No Democracy Yet in Thailand

David Kampf | March 2, 2007

Editor: John Feffer, IRC
Foreign Policy In Focus

In mid-September 2006, a bloodless "democratic coup"

swept through
Thailand, the region's darling of democracy. Military leaders
justified
their actions as a purely temporary means to wrest the
country back
from a power-hungry tycoon and restore the functions of
government.
Last month, the military government officially lifted martial
law in
Bangkok, the nation's capital. Restrictions, however, remain
along the
borders and in the strongholds of the former leader, Thaksin
Shinawatra. Five months after the coup, democracy is still
not around
the corner. Nor has Thaksin, the man the military sought to
marginalize, disappeared entirely from the scene. The
restoration of
Thai democracy depends on the military and monarch's
willingness to
cede power to true civilian leaders. As time passes there are
more and
more reasons to doubt the junta's true intentions and their
ability to
improve Thailand's government.

The Coup
The military coup was in many ways unexpected. From the
outside,
Thailand appeared to have the potential to become a healthy
and stable
democracy. The country had not experienced a coup since
1991. Its
progressive constitution, adopted in 1997, garnered praise
both at home
and abroad. Political stability seemed to be assured by the
way
Thailand weathered the Asian financial crisis of the late
1990s.
Thaksin Shinawatra, one of the most popular politicians the
country
had ever seen, built his base of support by providing cheaper
healthcare and financial assistance to the often-marginalized
rural
population. Opponents, however, grew increasingly angry as
he funneled
money to the countryside. Those in Bangkok who saw him as
nothing more
than a corrupt populist labeled his policies "vote-buying." His
critics
had a point. Thaksin was also consolidating power and using
his
influence to solidify his own finances. His mishandling of the
Muslim
insurgency in the south was a fiasco with no foreseeable
end. He was
attempting to gain a foothold in the courts, the media, and
most
recently the military. As a result, Thailand's democracy was
becoming
increasingly authoritarian.
It was not only the pervasive corruption that tarnished
Thailand's
democratic record. The revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej
weakened
Thailand's democrats and limited their ability to represent
their
constituents. This powerful and respected monarch, who
lurked behind
democratic institutions, did little to ensure their
accountability. In
a review of Paul M. Handley's The King Never Smiles,
a banned book in Thailand, Ian Buruma suggests that the
"King remains
the ultimate arbiter of power" and citizens expect "that in a
crisis it
is the King, and not his government, who comes to the
people's rescue."
Thaksin did not have a good relationship with the King, so
his reign
was arguably doomed from the beginning.
Tensions finally boiled over last year. Thaksin's family
unwisely
sold a major stake in a telecommunications firm, tax-free, to
a company
in Singapore. This unleashed the force of "people power" in
the
nation's capital. Energized and united, Thaksin's opponents
wanted to
force him from office even though they had no hope of
winning an
election.
Relying on "people power" because a group doesn't have the
votes on
election day is not the loyal opposition needed in a
successful
democracy. With all his faults - and there were many -
Thaksin was
still a democratically elected leader whose party was nearly
assured of
winning the next election. The urban and wealthy
constituents needed to
debate the policies in the political arena of a stable
democratic
system.
Instead, the massive street protests, because they didn't
force
Thaksin from power, only paved the way for the army. The
military might
of tanks and weapons enabled the junta to grasp control.
Even though it
was a peaceful military takeover, the event set a dangerous
precedent
in a country that was formerly notorious for coups.
Immediately following the coup, the United States and
Europe issued
strong rebukes calling for the speedy restoration of
democracy. The
United States suspended $24 million in military aid, and the
military
struggled to obtain international approval for its actions.
Despite
international condemnation, however, sustained criticism
has been
muted, and Thailand has avoided crippling isolation.

Thaksin's Influence
There was a strong expectation that the new military
leadership in
Thailand would file corruption charges against Thaksin and
his cronies.
But concrete accusations have not been forthcoming (though
are expected
in the near future). Thaksin has assured the international
community
that he does not intend to reenter politics or regain power.
But his
stops in Asia have raised fears that he is plotting a return.
Thaksin's travels have in turn complicated Thailand's
relations with
its neighbors. In January 2007, for instance, Singapore
welcomed
Thaksin to the country in a move that suggested support for
the former
Thai leader. Bangkok swiftly severed high-level diplomatic
contacts
with its neighbor and former ally.
The coup not only transformed relations but also damaged
democracy
throughout southeast Asia by lending greater legitimacy to
other
authoritarian regimes. There has been less of an incentive
for
countries such as Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam to open their
societies
and respect civil liberties. If democracy cannot function in
Thailand,
other countries are not likely to be eager to embrace similar
political
reforms.

Life After the Coup

While some claim that the imposition of martial law has been
virtually unnoticeable to the majority of citizens and there
has been
no overt repression, other problems have continued
unabated. Freedom
House, an organization researching and measuring political
freedom
throughout the world, acknowledged the regression of
democratic
freedoms under Thaksin. But the organization argues in its
most recent
ratings that despite Thaksin's style of governance, "Thailand
had
represented an important gain for democracy in Asia, and
the coup
caused its political rights rating to decline to the lowest
possible
for the survey."
In addition to its two-month delay in lifting martial law (the
government was waiting for royal approval), the military has
resorted
to various means to hold on to power. The military maintains
control
over who will draft the new constitution, which possibly
ensures its
retention of influence). It eliminated the judiciary's
independence and
censors the media. Coverage of Thaksin has been banned in
the local
press, and an interview he gave to CNN in January was
blocked.
On the economic front, the interim government's handling
and
bungling of the economy is exemplified by two decisions. In
December,
the stock market experienced a sharp15% drop when the
government
unwisely tried to impose capital controls to curb currency
speculation.
More recently, the stock market fell again when leaders
limited foreign
ownership of companies in Thailand invoking nationalism as
a
justification. These measures and the lack of stability that a
coup
represents have caused the economy to falter and hurt the
government's
credibility in the eyes of international investors. Still,
Thailand's
economy is expected to have a solid year of growth in 2007
despite some
forecasts that rates will slow.
In an attempt to appeal to Thaksin's base and continue his
successes
economically, the government is repackaging populist
economic
interventions. It is shifting away from Thaksinomics to a
"sufficiency
economy" as advocated and created by the King.
Government actions to
carry out the plan, however, have been met with resistance
and
encouraged rumors of internal rifts in the regime. Both the
finance
minister, Pridiyathorn Devakula, and Somkid Jatusripitak (a
former
Thaksin official) have resigned in the last couple of weeks,
and the
government recently announced the lifting of capital
controls.
The interim government is fulfilling its promise, however, to
employ
a less confrontational approach to manage the insurgency.
Nevertheless,
the softer touch has yet to achieve its desired results. On
February
18, 28 bombs ripped through southern Thailand following a
string of
beheadings, arson attacks, and the New Year's bombings in
Bangkok that
may or may not have been detonated by insurgents. The
escalation of
violence and lack of forward progress have caused
impatience and
frustration to mount, and the coup's popularity is receding
accordingly. Last week, a poll
conducted by Bangkok's Assumption University measured
Prime Minister
Surayud Chulanont's popularity falling from 70% to 35% in
November.

What Should Bangkok Do?

Now the military junta has to move the country steadily
forward
toward a new constitution and an enhanced democratic
government. The
goals - prevent corruption and build a democracy with
adequate checks
and balances - must be accomplished.
The longer it takes to build an unbreakable democracy and
relegate
Thaksin to the eternal sidelines of Thai politics, the less likely
the
government will achieve this result. The irony of the
situation is that
the military-supported government's actions to suppress
Thaksin's
impact - damaging relations with Singapore and censoring
coverage - end
up boosting his popularity. Only concrete and visible
movement towards
democratic institutions and equitable economic policies will
prevent
Thaksin from returning to power.
The hope is that the generals will allow democracy to be
restored
without manipulation and interruption. The fear is that the
cycle of
coups will be perpetuated and democracy will never be
realized while
the monarch and military retain their powers. A "democratic
coup" is
easier said than done.

David Kampf is a
political and economic researcher primarily based in New
York and
Kigali, Rwanda, and is a contributor to Foreign Policy In
Focus
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
AS-039-2007
March 2, 2007

Political Turmoil in Thailand:

Thaksin, Protests, Elections, and the King

by Michael H. Nelson

eastasia.at
Vol. 5, No. 1, September 2006
ISSN 1684-629X
In the concluding section of my preceding assessment of the
political situation in Thailand (see eastasia.at, Vol. 4, No. 2,
December 2005), I anticipated six months of suspense. Facto
rs assumed to contribute to this suspense were the decision
of the Supreme Administrative Court on the privatization of t
he Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT); a disa
ppointing cabinet reshuffle; the second Senate election on 1
9 April 2006 producing a TRT-dominated Upper House; and a
no-confidence debate against a number of ministers for alleg
ed corruption. In reality, the course of political events unexp
ectedly accelerated. On 24 February 2006, Prime Minister Th
aksin Shinawatra dissolved the House of Representatives an
d called for new elections to be held on 2 April.

From the “Sondhi Phenomenon” to “Thaksin ook pai!”

