G.R. No.

184760

April 23, 2010

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184 which affirmed the 05 October
2005 Decision2 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo,
Rizal, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno
Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.3
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust operation.
On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against accusedappellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging him with violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions
thereof reading.
Criminal Case No. 6992
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003 in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession,
direct custody and control a total of 2.04 grams of white crystalline substance
contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which gave
positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.4
Criminal Case No. 6993
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away
to another 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.5
The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.
One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a
different Information, which case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6991.
Estanislao was accused of possessing illegal drugs in violation of the
provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the Information
containing the following averments:
Criminal Case No. 6994
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession,
direct custody and control of 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance
contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave
positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered NOT
GUILTY pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel P.
Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9 September
2003, upon a series of reports relayed by a confidential informant that a

certain Paterno Lorenzo was peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan

area, the team of PO3 Pineda embarked on a buy-bust operation against
said drug peddler. Anticipating the operation, PO3 Pineda prepared two (2)
pieces of marked P100.00 bills to be used as buy-bust money. At around
10:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, PO3 Pineda, along with SPO1
Arellano and PO3 Tougan, proceeded to Barangay Dulongbayan and secretly
met with their confidential informant. According to the confidential informant,
he had not seen Lorenzo and raised the possibility that he was not in the
area at the time. Assessing the situation, the police officers instructed the
confidential informant to continue with his surveillance of the area and to
inform them immediately if he comes across Lorenzo.
At around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September 2003, while PO1
Pineda and his companions were waiting at Gen. Luna Street, the
confidential informant reported that Lorenzo was already at the Daangbakal,
Dulongbayan I area and was selling prohibited drugs. Riding an unmarked
vehicle, the team proceeded to where Lorenzo was. On their arrival, Lorenzo
was talking to a man at the corner of Pulong Diablo and Daangbakal. PO3
Tougan stepped out of their vehicle and hid in a place where he was not
visible to Lorenzo. PO3 Pineda stayed close to SPO1 Arellano, who was then
hiding inside a tricycle near Lorenzo. While this was happening, the
confidential informant approached Lorenzo for the transaction. Lorenzo and
the confidential informant were approximately four (4) meters away from PO3
Pineda. Because PO3 Pineda knew who Lorenzo was and considering the
place was illuminated, PO3 Pineda recognized the suspect. The confidential
informant and Lorenzo were talking for about one minute, after which the
informant gave the marked money to Lorenzo. After taking the marked
money, Lorenzo handed the shabu to the informant. PO3 Pineda and SPO1
Arellano alighted from the tricycle and approached Lorenzo, and introduced
themselves as police officers. They arrested Lorenzo.
Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was
able to retrieve the marked money and 2 other sachets of shabu from him.
Seeing what had happened to Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later
on identified as a certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers
and ran, but he was soon accosted by PO3 Tougan. A search of his pockets
yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the police
station where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The plastic
sachets containing 2.04 and 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance
bought from Lorenzo was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination. The results as contained in Chemistry Report no. D-1741-03E
showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.6
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant
Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their
version of the facts.
Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on the way home to Dulongbayan
sometime between 12:00 oclock in the evening and 1:00 oclock in the
morning of 10 September 2003. Estanislao, who was also with him at the
time, was riding in his motor cross style bike and was supposed to buy food
at said place after playing tong-its.
While the two (2) were traversing Daangbakal and Delos Angeles Street, the
chain on Estanislaos bike went loose. During the time Estanislao was
repairing his bike, PO3 Tougan, PO3 Pineda, and SPO1 Arellano, who were
then on board an owner type jeepney, arrived and arrested Lorenzo and
Estanislao. According to the police officers, they were to be brought to the
Municipal Hall. The two (2) suspects protested, claiming not having done
anything wrong but the police officers continued with the arrest. It was later
that they were informed that the arrest was for illegal drugs.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for
illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but acquitting Estanislao,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, first paragraph, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6993) or illegal selling
of 0.20 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).

(b) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, second paragraph,
No.3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6992)
or illegal possession of 2.04 gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to Twelve years and six (months) as maximum and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
(c) Finding accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier, for violation of
Section 11, second paragraph, sub paragraph 3, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, NOT GUILTY for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered released from
detention at the San Mateo Jail unless detained for some other lawful cause.
The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases are ordered
forfeited in favor of the government and the Officer-In-Charge of the Court is
hereby ordered to safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the same to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.7
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well
as the other evidence presented during trial, the trial court gave more veracity
to the prosecutions version that Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto
selling illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The trial
court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence in accordance with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions accorded to
police officers. According to the trial court, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust operation and the
seller, object and consideration, including the delivery of the shabu sold by
Lorenzo and the payment of the buy-bust money.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals, questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the
seizure and custody of the evidence against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction
rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby dismissed and the
assailed October 5, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo
Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended by AM No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004,
which became effective on October 15, 2004. This judgment of the Court of
Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with
the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Unyielding, Lorenzo appealed before this Court on Notice of
Appeal,8 adopting the same arguments raised before the Court of Appeals:

defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the

guilt of the accused.
Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to
be determined. Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is but a
fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored
on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if
considered, will change the outcome of the case. Considering that what is at
stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed and
evaluated the records of the case and find it necessary to reverse the
appellate courts decision convicting accused-appellant.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable
doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure of the prosecution to
adopt the required procedure under Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No.
9165, on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered
dangerous drugs. According to the defense, this alleged failure to follow
proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence,
raises doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist
and presented in court were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The
defense also faults the police operatives for not having coordinated with the
PDEA regarding the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the prosecution
discharged its burden of proving Lorenzos guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime charged.
We rule in the negative. The prosecutions case fails for failure to establish
the identity of the prohibited drug with moral certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the
prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.9 Material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had actually
taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.10 The term corpus delicti means the actual commission by someone of
the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements
are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to
be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this
case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction
cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.
Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the
fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with
the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165; AND
II.

While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an effective way to flush

out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy,
a buy-bust operation is susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been
mandated to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, specific procedures relating to

the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down under the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for Republic Act No. 9165 and it
is the prosecutions burden to adduce evidence that these procedures have
been complied with in proving the elements of the offense.

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic

constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction
must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.

The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21
(a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:

In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In which case,
the presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be
acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the
express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the
accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated
procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers.
In People v. Sanchez,11 we clarified that this saving clause applies only where
the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained
the cited justifiable grounds.
Accused-appellant claims that no physical inventory and no photographing of
the drugs took place. Non-compliance by the police operatives with the
foregoing requirements in the instant case is fatal to the prosecutions case.
Although the prosecution recognized its failure to coordinate with the PDEA
because of the urgency of the situation, it ignored the issue of specifically
identifying the prohibited drug at the point of confiscation. There is absolutely
nothing in the records to show that the inventory and photography
requirements, or their credible substitute to prove integrity and evidentiary
value, were ever followed.
In People v. Lim,12 this Court held:
xxx any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs
and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure and confiscation,
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of
the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of
the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt whether what
was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually
recovered from the appellants. It negates the presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed by the PAOC-TF agents.
In Bondad, Jr. v. People, 13 where the prosecution did not inventory and
photograph the confiscated evidence, this Court acquitted therein accused
reasoning that failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law
compromised the identity of the items seized.

were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable
doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the
accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.
To reiterate, the flexibility offered by the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 is
coupled with the proviso that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items must be preserved.
Thus, in Malillin v. People,16 the Court explained that the "chain of custody"
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and
must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in
evidence.17 Failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from accused is fatal to the
prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale
of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug.18
PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the
shabu from accused-appellant and that he only retrieved it from said
informant. He further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu
together with the two other sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized from
the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking was
done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens
thereafter.
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseurbuyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution
witness was at least four meters away from where accused-appellant and the
poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the
conversation between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer.
The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same
ones that were released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory
examination. We therefore find that this failure to establish the evidences
chain of custody is damaging to the prosecutions case.19
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to
support accused-appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.
Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 June 2007
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02184, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS is hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

In People v. Ruiz,14 this Court acquitted accused due to the failure of the
prosecution to comply with the procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 and
its IRR as no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the
seized items was taken under the circumstances required.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days
from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be
furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and the Director
General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information.

In People v. Orteza,15 the Court explained the implications of the failure to

comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to
wit:

SO ORDERED.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated
marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held
that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations
produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.1avvphi1

G.R. No. 150917

September 27, 2006

ARTEMIO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YADAO, petitioner,

DECISION
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom
operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the
accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the
drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review1 is the 18 April 2001 Decision2 and 13 November 2001
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19818, affirming in
toto the 28 March 1996 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.

Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of the decision
finding him "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide as
charged in the information x x x," 5 defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code for the death of Deogracias Gundran (Gundran),
and sentencing him to suffer the "indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum
period, as Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum
period, as Maximum, x x x."6
On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime
of homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one Deogracias Gundran, in an
Information,7 the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 1st day of October, (sic) 1989, in the
Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and maul one DEOGRACIAS
GUNDRAN, thereby inflicting upon said victim several injuries on
the different parts of his body which directly caused his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.
CONTRARY TO ART. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Yadao with assistance of a counsel de
parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. Thus, trial ensued, with the
prosecution presenting four witnesses, namely 1) Carmelita Limon, 8 2) Teofilo
Gundran,9 3) Napoleon Estigoy10 and 4) Dr. Arturo Llavore,11 to establish
petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
To counter the evidence abovementioned, the defense offered the
testimonies of the following defense witnesses: 1) petitioner Artemio Yadao,
2) Reynaldo Feratero,12 3) Dr. Magdalena Alambra,13 4) Calixto Chan14 and 5)
Evelyn Uy, as well as documentary evidence, i.e., the Autopsy Report of Dr.
Alambra.
From a review of the record of the case, we cull the following established
facts:

On the same day that he died, the body of the victim was autopsied by Dr.
Magdalena Alambra, Medical Specialist II of the Rural Health Unit of Bauang,
La Union. In her Autopsy Report, she made the following findings:
PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
1. Hematoma suboponeurotic layer of the scalp rt. Fronto parietal
area 10 cm. in length and 9 cm. in width.
2. Fibrocaseous necrosis of the right lung with loss of lung
parenchymal tissue and pleural adhesion of the rt. Lateral wall of
the chest.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio respiratory arrest due to pulmonary
tuberculosis. Far advanced with massive pleural adhesion rt.
side.16
During the trial of the case, Dr. Alambra testified for the defense. She stated
under oath that immediately after the death of the victim, she conducted the
autopsy of the body of said victim; that during the procedure, she made an
internal, as well as external, examination of the body of the victim; that
fibrocaseous meant that half of the victim's lungs, the right one in particular,
was already gone; that she was only told that the victim had been mauled
and that the latter became weak thereafter; that although a hematoma 17 was
present on the victim's forehead, she did not consider it as the cause of death
as hematoma alone will not cause the death of a person especially seven to
eight days later; and, that when she opened the skull of the victim to study
the latter's brain, she did not see anything unusual. Dr. Alambra then
confirmed that the cause of death of the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest
due to pulmonary tuberculosis that was already so far advanced with massive
pleural adhesions. On cross, however, she stated that a person with only one
lung left, with proper medication, would still be able to live normally.
Disbelieving that cardiac arrest secondary to Tuberculosis was the cause of
death of his son; Teofilo Gundran had the victim's body re-autopsied, this
time by the National Bureau of Investigation. The re-autopsy was conducted
by Dr. Arturo G. Llavore, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Regional Office, San Fernando, La Union, on 11 October
1991, or eight days after the first autopsy.18 Dr. Llavore's autopsy report
stated:
AUTOPSY REPORT NO. 88-26-LU

It was petitioner Yadao's birthday on 1 October 1988. As such, he had a few

guests over at his house to help him celebrate it. The guests included
defense witnesses Reynaldo Feratero, Calixto Chan and Evelyn Uy. At
around 9:00 a.m., petitioner Yadao noticed the victim, Gundran,15 albeit not
invited, to be milling around with the guests and was already drinking gin. At
around 3:45 p.m. of the said day, while petitioner Yadao was sitting on one
end of a bench, the victim, who happened to be lying down on the other end
of the same bench, suddenly stood up. Because no one else was sitting on
the middle, said bench tilted due to the weight of petitioner Yadao, thus,
causing him to fall to the ground. Upon seeing him fall to the ground, the
victim went over to petitioner Yadao and began boxing him on the stomach.
Petitioner Yadao's wife tried to pacify her nephew but this merely enraged the
latter who then got a can opener and tried to stab petitioner Yadao with it.
The latter deflected said attempt and delivered a slap on the face of the
victim in order to "knock some sense" into him. But because he was already
intoxicated, as he had been drinking since early that morning, the victim lost
his balance, hit his head on the edge of a table and fell to the ground landing
on his behind. The other guest helped the victim to stand up and proceeded
to show him to the door.
The victim, Gundran, left the house of petitioner Yadao, between 4:00 to 5:00
p.m., and proceeded to the house of Carmelita Limon who was the sister of
one of his friends. At that time, Limon was inside her house doing the laundry.
Upon seeing him, Limon noticed a one-inch in diameter lump on the victim's
forehead. The victim told her that he came from the birthday party of
petitioner Yadao and that the latter "mauled" him. While she treated the
"wound" with "kutsay," an herb, the victim complained of pain on his
breast/stomach area, the area where he claimed to have been hit by
petitioner Yadao.

