Table of Contents

Title 2: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State.................................................7

Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention...........................................................................................7
Milo v. Salanga (G.R. No. L-37007)............................................................................7
Cayao v. Del Mundo (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813).............................................................9
Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130).........................................................................11
Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities
........................................................................................................................................13
People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252).........................................................................13
Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)....................15
Title 3: Crimes Against Public Order................................................................................17
Art.134: Rebellion or Insurrection.................................................................................17
People vs. Silongan (G.R. No. 137182).....................................................................17
Enrile vs. Amin (G.R. No. 93335)..............................................................................18
People vs. Manglallan (G.R. No. L-38538)...............................................................19
Title 4: Crimes Against Public Interest..............................................................................21
Art. 168: Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and Other
Instruments of Credit.....................................................................................................21
Tecson v. CA (370 SCRA 181)...................................................................................21
Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or Ecclesiastical
Minister..........................................................................................................................23
Art. 172: Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents...........23
Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388)...................................................................................23
Pajelga V. Scareal (167 SCRA 350)...........................................................................25
Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88)...........................................................................27
Art. 183: Perjury............................................................................................................29
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice (475 SCRA 495).................................................29
Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman (450 SCRA 237)......................................................31
Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145)..............................................................................33
Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions....................................................................35
Ouano v. CA...............................................................................................................35
Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions, and Indecent
Shows.............................................................................................................................37
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673).................................................................37
Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806).......................................................................................39
Fernando v. CA (G.R. No. 159751)............................................................................41
Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers..................................................................43
Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment........................................................43
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)................................................................43
Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)..........................................................45
Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246)............................................................47
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Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order.............................................................................50

Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)................................................................50
Art. 211: Indirect Bribery...............................................................................................53
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152)......................................................53
Art. 212: Corruption of Public Officials........................................................................55
Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256).....................................................................55
Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property......................................................56
Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229)........................................................................56
People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)................................................................................60
Chan v. Sandiganbayan (G. R. No. 149613)..............................................................63
Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property.........................................................65
Tetangco v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 156427).............................................................65
Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129)........................................................................67
Parungao v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025)...........................................................69
Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons..........................................................................................71
Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances.........71
People v. Gelaver........................................................................................................71
People v. Amamongpong............................................................................................73
People v. Oyanib.........................................................................................................75
Art. 248: Murder............................................................................................................77
People vs Mallari (G.R. No. 145993).........................................................................77
People vs Gonzales (G.R. No. 139542)......................................................................79
People vs Avecilla (G.R. No. 117033)........................................................................81
Art. 249: Homicide........................................................................................................83
Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087).......................................................83
People vs Ullep (G.R. No. 132547)............................................................................85
People vs Antonio (G.R. No. 128900)........................................................................87
Art. 251: Death Caused in a Tumultous Affray..............................................................89
People v. Anecito Unlagada y Suanque (G.R. No. 141080).......................................89
Sison vs. People (G.R. No. 108280-83).....................................................................91
People v. Cresenciano Maramara (G.R. No. 110994)................................................94
Art. 254: Discharge of Firearms.....................................................................................96
Dado v. People (G.R. No. 131421).............................................................................96
Art. 257: Unintentional Abortion...................................................................................99
People v. Salufrania (G.R. No. L-50884)...................................................................99
People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-42819)...................................................................101
Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.....................................................102
Kingston(e) Li v. People and CA (G.R. No. 127962)..............................................102
Art. 266-A: Rape..........................................................................................................104
People v. Hermocilla (G.R. No. 175830).................................................................104
People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035).......................................................................106
People v. Oga (G.R. No. 152302).............................................................................107
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Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security...................................................109

Art. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention....................................................109
People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203).......................................................................109
People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182)................................................113
People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726).........................................................................116
Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention.................................................................................118
People v. Dadles (G.R. Nos. 118620-21)..................................................................118
People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262)........................................................................120
People v. Roluna (G.R. No. 101797)........................................................................122
Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor..................................................124
People v. Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644)....................................................124
People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316).........................................................126
People v. Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519).........................................128
Art. 287: Light Coercions............................................................................................130
Baleros v. People (G.R. No. 138099).......................................................................130
Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006).............................................................132
Title 10: Crimes Aganst Property....................................................................................133
Art. 293: Robbery........................................................................................................133
People v. Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera (G.R. No. 97426).......................133
People v. Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large), and Elvis Doca
(G.R. No. 126781)....................................................................................................135
People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.R. No. 13106).....................................................137
Art. 308: Theft..............................................................................................................139
Laurel v. Abrogar (G.R. No. 155076).......................................................................139
Alfonso D. Gaviola v. People G.R. No. 163297......................................................144
Santos v. People (G.R. No. 77429)...........................................................................146
Art. 310: Qualified Theft..............................................................................................149
People v. Salonga (G.R. No. 131131).......................................................................149
Roque v. People (G.R. No. 138954).........................................................................152
People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233)...................................................................157
Art. 312: Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property......162
Quinao v. People (335 SCRA 741)...........................................................................162
Art. 315: Estafa............................................................................................................164
Ong v. People (G.R. No. 165275)............................................................................164
Chua v. People (G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30).............................................................167
Gonzaludo v. People (G.R. No. 150910)..................................................................169
Art. 318: Other Deceits................................................................................................172
Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822).......................................................172
Title 11: Crimes against Chastity.....................................................................................175
Art. 333, 334: Adultery and Concubinage...................................................................175
Beltran v. People (G.R. No. 137567).......................................................................175
Vera Neri v. People (G.R. No. 96602)......................................................................177
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Art. 338: Simple Seduction..........................................................................................179

People v. Pascua (GR No. 128159-62).....................................................................179
People v. Teodosio (GR. No. 97496)........................................................................182
Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction,
Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness.................................................................................186
Beltran v. People (334 SCRA 106)...........................................................................186
People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52)...............................................................................188
Alonte v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245).......................................................................190
Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness...................................................................................192
Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340)......................................................................192
People vs. Collado (353 SCRA 381)........................................................................194
Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32).............................................................196
Art. 337: Qualified Seduction......................................................................................197
People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096)..........................................................................197
People v. Manansala (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)...........................................................199
People v. Alvarez (G.R. No. L-34644).....................................................................202
Art. 342: Forcible Abduction.......................................................................................205
People vs. Egan (GR No. 139338)...........................................................................205
People vs. Ablaneda (G.R. No. 131914)..................................................................209
People vs. Sabrado (G.R. No. 126114).....................................................................211
Art. 349: Bigamy..........................................................................................................215
Diego v. Castillo.......................................................................................................215
Abunado v. People....................................................................................................216
Cacho v. People........................................................................................................217
Title 13: Crimes against Honor........................................................................................219
Art. 353: Libel..............................................................................................................219
Fermin v. People (G.R. No. 157643)........................................................................219
Magno v. People (G.R. No. 133896)........................................................................225
Buatis v. People (G.R. No. 142509).........................................................................231
Art. 358: Slander..........................................................................................................236
Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351)..................................................................236
Caal v. People (G.R. No. 163181)..........................................................................238
Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157)..........................................................................239
Title 14: Quasi-Offenses..................................................................................................240
Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence.........................................................................240
Loney vs. People (G.R. No. 152644).......................................................................240
Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387).....................................................................242
People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588).............................................................244
Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)...........................................................................247
Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833).........................247
Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R. No. 121087)............................................249
Edgardo A. Gaanan vs. IAC and People (G.R. No. L- 69809).................................251
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Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539)..................................................................................254

People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)....................................................................254
People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470).........................................................................256
People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380)....................................................................258
Probation Law..................................................................................................................260
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044).........................260
Lilia Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203).................................................................262
Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108)...............264
Anti-Fencing Law............................................................................................................266
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584)......................................................................266
Tan v. People (GR No. 134298)...............................................................................271
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)..........................................................276
People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)..................................................276
Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. People (G.R. No. 147333)................................................278
Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72)............................280
Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532)..................................................................................282
People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870).......................................................................282
People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656)...................................................................283
People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397).......................................................................284
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.............................................................................285
People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525).................................................................285
Suson v. People (494 SCRA 691).............................................................................287
People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)............................................................................289
Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294)..........................................291
Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703).........................................................................291
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559).....................................................................293
People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12)..................................................296
Anti Fencing Law (P.D. 1612).......................................................................................298
Francisco v. People (G.R. No. 146584)....................................................................298
Anti-Bouning Checks Law (B.P. 22)...............................................................................301
Marigomen v. People (G.R. No. 153451).................................................................301
Sycip v. CA (328 SCRA 447)...................................................................................304
Recuerdo v. People (G.R. No. 133036)....................................................................307
Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape..................................................................................309
People v. Moreno......................................................................................................309
People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43).........................................................................310
People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515).........................................................................312
Art. 148: Direct Assault...............................................................................................313
People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201)............................................................................313
People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523)..........................................................................314
People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201)..........................................................................315

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John Aceveda
2008-0032

Title 2: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State

Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention
Milo v. Salanga (G.R. No. L-37007)
Facts:
On April 21, 1973, at around 10 in the evening, in barrio Baguinay,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, Juan Tuvera, a Barrio Captain, accompanied by several
policemen, maltreated Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fist
blows and immediately thereafter without legal grounds, deliberately deprived
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Valdez of his liberty. However, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged are not sufficient to support the filing of the
information made by Prosecutor Milo. That he was not a public officer who can
be charged with arbitrary detention. Respondent Judge Salanga granted the
motion. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not Tuvera, a barrio captain, is a public officer who can be
liable for the crime of arbitrary detention?
Decision:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that long before the enactment of P.D. 299,
Barrio lieutenants, who were later named Barrio Captains and now Barangay
Captains , were recognized as persons in authority. The Court ruled on its
various decisions, ruled them as deemed persons in authority. Under R.A. No.
3590, otherwise known as the Revised Barrio Chapter, the powers and duties of
a barrio Captain include the following; to took after the maintenance of public
order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor
in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in such barrio, to look
after the general welfare of the barrio, to enforce all laws and ordinances, and
organize and lead an emergency group for the maintenance of peace and order
within the barrio. He is a peace officer in the in the barrio considered under the
law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons
within legal limits.

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John Aceveda
2008-0032

Cayao v. Del Mundo (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813)

Facts:

Petitioner is a driver of Donny's Transit Bus. On October 22, 1992, while

travelling the Mataas na Lupa, Alulod, Indang, Cavite, he overtook a Sto. Nio
Liner driven by Arnel Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the bus driven by the
petitioner almost collided head-on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney. It
turned out that the jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del
Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was one of the passengers therein along
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with his sons. On the same day, he was apprehended by policemen of PNPIndang and immediately brought before the sala of respondent judge. Thereat,
petitioner was accused by the respondent of nearly causing an accident and
without giving petitioner any opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted
that complainant be punished. Petitioner was compelled by respondent judge to
choose from three punishments, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted
homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to be put in jail for three (3)
days. Petitioner chose the third and which he was forced to sign a "waiver of
detention" by respondent judge. He was immediately escorted to the municipal
jail. He was not actually incarcerated but he still remained in the premises of the
municipal jail for three days, by way of serving his "sentence". On the third day,
complainant was released. Hence this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was unduly deprived of his liberty and that
respondent judge can be held liable for arbitrary detention?

Decision:

Yes. The Supreme court ruled that while it is true that complainant was not
put behind bars as respondent had intended, however, complainant was not
allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not
synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as
confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent
judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered
the arrest and detention of complainant without legal. In overtaking another
vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committed a
crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the warrantless
arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, it
was duly proved that petitioner was indeed deprived of his liberty for three days
on the ground of mere personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of
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respondent contrary to the law.

John Aceveda
2008-0032

Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130)

Facts:
On September 1, 1997, the private offended parties who are members of
the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
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Environment and Natural Resources station at Tacloban City, accompanied by

SPO3 Cinco and SPO1 Capoquian, went to the Island of Daram, Western Samar
to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At that
afternoon, they found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in
breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner
Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the
boats. A heated altercation ensued between them. Petitioner accompanied by ten
armed men brought the DENR team to petitioners house where they had dinner
and drinks. The team left at 2 in the morning. This matter was brought to before
the Sandiganbayan which ruled and holds petitioner for arbitrarily detaining the
private offended parties.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is criminally liable for arbitrary detention?
Decision:
No. the Supreme Court ruled that the determinative factor in Arbitrary
Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. The elements of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention are: 1.) That the offender is a public officer or
employee, 2.) That he detains a person and 3.) That the detention is without legal
grounds.There is no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private
offended parties. There was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended
parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house
and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at
that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the
island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat. Petitioner, being then a
municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
Team in his house. The testimony made by the private offended parties negate
the element of detention. Fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.
Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hardand-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.

11 | P a g e

Gil Acosta
2008-0085

Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper

Judicial Authorities
People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252)
Facts:
12 | P a g e

On Nov. 18, 1994 herein accused Jesus Garcia boarded a jeep carrying a
plastic bag, and occupied the seat next to the driver. Also in that jeepney two
policeman who were in civilian clothes. After herein accused boarder smelled
marijuana of which seemed to emanate from the plastic bag carried by Garcia. To
confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow the accused when he gets of the
jeepney. When the two policeman were certain that it was indeed marijuana that
the accused was in possession they quickly identified themselves and arrested
Garcia. The accused after the arrest was turned over to the CIS office at the
Baguio Water district compound for further investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of the person as provided
for in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
NO. The Sc held that there was no irregularity with the turn over of the
appellants to the CIS office. It was clarified that this has been the practice of the
arresting officers as their office had previously arranged with the CIS for
assistance with respect to investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office
being more specialized in the area of investigation. Neither can the police officers
be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Art. 125 of the
RPC, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some legal ground
and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable
by the afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that
appellant was arrested for possession of 5 kls. Of marijuana in Nov. 28, 1994 at 2
p.m. a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for
further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to the court in the
afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of
investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the
time of his arrest.

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Gil Acosta
2008-0085

Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts:
On September 7, 1997 Jasper Agbay together with a Sherwin Jugalbot
14 | P a g e

were arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station by herein private
respondent policemen. They were arrested for an alleged violation of R.A. 7160.
The following day a complaint for violation of said law was filed against the two
accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one
Gicarya for and behalf of her daughter Gayle.
On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that
they be released, considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained
petitioner to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997.
The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to
the proper judicial authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the act
of Gicarya in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for the purposes of P.I.
as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within the
requirements of Art. 25.
Isuue:
Wheter or not there was a violation of Art. 125 of the RPC?
Decision:
NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent
behind Art. 125 of the RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this
power of the MCTC to order release when he applied for and was granted his
release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the RPC
has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the
MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

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Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052

Title 3: Crimes Against Public Order

Art.134: Rebellion or Insurrection
People vs. Silongan (G.R. No. 137182)
Facts:
The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were
convicted in the Regional Trial Court for the crime of kidnapping with Serious
Illegal Detention of Alexander Saldaa and his three companions. The four
victims were taken to a mountain hideout and the appellants demanded ransom
money for their release. Alexander was detained for six months until he was
finally released.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of kidnapping committed by the accused should
be absorbed in rebellion?
Decision:
As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that
16 | P a g e

consequently, the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find
the same likewise to be without merit. As held in Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.
Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily
mean that the crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion.
Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed
was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their
allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel
surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with
disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052

Enrile vs. Amin (G.R. No. 93335)

Facts:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile as having committed rebellion with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and
accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1,
1989 in his house knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of
PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him?
Decision:
The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce
Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot
complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it
17 | P a g e

prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It
should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
The intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply
because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is
completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives,
that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the
crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052

People vs. Manglallan (G.R. No. L-38538)

Facts:
Ka Daniel, the leader of the New People's Army (NPA) in Sta. Ana,
Cagayan directed accused Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos,
and Virgilio Ballesteros, members of the NPA to go to Barrio Punti and kill one
Apolonio Ragual who was suspected by Ka Daniel to be a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) informer. Said four went to the barrio of Ragual carrying with
them their firearms. They arrived at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at
the river bank giving his carabao a bath. Ramos went to him and after a while
shot him with his gun. Manglallan also shot him followed with another shot by
Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual fell down and died. Manglallan then placed
on the dead body of Ragual a writing and drawing made by their association
warning the people and the PC of their activities.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by the accused is rebellion or
murder?
Decision:
In the case of People vs. Agarin, which was a prosecution for murder, like
18 | P a g e

the present case, where the accused Huk member with his companions killed the
victim because he was a PC informer, this Court held that the crime committed is
simple rebellion and not murder, as follows:
The offense perpetrated by appellant is murder, qualified by
abuse of superior strength. Considering, however, the fact
that the killing was committed as a means to or in the
furtherance of the subversive ends of the Huk balahaps
(HUKS)

because

appellant

and

his

companions,

Commander Manaing and Commander Vida suspected the

deceased to have acted as a spy and had informed the BOT
and Government agencies regarding the presence of the
Huks in that region, we find Federico Agarin alias
Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple rebellion
only (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515; 52 Off. Gaz.
[12] 5506; Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 116; People vs. Melecio
Aquino, et al., 108 Phil 814; 57 Off. Gaz [51] 91 80)'" [People
vs. Agarin, 109 Phil. 430, 436]"
The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the
crime he committed is not murder but the crime of rebellion punishable under
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

19 | P a g e

Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz

2007-0388

Title 4: Crimes Against Public Interest

Art. 168: Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank
Notes and Other Instruments of Credit
Tecson v. CA (370 SCRA 181)
Facts:
On April 28, 1990, a buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank
Operatives in order to capture a certain Mang Andy who is involved in a
syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. Labita and
Marqueta (members of the buy-bust operation team) acted as poseur-buyer,
approached Mang Andy inside the Jollibee restaurant. When the civilian informer
introduced them to Mang Andy, the latter was convinced and drew 10 pieces of
US dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, Labita and Marqueta introduced
themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Mang Andy whom they
later identified as herein petitioner, Alejandro Tecson.
Petitioner denies liability for the crime of illegal possession and use of
false treasury bank notes and other instruments of credit as defined in Art, 168 of
the Revised Penal Code. According to him, to make him liable under the said
provision, his possession of counterfeit dollar notes should be coupled with intent
to use. In other words, petitioner contends that possession without intent to use
counterfeit US dollar notes would not make him criminally liable.

20 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not from the facts of the case, Alejandro Tecson is liable under
Art. 168 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled
with intent to use the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to
constitute a crime. However, from the facts of the case it can be inferred that the
accused had the intent to use the fake dollar notes. In the course of the
entrapment, petitioners natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the
poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly
shows his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note
that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with
the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually
the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did
was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly
therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention
to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was
only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the
legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties.

21 | P a g e

Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094

Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or

Ecclesiastical Minister
Art. 172: Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified
Documents
Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388)
Facts:
Petitioners Inocentes Amora, Jr. and Claudio Murillo were accused of four
(4) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioners allegedly
falsify the Time Book and Payroll Voucher of the municipality of Guindulman,
Bohol, covering the period from September 1 to 30, 1972 by making it appear
that Vicente Begamano and Alfredo Bagtasos rendered 21 days services each in
"gathering boulders for shore protection" for the period from September 1 to 30,
1972 when they did not in fact render said services. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Bohol finds the accused Guilty as charged.
The Court of Appeals held that the accused were not guilty of estafa
because evidently the Municipality of Guindulman did not suffer any loss or
damage arising from the payrolls. On the contrary, the government gained from
the said project. However, the Court of Appeals found that Inocentes Amora, Jr.
was a municipal employee and convicted him of falsification by public officer.
Although Claudio Murillo was not in the government service he was also
convicted of falsification by public officer on the ground that there was a
conspiracy between him and Amora. The Court of Appeals also held that the
appellants were motivated by a single intention and so found them guilty of only
22 | P a g e

one (1) instead of four (4) crimes.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense of
good faith.
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that although the accused altered a public
document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would
not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was
prejudiced by the alteration or error."
In the instant case, It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming
payment under the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so
many cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the
municipal wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll
system which is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason
could only be that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman
suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders
actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the
additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations
suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is
obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith.
The petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which
adjudged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the
petitioners are acquitted.

23 | P a g e

Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094

Pajelga V. Scareal (167 SCRA 350)

Facts:

Petitioner filed a Petition for review on certiorari of the Sandiganbayan's

decision finding him guilty of Falsification of Public Documents through reckless
imprudence in the first case and Infidelity in the Custody of Documents in the
second case.

Petitioner now alleges that he cannot be convicted of falsification under

either paragraph (2) or paragraph (4) of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
as he was not a party to the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale, nor did he
impersonate anybody in furtherance of the sale. He also questions his conviction
under Art. 171 (2) as he pleaded to and was tried on the basis of an information
charging him with falsification under paragraph (4) of Art. 171. He contends that
to convict him under paragraph (2) of said Article would be to deprive him of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. The motive and intent to falsify
attributed to him are likewise alleged to be baseless, as there really was a
contract of sale between him and Ablat executed two (2) months before the
questioned sale between Ablat and the provincial government of Batanes. Finally,
petitioner contends that, even assuming that there was falsification as defined in
Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, still, no conviction against him can lie as no
24 | P a g e

material damage was caused the government by reason of non-consummation of

the sale.

The Solicitor General, upon the other hand, maintains that the offense
committed is falsification, defined and penalized under paragraph (4) of Art. 171
of the Revised Penal Code since the claim of the petitioner that Ablat was the
owner of the motorcycle is untruthful and petitioner was an active participant in
the making of the untruthful narration of facts.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the charge of falsification of public

or official document?
Decision:

Petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.

As Justice Albert says: "in the falsification of public or official document

under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is not enough that the falsification
be committed by a public officer; it is also necessary that it should be committed
by a public officer with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instrument,
indentures, certificates, etc., in the execution of which he participates by reason
of his office."

In the instant case, the deed of absolute sale executed by Ablat was
adjudged to be a falsified document because it conveyed the impression that
Ablat was the owner of the motorcycle, subject matter of the transaction, when
such was not the case, as the petitioner Fajelga is the true and registered owner
of the said motorcycle, thereby making an untruthful narration of facts.
25 | P a g e

It should be noted, however, that the statement that Ablat was the owner
of the motorcycle in question is not altogether untruthful since the petitioner
Fajelga had previously sold the motorcycle to him. While the deed of sale may
not have been registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation, Ablat
nevertheless became the owner thereof before its aborted sale to the provincial
government of Batanes.

Besides, malicious intent to injure a third person is absent. In fact, neither

the government nor any third person incurred any loss by reason of the
"untruthful" narration.

Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094

Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88)

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Public Document.
26 | P a g e

Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court of falsifying the
signature of Caridad Dorol, causing it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has
signed her name on a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in his favor, when
in truth and in fact he well knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said
document, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
except for the award for damage.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of discretion
in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner?
Decision:

We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court.

The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a
forged document as found by the trial and appellate court. Petitioner,
nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that
there is no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery
was done under his direction.

This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no

need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As
27 | P a g e

keenly observed by the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was

submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for
examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and
not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial
Assessor's Office of Sorsogon. In other words, the petitioner was in possession
of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private
complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be
the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence
of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood
to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore,
we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.

28 | P a g e

Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280

Art. 183: Perjury

Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice (475 SCRA 495)
Facts:
Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the
Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against
certain importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The matter involved
151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany.
Because of such protest a conference was made among and between the
parties in order for them to reach a compromise agreement.
As the compromise was done, the reception of documents ensued between
the parties. On the process of such reception, the phrase in the agreement was
change by inserting the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the
compromise.
The petitioner filed a case of perjury against the respondents which was
dismissed by the Secretary of Justice for lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether a criminal case of perjury will prosper?
Decision:
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in
solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful
29 | P a g e

statements and not being included in the provisions of the next

preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in
lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in
this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest
concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the
false statement is made.
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there
must be malice on the part of the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil
intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious
statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what
was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated
as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows
his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as
to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the
truth of a statement is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously
the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made
by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
defendant did not believe those statements to be true.

30 | P a g e

Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280

Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman (450 SCRA 237)

Facts:
Petitioner Celsa P. Acua (petitioner) is a former teacher of the Angeles City
National Trade School (ACNTS) in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent
Pedro Pascua (respondent Pascua) was ACNTS Officer-In-Charge while
respondent Ronnie Turla (respondent Turla) was a member of its faculty.
A meeting within the school was conducted between teachers and personnels
of the school regarding matters which were arising among them. As on offshoot
of the meeting, series of misconduct case were file by and among them.
Such cases though filed administratively, others still filed a cases for violation
of perjury under the Revised Penal Code. Because of different acts which prove
or tend to prove the same.
Issue:
Whether a criminal case for perjury will prosper?
Decision:

Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the

existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The
elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code are:

31 | P a g e

(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an

affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was
made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.
Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are
absent here in that private respondents statements were not material to that
case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280

Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145)

Facts:
Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989, he
32 | P a g e

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, a verified petition for
naturalization.
Later on, the petitioner withdrew such petition for naturalization for some
unknown reason.
After 2 years, a case was filed against him by his wife for perjury, stating that
during within the time the petitioner is asking for naturalization, he committed
acts of perjury by stating material facts which his wife said was all false.
Issue:

Whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false

statements he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years
prior to the filing of the Information for perjury?
Decision:
We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor
General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the
withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material
statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in which
the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a
prosecution for the said crime is commenced. At the time he filed his petition for
naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements
of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated
material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition
without even stating any reason therefore. But such withdrawal only terminated
the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury
he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State
from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the
Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the
petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence
of his unlawful act.