After Sondhi Limthongkul—the founder of the newspaper

Manager, and since late September 2005 on a self-styled mis
sion to rescue the Thai nation from the clutches of “Thaksino
cracy” by calling for a royally-appointed government—on 13
January 2006 led about 3,000 protestors from Lumpini Park t
o Government House, his star seemed on the wane. A few hu
ndred of Sondhi’s followers had forced their way into the co
mpound. Many observers thought that this action went too fa
r. Moreover, it was lamented that Sondhi could not present a
ny new revelations about Thaksin’s alleged myriad of serious
wrongdoings. Reflecting on the possibility that politically-orie
nted non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could join Sond
hi in what appeared to be a personally motivated retaliation
campaign against the prime minister, Thirayuth Boonmee, a
leading social critic, said that “activists needed more eviden
ce of corruption to try to bring down the Thaksin government
” (The Nation, 15 Jan. 2006). The Nation (20 Jan. 2006) procl
aimed that “Mob politics is not the answer,” and spoke of the
“self-styled Thaksin haters-cum-reformists” with their “less-t
han-transparent cause.” The editorial continued:
It is not inconceivable that a genuine people’s movement for
political reform can arise from Sondhi’s campaign. It is
simply a matter of rebalancing the mix: more rationality, less
raw emotion, more public education, less incitement.[i]

Since Sondhi’s “crusade against Prime Minister Thaksin

Shinawatra falters” (Bangkok Post, 22 Jan. 2006), a mass de
monstration at Sanam Luang, announced for 4 February, was
generally seen as a good way for Sondhi to achieve a “soft la
nding” (ibid.) of his campaign. He had announced that he wo
uld end that event by submitting a petition to the King and t
hen withdraw from organizing any more protests.

In short, Thaksin’s political life seemed well on its

way to being relieved of some burden. Even this burden
should not have been taken as seriously as many observers
and political actors did, thus increasing political tension. Afte
r all, in a democracy, one should not be too surprised that so
me people are unhappy with what the government does. Nei
ther should the public demonstration of such dissent be perc
eived as something unusual in an open political order.[ii] In a
ny case, Thaksin himself fanned the flames with the sale of h
is company, Shin Corporation, for 73 billion baht to the inves
tment holding Temasek, after Shin’s share value had tremen
dously increased since 2001 during Thaksin’s time in office.
With this transaction, important government concessions for
the biggest mobile phone network and the satellite monopol
y, a low-cost airline, a television channel, an Internet service
provider, a marketing firm, and others in effect became the
property of the government of Singapore, which is the owner
of Temasek.[iii]

This sale to a foreign government was engineered by a Thai

prime minister who had founded his political party on nation
alist sentiments, even calling it “Thais love Thai” (Thai Rak T
hai, TRT). Matters were made worse by the fact that the sale
obviously had been meticulously planned over many months
by a number of Thaksin’s close legal and management confi
dents, with the probable aim of avoiding payment of a single
baht of tax for this sale.[iv] Hardly any observer was prepare
d to believe that Thaksin was as surprised by the sale of his
own company to Singapore as everybody else. Yet, this had t
o be his official line of defense because Article 209 of the Th
ai Constitution stipulates strict separation of executive politic
al power from the pursuit of private business interests. Mem
bers of the cabinet must not hold any shares in companies, a
nd they must also not take part in any management decision
s.[v] Furthermore, the sale raised the question of whether Th
aksin had used the relationship he had built in his capacity a
s prime minister of Thailand with the prime minister of Singa
pore for gaining private profit.

Some time later, former prime minister (1980-1988)

and highly respected chairperson of the King’s Privy Council
Prem Tinsulanonda, in a speech on responsible state adminis
tration based on the example of the King, voiced the opinion
that it was probably not positive to act based only on capabil
ities and cleverness, without the observance of ethical princi
ples. Although Prem added that these remarks were not dire
cted against anyone in particular, it was a short step to inter
pret them as criticism of Thaksin’s style of governance.[vi] M
oreover, conservative legal expert Meechai Ruchuphan, who
had helped the government with some law-related work, was
quoted in Matichon (13 Feb. 2006) as having said, “This gove
rnment supports clever people in order to use their cleverne
ss in any way that would make them succeed over their com
petitors. For this reason, we lack people to whom the protect
ion of the interest of the state and the nation is dear to their
hearts.” Many people complained that Thaksin had miserabl
y failed in following moral principles. This was used by many
well-known personalities for demanding Thaksin’s resignatio
n, often by using open letters.

Against this background, the protest demonstration

of 4 February gained new importance. More than 50,000
people joined Sondhi in demanding Thaksin’s resignation; he
also submitted a petition to the King to this effect. Moreover,
Sondhi did not withdraw himself from the political arena. On
the contrary, he announced yet another show of dissent for 1
1 February, which attracted a smaller number of people than
the previous week. Yet, it was the first time that Sondhi had
not treated the event as his personal affair, but acted as a m
ember of the “People’s Alliance for Democracy.” The PAD, ba
sically Sondhi plus some members of political NGOs, such as
the Campaign for Popular Democracy, had been formed on 9
February. This way, the usual collection of activists from the
“people’s sector” (phak prachachon) entered the fray. The N
ation (10 Feb. 2006) indicated a change in its stance concern
ing the “mob politics” criticized above by the headline “Move
to oust Thaksin: Real war has just begun.”[vii]

Yet, getting some vocal but powerless members of

NGOs to join, and even acquiring the mass media firepower
of the Nation Group might not have helped the PAD in its fin
al aim of “Toppling Thaksin.”[viii] The decisive addition to thi
s coalition came when Buddhist fundamentalist Chamlong Sri
muang, who some years earlier had installed Thaksin as chai
rperson of his Palang Dharma party, announced on 19 Febru
ary that he would join PAD. His stated reasons were, first, th
at Thaksin’s sale of his company had made him lose his legiti
macy as prime minister. Second, Chamlong’s previous boss,
Prem, had been attacked on TV (see fn. 6).[ix] It remained u
nclear why Thaksin should resign rather than the two hosts o
f the incriminated television show. And the sale of his compa
ny might have led to demanding the establishment of an inv
estigation commission rather than Thaksin’s immediate resig
nation. Anyway, Chamlong declared that he would lead his “
Dharma Army” to join the protests until Thaksin stepped dow
n.

It was not only The Nation (20 Feb.) that saw this
announcement as “one of the severest blows” to the prime
minister and as a “major boost” for the anti-Thaksin forces. A
fter all, it was Chamlong who had played a vital role in bringi
ng down Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon in May 1992. T
haksin must have had similar thoughts. Five days after Cham
long’s announcement, on 24 February, and even before the
next big demonstration planned for 26 February, Thaksin dis
solved the House of Representatives and ordered new electi
ons to take place on 2 April 2006. In the short term, however
, this measure could not save him. Already on 21 February, C
hamlong had declared that, “A House dissolution would be o
ut of the question because it could bring Mr. Thaksin back to
power” (Bangkok Post, 22 Feb. 2006). As a result, rather tha
n accepting the election as a way of resolving the political co
nflict by letting the voters decide the fate of Thaksin, on 14
March PAD started beleaguering Government House. The ba
ckbone of the demonstrators camping out in front of the seat
of government was made up of Chamlong’s Dharma Army. In
the late afternoons and evenings, they were joined by thous
ands of lower-class people and tens of thousands of member
s of Bangkok’s middle class, listening to often furious attacks
on Thaksin. The technical infrastructure and the communicat
ion equipment seemed to have been provided by Sondhi. Th
e demonstrators’ battle cry was: “Thaksin ook pai!” – “Thaksi
n, get out!”

Democracy?

Apparently, the leaders of the protestors did not want to get

involved with constitutional means of removing office
holders who stand accused of corruption and abuse of power
.[x] Perhaps, they assumed that the “Thaksin system” had re
ndered legally available mechanisms meaningless, or maybe
they were merely impatient and saw the alliance of anti-Tha
ksin forces under the umbrella of PAD, combined with the alr
eady achieved degree of public mobilization, as a golden opp
ortunity for getting rid of Thaksin. It is still being discussed w
hether the PAD’s tactics remained within democratic means
—backed by the freedom of assembly—or whether they had
crossed the line to “mob rule.”[xi] Beleaguering the seat of g
overnment by setting up tents and blocking roads for weeks
certainly substantially infringed on the rights of non-participa
nts in the protests, be it government officials (including the p
rime minister) or be it members of the public. For making the
ir voices heard, the PAD did not depend on such means, sinc
e they could have camped out at Sanam Luang. Nevertheles
s, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration provided them wi
th many toilet trucks, while the police, instead of being order
ed by the government to dissolve the protests, provided sec
urity for them. It would have been difficult not to find it reaso
nable if the government had insisted on keeping up public or
der, rather than bowing to the protestors’ implicit threat of a
violent ending. However, in practical-political terms, any atte
mpt at doing so would have been—sooner or later—the end
of the Thaksin government. It was thus in the prime minister’
s best interest to weather the storm engulfing his official resi
dence.

Some observers asked what the use of votes actually

was when only shortly after a convincingly won election tens
of thousands of protestors, for some months led by a demag
ogue with doubtful (until today) motives, could build up so m
uch pressure in the heart of Bangkok that the countrywide el
ectoral legitimacy of the prime minister faced unsolvable pro
blems. In addition, many of the speeches delivered at variou
s venues were not educational, but rather aimed at inciting h
atred. In a particularly regrettable case, the leader of a teach
ers’ association in the northeast, of all people, “educated” th
e audience about Thaksin and his family by saying, “Whoeve
r cheated [the country], may their children become whores i
nfected with venereal disease!” (The Nation, 1 March 2006).
This sort of speeches went so far that the chairwomen of Tha
i Amnesty International felt compelled to send an email of ca
ution to the organizers of the protests, reminding them that t
he “non-violent” means so cherished by the PAD not only co
ncerned the absence of direct physical violence (quoted in T
he Nation, 1 March 2006):

It would be great if the demonstration leaders tried to

control the speakers’ language on stage. The way we’ve
condemned Thaksin and his family has been rather rude. Au
eychai Watha’s words about prostitutes [in regard to Thaksin
's daughter] were not proper. Sulak did not have to compare
Thaksin to a dog …I was saddened to hear the speaker call f
or Thaksin’s execution. I myself am strongly against the deat
h penalty, and this is not funny. We do not support violence,
and neither should we foster conditions that would provoke v
iolence.[xii]

Generally, Thaksin was portrayed as Satan, intent on

destroying the Thai democracy. In one brochure distributed
by the protestors around Government House, Thaksin was de
picted as a reborn Hitler who forced his fellow citizens to rais
e their arms to the Nazi salute; as a person kowtowing on a p
ile of fellow-Thai skulls to US imperialist capitalism; and as of
fering Thailand on a silver platter to international Jewish (and
Chinese) monopoly capitalists.[xiii]