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Cadaver, embalmed.
I. Abrasions: Frontal region, left side. 0.9 x 0.2 cm.; Arm, left, upper
third, anterior aspect, 2.0 x 0.6 cm.; Forearm, right, upper third,
anteromedial aspect, 0.2 x 0.2 cm.; Elbow, left, posterior aspect,
0.6 x 0.4 cm., and right, posters-medial aspect, 2.0 x 0.5 cm. in
size.
II. Hematoma, Scalp, Interstitial; Fronto-tempero-parietal region,
right side, 13.0 x 10.0 cms., massive, extensive; Frontal region,
slightly to the right of the anterior medial line, 2.0 x 1.6 cms., mild;
Occipital region, mid-aspect, 8.0 x 2.3 cms, moderate.
III. Brain, markedly congested, with flattening and widening of gyri
and narrowing of the sulci. Cerebral blood vessels markedly
engorged.
IV. Lungs, Left lung intact; right lung previously dissected. Cut
sections showed areas of fibrosis at the right lung (focal)
surrounded by atelectatic and emphysematous changes, (Pleural
Adhesions, right. - B-2)19
V. Other internal visceral organs, markedly congested.
VI. Stomach, with approximately 60 cc of dark brownish fluid.

Two days later, or on 3 October 1988, Teofilo Gundran, the father of the
victim was informed by his granddaughter that his son, the victim, was having
difficulty breathing. Teofilo Gundran then proceeded to where the victim was,
which happened to be in his (the victim's) sister's house, a short distance
away from Limon's house. When he got to the house, Teofilo Gundran saw
the victim sitting on an "arinola" gasping for breath. He then held the victim's
two hands until the latter expired.

*** end ***

CAUSE
OF
DEATH: CEREBRAL
EDEMA,
SECONDARY TO TRAUMATIC INJURIES; HEAD/

SEVERE,

REMARKS: Pls. see pathology Report No. P-88-339. Old healed

scars noted at Chest, anterior and lateral aspects, right. Scalp
incision, postmortem, extending from above left ear, over the
superior midline and down to the front of right ear, 36.0 cms. long.
Postmortem incision, Y-shaped, extending from anterior superior
portion of Chest to abdominal area, lower quadrant, 53.0 cms.
long.
During the trial, prosecution witness Dr. Llavore testified that the cause of
death of the victim was the collective effect of all the injuries sustained by the
latter on the head. He explained that the forces that could have caused the
injuries to the victim's head were also the same forces that could have
caused the edema or swelling of the victim's brain. He illustrated further that
a human fist applied with "sufficient" force on the fronto-temporoparietal region of the head could cause an injury the same as that sustained
by the victim on his forehead. Similarly, the injury found at the back of the
head of the victim could have been caused by an edge of a palm applied with
sufficient force or it could have been caused by hitting his head on the edge
of a table as the shape of said injury is somewhat elongated. On cross
examination, Dr. Llavore admitted that he did the re-autopsy seven (7) 20 days
after the victim died but that his Autopsy Report failed to indicate that the
cadaver had previously been autopsied by another physician; that the blow
inflicted on the head of the victim was strong enough to have injured the
"moorings" of the brain causing the destruction of the brain cells and the
shifting of the fluid in the skull to one side; that the most serious wound
between the two injuries sustained by the victim on the head is the one found
on his right forehead; and that the process of swelling became irreversible
when the compression of the brain had caused its center to become
"imbalanced," so that the victim's brain ceased to function.

Under paragraph 1, Article 4, revised Penal Code, a person

committing a felony is still criminally liable even if "x x x
(c) the injurious result is greater than that intended-praterintentionem. x x x
Indeed the act of the accused in slapping the victim Deogracias
Gundran causing the latter to fall down hitting his head which
caused his eventual death is something which the accused cannot
escape. This Court does not favor making conjectures but looking
at the body built (sic) of the accused who is tall and sturdy as
compared to the body built (sic) of the victim who was described to
be tall and lanky, it is not hard to believe that accused did not know
that natural and inevitable result of the act of slapping the victim,
considering the fact that accused even admitted that the victim was
then very drunk.
Aggrieved, petitioner Yadao appealed the aforequoted decision to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court, in its Decision22 of 18 April 2001, affirmed in
toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC. The fallo of Court of
Appeals decision states that:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, there
being no reversible error but instead being in accordance with law
and evidence, the appealed Decision dated March 28, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union (sic)
is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

After trial, in a Decision21 promulgated on 28 March 1996, the RTC rendered

judgment finding petitioner Yadao guilty of the crime of homicide, and
sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
as charged in the information, and after considering two (2)
mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum
period, as Maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Deogracias Gundran and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC held that:
After a careful consideration and examination of the testimonies of
both medico-legal officers, this Court is inclined to give more
weight on the testimony of Dr. Arturo Llavore that the cause of
death of Deogracias Gundran was "cerebral edema, severe,
secondary to traumatic injuries, head" and not "Cardio respiratory
Arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis. It is to be noted that Dra.
Magdalena Alambra testified and even admitted that a person even
if he has no (sic) lungs can still live. Hence, the injuries which the
victim Deogracias Gundran sustained on his head caused his
death as he did not immediately undergo medical treatment. And
as testified to by Dr. Arturo Llavore x x x the blow inflicted was fatal
or very serious that "if no medical intervention is made, it will be
untreated (sic)" (T.S.N., September 25, 1991, p. 38).
x x x [g]ranting for the sake of argument that accused Artemio
Yadao did not maul the victim but only slapped him slightly which
caused him to fall down as he was very drunk, still accused is liable
for the consequences of his act.
xxxx
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1)
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. x x x "Pursuant
to this provision, "an accused is criminally responsible for the acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting there from". (sic) x x x.
xxxx

Petitioner Yadao's ensuing motion for reconsideration was denied by the

Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 13 November 2001, seeing as no "new
matters or issues raised in (the) Motion for Reconsideration x x x."23
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Petitioner Yadao seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide. Essentially, it is his contention that the evidence presented
by the prosecution was not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt as the perpetrator of the crime of homicide. He maintains that the
existence of two autopsy reports entirely differing as to the cause of death of
the victim is tantamount to reasonable doubt respecting his legal culpability
thereto. Particularly, he argues that:
x x x [t]he trial court's finding "that the blow inflicted was fatal and
very serious" is not in accord with the physical manifestations of
Gundran in going to and while in the house of Carmelita. It is a
matter of human experience that when a person is struck with a
fatal or serious blow in the head to such an extent that his brain
becomes swollen with its moorings injured as found by Dr. Llavore
in this case, such person will suffer serious, disabling or painful
consequences. Either he will be rendered comatose or
unconscious or suffer severe pain in the head.
xxxx
And although Limon noticed a lump in (sic) his forehead, Gundran
did not complain of any pain in the head and when asked what he
felt he told Limon that he felt pain in his chest and stomach
because that was where he was mauled.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that:
It is clear from the record that Dr. Alambra failed to notice the brain
injury sustained by the victim because she merely relied on "gross
findings" of said organ during her autopsy. After opening the skull,
she merely took a look at the brain, felt it, and found nothing
unusual about the organ. She testified that she could not conduct
further laboratory examinations on the victim's brain for lack of
facilities (citation omitted).
This circumstance indicates that the findings of the two (2) medicolegal experts, although inconsistent, are not necessarily
irreconcilable.

The threshold issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of petitioner Yadao beyond reasonable doubt on
the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially Dr.
Llavore's, and documentary evidence presented, i.e., the Dr. Llavore's
Autopsy Report.
The petition has merit.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and punishes the crime
of homicide, viz:
ART. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246,24 shall kill another without the attendance
of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusin
temporal.
From the abovequoted provision of law, the elements of homicide are as
follows: 1) a person was killed; and 2) the accused killed him without any
justifying circumstance; 3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.25
The Constitution demands that every accused be presumed innocent until the
charge is proved. Before an accused can be convicted of any criminal act, his
guilt must first be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 26 In this jurisdiction, proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error; 27 it is that
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.28
Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence presented must be
sufficient to prove the corpus delicti the body or substance of the crime and,
in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually
committed.29 The corpus delicti is a compound fact composed of two things:
1) the existence of a certain act or a result forming the basis of the criminal
charge, and 2) the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or
result.30 In all criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the prosecution to prove
the body or substance of the crime. In the case at bar, was the prosecution
able to prove the two components of the corpus delicti?
We think not.
Though it was established that petitioner Yadao slapped the victim, and as a
result of which the latter fell down and struck his head on the edge of a table,
the prosecution nonetheless failed to show the nexus between the injury
sustained by the victim and his death. It failed to discharge the burden to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the victim resulted from
the use of violent and criminal means by petitioner Yadao.
The fact that the victim herein was wounded is not conclusive that death
resulted therefrom. To make an offender liable for the death of the victim, it
must be proven that the death is the natural consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted. If the physical injury is not the proximate cause 31 of death of
the victim, then the offender cannot be held liable for such death.
It has been established in this case that on the afternoon of 1 October 1988,
at around 3:45 p.m., petitioner Yadao slapped the victim once. This is based
from the unrebutted testimonies of defense witnesses the only
eyewitnesses to the assault. It is also undisputed that the victim died on 3
October 1988, or two days later. What is in dispute, however, is the cause of
the latter's death.
In convicting Petitioner Yadao, the RTC and the Court of Appeals principally
relied upon the testimony of Dr. Llavore in addition to the latter's autopsy
report, both essentially stating that the injury sustained by the victim in the
head caused massive hematoma and/or cerebral edema. However, we find
said testimonial and documentary evidence utterly insufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction for homicide. To our mind, his testimony, as
well as the Autopsy Report containing his findings, vis--vis the first autopsy
conducted by Dr. Alambra and the factual circumstances surrounding the
conduct of two autopsies done on said cadaver, do not engender a moral
certainty, much less a belief, that the injury sustained was the cause of his
death. This Court's doubt is brought about by Dr. Llavore's failure to account
the effects of the following facts: 1) that the cadaver had previously been
autopsied; 2) that during the first autopsy, Dr. Alambra opened up the skull of
the victim to physically examine his brain and did not see anything out of the
ordinary, neither blood clot and/or pooling nor any swelling; 3) that the
cadaver of the victim had already been embalmed; 4) that it had not been

established for how long the embalming fluid was supposed to stave off or
delay the decomposition of the cadaver of the victim; 5) that the re-autopsy
was conducted eight (8) days after the death of the victim; 6) that when the
cadaver of the victim was re-autopsied, decomposition may have already set
in despite the body having been embalmed; and 7) that the only hematoma
noted inside of the cadaver's head was that on the "suboponeurotic layer of
the scalp rt. fronto parietal region,"32 or "scalp, interstitial; Fronto-temporoparietal region, right side."33 In layman's terms, the hematoma, noted by both
physicians, was merely on the scalp, just below the skin, of the frontal right
side of the head nowhere near the brain as the area was still outside of the
skull. Even Dr. Llavore recognized such fact as clearly stated in his Autopsy
Report and testified to in open court, viz:
COURT:
Now, could you tell us could you tell this Court what is
the cause of that trauma?
xxxx
Witness:
A x x x the cause of the trauma on the head is physical contact as
shown in paragraph 3, there were injuries to these areas on the
right side and actually there were two (2) and one (1) at the back of
the head and the force or violence that was applied to these areas
caused the brain to move suddenly also and the displacement of
the substances, the brain substances, because the brain is very
fragile, it is very soft, once they are displaced from their place,
because they move, there is breaking of very minute blood vessels
the very minute blood vessels if the force is stronger, it could
create breakage or rupture of larger blood vessels which you can
say grossly as hemorrhage, but in this case, there is no
hemorrhage there is no gross hemorrhage, there is only
minute blood vessels and since there is destruction of the very
minute blood vessels, they swell individually, they swell and
collectively, the swelling becomes so great because it already
involves the whole brain and the brain becomes swollen, it
expands, it tries to expand, but it cannot. Therefore, it compresses
in itself.
Consequently, the post mortem report and testimony of Dr. Alambra should
not be easily discounted. The same is significant in that the testimony and the
report on the autopsy, which was done immediately after the death,
establishes the nature and extent of the "injury," sustained as a result of the
assault, as well as the state of the brain and the surrounding area at the time
of death. The significance of said evidence will lead to the precise nature of
the injury sustained by the victim. From a legal perspective, therefore, the
examination of a wound should lead to the determination as to the degree of
danger of the wound and the danger it poses to the life or bodily function of
the victim when the wound was inflicted.
Wharton and Stille's discussion on the importance of a thorough and
painstaking post-mortem examination or assessment of the degree of injury
sustained by the victim is highly instructive, it reads:
x x x [a] careful post-mortem examination will usually show the
violent cause of death, and it is the duty of the physician whose
opinion is desired, to make that examination most carefully, and
to base his opinion entirely upon the findings of this
examination; not upon previous notions of the probable
nature and effects of the wound. Moreover, it is necessary not
merely to make an examination of the regions apparently involved
in the injury, but also a thorough examination of the entire body; for,
notwithstanding the immediate cause of death may be evident, it is
still advisable to be sure that there was no cause of death in any
other part. [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court recognizes the fact that the most critical aspect of head trauma is
what happens to the brain; that the immediate brain damage that results from
head trauma is dependent upon the force applied to the head, the area of its
application, and whether the head is fixed or freely movable; that when viable
tissue receives an application of force strong enough to be injurious, it (the
body) responds by alteration in intracellular and extracellular fluid content, by
extravasation of blood, by increasing blood supply to the local area, and by
mobilization of cells capable of removing cellular debris and repairing any
disruption.34 Moreover, it is acknowledged that tissues of the nervous system,
the brain being one of its components, and like any other tissue of the body,
responds to injury by the formation of edema or the retention of
fluid.35 Hence, it is not quite farfetched that the victim may have had cerebral