33 | P a g e

Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297

Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions

Ouano v. CA
Facts:
On June 8, 1977, Julieta Ouano obtained a loan from PNB. As security for
said loan, she executed a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land locataed
at Opao, Mandaue City. She default;ted on her obligation.
On September 29, 1980, PNB filed a petition for extra judicial foreclosure
with the City Sheriff.
On November 4, 1980, the sheriff prepared a notice of sale setting the date of
public auction of the two parcels of land on December 5, 1980 and caused the notice to
be published in the Cebu Daily Times, a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaue
City, in three separate issues. Likewise, he posted copies thereof in public places in
Mandaue City and in the place where the properties are located.
However, the sale as scheduled and published did not take place as the parties, on
four separate dates, executed Agreements to Postpone Sale.
Finally, on May 29, 1981, the sheriff conducted the auction sale, awarding the two
34 | P a g e

parcels of land to PNB, the only bidder.

On March 28, 1983, Julieta sent demand letters to PNB and petitioner, pointing
out irregularities in the foreclosure sale. Julieta filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu for the nullification of the foreclosure sale.
The RTC of Cebu rendered a decision saying that want of republication rendered the
foreclosure sale void.
PNB and petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals and said Court
affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the requirements of Act. No. 3135, the governing law for extrajudicial foreclosures were complied with?
Decision:
No, the republication and reposting of notice were not complied with. The waiver
by the parties only authorized the adjournment of the execution sale. There is nothing in
the statute that states that republication and reposting may be waived.

35 | P a g e

Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016

36 | P a g e

Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and

Exhibitions, and Indecent Shows
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673)
Facts:
Respondent appellate court affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board xrating IGLESIA NI CRISTOs TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128.
The records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for
"attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting
Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for
criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible. They
suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's own faith and beliefs
and avoid attacks on other faiths. Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was xrated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible
and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. Exhibit "C" shows
that Series No. 121 was x-rated for reasons of the attacks, they do on,
specifically, the Catholic religion. Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was
not favorably recommended because it outrages Catholic and Protestant's
beliefs. On second review, it was x-rated because of its unbalanced
interpretations of some parts of the bible. In sum, the respondent Board x-rated
petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of
petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary
religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the
said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
Issue:
Whether respondent board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioner's religious program for the reason that they constitute an
attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and
good customs?

Decision:

37 | P a g e

It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any
religion" as a ground allegedly because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are
contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully
disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be
invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any
religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any
religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over
by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.

38 | P a g e

Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016

Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806)

Facts:
Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, police authorities seized and confiscated reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned
the seized materials in public. "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and coedited by plaintiff Leo Pita was among the publications seized, and later burned.
Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera.
39 | P a g e

In his Answer and Opposition, defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the

confiscation and burning of obscene reading materials but claimed that the said
materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities,
and that the said confiscation and seizure was undertaken pursuant to P.D. No.
960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. In opposing the plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, defendant pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign conducted on
December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials confiscated belonged to the magazine
stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials,
and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court
warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply
of their determination that they are obscene?
Decision:
(PD No. 960 as amended by PD No. 969) Sec. 2. Disposition of the
Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings,
sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in
Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the following
rules: (a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the
Government to be destroyed. (b) Where the criminal case against any violator of
this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the
violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless
be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved
by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days
after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of
National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense
shall be final and unappealable.
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court
(1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant
40 | P a g e

of person arrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for

dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime
committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being
readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal
Code. To say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a
result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very
complaint of the petitioner.

Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016

Fernando v. CA (G.R. No. 159751)

Facts:
PNP-CIDG NCR conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the
name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair because of the reports of sale and
distribution of pornographic materials. Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional
Trial Court issued search warrant for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy.
Police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy
Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store
attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated
twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed
pornographic.
41 | P a g e

Petitioners, with Warren Tingchuy, were charged for selling and exhibiting
obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and women
having sexual intercourse, lewd photographs of nude men and women in
explicating positions which acts serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
for lust or pornography to public view.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of
the search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that
since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene
materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and
that he was selling the said materials. Moreover, he contends that the appellate
courts reason for convicting him, on a presumption of continuing ownership
shown by an expired mayors permit, has no sufficient basis since the
prosecution failed to prove his ownership of the establishment. Estorninos, on the
other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he
introduce himself so.

Issue:
Whether petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of
obscene materials?
Decision:
The Supreme Court emphasizes that mere possession of obscene
materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable
under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the
dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms
under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not
require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for
sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that
petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.

42 | P a g e

Ray Nagrampa Jr. B.

2008-0061

Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers

Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
Facts:
On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio, Jr both
Filipino were married. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted
the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single. A Decree of Divorce
was issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris
County, Texas (247th Judicial District) dissolving their marriage. Subsequently, on
June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein
complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego The marriage contract shows that this
time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil
status of single.
A criminal case for bigamy was filed before respondent Judge and
promulgated a decision, on February 24, 1999 acquittal said accused.
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent
Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence and for allegedly
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering
judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
Issue:

43 | P a g e

Whether or not there was unjust judgment made by the respondent

Judge?
Decsion:
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and
penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it
must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is
unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is
firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it
is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a
judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a
defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the
law.
As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting
an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of
bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge
in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the
complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative
complaint.
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment.

44 | P a g e

Ray Nagrampa Jr. B.

2008-0061

Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)

Facts:
This is a complaint filed by Louis Vuitton, S.A., represented by counsel,
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pea and Nolasco Law Office, against Judge
Francisco Diaz Villanueva of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36, on the ground that the latter knowingly rendered a manifestly unjust
judgment.
A criminal case was file by entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose V.
Rosario", Louis Vuitton, S.A. accusing the latter of unfair competition as defined
by paragraph 1 of Article 189, Revised Penal Code. But the trial court acquitted
the accused because of lack of the element constituting said crime. complainant
assailed the judge decision for failure to consider the alleged lack of credibility of
Felix Lizardo, violated the constitutional mandate that decisions should be
rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case and ignoring the
ruling Converse Rubber Corp. vs. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc., that "the
statute on unfair competition extends protection to the goodwill of a manufacturer
45 | P a g e

or dealer"
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of knowingly rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment?
Decision:
The Revised Penal Code holds a judge liable for knowingly rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment. Article 204 thereof provides:
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a
case submitted to him for decision shall be punished . . .
The law requires that the (a) offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
he knew that said judgment is unjust. In some administrative cases decided by
this Court, We have ruled that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
In this case, We are constrained to hold that complainant failed to
substantiate its claims that respondent judge rendered an unjust judgment
knowingly. It merely relied on the failure of respondent judge to mentioned the
motion in the decision, on his alleged reliance on the testimony of defense
witness and on the delay in the promulgation of the case. But they are not
enough to show that the judgment was unjust and was maliciously rendered. A
judgment is said to be unjust when it is contrary to the standards of conduct
prescribed by law. 9 The test to determine whether an order or judgment is unjust
may be inferred from the circumstances that it is contrary to law or is not
supported by evidence.
The decision herein rests on two legal grounds: first, that there was no
unfair competition because the elements of the crime were not sufficiently
proven; second, that Jose V. Rosarion who was accused as owner/proprietor of
COD was not properly charged as his personality is distinct from that of the
COD's.

46 | P a g e

Ray Nagrampa Jr. B.

2008-0061

Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246)

Facts:
In January 1987, Buenavista filed two complaints for rape in the Municipal
Trial Court of Aborlan Palawan , against Samuel M. Ledesma of having raped
Gail Buenavista, the 11-year-old daughter of the complainant. A no bail was
recommended but the judge admitted the accused to bail and directed that he be
released from custody.
On August 5, 1988, based on an affidavit of desistance executed by the
offended party on July 26, 1988, the day after she was kidnapped, a Motion to
Dismiss the rape cases dated July 4, 1988 was filed by Atty. Edgardo S. Arias,
counsel of the accused. The affidavit was notarized by First Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Sesinio B. Belen who certified that lie had "personally examined the
above-named affiant" and that he was "convinced that she voluntarily executed
the foregoing affidavit and understood the contents thereof'.
The complainant has filed an administrative case against Judge Marcelo
Garcia with gross ignorance of the law for dismissing the rape complaints on the
basis of the minor's affidavit of desistance knowing, as he should have known,
that an eleven-year old girl is incompetent to execute such affidavit.
Issue:
47 | P a g e

Whether or not respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law and for
knowingly issuing an unjust order or judgment?
Decision:
After a careful consideration of the complaint and respondent Judge's
comment thereon, we find merit in the complainant's charge that Judge Garcia
acted either in gross ignorance of the law or with malice and deliberate intent to
unjustly dismiss the criminal cases against Samuel Ledesma. As observed by Mr.
Justice Campos.
'To be guilty of 'knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,' it is
necessary that the judgment or order was rendered with conscious
and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice And the test to
determine whether the judgment or order is unjust, may be inferred
from the circumstance that it is contrary to law or is not supported
by evidence. (In re: Rafael C. Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan.
21, 1974; 55 SCRA 107). Judgment may be said to be unjust when
it is manifestly against the law and contrary to the weight of
evidence. (Sec. 1, par. [c], Rule 37, Rules of Court). An unjust
judgment is one contrary to the standards of right and justice or
standards of conduct prescribed by the law. (US vs. Oglesby
Grocery Co., 264 F. 691; Komen vs. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9;
289 S.W. 838).' (p. 4, Report and Recommendation.)
In view of Judge Garcia's legal backs round as a former Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan in 1985, the Court cannot imagine that he would be
ignorant of the law which penalizes statutory rape (Art. 335, Par. 3, Revised
Penal Code) or that he did not know that as the victim's consent in statutory rape
is invalid, it is not a defense (People vs. Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265; People vs.
Celic, 137 SCRA 166). Being incompetent to give valid consent to the rape
committed against her, her consent to the dismissal of the original charge against
her rapist is likewise invalid.
Judge Garcia's allegation that "ample amount" had been paid by the
accused to the complainant to settle the case "during a sort of a conference
between the parties in the chambers of the presiding judge" (Emphasis supplied;
p. 13, Rollo) while evidently intended to impugn the motives of the complainant in
prosecuting the rapist and kidnapper of his daughter has only succeeded in
revealing Judge Garcia's improper and immoral intervention in brokering a
compromise of the criminal cases against Ledesma. It is an admission that he is
48 | P a g e

either ignorant of the rule that criminal cases are not allowed by law to be
compromised, and that an offer of compromise by the accused is an implied
admission of guilt (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court), or that he does not know
that his participation in such a transaction is unbecoming of a judge.
Respondent Judge also admitted that the offended party, Gail Buenavista,
has never appeared before him "even for once" (p. 13, Rollo), That circumstance
would have aroused suspicion in a more alert Judge that she was being
sequestered by the accused to prevent her from disowning the letter she
supposedly signed in defense of the accused (Annex B, p. 24, Rollo) and her
affidavit of desistance (Annex B-2, p. 17, Rollo).
For all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Marcelo G. Garcia guilty
of serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an
unjust order or judgment. The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as follows:

Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a
case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual disqualification.

49 | P a g e

Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386

Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order

Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)
Facts:
This is an administrative case initiated by the sworn affidavit-complaint of
Lucia F. Layola, dated 12 August 1997, charging Presiding Judge Basilio R.
Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and
with gross ignorance of the law. Complainant sent the above-mentioned affidavitcomplaint to Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, BGen. Manuel B. Casaclang
(Ret.), of the Office of the Ombudsman who, in turn, indorsed the same to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of
Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross
ignorance of the law. According to the complainant the respondent judge directed
that accused SPO2 German be held in the custody of his immediate superior, the
Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any legal and factual basis,
instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for murder, a
heinous and non-bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion
for reconsideration interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military
The Office of the Court Administrator, after thorough examination of the
evidence submitted before it, found that the charges for violation of Section 3 (e),
R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust interlocutory order, bereft of merit but
respondent judge was adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the OCA stressed that the important element of the
50 | P a g e

offense, which is damage or injury to the complainant, or manifest partiality

shown to any party, is anemic of evidentiary support. There is no allegation of
any injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of
the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage
given to the adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in
connection with the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration
of the order granting the petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take
custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found such a charge to be
unfounded.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements:
1) that the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he
knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a
manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance.
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the
questioned order knowing it to be unjust, and neither is there any proof of
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
Thus, the OCA recommended:
1. x x x
2. That the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order be
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. is liable for
issuance of unjust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal
Code notwithstanding the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator that the same be dismissed for lack of merit?
Decision:
The Supreme Court sustained the recommendation of the Office of the
Court Administrator, thus:
It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the
judgment adverted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence,
and that the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice. In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge
51 | P a g e

guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the
Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of
moral certainty and does not suffice to convict. Here, the allegations of the
complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be
pronounced guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on
which conviction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond
reasonable doubt.
However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.

Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290

Art. 211: Indirect Bribery

Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152)

52 | P a g e

Facts:
Petitioner was the personnel supervisor of the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City. Her duties include processing of
appointment papers of employees. She was charged for her alleged refusal to
attend to the appointment papers of a certain Mrs. Mutia, a coterminous
employee. Mrs. Mutia testified that petitioner asked from her some money as a
consideration.
Attempts to entrap petitioner then ensued. Petitioner and Mrs. Mutia
supposedly agreed to meet at the canteen. Some of their officemates Mrs.
Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano joined them in the canteen. They occupied
two squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the
table with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's)
right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Member of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) brought along a camera in order to take photographs of the
entrapment. The marked money was folded altogether.
After the money had been delivered and received, pictures were taken,
one of them depicting the accused held by member of the PC on the left hand
and another showing the accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC
men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass .
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the
entrapment. She denied having accepted the supposed bribe money.
The case was brought to the respondent court which ruled that the crime
committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under
Article 211 of the same code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of the crime of indirect
bribery?
Decision:

53 | P a g e

No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of

the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted
the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of
the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own
property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing
the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance
or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that
the crime of indirect bribery has been committed.
An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken
immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was
standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. There was no picture
showing petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately after
the money was handed to her under the table. None of the photographs show the
petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was
handed to her.

Alexander Santos
2006-0205

Art. 212: Corruption of Public Officials

Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256)
Facts:
Complainant Rina V. Chua filed an administrative charge against the
respondent for allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her
favor after demanding and getting from her the sum of P1,500.00. Asked to
comment thereon, the respondent denied the charge. The case was referred for
investigation, report and recommendation to Judge Pardo of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila who, after hearing, found duly substantiated that to immediately
54 | P a g e

enforce a writ of execution, complainant agreed to give P1,000.00 to the

respondent, an additional amount of P500.00, but after the which the writ was still
not enforced for the losing party, against whom the writ was to be executed,
showed an official Receipt of payment of the supersedeas bond.
Issue:
Whether or not complainants action constitute corruption of a public
official?
Decision:
Yes, the court agreeing with the trial court adopts the recommendation that
appropriate directive be issued to the City Prosecutor of Manila after preliminary
investigation to charge complainant Rina Chua and Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr.
with corruption of public official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code.

Renato Segubiense
2006-0040

Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property

Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229)
Facts:
On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of
the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a
cash advance of P18,000.00 covered by Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check
No. SN-189833-N for the procurement of working tools for a certain "NALGO"
project. On May 5, 1988, petitioner received a demand letter from then Provincial
Treasurer Timoteo Magalang giving him until May 16, 1988 to submit a liquidation
of the aforementioned P18,000.00 cash advance. This was followed by another
letter received by petitioner on May 26, 1988, giving him this time up to May 31,
1999 to settle his account. But as in the first instance, the second demand went
unheeded.
In a letter dated August 16, 1990, the new Provincial Treasurer, Norma
Cabungal, informed the Provincial Prosecutor of Marinduque of the Commission
on Audit's findings on the examination of the cash accounts of the province
55 | P a g e

wherein petitioner was found to have an unsettled cash advance in the amount of
P18,000.00.
Petitioner admitted receiving the P18,000.00 cash advance intended to
purchase working tools for the "NALGO" project.

He, however, denied

allegations that he misappropriated the said amount. He testified, too, that, the
purchase order (PO) for the said tools were already approved by the provincial
treasurer and the provincial auditor, the new administration decided to scrap the
proposed transaction. According to petitioner, following the assumption to office
of Governor Luisito Reyes, his office files containing the said PO and the
requisition paper were taken and his services terminated per Governor Reyes'
Memorandum No. 88-63 dated November 23, 1988. Said memorandum also
stated that "should you apply for the commutation/payment of your unused
leave/vacation and sick/credits, the same may be approved provided it is first
applied/charged

to

your

unliquidated

cash

advance

of P18,000.00."

Pressing the point, petitioner stated that he then applied for his terminal leave
and other benefits through the following summary of vouchers which he
personally prepared, but were then disapproved.
Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his
P18,000.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner
brushed aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been
relieved of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He, however,
admitted receiving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier
adverted to dated May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his
liquidation of the P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively indicated
therein.
On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public
funds and sentencing him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime
charge?
Decision:
The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above
penal provision are; that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody
or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds
or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that he
56 | P a g e

appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.
The Supreme court ruled that there can hardly be no dispute about the
presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the
position of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque.
In that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial
government for which he is bound to account.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is
sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did
not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made, and that he
could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal
misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused
cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to
personal uses. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof
by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. The petitioner failed to
overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt.
Petitioner does not at all dispute the fact that he did receive a cash
advance. He also admitted receiving the demand letters of the provincial
treasurer for him to submit a liquidation of the cash advance on two occasions,
which he failed to do. He harps on Memorandum No. 88-63 issued by then
Marinduque Governor Reyes that he can offset his unliquidated cash advance of
from the commutation of his unused vacation and sick leave credits to justify his
failure to liquidate his cash advance. He also invites attention to the fact that,
even before the approval of his application for the commutation of his leave
credits, he already paid his cash advance on January 27, 1995.
Petitioners attempt at rationalization for his failure to liquidate is
unacceptable. Memorandum No. 88-63 merely informed petitioner that his
application for commutation may be granted provided that the commutated
amount is first applied to his unliquidated cash advance. Nowhere in the said
memorandum did it state that he is exempted from submitting his liquidation of
the same cash advance. As it is, petitioner failed to liquidate and return his cash
advance despite repeated demands. He was able to return the said amount only
57 | P a g e

on January 27, 1995, that is, after almost seven (7) years from the last demand.
The return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almost seven
(7) years to return the amount.
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or
reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does
not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely
affect the accused's civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating
circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.

Renato Segubiense
2006-0040

People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)

Facts:
The accused in this case accused Uy at the time stated in the information
was a Treasurer at the NPC; accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned
in the information was the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange
Division (LOMAFED); Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst,
58 | P a g e

LOMAFED, at the time mentioned in the information; Gamus does not have any
custody to public funds; Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require
him to take custody or control of public funds.
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) became
embroiled in a controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its
funds which were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC
Branch

(PNB)

but

were

subsequently

used

to

purchase

two

(2)

managers/cashiers checks (the first check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00

while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its loan
obligations to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As NPCs debt in favor of
ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous
procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case, United Coconut
Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local bank was supposed to
remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in this case, the
Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the
US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which
would then credit the funds to the account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with
the concerned banks (embodied in three 3 Payment Instructions) included a
value date (which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger
the above-mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC
obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank)
remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch.
Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to
have remitted on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M.
Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2)
managers/cashiers checks for such purpose, did not make the agreed
remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the
funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the
accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to
remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both
explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB
Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an Application for
Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a
private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It
claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment
59 | P a g e

Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to

be charged to NPCs savings account did not contain any account number.
Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds
from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas,
George Aonuevo and Mara Aonuevo.
On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the
accused Jaime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds thru
falsification of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable doubt
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest was issued
against Raul Gutierrez.
Issue:
Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Documents?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty of malversation, the
prosecution must prove the the offender is a public officer; that he has the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that
the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and that he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by
another person of, such funds or property.
The Supreme Court further ruled that Malversation may be committed
either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or
passively

through

negligence

by

allowing

another

to

commit

such

misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be

criminal intent or criminal negligence and while the prevailing facts of a case may
not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude
the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are
equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful
malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the putative assumption
60 | P a g e

that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence

but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of
this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. The question of
whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of
deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of
first impression. An accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can
validly be convicted of falsification through negligence.

Renato Segubiense
2006-0040

Chan v. Sandiganbayan (G. R. No. 149613)

Facts:
In November 1989, petitioner was hired as Accounting Clerk II and
assigned at the Regional Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Cebu City, discharging the function of Cashier or Collection Officer. Petitioner
went on leave from December 7 to 27, 1995. On December 27, 1995 Josephine
Daclan, the auditor from the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned to the NBI,
conducted a routine audit examination of the accountability of petitioner.
Petitioner being then on leave, the audit was conducted upon Delza Bas (Bas)
who was officially designated by the Regional Director to act as Collection Officer
during her absence. The auditor found that all collections for the period beginning
December 7, 1995 up to the date of the audit, December 27, 1995, were
accounted for, as reflected in her Cash Report dated December 27, 1995 signed
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by Bas.
On January 24, 1996, the same auditor conducted another audit
examination. Since petitioner had already reported for work, the audit covered
the period beginning June 15, 1995. The auditor found a shortage of
P290,228.00 in petitioner's cash accountability which was reflected in her Cash
Report dated January 24, 1996 on which petitioner affixed her signature. The
auditor thus issued a demand letter to petitioner to restitute the missing funds
and explain the shortage.
The COA Region VII thus filed a complaint against petitioner for
Malversation of Public Funds in the amount of P333,360.00 with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) on April 10, 1996. The said office found probable
cause against petitioner and recommended the filing of the corresponding
information against her.
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
for Malversation of Public Funds.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner herein is guilty of the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit and guilty of te crime
charge. In affirming the courts below the Supreme Court pointed out the following
reasons, that the fact that Bas was given official designation during all the times
that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that fact alone,
mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if
it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. The questioned
amount on time because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the strictest
supervision on the person he designated, otherwise, he would suffer the
consequences of the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In
short, by failing to exercise strict supervision he could be liable for malversation
through negligence. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to
petitioner's account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. The
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. The petitioner not only did omit to report the shortages of Bas to
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the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to
having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. Petitioner did not only lend
Bas those amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly
extended 'vales to her and to others, also out of public funds.
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an
accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public
funds by other persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice
is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with
the use of public funds. The Supreme Court further ruled that the alleged
acquiescence of petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. The fact
that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and
will not exculpate him from his criminal liability.

Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property

Tetangco v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 156427)
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent, alleging the latter

gave

Php 3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and Php 1,000 to each
tanod in a certain barangay. When it was not justified as a lawful expense, the
latter refunded the amount from the City of Manila.
Respondent asserted that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the
case, but it is lodged in the COMELEC instead. He alse maintained his position
on the validity of the expenses made.
Issue:
Whether or not Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case against respondent?
Decision:
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans
determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an
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arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.
The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable cause
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the
disbursement for financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a
lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an
original appropriation of the amount used for the financial assistance cited and that it was
diverted from the appropriation it was intended for.
The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the
offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or
property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally
appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is
necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than
that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion
of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.

Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

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Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129)

Facts:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime
of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under
Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under
an Information, both public officers, being then the President and cashier,
respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions
and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in
the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Darkis, also
a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of Php 40,000, which amount
was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan
in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed
upon her.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of technical malversation?
Decision:
The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all
charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College
to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were
entitled to under existing civil service laws.
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality.
It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages enjoy as claims
against the employers funds and resources.
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Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required
quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The
Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the
day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor
could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that
of guilt.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688.
The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the
public fund used should have been appropriated by law is therefore absent. The
authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of
the Php 40,000.00 allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary
school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the Php 40,000 released by
the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of
other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the
third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code are lacking in this case.

Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

Parungao v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025)

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds allegedly
committed by him as a municipal treasurer. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan
acquitted him of malversation of public funds but convicted him instead of illegal
use of public funds.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds?
Decision:

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The 1987 Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal

prosecutions, shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. From this fundamental precept proceeds the rule that the
accused may be convicted only of the crime with which he is charged. An
exception to this rule, albeit constitutionally permissible, is the rule on variance in
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The essential elements of the crime of malversation are: (a) the offender is
a public officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds and
property; and (c) he appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other
persons to take such public funds or property, or otherwise is guilty of
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
The essential elements of this crime, more commonly known as technical
malversation, are: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he applies
public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (c) the
public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law ordinance.
A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely
distinct and different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender
misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person
to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation,
the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or
another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was
appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily
include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since
the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the
information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the
crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical
malversation.

Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the
malversation case is the same evidence that will be presented and evaluated to determine
his guilt or innocence in the technical malversation case in the event that one is filed and
in order to spare the petitioner from the rigors and harshness compounded by another
trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on our overloaded judicial system, the Court
deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or not the petitioner indeed is guilty of
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illegal use of public funds.

Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the
utilization of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road was
merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public Works and Highways
and the barangay captain and was not particularly provided for by law or ordinance.
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purposepayment of the
wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note
the high priority which laborers' wages enjoy as claims against the employers' funds and
resources. In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the
concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the
crime of illegal use of public funds.

Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178

Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons

Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional
Circumstances
People v. Gelaver
Facts:
Eduardo Gelaver was charged with parricide for the killing of his wife
Victoira by multiple stab wounds at the latters residence. Husband and wife were
already living separately at the time of the killing.
The accused interposes the exempting circumstance embodied in Art. 247
of the RPC (Death Under Exceptional Circumstances). He claimed that he only
knew her wifes residence when her daughter told him the night before that she
(the wife) was living in front of the church). And so, he went there with the
intention of repairing the marriage only to find her wife having sex with her
paramour (the accused says that he doesnt know the paramours name) upon
his (Eduardos) arrival. And it was then that the paramour took a knife from the
headboard and tried to stab Eduardo but Eduardo was able to wrest the knife
from the paramour. And when he tried to stab the paramour, he was able to duck
whereby the stab wounds intended for the lover fell on his wife. The paramour,
the accused claims, was able to get dressed and ran outside the house to avoid
his wrath.
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Nevertheless, he was still found guilty by the RTC of parricide.

Issue:
Should Eduardo be granted the exceptional circumstance under Art. 247
of the RPC?
Decision:
In order to appreciate Art. 247 of the RPC, the accused must be able to
prove that:
lover;

1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having sex with a

2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts physical injuries to

the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never consented to the carnal
acts done by the spouse.
Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasnt able to establish the existence of the
aforesaid circumstances. His version of how things went down were too full of
inconsistencies. First off, he stabbed his wife several times which is not
consistent with an accidental killing (because he claimed he was aiming for the
lover). Another was that he claimed that the paramour was able to GET
DRESSED while under attack. And another was that even his daughter testified
that she did not tell her father anything about her mothers residence or
whereabouts as even she did not know where her mother was staying.
So the guilty verdict is sustained.

Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178

People v. Amamongpong
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Facts:
Amamompong was charged with homicide for the killing of SPO1 Flores in
their house. The accused contends that not only was the killing done under
exceptional circumstances (Art. 247 of the RPC), but that he was also justified in
killing Flores under Art 11 of the RPC because his act was done in defense of the
honor of his wife.
Although a prosecution witness testified that he saw the accused actually
hold a scythe to hack Flores in the first floor of the house, the accused counters
that the incident took place in the bedroom located at the 2 nd floor of their
residence. And it was there that he saw Flores naked from the waist down
attempting to have sex with his wife. It was then that he pursued Flores with the
scythe and thereby wounding him. And when the victim tried to run, Flores also
drew his gun but the accused was quick to wrestle the gun away and use it
against Flores. The accused whereby emptied the bullets on the victim.
Another prosecution witness testified that although the accused claims this
all happened in the second floor, large quantities of blood was found in the first
floor and even on the stairs and that on the second floor, no apparent signs of
struggle can be seen as all the furniture and appliances were in order. And
except for the victims bloody carcass, nothing else seemed out of the ordinary.
But Amamompong was steadfast in his defense.
Issue:
Should the accused be afforded the benefit under Art. 11 as well as Art.
247 of the RPC?

Decision:
No. Not only is the accused version of the events not credible, but the fact
that the accused claims BOTH Art 11 and 247 of the RPC is contradictory in
itself. One cannot claim that rage was brought upon when an accused sees his
wife engaged in sexual intercourse willingly with a lover, and at same time claim
that his acts were to defend the honor of his wife.
Add to this the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw the
accused strike the victim with a scythe on the first floor, as well as the forensic
evidence pointing to the fact that the body of the victim could have been just
carried on the second floor to make it seem like the victim was attempting to
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have intercourse, then the Court has no reason to reverse the finding of the trial
court that Art 11 and 247 of the RPC can not be appreciated in the case at bar.

Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178

People v. Oyanib
Facts:
Michael Oyanib was charged with parricide and homicide for the killing of
his wife and her lover at Michaels wifes residence.
The following facts have been established:
That Michael and his wife Tita started living separately a year earlier.
Michael tried to win back Tita but the latter was openly flaunting his new lover
Jesus Esquirdo.
In one occasion, Micheal and Jesus almost came to blows when Michael
saw his wife and Jesus in a loving embrace at the plaza. After this incident, Jesus
and Tita were heard threatening Michael that they would kill him the next time
they see each other.
A day before the killings, One of Michael and Titas children was asked by
the school to call her parents for a meeting. But because Michael was
indisposed, he went to his wifes residence the next day to ask her if she could
come. But because of the threats of Jesus and his wife in the previous incident,
he brought with him a hunting knife.
Unfortunately, when the accused arrived at Titas house, he saw Tita and
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Jesus having sex. Jesus launched at Michael but he (Mike) was able to draw his
knife and stab Jesus. Tita, meanwhile got a hold of a liquor bottle whereby she
attacked Michael. And so, Michael also stabbed Tita.
But the RTC still found Mike guilty.
Issue
Should the exempting circumstance under Art. 247 be applied under the
circumstances?
Decision:
In order for Art. 247 to apply, the accused or the defense must be able to
show the following elements: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise
having sex with a lover;

2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts

physical injuries to the spouse and/or the lover; and

3) the accused never

consented to the carnal acts done by the spouse.

The evidence show that all three elements are present in this case.
Michael was still married to Tita (albeit living separately), he caught his wife and
Jesus by surprise having sex, and Michael certainly did not approve of their
relationship, much less their carnal act.
The fact that Mike brought with him a hunting knife is consistent with his
excuse that he was fearful of an attack by either Jesus or Tita because of past
events.
So the decision of the RTC is modified. Mike is found guilty only under Art.
247 of the RPC.

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Mark Vergara
2008-0323

Art. 248: Murder

People vs Mallari (G.R. No. 145993)
Facts:
While Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching a basketball game at the
barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying
bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to
run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and
drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph
until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it
convicted Rufino of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for
the crime of murder?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the
present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the
accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to
the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which
caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the
victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another
by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle
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qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence
of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the
penalty to be imposed on Rufino.

Mark Vergara
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2008-0323

People vs Gonzales (G.R. No. 139542)

Facts:
Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path.
Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio. Noel later on
also had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused. Inocencio
seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect
Dino. Accused fired on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries
to the victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to
the ultimate death of the latter. The Trial court rendered judgement finding that
the shooting was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held
the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber
Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present for the
crime of murder?
Decision:
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by
itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant
deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him
when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the
position of the appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when
Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
Appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after the
latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not
alight from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it. For his
part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor
threatened Andres during their short spat. Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercation
with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son
was in imminent danger.
There is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the
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passengers when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to
support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to
gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any
decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime
committed is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime
committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines
whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is
made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill
the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding
behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring
treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries. In case of
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the
lesser offense of physical injuries.

Mark Vergara
2008-0323

People vs Avecilla (G.R. No. 117033)

Facts:
Accused-appellant arrived at the basketball court located on Dapo Street,
Pandacan, Manila, and for no apparent reason, suddenly fired a gun in the air.
Four meters from the basketball court, on a nearby alley, he initiated an
argument with the group of Boy Manalaysay, Jimmy Tolentino and Macario
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Afable. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placed his
left arm around Afable's neck and shot him pointblank on the abdomen. Afable
ran toward the alley and accused-appellant ran after him. Another shot rang out,
so one of the bystanders, Carlos Taganas, went to the alley and there, he saw
accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun. The Chief
Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun away from accusedappellant, who immediately fled from the scene of the incident. Afable died
afterwards after being rushed to the Philippine General Hospital.
Regional Trial Court of Manila, rendered judgment convicting accusedappellant of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the illegal possession of firearms by the accused is a
qualifying circumstance for murder?
Decision:
Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent
provision of the said law provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other
crime was committed.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal
possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed
only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of
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murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat.

Otherwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an
essential ingredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup d'etat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide.

Mark Vergara
2008-0323

Art. 249: Homicide

Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087)
Facts:
Petitioner Navarro and Lingan had a heated altercation. As Lingan was
about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above
the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to
get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored
him.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his
office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The
station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had
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been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an intention to kill on the part of the accused?
Decision:
The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner,
constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, we appreciated this
mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist
after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this
mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor
of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle, that
it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the
latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in
determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro.
The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In People v.
Castro, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him
guilty of homicide.

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Mark Vergara
2008-0323

People vs Ullep (G.R. No. 132547)

Facts:
Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept on running
without any particular direction. Leydan asked for police assistance. SPO1 Ulep
together with SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board
an Anfra police service jeep. The three (3) police officers, all armed with M-16
rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw the naked Wapili approaching
them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police claimed
that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and
neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning
shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot
him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the
police officers. When Wapili was only about two (2) to three (3) meters away from
them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of
his body. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and
pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out
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Issue:
Whether or not the killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for the crime of murder?
Decision:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. Considering the rule that
treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the
crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of accusedappellant. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify
the killing to murder, accused-appellant may only be convicted of homicide.
Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under
the circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police
officers who may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or
identical conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who may be
half-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear that
they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.

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Mark Vergara
2008-0323

People vs Antonio (G.R. No. 128900)

Facts:
Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound
right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber
Beretta pistol of appellant Antonio.
Prior to the shooting, appellant and the victim spent several hours having fun
playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to
appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and
Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other.
According SG Bobis who witnessed the said crime; Tuadles and Antonio were
arguing. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis
heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi.
Issue:
Whether or not the shooting was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for the crime of murder?
Decision:
If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there
was no reason to call for a Sergeant (Sarge) or any eyewitness for that matter.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack

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was arrived at on the spur of the moment.

The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a
murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Court.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar, where we held that there
was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More
recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as
when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to
face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.
Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal code.

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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021

Art. 251: Death Caused in a Tumultous Affray

People v. Anecito Unlagada y Suanque (G.R. No. 141080)
Facts:
On January 27, 1989 at around 9:00 in the evening Danilo Laurel left his
house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public
dance at Negros Occidental. After two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short
break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall.
Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought beer.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to
relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo
who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him,
approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his
assailant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men
numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons.
Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being
mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died
before he could be given medical attention.
Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the
custody of the police. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the
police authorities, that the man under detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same
man who stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused assails his conviction.
Issue:

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Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder
instead of tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?

Decision:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the
identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an
eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of
which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals , one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the
killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests,
a tumultuous affray within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code,
that is, a melee or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite or
identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner,
resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving
himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused
walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was
completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no
chance to put up any defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021

Sison vs. People (G.R. No. 108280-83)

Facts:
Tension and animosity between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke
into violence. On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a
known Coryista.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled
to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a
rally but it was denied. Despite this setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal
Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. No ticket could be
produced. Colonel Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano
turned towards his group and said gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory
infiltrators. The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse them.
At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Garden. Annie Ferrer was there and they informed her of the dispersal and
Ferrer angrily ordered them gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers! A few
minutes later, she was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted
kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon! a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo,
cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking the persons in yellow. The man in
yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists.
Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. He was hit on
various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could
extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sumilang was
able to tow Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man
boxed Salcedo on the head. De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while Pacadar.
Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision repeatedly boxed him.
Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at
the Rizal monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collap[sed and lost consciousness. Sumilang with a help of traffic enforcer
brought Salcedo to Medical Center Manila but was refused admission. So they
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took him to PGH where he died upon arrival.

The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel
Tan, Richard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime
of murder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting
Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo.
The court convicts Tamayo of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime
committed is murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
Decision:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established
that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that
the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence be can be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of
which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between
one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after
the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said
dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks
and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor
was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
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As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as

much as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the
victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and
frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded
for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim
qualifies the killing of murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.

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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021

People v. Cresenciano Maramara (G.R. No. 110994)

Facts:
The evidence shows that a benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi
Elementary School PTA of which accused- appellant is the president, was held in
the yard of accused- appellants house in Brgy. Calpi, Claveria Masbate in the
evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato was
dancing with certain Rowena Del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of the
accused- appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest.
Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the
fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about two meters away from where
Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused- appellant took his hand- gun
tucked in his waist and fired at the victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter at the
left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody
struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about 3
minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed
his parents of what happened.
Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to
the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day.
Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato, the father, asked who shot him and
Miguelito replied that it was accused- appellant.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of
Miguelito bore lacerated wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more
than two persons.
The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray
instead of murder?
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Held:
There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be
held liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the
Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene
and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked
him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on the
stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant
with his hand- gun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit
dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution
witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as
Miguelitos killer.
While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at
first blush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim
Miguelito inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider
them as a mitigating circumstance because the defenses version stands
discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the
circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death.
Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court
finds Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

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Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049

Art. 254: Discharge of Firearms

Dado v. People (G.R. No. 131421)

Facts:
On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay
Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station
formed three teams, which composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and
CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga.

Alfredo

Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, while petitioner
was armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying
an M16 armalite rifle.

The team saw somebody approaching who was half-

naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso to
wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite
rifle at the approaching man. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot from his .
45 caliber pistol. Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun burst, he
did not turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in
front of him purposely to demoralize their enemy.
The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of
Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept.
Accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas and told him that it was not
intentionally done and it was merely an accident. Silvestre Balinas died as a
result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on
the cadaver of Silvestre Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the
death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced
through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three
irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added that the position of the victim at
that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the
trajectory of the bullets was upwards.
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three
metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be
fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he
declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered
from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber
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5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.

The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of
homicide which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the
other hand petitioner, filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
petitioner guilty of homicide?
Decision:
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45
caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to
prove that petitioner had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did
not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim.

Intent to kill cannot be

automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to
life.

Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is

required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should
not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner
should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254
of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has
no intention to kill that person
.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of
petitioner for the crime of homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm.

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Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316

Art. 257: Unintentional Abortion

People v. Salufrania (G.R. No. L-50884)
Facts:
Filomeno Salufrania by boxing and strangling MARCIANA ABUYOSALUFRANIA, his lawfully wedded wife and who was at the time 8 months on
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the family way, caused upon her injuries resulting in her instantaneous death and
the death of the child who was still in its maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was
charged with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion committed.
The lower court found Filomeno guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review of the case by the Supreme
Court. Filomeno alleges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the
complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion, as there is no evidence to
show that he had the intention to cause an abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion is proper?
Decision:
No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1 That there is a pregnant woman.
2 That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
3 That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4 That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom.
It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to
eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily
exerted upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said
violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion
was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana
Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However,
the intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim
in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause
an abortion.

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Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316

People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-42819)

Facts:
Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow
she claims she owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist
causing her to fall to the ground several times. During which time, Soledad was
heavy with child. Soledad by such fall suffered pains in the abdomen. According
to testimony deceased was in good health the day before. From the time of the
incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of premature
delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it culminated in the
painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way
carrying, but the other baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies
died. Genoves was then charged and convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the
complex crime of homicide with abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with
abortion is proper?
Held:
No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article
257 of the Revised Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause
premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from
the assault to Soledads death. Genoves must be held responsible for the natural
consequences of his act.
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Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406

Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment

Kingston(e) Li v. People and CA (G.R. No. 127962)
Facts:

Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of
homicide for the death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that
Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane,
his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard
a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo
Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the
Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then
petitioner Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was
met by petitioner carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the
bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. The witnesses Tan and dela
Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li
re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once. Immediately
thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.

Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a

baseball bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right
arm which is near the shoulder. The deceased who is armed with a bolo,
retaliated by hacking Li on the head, causing him to lose his hold on the baseball
bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is highly
improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.

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After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review, seeking the reversal of his
conviction for the crime of homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight
physical injury instead of homicide?
Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury
attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li
striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from
injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of
the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.

What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous

street fight devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not
because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but
because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet,
however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the
circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of
the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is
responsible for the death apparently remains at large.

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Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz

2005-0048

Art. 266-A: Rape

People v. Hermocilla (G.R. No. 175830)
Facts:
Hermocilla was charged with two counts of rape. The records show that M
was born out of wedlock on May 30, 1989 to S and L. After they separated, M
stayed with her mother L who subsequently cohabited with appellant Hermocilla.
Sometime in 1999, while M was preparing dinner, appellant suddenly grabbed
and pulled her to the bed. He ripped off her shorts and underwear and made her
lie on the bed. After undressing himself, appellant inserted his finger into Ms
vagina and penetrated her with his penis. M cried and begged appellant to stop.
Thereafter, appellant would insert his finger into Ms vagina whenever her mother
is out of the house. Such abuse temporarily ceased when M lived with her father
S in Baguio City. But when he left t work abroad, M went back to live with her
mother and appellant.

The abuse resumed and culminated in second rape

incident which took place sometime 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning
their house, appellant suddenly grabbed her and pulled her towards the bed. He
took off her clothes, undressed himself and inserted his finger into her vagina.
Appellant denied the charges against him, he claimed that he treated M
like his own daughter. The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the insertion of the appellants fingers into the victims
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vagina constituted the crime of rape trough sexual assault?

Whether or not relationship could be considered in the proper imposition
of penalty?

Decision:
The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant inserted his
fingers into Ms vagina likewise constitute rape through sexual assault. In People
v. Palma, we held that the insertion of the appellants finger into the victims
vagina constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under Republic Act
No. 8252 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed
with any aggravating or qualifying circumstances.

The Information in Family

Case No. A-436 mentioned the victim as appellants stepdaughter and an 11-year
old minor. A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage,
while a stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage
subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. In the instant
case, appellant and Ms mother were never married. Hence, appellant is not Ms
stepfather; vice-versa, M is not appellants stepdaughter.

Appellant is the

common law spouse of Ms mother. However, since the relationship was not
specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be considered in the imposition
of the proper penalty.

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Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz

2005-0048

People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035)

Facts:
The prosecutions evidence disclose that on November 4, 1998 while
herein 6-year-old victim was on her way home from school, appellant waylaid
her, dragged her to an unoccupied house, tied her, and then forced himself inside
her. After consummating his vile, he left her with her body tied. When she was
able to let loose, she went home and told her grandmother of the incident, which
led to the arrest of appellant. After trial, appellant was convicted of rape and
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 each.
Issue:
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Whether or not the absence of penetration still constitute the crime of

rape?
Decision:
Although there had been no complete penetration of the victims vagina by
appellants penis, contact between them was not ruled out by the doctor who
testified in this case.

In fact, he found the victims vagina positive for

spermatozoa. Existing rulings on rape do not require complete or full penetration

of the victims private organ. Neither is the rupture of the hymen necessary. The
mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victims genitalia
engenders the crime of rape. Hence, it is the touching or entry of the penis
into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victims genitalia
that consummates rape.

Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the

labia. Even the briefest of contacts, without lacerations of the hymen, is deemed
to be rape.

Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz

2005-0048

People v. Oga (G.R. No. 152302)

Facts:
At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were
awakened by the loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks
of his co-construction worker which was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his
wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to
see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who
was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant
summoned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she
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approached him.

However, appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a

wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as
his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00
a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the
appellants barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but
interposed sweetheart story.
Issue:
Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case?
Decision:

Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled
down to the bed, she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife,
bolo or any object or instrument that the appellant could have employed so as to
create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm.
Irenes overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the
reasonable standard of human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is
unnatural for an intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a
feeble attempt to free herself despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This
constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant.

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103 | P a g e

Maricris Ella
2007-0030

Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security

Art. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203)
Facts:
Ed Henderson Tan, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and
Marileen Tan, was a Grade III student at the Philippine Institute of Quezon City,
located at Kitanlad, Quezon City.

At about 4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997, Ed

Henderson was dismissed from his classes and proceeded to the nearby house
of his tutor in Chinese language, Huang Lao Shih. Ed Henderson and his father,
Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m.,
Ed Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his
mentors house. The tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed
Henderson then proceeded to the store near the gate of the school to have his
periodic test papers photocopied. He left the store and was on his way back to
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the house of his tutor to wait for his father.

Suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver, chased and overtook Ed
Henderson at the Royalty canteen near the school. Tampos ordered the boy to
proceed to a motorcyle parked nearby and warned the latter that if he refused, he
would be shot.

Petrified, Ed Henderson approached the motorcycle where

appellants Elvie Ejandra and Roel Revilla were waiting. Ejandra had no legs
(pilay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post outside the school
premises but the lights inside the school were still on.

Ejandra covered Ed

Hendersons mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy and warned the
latter not to shout. Revilla boarded the motorcycle and took the drivers seat.
Ejandra sat behind him, and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed
Henderson to board the motorcyle, or else, he would be shot. The boy was then
ordered to sit behind Tampos.
Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and whitecolored walls. Once inside, he saw a man who was drinking, who turned out to
be Antonio Huera, and a female, who turned out to be Magdalena Calunod. Ed
Henderson also saw a cell phone. The was ordered to write down his fathers
telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Ed Henderson
did as he was told, and wrote down the telephone number of his father, Eddie
Tan.
At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing
him that his son had been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000.00 for
the safe release of his son which was reduce to P5,000,000.00. Thereafter,
Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom
they demanded, the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and
thereafter kill the boy and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for
mercy but the caller would simply hang up the telephone.
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers
came through, and Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional
amount. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the
kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom of P548,000.00. At about noon, the
caller contacted Eddie and instructed him to place the money in a newspaper
and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo Church in
Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the
doors and windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was
also told that a man would approach him and call him "Eddie."

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Eddie did as he was told. Suddenly, a man approached him and called
him Eddie, so he immdiately he handed over the plastic bag which contained
the money. He asked her how his son was, she told him not to worry because
she would bring the boy home. Shortly after his arrival at their house, Eddie
received two telephone calls from a male and a female, respectively, who
informed him of his sons impending release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he
would be brought back home. The boy then called up his mother and told her
that he would be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a
taxi.

Calunod ordered the boy to pretend that she was his aunt.

The taxi

stopped near the Imperial Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod

instructed Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the boy P50.00 for his fare back
home. The boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused could be held liable for the crime of
kidnapping?
Decision:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 reads: Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death; (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
three days; (2) If it shall have committed simulating public authority; (3) If any
serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person
kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the

kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention,
the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of
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detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and serious
illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if
the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c)
motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the
release of the victim.

The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a

qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before,
during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim.

Neither actual

demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary
sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration
paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release.
In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom
for the release of the victim.

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Maricris Ella
2007-0030

People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182)

Facts:
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Barangay
Laguilayan, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Americo Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis, and
Victor Cinco to meet with a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander
Lambada to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that were purportedly
being sold by the latter. During the meeting Macapagal told them that someone in
his family has just died and that he has to pick up an elder brother in Cotabato
108 | P a g e

City, hence, they had better transact business in the afternoon.

In the afternoon, Alexander's group and Macapagal, with a certain Teddy
Silongan and another person named Oteng Silongan, traveled to Cotabato City to
fetch Macapagal's brother. At 8:30 p.m., they neared the highway. Macapagal
ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and
his three companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and
blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing
more was done to them.