Further, the vast majority of voters living outside of Bangkok

and the bigger cities was openly denounced as uneducated,
uninformed, open to bribery, and morally deficient. This pres
umption of a significantly privileged political understanding o
n the side of the activists and their supporters provided the i
deological basis for giving much greater weight to the Bangk
ok-based anti-Thaksin forces than to Thaksin’s rural supporte
rs in deciding the question of legitimacy. On the claim that r
ural voters were unable to make an informed judgment of Th
aksin’s corruption, Andrew Walker notes:

This strikes me as an extraordinary claim given that

discussions about the appropriateness or inappropriateness
of obtaining personal gain from public office appear to be ubi
quitous in rural society.[xiv]

In a political-practical respect, the PAD had great

organizational advantages compared to the mobilization pro
blems of upcountry dwellers. Universal suffrage might be ens
hrined in the Thai Constitution. However, until now, it does n
ot seem generally to have been accepted by groups in Bang
kok, or it is accepted only as long as they agree with its elect
oral outcome. The large political gap between urban and rur
al areas—lamented about for decades—persists. From this p
erspective, the protests constituted yet another rejection of
what is seen by many Bangkokian academics, NGO activists,
technocrats, and members of the middle class as the “tyrann
y of the rural majority.”[xv]

However, this “tyranny” has become considerably

more direct compared to the time before the 2001 election.
Prior to that year, critics of rural voting behavior could direct
their attacks to constituency candidates who were said to ha
ve gained their MP status by vote-buying in their local area.
The prime ministers of Thai coalition governments had no im
mediate electoral legitimacy, but were only indirectly suppor
ted by votes of the constituency MPs who in turn elected the
m in Parliament to head the government. This fundamentally
changed with the introduction of the party-list system by the
1997 Constitution. Thaksin Shinawatra is the first PM who co
uld claim a very convincing direct mandate from the voters t
o govern the country. This primarily means the rural voters.
After the 2005 election, there were no serious voices that wo
uld have claimed Thaksin received “his” 19 million votes (De
mocrats: seven million) on the basis of electoral cheating. Ra
ther, they were seen as a true reflection of the will of the vot
ers. As a consequence, any Bangkok-based actions to topple
the PM cannot avoid having to declare that the great majorit
y of votes cast for Thaksin did not have as much weight as th
at of the comparatively small group of protest organizers, th
eir followers, and their supporters. Thus, the protests very di
rectly confronted the majority of voters, mainly those in rural
areas.

However, the situation is complicated by Thaksin’s

own actions as head of the government since 2001. Probably
only his most diehard supporters would— when given time to
carefully reason based on information—still doubt that Thaks
in is not a democratic politician and that he has had a fatal i
mpact on Thailand’s fledgling democratic and constitutional
structures.[xvi] On 19 July 2006, the Bangkok Post quoted Th
aksin as having told a meeting of local government politician
s:
Difference is beautiful in a democracy. Everybody has his or
her own rights. Don’t be so self-absorbed. Everybody has to
respect one another. Don’t regard people outside your own g
roup as enemies.

A few weeks earlier, Thaksin told a meeting of high-ranking

civil servants, “I will not allow any changes that don’t
observe the democratic process. I will protect democracy. Le
t me repeat I will protect democracy with my life” (Bangkok
Post, 30 June 2006). Democracy had already been a TRT the
me in the campaign to the elections of 2 April 2006. In July, o
n the occasion of the 8th anniversary of TRT, full-page newsp
aper advertisements claimed the party would “adhere to de
mocracy.” Unfortunately, since the founding of TRT, democra
cy had hardly ever been mentioned by Thaksin. On the contr
ary, he had aimed for “quiet politics” (kanmueang ning) und
er his centralizing and all-controlling leadership. When activi
sts and academics tried to remind him that he should not ne
gatively impact Thailand’s democratic political order and res
pect the publicly expressed differences of political opinions,
he retorted with the famous words, “Democracy is only a too
l, not an end.”

In short, had Thaksin followed his own words as quoted in

the Bangkok Post from the time he first assumed the positio
n of prime minister, he as well as the country would never ha
ve gotten into the present political quagmire. Regrettably, all
positive references to democracy are merely expressions of
pure communicative opportunism.[xvii] Thaksin adopted the
democracy rhetoric only when he could use it against his var
ious groups of opponents. Therefore, one should not mistake
them as reflecting his stance, or even as a change in his app
roach to governance. Rather, those observers who have calle
d Thai politics under Thaksin “democratic authoritarianism” r
emain correct.[xviii] One element of this order is that the pri
me minister undermines the democratic structures and const
itutional institutions at the center of the polity, while the vot
ers on the periphery continue to elect their autocratic ruler b
ased on the benefits his populist policies delivered to them.
Assuming that those who doubt Thaksin’s democratic
credentials are not merely jealous of his power and do not su
ffer from hallucinations, but can provide plenty of data in sup
port of their claims, reliance on election results alone would
mean that the dismantling of core elements of the democrati
c order must be permitted. In a democracy, after all, the expl
icit or implicit political will of the majority—as expressed at t
he ballot box—determines the direction of politics. If the maj
ority thinks that at this point in time a strong leader is more i
mportant than an imperfect democracy, so be it. On the othe
r hand, democracy is supported because it provides, if furthe
r developed, a much better deal to the people than a leader-
based political order, which is also invariably more susceptibl
e to the abuse of power. Thaksin serves as yet another “goo
d” example of this old insight. Thus, the weakening of democ
ratic structures based on the short-term needs of an authorit
arian leader will have negative effects on the overall welfare
of the country’s people in the medium and long term. Thus t
he question posed by Chang Noi, “Do we allow a leader to us
e the democratic process to destroy the democratic process i
tself?” (The Nation, 3 April 2006). But who is the “we” (or “us
”) who is supposed to decide the issue, based on what consi
derations, and who is included in the category logically oppo
sed to the “us”, that is, in “them”—Thaksin alone? Can we as
sume that the main protagonists of the protests—Sonthi Limt
hongkul and Chamlong Srimuang—in fact are motivated by a
ny love for democracy?

Things are even more complicated by the diversity of issues

used to attack Thaksin. From the beginning at Lumpini Park,
anti-privatization groups played a prominent role. It was the
m who produced and sold the combined “Thaksin-out-no-priv
atization” T-shirts in great numbers. Later, further policy issu
es included anti-Free Trade Agreement and even education r
eform. Of course, after the sale of Shin Corporation, the issu
e of the morality of the prime minister became important, es
pecially in adding more moderate groups, such as lecturers f
rom universities, to demand Thaksin’s resignation by publish
ing open letters. Yet, disagreements over policy issues are v
ery common in any democracy. As such, they are suitable for
use in policy debates, but surely not for trying to force an ele
cted PM from office. The same applies to the issue of moralit
y. It justifies the issuing of open letters demanding Thaksin’s
resignation. But it cannot justify mass street protests to forc
e him out. In summary, reducing the anti-Thaksin street prot
ests to the democracy-versus-dictatorship dichotomy probab
ly is too simple as an approach for analyzing the events.

Finally, a word on the “democratic” means used by the

various groups in pursuing their goals. Both sides seemed to
think that applying questionable practices was justified by th
eir noble ends. I already mentioned the beleaguering of Gov
ernment House by the PAD, and its hate campaign against th
e prime minister. In addition, they blocked the office building
housing the Election Commission (ECT) for many hours. Driv
ers of cars leaving the building were pressed to open their tr
unks, because the protestors assumed that Wasana Phoemla
rp, the ECT’s chairperson, and his fellow commissioners woul
d try to flee the scene this way. In the South, demonstrators
hindered candidates in their attempt to register for repeat el
ections; others were forced to run the gauntlet.

In Chiang Mai, pro-Thaksin groups broke up an election

campaign event organized by the Democrat party. In Bangko
k, some of the rural counter-protestors camping out at Chatu
chak Park went to The Nation building and blocked it. And in
Udon Thani, a seminar organized by the PAD was broken up.
In all three cases, members and supporters of Thaksin’s TRT
were obviously instrumental in implementing these actions.
All the examples show that Thailand’s democratic political cu
lture still seems to be rather fragile. If necessary, pushing thr
ough one’s political will is not subject to many restrictions.

The “elections” of 2 April 2006

Since Thaksin had set the new House elections for 2 April,
there were only 37 days left until election day. According to
the letter of the constitution, this was permitted because, aft
er the dissolution of the House, new elections must take plac
e within 60 days. However, the constitution also stipulates th
at elections following the end of the term of the House must
be held within 45 days. Amongst others, it was conservative j
urist Meechai Ruchuphan who, in an article criticizing the EC
T (Post Today, 25 April 2006:A9), pointed to the fact that a di
ssolution was difficult to foresee for the opposition parties, a
nd therefore the constitution gave them more time to prepar
e in such a case. With some justification, the Democrat, Char
t Thai, and Mahachon parties could have felt unfairly treated
by Thaksin. After all, he had always maintained that he woul
d never dissolve Parliament. On 22 November 2005, Thaksin
assured his ministers: “I confirm that I will not dissolve Parlia
ment or resign because nothing will disrupt [this administrati
on’s work] before the election scheduled for April 2009” (The
Nation, 22 Nov. 2006). He reiterated this stance in December
and January. Of course (and as Thaksin’s statement in Nove
mber shows), before the dissolution finally came, it had been
pondered for months as a possible way out for Thaksin, in pa
rticular with respect to re-stating the legitimacy of his gover
nment.

