1. Rommel G. Munoz vs COMELEC, et al.

GR # 170678 july 17, 2006

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order filed by petitioner Rommel G. Muoz assailing the Resolution [1] dated December 15, 2005 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPC No. 04-124 which affirmed the Resolution [2] dated October 25, 2004 of
the COMELEC First Division granting the petition of private respondent Carlos Irwin G. Baldo, Jr. to annul petitioners
proclamation as mayor of Camalig, Albay.
In fine, SPC No. 04-087 pertains to the preparation of the ERs which is a pre-proclamation controversy, while SPC No. 04-124
refers to the conduct of the MBC in proclaiming the petitioner without authority of the COMELEC.
Further, we find that the COMELEC First Division correctly annulled the proclamation of the petitioner. [16] At the time the
proclamation was made, the COMELEC First Division had not yet resolved SPC No. 04-087. We likewise do not agree with
petitioners contention that the proclamation was valid as the contested ERs will not affect the results of the election.
Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.
Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect
the results of the election. The phrase results of the election is not statutorily defined. Clearly, the results of the
election would be adversely affected by the uncanvassed returns.
As aptly held by the COMELEC First Division:
The votes obtained by petitioner and private respondent tallied in the contested election returns can not be the basis of the
partial proclamation. The objected election returns cannot be considered, even provisionally, as the true and final result of
the elections in the contested precincts. While the COMELEC En Banc correctly affirmed the October 25, 2004 Resolution of
its First Division in SPC 04-124 insofar as it annulled petitioners proclamation, however, we find that it exceeded its authority
and thus gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all ERs even before its First Division could
decide on SPC No. 04-087 filed by private respondent assailing the ruling of the MBC to include the 26 contested ERs in the
canvass.
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.

2. Republic of the Phils rep. NTC vs. International Communication Corp. GR# 141667 July 17, 2006
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before addressing the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the procedural matter raised by respondent ICC, namely, that the
present petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed out of time. It is respondent's posture that petitioner's
motion for reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the latter's Amended Decision is apro forma motion and, therefore, did
not toll the running of the reglementary period to come to this Court via this petition for review.
Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review must be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. While a motion for reconsideration
ordinarily tolls the period for appeal, one that fails to point out the findings or conclusions which were supposedly contrary to
law or the evidence does not have such an effect on the reglementary period as it is merely a pro forma motion. 7
In arguing for the outright dismissal of this petition, respondent ICC claims that the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner NTC in connection with the CAs Amended Decision failed to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the
CA which were supposedly contrary to law. Respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioner in its motion for
reconsideration were mere reiterations of the same issues which had already been considered and passed upon by the CA
when it promulgated its Amended Decision. On this premise, respondent maintains that petitioners aforementioned motion
for reconsideration is a mere pro forma motion that did not toll the period for filing the present petition.
Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for reconsideration reiterates issues already passed upon by the
court does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion.8 Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is
precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the
movant has to dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss those issues,
the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for
reopening and new trial.9
The CA ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act (CA 146, as amended), supra, allowed NTC to impose
fees as reimbursement of its expenses related to, among other things, the "authorization" of public services, Section 5(g),
above, of R.A. No. 7921 no longer speaks of "authorization" but only of "regulation" and "supervision." To the CA, the omission
by Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 of the word "authorization" found in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended,
meant that the fees which NTC may impose are only for reimbursement of its expenses for regulation and supervision but no
longer for authorization purposes.
We find, however, that NTC is correct in saying that there is no showing of legislative intent to repeal, even impliedly, Section
40(g), supra, of the Public Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial conflict between the new
and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 11 The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible such that they cannot be made to stand together. 12
It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it
is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with
each other that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the
judicial function of construction and interpretation.
Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence. 14
The CA was correct in finding the amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and in complete disregard of the basic limitation
that the fee should be at least approximately commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself admits that it had imposed the
maximum amount possible under the Public Service Act, as amended. That is hardly taking into consideration the actual costs
of fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory functions.
Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the dismissal of this petition, about which petitioner NTC did
not bother to comment at all. We refer to the fact that, as respondent ICC aptly observed, the principal ground given by the
CA in striking down the imposition of the P1,190,750.50 fee is that respondent ICC is entitled to the benefits of the so-called
"parity clause" embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, to wit:
Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. - Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption,
or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of
previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
grantees of such franchises x x x.
In this connection, it is significant to note that the subsequent congressional franchise granted to the Domestic Satellite
Corporation under Presidential Decree No. 947, states:
Section 6. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Republic of the
Philippines during the life of this franchise a tax of one-half percent of gross earnings derived by the grantee from its
operation under this franchise and which originate from the Philippines. Such tax shall be due and payable annually
within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts by the Commission on Audit as prescribed in Section 11
hereof and shall be in lieu of all taxes, assessments, charges, fees, or levies of any kind, nature, or
2

description levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial, or national authority x x x

