would be resumed today.

Nevertheless, in order not to

prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he
is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The
defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13,
1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963,
February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964,
and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to
another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty.
Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of
the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at
8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times,
and that the government witnesses have to come all the way
from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to
the accused and to the court and the performance of his task
as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and
that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and
requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since
the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less
than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He
ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers,
especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed
counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such
belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal
of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why
a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so
designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found
in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that
membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up
to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or
a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may
be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his
services are rendered without remuneration should not
occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is
not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do
compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend
to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance
since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to
neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent
upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles
Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion
penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should
exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous
performance of their official duties, especially when negligence
in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays
in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez
in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It
is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that
as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused
as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as
in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care.
He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant
expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the

bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social

conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it
was only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of
mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the
welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel
could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was
rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v.
Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if
it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and;
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney
of
his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The
present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to
reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of
the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration
could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of
enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly.
He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar.
Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an
exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed,
considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner
would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense
counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession
in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs
against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

In Re Farmer: 3
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

xxx xxx xxx

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND

OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.

This "upright character" prescribed by the

statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to
practice law in North Carolina, and of which
he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the
applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his
fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself,
not in negatives nor in following the line
of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr.
A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical
injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of
university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his coaccused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution
and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea
was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application
for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a
Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In
this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and
his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14
August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not,
however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to
allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him
to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago
had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated
11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for
more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since
then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we
regard as having persuasive effect:

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this
requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties
of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate
effect,
to
every
man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to
his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with is
client's property, reputation, his life, his
all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists
nowhere greater temptations to deviate from
the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard
therefore
becomes
clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as
an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral
standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised
as to the moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the
bar. The
evil
must, if
possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been

admitted, and has pursued his profession,

and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.

admit no person to the

practice of the law unless
he covered an upright
moral
character. The
possession of this by the
attorney
is
more
important, if
anything, to
the public and to the
proper administration of
justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be
acquired in after years,
but if the applicant passes
the threshold of the bar
with a bad moral character
the chances are that his
character
will
remain
bad, and that he will
become
a
disgrace
instead of an ornament to
his great calling a curse
instead of a benefit to his
community a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap,
instead of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin. 9

In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the
inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right
to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It
is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain
it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to
test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, and a fair private
and professional character is one of them; to
refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of
fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their
learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court in the trial
of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral
character, so that the agents and officers of
the court, which they are, may not bring
discredit upon the due administration of the
law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not
such qualifications in the first instance, or
who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear
in courts to aid in the administration of
justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral
character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E.
635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our
state has always been to

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired

into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader
than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an
attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a
disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon
application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of
good moral character unless it appears that
he has been guilty of acts which would be
cause for his disbarment or suspension,
could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a
disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show
the applicant's character as respects
honesty,
integrity,
and
general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt
of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity
be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession
is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The
growth of such a perception would signal the progressive
destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and
in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities

certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the
part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his
co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect
the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial
court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's
oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino
for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment
of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he
is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court,
by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

Footnotes

Take the 1993 Bar Examinations," stated on

page 2 thereof:
"The
Court
further
Resolved to ALLOW the
following
candidates
with dismissed charges or
complaints, to take the
1993 Bar Examinations:

xxx xxx xxx

3349. Al C. Argosino

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, applicant Argosino had been
convicted and sentenced and then paroled.
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ
& CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R.
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR.,
ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL
A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG,
ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO,
DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO,
BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE
MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS
ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the
surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5,
1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1 There is some indication that clerical error

attended the grant of permission to take the
1993
Bar
Examinations.
The En
Banc Resolution of this Court dated 24
August 1993 entitled "Re: Applications to

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from

continuing its business under a firm name which includes the
name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil

Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the

last paragraph that: t.hqw
The use by the person or partnership
continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as
part thereof, shall not of itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and
engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm
names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of
accountancy a profession requiring the same degree of trust
and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the
relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade
name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy
that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals
of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner,
at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics
of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by
the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the
firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a
deceased
or
former
partner
when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this
use. ... 4

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an

incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of
Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins
& Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before
acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957,
stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of
Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law
firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the
same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins &
Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given
by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the
name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the
policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy
A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including
in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes
that, in view of the personal and confidential
nature of the relations between attorney and
client, and the high standards demanded in
the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from
their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus
far enunciated by the Court.

