the petition on procedural issues without determining whether petitioner is entitled to avail
himself of the benefits of probation.

We find some merit in the petition, but only with respect to the additional ground for dismissal of the certiorari petition cited by the RTC the failure
to implead private complainant as a respondent in the Petition for Certiorari filed before the RTC. We uphold the rest of the RTC Decision, and in
doing so, fully affirm its dispositive portion.

The RTC held that petitioner failed to observe Rule 65, Sec. 5, which states:

Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the
person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or
comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondent shall be included
therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear of participate in the proceedings
therein.

While it may be correct to say that petitioner failed to comply with the rule cited above, it would not be correct to dismiss the petition based on this
provision. Rule 3, Sec. 11 states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Thus, the trial court
should have ordered petitioner to add private complainant as a respondent to the case.

Nevertheless, we agree with the RTC that the Motion for Probation was filed out of time.

Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the Court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When
the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

xxx

xxx

xxx

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording
the judgement in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation
and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is
considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable.
Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the
promulgation of the judgment.

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is
only when the accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In
case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the
judgment of the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC
should not have entertained petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September
2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion instead of immediately
denying it.

In People of the Philippines v. De Grano,12 we stated:

When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present.1avvphi1 Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took
cognizance of the joint motion.

The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at
large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and
Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any
right to seek relief from the court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner asserts that his failure to appear during the promulgation was for a justifiable cause. He alleges that he was on board an international
vessel as a seaman at the time of the promulgation. He further alleges that the MTCC was informed of this fact. He insists that his absence was
justified, thus exempting him from the application of Rule 120, Sec. 6.

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing his Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the
motion for leave would have been the proper opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing
on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself of other remedies
under the Rules of Court, including a motion for reconsideration.

Moreover, in his Reply13 filed on 14 October 2010, petitioner belatedly questions the propriety of the promulgation. In so doing, petitioner is barred
by estoppel for failing to raise the issue at the earliest possible opportunity, that is, when the case was still pending with the MTCC.

As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad14 that the rule in Neypes is also applicable to criminal cases regarding appeals from
convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that
petitioners Motion for Probation was filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The Order issued by the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action Case No. 0001-10
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, [1] dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443,
affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with
the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check
No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55),
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the
amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by
way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning
the number, date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. [5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico [6] and Evangeline
Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; [7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990
issued by Adronico;[8] sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional
loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; [9] between May and June 1990,
the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990
issued by Adronico;[10] the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT; [11] when the Ladonga spouses failed to
redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga
spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when
they mature;[13] and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to
imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of
UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 106136;

4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00
representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount of P30,302.10 which is the
total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. [16] On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a
special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. [17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. [18] It held that the provisions of the penal code were made
applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article 10
of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court
of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not
make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in
every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be
held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999. [22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER
CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST
SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punished under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P.
BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the
drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the
application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the
lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P.
Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically
punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. [24] Lex
specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause
contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to
special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs. Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases
involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of
Article 22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the
accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17 [29] of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the
same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision
in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the
recent case of Yu vs. People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 [32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg.
22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article
17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators,
and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. [33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission
of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. [35]
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified
to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check
subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners
participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct
inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was
issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. [37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship
and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. [38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any activeparticipation in the commission of the crime with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[39]
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:[40]
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under
specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal
liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases,
moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the
accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations
omitted)[41]
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof
required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the
charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y G. R. No. 160188
NATIVIDAD,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
SANTIAGO,
-

versus - GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,

MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA, JJ.
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 21, 2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious
acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated
stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory expounded in two well-known decisions [1] rendered decades ago by the
Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty. However, the rationale behind the
rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told,[2] the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.[3] A more cursory

treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla,[4] and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.[5] This petition now gives occasion for us to
finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information [6] charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and
Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super
Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning
his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open
parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons
of Tide Ultramaticand again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. [7]