(Emphasis supplied)
The CA was correct in ruling that the above-quoted provision is, by law, considered as ipso facto part of ICC's franchise due to
the "parity clause" embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925. Accordingly, respondent ICC cannot be made subject to the
payment of the subject fees because its payment of the franchise tax is "in lieu" of all other taxes and fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

3 Luis Marcos Laurel vs Zeus Abrogar GR # 155076 Feb 27, 2006

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68841 affirming
the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 150, which denied the "Motion to
Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment)" in Criminal Case No. 99-2425 for theft.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner in
the Court of Appeals; (b) whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDTs business of providing said telecommunication
services, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) whether or not the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion of the petitioner to
quash the amended information.
On the issue of whether or not the petition for certiorari instituted by the petitioner in the CA is proper, the general rule is that
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to nullify an order denying a motion to quash the
Information is inappropriate because the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law. Appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive of each other. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to continue with the case in due course
and, when an unfavorable judgment is rendered, assail the order and the decision on appeal. However, if the trial court issues
the order denying the motion to quash the Amended Information with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction, or if such order is patently erroneous, or null and void for being contrary to the Constitution, and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the accused may resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. 35 A
special civil action for certiorari is also available where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy
of an appeal. As this Court held in Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Viloria: 36
Nonetheless, the settled rule is that a writ of certiorari may be granted in cases where, despite availability of appeal after
trial, there is at least a prima facie showing on the face of the petition and its annexes that: (a) the trial court issued the order
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and
adequate remedy; (c) where the order is a patent nullity; (d) the decision in the present case will arrest future litigations; and
(e) for certain considerations such as public welfare and public policy. 37
In his petition for certiorari in the CA, petitioner averred that the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it denied his motion to quash the Amended Information despite his claim that the
material allegations in the Amended Information do not charge theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, or any
offense for that matter. By so doing, the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
charge against him. He further averred that the order of the trial court is contrary to the constitution and is, thus, null and
void. He insists that he should not be compelled to undergo the rigors and tribulations of a protracted trial and incur expenses
to defend himself against a non-existent charge.
Petitioner is correct.
We have reviewed the Amended Information and find that, as mentioned by the petitioner, it does not contain material
allegations charging the petitioner of theft of personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. It, thus,
behooved the trial court to quash the Amended Information. The Order of the trial court denying the motion of the petitioner
to quash the Amended Information is a patent nullity.
On the second issue, we find and so hold that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within
its coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter
and intent of the law.
The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly. Such rule is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in Congress, not in the judicial department. It is
Congress, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. 44 Due respect for the prerogative of Congress
in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. The Court must take heed to language, legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly
determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids. 45However, when the congressional purpose is unclear, the
court must apply the rule of lenity, that is, ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity.46
Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and may not be
held to include offenses other than those which are clearly described, notwithstanding that the Court may think that Congress
should have made them more comprehensive. 47 Words and phrases in a statute are to be construed according to their
common meaning and accepted usage.
In defining theft, under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as the taking of personal property without the consent of the
owner thereof, the Philippine legislature could not have contemplated the human voice which is converted into electronic
impulses or electrical current which are transmitted to the party called through the PSTN of respondent PLDT and the ISR of
Baynet Card Ltd. within its coverage. When the Revised Penal Code was approved, on December 8, 1930, international
telephone calls and the transmission and routing of electronic voice signals or impulses emanating from said calls, through
4

the PSTN, IPL and ISR, were still non-existent. Case law is that, where a legislative history fails to evidence congressional
awareness of the scope of the statute claimed by the respondents, a narrow interpretation of the law is more consistent with
the usual approach to the construction of the statute. Penal responsibility cannot be extended beyond the fair scope of the
statutory mandate.70
Orders of the Regional Trial Court and the Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is directed to issue an order granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended Information.
SO ORDERED.