edema as a result of the injury he sustained in the head. But just the same,
such a conclusion, as stated in the second post mortem report, does not
necessarily preclude the fact that the swelling or edema noted in the tissues
of the brain may have been due to other factors i.e., such as decomposition
or the fact that the cadaver of the victim had already been embalmed. The
foregoing uncertainty is all the more reinforced by the testimony of Dr.
Alambra and her findings stated in the First Autopsy Report stating that there
were no signs of damage to the brain, external or internal. This, by itself, is
very much inconsistent with the allegation that the cerebral edema was the
cause of death of the victim, which if it were so, would have already been
manifest at the time of death.
From a medical perspective, the abovediscussed issues are essentially
significant and must be established first before any correlation of the injury to
the victim's cause of death is done. It is an established fact that during
decomposition, numerous cellular changes occur in the body. A microscopic
examination of the tissues (of the body) under the influence of "autolytic
enzymes"36 enzymes
shows
disintegration, swelling or
shrinkage,
vacuolization and formation of small granules within the cytoplasm of the
cells.37 Therefore, the swelling of the brain, along with the other organs of the
victim as stated in the Pathology Report38 by the NBI, which reads:
FINDINGS
MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTIONS:
Brain (cerebral cortex): and cerebellum) : sections show markedly
widened spaces in the virchow in the white matter of the cerebrum
and collapsed walls of the capillaries. Cloudy swelling of neurons
and interstitial edema, marked.
Kidneys: sections show focal infiltrations of chronic inflammatory
cells in the interstitium accompanied by tubular atrophy and
glomeruler sclerosis. Cloudy swelling of tubules in the cortex,
moderate. Medullary congestion, moderate. The cerebellum shows
Liver: sections show moderate congestion of red blood cells in the
sinusoids and cloudy swelling of liver cells.
Lungs: sections show marked congestion of pulmonary septae
exhibiting numerous macrophages containing hemusiderin
pigments. Alternating atelectatic and hyperinflated lung alveoli with
emphysematous and bullae formation can be noted. Fibrosis in
diffuse in other areas with calcifications. The small bronchi are
irregularly dilated.
Myocardium: congestion of capillaries and cloudy swelling of
muscle fibers, moderate.

or the fact that the cadaver of the victim had already been previously
embalmed.
Dr. Llavore's testimony that the cause of death of the victim was the collective
effect of the blow sustained by the latter's head; that the blow was strong
enough to have caused the displacement of the brain from its moorings and
the resultant swelling. Such conclusion was brought about by the doctor's
external and internal examination of the brain of the victim. The records of the
case, however, is again bereft of any indication that the said inference or
conclusion took into account the fact that the cadaver of the victim had been
previously autopsied, more importantly, that his brain had been already been
removed from its "moorings" by Dr. Alambra in order for her to take the same
out of the skull when she examined it.
Indeed, the evidence of the defense might not, by itself, suffice to
emphatically negate the causal relationship between the actions of petitioner
Yadao causing injury to the victim and the cause of his death, but the same
must be considered in conjunction with the weakness of the evidence given
by the prosecution's witness discussed above. Defense witness Dr. Alambra's
Autopsy Report, on top of her testimony that upon opening the skull of the
victim, she found nothing out of the ordinary in the brain, tend to reinforce the
doubt already engendered by the weakness of the prosecution's evidence
about the fundamental correlation of the injury and the cause of death. It was
incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate petitioner Yadao's culpability
beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of whatever the defense has
offered to exculpate the latter. Conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence, not merely on conjectures or suppositions, and
certainly not on the weakness of the accused's defense; otherwise, the
phrase "constitutional presumption of innocence" will be reduced to nothing
but an innocuous grouping of words; worse, to a conspicuous exercise in
futulity. As a rule, findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great weight,
even finality, on appeal, unless the trial court has failed to appreciate certain
facts and circumstances that, if taken into account, would materially affect the
result of the case.43 In this case, prescinding from the above discussion, it is
arrantly manifest that the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, overlooked
material and relevant facts that could affect the outcome of the case. The
constitutional presumption of innocence aforementioned requires us to take
"a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance or doubt favoring
the innocence of the accused as court have the imperative duty to "put
prosecution evidence under severe testing."44
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in
this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 45 The proof against
him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment.46 If the evidence is susceptible of two
interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.47The
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 48 If there
exist even one iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long standing legal
injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner."49

x x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
may have also been due to the decomposing state of the cadaver of the
victim and not just that caused by the head injury he sustained from the
hands of petitioner Yadao.
Additionally, to delay the onset of decomposition, cadavers are embalmed.
Embalming is the artificial way of preserving the body after death by injecting
6 to 8 quarts of antiseptic solutions of formalin, perchloride or mercury or
arsenic, which is carried into the common carotid and the femoral
arteries.39 However, a dead body must not be embalmed before the
autopsy.40 The embalming fluid may render the tissue and blood unfit for
toxicological analyses.41 The embalming may alter the gross appearance
of the tissues or may result to a wide variety of artifacts that tend to
destroy or obscure evidence.42 Thus, in the case at bar, even if the cadaver
of the victim may not have started decomposing at the time of the re-autopsy,
all the same, the fact that such had already been embalmed, any
examination will likely lead to findings or conclusion not at all accurate as to
the true status of the tissues of the body of the victim.
From the above, absent further clarifications, Dr. Llavore's conclusion that the
victim's cause of death is cerebral edema is nothing but conjecture, being
tenuous and flawed. Consequently, the findings as stated in said autopsy
report is not decisive of the of the issue of whether or not injury sustained by
the victim in his head when he was slapped by petitioner Yadao and/or when
the victim hit his head on the edge of the table were the sole cause of the
cerebral edema observed in the latter's brain during the re-autopsy
conducted eight (8) days after his death. Again, it could have been caused
by other factors, one of which could have been the decomposition or the
breakdown of the cellular tissues of the body naturally occurring after death,

From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of petitioner
Yadao has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The facts of the case,
the autopsy reports, as well as the testimony of Dr. Llavore do not definitely
establish that the assault was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the blow inflicted on the head of
the victim resulted in an edematous condition of the brain, petitioner Yadao
would still not be held liable for the death as the prosecution failed to present
proof that said act was the efficient and proximate cause of the victim's
demise. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the
accused's innocence may be doubted. 50 It is better to free a guilty man than
to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the
required quantum of evidence. For only when there is proof beyond any
shadow of doubt that those responsible should be made answerable.51
The heirs of the victim, however, have not completely lost their case. Settled
in jurisprudence is the principle that a court may acquit an accused on
reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages in the same
case. 52In this case, though petitioner Yadao is acquitted, nonetheless, his
liability for damages is not considered extinguished since the judgment of
acquittal is not based on a pronouncement that the facts from which civil
claims might arise did not exist. Accordingly, this Court awards P50,000.00 as
civil damages to the heirs of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the 28 March 1996 Decision of the Regional Tial Court of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, as well as the 18 April 2001 Decision and 13
November 2001 Resolution both of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Petitioner
Artemio
Yadao
is ACQUITTED of the charge of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
His immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless he is being

held for other lawful causes. However, Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ordered to
pay the heirs of victim Deogracias Gundran in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137665. January 16, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO
PAINITAN alias "ABIE," accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Was the case proffered by the prosecution, absent contrary evidence
presented by the defense, sufficient to warrant a conviction of the
accused? The trial court concluded in the affirmative.
AAA, a thirty-seven year old housewife from xxx, and the mother to a brood
of nine, the youngest of whom was only a month old by the time AAA took the
witness stand, claimed to have been the victim of rape. The night of 12
December 1995 appeared to be a typical evening for AAAs family. AAA was
left alone with her children, as husband BBB, an abaca stripper had to spend
days in the mountains to gather and strip abaca. By seven o'clock that
evening, AAAs household had already retired for the night. Save from the
light of a lone lamp, the house was virtually dark and quiet. AAA was sleeping
in one room and her three children - CCC, DDD and EEE - in
another. Accounts on the whereabouts of the other children remained
unclear. The two rooms in the family dwelling were separated by bamboo
walls and an opening connected one room to the next. At approximately
eleven o'clock, AAA was suddenly roused from slumber when she felt
somebody hugging and kissing her lips. Aided by the light of a flickering
lamp, she recognized her attacker to be Alberto "Abie" Painitan, then slightly
drunk and wearing only an undershirt. Surprised, she tried to ward off his
advances but he proved to be too strong for her. To restrain her, Alberto
boxed both her shoulders and upper thighs. Pained by the blows, AAA slid
into unconsciousness. Strangely, despite being unconscious, AAA could
remember Alberto undressing her, removing her pair of shorts and panties,
placing himself on top of her, inserting his penis into her vagina and making
push and pull movements. When asked how long it took, private complainant
stated that she could not tell because she was unconscious and that when
she came to Alberto was no longer around. Instead, she said, she saw her
two children CCC and DDD crying by her bedside.
The following days, AAA remained quiet, deciding to report the matter only
upon her husband's arrival. It was five days after the alleged molestation
when BBB came home. After AAA recounted to her husband what had
happened to her, the couple decided to go to the barangay captain of xxx to
lodge a complaint against Alberto. The physical examination of AAA at the
hospital showed the presence of confluent hematoma which, according to
examining physician Freddie Letigio, was probably caused by a hard object,
like a closed fist. No physical examination was conducted on private
complainant's private parts as several days had already elapsed since the
alleged rape.
On 22 February 1996, the information against Alberto Painitan was
filed. Thus "INFORMATION"
"The undersigned hereby accuses ALBERTO PAINITAN, alias `Abie', who is
said to be found atxxx, of the crime of Rape based upon a complaint signed
by the offended party herself, and committed by above-named accused as
follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of December, 1995, at around 11:00 o'clock in
the evening, more or less, in xxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lustful intent and lewd
design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, had sexual intercourse with AAA, who is a married
woman, against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim and
her family."[i][1]
The warrant for his arrest was returned unserved with a notation that Painitan
had already transferred residence to Barangay Mainet, Nabontoran, Davao
del Norte. It was a year later when Alberto surrendered to the authorities of
xxx, and submitted himself to trial following his plea of "not guilty."
Taking the witness stand, AAA testified that she knew well Alberto "Abie"
Painitan who had been a neighbor for nine years with only a rice field
separating their houses. She did not know how Alberto was able to gain
ingress to their dwelling that fateful night nor did it occur to her to ask him,
confusion, fear and shock having gotten the better of her. On crossexamination, private complainant admitted that the door to their house was
not bolted that night.
CCC, Victoria's fifteen-year old daughter, testified that she had known Alberto
"Abie" Painitan even prior to the alleged rape, and that she would often see
Abie and her mother conversing with each other but added that she and her
siblings were invariably present on such occasions. On the night of the

incident, CCC was sleeping with her brother EEE and her sister DDD when
she heard a commotion. Curious, she rushed to the other room and there she
saw "Abie" on top of her mother, hitting her on different parts of her body and
rendering her weak and speechless. While atop her mother, CCC saw Alberto
make pumping motions, his bare buttocks in plain view to the terrified
child. Unable to do anything, CCC and her sister DDD, who just then had
followed her to their mother's room, were helplessly crying. Shortly
afterwards, Alberto stood up, put on his pair of pants and went
downstairs. With Abie gone, she and her sister DDD went to their still
speechless mother, embraced her and cried. AAA did not discuss with her
children what had happened.The first time CCC openly talked about the
incident was when BBB, their father, finally came home. It was she, however,
not her mother, who narrated the incident to her father. After listening to her
story, CCC could sense her father's rage. He confronted her mother, and it
was then when her mother told him the truth. Stunned, Daniel yelled before
breaking into tears.
The defense presented two witnesses -- Simeon Tagnipez, uncle of the
accused, and Proceso Samo.
Tagnipez testified that BBB and AAA had earlier confided to him their decision
to withdraw the case for lack of money and ill-health. According to Tagnipez,
financial hardships, coupled with BBB's swollen toes that made regular
attendance in court hearings difficult, impelled the spouses to execute an
affidavit of desistance. When shown the affidavit, however, witness Simeon
Tagnipez admitted that he did not know how to read. The second witness,
Processo Samo, corroborated Tagnipez' testimony and testified that he, too,
was present when the affidavit of desistance was executed. Reportedly, AAA
and BBB were given P500.00 when they affixed their thumbmarks on the
affidavit of desistance although no receipt was issued for the amount.
The defense rested its case, without the accused taking the witness stand.
The court a quo, after assessing the evidence found Alberto "Abie" Painitan
guilty of the crime of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused Alberto
Painitan alias `Abie' GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to indemnify the victim of the amount of P50,000.00 as damages."[ii][2]
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant contends that the sexual congress
between him and private complainant on the night of 12 December 1995,
given the testimony of AAA and her daughter, could not have been anything
else but an act of two consenting adults.
Verily, for the charge of rape to prosper, proof beyond reasonable doubt
should show (1) that there has been carnal knowledge of the victim by the
accused; and (2) that the accused achieves the act through force and
intimidation upon the victim or because the latter is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious.
AAA testified that accused-appellant, to subdue and succeed in taking her,
had boxed both her left and right shoulders and her upper thighs, causing her
to lose consciousness.
"Q. While you were sleeping on or about 11:00 p.m. of December 12, 1995,
do you recall of any unusual incident that occurred?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was the unusual incident that occurred, if any?
"A. That incident, when he climbed our house.
"Q. You mentioned the word `he' to whom are you referring when you said
`he climbed into your house?'
"A. Alberto Painitan, alias `Abie' entered our house.
"Q. After Alberto Painitan entered your house, do you recall through which
opening of your house did he enter?
"A. Because I was sleeping, I could not recall where he passed by when he
entered our house
"Q. Nevertheless, after he entered your house, what happened next if any?
"A. He hugged and kissed me, sir.
"Q. What were you doing at that time?
"A. I tried to overcome his force, sir.
"Q. Since it was nighttime, how did you recognize that it was Alberto Painitan
who entered your house; hugged and kissed you?
"A. At that time there was a lighted lamp.
"Q. You said you were kissed by Alberto Painitan, where were you kissed?
"A. On my cheeks, sir.
"Q. Left or right?
"A. Both cheeks, sir.
"Q. After Alberto Painitan kissed your left and right cheeks, what happened
next if any?
"A. He boxed my both shoulders and my laps, sir.
"Q. When Alberto Painitan boxed your left and right shoulders and your laps
what did you feel?
"A. I felt pain, sir.
"Q. After your shoulders and your laps were boxed, what happened next, if
any; what did Alberto Painitan do next?
"A. He undressed me, sir.
"Q. What was undressed from you?
"A. He removed my shirt and panty, sir.
"Q. After Alberto Painitan removed your short and panty, what happened
next, if any?
"A. He had sexual intercourse.
"Q. When you said sexual intercourse, what did he particularly do to you?