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon
was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. [8] The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases ofTide Ultramatic,
one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.[9]

Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the
Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon,
four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection
with the incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged
with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident.[10]
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the
Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to
the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account,
accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. [11] As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the
supermarket. It was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head out ofthe building to check what was

transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard, thus commencing their detention. [12] Meanwhile, petitioner
testified during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, [13] had been at the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and
headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the
scene to start running, at which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the
security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied
having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutors office where he was charged with
theft.[14]During petitioners cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing, assigned at the supermarket
though not at SM.[15]
In a Decision[16] promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon
of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to
seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.[17] The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the
convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal, [18] but only petitioner filed a brief [19] with the Court of Appeals, causing the appellate
court to deem Calderons appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
[20]
However, in its Decision dated 19 June 2003,[21] the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners conviction. [22] Hence the
present Petition for Review,[23] which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be modified to only of Frustrated Theft.[24]
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of
several cases of detergent with a total value of P12,090.00 of which he was charged.[25] As such, there is no cause for the Court to consider a
factual scenario other than that presented by the prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is
whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites [26] two decisions rendered many years ago by the Court of
Appeals: People v. Dio[27] and People v. Flores.[28] Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as they modified trial court convictions from
consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his
appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Dio and Flores rulings since they have not yet been
expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,

the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the silence on our
part, Dio and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings. They are comprehensively discussed in the
most popular of our criminal law annotations, [29] and studied in criminal law classes as textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive
of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law exams more than they
actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say that Dio and Flores are doctrinal, such conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of routine
theft prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting. Any scenario that involves the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a
supervised egress, such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application of Dio and Flores. The
fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Dio and Flores and the theories offered
therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are
correct and should continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future.

III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Dio and Flores, as well as the specific issues relative to frustrated theft, it is necessary to first refer
to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code.[30]
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Finally, it is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which
begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
[31]
After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins. [32] It has been held that if the offender never

passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. [33] On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case
of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, [s]ubjectively the crime is complete.[34]
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as
the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted
stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the
task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that
constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution
have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The
determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of
the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn
unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must
unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime, and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. [35] Accepted in this
jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se,[36] mens reahas been defined before as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,
[37]
and essential for criminal liability.[38] It follows that the statutory definition of ourmala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the
crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that a criminal law that contains no mens rearequirement infringes on
constitutionally protected rights.[39] The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal
law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.[40]

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the
craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced.
Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal
Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embeddedwhich attests when the
felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase shall kill another,
thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or
other forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. [41] In the
present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused was
undertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of
personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present
the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it
was without the consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things.[42]
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as defined by Gaius, was
so broad enough as to encompass any kind of physical handling of property belonging to another against the will of the owner, [43] a definition similar
to that by Paulus that a thief handles (touches, moves) the property of another. [44] However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold
that more than mere physical handling, there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: [ f]urtum est contrectatio rei
fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve.[45] This requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was
maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain.[46]

In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or unlawful taking, to characterize theft. Justice Regalado notes
that the concept of apoderamientoonce had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere
physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with the intent to appropriate the object in order to
constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. [47] However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the
Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking [48] or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen
property;[49] or that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance
of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento.[50] Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter
thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. [51]