In an article published two weeks before the actual

dissolution, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a politics lecturer at
Chulalongkorn University and political commentator, wrote: “
The best way out for Mr. Thaksin and for Thailand’s precariou
s democracy based on the hard-won 1997 Constitution, is for
the prime minister to renew his electoral mandate at the poll
s by dissolving the lower house” (Bangkok Post, 10 Feb. 200
6). Indeed, this should be seen as a very obvious option in a
situation where a PM, in February 2005, wins a very convinci
ng electoral mandate, and then, only seven months later, en
counters bizarre and personally-motivated claims by an alien
ated friend and maverick demagogue that he has lost all legi
timacy to govern the country, followed by sections of Bangko
k society slowly adopting this view. That Thaksin tried to de
monstrate that his leadership was still legitimate by using th
e usual democratic means of elections should come as little
as a surprise as the unwillingness of the protestors to accept
the decision of the voters. Thus, they intensified their attemp
t at forcing Thaksin out of office before he could receive a re
newed electoral mandate by using the means of continuous
street protests around Government House.

More important for the creation of Thailand’s present murky

political situation, however, was the indeed surprising and un
precedented decision of the opposition parties to boycott the
election.[xix] Immediately after the announcement of the Ho
use dissolution, the Democrat party’s executive board had a
six-hour “heated debate” on whether they should boycott th
e election or not. While those who wanted the Democrats to
participate in the elections argued that the party could be se
en as not abiding by democratic principles, the pro-boycott
members argued that there was no problem in the relationsh
ip between the House and Thaksin. Rather, Thaksin himself
was the problem (The Nation, 25 Feb. 2006).[xx] From this p
erspective, Thaksin’s decision was seen as illegitimate: “The
election is widely seen as a set-up that would enable Thaksin
to whitewash his tainted leadership and the plethora of corru
ption scandals involving his family and friends” (The Nation,
26 Feb. 2006). Not surprisingly, the PAD hailed the Democrat
’s pro-boycott decision. Chart Thai and Mahachon joined the
Democrats. All three briefly tried to make a deal with Thaksi
n, offering to trade their boycott against his signature under
a pact for a post-electoral political reform process. However,
Thaksin rejected this proposal, and so the boycott went ahea
d, with all the political and legal problems that have resulted
from it, even including an intervention by the King.

So it is certainly correct to assign a fair share of the blame

for the present situation to the Democrats, Chart Thai, and
Mahachon. The dissolution of Parliament by the prime minist
er was perfectly within his constitutional prerogative. Moreov
er, as pointed out above, it was a measure that suggested its
elf given that the attacks called his legitimacy into question.
It is probably not accurate to assume that the parties’ decisi
on reflected their unwillingness to get a beating at the polls.
They were not afraid of their sure defeats in 2001 or 2005. In
fact, given the political climate, they could anticipate coming
out of the election with a greater number of MPs. Rather, so
me amongst the Democrats executive board’s majority in fa
vor of the boycott might have been carried away by the anti-
dissolution discourse at that time, combined with the possibil
ity of portraying their party as being on the “people’s side” a
gainst the “tyrant” (thorarat) Thaksin. Others might have see
n a good chance to get rid of Thaksin by extra-parliamentary
, non-electoral means, since neither parliamentary nor electo
ral means would have allowed their return to power for many
years to come, as long as Thaksin remained head of TRT and
the government. In any case, if the entire opposition in a parl
iamentary democracy (even if it is “Thai-style”) deliberately
undermines a constituent element of this order—elections—t
hen this cannot be done as an ordinary political game. A boy
cott can only be justified in so far as the severity of the perc
eived threat to parliamentary democracy—for example, whe
n the election is sure to be so heavily corrupted that it will be
largely meaningless and merely serve to justify the power-ho
lder—that no other means of resistance is available. Be this
as it may, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the
Democrats’ decisive discussion, one would certainly be extre
mely pleased to receive a word-for-word transcript of that m
eeting.

With the decision by all parliamentary opposition parties to

boycott the election, many constituencies had only a single
TRT candidate. According to Article 74 of the Election Act, ca
ndidates standing alone must receive at least 20 percent of t
he eligible voters to be elected. Especially in southern provin
ces, the stronghold of the Democrat party, many TRT candid
ates could not reach the required number of minimum votes.
Countrywide, a great number of people marked the “abstenti
on” box on the ballot paper; the amount of invalid votes was
also unusually high.[xxi] Of the party-list ballot, 31.1 percent
of the voters ticked “abstain,” while 5.8 percent of the votes
were invalid. For the constituency votes, the figures were 33.
1 and 13.3 percent, respectively. As a consequence of the 20
percent rule, dozens of constituencies saw repeat elections.
Still, some of the 400 seats for constituency MPs could not b
e filled. It is here that the probable “real motive” for the Dem
ocrats’ boycott might be found. The party did not mean to m
erely stay away from the election and thus let TRT and a few
MPs from small parties enjoy life in the House, while they the
mselves would spend the four-year term in the extra-parliam
entary wilderness. Rather they tried to use their stranglehold
in southern provinces to prevent the election of the full num
ber of 400 constituency MPs. As a result, the Democrats wer
e be able to block the Parliament from convening (because it
needs the full number of MPs) and therefore prevent Thaksin
from forming a new government. When the election commiss
ion tried to subvert the Democrats’ game plan by admitting
new candidates as competitors to TRT candidates in the seco
nd round of voting, the Democrat party brought lawsuits agai
nst the ECT in the Administrative Court and, more importantl
y, the criminal court (see below).

Thaksin Shinawatra won 16,420,755 votes on the TRT party

list— a majority of 56.5 percent of the valid votes. With a
decrease in turnout of two million, TRT lost 2.6 million votes
over the 2005 election. At the same time, the party’s constit
uency candidates lost only 1.2 million votes, thereby reducin
g Thaksin’s advantage over his MPs from 2.4 million to a mer
e one million votes. Due to an adjustment of constituencies i
n Bangkok, the capital’s number of MPs was reduced from 37
to 36. While TRT won 32 seats in 2005, only nine of its Bangk
ok candidates managed to gain more votes than there were
abstentions in 2006. Altogether, 1,265,877 (2005: 104,304)
Bangkok voters abstained, while 1,168,208 voters (2005: 1,5
41,829) opted for TRT. In 2005, the Democrats received 1,04
7,496 for their constituency candidates running in Bangkok.
Thai Rak Thai’s party-list votes were reduced from 1,668,102
(57.6 percent) to 1,234,5222 (46.9 percent).[xxii] The pressu
re exerted by the protestors and the election result prompte
d Thaksin, on 4 April 2006, to go on TV and declare that he w
ould not be a candidate for prime minister in the next govern
ment. However, he would remain at the helm of TRT and fulfi
ll his duty as an elected MP.

It was assumed that some of TRT’s constituency

candidates surpassed the 20 percent minimum vote only for
the reason that party executives had hired members of small
er parties to run as competitors. On the urging of the Democ
rats, the ECT was forced to investigate such cases and, as a
result, initiate the dissolution process concerning two of thos
e parties. It was even found out that the ECT official responsi
ble for keeping the commission’s database of members of po
litical parties had been bribed with 30,000 baht to change th
e dates candidates had joined their parties in a way that wou
ld comply with the 90-day rule (election candidates must be
members of their political parties for at least 90 days before
they register their candidacy).

Initially, the ECT was reluctant to act against the TRT,

although observers found it strange that the agency would
punish parties that were accused of having been hired “by a
big party,” but would not try and punish that big party as wel
l. However, at the beginning of May 2006, a report by an ECT
subcommittee investigating the involvement of TRT was leak
ed to the press and published. This report stated that high-ra
nking members of TRT had hired the parties, and it suggeste
d initiating legal proceedings against TRT and Thaksin. After
some more delays, ECT chairperson Wasana Phoemlarp, in hi
s capacity as political party registrar, sent the investigation fi
le concerning TRT to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG
). After additional prompting, on 22 June Phoemlarp recomm
ended the party’s dissolution. Four days later, Phoemlarp se
nt a file concerning the Democrat party to the OAG, also rec
ommending that it be dissolved. The OAG changed some det
ails of the ECT’s suggestions, but submitted its writs to the C
onstitutional Court on 6 July. The Constitutional Court will he
ar the cases following the parties 30 August 2006 submissio
n of their written defenses.

The Constitutional Court can order the dissolution of

parties when they have committed wrongdoings as defined i
n Article 66 of the Political Party Act, mainly for one or more
of three reasons:

Article 66

The Constitutional Court may issue an order dissolving a

political party which has carried out any of the following:

(1) an act which overthrows the democratic regime of

government with the King as Head or an attempt to gain the
administrative power of the State by unconstitutional means;

(2) an act which may be adverse to the democratic regime of

Government with the King as Head of the State under the
Constitution;

(3) an act which may endanger the security of the State, or

may be contrary to law or public order or good morals.

It is very difficult to see how hiring smaller parties to field

candidates, hiring a small party to accuse TRT of misbehavio
r, boycotting the election, or promoting the use of the “no vo
te” box on the ballot paper could be construed as attempts t
o overthrow democracy or endanger national security, a catc
h-all clause left over from previous periods of military dictato
rships. Political parties are the backbone of representative p
arliamentary systems. Dissolving them without exceptionally
good legal reasons should be impossible.

The Democrat party has been operating for 60 years, and it

is the party that most closely resembles democratic parties i
n the West. Thai Rak Thai has 14 million members and receiv
ed overwhelming public support. In addition, political parties
cannot be held responsible for what individual board membe
rs do. It is certainly necessary to punish people who have co
mmitted serious wrongdoing. However, this should not affect
the party as a collective entity unless it can be proven that t
he party’s leadership in fact endorsed those actions as expre
ssions of the party’s will. Thongbai Thongpao, a former politi
cal prisoner, caretaker senator, and veteran lawyer who has
been active in the field of legal education for decades,[xxiii]
commented in his regular Sunday column, “I don’t see any a
ct by the five political parties that crossed the line and posed
a threat to national security and morality.” As for the charge
against TRT based on Article 66 (1), Thongbai noted that it w
ill be very difficult to find evidence in support of such a serio
us charge. “Therefore, contrary to appearances…, the charg
e probably does the party more good than harm” (all quotes
from Bangkok Post, 2 July 2006).