"A. He placed himself on top of me.

"Q. What did he do with his organ?
"A. He inserted his penis to my vagina.
"Q. After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what did he do next, if any?
"A. He kept on pumping while his penis was inside my vagina.
"Q. For how long did Alberto Painitan pump while inserting his penis to your
vagina?
"A. Since I was unconscious, sir, I could not remember for how long did he
keep on pumping, sir.
"Q. After he inserted his penis into your vagina and started pumping, what did
you feel?
"A. I felt pain in my vagina.
"Q. What did you observe on his person, was he drunk?
"A. He was slightly drunk.
"Q. Why do you say that Alberto Painitan was slightly drunk?
"A. I could say that he was slightly drunk because if he was not so drunk, he
could not locate my house.
"Q. While this sexual intercourse was occurring, where were these two (2)
children, then?
"A. My children were at the other room.
"Q. You said you were boxed on your laps; what portion of your laps were
boxed by Alberto Painitan?
"A. I was boxed on my both front portion of my laps, sir.
"Q. When you were boxed on your upper legs, what did you feel?
"A. I felt pain, sir.
"Q. You said you were unable to estimate the time Alberto Painitan kept on
pumping you; after he had sexual intercourse with you, what did he do next, if
any?
"A. Because I was unconscious, I could no longer remember what did he do
next. After I regained consciousness, he was no longer around.
"Q. When you regained consciousness where were your two (2) children
then?
"A. They were already at my side.
"Q. What were they doing?
"A. They were crying, sir."[iii][3]
According, however, to Dr. Freddie Letigio, the examining physician, the
hematoma found on Victoria did not correspond to the location of the injuries
testified to by her. Dr. Letigio found hematoma on her left elbow joint, left
upper arms and on the right shoulder.
"Q. And what were your findings, if any?
"A. Based on my record, there was a confluent hematoma at the left elbow
joint, confluent hematoma at the left deltoid area and multiple confluent
hematoma at the right shoulder."[iv][4]
Common experience would dictate that the force of a closed fist merely
hitting the extremities of the body normally will not be enough to cause
unconsciousness. Pointedly, private complainant has had herself examined
on 18 December 1995, or six days after the incident, at which time, an
average hematoma or mark on the body caused by mere inflection of a
closed fist could become indistinct. Clear marks on the body after the lapse of
nearly a week from the date the injury is inflicted can raise great likelihood
that the physical marks may have been of a more recent occasion.
A few other factors could militate against AAA's allegation of having been
rendered unconscious at the time of rape. Although claiming to be in a state
of stupor, private complainant, nevertheless, was able to narrate in detail the
acts of accused-appellant in removing her shorts and pair of panties, in
inserting his penis into her vagina and in making pumping motions. When her
attention was brought to this glaring incongruity, she deftly answered that she
knew what the accused-appellant did to her even in her unconscious state
only because her children had told her about it. If it were so, then her own
narration would also be reduced to mere hearsay. During both direct
examination and cross-examination, AAAherself stated that her children were
not with her when the rape had taken place
"Q. While this sexual intercourse was occurring where were these two
children, then?
"A. My children were at the other room."[v][5]
"Q. At that time your children were not yet with you when the sexual
intercourse was done by the accused on you?
"A. They were not yet with me, sir."[vi][6]
Perhaps realizing her inconsistency, AAA later reformed her testimony to say
that her children were already present when the episode was unfolding "A. My children came to my room when the accused was still there.
"Q. Where was the accused at that time?
"A. My children came to my room when the accused was still having sexual
intercourse with me.
"Q. Until the end?
"A. Yes, sir."[vii][7]
The flip-flopping on a material portion of her testimony taints AAA's credibility
and gives the version of her daughter, CCC, added prominence as being the
only eyewitness account of the sexual assault. Unfortunately, CCC's claim
that she witnessed the coupling between Painitan and her mother would itself
appear to be highly questionable. CCC's claim in open court that she actually
saw accused-appellant hit her mother and thereafter raped her diverges from
her earlier sworn declaration before Investigating Judge FFF where she
categorically stated that, upon reaching her mothers room, she saw accusedappellant already dressed, lying beside her seemingly unconscious mother.
"Q. At around eleven oclock in the evening on December 12, 1995, was there
any untoward incident that took place?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Please tell us what was that incident all about?
"A. I was awakened by a commotion in the room of my mother. My sister
DDD also awoke at that time and we went inside the room where my mother
was sleeping. I saw Alberto Painitan alias `Abie' lying beside my mother. We
cried upon seeing him and Alberto Painitan stood up and told us to give way
because he will go out.

"Q. At that time you saw accused lying beside your mother, was the accused
naked as well as your mother?
"A. I saw my mothers short already torn placed at the foot of my mother while
Abie who was wearing a short pant at that time was lying beside my
mother. Upon seeing us, Abie stood up and told us to give way because he
was going out passing through the kitchen door.
"Q. How come you were able to identify accused Alberto Painitan alias "Abie"
who was lying beside your mother?
"A. I could clearly identify him because the kerosene lamp in my mother's
bedroom was lighted.
"Q. Do you know personally the accused Alberto Painitan?
"A. He frequently comes to our house because he is a `compadre' of my
parents.
"Q. Having seen the accused lying beside your mother, what did you do
then?
"A. We just cried because we were afraid.
"Q. Did you actually enter into the room of your mother when you saw the
accused lying beside your mother?
"A. Yes, sir."[viii][8]
Not to be taken lightly was the failure of the prosecution to show that private
complainant had actually resisted accused-appellants amorous advances
except for the following snippet of her testimony
"Q. What were you doing at that time?
"A. I tried to overcome his force, sir."[ix][9]
Other than this negligible and obscure portion of her account, AAA failed to
describe to any extent the form and the manner of the resistance she exerted
to protect her honor. No attempt was made by the prosecution to recite how
private complainant exactly tried to overcome accused-appellant's brutish
intentions. Instead, per her testimony, AAA, upon being showered with kisses
by Alberto Painitan made no attempt to shout or struggle, her silence and
immobility suspiciously qualifying as somehow being a wordless
acquiescence and surrender to Painitan's advances "Q. On December 12, 1995 was the door of your house locked?
"A. Our door was not locked at that time.
"Q. You knew that somebody entered your house because of the sound that
you heard?
"A. I came to know that somebody entered our house when he was already
inside the house.
"ATTY. GABUCAN:
"Q. In fact you asked him why he was in your house at that time?
"A. I did not ask him because I was confused.
"Q. You just stared at him by the eyes?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Of course, at that time he uttered words when he was staring at you?
"A. No, sir, instead he directly approached me.
"Q. At that time your two children were sleeping in the other room of your
house?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. While he got near you, you were not able to shout for help?
"A. I was not able to shout for help.
"Q. Until what you said, he was able to embrace and hug you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And he even kissed your cheeks and your lips?
"A. Yes, sir."[x][10]
This Court is not unaware of its own rulings that when a woman states that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that would be necessary to show
that rape did take place. This principle, however, only stands as long as the
testimony is free from serious or major incongruence and unbridled by
suspicion or doubt.
Extraneous circumstances could also augur against the existence of force
and intimidation. The front door of the house during the night of the supposed
rape when AAA, alone with her young brood and without the man of the
house to protect them, was left unlocked. Then, too, it was her daughter CCC
who first related the incident to her father, and it was only when confronted
that AAA finally told her husband about it.
The presumption of innocence of an accused is a substantial part of the law
founded upon a great principle of justice that cannot be balanced out merely
by conjecture or by probability.[xi][11] The heavy burden of overcoming this
presumption rests on the prosecution, and unless it succeeds in proving by
satisfactory evidence the guilt of the accused, the constitutional mandate of
innocence prevails.[xii][12] In crimes of rape particularly, conviction or
acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the victim's testimony
because ordinarily only the participants can testify to its occurrence.[xiii]
[13]Rape is an emotional word, and the natural human reactions against it
are strong and categorical. Judges, as interpreters of the law and as
dispensers of justice, are enjoined, however, to look at rape charges without
those proclivities and to still deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection, free from the natural tendency to be protective of every
woman decrying her having been sexually abused.[xiv][14] Thus, the Court
has exhorted courts to keep in mind settled principles in the decision-making
process, i.e., (1) that an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) that
it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, although
innocent, to disprove; (3) that, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with great caution; and (4) that the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall in its own merits, and it cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
[xv][15]
Be all that, nevertheless, confronted with the conflicting and vague evidence
proffered by the prosecution, and the total silence on the part of accusedappellant, what might have actually transpired on the night of 12 December

1995 can never be fully known, except perhaps to the two involved in the
incident. Regrettably, there are, in the mind of the court, lingering doubts that
have remained unanswered. Could it be that the matter has been no more
than the unleashing of shared passions, and that the door of the house has
purposely been left unsecured? Could it have been because of an obvious
embarrassment upon being caught by her daughters in the afterglow of a
passionate lovemaking which has prevented her from immediately reporting
the incident to her husband or to the authorities? Could it be that the
disappearance of accused-appellant immediately after the incident has
merely been to escape the ire of a wronged husband? Could it be that the
injuries sustained by private complainant have been caused not by accusedappellant but by an angry spouse? On another end, it may well be that
Alberto "Abie" Painitan did commit the crime of raping the defenseless
AAA. If indeed he is guilty, let the Ultimate Judge make that righteous
judgment. Courts of men, hardly infallible, can only rely upon the evidence
before them. Verily, it may be necessary to reiterate the basic rule that
requires a party to prove his affirmative allegations even as it underscores
the delicate and pivotal role of the prosecution, particularly during the direct
and cross-examination, on the imperativeness of probing questions in order
to elicit fine points from witnesses that pertain to no less than the vital
elements of the crime. This focal duty of the prosecution is not abdicated
even in the face of the failure of the accused to utter a word in his defense.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of xxx is
REVERSED. Accused-appellant Alberto "Abie" Painitan is ACQUITTED of
the crime of rape on the ground of the People's failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He is to be released forthwith unless there are
other lawful reasons for his continued detention. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191071

August 28, 2013

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
ROGELIA JARDINEL PEPINO-CONSULTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The appeal before this Court seeks to challenge the Decision 1 dated
November 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02867.
The appellate court affirmed the Decision2 dated May 8, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga in Criminal Case
No. 14206, which found accused-appellant Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta
guilty of the crime of illegal sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information3 dated February 8, 2005, accused-appellant allegedly
violated the first paragraph of Section 5, Article II 4 of Republic Act No. 9165 in
the following manner:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 2005 in the City of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a recidivist who was convicted of the crimes of
violation of Sec. 15 and 16, Art. III of R.A. 6425 on March 8, 2002, Rogelia
Pepino-Consulta, without having been lawfully authorized, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute, deliver and transport five (5)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing Methylamphetamine
[Hydrochloride] weighing SIX HUNDRED TEN THOUSANDTHS (0.0610) of a
gram, FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY[-]SIX THOUSANDTHS (0.0556) of a gram,
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSANDTHS (0.0520) of a gram, SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY[-]EIGHT THOUSANDTHS (0.0638) of a gram and SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]SEVEN THOUSANDTHS (0.0677) of a gram[,]
respectively, or a total weight of THREE THOUSAND AND ONE
THOUSANDTHS (0.3001) of a gram, dangerous drugs.
When accused-appellant was arraigned on April 25, 2005, she pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.5