4. Regino Sy Catiis vs CA,et al GR# 153979 Feb. 9, 2006

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Regino Sy Catiis (petitioner) seeking to nullify the Decision 1dated June
14, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which sustained the Order dated December 18, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City,2 allowing private respondents to post bail and the Order dated December 21, 2001 of the Executive Judge of
the same court3 approving the surety bond posted by respondents and their release.
Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint counter-affidavits denying the charges against them.
On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a Resolution 4 finding the existence of a probable
cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. Private respondents on the
same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring
that the offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail, Judge Bersamin made the following
disquisitions:
Herein, only four persons are actually charged. When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable
shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000.00 pesos.
On December 26, 2001, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction10 assailing the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private respondents to post bail.
14
Petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the CA on January 14, 2002 assailing the jurisdiction of Judge Zenarosa in
issuing the Order dated December 21, 2001.
Whether or not the questioned Decision sustaining the order of release in the 2nd assailed Order dated December 21 of Hon.
Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure15
SECTION 1. Since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private Respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private
respondents could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of
the fraud exceeds P100,000.00. The next question is, whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is
bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua?
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. Sec. 9. While Branch 96 is open and available on the day private respondents posted their
bail with Judge Zenarosa, it does not necessarily follow that Judge Bersamin was available at that precise moment. Moreover,
it is not specifically stated in the supplemental petition that at the exact time Judge Zenarosa approved the bail, Judge
Bersamin was available. Costs against petitioner.
.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 14,
2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

5. Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jorellanes, et al GR # 148408 july, 14, 2006

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court questioning the resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a
preliminary and mandatory injunction, filed by petitionerConcepcion Parayno against respondents Jose Jovellanos and the
Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. d)
xxx the gasoline station
violated Building and Fire Safety Codes because the station has 2 nd floor storey building used for business rental
offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls. Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Section
44 of the Official Zoning Code since it was not a gasoline service station but a gasoline filling station governed by
Section 21 thereof. Albeit, Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of respondent municipality does not
mention a gasoline filling station, [but] following the principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling
station falls within the ambit of Section 44.
We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between gasoline service
station and gasoline filling station. xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.
[7]

xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 42. Service Station. xxx

xxx

xxx

3.
That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined
in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under
Article 42 of the said official zoning code;
Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline
station. xxx
Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner
insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing
Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

6. Depart of Agrarian Reform vs Phil Communication Satellite Corp. GR# 152640 June 15, 2006
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) seeking the nullification of the Decision and Resolution, dated November 23, 2001 and March 7, 2002, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, entitled Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) v.
DAR.
Section 1. Declaration of Security Zone. Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated
the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine
Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. Section 10.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal further opined that
subjecting the surrounding agricultural area within the security zone under CARP will not be detrimental to the operations of
PHILCOMSAT.[6]
The term security zone is not embraced within the definition of lands used for national defense under Section 10 of
R. A. No. 6657.[7]
6657 (COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988) AND P.D. NO. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS EXEMPT FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARP.
P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the security zone to the authority of the Ministry of National Defense,
consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the power and authority to determine who can occupy the areas
within the security zone, and how the lands shall be utilized, to wit:
The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security zone, has granted to the Ministry of
National Defense the control and administration of the same. The law which decreed the areas a security
zone is very clear in its purpose.

7. Sonia Maceda, et al. vs Encarnacion de Guzman VDA de Macatangay GR# 164947 Jan 3, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Sonia Maceda (Sonia) and Bonifacio Macatangay (Macatangay) contracted marriage on July 26, 1964. [1]After the
death on December 7, 1998 of Macatangay who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) or on December 14, 1998,
his common-law wife Carmen filed a death benefit application before the SSS Lucena Branch. The SSS denied[4] her
application, it ruling that it is Macatangays wife who is his primary beneficiary.
On January 9, 1999, petitioner Sonia filed before the SSS a death benefit application.
Petitioner Sonias application for death benefit was approved on December 20, 1999. The SSS office in Quezon City filed a
petition-in-intervention in the petition filed by respondent before the SSC in Makati City.[12]
[13]

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member; Provided, That the
dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) of the benefits. [15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[19]

(Underscoring supplied)

Also, the petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto (i.e.,
position papers filed by the parties before the SSC, motion to dismiss filed by petitioner before the SSC) as required
under Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals, finding no substantial compliance by petitioners with the requirement in Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading:
Section 11. Priorities in Modes of Service and Filing Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and
other papers shall be done personally. A violation of this rule may cause to consider the paper as not filed.,
[31]

(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners posit that they complied substantially with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Sonias affidavit of service clearly shows the impracticability of personal service of copies of the petition to the
adverse parties. Sonias counsels address is Lucena City. [32] (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is meritorious.
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,[35] this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that
a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation
to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not
resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service,
exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13: [37]
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally
whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. In the
case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City.
[39]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