Interestingly, the punishment for charges as serious as those

mentioned in Article 66, in addition to dissolution of the
political party, seem to be inconsistently light. Article 69 of t
he Political Party Act stipulates that any person who “used to
be a member of the Executive Committee of the dissolved p
olitical party shall not form a new political party, be a memb
er of an Executive Committee of a political party nor be a pro
moter of a new political party” for five years. In other words,
people who had just been found guilty of attempting to overt
hrow democracy and endangering the security of the state it
self, can right away (in the event there will be an election) sti
ll become MPs, ministers, and even prime minister. They can
also reestablish their old parties under the same names, exc
ept that they must find nominees who have not been memb
ers of the executive board of their previous outfit. A number
of political parties newly registered with the ECT are assume
d to have been established by close associates of faction chi
efs within TRT—just in case.

The King intervenes – the Constitutional Court nullifies the

election

After the election, the House must convene within 30 days.

To do so, the full number of 500 members must have been el
ected. Since dozens of the House of Representatives’ 400 se
ats for constituency MPs could not be filled due to candidate
s not reaching the minimum 20 percent of eligible voters, an
d since a second round of voting also failed to achieve the fu
ll number, holding the first meeting seemed to be impossible
.[xxiv] As a consequence, no new prime minister could have
been elected. It was in this context that, on 26 April 2006, th
e King intervened in an unusually direct and strong form. Dur
ing separate audiences for judges of the Supreme Administra
tive Court and the Supreme Court at Klai Kangwol Palace in P
rachuap Khiri Khan province, the King asked whether the poli
tical situation was perhaps messed up to the point that the e
lection might have to be nullified. He put pressure on the cou
rts to do their part to solve the problems by saying

Should the election be nullified? You have the right to say

what’s appropriate or not. If it’s not appropriate, it is not to
say the government is not good. But as far as I’m concerned,
a one party election is not normal. The one candidate situati
on is undemocratic. When an election is not democratic, you
should look carefully into the administrative issues. I ask you
to do the best you can. If you cannot do it, then it should be
you who resign, not the government, for failing to do your du
ty. Carefully review the vows you have made. … The nation c
annot survive if the situation runs contrary to the law. Theref
ore, I ask you to carefully study whether you can make a poi
nt on this issue. If not, you had better resign. You have been
tasked with this duty. You are knowledgeable. You must mak
e the country function correctly.[xxv]

Perhaps directed towards Thaksin, the King said, “I don’t

know who has messed up things this much. But you cannot g
overn the country in a messed-up manner.” Finally, he sternl
y reprimanded the protestors, whose campaign goal was to h
ave the King appoint a government based on Article 7 of the
Constitution and whose battle cry was “Rescue the nation!”
by stating

I have suffered a lot. Whatever happens, people call for a

royally appointed prime minister, which would not be democ
racy. If you cite Article 7 of the Constitution, it is an incorrect
citation. You cannot cite it. Article 7 has two lines: whatever i
s not stated by the Constitution should follow traditional prac
tices. But asking for a royally appointed prime minister is un
democratic. It is, pardon me, a mess. It is irrational…. People
call to “rescue the nation.” Whatever they do, they call [it] “r
escue the country.” What do you rescue? The country has no
t sunk yet. We have to prevent it from sinking; we don’t have
to rescue it. (The Nation, 26 April 2006)

After the King had given his lectures, the presidents of the
Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Court (the King had included this court in his a
ppeal) met to consider their next steps.[xxvi] The Constitutio
nal Court then needed only a few days, until 8 May 2006, to
declare the election of 4 April null and void. At the same tim
e, it ordered new elections to be held within 60 days of the a
mendment of the original Royal Decree, though without dete
rmining when this amendment had to be done. There were t
wo reasons for nullifying the election. First, the court found t
hat ordering a new election to take place only 37 days after t
he dissolution of the House, though not in itself a violation of
the constitution, had nevertheless led to political problems s
erious enough to violate the democratic core of the election.

Second, the court found that by turning the polling booths

around in a way that the open part would point to the polling
station committee and the public, while the voter would turn
his back to both, the constitutionally guaranteed secrecy of t
he vote had fundamentally been violated.[xxvii] Obviously, o
ne can doubt whether this point really warranted the nullifica
tion of an entire election. On the other hand, why would one
wish to favor the Thai mai pen rai (never mind) attitude over
adherence to the constitution? Moreover, the ECT had alread
y been warned by the Asian Network for Free Elections (Anfr
el) in November 2005, on the occasion of some by-elections,
that “turning around the open side of voting booths so they c
ould be seen into by outsiders… ‘seriously’ affected voters’ p
rivacy” (Bangkok Post, 5 Nov. 2005). That the constitutionall
y stipulated secrecy of the vote indeed was seriously compro
mised could not be doubted.[xxviii]
Ultimately, however, the court’s decision did not so much
concern purely legal interpretations, but rather implemented
a royally initiated attempt to find a way out of the political “
mess” by using the courts and the law. Simply speaking, the
question was how one could legally get rid of an election tha
t had politically—not primarily in terms of electoral manage
ment by the ECT—been badly screwed up, thereby causing u
nsolvable political and constitutional problems. The ECT was,
so to speak, the “weakest link” in this context. Even under s
uch circumstances, the judges of the Constitutional Court we
re deeply divided, with only a narrow majority of 8 votes to 6
being in favor of the nullification. One wonders what would h
ave happened if the ECT had not done something that, with
a certain degree of justification, could be interpreted as havi
ng violated the constitution seriously enough to annul the el
ection. In this sense, people should indeed be grateful to the
ECT for what it did.

Not surprisingly, after the verdict the ECT came under strong
pressure to resign. For some reason the ECT had come to be
seen as untrustworthy in their ability to organize honest and
fair elections. The three courts declared their political decisio
n that the ECT had to go. They repeatedly reiterated their st
ance, showing their impatience after nothing in this direction
happened. The courts also declared that they would take ove
r the organization of the election from the ECT, although the
constitution gives this task to the ECT. In unison, the press in
the capital demanded that the commissioners resign. Finally,
one member bowed to the pressure, while his remaining thre
e colleagues stood firm.[xxix] As a result, on 25 July 2006, a
criminal court sentenced them to an unsuspended four years
in prison for malfeasance in office while managing the April 2
006 elections.

In a number of constituencies in the South, where the sole

TRT candidates had not achieved the legally required minim
um vote of 20 percent of the eligible voters, the ECT had per
mitted the registration of additional candidates in repeat ele
ctions. Such new elections are legally required under the con
dition just mentioned. The ECT might have seen the permissi
on of additional candidates merely as a method of breaking t
he 20 percent deadlock, thereby enabling it to conclude the
general election within the required 30-day time limit. The cr
iminal court, however, saw this measure as a serious crimina
l act deliberately designed to advantage certain candidates a
nd/or parties over their competitors. Initially, it was unclear h
ow the ECT could have actively disadvantaged competitors o
f TRT candidates who were running without any competition.
Moreover, the court ruling seemed to imply that new election
s would have to be held as many times as it would take to fo
rce the electorate to come up with the necessary 20 percent
of electoral support.[xxx]

It is still open to question whether the court’s ruling

represented an instance of the rule of law or merely was yet
another case of the rule by law, expressly intended to use th
e law as a means in order to achieve the declared political e
nd of eliminating the resisting ECT members from the elector
al scene. The latter impression was reinforced when the crim
inal court did not, as is usual, immediately grant them bail, b
ut referred them to the Appeals Court to try their luck. This c
ourt also denied their bail application and referred them to t
he Supreme Court. Since they reached this court after office
hours, the ECT members had to spend the night in jail. As a r
esult, they automatically lost their positions, although they al
so signed their resignation letters while in prison.

This enabled the Supreme Court to assume sole power in

selecting 10 candidates—eight of them judges—for the new
ECT.[xxxi] For being able to do so, the constitution had to be
bent, because any selection of a new set of five election com
missioners must be done by both a selection committee and
the Supreme Court (Article 138). However, the selection com
mittee could not be established since it also comprises a nu
mber of sitting MPs—an impossibility when there is no House
of Representatives. While highly regarded legal experts had
already identified this problem in May and thus suggested us
ing the existing ECT, three months later an informal agreem
ent amongst the involved parties seemed to have been reac
hed to temporarily suspend Article 138 (1) of the Constitutio
n that required the establishment of a selection committee.

On 15 August, the Senate established a special committee to

scrutinize the shortlist of candidates sent to it by the
Supreme Court. The committee was given 20 days to fulfill it
s task. Consequently, the new ECT would not be in place on
24 August, the day when the amended Royal Decree orderin
g the election to be held on 15 October would come into effe
ct. It is therefore probable that the election day will have to
be postponed. This would make sense given that the new EC
T members will be unfamiliar with organizing elections as we
ll as with the entire electoral structure that starts at the nati
onal level and passes through the provincial election commis
sions and the constituency committees until it reaches the p
olling station committees. The five people at the top, especia
lly if they have to start administering something as unknown
to them as a general election with thousands of staff that the
y are also not familiar with, will not be able to make much of
a difference concerning clean and fair elections at the groun
d level. For these reasons, some groups—mostly in the anti-T
haksin camp—have suggested postponing the election until
December, or even January 2007. Other groups—mostly pro-
Thaksin—insist on holding the election on 15 October. After a
ll, the King already signed the Royal Decree.

Whenever the election is held, all those people who

unrealistically have come to the conclusion that the ECT was
a major pillar in Thaksin’s February 2005 election victory are
in for a big disappointment.