and the drug specimens to the crime laboratory, which were received by PO2
Bagaoisan,6the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then told her about the request
and she received the same together with the specimens. She checked
whether the letter-request and the specimens had the same markings and
she registered them in their logbook. She thereafter proceeded with the
qualitative examination of the specimens.7
After conducting the necessary tests, P/Sr. Insp. Perez determined that the
contents of the five sachets she examined were indeed dangerous drugs. Her
findings were contained in Chemistry Report No. D-027-2005. Afterwards,
she gave the report to the Record Custodian and submitted the drug
specimens to the Evidence Custodian.8
On cross-examination, P/Sr. Insp. Perez told the trial court that she did not
see the person who brought the specimens. She merely relied on the printed
stamp receipt made by PO2 Bagaoisan. When the specimens were
transmitted to their office, they were placed in a small plastic container
approximately one and a half by two (1 x 2) inches in size. As there were
no markings on the small plastic container, she discarded the same and put
the sachets in a brown envelope, which she then marked with her initials.9
The prosecutions version of the incident in question was derived from the
testimonies of PO2 Randy Dizon and PO3 Augusto Tiongco.
PO2 Dizon testified that on February 7, 2005, he was assigned as an
operative of the Drug Enforcement Unit, Intelligence Section of the City of
San Fernando Police Station. On that date, his unit conducted a buy-bust
operation along General Hizon Extension Avenue, Barangay Sta. Lucia, City
of San Fernando. The target of the operation was a certain Manang who,
according to PO2 Dizon, was the accused-appellant in this case. He already
knew accused-appellant since 2004 in view of the information he got from
fellow police officers that she had a previous drug case. From their office, he
proceeded to the place where the buy-bust operation would take place along
with PO3 Tiongco and a confidential informant. They rode his private vehicle
and arrived at the scene at around 5:45 p.m. When they reached the place,
the informant pointed to accused-appellant who was four meters away from
them, standing in front of the Akim Restaurant. They passed by her. He gave
instructions to the confidential informant to alight from the vehicle, approach
accused-appellant, and conduct the buy-bust operation. They turned back
and parked the vehicle on the other side of the road in front of the Akim
Restaurant. They were about eight to ten meters away from where the
accused-appellant was situated.10
While PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco remained inside the car, they saw the
informant talk to accused-appellant for about five to seven minutes. The
informant then handed something to accused-appellant and the latter gave
something in return. PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco witnessed this as they
were sitting inside the vehicle on the other side of the road, watching the
informant and accused-appellant sideways. They saw the informant extend
his left hand to give the buy-bust money to accused-appellant and the latter
handed the object of the sale using her right hand. Thereafter, the informant
gave the pre-arranged signal of placing the substance bought inside his
pocket. PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco then got out of the vehicle and
approached accused-appellant.11
PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco introduced themselves as police officers and
asked accused-appellant to empty the contents of her pocket. They were
able to recover the buy-bust money, which was a five hundred peso
(P500.00) bill that was pre-marked earlier in the police station. The bill had a
marking of RD placed after its serial number by PO2 Dizon. They did not
recover any other object from accused-appellant and they did not conduct a
body search on her anymore. PO2 Dizon stated that it was PO3 Tiongco who
arrested accused-appellant, while he recovered the buy-bust money. After
they boarded accused-appellant in the vehicle, PO3 Tiongco took the
suspected drugs subject of the sale from the informant.12

The relevant portions of their testimonies are as follows:

PO2 Dizon said that the meeting of the informant and accused-appellant was
a chance meeting. The informant came to their office at around 5:10 p.m. on
February 7, 2005 and he informed PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco that
accused-appellant was at the Akim Restaurant selling shabu. They relayed
this information to P/Sr. Insp. Ferdinand Germino, the Chief of their office.
They were then tasked to conduct the buy-bust operation. The informant was
to act as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco were the backup.13

P/Sr. Insp. Aylin Casignia Perez testified that on February 7, 2005, she was
assigned at the Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Camp Olivas, City of
San Fernando as a Forensic Chemical Officer. On said date, she received a
written request for laboratory examination from the Detective Bureau of the
City of San Fernando pertaining to an alleged violation of Republic Act No.
9165. A certain Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Noel Doria brought the request

PO2 Dizon stated that he was able to see the five pieces of transparent
plastic sachets of shabu handed by the informant to PO3 Tiongco. After
accused-appellant was arrested, they brought her to their office at the City of
San Fernando Police Station. PO2 Dizon said that he placed the markings of
RD1 to RD5 on the five sachets when they were already at their office. The
buy-bust money and the five pieces of plastic sachets were then turned over

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of: (1)
Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Aylin Casignia Perez; (2) Police Officer
(PO) 2 Randy Dizon; and (3) PO3 Augusto Tiongco.

to SPO1 Noel B. Doria. The five sachets of suspected drug specimens were
submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. PO2 Dizon and PO3
Tiongco also executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest regarding the buy-bust
operation they conducted.14
On cross-examination, PO2 Dizon stated that the informant who participated
in the buy-bust operation on February 7, 2005 came to their office for the first
time on said date. Also, the police did not conduct any surveillance to confirm
the informants tip that a certain Manang was selling shabu on that date. The
accused-appellant was, however, already included in their drug watch list.
During the conduct of the buy-bust operation, he said that he saw the
exchange of the buy-bust money and the shabu. Even if the windows of his
vehicle were tinted, he can still see from the inside looking out. PO2 Dizon
admitted that he did not really see the items exchanged by the informant and
accused-appellant because the sachets were small. They merely relied on
the pre-arranged signal of the informant to indicate that the sale was
consummated. Because the signal was made by the informant, they
assumed that the illegal transaction indeed occurred. He also said that at the
time of the buy-bust operation, they did not bring a media representative or
an elected public official and they did not coordinate the operation with
barangay officials. The police officers likewise did not take a photograph of
the evidence immediately after the same were obtained because they had no
available camera then.15
PO3 Augusto Tiongcos testimony corroborated that of PO2 Dizons. He
testified that on February 7, 2005, he was a newly assigned operative at the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the City of San Fernando Police Station. On said
date, he participated in a buy-bust operation in front of the Akim Restaurant in
Barangay Sta. Lucia, City of San Fernando. The target of the operation was a
certain Manang, whom he identified in court as the accused-appellant. From
their office, they proceeded to the target place using PO2 Dizons vehicle.
When they arrived at the place, the informant pointed to accused-appellant
who was standing in front of the Akim Restaurant. The informant alighted and
the vehicle was parked across the road from the restaurant. The informant
walked towards accused-appellant and he noticed that they made an
exchange with their hands. The vehicle they were riding was about eight to
ten meters away from the informant and accused-appellant. After the
exchange was made, the informant gave the pre-arranged signal of putting
the object of the sale in his pocket. PO3 Tiongco said that he and PO2 Dizon
got out of the vehicle and proceeded towards accused-appellant. They
introduced themselves as police officers. They told accused-appellant that
they were arresting her for selling illegal drugs. She just looked at them while
she was informed of her constitutional rights. The informant distanced himself
a little from them. PO2 Dizon instructed accused-appellant to empty the
contents of her pocket and it yielded the marked money that is a P500.00 bill.
They then brought accused-appellant to their vehicle. Afterwards, PO3
Tiongco went back to the informant who was still in front of the Akim
Restaurant to retrieve the five pieces of plastic sachets. He asked the
informant to leave so that his identity would not be compromised.16
PO3 Tiongco stated that they brought accused-appellant to the City of San
Fernando Police Station. The chief of their office talked to accused-appellant
then she was turned over to the investigator. PO3 Tiongco and PO2 Dizon
executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest on February 7, 2005.17
On cross-examination, PO3 Tiongco stated that it was during the buy-bust
operation that he saw accused-appellant for the first time. When they went to
the Akim Restaurant, they were not accompanied by barangay officials. He
explained that the operation they conducted was immediate in nature and the
suspect might leave the place at any moment. There was no representative
either from the media or the Department of Justice (DOJ). After he took
custody of the suspected drugs taken from accused-appellant, he did not
take a photograph of them or made an inventory thereof that was supposedly
signed in the presence of a media representative, a barangay official, and a
DOJ representative.18
On redirect examination, PO3 Tiongco said that he was informed by PO2
Dizon a week before the buy-bust operation that accused-appellant was
already under surveillance by the police. He was also told that accusedappellant was their number one target in their drug list and she was one of
their priorities for that month. They were not able to coordinate with the
barangay officials of the place where the buy-bust operation took place since
time was of the essence then and their concern was whether accusedappellant would still be there when they arrived.19
Originally, the prosecution also intended to present the testimony of SPO1
Noel B. Doria, the officer who prepared the Advance Information and Request
for Laboratory Examination. At the trial, the prosecution agreed to stipulate
that SPO1 Doria had no personal knowledge of the buy-bust operation
conducted on February 7, 2005. The defense further proposed for stipulation
that SPO1 Doria had no knowledge of the fact that at the time the specimens

were turned over to him, there was no media representative, a barangay

official or a DOJ representative present. The prosecution and the defense
also stipulated on the genuineness and authenticity of the request for
laboratory examination of the five plastic sachets of shabu, as well as on the
fact that SPO1 Doria had no personal knowledge of where and when the
shabu was taken. In view of the said stipulations, the testimony of SPO1
Doria was dispensed with and his Advance Information and Request for
Laboratory Examination were marked as evidence for the prosecution.20
The testimonial evidence of the defense, however, deviated greatly from the
prosecutions version of events. The defense claimed that no buy- bust
operation ever took place.
Testifying for the defense, Francis Canicon stated that on February 7, 2005,
he plied his route as a pedicab driver in front of the Pampanga Provincial Jail.
At about 4:00 p.m., accused-appellant came from the Provincial Jail and
boarded his pedicab. She asked to be brought to the Cleofers Building, which
was near the Akim Restaurant. When they got there, accused-appellant was
taken by two police officers, whom he saw were carrying firearms. The police
officers boarded accused-appellant into their car. After that incident, Canicon
went back to the Provincial Jail to tell accused-appellants husband, who was
a detainee therein, about the apprehension. Canicon knew the husband of
accused-appellant as the latter used to be his neighbor. Afterwards, he went
home. Canicon said that when the police officers pulled accused-appellant
out of his pedicab, he did not see them give a P500.00 bill to her. He
previously saw accused-appellant count her money before she boarded his
pedicab. He also noticed that she had a cellphone.21
On cross-examination, Canicon said that he knew accused-appellant as she
usually rode on his pedicab from the Provincial Jail to the public market. He
had occasion to ask her why she frequently went to the Provincial Jail and
she replied that she was visiting her husband. He clarified that accusedappellant boarded his pedicab at exactly 3:00 p.m. on February 7, 2005.
They reached the Cleofers Building at about 3:45 p.m. They were in front of
the Akim Restaurant when the police officers blocked their way. One of the
officers approached accused-appellant, asked the latter what her name was,
and she said that her name was Mikaela. The vehicle of the police officers
was parked at the other side of the road. Canicon added that when the police
officers took accused-appellant from his pedicab, accused-appellant asked
for help from the bystanders. Canicon said that he just went home because
he got nervous. He rested for a while then he went to the Provincial Jail at
around 4:30 p.m.22
Accused-appellant also took the witness stand. She testified that at around
2:00 p.m. on February 7, 2005, she visited her common-law husband at the
Pampanga Provincial Jail. Before she was allowed to enter, a jail guard first
conducted a body search on her. She was bringing money and a cellphone at
that time. Her visit lasted around 4:00 p.m. From the Provincial Jail, she rode
a pedicab to go to the market so that she could catch a ride in a San Matias
jeepney. She knew the pedicab driver as a certain Francis, but she did not
know his surname. She had known him for almost two years as she was a
constant passenger of his pedicab. When they got to the jeepney terminal,
the driver thereof was still waiting for more passengers. Since accusedappellant was then in a hurry to get home to breastfeed her baby, she asked
Francis to bring her instead to the Cleofers Building. She said that she could
catch a jeepney ride from there. They reached Cleofers Building at around
4:15 p.m. There, a male person also boarded the pedicab. That was the first
time she saw him. She pointed to that person who was in court as PO2
Randy Dizon.23
Accused-appellant stated that PO2 Dizon instructed Francis to turn and go to
the other side of the road. Francis followed the instructions and parked the
pedicab beside a car. PO2 Dizon made a body search on Francis.
Afterwards, PO2 Dizon asked accused-appellant if her name was Mikaela.
She told him that her name was Rogelia. PO2 Dizon told her to alight from
the pedicab and asked her if she knew Francis. She answered that she was a
passenger of Franciss pedicab. PO2 Dizon then asked Francis to leave,
which the latter obeyed. PO2 Dizon opened the backseat door of the car and
accused-appellant saw PO3 Tiongco inside. She was pushed inside the
backseat of the car as she was shouting for help.24
Accused-appellant said that the police officers brought her to a safehouse.
They parked the car in front of the safehouse but they did not alight. PO3
Tiongco was the one who talked to her and asked her if she knew anybody
who can lend money "at 5-6." It was about 6:00 p.m. when they left the place.
They brought her to Bakeline and gave her food. PO2 Dizon left to fetch a
female person who was a sales lady in a clothing store near Bakeline. They
then went to the police headquarters. There, PO2 Dizon asked the female
person to make a body search on accused-appellant. The female person
found money in accused-appellants pocket and gave the same to PO2
Dizon.25

Accused-appellant related that when she was arrested in front of Cleofers

Building, there were no representatives from the media and the DOJ and
there were no barangay officials present. She was subsequently brought to
the Municipal Hall of the City of San Fernando and she was detained. The
following day, she was brought to the Hall of Justice Building to undergo
inquest proceedings. She was not allowed to present any witnesses and she
had no companion at that time. After the inquest, she was brought to the
Provincial Jail.26

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) in favor of the government with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On cross-examination, accused-appellant said that she told Francis to bring

her to the market in the City of San Fernando, not in front of Cleofers Building
as Francis testified to. When she discovered that she still had to wait for the
passenger jeepney to get filled up, she decided to go to the Cleofers Building.
Accused-appellant stated that she already knew that PO2 Dizon was a police
officer as she had seen him in the probation office, while she was a
probationer. There were also times when she would see him in uniform when
she visited the Provincial Jail. Back then, she did not know PO2 Dizons
name. She admitted that she previously pleaded guilty to the charge of
selling and possessing illegal drugs, for which she was sentenced to
probation. She belied the testimony of Francis that she told PO2 Dizon that
her name was Mikaela.27

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Judgment of the RTC

On May 8, 2007, the trial court adjudged accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of selling illegal drugs. The trial court explained that:
Prosecution evidence showed that on February 7, 2005 at 5:10 in the
afternoon or thereabouts, a buy-bust operation was conducted in front of
Akim Restaurant located at Cleofers building City of San Fernando against a
certain Manang who was later identified as the accused Rogelia Jardinel
Pepino-Consulta. The operation yielded a positive result 5 sachets of shabu
weighing 0.3001 gram were recovered from the poseur buyer. The substance
confiscated from the accused turned out to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit "C").
On the other hand, the accused denied that there was a buy-bust operation
conducted against her and that she was only framed up. She, however, failed
to establish by convincing proof any motive or reason why the arresting
officers will falsely impute the crime charged on her. x x x Furthermore, the
two oral evidences presented by the defense contradict each other on
material points and lack credibility with the accused even stating that her
witness Francis Canicon lied under oath.
The defense of denial or frame up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by
the courts with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is [a] common
standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of [the] Dangerous
Drugs Act (People vs. Solomon, 244 SCRA 554). While testimonies of
arresting officers with no motive or reason to falsely impute offenses on the
accused are credible (People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191).
In several drug cases, the courts consistently held that absent any proof to
the contrary, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their
duty (People vs. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733). It is noteworthy to state that the
arresting officers PO3 Tiongco and PO2 Dizon merely acted upon
instruction of their superior which is within the scope of their duties and
responsibilities as members of the PNP [Drug] Enforcement Unit of the City
of San Fernando.