So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the
operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. As
applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such
seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft
would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain
the answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to
produce theft as a consequence, do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not produced, and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition
attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code [52] as to when a particular felony is not produced, despite the commission of all the
acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced.
Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is
already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent.
U.S. v. Adiao[53] apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was charged with theft after he abstracted a leather belt from the
baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the accused able to get the merchandise out
of the Custom House, and it appears that he was under observation during the entire transaction. [54] Based apparently on those two circumstances,
the trial court had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft. The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive, and holding
instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. [55] In support of
its conclusion that the theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion of which we
replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit[,] he was
seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but sometime later. The court
said: "[x x x] The trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft
inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining
land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him
for an interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on
account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while
the defendant was still inside the church, the offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court said that the
defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the
case took a small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20
centimos, and then he placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards who
were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said: "[x x x] The accused [x x
x] having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where it had been, and having
taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was
thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the
elements of the consummated crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.) [56]
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in all these cases had been able to
obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. The interval between the commission of the acts of theft and the
apprehension of the thieves did vary, from sometime later in the 1898 decision; to the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse
which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building where the theft
took place, as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the
thefts in each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession of the property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than consummated theft. The case is People
v. Sobrevilla,[57] where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of
the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft, caught hold of the [accused]s shirt-front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle,
he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman. [58] In rejecting the contention that only
frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that determines
the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the [accuseds] criminal
liability, which arose from the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book. [59]
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the fact that the offender was able to
succeed in obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was able to consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner in this case. Yet to simply
affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as there is another school of thought on when theft is consummated, as reflected in
the Dio and Flores decisions.
Dio was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The accused therein, a driver
employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S.
Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the
Military Police, he was stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that
he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had
passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead
that only frustrated theft had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles pass through the
checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed to pass through the check

point without further investigation or checking.[60] This point was deemed material and indicative that the theft had not been fully produced, for the
Court of Appeals pronounced that the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it
were more or less momentary.[61] Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24 January
1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de hurto
es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede decirse en realidad que se haya producido
en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa ajena.[62]
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:

This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of the
culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was opportunely discovered
and the articles seized after all the acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under the final control and
disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely
intervention of the guard. The offense committed, therefore, is that of frustrated theft.[63]
Dio thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of apprehension is determinative
as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a case
which according to the division of the court that decided it, bore no substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and in [Dio].[64] Such
conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery
receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring
company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on
inspecting the van, and discovered that the empty sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well. [65] The accused was prosecuted for
theft qualified by abuse of confidence, and found himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of Appeals, accused argued in the
alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that there was no intervening act of spontaneous desistance
on the part of the accused that literally frustrated the theft. However, the Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on Dio, did find that the accused was
guilty only of frustrated, and not consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found no substantial variance between Dio and Flores then before it. The prosecution
in Flores had sought to distinguish that case from Dio, citing a traditional ruling which unfortunately was not identified in the decision itself. However,
the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said traditional ruling was qualified by the words is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of
its contents at once.[66] Pouncing on this qualification, the appellate court noted that [o]bviously, while the truck and the van were still within the
compound, the petitioner could not have disposed of the goods at once. At the same time, the Court of Appeals conceded that [t]his is entirely
different from the case where a much less bulk and more common thing as money was the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or
make use of it is palpably less restricted,[67] though no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative
circumstance been present instead.

Synthesis of the Dio and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the
ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary. Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether theft had been consummated, es preciso que so haga en
circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente . The qualifier siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente proves another important consideration, as it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items
before apprehension, then the theft could be deemed consummated. Such circumstance was not present in either Dio or Flores, as the stolen items
in both cases were retrieved from the actor before they could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were
filched. However, as implied inFlores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there could have been free
disposition, as in the case where the chattel involved was ofmuch less bulk and more common x x x, [such] as money x x x.[68]
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the import of the Dio ruling:

There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of the
stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in another case[ [69]], theft is consummated upon the
voluntary and malicious taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the thing
whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. This ruling seems to
have been based on Viadas opinion that in order the theft may be consummated, es preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x
x [[70]][71]
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other cases, also states that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the
thing was frustrated.[72]
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Dio and Flores rulings. People v.
Batoon[73] involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police detective, who followed the accused
onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. While the trial court found the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals
held that the accused was guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that [t]he facts of the cases ofU.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x
x indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft.[74]
In People v. Espiritu,[75] the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck.
However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the Military Police running the checkpoint. Even though
those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Dio, the Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused
were able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the
use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense. [76]