The four victims were taken to a mountain hideout in

Maganoy, Maguindanao, where a certain Salik Karem, Hadji Kutang Omar alias
Commander Palito, and Jumbrah Manap met them. Initially, the three demanded
P15,000,000 from Alexander Saldaa for his release which was subsequently
reduced to P12,000,000.00. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife to pay
the ransom. The letter was hand-carried by a certain Armand Jafar, alias Dante,
and two of the victims, Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco, who both later managed to
escape. No ransom was obtained so Commander Palito and Jumbrah Manap
sent other persons and one of the victims, Americo Rejuso, Jr., to renegotiate
with Alexander's wife. No agreement was likewise reached.
Seven days later, Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., were
transferred to the town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah Manap,
Sacaria Alon alias Jack Moro, Ramon Pasawilan, guarded them. When the
kidnappers learned that the military was looking for Alexander, they returned to
the mountain hideout and stayed there for two weeks.
On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaa to the
military in exchange for a relative who was caught delivering a ransom note to
Alexander's family.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused the guilt of the appellants has been proven by
credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of
an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following
be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
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commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article

267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the
appellants abducted Alexander Saldaa and his companions at gunpoint and
deprived them of their freedom. That the appellants took shifts guarding the
victims until only Alexander was left to be guarded and in transferring Alexander
from one hideout to another to prevent him from being rescued by the military
establish that they acted in concert in executing their common criminal design.
Macapagal's participation is clearly evident from the records. Aside from
being one of Alexander's armed guards in Kabuntalan, and having been part of a
party which brought Alexander from the river hideout of Commander Kugta to
Mayangkang

Saguile's lair in

Talayan,

indirect

evidence

also

support

Macapagal's participation in the criminal design. First, Macapagal made several

postponements of their trip on March 16, 1996 until it was already 7:30 in the
evening. His reason that someone in his family died is not corroborated at all.
Teddy, his cousin, never mentioned it, and his other relative, co-accused Abdila
Silongan, was reticent about it. In fact, nobody told the trial court the name of the
deceased relative. Secondly, Americo testified that when they stopped over at
Macapagal's house, he heard the wife of Macapagal utter the words "kawawa
naman sila" as they were leaving. Thirdly, it was established that Macapagal
ordered the driver to proceed slowly towards the highway. During this time, he
was busy talking on his handheld radio with someone and the victims heard him
say "ok." When they were near the highway, he ordered the driver to stop
whereupon 15 armed men appeared and blocked their vehicle. Finally, while the
15 men took away Alexander Saldaa and his three companions, nothing was
done to Macapagal or to Teddy Silongan. By their own admission, they were just
left behind after being hogtied. How they managed to escape was not explained.
All these taken together give rise to the reasonable inference that Macapagal had
concocted the funeral for a supposed recently deceased relative purposely to
afford his co-conspirators time to stage the kidnapping. Then, also, it was through
Macapagal's indispensable contribution that the armed men were able to stop the
vehicle at a precise location near the highway.
Likewise, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
the kidnapping was committed "for the purpose of extorting ransom" from
Alexander, as to warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. For the
crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be
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made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what
the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In
this case, the records are replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded
ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout in Maganoy where Alexander
was first taken, he was made to write a letter to his wife asking her to pay the
ransom of twelve million pesos. Among those who demanded ransom were the
appellants Ramon Pasawilan, Sacaria Alon, and Jumbrah Manap. Then, when
Alexander was in the custody of Mayangkang Saguile, not only was he made to
write more letters to his family, Mayangkang himself wrote ransom notes. In
those letters, Mayangkang even threatened to kill Alexander if the ransom was
not paid.

Maricris Ella
2007-0030

People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726)

Facts:

On January 17, 1997, at about six oclock in the afternoon, Alfonso Saez
came home. He was informed by his siblings that Jesse Castro called up to say
that he (Castro) wanted to speak with Saez. Subsequently, Saez repaired to
Castro's residence. Just as Castro opened the gate for Saez, Castro pointed and
fired his 9 mm. handgun at Saez, its bullet whizzing by his right ear. Saez was
thrown against the concrete wall of the house. He was then taken inside the
house. Two men, identified to be Edgardo Reyes and Jesus de los Angeles,
joined Castro in mauling Saez. Castro hit Saez with an iron club.

At around nine o'clock in the evening, Castro handed over to him a phone
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and ordered him to tell his family to raise P20,000.00 and intstruct them to bring
the money to a place near Bautista Hospital. About half an hour later, another call
was placed to follow-up the demand. Turning to de los Angeles and Reyes,
Castro instructed the two to go to the "drop-off point." Nobody showed up. After
an hour, Saez was ordered to call again, this time to designate another place
where the money was to be delivered. Castro told Saez to have his relatives
bring the money to the vicinity of the Aglipay Church in Caridad. Again, no
meeting materialized.

Around midnight, Castro, de los Angeles and Reyes left the house and
stayed by the gate conversing with one another. The victim took the opportunity
to flee. He was able to untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second
storey. He jumped out through the window but the noise he created caught the
attention of Castro. The latter fired his gun, hitting the fleeing victim and planting
a bullet in his buttocks. His plea for help alarmed some barangay officials who
immediately came to his rescue and brought him to the nearest hospital.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused can be held liable for the crime of kidnapping
even if detention was made to merely compel Saez to pay his debt?

Decision:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the
kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall
have been committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical
injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or
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detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the
commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed."

The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an
individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom
is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.

In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed: "x x x No specific form of

ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long
as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In
municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom
is necessary for the crime to be committed."

Maria Criselda Fojas

2010-0226

Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention

People v. Dadles (G.R. Nos. 118620-21)
Facts:
The accused Dadles was charged with kidnapping two farmers, Tehidor
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and Alipan, along with their sons, in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental. The accused denied the charges stating that on the night of the
alleged kidnapping, he had fallen asleep at the home of one of the defense
witness after a night of drinking. The RTC rendered a decision conviction the
accused of 2 counts of kidnapping and serious detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred on convicting Dadles of 2 counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention?
Decision:
The accused argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses fail
to make out a case for kidnapping, referring to particular witness testimony that
he believed showed that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because
they went with the Dadles and his companions peacefully without being
subjected to threats and coercion. The SC disagreed, stating that the victims
hands were not tied nor guns poked at their sides when they were taken by the
appellants group do not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty. The
circumstances surrounding the taking of Salvador and Antonio, particularly the
appellant and his companions previous conduct in kidnapping victims Alipio and
Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and Antonio
of their liberty. The Court likewise added that the general rule is that evidence
is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal
case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature
for the purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in
the indictment. Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific
crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed at about the
same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
The Court found that both incidents of kidnapping were related in that proof of
one kidnapping tends to prove the other, thereby establishing the accuseds
intent to deprive the victims of their liberty.

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Maria Criselda Fojas

2010-0226

People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262)

Facts:
Accused Llaguno, along with several others, were charged with
Kidnapping with Murder when they allegedly kidnapped and detained Bienvenido
Mercado, and while under detention, shot and killed said victim. Although
charged with kidnapping with murder, the accused was only convicted for murder
and not for serious illegal detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was guilty of Kidnapping with murder?
Decision:
The Court found the accused guilty only for serious illegal detention and
not for murder. It held that the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused for
murder when the circumstances do not clearly and sufficiently prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that accused was guilty of murder. Parenthetically, when the
prosecutions case is anchored only on circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
of the crime sought to be proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances
under consideration must not support any rational hypothesis consistent with the
innocence of the accused. Consequently, appellant may not be held criminally
liable for killing the victim. The TC also erred in finding the accused not guilty of
115 | P a g e

serious illegal detention as the period of detention was less that 5 days. The
evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court,
clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority
to do so. At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court
merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal
detention for the sole reason that the victims detention did not exceed five days.
The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at
least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the
trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying
circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no
proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records
indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention.

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Maria Criselda Fojas

2010-0226

People v. Roluna (G.R. No. 101797)

Facts:
Eight person, including accused Roluna were charged with kidnapping
with murder. Witnesses claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped
by accussed and several others. The victim was alleged to have been threatened
with firearms andhand bound behin his back. The accused claimed that he was
taking care of an ill relative at the time of the kidnapping. The RTC found Roluna
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder.
The accused raised that the body of the victim has not surfaced and that the
unexplained disappearance cannot be blamed on him as there is all possibility
that the victim may still be alive.
Issue:
Was the death of the victim sufficiently proved and may the accused be
held liable or it?
Decision:

The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person
who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years. However, the SC decided that there were
insufficient circumstances to hold the accused responsible for the death of the
victim. The testimony of the witnesses stating that the victims hands were bound
by a companion of the accused is not enough to prove that the accused killed
him. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping
118 | P a g e

with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts
established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by
the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient
to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
The SC thus decided that Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was
proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we
find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code.

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120 | P a g e

Maria Garalde
2008-0326

Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor

People v. Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644)
Facts:
Erma Postejo, a domestic helper in Canada, is the mother of Jenny,
Doroteo, Aresola and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law
relationship. She was introduced to accused-appellant Rubi-Rose who offered to
work on the processing of Willys travel documents to Canada. Rubi-Rose asked
for P 18,300.00 as processing fee. Later on, accused-appellant informed Erma
that Willy was suffering from bronchitis. Erma sent P 5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be
given to Doroteo and the remaining balance should pay for Willys medical
treatment.

Then on March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and

Aresola from their home in Caloocan and brought them in Tondo. Aresola went
home and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was asking Erma for sums
of money which Erma refused to transmit.
March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was
missing and that he was last seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned
to the Philippines to look for her son. Erma found out that Willy was never
treated for any illness.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges

against her but the trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Issue:

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Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code?
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1)
the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender
deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something
more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses.
As consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.

Factual

findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial
courts finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full
faith and credit.

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Maria Garalde
2008-0326

People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316)

Facts:
On May 13, 1999, around 11:30 in the morning, Rosita Tolibas brought
with her in Fabella Memorial Hospital her two daughters, 12-year old Roselle and
15-day old Rosalyn. Rosita went to the hospital for medical check-up and tooth
extraction. While the mother, Rosita, was undergoing a medical check-up, her
two daughters waited for her in the lobby. Roselle sat on a bench carrying on her
lap her 15-day old sister. Accused-appellant sat beside them and befriended
Roselle. After a while, accused-appellant asked Roselle to buy ice water and the
latter entrusted her sister with the accused. Roselle didnt see any ice water
being sold so she returned to the bench. Upon returning, she saw accusedappellant running away with her sister. Roselle ran after the accused and clung
on to the leg of the accused.
The commotion caught the attention of the Kagawad of Barangay,
Emerento. He saw the accused and Roselle struggling and the latter shouting
akina ang kapatid ko, akina ang kapatid ko. Emerento approached them and
asked what was happening. Accused told the kagawad that she was running
after the mother of the baby but Roselle asked for help and informed the
kagawad that her mother was undergoing a medical check-up.

Kagawad

Emerento took the baby and handed it to his wife. They looked for the mother of
the two children and when they found her, she confirmed that the baby was
indeed her daughter. The kagawad requested the hospital security guard to
blotter the incident.

After trial, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the accused-appellant,
Teresa Bernardo, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
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and failure to return a minor under article 270 of the Revised Penal Code?

Decision:
No, the Court ruled that a person whose only intention is to look for the
childs mother would generally return the child to the person who entrusted the
child to her. This did not happen in the present case. The only logical conclusion
we can derive from appellants actions is that her intention was really to kidnap
the child not to look for the childs mother.
The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians. It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted
with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to
restore the said minor to his parents or guardians (People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA
478 [1997]). In People vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), we stated that the
essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that
the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed,
the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply
something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.

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Maria Garalde
2008-0326

People v. Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519)

Facts:
On November 8, 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her seven-month old
daughter, Arabella, to Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic. The clinic was
owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be
suffering bronchitis and diarrhea and was confined for three days. After which,
Sombong was not around to pick up her daughter and she only appeared after a
week. Sombong couldnt pay the hospital bills and since no one could take care
of her daughter at home, she left her at the nursery of the hospital, which she will
be charged P50.00 per day. Arabella was transferred to the clinic extension and
she was taken cared of by a yaya hired by her mother. Nothing was heard of the
complainant so Dr. Ty notified the barangay captain of the childs abandonment.
After two years, Arabella was entrusted to a guardian, Lilibeth Neri. Then after
five years, Sombong came back to claim her daughter.

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Sombong filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-appellant with

the RTC of Quezon City but was summarily dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the alleged detention was perpetrated in Kalookan City. Then, a
criminal case was filed against accused-appellants and an administrative case
was filed against Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of PRC. The case
was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Then on October 13, 1992,
Sombong file a petition for habeas corpus against the alleged guardians of her
daughter and the petition was granted and ordered the immediate delivery of
Cristina Grace Neri having found that she was the daughter of Sombong. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, said decision was reversed on the ground that
Cristina and complainants daughter are not one and the same person.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty of kidnapping and failure
to return a minor?

Decision:
No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two
elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the
custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor
to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the
kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to
his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be
deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of
the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply
something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at
bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her.
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127 | P a g e

Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154

Art. 287: Light Coercions

Baleros v. People (G.R. No. 138099)
Facts:
Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou) a medical student of University of Sto. Tomas,
was a tenant of Room 307, with Marvilou Bebania, at the Celestial Marie Building,
Sampaloc, Manila. On December 13, 1991, she was attacked by someone while she was
sleeping. A piece of cloth that smelled of a chemical was pressed on her face, thus
awakening her from her sleep. The person pinned her down preventing her escape. She
was finally able to fight off her attacker and reported the incident to the security guard.
She was not able to identify her attacker but she felt the attackers clothes describing it to
be made of cotton and the lower garment to be smooth and satin-like.
The security guard testified that on the same day, at around 1:30 am, Renato
Baleros, Jr. (Chito) arrived at the building wearing a white shirt with Greek letters and the
words and a black Adidas shorts. He went to room 306 where Joseph Africa was. Africa
was awakened by another knocking at around 3pm by Bernard Baptista, occupant of
room 310, and was told of the incident that happened that morning. At around 6-6.30am,
Chito was told that they cannot leave the building due to the incident.
Other occupants of room 310, Christian Alcala and Rommel Montes were asked
by the CIS to inspect their room (310) for any object not belonging to them. Montes
found a grey bag not belonging to them and surrendered it to the authorities. Upon
seeing the bag, they knew that the bag belonged to Chito.
When the bag was opened by the authorities, they found a white shirt with Greek
letters, black Adidas shorts, a handkerchief, 3 white shirts, socks and underwear. Alcala
identified the items belonged to Chito. The items were examined and it was found that
the handkerchief contained chloroform, the same chemical found in the salmon pink
night dress owned by Malou.
Trial Court convicted Chito of attempted rape. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. The case was elevated to the Supreme
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Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth while on top of
the

victim

constitutes

the

crime

of

attempted

rape?

Decision:
The Supreme Court held the acquittal of Chito from the crime of attempted rape.
There was no overt act of rape in this case. Overt act is some physical activity or deed
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime. It is more than a mere planning or
preparation. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot be construed that the act of
pressing chemical-soaked cloth on the face of Malou constitutes an overt act of rape
when there was no commencement of any act indicating the intent to rape the victim.
The acts committed by Chito are not indicative of rape but rather of unjust
vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. Unjust vexation exists when an act causes
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the offended. Unjust
vexation includes any conduct which would unjustly annoy or irritate a person.

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Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154

Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)

Facts:
Crazy Feet is a business establishment owned by Mildred Ong. On April 24,
1990, Wilfredo Infante was ordered by Ong Chiu Kwan to relocate Crazy Feet's
telephone, electric and water lines without a permit from appropriate authorities. Mildred
Ong filed a case against Ong Chiu Kwan for unjust vexation and the Trial Court found
Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation under Article 287, second paragraph.
The Court declared Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation?
Decision:

The court ruled that petitioner is liable for unjust vexation. Having admitted that
he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without the permit to relocate
such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To add, the electric, water
and telephone interruption happened during the operation of the business.

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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192

Title 10: Crimes Aganst Property

Art. 293: Robbery
People v. Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera (G.R. No. 97426)
Facts:
Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera by means of force entered the
house of husband and wife Simon and Restituta Hibaler through their window.
Armed with bolos, they were able to carry away property amounting to
Php18,250 through use of violence and intimidation.
According to the wife's testimony, they were awakened during the
breaking. Simon was able to get his flashlight and point its light at the intruders,
allowing them to identify the three and causing him to exclaim "It's you guys!" in
the vernacular. The husband was attacked first while the wife pleaded for his life,
one of the intruders then struck her on the face which caused her to lose
consciousness. When she regained consciousness she found the intruders
taking clothes and ransacking a trunk, after which they went downstairs and had
coffee. After they left, Restituta called out for help. When their son Pedro and a
neighbor arrived, they found Simon bleeding, and when asked what happened
the victim named Romeo, Antonio and Mario as the culprits who attacked him.
Simon died before they could take him to the hospital.
Pedro testified that when he first reported the crime he withheld the
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identity of the three assailants because an Anacleto Habana whose stepson was
married to the daughter of one of the assailants, Romeo Apolinario, was present
at the police station. He was afraid that if he had named the three at the
presence of Patrolman Habana, they would be warned and could flee.
The Regional TrialCourt of Capiz City found the appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of robbery with
homicide were proven by the prosecution?
Decision:
Yes, the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide was
proven by the prosecution. Add to that that the homicide was committed by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, appellants are guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The element of taking or asportation was completed when the apellants
took the personal property of spouses Hibaler. The wife Restituta testified that
after the incident, she made an inventory and found out that some of their
personal belongings were missing. It is of no moment that the property taken was
not disposed of in so far as the characterization of the crime as robbery is
concerned.

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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192

People v. Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large),

and Elvis Doca (G.R. No. 126781)
Facts:
Elvis Doca, Artemio Apostol, Calixto Zinampan and Roger Allan entered
the sari-sari store of Henry and Gaspara Narag of Linao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
and forced their way into the house adjacent to the store. The housekeeper,
Marlyn Calaycay was pulled back to the store by Elvis Doca as Henry was taken
to the sala. Henry was repeatedly ordered to produce his gun and money and
when he refused Artemio hit him in the head with his gun. Henry gave them
money but insisted that he did not have a gun for which Calixto hit him with the
butt of a gun at the back of his head while Gaspara pleaded for their lives. The
intruders then carried away property and money that they had obtained from the
couple. Henry died five days later due to the injuries suffered from the robbery.
Gaspara Narag passed away while the criminal case was pending with the trial
court leaving Marlyn as the lone witness left. The trial court found Elvis Doca
guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the crime of robbery with
homicide was proven by the testimony of the single witness?
Decision:
Yes, the guilt of the accused was sufficiently proven by the sole
prosecution witness for the crime of robbery.
The accused was positively identified by the prosecution witness who has
no motive whatsoever against him that would cause her to fabricate evidence. It
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is clear from the facts of the case that there exist a conspiracy between the
appellant and his co-accused as can be inferred from their acts.
The court found the testimony of the sole prosecution eyewitness as
honest and credible and further holds that a credible and positive testimony of a
single eyewitness is sufficient. A conviction for the truth is determined by the
quality of the testimony and not by the number of witnesses.

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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192

People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.R. No. 13106)

Facts:
Emelita Paraguas house was set on fire, some of her jewelries were
missing and niece Raquel Lopez was found dead at the kitchen. The police
received information that Donato Del Rosario was seen outside the house of
Paragua before the incident happened and disappeared since then.
A few days later, Del Rosario surrendered himself to a police officer and
volunteered that he will accompany them in recovering the stolen jewelries from
where he sold them. After the jewelries were recovered, with the assistance of
his lawyer, the suspect signed a waiver and confession for killing Raquel Lopez,
robbery and setting the house of Paragua on fire.
Del Rosario was charged for Robbery with Homicide before the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty for the crime charged. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt hence, an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the essential requisites of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide are present?
Decision:
Yes, the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide are
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present.
Case law has it that when a stolen property is found in the possession of a
person who is not the owner thereof, will be presumed the thief if he can not
satisfactorily explain his possession. The accused knew exactly where he can
recover the stolen jewelries and was positively identified by witnesses.
Intent to gain is assumed in an information where it is alleged that there
was unlawful taking and appropriation by the offender of the properties stolen.
The jewelries recovered were pawned and sold by the accused and was
positively identified by the owner of the establishments.

Homicide may occur before or after robbery, what is important is there is

an intimate connection between the killing and the robbery.

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137 | P a g e

Divina Gracia Maramba

2007-0321

Art. 308: Theft

Laurel v. Abrogar (G.R. No. 155076)
Facts:
PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for
allegedly using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the international
long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale
(ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in
the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT,
in the said amount.
Petitioners special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court. In his
petition for review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes definition of real and personal
property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is
exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal properties. Since
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words "personal property"
without qualification, it follows that all "personal properties" as understood in the
context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of
providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties
capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
In his Comment, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a
conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It
is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be
considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that
"business" is not personal property. It is not the "business" that is protected but
the "right to carry on a business." This right is what is considered as property.
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Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may
not be subject of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the international calls as well as the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
Held:
The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court
with direction to the Public Prosecutor of Makati City to amend the Amended
Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the private offended party because the international calls, although
considered as personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner
cannot be liable for theft on that matter; but the business of providing
telecommunication is a personal property which is capable of being appropriated
hence subject to theft.
This Court adhering the decisions in United States v. Genato, United
States v. Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any
personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of
appropriation can be the object of theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8,
1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil
law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as
"anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter
(not real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal
Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in
accordance with the rule on statutory construction that where words have been
long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a
certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words used in
such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have
been previously used. In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United
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States v. Carlos.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft
under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable
of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that
to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation
or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word
"take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer
possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through
the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as
an access device or card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the
destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as
the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a
device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the
use of a jumper to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v.
Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which
are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved
by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of
nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using
any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case,
petitioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by Articles 517
and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of
subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling
electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme
court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing
the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles
517 and 518 of the code in force in these islands.
The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or
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other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or

measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise
wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other
apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of
which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or
telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting
various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system,
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance
calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction
mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is
likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act
No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business
was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at
the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared
to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in
the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all
things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real
property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal
property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be
appropriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human
voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are
transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It
was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical
energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away.
Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls,"
the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical
energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal
properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
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over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the
use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.

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Divina Gracia Maramba

2007-0321

Alfonso D. Gaviola v. People G.R. No. 163297

Facts:
The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
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crime of qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito, a

nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola,
Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and
deliberately took, harvested and gathered 1500 coconuts thru the supervision of
Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without his
authority and consent. The said accused admitted that the coconuts were taken
upon his instruction but insisted that the trees were planted from the lot he
inherited from his father.
Issue:
Whether or not the said accused is guilty of the crime of qualified theft?
Decision:
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by
any person, who with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of
neither persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latters consent. Theft is likewise committed by: (1.) Any
person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or
objects of the damage caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an
enclosed state or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products. Thus, the elements of theft
are: 1). That there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to
another; 3) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. According to Article 310: Qualified theft - The crime
of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degree than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of
theft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal property,
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meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of

personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general
criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioners
claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from private complainants land is a
mere pretense to escape criminal liability.

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Divina Gracia Maramba

2007-0321

Santos v. People (G.R. No. 77429)

Facts:
Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion
Pealosa, entrusted her car, a 1976 Ford Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro
Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week later,
Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within a
period of two months.
After two months, Pealosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at
MacArthur Highway, Malabon, to retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the
vehicle unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the
money then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she
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could not find Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to
the shop several times thereafter but to no avail.
Pealosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in
Malabon. Unable to recover her car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against
Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case
was dismissed when the petitioner convinced the military authorities that the
complainant had sold the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of
Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor.
This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on Pealosa's complaint
was filed against Santos in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October
26,1982. After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced to
"an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to
four (4) years and two (2) months as maximum, both of prision correccional, to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P38,000.00 which is the value of
the car without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and with costs."
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of qualified theft?
Decision:
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime
committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the
offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as
described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential
elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal
distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa
the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit.
However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property.
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If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto

possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if
he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa."
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the
taking of the vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, we held
that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to
him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared:
... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a
certain quantity of rice at a certain price per picul. A ships several sacks of the
grain which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior to the measuring required
before the payment of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the
different sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now,
it may be asked: Did not B receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes.
And did A voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them
to B?-Yes Was the taking of the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's
consent?- No.
This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable,
according to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or
converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner, the crime
committed is not that of theft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of
qualified theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not
alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had
reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same
circumstance may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial.
Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying
circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.

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149 | P a g e

Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026

Art. 310: Qualified Theft

People v. Salonga (G.R. No. 131131)
Facts:

This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR NO. 18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty
imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua.
Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup
were charged with the crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Document in an information alleging that on or before 23 October
1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding
one another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said
Metrobank and Trust Company (Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence,
intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign
the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake
Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no
such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the
preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the
amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which
they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total
sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust
Company in the total amount of P36,480.30.
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On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial
Document.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?
Decsion:
The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of
accused-appellant in the crime charged.
It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank
Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed.
Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of
accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not
tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued
without any transaction.
Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of
bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other
specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing
therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the
signature appearing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs.
Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of
Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial
confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00.
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial
Document. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for
the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year
of each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of
the RPC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that
specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank
officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to
obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused.
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Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to

commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime
in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more
serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under
Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum
period,

the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of

reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as

maximum.

Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026

Roque v. People (G.R. No. 138954)

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR
No. 20411, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Asuncion Galang Roque,
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua,
Pampanga, Branch 49, where petitioner was found guilty of the crime of qualified
152 | P a g e

theft.

0It was alleged that on or about 16 November 1989, in the municipality of

Floridablanca, Pampanga, accused Asuncion Galang Roque, being employed as
teller of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) and as
such was authorized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect
capital contributions from its member/contributors of said corporation, and having
collected and received in her capacity as teller of the BABSLA the sum of PHP
10,000.00, said accused, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and
without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of
P10,000.00, by making it appear that a certain depositor by the name of Antonio
Salazar withdrew from his Savings Account, when in truth and in fact said
Antonio Salazar did not withdraw the said amount to the damage and prejudice
of BABSLA.
Issues:

Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property
is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged
felony?
Whether or not the elements of qualified theft were proven?

Decision:
When the defendant, with a grave abuse of confidence, removed the
money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there
was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of
theft.
In the case of the United States vs. De Vera (43 Phil., 1000, 1003), Justice
Villamor enumerated the essential elements of the crime of theft, which are as
follows:

The taking of personal property;

The property belongs to another;
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 The taking away be done with intent of gain;

The taking away be done without the consent of the owner; and
The taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.