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because

the deaths of their respective deceased partners were wellpublicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several
days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective
deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners
will notify all leading national and international law directories
of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings

thus laid down.

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased

partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no
custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater
Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate

under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the
partners.

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm

name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by
U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession
of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under
consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu
(the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm
name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter
was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from
including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston,
who has long been dead."

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and

Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes"
are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the
names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of
the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw

Those who, not being members of the

partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm
name of a partnership must either be those of living partners
and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who
can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil
Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the
firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The
heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable
as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where
they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of

Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to

the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage,
either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the
recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part
of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs
can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing,
there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to
allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages
in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from
scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil
Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is
that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled
"Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with
the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership,
of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues
the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates
therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership
with
a
good
will
to
protect
rather
than
of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.
hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of
a commercial partnership the succeeding
partners or parties have the right to carry on
the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince
the name of a commercial partnership is a
partnership asset inseparable from the good
will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation
of which depends or; the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to
be distributed as a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable
such skill and reputation may be, especially
where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an
asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to

partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For
one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of
a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy. 10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a
legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding
property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or
trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different
standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to
business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published
contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as
"a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service,
no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the
legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without
making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree
fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their
petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the

continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in
the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.

approval of other attorneys, bar associations

and the courts. The Appellate Division of the
First Department has considered the matter
and reached The conclusion that such
practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis
supplied)

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local

custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or
former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships.
Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in
this country would show how their firm names have evolved
and changed from time to time as the composition of the
partnership changed. t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

The continued use of a firm name after the

death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active
members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under
the working of the Canon, as to the propriety
of adding the name of a new partner and at
the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the
new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp.
207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of
legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed
the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm
name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is
sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al.
quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court
sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if
none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did
not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was
adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the
sanction of custom and offends no statutory
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York
State Bar Association provides in part as
follows: "The continued use of the name of a
deceased
or
former
partner,
when
permissible by local custom is not unethical,
but care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this
use." There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the
names of deceased members with the

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal

Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between
the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that
sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of
conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We
find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein.
Merely because something is done as a matter of practice
does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes
of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement
statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not
so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in
the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing
lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if
proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which
clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of
any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order
or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the
administration of justice and should not be considered like an
ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is
practiced in a spirit of public service. A
trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a
profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide
free opportunity, we think of free competitive
self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely
competing with their fellows in their calling in
order each to acquire as much of the world's
good as he may within the allowed him by
law. But the member of a profession does
not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his
services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the
farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be
no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians'
strike. The best service of the professional

man is often rendered for no equivalent or for

a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do
what he does in a way worthy of his
profession even if done with no expectation
of reward, This spirit of public service in
which the profession of law is and ought to
be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law.
The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned
art have their justification in that they secure
and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms
in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and
petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA"
from their respective firm names. Those names may, however,
be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners
in their firms indicating the years during which they served as
such.
SO ORDERED.
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections
be
declared
null
and
void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec
violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C,
that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,

having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years.
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The
term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates."
Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, et. al.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Ponente: PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, Cayetano as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent

appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on

Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years.
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having
hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two
years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked
with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In
the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman
of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which
he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.
HELD:
Yes. Monsod was engaged in the practice of law.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
Practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law
covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of
the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for

over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons

practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the
public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed,
for has been clearly shown.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

FACTS: The petitioner contends that the advertisements
reproduced by the respondents are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession,
he is ashamed and offended by the following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering
of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE:Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the
Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and whether the
same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility

RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in

the term practice of law as defined in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance
of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another or to
render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The
Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR,
had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of
the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance the lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the
rule prohibiting the advertisement of a lawyers services.
However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of
the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found
and held that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondents
defense with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when
there is an exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly
or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in
any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state.
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the
same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Ulep v The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553
Ponente: J. Regalado
Date: June 17, 1993
Petitioners: MAURICIO C. ULEP
Respondents: THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:

Ulep, a member of the bar, filed a petition against the

Legal Clinic because its advertisements are unethical,

demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that as a member of the bar,
he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements.