Outlook

Soon after the verdict of the Constitutional Court, political

activities died down for some weeks in order to celebrate the
60th anniversary of the King’s accession to the throne. Thais
were given some reprieve from the harsh realities of politics
in their country by participating in a prolonged outpouring of
worship for their King. Afterwards, rumors of an impending m
ilitary coup—either in favor or against Thaksin—were spread.
Some comments in newspapers appeared to reluctantly cons
ider a coup as a last way out of the political quagmire. Thaks
in himself spread the news that the National Intelligence Age
ncy had uncovered that an assassination attempt against hi
m might be undertaken. He also addressed a gathering of hu
ndreds of high-level bureaucrats with a prepared speech telli
ng them that an “extra-constitutional person with a high deg
ree of baramee” wanted to replace him as prime minister by
being appointed by the King.[xxxii]

It was immediately speculated that this was a reference to

Prem Tinsulanonda, the widely respected former prime minis
ter and present chairperson of the King’s Privy Council. Som
e observers saw this as a challenge of the old elite by a mem
ber of the new elite. In fact, Thaksin, with his highly centralis
tic, semi-presidential and authoritarian “A Country Is My Co
mpany” approach[xxxiii] to governing could never really put
up with other spheres of influence in the Thai polity, be it the
mass media, civil society, the parliamentary opposition, an in
dependent Senate, or independent checks-and-balance instit
utions under the constitution. Amongst many other activities
to control such spheres, he had persistently tried to place co
nfidants in military positions of power to prop up his political
stability. Shortly after Thaksin made his remark, Prem addre
ssed 950 Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy cadets, urg
ing them to embrace professionalism. While governments ca
me and went and were oriented to short-term gains, the milit
ary’s loyalty had to be with the nation and the King, serving l
ong-term goals (The Nation, 15 July 2006). Only a few days a
fterwards, in another act of defiance, Army Commander-in-C
hief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, replaced scores of middle
-ranking officers who were serving under Thaksin’s close clas
smates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory Scho
ol’s Class 10, thus weakening their operative capacity in pro
viding Thaksin with army support, should this be needed (Th
e Nation, 20 July 2006). As a journalistic observer of military
affairs noted, “the latest military reshuffle serves as an unmi
staken message to Mr. Thaksin and his ex-classmates at the
pre-cadet school, that Gen Sonthi’s first and foremost loyalty
is not to them” (Bangkok Post, 21 July 2006).

In any case, the King finally signed the amended Royal

Decree ordering a new election on 15 October 2006. This
decree would come into effect on 24 August 2006. In yet ano
ther unprecedented demonstration of his political will, the m
onarch added a handwritten note for the prime minister to th
e decree. This “Royal Message” (phraratchakrasae) consiste
d of two points. First, the King signed the Royal Decree beca
use he wanted to see the nation swiftly return to peace and
order. Second, the King wanted the election to the House of
Representatives to proceed truly orderly, cleanly, and fairly (
Matichon, 23 July 2006:13). With the King’s signature under t
he Royal Decree, and especially with his phraratchakrasae, T
hailand returned to the political situation when Thaksin disso
lved the House on 24 February, the opposition parties declar
ed their election boycott, and Thaksin rejected their last-ditc
h effort of trading their electoral participation against the co
ntractual promise of constitutional reforms.

However, a number of things have changed. First,

the Democrat, Chart Thai, and Mahachon parties can no long
er boycott the election. As parliamentary parties, a permane
nt election boycott is hardly a feasible option anyway. Moreo
ver, the anti-Thaksin climate that might have carried them a
way in February has largely died down. Finally, the upsurge
of royalist enthusiasm since the King’s jubilee would not mak
e it seem advisable to appear as acting against the monarch’
s will, especially since he has clearly expressed what course
of action he wants the country to take, and now that he is re
cuperating in hospital from microsurgery. Chart Thai and Ma
hachon have kept a very low profile over the past months, w
hile the Democrats have been visible through their anti-corru
ption activities and by bringing complaints and lawsuits agai
nst TRT and the ECT. It remains to be seen how they will desi
gn their election campaign—what role policies Thaksin and c
onstitutional reform will play. The Democrats will certainly wi
n the South. It will be interesting to see whether the Bangoki
ans’ limited anti-Thaksin vote in April will translate into as m
any seats for the Democrats in October. The party’s prospect
s in other regions do not seem to be encouraging.

Second, the PAD appears considerably weakened. Compared

to previous turnouts, the audiences attending Sonthi’s
weekly attacks on Thaksin at Lumpini Park have dwindled dr
amatically. The newspapers seem largely to have stopped pa
ying attention to him. It is difficult to say whether this more
generally reflects a decreased mobilization capacity of the P
AD. In any case, they have announced that during this time t
hey do not want to cause the King any additional worries, an
d so they will not organize any mass rallies in the foreseeabl
e future. Obviously, in pursuing its political goals, the PAD m
ust also take into account the public’s position concerning th
e welfare of the King and his political will. Opponents could e
asily paint the PAD as anti-royalist if they returned to their ol
d ways. After all, it was the King himself who strongly rebuke
d the PAD (without naming it) in his address to the courts. M
oreover, the King, in his “Royal Message”, clearly expressed
that he wanted to see order return to Thai politics. And it wa
s the PAD itself that had campaigned on a strongly royalist t
one. In fact, Sonthi Limthongkul had, from the beginning unti
l today, used the Monarchy as a tool to push for Thaksin’s re
moval, having recently gone as far as calling on the people t
o decide whether they were on the side of Thaksin or on the
side of the King (Phuchatkan, 6 July 2006).

It remains to be seen how the PAD will manage to pursue

their aim of forcing Thaksin out of politics without endangeri
ng the holding of an honest and fair election. The PAD also lo
st their parliamentary allies in their quest. Maybe, they could
opt for a post-election resumption of their protests in case T
haksin does not follow his earlier announcement to take a po
litical break after the election and thus allow constitutional r
eform to proceed smoothly. Moreover, it would certainly be p
ositive for political development in Thailand, if the PAD conti
nued its political work upcountry during the election campaig
n in order to provide the voters with an alternative point of vi
ew.

Third, Thaksin Shinawatra has strengthened vis-?-vis his

parliamentary opponents as well as the PAD. He has also str
engthened vis-?-vis any potential opponents within his own p
arty. Before the King signed the Royal Decree, there had bee
n some grumbling against Thaksin within TRT, mainly becaus
e the political situation seemed so hopeless. With the politica
l air cleared by the scheduled election, TRT must unite behin
d Thaksin, because he is both the party’s major selling point
and its major financier. However, this does not mean that ele
ments dissatisfied with Thaksin’s highly centralist approach t
o TRT and governing would not try to suggest a different pat
h, or perhaps leave the party and government once the elect
ion has confirmed Thaksin in his position. So far, Thaksin has
not made public his decision whether he would assume the n
umber one spot on TRT’s party list and the position of prime
minister after TRT’s certain election victory. Some assume th
at he still might take the political break he had announced af
ter the April election, to let constitutional reform run its cour
se. Others speculate that there are concrete signs Thaksin m
ight leave the country altogether for London once the electio
n is over (Matichon, 17 Aug. 2006:11). Given Thaksin’s curre
nt use of royally inspired reconciliation rhetoric, which almos
t always includes dressing in yellow (the color of the King), h
e should certainly take a back seat after the election. Howev
er, it is probably not easy to run an election campaign by rel
ying on Thaksin, but at the same time make clear that he wil
l not be the PM of the next government.

As mentioned above, the Constitutional Court has started a

case that might lead to the dissolution of five parties,
amongst them TRT and the Democrats. In fact, the court’s d
eliberations should not take that long since the legal basis fo
r dissolutions is clear, the case files delivered by the Office of
the Attorney General should not pose great challenges in ter
ms of time, and court hearings should not take more than a f
ew days. However, it would be fatal if the court indeed dissol
ved TRT and the Democrats, as this decision would directly c
ontravene what the King had wished for in his “Royal Messag
e.” In addition, the Constitutional Court would create more pr
oblems by applying the law instead of using it to solve the p
olitical problems, as the King had asked them to do in his ap
peal preceding the nullification of the April election by the sa
me court. After all, it would remove almost the entire establi
shed political class from the political landscape, followed by
an election largely without candidates. This might have been
the reason why Suchit Bunbongkarn, a former judge at the C
onstitutional Court, said “the decree could send a signal that
the two major parties being tried for alleged electoral fraud
would not be dissolved” (Bangkok Post, 22 July 2006). At leas
t not before the election, one might add. The decision could
be made after the election, which would allow the political cl
ass to remain in politics, because it already would have been
returned to the House. Members of Parliament would merely
have to join other political parties.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Endnotes

[i] Ironically, The Nation later became the most emotional,

even militant, Pravda-style standard bearer in the protestors’
relentless hate campaign against Thaksin. More generally, th
e protests as reflected in the development of newspaper rep
orting during the course of events, both in the Thai and Engli
sh language Thai press, should be a good research object for
students interested in the role of a pluralist press (or its abse
nce) in a democracy.

[ii] In the Thai context, however, public demonstrations of

this kind, even if they only draw 20,000-40,000 people, such
as in the case of Sondhi, are easily placed in the context of t
he successful anti-government protests of October 1973 and
May 1992, including the specter of bloodshed.
[iii] Reportedly, the mood has turned sour in Singapore,
because the shares they bought by now have lost about 35 p
ercent of their value. That Lee Kwan Yew criticized the Thai p
olitical system might have to do with the fact that Temasek i
s headed by a lady who happens to be married to his son, w
ho is prime minister of the highly authoritarian city state.

[iv] Around the same time, yet another close personal

associate of Thaksin, Finance Minister Thanong Bhidya, spen
t 125 million baht on a campaign encouraging Thai people to
pay their taxes.

[v] Thaksin tried to make a joke out of this by saying that it

was his kids who did the sale in order to make it possible for
him to concentrate on politics. His son, asked about his role i
n the sale, responded by saying that he did not know a thing
, because it was done by the “phuyai” (seniors).

[vi] Two right-wing TV commentators, former Bangkok

governor Samak Suntharavej and former appointed senator
Dusit Siriwan, both staunch supporters of Thaksin, promptly
attacked Prem in their joint show.