In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the

capacity of a bank teller.
In People v. Locson, this Court considered deposits received by a teller in
behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This
interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the
beginning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is
only material possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank.
If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony
committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of
confidence, and the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the
confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.

The elements of qualified theft include the elements of theft and any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC. The elements of theft,
which is defined in Article 308 of the RPC, are the following:

1
2
3
4
5

Taking of personal property;

That said property belongs to another;
That said taking be done with intent to gain;
That it be done without the owners consent; and
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things.

The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the
information indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of
confidence. Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have also
proven the fact that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the case at bar, regarding the first element, the taking of personal property,
the prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took the
PHP 10,000 on November 16, 1989. The prosecution attempted to prove the
taking through circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the
prosecution adduced was the withdrawal slip for PHP 10,000 dated November
154 | P a g e

16, 1989.
Antonio Salazar disowned the signature on the withdrawal slip. However, he
also indicated that he did not know who made the withdrawal. Rosalina de Lazo
testified that the initial on the withdrawal slip, written after the figure 11-17-89,
was the customary signature of petitioner. She, however, did not intimate the
significance of petitioners initial on the withdrawal slip.
A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips including the withdrawal slip
stated above shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written across
the stamped word paid. This indicates that petitioners initial was placed in her
capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed
through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show that
petitioner prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal
increased her patrimony.
The presumption that being in possession of said withdrawal slip before its
delivery to Reynaldo Manlulu, the accused is the one who prepared the said
withdrawal slip is without basis in law. The presumption under paragraph (j),
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent

wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;

Thas always applied to a situation where property has been stolen and the
stolen property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the
possession of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the
taker of the stolen property.
In the case at bar, the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property.
The presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j),
Section 3 of Rule 131 are different. The lower court presumed that the petitioner
was the maker of the withdrawal slip and not that the petitioner stole anything. It
is plain that there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared
by the petitioner.
Another piece of evidence offered to prove petitioners taking is her
extrajudicial confession that she allegedly admitted taking money from the
155 | P a g e

accounts of several members of the BABSLA and the list of people from whose
accounts she took money.
However, it cannot be deduced from the alleged verbal confession of
petitioner that she was confessing a specific taking of P10,000 from the account
of Sgt. Salazar on November 16, 1989. And a perusal of the handwritten list
allegedly prepared by petitioner does not disclose any relation to the specific
taking alleged in the information. All that was written on the list, among other
names and figures, was the name Salazar, Antonio and the number fifteen (15) to
the right of the name. The list does not mention the date on which the money
was taken. Neither does it disclose the precise amount that was taken.
The other pieces of evidence such as the Tellers Daily Report and Abstract of
Payment merely reveal that on 16 November 1989, a withdrawal was made on
the account of Sgt. Antonio Salazar and that this withdrawal passed through the
hands of petitioner in her capacity as a teller of the BABSLA. Again, they prove
neither that petitioner prepared the subject withdrawal slip nor that she took the
P10,000 on that date.
It is plain that the prosecution failed to prove by direct or sufficient circumstantial
evidence that there was a taking of personal property by petitioner.

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Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026

People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233)

Facts:
From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
theft for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.

In an information dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:

The undersigned accuses Luisito D. Bustinera of the crime of Qualified

Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about 25 December up to the 9 January 1997 in Quezon City,
the said accused being then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S.
Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs in Diliman, Quezon City, and as such
has free access to the taxi he drives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him
by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266
worth PHP 303,000.00 belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of PHP 303,000.00.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused-appellant had intent to gain when he failed to

return the taxi to its garage?
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft?

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Decision:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,
by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT
PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the RPC
are:
1
2
3
4
5

that there be taking of personal property;

that said property belongs to another;
that the taking be done with intent to gain;
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and,
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:

the theft is committed by a domestic servant;

the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;
the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle;
the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a

plantation;
the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.
The elements of carnapping are thus:
1 the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
2 the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and
3 the taking is done with intent to gain.
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping
law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.

The anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
158 | P a g e

and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and
theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken
without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals
with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the
owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force
upon things.
Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the
case before the enactment of said statute.

While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles,
it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, streetsweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on
public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers
and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By
implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on
robbery, respectively.
Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it
is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would
apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in
the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as
one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the
crime of carnapping.For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be
stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating
the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation
that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the
real nature of the crime.
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain,
took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the latters consent. Thus, the indictment
159 | P a g e

alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, and the prosecution proved the
same.
Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return
it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without
the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he
was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not
returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the
owners consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful
one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi
was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding its
return.
Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to gain with
the mere taking of the taxi without the owners consent.
Appellants position does not persuade.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the

unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.

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Christine Perez
2006-0104

Art. 312: Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real

Rights in Property
Quinao v. People (335 SCRA 741)
Facts:
Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private
complainant Francisco Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in
question. Accused-appellant presented a tax declaration and alleged that the
land being claimed by the complainant is different from the land litigated in Civil
Cases No. 3561. Trial Court finds accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of
Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land

in question could be held liable of usurpation of her own property?
Decision:
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court
convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on
161 | P a g e

"speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record

and in accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal
Code.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of

another's real property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the
possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that
the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion
de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or
usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and
that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or
violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.

In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense
are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right
belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in
possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused
should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent
reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.

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Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392

Art. 315: Estafa

Ong v. People (G.R. No. 165275)
Facts:

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Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is
owned and operated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While
she normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated
checks to cover the jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995,
upon her assurance that the checks would be funded on their due dates. When,
on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp
"Account Closed."

Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10
counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code?
Held:
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the
accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information.
From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime
charged is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner
issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and
failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations
clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found
but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

164 | P a g e

Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses or
fraudulent acts the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a
check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure
to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a
violation of paragraph 2(a).

Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge

of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent,
which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply
with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then
an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly
charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder.

In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under

paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received notice of
dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the
questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This
leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state
that petitioners defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a
malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of
sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner
offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the
amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the
prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250,
which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more
than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check.

In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her
acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.

165 | P a g e

Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392

Chua v. People (G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30)

166 | P a g e

Facts:
Private complainant Araceli Estigoy was engaged in the buy and sell of
imported goods from 1982 to 1984 when she met appellant (Anita Chua) who
transacted twice with her. n November 25, 1982, appellant issued to complainant
in payment of imported (PX) items postdated checks drawn against Pacific Bank,
Tarlac branch. On December 4, 1982, appellant again went to complainants
house, purchased some imported items and issued another set of postdated
checks drawn against the same bank in Tarlac. On their due dates, complainant
deposited the checks in the bank but they were dishonored, as evidenced by the
check return slips with annotations as follows: "drawn against insufficient funds"
and/or "account closed".

Complainant notified appellant of the dishonor and

demanded payment of the checks. Appellant failed to redeem or pay the amounts
of the checks despite several demands. Appellant admitted issuing the checks
but interposed the defense that she issued the checks as collateral and by way of
accommodation of the complainant who requested for the checks. The Regional
Trial Court found appellant guilty of violation of Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of conviction
rendered by the court a quo, with a slight modification as to the penalty imposed.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Anita Chua is guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the
RPC?
Decision:

Article 315 (2)(d) of the RPC penalizes any person who defrauds another
by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender has no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient
to cover the amount of the check.

The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 4885, are:

167 | P a g e

(1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation

contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) that the at the time of the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in
the bank or the funds deposited were insufficient to cover the amount of the
check; and,
(3) that the payee has been defrauded.

All the elements of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Art. 315, RPC are
present in this case. The evidence showed and petitioner Chua admitted issuing
the questioned checks in favor of private respondent in exchange for the
imported goods she obtained from the latter. It is likewise not disputed that the
checks she issued bounced or were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds
and/or because her bank account had already been closed by the bank due to
lack of funds. As a result, private respondent suffered damage. She had to close
down her business because she could not recoup her losses due to the huge
amount petitioner owed her.

Petitioners defense that she issued the unfunded checks as collateral or

security for the goods she got from private respondent was not worthy of
credence. the amounts of the checks issued by petitioner clearly showed that
they were intended as payments for the items she obtained from private
respondent. Private respondent would not have parted with her goods in
exchange for bum checks. It was likewise contrary to ordinary human experience
and to sound business practice for petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks
as

"collateral"

or

"by

way

of

accommodation."

As

an

experienced

businesswoman, petitioner could not have been so nave as not to know that she
could be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks.
Ergo, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

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Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392

Gonzaludo v. People (G.R. No. 150910)

Facts:
Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the
Bacolod City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita
Manlangit in Bacolod City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulyssess mother at
the latters house at Bacolod City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City.
Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting
her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.

After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to

Bacolod City. And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a
small house located near that of his mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City.
Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and brought
her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the house and the
house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. After Ulyssess demise in
January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey
house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben
Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since the house was being sold for a cheap
price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to
whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced the
Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed
as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the 2storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of
Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject house.

Later, upon complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an Information

dated May 31, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City
charging Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg
Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru
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Falsification of Public Document. The trial court acquitted the Canlas spouses but
convicted petitioner of the crime charged. The appellate affirmed the trial courts
judgment of conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru

Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a),
Article 315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime
of Estafa is not present?

Decision:
The petition is partly impressed with merit.

For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through

falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document must exist.

There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are
present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo
when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false
pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
and private complainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey house was
lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases.

It is petitioners thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the third

element contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the
offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any money or
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property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or

fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioners
submission.

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that
the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of
defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced
the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the
present case.

While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by

Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her
semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit
was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with
their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging
Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the
Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit
or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part
with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all
the more reason must this be for herein petitioner.

The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily
absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of
public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.

It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the

offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established,
despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally
feasible. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie
to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the
deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of
such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name,
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Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is

established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the
crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable
doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and
petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the
house in this case.
Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification
of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document.

Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040

Art. 318: Other Deceits

Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822)
Facts:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor
vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor
Sales. His office and display room for cars were located along Panganiban
Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager.
Spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo purchased a, what would seem as a
brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van that was displayed in the show room of
the petitioner. They were not informed that said van was damaged due to a
vehicular accident that occurred when Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan,
suffered a heart attack while traveling from Manila to Naga City On March 17,
1995 when said van was initially purchased by petitioner from Union Motors
Corporation in Paco, Manila.

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A day after Spouses Silos purchase of the van, they heard a squeaking
sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the van. Believing that the
van merely needed grease, they stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it was
examined. The mechanic discovered that some parts underneath the van had
been welded. When they complained to Guinhawa, the latter told them that the
defects were mere factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo
requested that Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles.
Guinhawa initially agreed to the couples proposal, but later changed his mind
and told them that he had to sell the van first. The spouses then brought the
vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for examination. The mechanic
discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was producing the annoying
sound, and that it had been repaired.

Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund
of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the
confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had
bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in
the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI.

On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for

violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against
Guinhawa.

Issue:
Whether or not Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318 of the RPC covering
other deceits?
Decision:
Yes, Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318.
Petitioner insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van
was brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect. He
173 | P a g e

avers that deceit cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any

notice to the public that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that
he made no personal representation that the herein subject van was brand new
for the simple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the
allegation in the complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It
has thus become admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new
vehicles a fact which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied.
Therefore, when private complainant went to petitioners showroom, the former
had every right to assume that she was being sold brand new vehicles there
being nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private
complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in
a road accident when driven by no less than petitioners own driver.
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which
the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which
the other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good
faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its
inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is
bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover,
a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as
well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus
allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.
The petitioner knew that the van had figured in an accident, was damaged
and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom, thus
making it appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was
mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the
petitioner even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the
vehicle did not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained
that the van was brand new. Thus, the private complainant bought the van,
believing it was brand new.
Hence, petitioner Guinhawa is guilty of the crime of Other Deceits
punishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341

Title 11: Crimes against Chastity

Art. 333, 334: Adultery and Concubinage
Beltran v. People (G.R. No. 137567)
Facts:

Meynardo Beltran herein petitioner and wife Charmaine E. Felix were

married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in
Cubao, Quezon City.

After twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a

petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In
her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and
his paramour.

In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration
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of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the

criminal case.

Issue:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for the declaration of nullity of
petitioners marriage is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife?

Decision:

No. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's

marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to
be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner
need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.

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Therefore, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming
the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.

Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341

Vera Neri v. People (G.R. No. 96602)

Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo
Arroyo in the City of Baguio.
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of
Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving
at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of
Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park
Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening,
accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the
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door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's
bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were.
On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and
went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes later,
Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three
of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a
new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private
complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on traded marriage
with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Neris alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from
filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.

Decision:

The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but
only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil
Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not
involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking
to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband,
by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live
separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a
year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in,
the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not
authorized

by

law

to

institute

the

criminal

proceedings."

In

fine,

the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a bar
to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such
acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with
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Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code
provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended
spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case
passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not
exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the
offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy.
Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social
institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental
kind.

Anna May Vallejos

2007-0140

Art. 338: Simple Seduction

People v. Pascua (GR No. 128159-62)
Facts:
On four separate incidents and as early as August 1995, accusedappelant Hipolito Pascua, a 65-year old man, had succeeded in having sexual
intercourse twice with Liza Paragas and also twice with her twin sister Anna, both
of whom were of 12 years of age then.
On said four separate incidents, accused-appellant would always call on
the twins while they were playing in front of his house; instruct them to go inside
his house; and once inside order them to take off their pants and insert his penis
inside their vaginas, while threatening them not to scream for he would kill them.
After his sexual advances, he would give them money from P5 to P10 and
threaten them again not to tell their mother about what happened or he would kill
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them.
Fearing for their lives, the twins did not tell their mother about what
happened. It was only when their older sister, Rosalina, had told their mother
about it, based on the confession of accused-appellants granddaughter who saw
him rape Liza, had she learned of the incidents.
Wasting no time and propelled by her rage of what she had learned, their
mother filed four separate complaints for rape against accused-appellant. This
was after she had her twins physically examined by a doctor who, based on his
findings, confirmed that the twins were indeed sexually-abused.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of all the charges, sentenced
him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay each twin with
P100,000 as indemnity for moral damages.
On appeal, appellant, maintained and consistently argued that the
intercourse he had with twins were all consensual and that the complainants in
fact, would always visit him at his house asking for money and sexual
satisfaction. He further argued that if any, he would, be only held liable for simple
seduction.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant may be held liable for the crime of rape
even if allegedly he did not employ force in order to have sexual intercourse with
the twins?
Whether or not he is liable for simple seduction?
Decision:
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to
scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, after
each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant not to tell
their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not required
to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be
irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the desired
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result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point. Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in
this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she submitted to the rapists
lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds that even
though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance
through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the
man is rape. Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy
his lust.
No. Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable
for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some
deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of
this promise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of
sexual intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He
declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would
promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant
presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of
such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant
to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him.
Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody
discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than
enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private
complainants was totally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies
established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with them without their
consent and against their will. Considering that the victims accounts of what the
appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court
correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-yearold twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.

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Anna May Vallejos

2007-0140

People v. Teodosio (GR. No. 97496)

Facts:
In a complaint filed against defendant-appellant Fernando Carreon, who
was a 4th year college student, Elaine Cesar, who was then only 12 years and 6
months old, alleged therein that on December 19, 1985 Fernando raped her
against her will. According to her, she did not gave her consent to said incident
as Fernando gave her softdrinks which made her unconscious and thus enable
him to succeed in having carnal knowledge with her at the Champion Lodge Inn
at Sta. Cruz Manila where she was dragged forcefully by Fernando.
Fernando for his part denied in his answer that she forced her in having
sexual intercourse with him because according to him she agreed to go and stay
with him at Champion Lodge Inn.
Based on the record, it was undisputed that prior to the said incident,
Fernando and Elaine were together. Earlier that day he accompanied her to her
Christmas party at her school in Manila Central University in the morning; went to
Luneta Park and took a stroll; thereafter went to Cubao and ate at a fastfood
restaurant; then she accompanied him to his school at Lyceum where he took his
examination; and then finally they went to Champion Lodge Inn where said
incident took place.
After said incident, Elaine told it to her mother who, without wasting time,
brought her to PC Crime Laboratory for a physical examination, the result of
which revealed that she had a fresh laceration on her hymen. Based on said
findings, a complaint was filed against Fernando.

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After arraignment, Fernando pleaded not guilty. In the meantime during her
testimony before the court, Elaine admitted that she knew Fernando because
they were neighbors. She even admitted that they were sweethearts and that she
had given him her photo, at the back of which, she had her personal message for
him.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of the offense
charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision and
imposed upon defendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case was
brought to the Supreme court through an automatic review.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court had proven the guilt of defendant for the crime
of rape beyond reasonable doubt?
Whether or not defendant may be held liable for the crime of simple
seduction?
Decision:
NO. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to
prove that their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the
prosecution, served to demolish the same.
Firstly, while Elaine claimed she was dragged to the hotel, her medical
examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force
on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped
during the many hours they were together going from one place to another, but
she did not. She was enjoying their tryst.
Secondly, if she was really drugged she should have been given at least a
blood and urine test to determine if there were any remaining chemicals in her
system. This was not done.
Thirdly, after the incident, Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all.
She did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. It was only
when her mother scolded her that she contrived her story.
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Fourthly, in one part of her Sagot Salaysay submitted to the fiscal's office, she
said she did not accept the invitation of appellant for them to go to the Luneta. In
another part thereof, she said she accepted the same. 6 In court, she said she
agreed to go to the Luneta and thereafter she said she was
forced.
She also stated in her Sagot Salaysay that she was only persuaded to give
appellant her photograph and appellant dictated what she wrote thereon. In court
she admitted she gave the photograph to appellant and that appellant did not ask
her to write the dedication thereon.
Verily, the foregoing circumstances effectively disprove the theory of force and
involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two.
What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their
mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and
thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held
liable for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
NO. Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 338.

Simple seduction. The seduction of a woman who is

single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years
of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
All the elements of the offense are present.
Frankly
1.

Elaine was over 12 and under 18 years of age.

2.

She is single and of good reputation.

3.

The offender had sexual intercourse with her.

4.

It was committed by deceit.

Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully
persuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that
attended the commission of the offense.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 4.

Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint

184 | P a g e

or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the

offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged
nor necessarily included in the offense charged in the information. The only
elements of the offense alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party are
that she is over 12 years of age when appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
Thus, appellant cannot be convicted even for simple seduction either.

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Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz

2007-0388

Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage,

Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
Beltran v. People (334 SCRA 106)
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were legally
married. After 24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. In her answer to said petition,
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home
and cohabited with a woman named Milagros. Felix then filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage under Art. 344 of the RPC against petitioner and his
paramour. The City prosecutor of Makati found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an information against petitioner.
On the other hand, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of warrant
of arrest, filed a motion to defer proceedings. He argued that the pendency of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case of concubinage against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case of concubinage should be suspended on
the ground of a prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage?
Decision:
The pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
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prejudicial question to the concubinage case. Article 40 of the Civil Code

provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. In view of this provision, it follows that for purposes other
than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. Therefore in a case for
concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal
case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.
A subsequent pronouncement that marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense in a concubinage case. He who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage.

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Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz

2007-0388

People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52)

Facts:
Susan Pelaez, 15 years old, suffering from mild mental retardation and
transient psychotic illness, was assisted by her grandmother Flora Deguino to file
a criminal complaint for the crime of rape against her stepfather named Romeo
Tipay.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that the accused raped his
stepdaughter Susan several times whenever the latters mother and siblings
were out of the house. Susan was threatened by the accused that he would kill
Susans family member if she would tell anyone about it. One day, Susan
complained to her grandmother that her head was aching. Flora had Susan
checked up by a midwife. The midwife found out that Susan is 4-months
pregnant and it was at this moment that Susan confided to her grandmother that
she was being raped by her stepfather.
Sometime in 1996, the lower court convicted the accused of the crime of
rape under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and
sentenced the accused to Death Penalty which caused the automatic review by
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave error when it convicted the
accused under a fatally defective complaint as it was Susans grandmother who
filed the same, when it should have been Marilyn (Susans mother), in
accordance with Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court?
Whether or not the death penalty should be imposed?
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Decision:
Under Sec. 5, par. 3 of Rule 110, where the offended party is a minor, her
parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the complaint. The right to file the
action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided.
However, with the advent of RA 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against
person and no longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can now
be instituted by any person. It is also worthy to note that in the case of People vs.
Estrebella, it was held that any technical defect in a complaint for rape would be
remedied by testimony showing the consent and willingness of the family of the
complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental retardation,
for instance) to have the private offense publicly tried. In the case at bar, Marilyn
Deguino (complainants mother) herself requested Susans grandmother to take
care of the case.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing
death penalty on accused-appellant. In view of RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law)
applicability in the crime of rape, which imposes death penalty when the victim is
under 18 years of age and the offender is her parent, ascendant, step-parent.. it
is required that the prosecution proved with certainty the fact that the victim was
under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the
imposition of death penalty. In the case at bar, the allegation in the complaint that
complainant is under 16 years of age when the crime was committed and that the
accused-appellant lack of denial in that regard is not sufficient to excuse the
prosecution of its burden to prove said qualifying circumstance by competent
evidence.

189 | P a g e

Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz

2007-0388

Alonte v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245)

Facts:
Before the Supreme Court are consolidated petitions filed by Bayani M.
Alonte and Buenaventura Concepcion which both assails the decision of the
respondent Judge Maximo Savellano, Jr.., of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
finding both petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
An information for rape was filed on December 5, 1996 against petitioners
Alonte (incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna) and the latters accomplice
Concepcion based on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. Said
information alleged that on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian,
Laguna, accused Concepcion brought Juvie-lyn to Alontes resthouse and left her
to Alonte after receiving P1,000.00. Alonte gave Juvie-lyn water to drink that
made her dizzy and weak and against the latters will and consent raped her.
In 1996, Juvie-lyn, through her counsel, Atty. Balbin, and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for Change of Venue to have the case transferred and tried by any of the
Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. The same has been approved on
September 20, 1997. On the other hand, during the pendency of the petition for
change of venue, Juvie-lyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an
affidavit of desistance.
Meanwhile, in 1997, Atty. Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have
the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become
moot in view of complainants affidavit of desistance.
Upon arraignment on November 07 1997, petitioners both pleaded not
guilty to the charge. From November 10, 1997 to December 10, 1997,
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petitioners filed five Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail to which the respondent judge
did not act on.
Accused were sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for having been found guilty of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party
extinguished the criminal liability of the accused?
Decision:
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in
the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal
case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so
earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value,
like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation.
Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a
prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except
upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance
of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the case has
been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said case.

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Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027

Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness

Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340)
Facts:
Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 or Child Abuse.
Private complainant Kristine Joy alleged that one morning, while she was walking
to school, Alvin approached her and placed his hand on her shoulder where it
went down to her breast. Kristine Joy told her grandmother about it. Along with
her mother and grandmother, they went to DSWD to report the incident. The
latter filed a complaint with the RTC. The latter rendered decision finding Alvin
Amployo guilty of the crime charged. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Amployo contends that the element of lewd design was not sufficiently proven.
Furthermore, he posits that even if lewd design was sufficiently proved, he must
only be charged for the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness and not Child Abuse.
Issue:
Whether or not Alvin Ampayo is guilty of Child Abuse under RA 7610?
Decision:
Yes. The term 'lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or
obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an
accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental
process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of
the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
In the present case it would have been easy to entertain the possibility
that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is
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not the case, however, as Alvin Ampayo did the very same act to Kristine Joy in
the past. As to Alvins argument that human experience negates the presence of
lewd design as Kristine Joy had no developed breasts with which to entice him,
human experience has taught us painfully well that sexual misconduct defies
categorization and what might be an unusual, unlikely or impossible sexual
conduct for most might very well be the norm for some.
Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7610, before an accused can be convicted of
child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the
requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.
Thus, Alvin Ampayo is guilty for the crime of Child Abuse because the
prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of acts of lasciviousness.

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Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027

People vs. Collado (353 SCRA 381)

194 | P a g e

Facts:
Messeah confronted her mother about the sexual abuses she sustained
from her distant cousin, accused Jessie Ventura Collado who also lives with them
in one roof. Since Messeahs father was a seaman, their children were left in the
care of Jessie. Messeah recounted four occasions where she was molested.
The first of which happened on 27 April 1993 when Jessie tied her on the bed
and attempted to insert his penis to her vagina. When he was unsuccessful, he
then inserted the same to her anus.
The second instance happened on 5 June 1993 when Messeah was
grabbed by Jessie and dragged her upstairs. He told her to take off her shorts
and panties, took off his shorts, pressed her legs apart with his two (2) legs, and
rubbed his penis against her thighs, until it touched her vagina.
On 7 July 1993, the third molestation occurred when Messeah and her
brother Metheor were again left home with Jessie. Armed with a knife, Jessie
forced Messeah to sit on a chair. He took off her shorts and underwear and
spread her legs. He inserted and rubbed his penis between her thighs until it
touched her vagina.
Another similar incident happened on 17 October 1993. While, Messeah
was changing her clothes, Jessie entered the room and inserted his smallest
finger into her vagina. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top of
her but his penis was not able to touch her vagina because Messeah cried for
help and Metheor came and told Jessie to get away.
After Messeahs parents learned about their daughters ordeal they
decided to file complaints against him for one (1) count of consummated rape
and three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness. RTC rendered decision holding
Jessie liable for statutory rape and 3 counts of acts of lasciviousness.