The advertisement of the Legal Clinic includes secret

marriage and divorce among others.

In an article published in the Starweek (Philippine Star)

entitled Rx for Legal Problems, Atty. Rogelio Nogales,
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, explained the main
purpose, structure, and operations of the said
corporation.

In response, The Legal Clinic admits the fact of

publication of the advertisement but claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
legal support services through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines.
Position paper of IBP:
> The use of the name The Legal Clinic Inc gives the
impression that it is being operated by lawyers and that
it renders legal services. There is no difference
between legal support services and legal services.
> The advertisements in questions are meant to induce
the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy. This is against Rule 1.02 which
states that, a laywer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
ISSUE1:
Whether or not the services offered by The Legal Clinic
constitutes practice of law -- YES
HELD/RATIO1:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. Generally, to practice law is to give
advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill.
In practice, a lawyer engages in three principal types of
professional activity:
(1) legal advise and instructions to clients to inform them of
their rights and obligations
(2) preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of
legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman
(3) appearance for clients before the public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty,
and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law
Applying the criteria, the activities of The Legal Clinic constitute
practice of law. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it
will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisement represents and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the definition of practice of law.
ISSUE2:
Whether or not their services can properly be the subject of the
advertisements -- NO

HELD/RATIO2:
The standard of legal profession condemn the lawyers
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The canon
of the profession states that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for profession capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Court resolved to RESTRAIN AND ENJOIN The Legal
Clinic Inc from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation, or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics.
Atty. Rogelio Nogales, as a member of the Philippine Bar, is
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.
The question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose for
which the Legal Clinic was created was not decided upon by
the Court. They are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter since it is clearly not within the adjucative parameters of
the present proceedings which is administrative in nature.

same impostors. The loan was left unpaid resulting in

a extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.

January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing

ASB that the mortgage was without their authority. He
also requested the sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the
auction. Both parties refused.

The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of

deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction

RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing a Certificate

of Sheriffs Sale and annulled the mortgage

CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for coming to

the bank with Maosca and letting himself be introduced
as Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of
last
clear
chance

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED

DOCTRINE:
DEFINITION:
NOTES:
Not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed (brief biographical and informative data)
and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions
(use of professional card).

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

Laws
Applicable: Article
1173

Canlas vs CA
FACTS:

August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a

Special Power of Attorney authorizing Vicente Maosca to
mortgage 2 parcels of land situated in BF Homes
Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas.
Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the
lands to Maosca for P850K, P500K payable within 1
week, and the balance serves as his investment in the
business. Maosca issued 2 checks P40K and P460K.
The P460K lacked sufficient funds.
September 3, 1982: Maosca mortgage to Atty.
Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with the
help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
Spouses Canlas.
September 29, 1982: Maosca was granted a loan by
the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) for P500K with
the parcels of land as security and with the help of the

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor

consist in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply
The degree of diligence required of banks is more
than that of a good father of a family
not even a single identification card was
exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity
acted simply on the basis of the residence
certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the
signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to Atty.
Magno
previous deed of mortgage did not
bear the tax account number of the spouses as well as the
Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas
doctrine of last clear chance
where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do
so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom
the antecedent negligence of a person does
not preclude recovery of damagescaused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence
Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was
negligent in giving Vicente Maosca the opportunity to
perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting him the owner's copy of
the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land
Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the
simple expedient of faithfully complying with
the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the
persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss
Canlas went to ASB with Maosca and he was
introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't correct Maosca.
However, he did not know that the lots were being used
as a security for he was there to make sure that Maosca
pays his debt so he cannot be estopped from assailing the
validity of the mortgage
But being negligent in believing the misrepresentation
by Maosca that he had other lots and that the lot were

not to be used as a security, Canlas was negligent and

undeserving of Attorney's fees.
the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into
and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves
as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas =
complete nullity

