A.C.

38640
JORDAN M

SUPREME COURT

V.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

DARRIC M

PETITION TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR CERTIFICATION

FOR REVIEW FROM THE APPELLATE COURT
Pursuant to Section 84-1 of the Practice Book, the plaintiff petitions the Supreme
Court for certification to appeal from the final determination of this appeal in the
Appellate Court reported in 168 Conn. App. 314 (2016), for the reasons set forth below:
1.

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:

2.

STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION

3.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

Darric M, the appellant in this matter, is the biological father of Jordan M, who

was two and one-half years old at the time of the trial court proceedings below. The
biological mother is Heather S., a nineteen year old. Darric was eighteen years old at
the time of birth of the minor child and was in high school. Because he was still in high
school and not yet employed, he contributed as he could to the support of the child with
assistance from his family. Darric completed high school, then went on to college at
Central Connecticut State University and later transferred to Western Connecticut State
University. When he could he provided financial support to the mother for the support of
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Jordan M. including a crib, a car seat, diapers, clothes, whatever was needed for him.
At some point Heather became estranged from Darric and the Department of
Children & Families (hereafter referred to as DCF) filed a neglect petition against her.
Darric was never charged with neglect by DCF and complied with everything that they
requested of him. Heather left Connecticut with Jordan and another child that she had
by a different father and went to live in South Carolina with her family.

During the

summer of 2015 Darric learned that his maternal aunt, Eleanor McClain, had obtained
custody of the Jordan and brought him back to Connecticut.
Unknown to Darric, Heather reached an agreement with McClain to surrender
temporary custody of her two children. The purpose of the agreement for temporary
custody was so that McClain could assist Heather with financial care and support for the
children.

She was to live with McClain and be able to see her children whenever she

wanted. However, on an occasion when Heather remained at the McClain home while
that family went on vacation, when she attempted to return to the home, the locks had
been changed and she was denied the right of access to her two children.

Someone,

presumably McClain signed Heathers signature to a document that was filed with the
probate court that purported to be her agreement to a transfer of guardianship to
McClain.

Testimony was presented from a handwriting expert that confirmed her

testimony that the signature on this document was not that of Heather. Darric was
never consulted by the mother of his child regarding whether he wished to surrender
custody or guardianship of Jordan to his aunt.
When Darric learned that his aunt had custody of the child and that Heather was
not living in the home, he filed an ex parte order seeking custody of the child.
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For

some three weeks after August 7, 2015 Darric had custody of his son.

Multiple

restraining orders were then filed and the custody of Jordan went between Darric,
Heather, and McClain. On August 21, 2015 custody of Jordan was given by the
court to McClain, the maternal aunt. Multiple hearing dates were held resulting in the
trial court granting a restraining order against Darric and Heather providing for no
contact between them and their child for a one year period (i.e. until September 15,
2016). McClain was granted custody of Jordan on September 15. Darric has had
no contact with his child since September 15, 2015. At the time of the trial court
consideration of this matter, Heather was residing with Darric, and his brother and
sister-in-law in their home. They had been given the assurance that they could
reside there as long as necessary.

After the denial of Appellants motion for

articulation and a motion for reconsideration, this appeal was then filed. The trial
court made no finding of abuse, neglect or the lack of proper, care custody or
control. The only fault found by the trial court was that it was not convinced that
either one or the combination of both is the right fit yet and Im going to need some
input.
The trial court refused to provide any articulation of its custody decision but did
take pains to point out that there were multiple restraining orders with varying docket
numbers. Because of an alleged mistake in the correct docket number, the trial
court claimed and the appellate court accepted the argument that Plaintiff had not
appealed the custody order but only the restraining order.

Indeed, at the oral

argument before the appellate court, some 25 of the 30 minutes of the unopposed
appeal was spent with questions from the court about the docket number rather than

the merits of Plaintiffs claim that he had been denied the fundamental right to the
custody of his son.
Even as of the date of this filing Plaintiff continues to be denied the right of a
hearing regarding the continued deprivation of his rights.

This court may take

judicial notice of the fact that on September 13, 2016 a habeas corpus action was
filed in the proper jurisdiction where the child has resided for the last twelve months
(i.e. Bridgeport) in Myers v. McClain FBT-FA16-4052637.

It was not until 14 days

later that the trial court in Bridgeport took action (backdated to September 13)
claiming a judgment without trial. Even as of the date of this filing Plaintiff has
received no notice from the court of this judgment without trial and the reasons
therefore. Indeed, the alleged judgment without trial would not have been known
except for a perusal of the judicial website. [See at Appendix B Plaintiffs motion for
clarification, filed on September 23]
4.