[vii] The Nation as such is insignificant, because its

readership is tiny. However, the same company also publish
es the business daily Krungthep Thurakit and the mass circul
ation Khom Chat Luek.

[viii] This is the title of an article by Thammasat-based public

commentator Kasian Tejapira that appeared in the New Left
Review 39, May-June 2006, pp. 5-37. For a journalistic accou
nt see Colum Murphy. 2006. “‘Thaksin, Get Out!’: Why Thais
Are Angry.” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2006, pp. 7-
13.

[ix] Of course, some observers speculated that Chamlong

had acted on behalf or at least with the encouragement of Pr
em. The Nation (24 Feb. 2006) reported from a visit Thaksin
paid to Prem, that “The premier told a subsequent gathering
of top bureaucrats at City Hall that he asked Prem if he had
encouraged Chamlong Srimuang to oppose him as allegedly
claimed by Chamlong. Thaksin said Chamlong claimed in Na
khon Sawan recently he had decided to join the anti-Thaksin
campaign after receiving a supportive phone call from Prem.
‘I asked General Prem and he told me that what Maj General
Chamlong claimed was untrue. He had never phoned Chamlo
ng. [Prem] insisted he was remaining neutral,’ Thaksin was q
uoted by a source as saying.”

[x] Though a group of students at Thammasat University did

start the process by collecting 50,000 signatures. Their
petition has meanwhile been submitted to the speaker of the
Senate.

[xi] On a comparative note, two Southeast Asian countries

that are much less democratic than Thailand, at roughly the
same time that Bangkok saw mass anti-government demons
trations, made short work of small numbers of demonstrator
s (Putrajaja) and election campaigners (Singapore). In additio
n, it is very unlikely that the governments of Australia, Germ
any, Britain, France or the United States—all undoubtedly de
mocratic—would have allowed such protests to take place.

[xii] This quote is taken from an article written by Subhatra

Bhumiprabhas. It was one of only about four pieces printed
by The Nation that tried to throw a somewhat critical light on
the protests. The hallmark of newspaper reporting during tha
t period was its anti-Thaksin uniformity. Diversity of opinion
had largely disappeared.

[xiii] This brochure was “Stop the Thaksin System: Help us

Rescue our Nation, Rescue our Democracy” (in Thai). It was
produced by Kaewsan Athipho and his twin brother Khwansu
ang. Kaewsan was a caretaker senator, who, at the time of w
riting, had been put forward by the Supreme Court as a cand
idate for the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT), althoug
h the constitution requires election commissioners to be of “
apparent political impartiality” (Article 136). Khwansuang ca
me in seventh in the Bangkok race to the Senate. Bangkok h
as 18 senators.

[xiv] From a statement delivered at the Round Table

Discussion on Political Crisis in Thailand, held at the National
Thai Studies Centre, Australian National University, 23 March
2006.

[xv] Kasian Tejapira. 2005. “Reform and Counter-Reform:

Democratization and Its Discontents in Post-May 1992 Thai P
olitics.” In Towards Good Society. Berlin: Heinrich B?ll Found
ation, pp. 128ff.

[xvi] Not surprisingly, this has become a major point of

criticism by Thai and foreign political observers. A useful
summary of the issues is found in chapters five and six of Pa
suk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. 2004. Thaksin: The Busine
ss of Politics in Thailand. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

[xvii] On the broader issue of “Thaksin’s Political Discourse”

see chapter five in Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathamanan
d. 2005. The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen: NIAS P
ress.
[xviii] For example, Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 2003. “Thailand:
Democratic Authoritarianism.” In Southeast Asian Affairs
2003, pp. 277-290. Singapore: ISEAS.

[xix] I was absolutely stunned when I first read about the

boycott. I had never thought that the Democrats, normally
seen as bureaucratic, cautious, and legalistic, would be as da
ring as adopting such a drastic and novel measure with unfor
eseeable consequences.

[xx] This is a political, not a constitutional argument. Article

116 of the Constitution does not include any reasons for whic
h the House might be dissolved. It stipulates, “The King has t
he prerogative to dissolve the House of Representatives for a
new election of members of the House. The dissolution of the
House of Representatives shall be made in the form of a Roy
al Decree in which the day for a new general election must b
e fixed within 60 days and this election day must be the sam
e throughout the Kingdom.” However, paragraph three of the
same article prevents the PM from repeatedly using the diss
olution for the same purpose by saying, “The dissolution of t
he House of Representatives may be made only once under t
he same circumstance.”

[xxi] In the Thai system, voters who want to abstain need to

tick the respective box on the ballot paper. Putting the blank
paper in the ballot box makes the vote invalid.

[xxii] Figures according to tables in Krungthep Thurakit (5

April, and 10 Aug. 2006), and Michael H. Nelson. 2006. “Thail
ands Wahlen vom Februar 2005: Thaksins kurzlebiger Trium
ph” (forthcoming in Internationales Asienforum; Engl. version
“Thailand’s 2005 General Election: Thaksin’s Shortlived Triu
mph”, unpublished manuscript).
[xxiii] A brief description of the work of his Thongbai
Thongpao Foundation can be found in Kevin F. F. Quigley. 19
96. “Towards Consolidating Democracy: The Paradoxical Rol
e of Democracy Groups in Thailand.” Democratization 3 (3):
264-286.

[xxiv] On 23 April, 26 seats were filled in by-elections in 17

provinces, most of them in the south. The ECT planned a sec
ond round of by-elections in 14 constituencies in nine southe
rn provinces. It was anticipated that this second round would
still leave eight seats unfilled, because only single TRT candi
dates were standing with slim chances of passing the 20 per
cent threshold (Bangkok Post, 25 April 2006).

[xxv] Quoted from an unofficial translation printed in The

Nation (26 April 2006). All major Thai newspapers printed
the King’s speeches.

[xxvi] Unavoidably, the King’s intervention raised the

question of royal power and the constitution within the
context of the particularities of Thai politics (similar to Octob
er 1973, October 1976, and May 1992). In an ideology-heavy
five-part series of articles on royal power, staunch royalist-lib
eral Borwornsak Uwanno, just after he had resigned from his
position as secretary-general of the Thaksin-cabinet, praised
a foreign journalist for his correct understanding: “The writer
made a sound conclusion that critics may allege that the pal
ace has conspired to hold the ultimate reins of power in Thail
and, but with His admonition of the judiciary to do their job, (
His Majesty the King) has laid down a legacy of support for m
odern democracy in Thailand and that the King supports plur
alism. (From the article ‘When kings do good’ by Michael Vati
kiotis, International Herald Tribune, May 18, 2006, p.7.) This
analysis shows that His Majesty the King upholds his role as
a constitutional monarch by advising the constitutional orga
ns to perform their duties, instead of asking the King to brea
ch his constitutional duties” (Bangkok Post, 13 June 2006).

[xxvii] See the decision of the Constitutional Court as

published on its website (Khamwinitchai thi 9/2549, 8 May 2
549).

[xxviii] In a polling station that I observed in Chachoengsao

province, within 10 minutes I saw that four voters ticked the
“no vote” box, which was placed on the right on the bottom
of the ballot paper and could make a well-founded guess tha
t another voter had ticked the TRT box placed near the top o
f the ballot on the left-hand side.

[xxix] One election commissioner had earlier died. His

position was still vacant.

[xxx] At the time of writing, I have not yet finished my

detailed reading of the court’s verdict. So far, no analysis or
criticism of the verdict has been published, although some n
ewspapers printed the entire piece. This situation might hav
e to do with the fact that most observers were happy with ha
ving the ECT punished, irrespective of the “legal details.” Ho
wever, there have been critical voices, too. They might have
been impeded by the courts’ handling of the contempt-of-co
urt issue. Worachet Pakeerat, a German-trained associate pr
ofessor of law at Thammasat University, indicated his criticis
m but added, “Though the court said academic comments co
uld be made, I don’t have the confidence [to make stronger
comments]” (The Nation, 6 Aug. 2006).

[xxxi] For a list of the candidates see Bangkok Post (11 Aug.
2006).
[xxxii] The Thai word baramee is often translated as
“charisma.” This is not correct. A person has baramee when
he can command many people to follow his requests for cert
ain actions because he has built up a high level of respect ov
er decades by his good deeds.

[xxxiii] See Bidhya Bowornwathana. 2004. “Thaksin’s Model

of Government Reform: Prime Ministerislisation through ‘A
Country Is My Company’ Approach.” Asian Journal of Political
Science 12 (1): 135-153.

Michael H. Nelson is a visiting scholar at the Faculty of

Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailan
d; and a senior researcher at the Department of South East A
sian Studies, University of Passau, Germany.

Famed Thai hospitality shows signs of strain

By Thomas Fuller Published: March 20, 2007

BANGKOK: Long one of the most open and

accommodating destinations for tourists and businesspeople
in Asia, the
well-advertised "land of smiles" is showing signs of a subtle
frown
directed toward foreigners.

Over the past seven months, successive Thai governments

have passed
measures scrutinizing land purchases by non-Thais and
clamping down on
long-stay retirees and expatriate workers who lack proper
visas. In
January, the cabinet passed a sweeping bill that tightens
restrictions
on foreign companies, a measure that awaits final approval.

"There's been a trend that suggests rising economic

nationalism,"
said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a professor of political science at
Chulalongkorn University. Thailand, he said, has fallen into a
"very
complex mood of ambivalence" toward outsiders under the
military-led
government that seized power last September.

That mood is evident in a 12th-floor conference room at the

headquarters of Bangkok Bank, where Vongthip Chumpani,
an adviser and
former vice president at the bank, expresses her frustrations
about
certain types of foreigners who come to Thailand - and tend
to stay.

"We are getting a lot of weird retirees here," Vongthip said.

"They can't survive in your country so they come here."

Thailand needs to slow down and catch its breath, she said.
Thaksin
Shinawatra, the prime minister ousted in September, had
entered into a
flurry of free-trade agreements with Australia, China, Japan,
the
United States and others. To Vongthip's thinking, he tried to
pry the
country open too quickly.