OSMUNDO S. CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ASB, MAXIMO C.
CONTRERAS and VICENTE MAOSCA, respondents.GR
RD
112160 Feb 28, 2000 3
DIV PURISIMA- Osmundo S.
Canlas, and private respondent, Vicente Maosca, decided to
venture in business and to raise the capital needed. The former
then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the
latter to mortgage two parcels of land, each lot with semiconcrete residential house, covered by TCT in Osmundo's
name and TCT in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas.
- Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said
parcels of land to Vicente Manosca, for and in consideration of
P850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which payable within one week,
and the balance of P350,000.00 to serve as Osmundo's
investment in the business. Thus, Osmundo Canlas delivered
to Vicente Maosca the TCT of the parcels of land involved.
Vicente Maosca, as his part of the transaction, issued two
postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts
of P40,000.00 and P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out
that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently
funded.
- Vicente Maosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of
land for P100,000.00 to a certain Attorney Manuel Magno, with
the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
spouses, Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas.- Vicente
Maosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings
Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00, with the use of
subject parcels of land as security, and with the involvement of
the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the
Canlas spouses. When the loan it extended was not paid,
respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged.
- Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent
bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two
parcels of land in question was without their (spouses)
authority, and request that steps be taken to annul and/or
revoke the questioned mortgage. Osmundo Canlas also wrote
the office of Sheriff Maximo C. Contreras, asking that the
auction sale be cancelled or held in abeyance. But
respondents Maximo C. Contreras and ASB refused to heed
petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the auction. Consequently, petitioners instituted the present case for
annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; RTC issued an
Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the
corresponding Certificate of Sheriffs Sale.
- Vicente Maosca was declared in default.- RTC annulled
subject deed of mortgage. CA REVERSED Set-aside complaint
and order spouses to pay moral and exemplary.HELD - The
Petition is impressed with merit.- Article 1173 NCC degree of
diligence required.- The degree of diligence required of banks
is more than that of a good father of a family; in keeping with
their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and
prudence in dealing even on a register or titled property.Respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in
ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who
introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and
Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a single ID

was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity;

and yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the
basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which
tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of
mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcels
of land in question. Felizado Mangubat, Assistant Vice
President of ASB, in testimony: only signature on the
mortgage, TAX Account Number, Residence Certificate
appearing on the previous loan executed by the spouses
CANLAS, mortgage to ATTY. MAGNO. We requested for
others but they could not produce, and because they presented
to us the Residence Certificate which matches on the signature
on the Residence Certificate in favor of Atty. Magno."- The
efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple
posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of
the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the
diligence of a good father of a family. The negligence of
respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous
deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking
the genuineness of the signatures of the suppose Canlas
spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses,
as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas.
But such fact notwithstanding, the bank did not require the
impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity.Doctrine of last clear chance - applicable here - the
respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the
doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than
that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is
that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of
the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
- Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving
Vicente Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by
entrusting to latter the owner's copy of the transfer certificates
of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the
bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by the
simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements
for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting
with them.
- For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking
institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest,
respondent ASB has to bear the loss sued upon.- CA
concluded that the petitioner Osmundo Canlas was a party to
the fraudulent scheme of Maosca and therefore, estopped
from impugning the validity of subject deed of mortgage.
- A meticulous and painstaking scrutiny of the Records on
hand, reveals, however, that the findings arrived at by CA are
barren of any sustainable basis. For instance, the execution of
the deeds of mortgages constituted by Maosca on subject
pieces of property of petitioners were made possible not by the
Special Power of Attorney executed by Osmundo Canlas in
favor of Maosca but through the use of impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the spouses Angelina Canlas
and Osmundo Canlas. It cannot be said therefore, that the
petitioners authorized Vicente Maosca to constitute the
mortgage on their parcels of land.