ARGUMENT
A. There Was Only One Cause of Action Regarding Jordan M
A red herring was thrown into this matter by the trial court, and improperly

accepted by the appellate court, because there was only one cause of action involving
Jordan M. The definition of a cause of action has consistently been interpreted broadly
by the courts, focusing upon the single set of facts that brings about the injury without
regard to the intent of the parties respecting those facts. Our appellate court has held
that in determining the nature of a cause of action, we have long looked to the group of
facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff ... and

have noted that [e]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several
different kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action. Lighthouse Landings, Inc. v.
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 300 Conn. 325, 34849, 15 A.3d 601 (2011). Compare
Gallo v. G. Fox & Co., 148 Conn. 327, 330 (1961); Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Pearson,
139 Conn. 186, 197 (1952); Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 131 Conn. App.
99, (2011).

Although there were multiple and sometimes confusing actions taken by

various parties, they all arose from one cause of action over the care, custody and
control of Jordan M. Plaintiffs entire brief was a challenge to the deprivation of his right
to the custody of his minor son.

Even the appellate court acknowledged that the

record was confusing regarding the so-called custody case and the restraining order
case.

B.

The Amended Appeal Cured Any Misunderstanding Regarding the

Issues Raised on Appeal

Although Appellants brief clearly and distinctly raised the issue of custody, even if one
looks at the technical question of what docket number was involved, it is clear that this
defect was cred. On May 23, prior to the decision in this matter being heard by the
panel, Appellant amended the complaint to include the docket number of the so-called
custody case to the docket number of the restraining order case. The entire transcript
of the hearing in the docket number assigned to the custody case was made an
appendix to Plaintiffs brief. Thus, the appellate court had before it the entirety of the
evidence upon which custody was taken from Plaintiff and given to the maternal aunt.
The fact that the trial court refused to provide an articulation of the reasons for the
custody decision should not have been a basis for the appellate court refusal to decide
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the real issue in this cause of action. That issue is whether Plaintiff may have his child
taken away because the trial court believed he was not a good fit yet.
B.

Vacating the Restraining Order was an Anemic Response to the

Grave Harm to Plaintiff and his Son

The court correctly determined that the trial court had no sufficient cause for
restraining Plaintiff from any contact with his son for the past twelve months. However,
the court failed to do justice when it accepted the red herring that Plaintiff had not
appealed the custody determination. Unquestionably the removal of a very young child
from their biological parent implicates a fundamental right, perhaps one of the oldest of
fundamental rights recognized by our courts. The order of the trial court tore away at
the very fabric of this family unit when it determined that Darric, and Heather, were not
the right fit for rearing their child.

Darric has been unable to witness various

milestones in the life of his son, watching him engage in certain actions, hearing him
speak words. Perhaps we will never know the damage that may have been done to this
small child in the environment where he has been placed without any prior investigation.
The trial courts actions, constituting harmful error, have been compounded by the
appellate court.

AS the court said in Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (1985), the

fundamental right of a parent may be disturbed only upon compelling circumstances,

not merely a decision that another home may be better for the child. See also
Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn 336, 344 (1996); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629,
639 (1968); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S.
205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972)]; Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U. S. 390- 399-401 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166
(1944).
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It is outrageous for the trial court to have determined that Darric M was not the
right fit to rear his own child particularly when there was no DCF claim of child abuse
or neglect, no criminal activity by him, just a young father who had temporarily had to
suspend his basketball scholarship to Penn State. He should not have been derided as
the trial court did for aspiring to obtain his college degree and complete his higher
education so that he can know more stuff and make a healthy living for [his] son.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition for certification should be granted as
to the issue presented.

The Petitioner,
By:___________________________
Josephine S. Miller, JURIS #422896
152 Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302
Danbury, CT 06810
Tel: (203) 512-2795
Fax: (203) &02-5188
Email: jmillerlaw@sbcglobal.net

CERTIFICATION
The undersigned attorney hereby certifies, pursuant to Connecticut Rule of
Appellate procedure 67-2, that on September 28, 2016
The electronically submitted petition and appendix were delivered electronically
to the last known e-mail address of each counsel of record for whom an e-mail address
was provided; and
The electronically submitted petition and appendix has been redacted or do not
contain any names or other personal identifying information that is prohibited from
disclosure by rule, statute, court order, or case law; and
A copy of the petition and appendix was sent to each counsel of record and to
any trial judge who rendered a decision that is the subject matter of the appeal, in
compliance with Section 62-7; and
The brief and appendix filed with the appellate clerk are true copies of the brief
and appendix that were submitted electronically; and
The brief complies with all provisions of this rule.

Honorable Jane B Emons

Superior Court
235 Church Street
New Haven, CT 06511

Jordan M
c/o Eleanor McClain
P O Box 884
Bridgeport, CT

Eleanor McClain
P O Box 884
Bridgeport, CT

Darric Myers
19 Manilla Road
Woodbridge, CT

____________________________
Josephine S. Miller