Isue:
Whether or not Jessie should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and
statutory rape?
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Decision:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3)
counts of acts of lasciviousness. However, RTC erred in sentencing him guilty
for statutory rape because he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.
While Jessie succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts there was
no indication that it successfully penetrated at least the labia of the victim.
We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant
tried forcing his penis into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, he
inserted it into her anus instead. This could have been attempted rape, or even
consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for acts of lasciviousness.
By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his victims sex
organ. Touching of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the
penis slid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will
only result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.

Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027

Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32)

Facts:
An information for rape was filed against Nicanor Dulla. During the trial, it
was established that three year old Andrea Ortega came home crying with
bruises on her thighs saying that his uncle showed his penis to her. In her own
words she said inaano ako ni uncle while doing a pumping motion on her lower
196 | P a g e

body. The medical report on Andrea showed that her hymen was still intact.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of
lasciviousness and not of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of acts of lasciviousness and if so,
whether or not he should be convicted for the said crime even though the
information alleged against him is for rape?
Decision:
Yes. The trial court correctly convicted petitioner of acts of lasciviousness.
Andrea told the court that petitioners penis was never inserted in her vagina, nor
was there even a touching of her external organ by petitioners penis. There
could, therefore, be no rape.
Andrea Ortega recounted the event while she was on witness stand and
was given full credence by the trial court. The lewd design of petitioner is evident
and, although the information filed was for the crime of rape, he can be convicted
of acts of lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.

Marie Joan Tusi

2007-0276

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Art. 337: Qualified Seduction

People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096)
Facts:

Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father,
Amado Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November,
1994 and December, 1994, which resulted to Julias pregnancy.

Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the
crime of incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon
failure of the prosecution to prove the use of force by Amado in the second and
third complaints, he was just convicted of qualified seduction.

Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the
complaint for the crime of rape?
Decision:
No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by
accused, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the
complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused
may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of
force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise
would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to
be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape
cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People
vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are
not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is
carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects
(Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).
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What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape
in Criminal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, in its opinion, the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation,
and order instead the filing of the appropriate information. Be that as it may, this
Court believes otherwise and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty
as well of these two other counts of rape.

Marie Joan Tusi

2007-0276

People v. Manansala (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)

Facts:
Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her
father, a 44-year old taho vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991.
On direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in
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the taho factory in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination,
however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident was
committed in the taho factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents
were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money
every time they had sexual intercourse.
The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his
daughter in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly,
the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the
victims statement?
Decision:
No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified
seduction.
The inconsistencies on victims testimony for evidence cannot be
dismissed as trivial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be
able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a
reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution must
stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. As SC has said:
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions
to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous
female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and
dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection.
Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually
abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought
to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
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through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind

that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies
and contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on
November 1, 1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to
Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She
was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her
father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with
him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991
showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual
intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac
suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction,
considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is
especially true because she said she had been given money by her father
everytime they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows
that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One
subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done
to her. What is clear from complainants testimony is that although accusedappellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or
intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accused-appellants
moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living
with them, having separated from complainants mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was
committed by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant
cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither
can qualified seduction include rape.

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202 | P a g e

Marie Joan Tusi

2007-0276

People v. Alvarez (G.R. No. L-34644)

Facts:
On June 6, 1969, Loreta T. dela Concepcion, a 13-year old girl, was
raped by her brother-in-law, Nicanor Alvarez.
Loreta narrated that the accused raped her in the presence of her sister
(wife of the accused) while they were sleeping in the sala. Loreta resisted but she
203 | P a g e

was not able to shout because she was allegedly weak and tired. She told the
incident to her sister the following morning but the latter did not pay heed. She
eventually got pregnant and a child was born.
An Information was filed. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape or quite possibly, of the crime
of qualified seduction?
Decision:
SC acquitted the accused for the crime of rape but charged him of the
crime of qualified seduction, the elements of which were included in the facts
alleged in the Information.
Viewed from human observation and experience not even a confirmed sex
maniac would dare do his thing before the eyes of strangers, how much more for
a healthy husband before the eyes of his very wife? Then, again, testimony that
her sister before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place did not
lift a finger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this
piece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that
the natural reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than
passive [acquiescence] and the natural response of a sister would be to protect
the virtue of a younger sister from abuse of her husband.
Our criminal law is not susceptible to such a reproach, it being clear from
the information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were
included in the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is
entitled to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given
credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced
adolescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound
by the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how close
she felt towards him.
In the case of People v. Fontanilla, it is said that when the offender is a
public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under
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any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the
present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been
used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seduction of a virgin over twelve
and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated
in art. 337 is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction, even though no
deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the
part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence
of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater
severity than it does the simple seduction, taking into account the abuse of
confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which
implies deceit or fraud.
As early as 1908, in the leading case of United States v. Arlante, the
penalty for qualified seduction was rightfully visited on an accused whose
conduct was similar to the appellant. The facts, as set forth in the very able
opinion of no less than Chief Justice Arellano, reads as follows: "That the
accused had carnally abused two orphan girls, relatives of his wife, who were
sheltered in his house; that they respectively gave birth to a boy and a girl, one of
them on the 5th of November, 1905, this being the one who files the complaint for
seduction, and the other on the 15th of October of the same year, the latter
appearing in the case as a witness for the prosecution x x x x And even though
the accused were not, as a matter of fact, in charge of the keeping of the
offended girl, it is beyond doubt that, as she was a domestic, the crime is
included within paragraph 1 of said article. 'Upon the word domestic being
employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of a servant, the term is
applied to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same
house, and constituting, in this sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the
term servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this
manner, it has been properly used."
Nothing remains to be added except that in a situation like the present,
where, in keeping with Filipino mores, a younger sister is called upon to be of
help to those ahead of her and to stay, even if intermittently, in the latter's house,
especially so after marital ties are formed and children born, may give rise to
situations of this character considering that among the poorer elements of our
society, all the members of a family are huddled together within briefest confines,
and insistence on personal modesty and privacy is practically out of the question.
If the ascendancy of a brother-in-law, instead, were used for moral purposes,
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then, certainly, there is more than a justification for adherence to the view first
announce in the landmark Arlante decision that thereby the offense qualified
seduction was in fact committed.

Katherine Yarte
2011-0296

Art. 342: Forcible Abduction

People vs. Egan (GR No. 139338)
Facts:
Lito Egan, alias Akiao, 36 years old, a Manobo was an avid admirer of a
fellow Manobo, Lenie Camad, 12 years old. Both are residents of Sitio Salaysay,
Marilog, Davao City.
On 6 January 1997, the accused appeared from nowhere and forcibly
dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sition Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato. He threatened
Lenie that he would kill her should the latter resisted.
Jessica, the cousin of Lenie, who witnessed the abduction, informed
Palmones Camad, the father of Lenie regarding the incident.
For four (4) months, the datus attempted a customary settlement of the
abduction in accordance with Manobo traditions. In exchange of the hand of Lenie in
marriage, the accused agreed to give 2 horses to the family of Lenie. When the
accused failed to fulfill his promise, the father demanded the unconditional return of
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his daughter to his custody.

Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie
to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued on
15 May 1997.
An Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the
accused. After several warrants of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally
arrested at Arakan, Cotabato.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial,
accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under
Manobo rites in the house of her father after he has given the family, the dowry. The
accused allegedly delivered the horse to the father, but was again refused when the
latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded that
because he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed against him.
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of
forcible abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Between the accused and the victim, whose version is more credible, more
plausible and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime charged?
Decision:
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim
who is a young girl was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knifepoint, she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her
abode. At her tender age, she could not be expected to physically resist considering
the fact that even her companion, Jessica, had to run home to escape accusedappellants wrath as he brandished a haunting knife.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was
done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The
word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that
form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a
wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts which
accused-appellant displayed towards the victim after she was abducted. This element may
also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old,
accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in
the ways of the world than she
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Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father Palmones as
well as the absence of any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the logical
conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and their respective
testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of full faith and credit

Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been

engaged under Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship
was willful and voluntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1)
horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild
horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in
marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the
old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize
his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie.
The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accusedappellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they
were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him
of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it all, by filing
a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could have easily told her
father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing
untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction
would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom
she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in
denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the
disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father
would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching
for the couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from
captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter.

Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for

forcible abduction under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which
accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible
abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other half
of

complex

crime since

the

record

does

not

show

that

the principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity
and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would
not have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during her four
(4)-month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to
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lay with her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl
forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other
element of the crime which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever
familiar place she may be and to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of
accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but also to
separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of
forcible abduction

Katherine Yarte
2011-0296

People vs. Ablaneda (G.R. No. 131914)

Facts:
On or about 7:00 oclock in the morning of February 18, 1993 at Barangay
Camambugan, Municipality of Daet, province of Camarines Norte and within the j the
accused-appellant Jaime Ablaneda, also known as Joey Capistrano with lewd design did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct one Magdalena Salas, a minor, 7 years
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old by bringing her to a small hut in a grassy place and while thereat, said accused,
unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said
Magdalena Salas against her will to her damage and prejudice.

At the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the

lower court found the

the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

complex crime of forcible abduction with rape

Issue:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused?
Decision:

The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of

the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her
will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or
when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under
twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman,
was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally
directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena
could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of
accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical
resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her
will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was
raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose
was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the
taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving
minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against
her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd
designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim
In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is
corroborated by the medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered
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from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual
contact is immaterial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve
years of age. Sex with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she
consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape.

The findings of facts of the trial court, when supported by evidence on

record, are binding on this Court. No significant facts or circumstances were
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, might
substantially affect the outcome of this case. Consequently, the trial courts
conclusions and assessments on the credibility of witness must be accorded
respect on appeal
The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible
abduction with rape committed in 1993, was correct. No qualifying or
aggravating circumstance was proven in this case and there was none alleged in
the information.
However, the trial court erred in failing to award civil indemnity to the
victim. Whenever the crime of rape is committed, a civil indemnity is awarded to
the victim without necessity of proof or pleading, and the same is automatically
granted together with moral damages, generally in the amount of P50,000.00
each. In this connection, the prayer of the Solicitor General that the civil
indemnity be increased to P75,000.00 cannot be granted, the same being
contrary to jurisprudence In cases where the death penalty cannot be imposed,
the civil indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00

Katherine Yarte
2011-0296

People vs. Sabrado (G.R. No. 126114)

Facts:
Appellant is the uncle of Judeliza, the complainant. He is the younger brother of her
father.
Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed and
forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a truck for
Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under
211 | P a g e

cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer,
Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar, Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the
house of Conchita Tipnit, Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt. Though aunt and niece did not
know each other. In Estampar, Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who
severely mauled her until she lost consciousness

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually

assaulted Judeliza. He covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After
satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly
pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help. Their host, Roberto, was
awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza
with a piece of wood, rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to
the house of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba.
Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her
medicine.

Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal.

After the initial police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial
Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer
examined her.

An information for forcible abduction with rape was filed. The

accused pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, accused admitted having

sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed
that they were lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three
months before running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after
Judeliza had revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They
then lived together as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked
her but claimed that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his
niece, contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched
the victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship.
He claimed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment
she received. Pedsc
The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and
his defense untenable.

|The trial Court found the accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under
Article 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is
meted the extreme penalty of death.

212 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in its evaluation of the honesty of
private complainant, in effect giving full weight and credence to the evidence of the
prosecution than that of the defense?
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in finding the accused appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
Decision:
There is no no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed evaluation of the evidence
for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's testimony was given in a
straightforward, clear, and convincing manner, which remained consistent even under crossexamination. The trial court found her testimony believable and convincing, while appellant's
version of events incredible and outrageous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-legal
officer, he found that her body bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's bare
denial could not prevail over said positive evidence
Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consensual,
since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated by some
documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship .In this case, there is no showing of
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete proof of a romantic nature. Besides,
as observed by the trial judge, it is contrary to human experience that a naive rural lass like
Judeliza, barely nineteen years old, would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor,
would he if he were indeed her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause,
without over-straining our credulity

The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is
any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is
against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The
prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at
knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation
brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That
appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having
carnal knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at
Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible
abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code
was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. When a complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with
213 | P a g e

rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of
all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of
rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then
absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple
rape only.
The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape
is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the
bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant should be meted the
death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the
commission of the crime. A perusal of the record shows that none of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating
circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was
his niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1)
of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made
to apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was
committed, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age.
Second, the information did not allege that offender and offended party were
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven
circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the
death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such
should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. In view of the
failure of the information to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation
could not be taken into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For
these reasons, the sentence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua

214 | P a g e

215 | P a g e

Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297

Art. 349: Bigamy

Diego v. Castillo
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio
Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case
and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
Said Administrative complaint stemmed from the Judgment of the aforementioned
Judge in the Bigamy case filed against Lucena Escoto by Jorge de Perio, Jr.
Prior that filing of the case, the Family District Court of Texas granted a decree of
Divorce on Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio, Jr.
Later on, Lucena Escoto (Cresencia Escoto, her adopted name) contracted
marriage with the brother of the complainant, Manuel P. Diego.
After trial of the case of bigamy, respondent Judge acquitted the accused and stated that
his main basis was the good faith on the part of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Castillo should be administratively held liable for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and for gross ignorance of the law?
Decision:
No, the court applied the case of Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr. which explained that: a
judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision
he renders. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad
faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross
ignorance that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.

Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297

216 | P a g e

Abunado v. People
Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno on September 18, 1967. Salvador later
contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas.
On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
On May 18, 2001, the Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal convicted Salvador of the
crime of bigamy.
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial
court appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the accuse s seventy six years of age
then.
Salvador avers that the information filed against him was defective as it stated
that the alleged bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have
been 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him?
Decision:
No, the statement in the information that the crime was committed in January
1995 was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that
petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Abunado on January 10, 1989.
Also, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial
and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297

Cacho v. People
Facts:
217 | P a g e

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete married on August 30, 1990.

On August 19, 1991, a decree of divorce by Ontario Court was granted
unto them.
On October 4, 2992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
On September 321, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicail declaration
of nullity of marriage in the trial court of Bohol, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appelant was charged with bigamy filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
On August 5, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Bohol convicted Lucio
Morigo of the crime of bigamy.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals and the same affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy?
Decision:
No, the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own.
Under the aforementioned circumstance, the Court held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy.

218 | P a g e

Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386

Title 13: Crimes against Honor

Art. 353: Libel
Fermin v. People (G.R. No. 157643)
Facts:
This is a case for Libel filed by a showbiz couple namely, Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C
Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Brach 218. The two
(2) criminal informations uniformly read, as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City,
Philippines,

the

above-named

accused

CRISTENELLI

SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS,

219 | P a g e

Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A

Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon City, and
circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila
and the whole country, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, publicly and acting
with malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously print and circulate in the headline and lead story
of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 the
following material, to wit:
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO
NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI
ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG
ASUNTO

NILA

DUN,

BUKOD

PA

SA

NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING

SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA
ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA
STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO
NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG
KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES
NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON
PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA
SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the
same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made
for no other purpose than to expose said ANNABELLE
RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts
her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby
causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of
the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of the said
ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
CONTRARY TO LAW

220 | P a g e

Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded

not guilty.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint
Decisions dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.
Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its
Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but
acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous
article.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in
the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for liable?
Decision:
The Supreme Court noted that, in the first issue, the CA erred in
acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the
publication of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint
Counter-Affidavit and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wit:
WITNESS:

As editor-in-chief, I have no participation

in the writing of the questioned article and my only

participation in the publication is the handling of the
physical lay-outing, indication and allocation of typesize of the body of the article, before the same was
printed and published in GOSSIP Tabloid
Q:

You do not deny the statements in this

publication as executed by you in the counteraffidavit

221 | P a g e

and

sworn

in

before

the

City

Prosecutor, is this correct?

A:

Yes, that is correct.

ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
That is all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT:

Do we get it right from you, if you were acting

as you were, you will not allow the said
publication of this same article or same
stories?

A:

If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I

will because if you can see the article, your
Honor, it is according to our source, it is not a
direct comment.

COURT:

So whether you are there or not, [the] same

article leading to them (sic) will still find its way
to come out?

A:

Yes, your honor.

In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277
which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or
serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any
part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the
author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that
accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence
that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of
the matter contained in the said libelous article.
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish
text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar.
Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who
causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or
publishes it.
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation
222 | P a g e

in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been
specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the
publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case.
Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the
preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof
as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the
CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City,
is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas
medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work.
However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by
the appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of
the Supreme Court, But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial
court convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run
afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject
article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by
the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest
comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the
libelous articles, to wit:
The banner headlines of the offending article read:
KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE
RAMA,

IMPOSIBLENG

SA

STATES

SIYA

NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA
SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO
DUN SI ANNABELLE!
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller
but bold letters, are:
HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL
NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN
DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E,
PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY,
223 | P a g e

SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG

TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY
OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG
MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA
NILA

NOON

SA

NAGKAPROBLEMA,

AMERIKA,

DUN

MILYON-MILYON

SILA
ANG

INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI

SA PILIPINAS NOON.

A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a

vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining
whether the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense.
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones
sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation
of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal
use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of
distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the
law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade
prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez
lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos).
The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a
nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More
importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical
utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties,
or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not
automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the
utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of
224 | P a g e

his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the
same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are
considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business,
media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as
petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast
media or in print, about their personal lives.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for
libel should be upheld.

Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386

Magno v. People (G.R. No. 133896)

Facts:
This is a case for Libel committed by Dolores Magno on various occasions
against Cerelito T. Alejandro, the formers neighbor for almost 20 years at
PucayVillage, Marcos Highway, Baguio City.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper
portion of his house, saw Dolores write on the wall at the back of her
garage the following words: 'Huag Burahin Bawal Dumaan Dito ang
Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Cere Lito O. Cedring.
Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to,
Cerelito reported the matter to the local police and filed an affidavitcomplaint with the Fiscal's Office.
Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito,
Cerelito's 16-year old son, while on his way to buy bread at a nearby
store, saw Dolores writing something on her garage's extension wall with
225 | P a g e

the use of a paint brush and red paint. In full, the writing reads: "HUAG
BURAHIN

BAWAL

DUMAAN

ANG

SUSPETSOSA

BASTOS

AT

MAKAPAL NA MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW

NG ASO KATULAD NI CERELITO." After reading what was thus written,
Rodelito proceeded with his errand and, upon reaching home, related
what he saw to his father.
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to,
Cerelito lost no time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP).
Pictures were then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation,
probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding information
giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito,
Dolores, in the morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver
her 3-page letter-answer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station subcommander.
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to
and instructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white,
long, ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the
house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who
immediately read the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn
followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching
home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was
addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the
information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads:
If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila
then comply & if your husband can't understand this simple
English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig
isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal
educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa
kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng
grasa sa Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi
niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa siyang marumi at putang
ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng
tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa
226 | P a g e

pinangalingan

namin.Siya

ang

magnanakaw

at

mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng

hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote ninyo.Pinalakad
ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo
magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo
muna ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang
asawa mo para malinaw.
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following
addendum written in ink at the back page thereof which reads:
Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang
mukha mo at ikaw pa ang magpapablotter sa akin para
pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo
masasabi na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa
inyo. Tanga.
The third letter, a photocopy of Dolores signed letter dated March
15, 1991, to the Sub-Station 5 Commander of BCP purportedly in reply to
the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the police station on March 3,
1991, reads, in part, as follows:
The Sub Station Commander
Sub-Station 5
Marcos Highway, B.C.
Dear sir:
cralawxxxxxxxxx
Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a
maniac.Pumasok siya sa lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter
(temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagkatapos ng lindol (3
weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas
ang zipper ng pantaloon nakayapak na walang sapin sa
paa.Tulog na kami.We were awakened by the constant
barking of my dogs.I have 3 native dogs but 1 was
slaughtered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro '.He is even a dognapper. My Manang Louie can relate the incident since we
were out of the country x x x.I don't trust him as my
kapitbahay

na

bantay

salakay.In

simple

tagalog

magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na

takaw at walang maibili.
227 | P a g e

It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged

with libel under four (4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R,
8805-R and 8806-R and raffled to Branch 6 of the court.
Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of Not
Guilty to each of the offenses charges in the four informations aforecited.
Following a joint trial, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23,
1993, finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R and
8806-R and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment and ordering her to
indemnify the offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal
Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acquitted.
On Appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of
conviction of the RTC. The appellate court likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration of Dolores Magno for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether Magno could be held liable for libel?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to
exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and (d) existence of malice.
There can be no quibbling about the defamatory nature of the
written imputation or allegations hurled against Cerelito. And the
derogatory writings were obviously made out of ill-will or revenge.The
issue of defamation, malice or the identity of the person defamed is not
even raised in this recourse.
As earlier recited, the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R
arose out of what Dolores wrote about the spouses Cerelito and Fe
Alejandro contained in an unsealed envelope and delivered, through
Evelyn Arcartado, on March 15, 1991. Dolores contends that, from the
time Evelyn was physically handed the unsealed envelope to the time the
latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or read the offending letter
228 | P a g e

contained therein. Prescinding therefrom, Dolores argues against the

existence of libel, citing, for the purpose, American jurisprudence holding
that "where libelous matter is communicated only to a person defamed
and he voluntarily discloses the contents of the libelous communication to
others,

the

originator

of

the

libel

is

not

responsible

for

the

publication."Dolores argues that since the obnoxious letter was addressed

to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito is
concerned, not a third person for purposes of publication. She further
declares that to call the husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a
charge that he and his wife had stolen goods, is not to speak words of
defamation of him alone so as to make the utterance in the presence of
his wife a publication.
Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter,
after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has
been written. If the statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written
there is no publication of it. The reason for this is that 'a communication of the
defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it
may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of
himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.
In People vs. Silvela, the Court ruled that sending an unsealed libelous
letter to the offended party constitutes publication. In the present case, there is
no dispute that the unsealed envelope containing the libelous letter was handed
by Dolores to Evelyn Arcartado. Contextually, there was a reasonable probability
that the contents of the unsealed envelope, particularly the libelous letter, could
have been exposed to be read by Evelyn before delivering the same to Cerelito.
However, Evelyn categorically admitted not reading the letter at the first instance,
reading it only after securing Cerelito's permission.
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to
constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third
person in relation to its writer and the person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in
context, a third person to whom the publication was made.
Finally, the Court cannot give credence to Dolores' allegation that she is
not the author of the unsigned libelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she
herself handed the unsigned letter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions
to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the contents of the letters are
basically reiteration/elaborations of Dolores' previous writing on the wall and her
letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this
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point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance.

The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently
established. Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA
and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of libel cannot be sustained.

Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386

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Buatis v. People (G.R. No. 142509)

Facts:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. JoseJ. Pieraz
(Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The
letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her
husband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made
out its content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , PasigCity, Metro Manila
Subject:
Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter
dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using
carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue
harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582
Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro Manila--undersigned

much

to

his

regrets

shall

be

constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for

disbarment against you.
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full
consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is
irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same
shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in
filing administrative charge against you and all persons
behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to
face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can
prove 'who is who once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these
matters, I remain.
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Yours in Satan name;

(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan,
senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against
accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not
only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him:
'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial.
According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization
'Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a
member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had
signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither
could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr.
could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had
sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty.
Pieraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30,
1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in
its Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the
trial court.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution
dated March 13, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of libel?
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Decision:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it
must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution.
There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person
against whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that
the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has
communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the
mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply
was addressed to respondent himself.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to
be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn.,
341), the court had the following to say on this point:In
determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se,
two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:
(1)That construction must be adopted which will give to the
matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain
and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered.(2)The published matter
alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
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In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel,

the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation
offered by the publisher on being called to account.The
whole question being the effect the publication had upon the
minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by
the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too
late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be,
from the words used in the publication.ry
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter
dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using
words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter,
as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of
respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need
be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have
caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him:
'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under
the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious (malice in law).
A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently
castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There
was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice.
Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in
affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.