The accused is credited with her preventive suspension.29

On appeal,30 the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accusedappellant in its assailed Decision. The Court of Appeals held that accusedappellant was validly arrested after she was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu to the confidential informant who acted as the poseur-buyer. The same
was done in the presence of police officers who were watching the
transaction from across the street. At any rate, accused-appellant was
estopped from questioning the legality of her arrest since she failed to move
for the quashal of the information against her before she was arraigned.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution established the elements of the crime charged, i.e., that the buybust operation took place, that the five sachets of shabu subject of the illegal
sale were brought to and identified in court, and that the buyer and seller
were identified.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals stated that non-compliance with the first
paragraph of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 916531 was not fatal as long as
there was justifiable ground therefor and the integrity of the confiscated illegal
drugs was properly preserved by the police officers. The appellate court
found that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the five sachets of shabu
were preserved in this case as the seized items were immediately brought to
the police station for marking. Afterwards, the five sachets were forwarded to
the crime laboratory for the examination of the contents thereof. The police
officers identified the sachets in court and accused-appellant had the
opportunity to cross-examine them on said point. According to the appellate
court, accused-appellants denial could not prevail over the straightforward
and positive testimonies of the police officers. The presumption of regularity
was not overcome as accused-appellant did not ascribe any ill motive on the
part of the police officers, which would impel them to fabricate charges
against her.
The appellate court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando City, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 14206 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant shall pay
a fine in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), instead of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Upon remand of the records, the Clerk of Court of Branch 41, Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando City, Pampanga is DIRECTED to immediately
transmit the subject five transparent heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
the total weight of 0.3001 of a gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(Exhibit "B" and series), which are still under the court a quos custody, to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for disposition in accordance
with Republic Act No. 9165.32
Accused-appellant appealed33 the above decision to this Court.

xxxx
The Ruling of the Court
Well-settled is the rule that, between the positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of accused, the former
indisputably deserve more credence and entitled to greater evidentiary
weight (People vs. Padre-e, 249 SCRA 422).
Moreover, the prosecution also successfully proved that the accused is a
recidivist since she has been earlier convicted of the crimes of Violation of
Sections 15 and 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, under Criminal Case Nos.
12219 and 12220 before this Court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of one year imprisonment for each case. The accused availed of probation in
these cases and her probation was terminated on June 3, 2003.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence presented, the Court finds that the
prosecution sufficiently proved all the elements of the offense charged stated
in the information filed and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.28
The RTC, thereafter, decreed:

In pleading for her acquittal, accused-appellant calls our attention to the

allegedly fatal procedural lapses committed by the police officers in this case.
Accused-appellant stresses that no justification was offered for the failure of
the police officers to comply with the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. Furthermore, accused-appellant claims that the evidentiary value
of the items allegedly seized was not preserved.
We find merit in accused-appellants appeal.
The RTC essentially convicted accused-appellant as it gave greater weight to
the testimonial evidence of the prosecution. The trial court brushed aside
accused-appellants denial, ruling that she failed to prove that the police
officers in this case were impelled by ill motives to falsely accuse her of the
crime charged. The RTC held that accused-appellants evidence failed to
overturn the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on
the part of the police officers. Similarly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the RTC by also lending greater credence to the testimonial

evidence of the prosecution. Said evidence was found to have sufficiently

established the elements of the crime charged, as well as the fact of
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug specimens
seized. The appellate court also upheld the presumption of regularity in favor
of the police officers.
We read closely the records of the present case and we saw a different story.
We found that the police officers indeed committed serious lapses in
procedure in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on February 7, 2005.
Additionally, the prosecution adduced evidence that fell short of the exacting
degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required under our criminal laws.
The Court stated in People v. Kamad34 that "[a]s a general rule, the trial
courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the [Court of Appeals],
are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and
substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied." As will be hereinafter
discussed, the above exception holds true in the present case.
We held in People v. Hernandez35 that "[t]o secure a conviction for illegal sale
of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof."
Furthermore, we explained in People v. Denoman36 that:
A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the
perfunctory presentation of evidence establishing each element of the crime:
the identities of the buyer and seller, the transaction or sale of the illegal drug
and the existence of the corpus delicti. In securing or sustaining a conviction
under RA No. 9165, the intrinsic worth of these pieces of evidence, especially
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to
have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal
drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug
pushing under RA No. 9165 fails. (Citations omitted.)
The Court also cautioned in People v. Roble 37 that "[w]hile a buy-bust
operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards must be undertaken. It is the duty of the Courts to ascertain if the
operation was subject to any police abuse."
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section
21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165 provide the procedural guidelines that police officers must observe
in the handling of seized illegal drugs in order to ensure the preservation of
the identity and integrity thereof.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the

Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]
In the present case, the above-mentioned procedures were not observed at
all by the police officers. Both PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco clearly and
categorically admitted during their respective cross-examinations that the five
sachets of suspected shabu allegedly obtained from the buy-bust operation
were not physically inventoried nor photographed in the presence of
accused-appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and an elective official. In fact, they stated that the buy-bust operation
was actually conducted without the presence of the said representatives.38
Although Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 9165 contains a proviso in the last sentence thereof that
may excuse the non-compliance with the required procedures, the same may
be availed of only under justifiable grounds and as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the
apprehending police officers. We held in People v. Sanchez39 that:
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the
police operates under varied conditions, many of them far from ideal, and
cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling
of confiscated evidence. The participation of a representative from the DOJ,
the media or an elected official alone can be problematic. For this reason, the
last sentence of the implementing rules provides that "non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items." Thus, non-compliance with the strict directive
of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's
case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still
have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved.
Here, we find that the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs
seized were not shown to have been preserved. Contrarily, the records of the
case bear out the glaring fact that the chain of custody of the seized illegal
drugs was broken even at the very first link thereof.
To recall, the testimonial evidence of the prosecution established that the
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation was the confidential informant who
tipped the police about the drug peddling activities of accused-appellant.
Thus, it was the poseur-buyer who supposedly received the suspected illegal
drugs from accused-appellant, which allegedly consisted of five plastic
sachets of shabu. PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco did not participate at all in
this transaction. They merely witnessed the exchange while they were seated
inside a vehicle parked across the road eight to ten meters away from where
accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were situated. Even more damning
was PO2 Dizons admission that he did not in fact see the item(s) handed by
accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer. His testimony during crossexamination pertinently stated thus:
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision,
stipulates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her

Q:
Mr. Witness, is it correct to say that you cannot possibly see the items that
was exchanged by the accused and your confidential agent at a distance of
ten (10) meters and at a condition wherein your car is tinted?
A:
Because the sachet is just a small pack, sir, you could not really possibly see
it but we have a pre-arranged signal, sir, to prove that the operation was
consummated and positive.
Q:

So in other words, Mr. Witness, considering that you cannot see these items
you merely rely on the pre-arranged signal of your confidential agent?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
So you are merely waiting for the pre-arranged signal of your confidential
agent at that time, am I correct?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And because of the said pre-arranged signal made by your confidential agent
you assumed, Mr. Witness, that there was indeed [an] illegal transaction that
happened between the accused and your confidential agent, correct?
A:
Yes, sir.40 (Emphases ours.)
Clearly, PO2 Dizon was not in a position to say whether the objects handed
by accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer were in fact sachets of illegal
drugs. Equally vague was the actual number thereof, i.e., if in fact five
sachets were handed to the poseur-buyer, not four or three or any other
number. PO3 Tiongcos testimony was also silent on this aspect. The police
officers had no personal knowledge whether the alleged transaction between
accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer indeed involved illegal drugs.
Moreover, the suspected drugs subject of the sale were left for some time in
the custody of the informant. PO3 Tiongco testified that while they were
arresting accused-appellant, the informant distanced himself from them. The
police officers first boarded accused-appellant into their vehicle that was
parked on the other side of the road and it was only after that that PO3
Tiongco went back to the informant to retrieve the plastic sachets. Thus, from
the time accused-appellant was arrested until the plastic sachets were
retrieved by PO3 Tiongco, the suspected drugs were unaccounted for. That
the informant may have tampered with, contaminated, substituted, added to
or pilfered a portion of the plastic sachets are distinct possibilities that could
not be ruled out. Undoubtedly, only the informant who acted as the poseurbuyer could possibly state for certain that accused-appellant indeed handed
to him five sachets of suspected shabu. Unfortunately, the informant was not
presented in court to testify on this matter.
Nevertheless, granting for the sake of argument that there were indeed five
sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, there were still more
broken links in the chain of custody.
We elucidated in People v. Obmiranis41 that:
Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain does not always
have to be the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody indeed becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is a narcotic substance. A unique
characteristic of narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are not
distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. And because
they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually from other
substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature, they are
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and
exchangewhether the alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and
exchange be inadvertent or otherwise not. It is by reason of this distinctive
quality that the condition of the exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical.
Hence, in authenticating narcotic specimens, a standard more stringent than
that applied to objects which are readily identifiable must be applieda more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or contaminated or tampered with. (Citations
omitted.)
In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from
the buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified
that after he placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he

turned them over to SPO1 Doria and the specimens were submitted to the
crime laboratory for examination. 42 However, SPO1 Doria did not testify
before the trial court so as to shed light on this matter. The Court finds this
unfortunate as the prosecution even chose to dispense with his testimony.
Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug specimens
from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the
request for laboratory examination and drug specimens were first received by
PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to
physically receive the same.43However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did
not actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She
merely relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. 44 Furthermore, PO2
Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that it was indeed SPO1 Doria
who delivered the drug specimens to the crime laboratory.1wphi1
In view of the evident breaks in the chain of custody, very serious doubts
arise as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case. Apparently,
there can be no absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu seized from the
informant were the very same drugs handed by accused-appellant, or, later
on, the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and eventually
presented before the trial court.
These breaks in the chain of custody go into the very elements of the crime
of illegal sale of drugs that was charged against accused-appellant.
Specifically, the elements of the identity of the object of the illegal sale of
drugs and the delivery of the thing sold were not proven in this case beyond
reasonable doubt.
As regards the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
that the RTC and the Court of Appeals heavily relied upon, we clarified in
People v. Caete45 that:
"[W]hile the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it
cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used
as basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction because "First, the
presumption is precisely just that - a mere presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." x x x. (Citations omitted.)
In this case, the above presumption was undoubtedly overcome by evidence
that the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation committed
lapses in the seizure and handling of the allegedly seized plastic sachets of
shabu. Even if accused-appellant failed to present evidence with respect to
her defense of denial or the ill motive that impelled the police officers to
falsely impute upon her the crime charged, the same is of no moment. The
well-entrenched dictum in criminal law is that "[t]he evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense."46 If the prosecution cannot,
to begin with, establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt, the defense is not even required to adduce evidence. Thus, the
presumption of innocence on the part of accused-appellant in this case must
be upheld.
On a final note, the Court cannot emphasize enough that zealousness on the
part of law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of drug peddlers is indeed
laudable. However, it is of paramount importance that the procedures laid
down by law be complied with, especially those that involve the chain of
custody of the illegal drugs. This is necessary in order to dispel even the
most infinitesimal of doubts on the outcome of arrests and buy-bust
operations, so as not to render naught the efforts and the resources put forth
in the apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws.
WHEREFORE, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
November 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02867.
Accused-appellant Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta is hereby ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She
is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for
another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Bureau of
Corrections, Correctional Institution for Women, City of Mandaluyong for
immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution
for Women is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within
five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138503. September 28, 2000]