9.Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Azucena T Reyes GR# 159694 Jan 27, 2006
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Under the present provisions of the Tax Code and pursuant to elementary due process, taxpayers must be informed in writing
of the law and the facts upon which a tax assessment is based; otherwise, the assessment is void.
In a letter to [the CIR] dated January 27, 2000, [Reyes] proposed to pay 50% of the basic tax due, citing the heirs
inability to pay the tax assessment.
On February 19, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion to Declare Application
for the Settlement of Disputed Assessment as a Perfected Compromise.
Whether petitioners assessment
against the estate is valid.
Validity of the Assessment Against the Estate
Protesting of Assessment.
In the present case, Reyes was not informed in writing of the law and the facts on
which the assessment of estate taxes had been made.
It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary assessment
notice was issued against the estate. On April 22, 1998, the final estate tax assessment notice, as well as demand letter, was
also issued. A tax regulation is promulgated by the finance secretary to implement the provisions of the Tax Code. [15]Third,
neither Section 229 nor RR 12-85 can prevail over Section 228 of the Tax Code.
The provision on protesting an assessment has been amended. A void assessment bears no valid fruit.
Tax laws are civil in nature.

10

10. GSIS vs City of Assessor of Iloilo City, et al. GR #147192 june 27, 2006
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in the auction sales held for the satisfaction of delinquent
real property taxes. WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the Register of Deeds, City of Iloilo is hereby directed to issue a new
owners duplicate certificate of Title No. Tacas, Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines. The owners duplicate certificate of title No. It
claimed that the assessment of real property taxes on it (GSIS) was void since, under its charter (RA 8291), it was
exempt from all forms of taxes (including real property taxes on the properties held by it) that were due to the local
governments where such properties were located. Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and
Lien. xxx
xxx
xxx
In the present case, GSIS had already conveyed the properties to private persons thus making them subject to
assessment and payment of real property taxes. [10]Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The
following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
Again, in the 2004 case of Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System,[17] the Court declared that any interpretation that
gave Section 39 an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets and properties from legal processes was unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

11

11.Twin Ace Holdings Corp. vs Rufina and Company GR# 160191 June 8, 2006
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Twin Ace thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over again as containers for its products.
In producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or
permission from the latter.
Twin Ace appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 September 2002, the appellate court
rendered its decision[5] modifying the decision of the trial court as follows:
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.[6]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES AGAINST PETITIONER TWIN ACE
CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS THE ONE WHOSE RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED OR INVADED BY RESPONDENT RUFINA.
Sec. 2.
Sec. 3.
Sec. 4.
Sec. 5.
Sec. 6. The earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[15] applies to the present petition. In said case, Twin Ace filed a Complaint
for Replevin against Lorenzana Food Corporation to recover three hundred eighty thousand bottles allegedly owned by Twin
Ace but detained and used by Lorenzana Food Corporation as containers for its native products without its express
permission, in violation of the law. The Court held:
Petitioner itself alleges that respondent LORENZANA uses the subject 350 ml., 375 ml. and 750 ml. bottles as containers for
processed foods and other related products such as patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food seasonings. None of the
small-scale manufacturers of the indigenous native products protected would possibly wish to use the registered bottles if
they are vulnerable to civil suits. As stated by the court in the earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Court of
Appeals[28]:

12

12.Fransisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives GR# 160261 December 10, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
ARTICLE XI
SECTION 1. SECTION 2. SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives. 13
al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or
strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution;
and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Article 7. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment
court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial
review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
This Court held:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." To the argument that only the
House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision
and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Section 3. Rule XV
(House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

13

13. Lambino vs Comelec GR # 174153 October 25, 2006

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's
initiative. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is thatthe entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of
people's initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the
25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The Lambino Group
quotes an authority that cites a proposed changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority
the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. In the present initiative, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with
the petition. The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. The proposed Section
5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed
Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. 2. The
Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII
of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution
clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even
as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the
present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention
had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute
a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present
initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However,
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since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice."

15

14.Reynante B Orceo Vs COMELEC GR# 190779 March 26, 2010

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Further, petitioner alleges that there is no law that covers airsoft guns. SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. SEC. 35. Rules and
Regulations. Who May Bear Firearms. Moreover, R.A. No. 7166 does not mention airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations.
Hence, its implementing rules and regulations contained in Resolution No. 8714 should not include airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the definition of the term firearm.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and imitations of airsoft guns from the
term firearm is concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are hereby declared excluded from the term
firearm in Resolution No. 8714. The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from the term
firearm in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during the election period.

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15. Arturo M. de Castro Vs Judicial and Bar Council GR#'s 191002,191032,191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, GR#'s
191149,191342,19142 March 17, 2010 (consolidated cases)
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief
Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.
Clerk of Court &
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme Court en
banc?
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010, including that for
the position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010?
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. Ruling of the Court
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
Section 15. Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15,
Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. Said the Court:
Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the
President.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to
the office of Chief Justice.
With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in
an acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief
Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President
is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII,
mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. Section 9. WHEREFORE, the Court:
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May
17, 2010; and

17