- What is more, Osmundo Canlas was introduced as "Leonardo

Rey" by Vicente Maosca, only on the occasion of the
luncheon meeting at the Metropolitan Club. The failure of
Osmundo Canlas to rectify Maosca's misrepresentations
could not be taken as a fraudulent act. As well explained by the
former, he just did not want to embarrass Maosca, so that he
waited for the end of the meeting to correct Maosca. Osmundo Canlas recounted that during the said luncheon
meeting, they did not talk about the security or collateral for the
loan of Maosca with ASB. So also, Mrs. Josefina Rojo, who
was the Account Officer of ASB when Maosca applied for
subject loan, corroborated the testimony of Osmundo Canlas,
- Verily, Osmundo Canlas was left unaware of the illicit plan of
Maosca, explaining thus why Osmundo did not bother to
correct what Maosca misrepresented and to assert ownership
over the two parcels of land in question.- Not only that; while it
is true that Osmundo Canlas was with Vicente Maosca when
the latter submitted the documents needed for his loan
application, and when the check of P200,000.000 was
released, the former did not know that the collateral used by
Maosca for the said loan were their (Canlas spouses)
properties. Osmundo happened to be with Maosca at the time
because he wanted to make sure that Maosca would make
good his promise to pay the balance of the purchase price of
the said lots out of the proceeds of the loan.
- The receipt by Osmundo Canlas of the P200,000.00 check
from ASB could not estop him from assailing the validity of the
mortgage because the said amount was in payment of the
parcels of land he sold to Maosca.- What is decisively clear
on record is that Maosca managed to keep Osmundo Canlas
uninformed of Maosca's intention to use the parcels of land of
the Canlas spouses as security for the loan obtained from ASB.
Since Vicente Maosca showed Osmundo Canlas several
certificates of title of lots which, according to Maosca were the
collaterals, Osmundo Canlas was confident that the Canlases
parcels of land were not involved in the loan transaction with
the ASB. Under the attendant facts and circumstances,
Osmundo Canlas was undoubtedly negligent, which
negligence made them (petitioners) undeserving of an award of
Attorneys fees.
- Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be
constituted only by the absolute owner on the property
mortgaged; a mortgage, constituted by an impostor is void.
Considering that it was established indubitably that the contract
of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the
ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of
mortgage is a complete nullity.
- WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of
CA SET ASIDE. The Decision of RTC Makati REINSTATED
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,
Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.

Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of

the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith,
a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15,
1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying
you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered
into between me and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that
my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid
sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite
acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the
bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual
rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract
**. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the
need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of
Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the
post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above
the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also
wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa &
Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary
deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby
annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract'
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of

confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds

between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the
real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some
detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the
NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3,
1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he
insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was
allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the
scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to
the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and
** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD
26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;"
and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as
"unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without
"even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic)
** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the
complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk
of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by
Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which
he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an

explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not

to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion
that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between
Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in
much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in
order that he might comment thereon. [6] He stated that his acts
as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of
June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of
the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus
transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with
the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD
26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person,
an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);
[8]
and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with
the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those
letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this
had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.
[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the

assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-atlaw," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what
he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his
trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would
show the completed document to him later for correction, but
she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and
follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject
of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa &
Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the
next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also
claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as
those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he
ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done

without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and
baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to
the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters
to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated
December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary
M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid
letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent"
who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the
contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against
** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these
statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and
doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." [17] More than
once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved
in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the
most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good

morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights
of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however
sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya
is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing,
or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His
radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this
Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar,
and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor"
or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar
to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not,
is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of
the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

ALAWI VS ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sale representative of E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. of Davao City. Ashari Alauya is the

incumber executive of clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a

District in Marawi City. It appears that through Alawi's agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December
15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with
the company.
Ruling:
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court
has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.
2. WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
hereby REPRIMANDED for
the
use
of
excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of
attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety
or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for

admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines
that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has
none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law
in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath
to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of
the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules
of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any
breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and
clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

CORONA, J.:
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free
medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus,
this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar
Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person

heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice
law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules
of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be
a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He
must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such
as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the
lawyers oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving

from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to

practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in
good standing is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.14

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay

is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to
the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in
the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never
to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:

(Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza

Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations through
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9,
2010)

Amending Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,

the Supreme Court now allows Filipino graduates of foreign law
schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to certain conditions.
Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted
to the examination, all applicants for admission to the bar shall
satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all
the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or
its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially
recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper
authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been
granted.
Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen who
graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the
bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of
certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to
the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b)
recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper
authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the
Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly
recognized by the Philippine Government.

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual

membership dues in the IBP;

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her

degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a foreign law
school must also present proof of completion of a separate
bachelors degree

(b) the payment of professional tax;

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of

mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not

only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew
his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing
as a member of the Philippine bar.

Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canadas free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he

took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the

Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership
in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in
the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass

oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant)
filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to
the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001
at
the
Philippine
International
Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not
sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to
now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized
practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with
the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On
the
charge
of
grave
misconduct
and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting
as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
(Bunan)
without
the
latter
engaging
respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading
as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice
mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the
legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among
those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought

his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the
law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer
or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on
11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date.
He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by ViceMayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant
is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for

mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the

complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent
that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend
specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19
May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition
for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before
the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise
found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The
OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC
also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is
a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC
therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to
the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed
to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC
that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent
took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily EstiponaHao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty.
Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as
the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the
lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of
law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, [1] the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of
law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law
when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence
clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably

strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a fullfledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means

termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No.
9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the
practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a
person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines
must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court
for the practice of law, the OBC required, and incompliance
thereof, petitioner submitted the following:

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the

Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11
May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] ViceMayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11
May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the
IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE.

On
the
charge
of
grave
misconduct
and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before
the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to
practice law.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his

compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that
the petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED

admission to the Philippine Bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is

hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall retake the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends

that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

SO ORDERED.
BM 2112

On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the

Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a American citizen in
1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in Washington,
D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to
resume the practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks
twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been
rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez

(Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking
the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine
Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not
disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal
Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident
which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in
front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing
the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been
using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement
letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and
appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3,
2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose
the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised
him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in
good faith that the case would be settled because the said
Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving
the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do
not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that
some of his communications really contained the word Attorney
as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8,
2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge
nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the
same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this
case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person

really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against
him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall
be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had
this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his
letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that
he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why
he signed as attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the
practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as
Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled
thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a
person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be
allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the
Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of
the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the
Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a
member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be
acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia
Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.[8] The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the
application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any
act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a
fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or
accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case
or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by
the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment,
done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to

determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are
pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3)
pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of
the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia
Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing
fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to
discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by
members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of
the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk
of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used
the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with
the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private
capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before
Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an attorney.The title attorney is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the
court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to
be part of service therein, from the highest official to the
lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,
but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the
public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the
fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and
unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it
seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly,
the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia
Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court,
the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of
the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the
Sharia Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER
RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL
(BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who
appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule
(Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar
during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court
Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil
Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T.
Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11
was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the
Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona
conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the
plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a
supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the
appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the
latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On
December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued
an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said
Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a
Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty.
Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr.
Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before
the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its
Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of
allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly
accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound
discretion of the court after having made at least one
supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law
student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule
138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.

The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less

than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the
hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale
behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no
miscarriage of justice as a result of
incompetence or inexperience of
law students, who, not having as
yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not
fully equipped to act a counsels on
their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which
the accredited law school clinic may
be able to protect itself from any
potential vicarious liability arising
from some culpable action by their
law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the
fundamental principle that no
person is allowed to practice a
particular
profession
without
possessing
the
qualifications,
particularly a license, as required by
law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the
discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that
the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct
control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must
be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal
work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested
qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary
control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove
like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past,
our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party
litigants in places where duly authorized members of
the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil.
539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal
courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or
capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a
lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the
interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in
regional trial courts and higher courts is more
stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule.
Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student
appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised
by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before
an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively
simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section
34 Rule 138 provides;

Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the

court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member
of the bar.
There is nothing wrong with the title of this post, because nonlawyers are, in limited instances, explicitly allowed to practice
law:
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to the Bar), Section 34. By
whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Rule 138, Section 34 was described by the Supreme Court
in Maderada v. Mediodea (2003) as follows:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may
personally do everything during its progress from its
commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as
their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute
and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not
practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
And so Rule 138, Section 34 is not an unbridled license to
wannabe-lawyers who want to try their luck in court. Since they
will be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure
as those qualified to practice law, they cannot complain of
denial of due process or miscarriage of justice if the case is
decided against them.
Moreover, the rule applies to a party who wants to conduct his
litigation in person or with the aid of an agent or friend, and so
the said party must be a real party in interest or have legal
standing: he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Rule 3,
Section 2, Rules of Court; Baltazar v. Ombudsman [2006]).
In Maderada v. Mediodea, the Court also took pains to
distinguish a non-lawyers appearing in court for himself, and
his appearing in court for someone else:
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had
appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for
which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of
someone else. The raison detre for allowing litigants to
represent themselves in court will not apply when a person is
already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she

was already defending the rights of another person when she

appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that
complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights
may be interrelated will not give complainant authority to
appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her

co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be

impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for
the latter without permission from this Court.