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Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290

Art. 358: Slander

Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351)
Facts:
Petitioner Noel Villanueva was a member of the Municipal Council while
private complainant Yolanda C. Castro was the Municipal Vice Mayor of
Concepcion, Tarlac.
Sometime in September 1994, petitioner was filing an application for
monetized leave for the approval of herein complainant. The application was not
immediately attended to by complainant as she was then busy dictating some
important matters to her secretary. A heated argument then ensued between the
complainant and the enraged defendant Villanueva. In the presence of several
persons, defendant Villanueva, in a loud voice and within hearing distance of
everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and
insulting manner the following words: "Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis,
garapal ca" and "Balamu mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca,
tictac carinat" (You are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean
and honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red apple, but inside you are worm
infested and extremely dirty).

Issue:

235 | P a g e

Whether the petitioner is guilty slight or serious oral defamation.

Decision:

Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.

Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. There is grave slander
when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation
depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their
sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the
position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society
against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party
was a Vice-Mayor. However, it should be noted that such scathing words were
uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the
Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve
the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner.
The rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be
taken in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as
slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony.

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Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290

Caal v. People (G.R. No. 163181)

Facts:
Petitioner is accused of bringing private complainant Daylinda Caal, into
discredit, disrepute and contempt when he unlawfully and publicly speak and
utter against her the following insulting words and expressions, to wit: AYAW
MO KAHADLOK SA TESTIGOS NI DAYLINDA KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN,
NAHADLOK KAW KANG DAYLINDA, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI
ITON SA PANGAWAT which if translated in English language will mean (You
afraid to the witness of Daylinda who had no how, why you afraid to Daylinda,
she live from stealing, she is a long time thieves) and other words of similar
imports.
Issue:
Whether or not statements of petitioner Caal constitute oral defamation?
Decision:
Yes. To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation.
This imputes to her a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of
publication subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.
Indeed, calling Daylinda a thief is defamation against her character and
237 | P a g e

reputation sufficient to cause her embarrassment and social humiliation.

Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290

Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157)

Facts:
On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was
conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan
when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted Putang ina mo Atty.
Escolango.

Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was dumbfounded and

embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of
Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation?
Decision:
Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.
In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending
not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory.

Considering,

however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.
238 | P a g e

The parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered
the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what
Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral
defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.

Alexander Santos
2006-0205

Title 14: Quasi-Offenses

Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence
Loney vs. People (G.R. No. 152644)
Facts:
Petitioners are officers of Marcopper, a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the
Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete
plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the
tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners
in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article
91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water
Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or
the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Section 108 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), and
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the grounds that the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than
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one offense for a single act.

Issue:
Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942?
Decision:
The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is
the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent
damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.
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Alexander Santos
2006-0205

Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387)

Facts:
Petitioner Teofilo Abueva y Cagasan was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, in an information of Reckless Imprudence resulting in
homicide for the death of Lourdes Mangruban qualified by petitioners failure to
render or lend assistance on the spot to the victim such help as may be in the
hands of the accused to give.
The information alleged that petitioner drove and moved a passenger bus
out of the terminal building even before Lourdes Mangruban, a passenger of said
bus, could properly find and safely take her seat, and that as a direct result of
said negligence, recklessness and carelessness, LOURDES MANGRUBAN fell
down to the cemented pavement of the terminal road and sustained the injuries
which caused her death.
The facts showed that the victim, Lourdes Mangruban, fell rather than
jumped off the bus. The claim of the defense that the deceased jumped off the
bus is incredible and contrary to human experience.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for Reckless Imprudence resulting to
homicide?

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Whether or not the qualifying circumstance, that the offender failed to lend
on the spot to the injured parties such assistance as may be in his hands to give,
should be considered against the petitioner?
Decision:
Yes, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of
the bus company for 18 years and has undergone training courses and
seminars to improve his skills as a driver. He is expected to be well aware of his
responsibilities to his passengers. Not only must he make sure that they reach
their destinations on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are
boarding, during the entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle.
Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident,
petitioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by
the lower courts, must be sustained.
No, The records show that petitioner stated under oath that he alighted
from the bus and saw that several people were assisting the injured party and
corroborated by other witnesses.
The assistance required by Article 365, Revised Penal Code, is one which
may be in the hands of the offender to give. We must therefore take into
consideration the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and
place of the incident, is capable of giving.
Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not a hit-and-run
driver. He exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had been attended to. There
were several people assisting the victim, including his co-employees working for
the bus company. The injured party was carried from the terminal, to a vehicle,
242 | P a g e

then to the hospital. Before petitioner was given clearance by the dispatcher to
leave, an hour later, he was assured that the victim was brought already to the
hospital. We note that petitioner had a bus full of passengers requiring also his
attention. He could only do so much, so that the burden of helping the injured
party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans.

Alexander Santos
2006-0205

People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588)

Facts:
GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in only one information filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information read that
the accused driving an Isuzu Elf, hit and killed members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 0795), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance
Run" of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, as a
result thereof, some PNP members were killed on the spot, while another
trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while
eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, and some sustained
minor injuries.
After which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the
incident, leaving behind the victims afore-enumerated helpless.
The trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor
vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.
Issue:

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Whether or not accused is guilty as charged?

Whether the filing of only one information for the offenses as charged is
valid?
Decision:
No, from the convergence of circumstances, the court held that the tragic
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on
accused part. The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the accused
intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the
assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his
vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks
or skid marks along the traffic scene. For its part, the defense attributed the
continuous movement of accused vehicle to the confluence that the Isuzu Elf
truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the
truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a
reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two
or more explanations one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of
liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver
responsibility the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to
the accused.
The court is convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the
number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially
where the assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important
in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be
true.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
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the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution and liable under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but
rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty
of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
No, The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other
victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have
constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48,
they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate
informations should have, therefore, been filed.
However, It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial
court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the
multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence,
he is deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021

Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)

Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833)
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the RTC of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and
furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality,
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. The petitioner produced the
verbatim transcript on which civil case was based culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
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entitled, An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations
of private communication, and other purposes.
Upon arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The RTC granted
the motion agreeing with petitioner. On February 9, 1990, respondent CA
promulgated the assailed decision declaring the trial courts order null and void.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of petitioner Ramirez in recording the assailed
conversation is covered by R. A. No. 4200?
Held:
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statutes intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recordings is underscored by the use of a qualifier any.
Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, even a person (privy) to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. No
4200.
The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of devices enumerated therein.
Mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Sec.1 of
R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning
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of the word communication to a point of absurdity.

The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts
and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity,
and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized recording of private
communications with the use of tape- recorders as among the acts punishable.
Petition is hereby denied.

Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021

Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R. No. 121087)

Facts:
It appears that, at around 8:40 in evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley
Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI
in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City
following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
After the three had seated and ordered beer, a dancer appeared on stage
and began to perform a strip act. As the dancer removed her bra, Jalbuena took
a picture.
The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with security guard, Alex Sioco,
approached Jalbuena and demanded why he took picture. Jalbuena replied:
wala kang pakialam, because this is my job. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out followed by his companions.
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Jalbuena and his companion went to the police station to report the
matter. Three of the policemen on duty including Navarro, were having drinks in
front of the police station and they asked Jalbuena to join them. Jalbuena
declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Anonuevo, to report the incident.
Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.
Sioco and Liquin were met by Navarro who talked with them in a corner
for around fifteen minutes. Navarro turned to Jalbuena and pushing him to the
wall, Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, pressing it on the face of
Jalbuena. At this point, Lingan intervened and said to Navarro: huwag namang
ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa blotter. Navarro replied: walang press,
press, mag- sampu pa kayo. He then turned to Sgt. Anonuevo and told him to
make of record the behaviour of Jalbuena and Lingan.
This angered Lingan, he said, Masyado kang mayabang alisin mo yang
baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. As Lingan was about to turn away,
Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on
the floor, blood flowing. He tried to get up, but Navarro gave him a fist blow on he
forehead which floored him. Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
The RTC of Lucena City rendered decision finding Petitioner Navarro
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the tape recorder recorded by Jalbuena is admissible as
evidence in view of R.A. No. 4200 which prohibits wire tapping?
Held:
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: x
x x Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
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was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording
is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established : (1) that there was a
heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the
police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting
the worst of it.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021

Edgardo A. Gaanan vs. IAC and People (G.R. No. L- 69809)

Facts:
It appears that in the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainants
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on
the proposed conditions, complainant made telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to
come to his office and advised him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer is on a business trip. Appellant went to the said office.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
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Complainant called up to ask Laconico if he was agreeable, the latter said

yes. Complainant told him to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife. Laconico alerted
his friend Colonel Zulueta, insisted that complainant himself receive the money.
When complainant received the money he was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complaint for robbery/ extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since the appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainants consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act.
The trial court ruled that Gaanan and Laconico violated Section 1 of R.A.
4200. The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. However the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term device or
arrangement under R.A. 4200?
Decision:
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
Dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Section 1 of RA 4200,
although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
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comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of the telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a
telephone conversation.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favour of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on
whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase device or
arrangement, the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
telephone.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is Acquitted of the crime
of violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- Wiretapping
Act.

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Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341

Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539)

People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)
Facts:

Accused being then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S.

Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs. It was agreed that appellant would
drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC
Transports garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the
taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to. The
following day, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was
not returned. Arriving at appellants house, he did not find the taxi there,
appellants wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived. Leaving nothing
to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and
reported that his taxi was missing. The trial court found appellant Luisito
Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft for the unlawful taking
of Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi. Hence, this appeal.

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Issue:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting the accused-appellant for

qualified theft?

Decision:

No. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2)
the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is
either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as

"the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of
the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. From
the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a
Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified
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theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the
exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.

Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341

People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)

Facts:

Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was

approached by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand
new Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying
that the van was unavailable. Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio,
who had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to
lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe
and Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a
day inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upon
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their return from Bicol. Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios
Tamaraw FX at his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back
to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.

However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe.
Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from Ferdinand
Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It was
later found out that the two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbed
and dumped Elis him along the highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacan
when Elis refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found
Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?

Decision:

Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."
More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. That there is an
actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of
the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things.

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A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the

elements of carnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot be
denied that the nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was
initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose
of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into
an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the
Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the
two separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter
refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle.

Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant

constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the
vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of
property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person
unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply
required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual
possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there
is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's will
through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a
property belonging to another is imputable to the offender.

Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341

People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380)

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Facts:

That on or about December 6, 1998, in the City or Urdaneta and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused SPO1 Danilo Lobitania with grave
abuse of authority being a member of the Navotas PNP-NPD Command,
Navotas, Metro Manila, together with three still unidentified companions, armed
with firearms by means of force and intimidation with intent to gain, conspiring
with one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take,
steal and carry away one Yamaha motorized tricycle with Plate No. 2N-7910
owned by David Sarto and driven at the time by Alexander de Guzman against
the latters will and without his consent and on the occasion of the carnapping or
by reason thereof, accused with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength conspiring with one another, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously box, hogtie, shoot and push out of the moving tricycle
which caused the instantaneous death of said Alexander de Guzman, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.

The trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant of the crime

of aggravated carnapping with murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged?

Decision:

Yes. After a thorough review of the records, we find that the prosecution
was able to prove that accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Based
on the facts proven, the offense committed by accused-appellant is the special
complex crime of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form
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under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law, which
took effect on 31 December 1993.
In Section 2 of R. A. 6536 as amended, defines the crime of carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. It becomes qualified when in the course of the
commission or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the
penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, all the
elements were duly proven by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of
Sanchez, accused-appellant and his companions shot the driver of the tricycle,
abandoned him and took possession of the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez
that the driver was unknown to the group clearly establishes the fact that the
motive of accused-appellant was to steal the tricycle and that the killing of the
driver was incidental thereto.

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Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406

Probation Law
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City rendered a decision against
the petitioners Lagrosa and Baguin for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest
products without the requisite permits. They were sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, they appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. However,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification
as to the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of Prision
Correccional, as maximum. Said decision became final and executory.
Petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court but it was denied.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but it the latter only affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners should be allowed to apply for probation
even if they had already appealed the decision of the trial court?
Decision:

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The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that probation may be
granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Under Section 9 (a)

of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation.
In the case at bar, upon interposing an appeal petitioners should be precluded
from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto
relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose
of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but
did so only after failing in his appeal.

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Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406

Lilia Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)

Facts:

Petitioner Vicoy was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Tagbilaran City for violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling
fish outside the Agora Public Market, and accordingly sentences her to suffer the
penalty of a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Also, she was found to be guilty for the crime of Resistance and
Serious Disobedience to Agents of a Person in Authority, and accordingly
sentences her to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of Arresto Mayor and to
pay a fine of two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

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Thereafter, she filed an application for probation but later on, petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw her application for probation and simultaneously filed a
notice of appeal. The MTCC granted petitioners withdrawal of application for
probation but denied her notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court
but it was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgment rendered by the MTCC became final despite
the withdrawal of the application for probation?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It held that under Section 7,
Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is
totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of
1976, as amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more
opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become final by the filing of an application for probation.

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264 | P a g e

Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406

Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108)
Facts:
Information was filed before the RTC of Dagupan against petitioner Pablo
charging her with a violation for BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law) for issuing and
delivering various checks to Nelson Mandap in partial payment of a loan she
obtained from the latter. When Mandap draw those checks from the bank, it was
dishonored upon presentment for payment because the current account of the
petitioner had been closed. The trial court rendered its judgment convicting
petitioner for the crime charged, sentencing her to pay a fine and to serve a
prison term of 30 days.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation. Her application was given due
course and was given a favorable evaluation upon recommendation of the local
probation office. However, such recommendation was overruled by the National
Probation Office and denied petitioners application on the ground that she is
disqualified under Section 9 ( c ) of the Probation Law: c) those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than
two hundred pesos. Respondent judge denied petitioners application for
probation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:

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Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners application for probation on the ground of disqualification
from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Section 9 paragraph
(c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person, who was previously
convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive and
unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous
conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is entirely different from
that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime which arose out of
a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand. As
held in Rura vs. Lopea, the word previous" refers to conviction, and not to
commission of a crime.

It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore,
the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning is
clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for
construction or interpretation.

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Anna May Vallejos

2007-0140

Anti-Fencing Law
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584)
Facts:
The private complainant in this case, Jovita Rodriquez, was the wife of the
former mayor of Rodriguez Rizal and was engaged in business as a general
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contractor. She and her husband own pieces of jewelry which they kept inside a
locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Aside from her family, she
also had under her employ one Macario Linghon and the latters sister, Pacita,
who was their household helper charged with sweeping and cleaning the room
periodically. Pacita later on left her employ.
Sometime on August 1992, she was surprised to discover that the box
where the jewelries were kept inside the cabinet were empty. There appears no
indication however that the lock of the cabinet was broken. Among the pieces of
jewelry missing were one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white
gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and a pair of diamond heartshaped earrings worth P400,000.
Believing that Pacita, her previous helper, had taken said jewelries, she
filed a complaint for theft against her and her mother Adoracion. When the latter
was invited to the police station, she admitted selling one pair of heart-shaped
earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring,
and one ring with big and small stones to petitioner whom she identified as
Mang Erning. The amount she obtained from said sale, was, according to her,
intended for her fathers operation and for food.
To confirm her admission, she accompanied the policemen to said Mang
Erning, who refused to cooperate with them at first when Pacita identified him as
the one who purchased the stolen jewelries. Despite his refusal, however, Jovita
filed a complaint for violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law, against him. To
strengthen her accusations against petitioner, she obtained the written testimony
of the policemen involved in the case and also convinced Macario to testify
against him as Macario had once sold jewelries to him.
In the meantime, the trial court found Pacita and her mother guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft and PD 1612 respectively.
Subsequently, the trial court also rendered judgment in the case of petitioner and
found him also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612.
Wasting no time, petitioner appealed the adverse decision to the Court of
Appeals alleging that the lower court erred in not finding that the testimony of
prosecution witnesses are all hearsay evidence and that because of said failure,
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not sufficiently established. The court of
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Appeals however affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence the present appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Pacita in the crime of theft is sufficient to
establish petitioners conviction for violation of PD 1612?
Whether or not the prosecution based on the pieces of evidence presented
was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
No. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of
Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main
house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and
the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing
the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal,
Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not
constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the
jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005
was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the
instant case.
No. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
269 | P a g e

article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that
the prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the
testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that
Pacita had confessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner;
the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of
the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said
investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the
testimonies of Pacita and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation
of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the
transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the proceedings; the
supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court.
First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita
had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is
inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said
admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said
criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties to a case are bound
by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said
criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecution did not present
Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to
Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is
that the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence against a
third party.
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 92-13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise,
inadmissible against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo.
The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and crossexamine a witness against him.

270 | P a g e

Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita
pointed to the petitioner, while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the
person who bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence
against the petitioner. It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario.
However, such testimony is admissible only to prove such fact - that Pacita
pointed to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is
inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas declaration to the policemen, that the
petitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must be stressed
that the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more
importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was
deprived of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told the
policemen.
Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against
the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined on
his testimony during the preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner
purchased the jewelry from Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony
and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the
preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo.
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused
had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove
facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should
have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves
two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and,
(b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime,
since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will
fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v.
Dator.

271 | P a g e

Anna May Vallejos

2007-0140

Tan v. People (GR No. 134298)

Facts:
Complainant Rosita Lim is a proprietor engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. She had under her employ
petitioner-accused, Manuelito Mendez, but later on left and went home to his
province in Negros.
After his employment however, Rosita discovered that some of her
inventories in her business, amounting to P48,000, were missing. Suspecting
that it was Manuelito who took them, she informed Victor Sy, her nephew, who
was in turn Manuelitos uncle.
Acting on the matter, Victor had Manuel arrested and brought to Manila.
However, when asked about the incident, Manuel, after admitting the taking of
the lost items asked for forgiveness from Rosita and as a result the latter did not
file a complaint against him. Instead, she filed a complaint for violation of PD
1612, against Ramon Tan, the petitioner, whom Manuel identified as the person
with whom he had sold the stolen items for P13,000. Despite the filing of said
complaint, Rosita, however, failed to report the incident of theft with the police
authorities.
In the meantime, Rosita, together with the confessed thief Manuelito, and
272 | P a g e

the latters uncle, Victor Sy, all testified for the prosecution. Manuelito testified
that it was Mr. Tan who had personally accepted the stolen items and paid him
P13,000.
For his part, Ramon Tan, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied all the charges,
alleging that while he is engaged in the selling hardware (marine spare parts) he
did not buy the stolen spare parts and that he never talked nor met Manuelito.
The trial court found him guilty of violating PD 1612. When he appealed, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, hence the present appeal.
Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt hence he should be acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution had sufficiently established the elements
of fencing as against the petitioner?
Decision:
No. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft.
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in
the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be
prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is
defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it
was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.
P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who
profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory
in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the
273 | P a g e

Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, the
accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of
fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and
fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The State may thus
choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612,
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that
fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of
fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential
elements of the crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by
establishing the existence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. It
is an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan,
180 SCRA 9).
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft
independently of fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
274 | P a g e

However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is
a public crime.

It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private

complainant, but it cannot be without a victim.

As complainant Rosita Lim

reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property.
True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the
boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission
or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only
against the person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially,
the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission
would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. Here, the
extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of
counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness.

Neither may such extra-

judicial confession be considered evidence against accused. There must be

corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Corpus
delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense,
refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. The essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs
to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away
was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). In theft, corpus delicti has two
elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was
lost by felonious taking. In this case, the theft was not proved because
complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious
taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez,
who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the
complainant and sold them to petitioner.

Such confession is insufficient to

convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.

What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or
should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One
is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
275 | P a g e

awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the

acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the
court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is
contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt
acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be
guilty of fencing.

276 | P a g e

Gil Acosta
2008-0085

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)

People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)
Facts:
Respondent herein, Arturo F. Pacificador was then the Chairman of the
Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NSSC) , a GOCC and
therefore making respondent a public officer.
On Oct. 27, 1988 Pacificador and a certain Jose Marcelo were charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of R.A. NO. 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleges that on or about
Dec. 6, 1975 to Jan. 6, 1976 Pacificador together with Mr. Marcelo who was then
chairman of a private corporation Philippine Smelters Corporation , conspired to
cause the transfer and conveyance of parcels of land owned by the NSSC
located in Camarines Norte to the private corporation Philippine Smelters
Corporation by virtue of a contract of sale. That in relation to that sale the
Government was in a serious disadvantage for the contract price of such land
was only P 85, 144.50 compared to the fairmarket value of P862,150.
The Deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of said province
on May Dec. 29, 1975
277 | P a g e

Pacificador main defense was that the crime charged had been
extinguished by prescription.
Petitioner argument on the other hand was that the crime was not
extinguished first on the ground that R.A. 3019 provides for its own prescription
of 15 years. 2nd on the ground that the case should have been deemed
discovered only on May 13, 1987, when a complaint was filed with the PCGG,
hence the filing to the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988 was well within the
prescriptive period.Lastly, it is the petitioners contention that respondent
effectively prevented the discovery of the offense in such

way the ordinary

principles of prescription do not apply in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime has been extinguished by prescription?
Decision:
Yes. The SC answered herein petitioners argument in the negative. First
the Sc held that Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription
of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. Wherein it provides that
Prescription should begin from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings. In other words if the commission of the crime is
known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was
discovered, and the running of the prescriptive period is tolled by the institution of
judicial proceeding.
In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of
1975 to Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019 in
which crimes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this case
because it seems to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P.
195 which was approved on March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only
10 years, wherefore it could not be applied on the ground that such amendment
is not favourable to the accused. The SC also held that while petitioners herein
allegation of having no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the
jurisprudential rule that the registration of deeds in the public real registry is a
278 | P a g e

notice thereof to the whole world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of
what it contains. Hence, even If the period of prescription is reckoned from Feb.
18, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was
filed with the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.

Gil Acosta
2008-0085

Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. People (G.R. No. 147333)

Facts:
Petitioner herein was the Assistant Regional Director of DSWD in Region
2. On July 1989 DSWD Region 2 embarked on a project involving the
procurement of 19 typewriter. Respondent herein served as the chairman of the
Procurement Board in relation to the abovementioned project. The Board
prepared the Requisition for Equipment and Supplies (RES) for 19 typewriters,
and then after submitted to Regional Director Arafiles for approval which she
approved. From the 4 bidders it was San Sebastian Marketing represented by
Jessie Callangan, won the bid. After San Sebastian completed its delivery of the
19 machines, supply officer Rogelio Hipolito also a member of the abovementioned board inspected and tested the typewriters and certified that the
machines are in compliance with the specifications given by them.
However, upon pos-audit it was discovered that all the 19 typewriters were
not brand new but merely rebuilt and reconditioned and thus failing to comply
with the specification requirements. The petitioner together with Director Arafiles,
Callangan and Hipolito were charged for violation of section 3 ( e ) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. The sandiganbayan adjudged herein petitioner
as guilty of the charge hence this petition to the Supreme Court.
Petitioners main contentions are that the elements of conspiracy were not
established beyond reasonable ground and that there is no sufficient evidence to
prove the alleged crime.
279 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner herein is guilty of the charge?
Decision:
Yes. Petitioners contention is untenable first on the issue of conspiracy,
the reliance of petitioner to the ARIAS Doctrine must be answered in the
negative. Petitioners contention that all heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinate and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations When however, that
infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of
office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a
clear sense of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail. Petitioner
cannot seek refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the
recommendations of her subordinates. Petitioner is an Assistant Regional
Director, not the head of office or the final approving authority whom the Arias
doctrine is applicable.
In relation to the second issue of sufficiency of evidence, the Supreme
Court elucidated the main elements of the crime provided for in sec. 3 R.A. NO.
3019 corrupt practices of officers, these are 1. The accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them 2. Said public officers commit
the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties as in relation to
their public position. 3. They caused undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party 4. Such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officers have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
These requisites being attendant in this case, the SC held that indeed Petitioner
is guilty with the crime.