In pointing out the distinction between Dio and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that [w]hen the meaning of an element of a felony is
controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that felony. [77] Indeed, we can discern from this survey of
jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed foundational basis of the
concept of frustrated theft itself, the question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we undertake this
inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this Courts 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC.[78]
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his plantation, in the act of
gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts
they had gathered. The accused fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were subsequently arrested after the owner reported
the incident to the police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only
of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, [79] but further held that the accused
were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was raised by any of the
parties. What does appear, though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences, which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts away
from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.[80]
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Dio, Flores or the Spanish authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion.
There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced
the felon as a consequence.[81] However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution, though not producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted,
provided
that
the
non-performance was by reason of some cause or accident otherthan
spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was

frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the owner. However, following Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only attempted, especially given that the acts were not performed because
of the timely arrival of the owner, and not because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition. Even if the two sentences we had cited actually
aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection that it is the product of the considered
evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so
settled it required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot see how Empelis can contribute
to our present debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even
if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that
inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.

Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction. Considering the flawed
reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument to persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may
imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa was then in place. The definition of the crime of theft,
as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con nimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidacin en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles
ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo.
2.

Los que encontrndose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quin es su dueo se la apropriaren co intencin de lucro.

3.

Los daadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del dao causado, salvo los casos previstos en los artculos
606, nm. 1.0; 607, nms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, nm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo prrafo del 617 y 618.

It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed down. However, the
said code would be revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal Espaol de 1995, the crime of theft is now
simply defined as [e]l que, con nimo de lucro,

tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo ser castigado[82]
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, la libre disposicion of the property is not an element or a
statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.

The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa. Therein, he
raised at least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred. The passage cited in Dio was
actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether frustrated or consummated theft was committed [e]l que en el momento mismo de
apoderarse de la cosa ajena, vindose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo.[83] Even as the answer was as stated in Dio, and was indeed derived from the
1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decisions factual predicate occasioning the statement was apparently very different from Dio, for
it appears that the 1888 decision involved an accused who was surprised by the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of
clothing off a mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled.[84]
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain that have
held to that effect.[85] A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Caln pointed out the inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court
with respect to frustrated theft.
Hay frustracin cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro
que los conducia a otro que tenan preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la intervencin de la
policia situada en el local donde se realiz la sustraccin que impidi pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustrado, 30 de octubre
1950. Hay "por lo menos" frustracin, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay
frustracin "muy prxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la sustraccin, 28 febrero
1931. Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de frustracin cuando, perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento
de llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es admissible,
stos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son hurtos consumados.[86]
Ultimately, Cuello Caln attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la
disposicin del agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada ltimamente porla jurisprudencia espaola que generalmente
considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y sta quede por tiempo ms o menos duradero
bajo su poder. El hecho de que ste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es indiferente. El delito no pierde su carcter de
consumado aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere recuperada. No se concibe la frustracin, pues es muy
dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que
nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos consumados.[87] (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calns submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish Supreme Court decisions
on the matter, Cuello Caln actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be frustrated, since pues es muy dificil que el
que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin delhurto no lo consume efectivamente. Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the
execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges us to accept frustrated
theft, as proposed in Dio andFlores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic
pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calns position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective, as we are not bound
by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage.
Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt the Dio and Flores doctrines, the
answer has to be in the negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the exercise of the
function of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of
theorems in competition until one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature, through statute, to define
what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the sovereign people, which determines which acts
or combination of acts are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident legislative intent, as
expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.[88] The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by the legislature, or redefine a
crime in a manner that does not hew to the statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains
the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a narrow interpretation is appropriate. The Court must take heed of language,
legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids. [89]
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen
is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of
theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for
in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[90]
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of another
without the latters consent. While theDio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only
the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime
of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due
to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has
already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or
robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of
making use of the thing was frustrated.[91]
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of taking itself, in that
there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the
taking not having been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is
indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the

facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to
gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot
in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[92] And long ago, we asserted in People v. Avila:[93]
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of
the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the
consent of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be effected against the
will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of no slight importance. [94]
Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of
ones personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of
execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage.
Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Neither Dio nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession over the
stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely
dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion
of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property
frustrates the theft would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent, [95] since the Court would have
carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to
formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of
the offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Dio?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the property, the location of the
property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom the offender is expected to
encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more.
Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free
disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of property by
one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for
therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these
peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed.
But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the
consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Dio/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do not align with the legislated framework of the
crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is
no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the free disposition of the items stolen is in any way determinative of whether the
crime of theft has been produced. Dio itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was
ultimately content in relying on Dio alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their
erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has
not since found favor from this Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his
appeal on our acceptance of the Dioand Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it
has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the
correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized.
Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CRESENCIO C. MILLA,

G.R. No. 188726

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARKET

PURSUITS, INC. represented by CARLO V. LOPEZ,
Respondents.

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
PEREZ,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.
Promulgated:
January 25, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the 22 April 2009 Decision [1] and 8 July 2009 Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
Decision of the trial court finding petitioner Cresencio C. Milla (Milla) guilty of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). In March 2003, Milla represented
himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation, which was engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and
offered
to
sell
MPI
a
property
therein
located.
For
this
purpose,
he
showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216445 registered in the name of spouses Farley and Jocelyn Handog (Sps.
Handog), as well as a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the spouses in favor of Milla. [3] Lopez verified with the Registry of Deeds
of Makati and confirmed that the property was indeed registered under the names of Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was convinced by Millas authority,
MPI purchased the property for P2 million, issuing Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) Check No. 154670 in the amount of P1.6 million. After
receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2)
an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 216445.[4]
Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopezs partner, a copy of the new Certificate of Title to the property, TCT No. 218777, registered
in the name of MPI. Thereafter, it tendered in favor of Milla SBTC Check No. 15467111 in the amount of P400,000 as payment for the balance.[5]
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to Acosta, but did not furnish the latter with the receipts for the transfer taxes and other costs incurred
in the transfer of the property. This failure to turn over the receipts prompted Lopez to check with the Register of Deeds, where he discovered that
(1) the Certificate of Title given to them by Milla could not be found therein; (2) there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to MPI; and
(3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in the name of a certain Matilde M. Tolentino.[6]
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount of P2 million from Milla, who then issued Equitable PCI Check Nos. 188954 and
188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003, respectively, in the amount of P1 million each. However, these checks were dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. When Milla ignored the demand letter sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI Board
of Directors, filed a Complaint against the former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Public Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City, Branch 146
(RTC Br. 146).[7] Milla was accused of having committed estafa through the falsification of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777
purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034167
th

That on or about the 25 day of March 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
document denomindated as Deed of Absolute Sale, duly notarized by Atty. Lope M. Velasco, a Notary Public for and in the City
of Makati, denominated as Doc. No. 297, Page No. 61, Book No. 69, Series of 2003 in his Notarial Register, hence, a public
document, by causing it to appear that the registered owners of the property covered by TCT No. 216445 have sold their land
to complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. when in truth and in fact the said Deed of Absolute Sale was not executed by the owners
thereof and after the document was falsified, accused, with intent to defraud complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. presented the
falsified Deed of Sale to complainant, herein represented by Carlo V. Lopez, and complainant believing in the genuineness of
the Deed of Absolute Sale paid accused the amount of P1,600,000.00 as partial payment for the property, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant in the aforementioned amount of P1,600,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034168
That on or about the 3rd day of April 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a document
denominated as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218777 purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City, hence, a
public document, by causing it to appear that the lot covered by TCT No. 218777 was already registered in the name of
complainant Market Pursuits, Inc., herein represented by Carlo V. Lopez, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew
that the Register of Deeds of Makati did not issue TCT No. 218777 in the name of Market Pursuits Inc., and after the document
was
falsified,
accused
with