ROBERTO FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, Roberto Fernandez seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] dated December 24, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR No. 18830 which
affirmed in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of
Makati in Criminal Case No. 88-538 finding petitioner and his co-accused
Efren O. Olesco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
The petitioner, Roberto Fernandez (FERNANDEZ) together with Efren
O. Olesco (OLESCO) and Nicanor R. Gatchalian, Jr. (GATCHALIAN) were
charged with the crime of estafa through falsification of public document in an
information[3] that reads as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of December, 1987, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who are all private individuals, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another by
means of deceit and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products, Inc., represented by
Atty. Oscar P. Beltran, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, upon
their false manifestation and fraudulent representation that they have the
power and capacity to secure a defendant counterbond for the lifting of a writ
of preliminary attachment in the sum of P500,000.00 to be used by the said
complainant in Civil Case No. 3226 of Branch V of the Regional Trial Court of
Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City in which the said complainant was the
party defendant and which representation and manifestation the accused
knew to be false, succeeded in inducing the same complainant to give and to
deliver to them the sum of P50,000.00 which is equivalent to 10% of the face
value of said counterbond representing the premium thereof in consideration
of Counterbond No. JCR 00300 dated December 14, 1987 purportedly issued
by the First Integrated Bonding & Insurance Co., Inc. and notarized by Notary
Public Benito Salandanan of Manila which the accused falsified by making it
appear that the same was signed by Eduardo V. Gadi and that it was
regularly issued by the said bonding and insurance company when, in truth
and in fact, as accused well knew, the same was not issued by it, and the
accused, once in possession of said money, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously appropriate and use the same to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products, Inc., represented by Atty. Oscar P. Beltran,
in the aforestated amount of P50,000.00.[4]
On April 29, 1988, the three (3) accused were arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty with the assistance of counsel. [5] Thereafter, trial
ensued. The case against GATCHALIAN was dismissed due to his death
during the pendency of the trial.[6]
At the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Atty. Oscar P.
Beltran, President of Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation, Manuel
de Castro, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Melencio P. Cruz, a helper-assistant of insurance agent Manuel Boy Reyes,
Consuelo San Juan, court interpreter and representative of the Clerk of Court
of Branch 5, Regional Trial Court of Agusan Del Norte, Butuan City and Atty.
Rogelio B. Mendoza, legal counsel of the First Integrated Bonding and
Insurance Company, Inc.
The prosecution also offered in evidence Official Receipt No. 157 dated
December 14, 1987 in the amount of P50,000.00 issued by Hexagon Surety
Services, Inc. signed by accused Efren Olesco [7]; Machine copy of Counter
Attachment Bond No. JCR 00300 dated December 14, 1987 issued by First
Integrated Bonding and Insurance Corporation with a face value
of P500,000.00[8]; another machine copy of the same Counter Attachment
Bond No. JCR 00300 filed by defendant Ines Melale Corporation in Civil
Case No. 3226 pending before RTC Branch 5, Butuan City [9]; parts of the
Case Records of Civil Case No. 3226 brought by witness Consuelo San Juan
as part of her testimony[10]; Sinumpaang Salaysay of witness Melencio Cruz
consisting of two pages with his signature thereon [11]; Manifestation and

Motion of Atty. Rogelio Mendoza dated January 04, 1988 filed before RTC,
Branch 5, Butuan City[12]; and letter dated January 8, 1988 of Atty. Oscar
Beltran to Col. Fernando Angara of the Southern Police Distrtict, Fort
Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila requesting police assistance in the
investigation of a possible commission of the crime of Estafa Thru
Falsification of Documents [13]
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner FERNANDEZ filed a
Demurrer to Evidence which was denied by the trial court. [14]Despite such
denial, both accused Roberto Fernandez and Efren Olesco opted not to
present evidence for their defense.
The facts established by the evidence are as follows:
Sometime in December 1987, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del
Norte, Branch V, Butuan City, issued a writ of preliminary attachment against
the properties of private complainant Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products, Inc.
(MELALE) defendant in the therein pending Civil Case No. 3226 filed by
Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation.
In order to secure the lifting or discharge of the writ, MELALE, through
its President, Atty. Oscar Beltran (BELTRAN), called up his friend Mr. Manuel
de Castro (DE CASTRO), Deputy Sheriff of RTC Branch 137, Makati at about
11:00 oclock in the morning of December 14, 1987 and requested him to look
for a bonding company which can issue a counter attachment bond for his
companys use in the said civil case. [15] DE CASTRO obliged and from the
third floor of the Chateau Building on F. Zobel Street, Makati where he holds
office, he went down to the ground floor to see Manuel Boy Reyes (REYES),
an insurance agent. Unfortunately, REYES was not around at that time. It
was Melencio Cruz (CRUZ), a compadre and helper-assistant of REYES,
who attended to him and with whom DE CASTRO talked about the request of
BELTRAN. CRUZ told DE CASTRO that he had to ask OLESCO, known to
him as a Branch Manager of Interworld Assurance Corporation, whose office
is at the second floor of the same building. When CRUZ returned to his office,
he had with him an application form and indemnity agreement form for a
counter attachment bond from Interworld Insurance which according to him,
was given to him by OLESCO. CRUZ gave the blank form to DE CASTRO
who in turn brought the form to BELTRAN who accomplished the same. [16] At
around 4:45 oclock that afternoon, DE CASTRO returned and delivered the
already accomplished bond application form to CRUZ who in turn brought the
same to OLESCOs office. Twenty minutes later, OLESCO and CRUZ came
down together and handed to DE CASTRO (who was then waiting at CRUZs
office, Counterbond No. JCR 00300 dated December 14, 1987 in the amount
of P500,000.00 issued by the First Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Company and not by Interworld Insurance Company, signed by Eduardo V.
Gadi and notarized by Notary Public Benito Salandanan of Manila. [17] In
return, DE CASTRO handed OLESCO the amount of P50,000.00 as
premium payment for the bond. When asked by DE CASTRO why the
Counterbond is a First Integrated Insurance Company bond and not an
Interworld Insurance bond, OLESCO allegedly answered that Interworld
Insurance Company branch in Butuan City was already closed. He added
that in procuring the bond, he asked the help of Roberto Fernandez and
Nicanor Gatchalian, Jr. for the issuance of the bond. OLESCO acknowledged
receipt of the amount of P50,000.00 by issuing Hexagon Surety Services,
Inc. Official Receipt No. 157 also dated December 14, 1987 [18] which CRUZ
also
signed
as
witness
that
OLESCO
actually
received
the P50,000.00[19] Thereafter, BELTRAN filed the counterbond with the RTC
of Agusan del Norte, Branch V in Butuan City to support MELALEs pending
motion to quash the writ of preliminary attachment earlier issued against it.
On January 8, 1988, BELTRAN learned that Atty. Rogelio Mendoza
(MENDOZA), Legal Counsel of First Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Company, Inc., filed a Manifestation and Motion[20] before the said RTC
denying the issuance by First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company,
Inc. of the aforementioned counterbond for the reason that the same was
spurious or fake inasmuch as the First Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Company, Inc. had no officer or employee by the name of Eduardo Gadi and
that the counterbond does not have the letter head of the First Integrated
Bonding and Insurance Company.
Immediately thereafter, BELTRAN called DE CASTRO and requested
him to arrange a confrontation with OLESCO, GATCHALIAN and
FERNANDEZ. During the confrontation, only OLESCO and FERNANDEZ
came and allegedly assured BELTRAN that the counterbond was
genuine. Prior to the confrontation, BELTRAN never met accused OLESCO
and FERNANDEZ.[21] On January 8, 1988, BELTRAN also wrote then
Superintendent Fernando Angara of the Southern Police District, Fort
Bonifacio, Makati[22] formally requesting for police assistance in the
investigation of a possible commission of the crime of Estafa Thru
Falsification of Documents which thereafter led to the filing of the information
against FERNANDEZ and OLESCO.

On September 21, 1995, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged the dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused EFREN
OLESCO and ROBERTO FERNANDEZ Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
having committed ESTAFA thru falsification of public document, and
sentences them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional medium as minimum, to nine (9) years
of prision mayor medium as maximum.
Both accused are ordered to jointly and severally indemnify complainant
Santa Ines Melale Forest Product Corporation in the sum of P50,000.00.
With cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[23]

and in this particular case, in conspiracy with two other accused as defined
under Article 8, of the Revised Penal Code.[27]
To secure a conviction for this kind of estafa, the following requisites
must concur, to wit:
(1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent
representations as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were
made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud;
(3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to
part with his money or property; and

From the judgment of conviction, only FERNANDEZ appealed to the

Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision.[24]

(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied [25] hence the instant
petition for review where the petitioner raises the following arguments for
consideration:

In convicting the petitioner, the trial court applied the rule that if a
person had in his possession a falsified document, used it (uttered it), took
advantage of it and profited thereby, he is, in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, presumed to be the material author and the forger of the
falsification.[29] We quote the trial courts ratiocination as follows:

A.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE FINDING OF THE COURT A QUO THAT AS
OF THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE DUMURRER TO
EVIDENCE THERE WAS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE
PROVING THAT PETITIONER HAD INDEED CONSPIRED
IN COMMITTING THE OFFENSE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION
OF THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF MERE
PRESUMPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER WTHOUT INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWING
THE
LEGAL
BASIS
FOR
THE
CONVICTION
CONSIDERING THAT THE COURT A QUO FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY
PROVEN OR OTHERWISE STATED, THE COURT OF
APPEALS AFFIRMED THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
OF LAW.

[28]

The unrefuted evidence for the prosecution established the fact that the
counter bond with serial no. JCR 00300 under the name of First Integrated
Bonding Insurance Company, Inc. is a fake bond. The complainant received
the same from accused Efren Olesco and Roberto Fernandez they being the
persons who secured the issuance of said bond. Being the source of said
fake bond and there being no explanation from the accused how they came
into possession of said fake bond, the presumption that they are the author of
said fake bond attaches to them. That presumption has not been
rebutted. Mere denial of their participation without supporting proof would not
be sufficient to exculpate them from liability. The crime committed is Estafa
thru falsification of public document. The falsification of the surety bond
(Counter bond) a notarized document, was resorted to by the accused in
order to defraud complainant.[30]
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals adopted
the trial courts reasoning and added that the petitioners participation in the
issuance of the fake counterbond was proved by the testimony of DE
CASTRO and was confirmed by the testimony of BELTRAN.
We disagree.

1. Whether or not the offense of estafa thru falsification of a public document

was in fact established.

To our mind, the evidence is not sufficient to form a basis for petitioners
conviction.

2. Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the alleged offense.

First of all, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses linking

FERNANDEZ to the commission of the crime are all hearsay in nature for
they are not based on the witnesses own personal knowledge.

[26]

In support of his petition, the petitioner contends that respondent Court

of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction because the trial
court found no direct evidence linking him to the offense charged. He claims
that the Court of Appeals relied on the mere imputations of his guilt made by
the private complainant BELTRAN in his testimony in violation of the res inter
alios acta and the hearsay rules. Moreover, considering that there was no
positive and conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the
conspiracy; the alleged conspiracy between petitioner and co-accused
OLESCO was based on mere conjecture. He should consequently be
acquitted of the crime charged.
The core issue involved in this case is whether or not FERNANDEZ is
guilty of committing the crime of estafa through falsification of public
document in conspiracy with OLESCO.
After a careful review of the case, we rule in the negative and find the
petition meritorious.

Prosecution witness DE CASTRO testified that:

ATTY. BAARES:
What happened when Mr. Olesco give (sic) you the First Integrated
Counter attachment bond?
A: I examined the bond and asked him if the bond is okey (sic).
ATTY. BAARES:
We will object to that your Honor we are asking that statement of the
witness be stricken off the record because it is not responsive to
the question.
FISCAL ISRAEL:

FERNANDEZ is charged with the crime of estafa described under

Paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e. swindling or
estafa committed by any person who shall defraud another by falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions or by means of other similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud

Why it is not responsive?

ATTY. BAARES:

The question is -what is the result and he said I examined and I asked
him if the bond is okey (sic). That is no responsive to the question

FISCAL:
No, what did you do?

FISCAL ISRAEL:
ATTY. BAARES:
He should conduct an examination and that is the result.
What did you do with the P50,000.00?
ATTY. BAARES:
COURT:
That should be ask (sic) in the proper manner.
COURT:
Alright reform Fiscal.
Q: When you said (sic) conducted an examination of the First Integrated
Counter Attachment Bond, how did you conduct your investigation?

Just a moment, there is no really direct answer. What did you do with that
amount of P50,000.00?
A: When Efren Olesco give (sic) me the counter attachment bond and
after asking him the veracity of the signatories in the bond, I
handed to him the P50,000.00.
ATTY. BAARES:

A: I look (sic) at the bond and when I saw that it was issued by First
Integrated Insurance Company, I asked Mr. Olesco why is it that it
came from First Integrated Insurance Company while he gave me
an Interworld Insurance application bond.

You Honor please, may we ask that the first portion of the statement of a
witness be stricken off the record for being no responsive to the
question. The answer should be confine on what happened to
the P50,000.00.

Q: What was the reply of Mr. Olesco

COURT:
A: Mr. Olesco told me that their Interworld branch in Butuan was already
closed and he asked the help of Mr. Roberto Fernandez and Mr.
Gatchalian for the issuance of the bond.

When Mr. Olesco give (sic) him the counter attachment bond, that is the
time that he handed (sic).

ATTY. AGOOT:

ATTY. BAARES:

May I moved for he striking out of the answer to the last question. Mr.
Fernandez be stricken off the record.

There is a statement about perusal.

FISCAL ISRAEL:

COURT:
That is insofar as the counter bond..
That is an answer to the question, that remain in the record.
ATTY. BAARES:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you said that on December 14, 1987, you went to
the Office of Atty. Oscar Beltran and he handed you also
a P50,000.00, do you know what that P50,000.00 was that
intended for?

You give (sic) it to Olesco?

A: That is intended for the 10% premium of the principal amount of

money.

FISCAL:

Q: Now what did you do with that P50,000.00 that Atty. Beltran gave you
that was intended for the premium?

A: Yes, sir and I handed to him.

Mr. Olesco received that P50,000.00?

A: Yes, sir.

A: When I came back to the Office of Mr. Melecio Cruz, I told him to tell
Olesco that I have the money so that he can give me the bond.