"We bent over backward all the time to accommodate

foreign investors," she said.

That could be changing.

Under proposed new rules for foreign investors, companies

such as
Federal Express might have to give up control of their
operations in
Thailand. Car and electronics manufacturers could be barred
from
delivering their cars or disk drives to ports for export; only
Thai-owned companies would be allowed to transport items
within the
country.

Retail chains - big ones like Carrefour and hundreds of

smaller ones
- could be frozen out of future expansion. Land purchases by
thousands
of foreigners could be declared illegal.

These amendments to the Foreign Business Act were

approved by the
Thai cabinet in January and are now under review by the
Council of
State, an independent government body of legal experts.

Since the very first boatloads of Portuguese and Dutch

emissaries
arrived here five centuries ago, Thailand has had a knack for
dealing
with foreigners: trade but not domination, hospitality but not
subservience. Thais successfully gleaned technology from
Europeans,
Americans and Japanese, and the elite sent their children to
study
abroad. Unlike all of its neighbors, Thailand was never
colonized.

But this was before millions of tourists poured into the

country's
spas, beaches, golf courses and restaurants - not to mention
red-light
districts and massage parlors. The number of tourists visiting
Thailand, whose population is 64 million, is expected to
reach nearly
15 million this year, a doubling over the past decade.

On the southern resort island of Phuket, roadside billboards,

written in English, advertise million-dollar condominiums -
this in a
country where a schoolteacher is lucky to bring home a few
hundred
dollars a month. In northeastern Thailand, men from
Germany,
Switzerland, Britain and other Western countries live with
their Thai
wives on neatly groomed streets that stand out from
ramshackle
neighboring villages.

"I've seen so many old farangs with young Thai women,"

said Nattaya
Rattanamanee, 31, an accountant working at a hotel on the
resort island
of Samui, using the Thai word for Westerners. "These old
farangs damage
the reputation of Thailand; they turn Thailand into a land of
prostitutes."

Feeling the strain of the tourist influx, the Thai government

recently announced a new approach: the country would no
longer focus on
the quantity of tourists, but instead target "quality" - read
"wealthy"
- tourists.

"In years past we've always targeted numbers: trying to

achieve the
highest numbers of arrivals possible," said Chattan Kunjara
Na Ayudhya,
a spokesman for the Tourism Authority of Thailand. "It's time
to
change. If we continue to focus mainly on numbers, some
destinations
will not be able to handle that many people."

Any resentment that Thais may harbor toward foreigners is

unlikely
to be felt by short-term vacationers. It is hidden behind an
often
genuine Thai smile and shielded by a wall of politeness.
There is no
generalized backlash against foreigners, Thais say, but
rather concerns
about specific problems: criminals who come to Thailand on
the lam, the
increase in land purchases by foreigners and foreign
companies having
too much influence in the economy.

In September, just before the coup, the head of the country's

immigration department announced that foreign tourists
would be limited
to staying in Thailand for 90 days within any six- month
period. This
was primarily aimed at foreign retirees who take up
permanent residence
without proper paperwork and the thousands of people
working here
without work visas.

One such person was John Mark Karr, the American who
falsely
confessed to the 1996 killing of JonBenet Ramsey, a
Colorado
schoolgirl, and was living in Bangkok as an English teacher.
Karr's
apprehension last August in Bangkok buttressed Thailand's
image as a
magnet for creeps and perverts.
"I hate them. There are so many of those in Thailand," said
Yupa
Boontaworn, a 22-year-old university student, when asked
about people
like Karr. Tourism is good for the Thai economy, she said, but
the
government should move more aggressively against
pedophiles and sex
tourists.

As a tourist destination, Thailand shares much in common

with the
Netherlands: a hands-off government and the veneer of a
tolerant
society, but a surprisingly conservative core. In some ways,
anti-foreign feelings in Thailand arise from the clash between
the
permissive Thailand of skimpily clad bar girls twirling around
poles
and the more traditional side of the country, where women
are too shy
even to wear a swimsuit on a beach. Today, that veneer of
tolerance,
while still intact, is chipping.

"Foreigners shouldn't be able to do anything they please in

Thailand," said Samree Ardsuan, 68, a retired civil servant. If
someone
led a demonstration protesting foreign ownership of
companies, Samree
said, he would definitely join in.

With a few exceptions such as condominiums and small

plots,
foreigners are barred from owning property in Thailand. But
many have
skirted these laws by registering shell companies, a practice
that the
government now promises to stop.
The mood toward foreigners today, analysts say, is a
corollary to
Thailand's political crisis. Many Thais became defensive
when foreign
governments criticized the coup in September as
undemocratic, and today
there are occasional nationalist outbursts. In February, the
head of
the military junta, Sonthi Boonyaratglin, vowed to retake
stakes in a
satellite company that Thaksin's family sold to a Singapore
government
agency last year.

The Thai government says the proposed amendments to the

Foreign
Business Act are long overdue clarifications. But to some
Thais,
including Vongthip of Bangkok Bank, the law would also help
redress
what is seen here as the injustices that accompanied the
financial
crisis of the late 1990s, when indebted Thai companies were
forced to
sell their assets cheaply to foreigners. Foreign banks and
companies,
Vongthip said, "picked up everything for a song."

Many questions about the amendments remain. Analysts say

there could
be less pressure for a new law since one of the more
nationalist
members of the Thai cabinet, Pridiyathorn Devakula,
stepped down as
finance minister in February.

The legal committee also appears to be casting a skeptical

eye on
the proposed new law. "The majority of the committee is not
sure that
the law needs to be amended," Pakorn Nilprapan, the
committee's
secretary, said this month. "We are seeking explanations
from the
Ministry of Commerce."

Even if the amendments do become law, many here predict

that the law's harshest provisions will be quietly forgotten.

"I don't think it's going to be enforced - it's just not the Thai
way," said David Lyman, chairman of Tilleke & Gibbons, a
prominent
Bangkok law firm.

Lyman, who first moved to Thailand in 1949, says he has

seen this
all before: the government has threatened to restrict foreign
ownership
on and off for nearly four decades.

"Reason usually ends up prevailing in Thailand - after all

other options have been exhausted," Lyman said.

A Statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission

THAILAND: For lack of a solution, no solution is also a

solution

According to the Bangkok Post of March 2, the interim prime

minister of Thailand, General Surayud Chulanont, has ordere
d that more police officers be sent to the south in response t
o persistent and growing violence that has resulted in over 1
50 casualties in the last two weeks alone.
The problems of the south are a direct consequence of the
region already being saturated with corrupt and abusive poli
ce and soldiers brought from other parts of Thailand. The hu
man rights violations and other unchecked excesses of the p
olice especially were among the primary causes of the rapid
escalation in violence during 2004 and 2005. The former ad
ministration responded to every incident by sending more. N
ow the current military-appointed prime minister, despite rh
etorical commitments towards peace, is offering the same so
lution: for lack of a solution, no solution is also pretended to
be a solution.

The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) set up by the

government of Pol. Lt. Col. Thaksin Shinawatra ostensibly to
find a way out of the southern morass went to great trouble t
o identify the real causes of the renewed conflict, and propos
e meaningful solutions: not pretend ones. Its findings were al
l but ignored by the authorities, including by the September
19 coup leader, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who was in co
mmand of the military in the region at the time. The interim
administration too has failed to show any genuine interest in
its findings and recommendations, and its softened words ha
ve not been matched by deeds.

The NRC at no point suggested that the solution to the

southern conflict would be to pour in more police and soldier
s. On the contrary, it observed that "the violence that took pl
ace in the area was a reaction to the state's excessively hars
h tactics, which resulted from miscalculated strategies and ci
rcumstantial assessments", and that "the violation of people'
s rights by state officials has the effect of aggravating the sit
uation". Both the current interim prime minister and the new
national police chief have acknowledged the same in recent
times, yet their proposed solution to the violence is apparent
ly to exacerbate it.

Some persons may find this idea contradictory, but under

the current circumstances in Thailand it is not. The solution t
o a regional crisis requires the involvement and genuine com
mitment of the centre. But where the centre is itself in crisis,
the regional crisis becomes a crisis within a crisis. The soluti
on to the one depends on the solution to the other. But in Th
ailand, as in many other countries that have been caught in
similar straits, the regional crisis may be held hostage to the
purposes of parties in the national crisis.

The Asian Human Rights Commission poses the following

question to all persons concerned about the violence in the s
outh of Thailand: what does the army stand to gain by stoppi
ng it? Nearly 400 years ago, Thomas Hobbes rightly observe
d that, "All men that are ambitious of military command are i
nclined to continue the causes of war and stir up trouble and
sedition." How true that is of Thailand today. Nobody should
underestimate the extent to which this military government,
like any other, must obtain legitimacy by creating, not exting
uishing, threats to national security that oblige its long-term
involvement in one guise or another.

How long can the regime use the former prime minister as a
believable bogeyman for everything that has gone wrong in
Thailand over the last five months? It needs other dangers to
society to justify its renewed institutional control, which inclu
des, under the latest plan, arrangements for senior army offi
cers to be appointed as "deputy governors" in all 76 provinc
es. These officers are to be given responsibility to monitor "p
olitical undercurrents", the new expression for anything the
military junta considers a menace to its authority, and report
to the revamped Internal Security Operations Command hea
ded by General Sonthi himself. Apparently, a number have b
een sent to the south already. No doubt they will find plenty
to keep the army involved there for a long time to come.

There are no easy solutions to the problems in the south of

Thailand. But whereas under a proper government some ma
y perhaps be found, under a military government there are o
nly non-solutions. Unable and probably unwilling to come up
with solutions, it instead takes advantage of the crisis. So th
e regional crisis is made a plaything in the bigger national cri
sis; more police and soldiers get sent south not because ther
e is no other solution but precisely because they are not the
solution.

###

About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a

regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobb
ying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based grou
p was founded in 1984.