intent to defraud complainant and complainant believing in the genuineness of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218777 paid
accused the amount of P400,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of complainant in the aforementioned amount of
P4000,000.00 (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of court, his Demurrer to Evidence. [9] In its Order dated 26 January 2006, RTC
Br. 146 denied the demurrer and ordered him to present evidence, but he failed to do so despite having been granted ample opportunity. [10] Though
the court considered his right to present evidence to have been consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. [11]
In its Joint Decision dated 28 November 2006, [12] RTC Br. 146 found Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Cresencio Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. Applying the indeterminate sentence law and considering that the
amount involved is more than P22,000,00 this Court should apply the provision that an additional one (1) year should be
imposed for every ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos in excess of P22,000.00, thus, this Court is constrained to impose the
Indeterminate (sic) penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count.
Accused is adjudged to be civilly liable to the private complainant and is ordered pay (sic) complainant the total
amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS with legal rate of interest from the filing of the Information until the same is
fully paid and to pay the costs. He is further ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the total amount due as
and for attorneys fees. A lien on the monetary award is constituted in favor of the government, the private complainant not
having paid the required docket fee prior to the filing of the Information.
SO ORDERED.[13]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision dated 22 April 2009, affirmed the findings of the trial court. [14] In its assailed
Resolution dated 8 July 2009, it also denied Millas subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. [15]
In the instant Petition, Milla alleges that the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals were not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence. He raises the following issues:
I.

Whether the case should be reopened on the ground of negligence of counsel;

II.

Whether the principle of novation is applicable;

III.

Whether the principle of simple loan is applicable;

IV.

Whether the Secretarys Certificate presented by the prosecution is admissible in evidence;

V.

Whether the supposed inconsistent statements of prosecution witnesses cast a doubt on the guilt of petitioner.[16]

In its Comment, MPI argues that (1) Milla was not deprived of due process on the ground of gross negligence of counsel; (2) under the Revised
Penal Code, novation is not one of the grounds for the extinction of criminal liability for estafa; and (3) factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive.[17]
On the other hand, in its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that (1) Milla was accorded due process of law; (2) the elements of
the crime charged against him were established during trial; (3) novation is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability for estafa; (4) the money
received by Milla from Lopez was not in the nature of a simple loan or cash advance; and (5) Lopez was duly authorized by MPI to institute the
action.[18]
In his Consolidated Reply, Milla reiterates that the negligence of his former counsel warrants a reopening of the case, wherein he can present
evidence to prove that his transaction with MPI was in the nature of a simple loan.[19]
In the disposition of this case, the following issues must be resolved:
I.

Whether the negligence of counsel deprived Milla of due process of law

II.

Whether the principle of novation can exculpate Milla from criminal liability

III.

Whether the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, should be reviewed on appeal

We resolve to deny the Petition.

Milla was not deprived of due process.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived him of due process. Specifically, he
states that after the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to Evidence, and that the former was never advised by the
latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly surprised to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that
it had issued a warrant for his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New Trial, which Milla claims to have been
denied by the trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus, demonstrating his counsels negligence. These contentions cannot be given any
merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is so gross or palpable that
courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client. [20] In this case, Milla was able to file a Demurrer to Evidence, and upon the trial courts

denial thereof, was allowed to present evidence. [21] Because of his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that he had waived his
right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial court still allowed him to submit a memorandum in the interest of justice. Further, contrary to his assertion that
RTC Br. 146 denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed by his former counsel, a reading of the 2 August 2007 Order of RTC Br.
146 reveals that it partially denied the Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Recall of Warrant of Arrest, but granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Avail of Remedies under the Rules of Court, allowing him to file an appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest. [22]
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla was given opportunities to defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs.
Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.
The principle of novation cannot be applied to the case at bar.
Milla contends that his issuance of Equitable PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 before the institution of the criminal complaint against him
novated his obligation to MPI, thereby enabling him to avoid any incipient criminal liability and converting his obligation into a purely civil one. This
argument does not persuade.
The principles of novation cannot apply to the present case as to extinguish his criminal liability. Milla cites People v. Nery[23] to support his