Q: Do you have any proof or evidence to show that Mr. Olesco received
that P50,000.00?

ATTY. BAARES:
We are asking that the statement be stricken off the record. The question
is very clear, what did you do with that P50,000.00 that Atty. Beltran
gave you?

A: After I gave him the P50,000.00, I asked him (sic) an official receipt
and he handed to me an official receipt.

FISCAL:

Q: I am showing to you an Official Receipt No. 157 dated December 14,

1987, will you please go over the Official Receipt if that is the
receipt that you are referring to that was given by Mr. Olesco?

After receiving the P50,000- what did you do?

A: Yes, sir.

A: I bring (sic) it at (sic) Chateau building in the office of Mr. Reyes.

Q: May I request that this Official Receipt be marked as Exhibit A dated

December 14, 1987.

Q: After that what else happened, what did you do with that P50,000.00
which you brought with you?
A: I called Mr. Cruz that I have the money and he told Mr. Olesco that I
have money for the premium.
ATTY. BAARES:
I object to the question your Honor, that is not the question. The question
is what happened for the money that was given to you?

Q: Under this Exhibit which is now marked as Exhibit A Mr. Witness there
appears a signature above the typewritten name Efren Olesco, do
you know whose signature is that?
A: That is the signature of Efren Olesco.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Efren Olesco?
A: He signed it in front of us.

Q: Which we request your Honor that the same be bracketed and marked
as Exhibit A-1.
COURT:

ATTY. BAARES:
We will object your Honor please, misleading. The witness never testify
that he talk (sic) to Olesco. Witness testify (sic) that it was Melencio
Cruz who told him that Olesco asked the help of Gatchalian.

Mark it.
ATTY. BAARES:
Q: Now, Mr. Witness you made mentioned (sic) of Mr. Olesco having
gone to one Mr. Roberto Fernandez, is that correct?

We refer to the record, first the witness testified a while ago your Honor
please..

ATTY. AGOOT:
FISCAL:
There is no mentioned (sic) about that your Honor.
Because if I can recall there was an answer from the witness.
COURT:
COURT:
What the witness mentioned is that he asked the help of Fernandez and
Gatchalian.

Fernandez and Gatchalian for the issuance of that bond, First Integrated
bond.

Q: You said that you asked the help of

ATTY. BAARES:
A: I did not asked (sic) the help, it was Efren Olesco (sic) asked the help
of Mr. Fernandez and Gatchalian.
Q: You said that Mr. Olesco told you that he asked the help of Mr.
Fernandez and Mr. Gatchalian. Now, do you know what kind of
help was Mr. Melecio Cruz would ask if you know and did he tell
you what kind of help would Mr. Cruz ask (sic) Mr. Fernandez and
Mr. Gatchalian?

That was an answer for the second question your Honor. The question is
that: when the witness said and testified that he asked Olesco why
it was the First Integrated while the application was an Interworld..
COURT:
Yes.

COURT:

ATTY. BAARES:

Remove that portion Fiscal.

But he never testified that he conversed with Olesco who told him that
Olesco will ask the help of Fernandez and Gatchalian. What the
witness testify was that it was Melencio Cruz who told him that
Olesco will ask the help of Gatchalian.

FISCAL ISRAEL:
Did you ask him what kind of help?

COURT:
A: He already told me that when I asked him why is it that it is the First
Integrated bond while the application form that he gave us is
Interworld Insurance Company?

No.
ATTY. BAARES:

Q: What did he tell you?

I submit your Honor after all I will cross-examine the witness.
A: He told me that he asked the help of Fernandez and Gatchalian to
secure the First Integrated bond because the Butuan branch of
Inteworld was already closed.

COURT:

ATTY. AGOOT:

It was Olesco who told him (sic) he asked the help of Fernandez and
Gatchalian.

For purposes of the record your Honor please, the answer of the witness
is hearsay your Honor.

ATTY. BAARES:

COURT:
That is what (sic) told to him.
Q: Do you know if he was able to secure the help of Mr. Fernandez and
Gatchalian?
ATTY. BAARES:

That was the answer to the later question, may we just place on record
our objection your Honor so that when the transcript of the
stenographic notes shall have already been transcribed we can
raise the same objection at the earliest possibility.[31]
In an attempt to corroborate his testimony, the prosecution presented
CRUZ whose testimony reads:

He was only told your Honor.

Q: This Noel de Castro you mentioned you entertained on that December

14, 1987 can you tell the court what kind of document from the
Office of Mr. Manuel Reyes he wish to get?

FISCAL

A: A counter bond sir.

If he knows because he was told by Mr. Olesco to help, now, the question
is- if he knows, if he was able to secure?

Q: What did you do after Noel de Castro informed you that is in need of a
counter bond?

A: I do not know.

A: I told him that I will first ask Mr. Olesco about it.

Q: Then from the Office of Mr. Melencio Cruz after Mr. Olesco told you
that he would asked (sic) the help of Mr. Gatchalian and Mr.
Fernandez to help him about this bond, then what else happened?

Q:: Do you know this Mr. Olesco?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Please look around Mr. Witness and tell the Court if he is here inside
the court room?

COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the bond your honor.

A: He is here your Honor.

FISCAL:
INTERPRETER:
We request your honor that this be provisionally marked as Exhibit Z.
Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom wearing a green shirt and
when asked his name answered in the name of Efren Olesco.

COURT:

Q: And were you able to go to Mr. Efren Olesco on that day of December
14, 1987?

Mark it.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Mr. Witness when this counter bond was issued by Mr. Olesco and
delivered to you were there other document or other document
were delivered to Mr. De Castro?

Q: What did you tell him?

A: The receipt sir.
A: I told him that Mr. Noel de Castro is applying for a counter bond.
Q: Receipt for what?
Q: What was the reply of Mr. Olesco, if there is any?
A: For the payment of the bond sir.
A: He told me to prepare some documents sir.
Q: You mean the premium?
Q: What document are your referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
A: The application form sir.
Q: How much is the receipt?
Q: Did you prepare this document?
ATTY. AGOOT:
A: Yes, sir. I got it from Mr. Noel de Castro.
The receipt will answer to that question your honor.
ATTY. AGOOT:
COURT:
I moved for the striking out of the answer your honor. It is not responsive
to the question.

Let the witness answer, if he knows.

COURT:

A: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) sir.

Strike out the last portion of the answer.

Q: From whom (sic) Mr. Olesco received the amount of fifty thousand
pesos?

Q: You mention of an application, application for what is this?

A: From Mr. Manuel de Castro sir.
A: Yes, sir. After preparing the application it would enter the bonding
company and the bond will be issued.
Q: Aside from the document required by Mr. Olesco is there any other
document required?

Q: I am showing to you a copy of Official Receipt No. 157 please go over

the same and tell the court if this is the receipt your are referring
to? May I make of record your honor that this is a xerox copy?
ATTY. AGOOT:

A: Yes, sir. After I finished preparing the document he issued the bond sir.
The best evidence is the receipt your honor.
Q: Can you still remember what kind of bond Mr. Olesco issued?
COURT:
A: First Integrated bond sir.
Let the witness answer.
Q: If a copy shown to you can you recognize the same?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the relation of this receipt to the one you mentioned?
Q: I am showing to you a xerox copy of defendants counter bond, can
you tell us what relation is this to the one you mentioned?
A: It was Mr. Olesco who give (sic) the bond to Mr. Noel de Castro.

A: This is the receipt that I give (sic) to Mr. de Castro sir.

Q: Below the receipt there is a signature over the name Eren Olesco, can
you tell the court whose signature is this?

Q: Did you see this given by Mr. Olesco to Mr. De Castro?

ATTY. AGOOT:
A: Yes, sir.
May we know the materiality of this your honor.
Q: I am showing to you a xerox copy of a counter bond and go over the
same and tell the court if that is the copy of the one you
mentioned?

FISCAL:

A: Yes, sir.

As a proof your honor that Mr. Olesco received the money as payment
for the bond.

COURT:

INTERPRETER:

Proceed, fiscal.

Witness your honor pointing to a signature above the name Melencio

Cruz.

FISCAL:
Q: Again I see a signature over the word saksi, whose signature is this?
May we request your honor that this receipt presented to by witness may
provisionally marked as Exhibit Y and the signature over the name
Efren Olesco be marked as Exhibit Y-1.

A: I do not recognize whose signature are these sir.

FISCAL:

COURT:
Mark it.
Q: Mr. Witness I see here another signature below the signature you
pointed as a signature of Mr. Olesco, whose signature is this?

We request your honor that the signature of Melencio Andrada be

marked as Exhibit H-1 a.
COURT:
Mark it.

A: That is my signature sir.

Q: And what is the significance of your signature here?

Q: Mr. Witness I want you to go over again Exhibit H and H-1 and
examine its contents and tell the court whether you affirm the
contents of this sinumpaang salaysay?

ATTY. AGOOT:
INTERPRETER:
Objection your honor the best evidence is the receipt itself.
COURT:

Your honor witness is reading the document handed to him by public

prosecutor.

Objection denied.

A: Yes, sir. This is my sinumpaang salaysay.

A: I was directed by Mr. de Castro to sign it sir for the purpose of proving
that Mr. Olesco received the money.

FISCAL:

Q: Mr. Witness, relative to this case do you remember if you have

executed a sinumpaang salaysay?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a sinumpaang salaysay will you go over the
same and tell the court what relation is this to the one you
mentioned?
A: It is about the counter bond sir.
Q: You go over that sinumpaang salaysay and inform the court what
relation is that to the sinumpaang salaysay you mentioned?
A: This is the sinumpaang salaysay I executed sir.

With Exhibit H your honor we would like to confirm the testimony of the
witness and we terminate our direct examination.[32]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception x x x. Thus, any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand.[33] In the present case, neither DE CASTRO
nor CRUZ, the prosecutions main witnesses, had personal knowledge that
FERNANDEZ in any way helped or aided OLESCO in the facilitation or the
procurement of the counter bond. In fact, DE CASTRO admitted that he did
not know if OLESCO was able to secure the help of FERNANDEZ and
GATCHALIAN. And even assuming that DE CASTRO could testify to the
alleged statements made by OLESCO implicating FERNANDEZ in the
commission of the crime, said statements may still not be utilized against
FERNANDEZ, who never had the opportunity to cross-examine OLESCO, for
being violative of the res inter alios rule which ordains that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.[34]

Q: Your honor.
FISCAL:
Your honor may we request that this sinumpaang salaysay be marked as
Exhibit H.
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL:
Your honor please may we request hat the second page of this
sinumpaang salaysay be marked as Exhibit H-1.
COURT:
Mark it.
Q: Mr. Witness there is a signature on this Exhibit H-1, please inform the
court whose signature is this above the name Melencio Cruz?
A: That is my signature sir.

Secondly, although a conspiracy was alleged in the information, there

is no evidence to prove that a conspiracy existed between FERNANDEZ and
OLESCO. As a manner of incurring criminal liability, the same degree of proof
necessary to establish the crime is required to establish a finding of criminal
conspiracy, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. [35] Nowhere in the
decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, do we find any mention
in the testimonies of the witnesses, much less proof of the existence of
conspiracy between OLESCO and FERNANDEZ to defraud private
complainant MELALE or to commit the crime of estafa through falsification of
public document nor was evidence adduced of any act of FERNANDEZ that
may be construed as an overt act in the furtherance of a conspiracy.Based on
the evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that OLESCO
conspired and/or connived with the petitioner or vice versaboth in the
procurement, preparation and facilitation in the issuance of the spurious
counterbond and in defrauding private complainant in the amount
of P50,000.00.
Besides, evidence discloses that the petitioner was not present or with
OLESCO during the whole day of December 14, 1987 and did not witness or
participate in any of those acts or events which happened on that day starting
with the negotiation conducted by DE CASTRO through CRUZ for the
procurement of a counter attachment bond needed by BELTRAN; the
accomplishment of the application form for the bond made by BELTRAN and
the filing thereof with OLESCO made by DE CASTRO through CRUZ; the
preparation and delivery by OLESCO of the bond to DE CASTRO; the
payment made by DE CASTRO to OLESCO of the cash amount
of P50,000.00 as premium payment therefor; and the acknowledgment by

OLESCO of his actual receipt of said amount of P50,000.00 as evidenced by

Hexagon Surety Services, Inc. Official Receipt No. 157 dated December 14,
1987 which OLESCO signed himself. In fact, the only evidence proffered
tending to incriminate the petitioner is the testimony of DE CASTRO who
stated that OLESCO informed him that the bond was issued with the help of
petitioner FERNANDEZ and a certain GATCHALIAN which as previously
stated, is inadmissible in evidence. [36] BELTRANs assertion that
FERNANDEZ admitted that he delivered the counter bond and that he
facilitated in procuring the same during their alleged confrontation fails to
persuade us considering that this was not corroborated and was in fact
contradicted by the testimony of DE CASTRO who testified that only
OLESCO delivered the counter bond to him. Moreover, the mere fact that
FERNANDEZ allegedly claimed that the counterbond was genuine does not
establish that he had knowledge that the counterbond was spurious. Neither
does it prove that he conspired with or participated in the procurement
thereof or was ever in possession thereof.
The Court of Appeals therefore erroneously applied the presumption
that the person in possession of the falsified document is the author thereof
for the reason that there is no evidence to prove that FERNANDEZ was ever
in possession of, used, took advantage of and/or profited by the use of the
fake counter bond.
In all criminal cases, mere speculation and probabilities cannot
substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.
[37]
Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must be
acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted since the constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by
proof reasonable doubt.[38] When the guilt of the accused has not been
proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his
exoneration be granted as a matter of right.[39]
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Roberto
Fernandez is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.