280 | P a g e

Gil Acosta
2008-0085

Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72)

Facts:
Petitioner herein Arturo Mejorda is a public officer, connected with the
Office of the Highway District Engineer of Pasig. His position in said office was a
right of way agent of which his main duty was to negotiate property owners
affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them for
damages incurred by said owners
Sometime in Oct. or Nov. of 1977, Mejorada approached herein private
respondents and informed them that he could work out their claims for the value
of their lots and improvements affected by the widening of a certain highway in
Pasig oh which their properties would be damaged in a certain way. Mejorada
required said owners to sign blank copies of Sworn Statement on the Correct and
Fair Market Value of the Real Properties and Agreement to Demolish. Remove,
and Reconstruct improvements. However Mejorada for his part made it appear
that the value of the respective properties were much higher than the actual price
claimed by the owners. Furthermore Mejorada , in relation to the improvements
made it appear that the declarations of Property are not really intended for the
claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons.
On the date on which the claims were to be encashed by herein private
respondents, Mejorada accompanied them and personally assisted in the
process of signing and encashing the checks. Right after the claimants received
the cash, accused Mejorada accompanied them to his car were they were
divested of the cash and was given only the sum of P1,000.00 , stating to them
that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were
helpless to complaint because they were afraid o0f the accused and his armed
companions. Thus the complainants filed a case against herein Petitioner
Mejorada for violation of Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act

281 | P a g e

For his defense the main contention of the accused is that the element of
damage to the parties must have caused by the public officer in the discharge of
his official functions, in as much as when the damage to the complainants, he
was no longer discharging his official duties, therefore he is not liable for the
charge. Furthermore it was also the argument of the petitioner herein that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of R.A. 3019 but that of
robbery.
Issue:
Whether or not Mejorada could be prosecuted of the crime punishable
under Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019?
Decision:
Yes. The SC Held that the first argument of the petitioner as stated above
is devoid of merit. It was clearly established that the petitioner took advantage of
his position as right of way agent by making the claimants sign the
aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained
falsified

declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was

evident bad faith on the part of Mejorada when he inflated the values of the true
claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
The SC also answered the second argument of herein petitioner in the
negative. The High Court stated that it was duly proven that through badfaith,
petitioner cased damage to the claimants and the Government. The Manner by
which the petitioner divested the private individuals of the compensation they
received was part of the scheme which commenced when the petitioner
approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims
for payment of the values of their lots and improvements affected by the widening
of the highway. The evidence clearly establish a violation of Section 3 ( e ) of
R.A. 3019

282 | P a g e

Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154

Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532)

People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870)
Facts:
On January 16, 1992, two men alighted from a taxi cab parked near a dead-end in
Purok Maligaya. Arnold Nuarin, the driver, came out of the cab asking for help as he had
been stabbed. Nuarin's body was found by Andro Paglinawan's group and they saw two
men escaping. They ran after the two men and caught Olegario Pascual. A bloody
balisong knife was found in his possession. Investigation revealed that Nuarin was
robbed by Pascual and another person identified as Johnny Bonglay. Nuarin was later
stabbed who consequently died.
Pascual was found guilty of the crime of violation of P.D. 532 or the Antihighway

Robbery

Law.

He

appealed

the

decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Pascual is guilty of the violation of the Anti-Highway Robbery
Law?
Decision:
The court ruled that Pasual is liable for the crime of robbery with homicide and
not of the violation of P.D. 532. For a person to be convicted for highway robbery, it is
required that there must be an organization of a group of persons for the purpose of
committing indiscriminate robbery. In the present case, no proof was shown that a group
was organized by Pascual and Bonglay to commit the robbery. P.D. 532 punishes the
commission of robbery of persons who travel from one place to another, disturbing
peace. In this case, there was a single act of robbery and homicide committed by the
accused.

Lourizza Genabe
283 | P a g e

2008-0154

People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656)

Facts:
On May 10, 1994, Gregorio and Lilia Tactacan were on board their passenger
jeepney on their way to San Roque, Batangas from San Miguel, Batangas. Two
unidentified men climbed their vehicle. One pointed a revolver at Gregorio and the other
a balisong on Lilia's neck. They were asked to pull over. Once they pulled over, 2 more
persons, one identified as Armando Reanzares, approached the vehicle. Gregorio was
gagged and blindfolded by one of the culprits. His hands and feet were tied and his Seiko
watch was taken. While the vehicle was driven by one of the accused, he heard his wife
beg for mercy and cry in pain. After which, he was told not to move, then the culprits
left. He untied himself and ran for help. When he returned to the jeep, he found his wife
in the passenger's seat, bloody and her bag containing their earnings gone.
An Information for violation of P.D. 532 and another Information for violation of
R.A. 6539 were filed against Reanzares. The Trial court found him guilty of Highway
Robbery

with

homicide

and

the

is

Reanzares

appealed.

Issue:
Whether

or

not

accused

liable

for

highway

robbery?

Decision:
The court held that the accused is not liable for highway robbery but of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. For conviction under P.D. 532 to prosper,
proof that several accused organized for the purpose of committing indiscriminate
robbery must be established. There was no proof, in this case, showing that there was
organization by several persons to commit this purpose.

There was only the

establishment of a single act of robbery which is not contemplated under the law.

Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
284 | P a g e

People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397)

Facts:
On September 3, 1992, four men identified to be Daniel Mendoza Cerbito,
Vicente Mendoza Acedera, Jimboy Cerbito Morales, and John Doe boarded a
Philippine Rabbit Bus at Eurobake.

Daniel Cerbito, armed with a gun,

announced the hold-up. The four armed men proceeded to seize the passengers
of their money and belongings. A passenger, who happened to be a policeman,
was shot by one of the accused and, as a consequence, died.
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 532 and of
homicide. It was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of violation of the Anti-Highway
Robbery Law?
Decision:
The Court ruled that accused are guilty of highway robbery/brigandage
under Section 2(e) of P.D. 532. As defined by law, brigandage is the taking of the
property of another using violence against or intimidation of persons or other
unlawful means. It is committed by any person against another on any Philippine
Highway. It must also be directed against any prospective victims and not only
against specific victims. In this case, the elements of highway robbery were
proven and present thus the accused are guilty of violation of P.D. 532.

Christine Perez
2006-0104

285 | P a g e

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act

People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525)
Facts:
Basher Bongcarawan was charged in violation of Sec. 16, Art. III of RA
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by RA
7659. On march 11, 1999 in M/V Ferry 5, a woman whom he recognized as his
co-passenger at cabin no. 106 together with 5 members of the vessel security
force came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry and was
requested by the security to open his suitcase. Thereafter, a brown bag and
small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance was found inside his
suitcase. When asked about the articles, the accused explained that he was just
requested by a certain Alex Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latters brother
in Iligan City. Trial Court held that accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
imposes the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against the
accused-appelant?
Decision:
The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without
his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends thatPeople v. Marti is
not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the
duties of a policeman.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the
object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.

286 | P a g e

It has been ruled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima

facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence
is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the
owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim.

Christine Perez
2006-0104

Suson v. People (494 SCRA 691)

Facts:
After conducting a surveillance, the Narcotic Team together with the
Danao City Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation on Teresita Susons
house, Fortich was arrested and on the same date police authorities were able to
apprehend Suson and recovered the marked bills used in the said buy-bust
operation.
3 cases were tried jointly in Branch 25, RTC of Danao City. Petitioners
Suson and Fortich were charged with violation of sec.15, Art. 3 in relation to Sec.
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21, Art. 4 of RA 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Also, Petitioner Suson together with Andres Camargo were charged with Illegal
Possession of Shabu and Illegal Possession of Firearm.
Petitioners contend that there was no buy0bust and evidence of shabu
and firearms allegedly confiscated in their house was planted. Trial court
rendered a decision that Petitioners Suson and Fortich is guilty of the crime of
illegal sale of shabu. However, acquits Suson and Andres Camargo of the crime
of illegal possession of shabu and firearms due to lack of sufficient evidence. CA
affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been
accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following
elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The recording of marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the
elements for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or non-recording
thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as the sale of
the prohibited drug is adequately proven. In the case at bar, SPO2 Patio, the poseurbuyer, testified on the circumstances regarding the sale of the shabu for which
petitioners were charged and convicted.
Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the
absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as
long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the
transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the
presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation What is material to a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. In the instant case, both were sufficiently shown by the prosecution.
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Petitioners deny that a buy-bust operation took place and claim that the
evidence against them is planted evidence. Denial is a weak form of defense,
particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence just like
in the case before us.

Christine Perez
2006-0104

People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)

Facts:
Edelma Lagata was accused of having in her possession and control of
shabu. Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. Accused-Appellant does not
deny the fact that at the time of her arrest she was in possession of the package
which turned out to contain shabu. But she denied knowledge of the contents of
the package handed to her by the unidentified man. Trial Court rendered accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of RA 6425 as
amended by RA 7659.
Issue:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime charged against her?
Decision:

For one to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or regulated

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drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.

The prosecution failed to prove that she had knowledge of the contents of
the package. Thus, it cannot be said that she was caught in flagrante delicto,
since she was not consciously committing a crime when the NBI agents accosted
her.

We have held that possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of
said articles. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into
consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the
attendant events in each particular case.
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that appellants
explanation of how she came into possession of the package without knowing that it
contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption
of animus possidendi.

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Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316

Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294)

Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703)
Facts:
Sayco a confidential civilian agent of the AFP was found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions under the provisions of PD 1866 as
amended by RA 8294. Sayco committed the crime by possessing and carrying a
9MM caliber with 14 live ammunitions while in Bais City visiting and attending to
a family emergency. The court found him guilty as charged on the ground that
that the possession and carrying of the aforementioned firearm and ammunitions
was without proper license and authority. Sayco, without denying possession of
the same, insisted that he had the requisite permits for having been issued a
Memorandum Receipt and a Mission Order by the Commanding Officer of the
Philippine Army.

However, the court said that Memorandum Receipts and

Mission Orders do not constitute the license required by law for these were not
issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who is the one authorized by
law to issue the required license. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that
Saycos reliance in good faith on the said documents is not a valid defense in the
crime of illegal possession of firearms.
RTC affirmed the conviction but lowered the penalty imposed. CA likewise
denied Saycos petition for review as well as its Motion for Reconsideration,
hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute
sufficient authority to possess and carry firearms and ammunitions required by
PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
Decision:
No, they are not, for it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum
receipt and mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license
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and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a
defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms as this is a
malum prohibitum.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the
accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession
itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has
the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or
carry the same.
Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to
receive

the

subject

government-owned

firearm

and

ammunitions.

The

memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did

not legitimize his possession thereof. Neither was Sayco authorized to bear the
subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order
issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a
mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, he was not even acting as such
confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and
ammunitions.
While this Court sustains the conviction for illegal possession of firearms,
a further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law. RA
8294, amending PD 1866, lowered the penalty to be imposed provided no other
crime was committed.
There being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and
considering that Sayco accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the
government under the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and
mission order issued to him legitimized the possession thereof, Sayco is
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.

Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316

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People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)

Facts:
Comadre et al. were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder
through conspiracy, treachery, and use of an explosive.

The accused

committed the crime by lobbing a hand grenade over the roof of the house of the
Agbanlogs that eventually exploded, killing Robert Agbanlog and injuring 6
others. After trial, the court a quo convicted Comadre et al. of the complex crime
of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of death, hence this automatic review.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives,
the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does
jurisprudence support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the
principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should
qualify the offense instead of treachery, which will then be relegated merely as a
generic aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No.
8294 which also considers the use of explosives as an aggravating circumstance,
there is a need to make the necessary clarification insofar as the legal
implications of the said amendatory law vis--vis the qualifying circumstance of
by means of explosion under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code are
concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be applied in the
instant case. R.A. 8294 was enacted, to lower their penalties (as conspicuously
reflected in the reduction of the corresponding penalties for illegal possession of
firearms, or ammunitions and other related crimes under the amendatory law
including the penalties for unlawful possession of explosives) in order to
rationalize them into more acceptable and realistic levels, and this is therefore
favorable to the accused. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives
are used to commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which
result in the death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No.
1866, but it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance. Congress
likewise clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating circumstance,
instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and explosives when
such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of
murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating
circumstance when resorted to in committing any of the crimes defined in the
Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of
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explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating

circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives
as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code. Like the aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12,
evident premeditation in paragraph 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article
14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA No. 8294 does not change
the definition of murder in Article 248.
Issue:
Whether or not the killing be qualified by explosion under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code or by the use of an explosive under the provisions of RA
8294?
Decision:
R.A. 8294 is inapplicable in the instant case and thus what may be
properly considered, the accused-appellant having been sufficiently informed of
the nature of the accusation against them, the crime is Murder committed by
means of explosion in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code.
R.A. No. 8294, even though favorable to the accused, cannot be made
applicable in this case because before the use of unlawfully possessed
explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must
be adequately established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the
accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows
the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This
proof does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the
information, no evidence was also adduced by the prosecution to show that the
possession by Comadre of the explosive was unlawful.

What the law

emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the use of
unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere use of
explosives is not.

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Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316

People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12)

Facts:
Michael Tadeo was charged of 3 distinct and separate crimes of 1) murder
for the fatal shooting of Mayolito Cabatu, 2) frustrated murder for the injury
sustained by Florencia, and 3) qualified illegal possession of firearm, same
firearm having been used in the two (2) formerly mentioned crimes.
After trial, the court a quo convicted Tadeo of the crimes charged and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder; an indeterminate prison term of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum,
for frustrated murder; reclusion perpetua for qualified illegal possession of
firearms.
Tadeo appealed not to challenge the finding of the trial court that he killed
Mayolito Cabatu and injured his mother Florencia Cabatu, nor that he was the
possessor of the .38 cal. revolver, but questions among others his conviction of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms despite the absence of any evidence
indicating that the gun he used was unlicensed.
The Solicitor General agrees with Tadeo that his verdict in the qualified
illegal possession of firearm is incorrect hence must be reversed and set aside.

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Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for qualified illegal possession of firearms is
proper?
Decision:
The conviction of Tadeo in the case for qualified illegal possession firearm
used in perpetrating the homicide and attempted homicide must be reversed and
set aside, as a result of the decriminalization of violations of PD 1866 by RA 8294
where the unlicensed firearm is used in carrying out the commission of other
crimes. These amendments obviously blur the distinctions between murder and
homicide on one hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in
murder or homicide on the other. We have declared that the formulation in RA
8294, i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the illegal
possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of
an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in
committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to
be the two (2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal
Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder
under PD 1866; in other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes
merely a special aggravating circumstance.
The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a
special aggravating circumstance in the Murder Case and Frustrated Murder
Case.

For one, it was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in

the Informations for murder and frustrated murder, which is necessary under our
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the
circumstance cannot be retroactively applied to prejudice accused-appellant; it
must be stressed that RA 8294 took effect only on 6 July 1994 while the crimes
involved herein were committed on 4 November 1993. In any event there is no
evidence proving the illicit character of the .38 cal. revolver used by accusedappellant in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia Cabatu, as to
which requisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.

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Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049

Anti Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)

Francisco v. People (G.R. No. 146584)

Facts:

Jovita Rodriguez was engaged in business as a general contractor.

Macario Linghon was one of her workers. She and her husband acquired several
pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in
their main house. Pacita Linghon, Macarios sister, was hired as one of their
household helpers sometime in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the
room periodically. However, she left the employ of the Rodriguez family,
sometime in May 1991.
Sometime in October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario and
asked him to sell some pieces of jewelry owned by a friend of hers. Macario
agreed and went to the shop of petitioner Ernesto "Erning" Francisco in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two rings and one
bracelet where Ernesto agreed to buy the jewelry and paid the amount of
P25,000 to Macario. Another transaction happened in November 199 where
Macario offered to sell to Ernesto a pair of earrings for P18,000. The latter
agreed and paid Macario said amount. After these transactions, Macario saw the
petitioner in his shop for about five to six more times and received some
amounts.
Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was shocked when she found out
that the box containing her jewelry was empty. She noticed that the lock to the
cabinet was not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of
diamond heart-shaped earrings worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring
worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000;
and one ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that it
was Pacita who stole her jewelry.
Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion
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Linghon. Police investigators invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame,

Quezon City, for investigation. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame without counsel
and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she
sold Jovitas jewelry. Thus, petitioner was invited for questioning in Camp Crame.
Nonetheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft and Adoracion was also
charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612
was filed. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that
they sold pieces of jewelry to the petitioner at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for
his arrest.

Thereafter, an Information was filed with the RTC charging the

petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.

Judgment was rendered finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty
of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt.
While the trial court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
petitioner guilty for violation of the Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law?
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the
jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances
from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the
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property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes:
(a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the
trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty
depends on the value of the property.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision of the trial
court is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of
violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

Anti-Bouning Checks Law (B.P. 22)

Marigomen v. People (G.R. No. 153451)
Facts:
Petitioner was the finance officer of INSURECO, who was granted a credit
line to purchase gasoline and lubricants from Caltex. The latter has agreed to
accept post dated checks from INSURECO to pay for its purchases from them.
When presented to the bank, they were dishonoured by reason of being drawn
against insufficient funds and account closed, respectively.
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Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
B.P. 22?
Decision:
For violation of B.P. 22 to be committed, the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
It is difficult for the prosecution to prove the second element of the crime
because the knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such checks in full upon its presentation is a state of the mind.
However, Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides that if the prosecution proves that the
making, drawing and issuing of a check, payment of which is refused by the
drawee bank because of insufficiency of funds or credit with the said bank within
90 days from the date of the check, such shall be prima facie evidence of the
second element of the crime. The drawee or maker of the check may overcome
the prima facie evidence, either by paying the amount of the check, or by making
arrangements for its payment in full within five banking days after receipt of
notice that such check was not paid by the drawee bank.
The ruling of the Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.
In acquitting the petitioner therein, the Court explained that this statute actually
offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act, which
operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is
abated. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check
within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The
absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity
to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on the petitioner.

The

petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
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Moreover, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not

enough. This is because while Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice
of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law,
i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal, a
mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction
under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the
Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not
only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.

The

consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of
dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew
or issued the check for and in its behalf. The Court explained in Lao v. Court of
Appeals, that there was no obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to the
employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no criminal
liability under BP 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility under
B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is
not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is the petitioner, as an officer of
the corporation, who is the latters agent for purposes of receiving notices and
other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to
the corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner,
does not constitute notice to the latter.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any employee of the PT&T
to prove that the telegrams from the offended party were in fact transmitted to
INSURECO and that the latter received the same. Furthermore, there is no
evidence on record that the petitioner ever received the said telegrams from
INSURECO, or that separate copies thereof were transmitted to and received by
the petitioner. In fine, the respondent failed to prove the second element of the
crime. Hence, the petitioner should be acquitted of the crimes charged.

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Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

Sycip v. CA (328 SCRA 447)

Facts:
Petitioner agreed to buy, on installment, from FRC, a townhouse unit in
the latters project at Cavite. Upon execution of the contract to sell, as required,
issued to FRC, 48 postdated checks, each in the amount of Php 9,304.00,
covering

48

monthly

installments.

After moving in his unit, petitioner complained, to FRC regarding defects in

the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the
complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two 2 notorial notices to the effect
that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance
with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the HLURB. Petitioner
filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defect,
but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its
townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the
alleged

defects.

Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment

petitioners postdated checks in its possession. Petitioner sent stop payment
orders to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks
to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised petitioner to close his checking
account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a stop payment
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order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioners checking

account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC file a complaint
against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for violation of B.P. 22?

Decision:

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an
offense is committed when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
4 the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

In this case, the Court found that although the first element of the offense exists, the
other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at
the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the
bank for

payment thereof upon

its

presentment.

B.P.

No.

22

creates

presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not
rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which
it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency
of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for
insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the
contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict
said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the
offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means
that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the
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checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case were issued at the
time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records
no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his
deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for
encashment. On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of
presentation of the checks, he had P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case,
would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must
be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act
must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.

Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

Recuerdo v. People (G.R. No. 133036)

Facts:
Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she
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issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were
dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to
make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition
for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional?
Decision:
A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for
encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the
contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x
x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by
imprisonment.
B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the
stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency.
It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for
which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before
an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made
It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present
the drawee banks representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the
checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did
in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the
offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she
deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received
from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against
insufficient funds stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks
themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the
complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks
or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.

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Winny Mahor
2008-0306

Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape

People v. Moreno
Facts:
Accused Moreno, Deloria and Maniquez robbed the Mohnani spouses.
Deloria raped househelp Narcisa while Maniquez raped househelp Mary Ann.
Moreno was convicted of robbery while Deloria and Maniquez, robbery with rape.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in ruling that Moreno was guilty of the crime of
robbery only?
Decision:
No, the ruling of the court is correct. Moreno took no part in the rape thus
he is guilty of robbery only.
The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in Article 293 in
relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
employs the clause "when the robbery shall have been accompanied with rape."
In other words, to be liable for such crime, the offender must have the intent to
take the personal property of another under circumstances that makes the taking
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one of robbery, and such intent must precede the rape. If the original plan was to
commit rape, but the accused after committing the rape also committed robbery
when the opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be viewed as a
separate and distinct crime.

Winny Mahor
2008-0306

People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43)

Facts:
Appellant Domingo Temporal, Pedro, Valdez, and Rivera went to the
house of Spouses Valentin and Clara Gabertan, armed with a piece of bamboo,
2x2 piece of wood, ipil-ipil posts and bolo, They assaulted and clubbed Valentin
with their weapons, weakening and injuring him. Eventually they stole from the
Gabertan spouses cash in the amount of P5,350.00, 1 ladies gold Seiko watch, 9
turkeys, and 2 chickens. Thereafter, while Rivera guarded Valentin, the four
accused took turns in raping Carla outside the house where she was forcibly laid
on the cogon grass. RTC found appellant guilty of robbery with multiple rape.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of robbery with multiple accounts of rape or just
robbery with rape under Article 294(b)?
Decision:
The RTC erred in ruling that the accused is guilty of robbery with multiple
rapes. He should have been convicted of the crime under Art. 294(b) that is
robbery with rape.
In the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the true intent of the
accused must first be determined, because their intent determines the offense
they committed. To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that
the robbery itself must be conclusively established. To support a conviction
therefor, proof of the rape alone is not sufficient. Robbery with rape occurs when
the following elements are present: (1) personal property is taken with violence or
intimidation against persons, (2) the property taken belongs to another, (3) the
taking is done with animo lucrandi, and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
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In the case at bar, all the foregoing elements are present. The
contemporaneous acts of appellant and his co-accused stress the fact that they
were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. They first demanded guns, moneys
and animals from Valentin Gabertan. Apparently, it was only when they entered
the house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her. The prosecution
likewise established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch
and money from complainants through violence.

Winny Mahor
2008-0306

People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515)

Facts:
Accused Verceles alias "Baldog", Corpuz, Soriano alias "Merto", Ramos
and Soriano entered the house of Mrs. Rosita Quilates by forcibly destroying the
grills of the window. Once inside, they took away 1 colored T.V., 1 VHS, assorted
jewelries, 1 alarm clock and 1 radio cassettes. In the course of the robbery,
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Soriano, succumbed to lustful desires and raped Maribeth Bolito while the others
just stood outside the door and did nothing to prevent Soriano.
Issue:
Whether there exist a conspiracy to commit the crime of rape of
individuals who conspire to commit a robbery.
Decision:
Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission
of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape
committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them
proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The
rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or
on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as
principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in
the rape. Appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Rape punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Luis Celestino
2006-0354

Art. 148: Direct Assault

People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201)
Facts:
In1998, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal were charged with double
murder with assault upon agents of persons in authority for the death of two
CAPCOM soldiers. Positively identified by witnesses, Dural was seen firing upon
the two CAPCOM soldiers on board a CAPCOM mobile car. Dural and Itucal
were convicted by the Caloocan RTC, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not they are liable for double murder with assault upon agents
of person in authority.
Decision:
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Itucal was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt on his part as a

co-conspirator. Durals conviction was affirmed as he was positively identified as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. There was no doubt that they knew that the
victims were members of the CAPCOM as they were in uniform and riding an
official CAPCOM car. The victims were agents of persons in authority performing
an official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. Thus, the crime committed
are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon agents of person
in authority, wherein the maximum penalty for the more serious crime should be
imposed.

Luis Celestino
2006-0354

People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523)

Facts:
On or about the 20 th day of March, 1983, during the barangay fiesta in
Catbalogan, Samar, Tiburcio Abalos struck P/pfc. Sofronio Labine with a piece of
wood which caused the latters death. According to the witness, Felipe Basal, he
noticed the accused and his father having an argument when a woman
shouted for help. Thereafter, the victim appeared and asked the accuseds father,
Major Abalos who is the victims superior officer, on what was going on. He even
shouted the accuseds father. The accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of
wood which he used in striking the victim. The accused was convicted by the
RTC of Samar for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. For his
defense, the accused alleged that he had the the notion that his father was being
attacked by a member of the NPA, hence he could not have committed the felony
of direct assault.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for direct assault with
murder?
Decision:
As correctly observed by the trial court, there can be no doubt that the
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accused knew that the victim is an agent of a person in authority. The lighting in
the area were enough to afford him to identify the victim. He even testified that he
personally knew the victim to be a policeman and in fact, Labine was then
wearing his uniform. Tiburcio Abalos committed the second form of assault when
he attacked with the use of force an agent of person in authority on the occasion
of the performance of the latters duty.

Luis Celestino
2006-0354

People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201)

Facts:
Renato Tac-an and Francis Escano III were classmates in high School and
close friends before their relationship turned sour. In 1984, a fight ensued
between them in the classroom prompting Tac-an to go home and get a gun
which he used to kill Escano in the presence of their classmates and teacher.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with Insult to
public authorities?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in applying the
provisions of Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. While a teacher is
deemed to be a person in authority under the last paragraph of Art.152, such
teacher is so deemed only for purposes of application of Art.148, direct assault
upon a person in authority. In the case at bar, the assault was not directed upon
the teacher, hence, there was no violation of Art.148. The accused is however
guilty for the crime of murder.

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