contention that his issuance of the Equitable PCI checks prior to the filing of the criminal complaint averted his incipient criminal liability. However, it
must be clarified that mere payment of an obligation before the institution of a criminal complaint does not, on its own, constitute novation that may
prevent criminal liability. This Courts ruling in Nery in fact warned:
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby
criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to
cast doubt on the true nature of the original petition, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs.
People, 90 Phil. 581; Villareal, 27 Phil. 481).
Even in Civil Law the acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the original relation between the
complainant and the accused, can not produce novation. For the latter to exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish the
original relationship, and such intent can not be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments on account of what is totally
due. Much less can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the nullification of a criminal liability that is
fully matured, and already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this Court has ruled that the offended partys acceptance of a
promissory note for all or part of the amount misapplied does not obliterate the criminal offense (Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48
Off. Gaz. 3898).[24] (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, in Quinto v. People,[25] this Court exhaustively explained the concept of novation in relation to incipient criminal liability, viz:
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement
of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation which may be effected
either expressly or impliedly. The term expressly means that the contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in
executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an implied
novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is really no hard
and fast rule to determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation, the touchstone for
contrariety, however, would be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligations.
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby produce the effect of
extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is when novation has been explicitly stated and
declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of
incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they
cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be
essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the
obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in
nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the manner of payment. There was really no substitution of
debtors since private complainant merely acquiesced to the payment but did not give her consent to enter into a new contract.
The appellate court observed:
xxx xxx xxx
The acceptance by complainant of partial payment tendered by the buyer, Leonor Camacho,
does not evince the intention of the complainant to have their agreement novated. It was simply
necessitated by the fact that, at that time, Camacho had substantial accounts payable to complainant, and
because of the fact that appellant made herself scarce to complainant. (TSN, April 15, 1981, 31-32) Thus,
to obviate the situation where complainant would end up with nothing, she was forced to receive the tender
of Camacho. Moreover, it is to be noted that the aforesaid payment was for the purchase, not of the jewelry
subject of this case, but of some other jewelry subject of a previous transaction. (Ibid. June 8, 1981, 10-11)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa and penalizes any person who shall defraud another by
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property. It is axiomatic that the gravamen of the offense is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The terms convert and misappropriate have been held to connote an
act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own or devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed

upon. The phrase, to misappropriate to ones own use has been said to include not only conversion to ones personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. Verily, the sale of the pieces of jewelry on
installments (sic) in contravention of the explicit terms of the authority granted to her in Exhibit A ( supra) is deemed to be one of
conversion. Thus, neither the theory of delay in the fulfillment of commission nor that of novation posed by petitioner, can avoid
the incipient criminal liability. In People vs. Nery, this Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of contract, for it is
a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own conation. (Emphasis supplied.)[26]
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have novated the original transaction, as the
checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus
unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed through
Millas falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere novation.
The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial courts finding of guilt.
Finally, Milla assails the factual findings of the trial court. Suffice it to say that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, are binding on and accorded great respect by this Court.[27]
There was no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it affirmed the finding of the trial court that Milla was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of estafathrough falsification of public documents. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime
charged. The relevant provisions of the Revised Penal Code read:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:
1.
Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsification enumerated in the next preceding article in
any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx

It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented himself to have the authority to sell the subject property, and it was precisely this misrepresentation
that prompted MPI to purchase it. Because of its reliance on his authority and on the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777, MPI parted
with its money in the amount of P2 million, which has not been returned until now despite Millas allegation of novation. Clearly, he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa through falsification of public documents.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the Petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, G.R. No. 172716

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J. Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, *
- versus - PERALTA, ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and Promulgated:
EVANGELINE PONCE,
Respondents. November 17, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. [3]
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC),
in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the
MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. [4] Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. [5]Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of
standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing
to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this
proved unavailing.[6]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. [7]
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be
complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies ( e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to

separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition
in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,[8]in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court
of Appeals to also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance
on People v. Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the
Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending
trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No.
7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.[10]
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
Under Section 21, Rule 114[11] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable
on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should
he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding [12] at the MeTC is
belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light
of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the
MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense [13] protects him from, among
others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.[14] It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the same offense.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise,
finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. [15]
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
imprudence and negligence (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of reckless imprudence and simple imprudence (paragraphs 78). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible,[16] unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasioffenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under
the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x[17] on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative
intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the
different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion
to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
whole class, or series, of crimes.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.
[19]

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence, its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of
imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, [21] stands on
solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller[22] that [r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but]
simply a way of committing it x x x,[23] has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the
Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct
species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizonjurisprudence[24] only by dint of lingering
doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed,
the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another
resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes
such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in
1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for damage to property thru reckless
imprudence because a prior case against the same accused for reckless driving, arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was
based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or
acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga[26] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero[27] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc,
per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes,J.), People v. Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in 1966 by
the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals[32] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila [33] (promulgated in 1983 by the
First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was
best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence because of the accuseds prior acquittal of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:[34]
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.[35] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, [36] decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless
operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence
suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the Court of
Appeals conviction of an accused for damage to property for reckless imprudence despite his prior conviction for slight and less serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence, arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied
on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:[38]
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents
his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of
the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property
through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs. He stressed that if double jeopardy exists where the reckless
act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act
caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap.
[40]
(Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, [41] a Diaz progeny. There, the
accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence and Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence. Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the
quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds
claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its
progeny People v. Belga:[42]
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from
a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the
same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the
collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96)
signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88.
Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a
duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash
was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance
of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the
owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay
after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who
alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed
by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an
accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the
Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion,
and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr.
Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court
and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal
Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the
second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is
whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether
the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the
second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined
with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in
view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention
might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. [43]
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application.[44] We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy,
upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the
same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the
Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a
re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar
to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated

the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies[46]); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x, [47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes
falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of
a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s
framework apply to complex the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses
which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single
quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48
by complexing one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences [48] unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and,
on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. [49] Expectedly, this is the approach the
MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, [50] the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the complexing of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double
jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which
case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged
in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,[51] penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,[52] we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries, as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of
said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be anadditional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.[53] (Emphasis supplied)

By additional penalty, the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other.
Either (1) we allow the complexing of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus reconceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and
treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we
forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of
their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate
the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasicrimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered
and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more

serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose
out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.
[54]
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity
of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. [55]
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as light offenses (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of
penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157. WeDISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 162540

Present:

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 13, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of CaloocanCity, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free
access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing
payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid
stated amount of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649
postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from one of their
customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the
checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable
to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about
the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia,
because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle
at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with
cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00
sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. [4] Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also
called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. [5] Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the
subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement
for the dishonored check.[6]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account, but explained that the check
came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He

parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its
agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were
given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over
said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not
push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and
Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was
only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca
alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she
actually brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and
upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who
had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of
both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the
two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting
payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's
house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and
her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep,
which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents
arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect
payments from customers.According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia)
could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during crossexamination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's
mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted,
but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she
even asked, What is this? Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia
y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,as minimum, to SIX
(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was
denied per Resolution datedMarch 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in
the petition are as follows:
1.

Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;

2.

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.[8]
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308,
in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for
Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to
another the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is
presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-inlaw; (4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by
not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things
the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave
abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have
some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the
latters bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod
guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent
portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2.

By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment
of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are
impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by
him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The
aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the
Court in Intod[10] in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or
(b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x [11]
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to
consummate the crime ofqualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored
check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the Court held,
thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of
the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent.
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. x x x [13]
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case . The circumstance of petitioner
receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment
on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another
possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution
dated March 5, 2004, areMODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles
4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor,
and to pay the costs