1NC Solvency

5 alt causes Aff doesnt solve

Enderle 6/12
(Rob, 6/12/15, CIO, US surveillance programs are killing the tech industry, Rob is the president and
principal analyst of the Enderle Group, he has worked for IBM, Dell, Microsoft, Siemens, and Intel, MBA
@ California State University, Long Beach, http://www.cio.com/article/2934887/privacy/u-ssurveillance-programs-are-killing-the-tech-industry.html, 7/13/15, SM)

The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, ranked as the most authoritative science and technology
think tank in the U.S. (second in the world behind Max Planck Institutes of Germany), has just released its latest
report on the impact of the existence and disclosure of the broad NSA national and international spying programs.
It was initially reported that the revenue loss range would be between $21.5 billion and $35 billion, mostly affecting
U.S. cloud service providers. However, they have gone back and researched the impact and found it to be both far
larger and far broader than originally estimated. In fact, it appears the surveillance programs could cause a number
of U.S. technology firms to fail outright or to be forced into bankruptcy as they reorganize for survival. The damage
has also since spread to domestic aerospace and telephony service providers. The programs identified in

the report are PRISM; the program authorized by the FISA Amendments act, which allowed
search without the need for a warrant domestically and abroad, and Bullrun; the program
designed to compromise encryption technology worldwide. The report ends in the following
recommendations: Increase transparency about U.S. surveillance activities both at home
and abroad. Strengthen information security by opposing any government efforts to
introduce backdoors in software or weaken encryption. Strengthen U.S. mutual legal
assistance treaties (MLATs). Work to establish international legal standards for government access to data.
Complete trade agreements like the Trans Pacific Partnership that ban digital protectionism,
and pressure nations that seek to erect protectionist barriers to abandon those efforts. The
2014 survey indicates that 25 percent of companies in the UK and Canada plan to pull data out of the U.S. Of those
responding, 82 percent indicated they now look at national laws as the major deciding factor with regard to where
they put their data. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) company Birst indicated that its European customers are refusing
to host information in the U.S. for fear of spying. Salesforce, another SaaS company, revealed that its German
insurance client pulled out of using the firm. In fact, Salesforce faced major short-term sales losses and suffered a
$124 million deficit in the fiscal quarter after the NSA revelations according to the report. Cisco, the U.S. firm that
leads the networking market, reported that sales was interrupted in Brazil, China and Russia as a result of the belief
that the U.S. had placed backdoors in its networking products. Ciscos CEO, John Chambers, tied his revenue
shortfall to the NSA disclosure. Servint, a U.S. Web Hosting company, reported losing half of its international clients
as a result of the NSA Disclosure. Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have all reported significant
adverse revenue impact in China from the NSA disclosure. A variety of U.S. companies including Cisco,
McAfee/Intel, Apple and Citrix Systems were all dropped from the approved list for the Chinese government as a
result of the NSA disclosure. But it isnt even just tech companies that have lost significant customers and
revenues. Boeing lost a major defense contract to Saab AB to replace Brazils aging fighter jets due to the
disclosure. Verizon was dropped by a large number German government facilities for fear Verizon would open them
up to wiretapping and other surveillance.

Executive circumvented FISA once- no proof that it wont

happen again
NYT 07 ( Spies, Lies and FISA, October 14 2007,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/opinion/14sun1.html?_r=0, Accessed 7/16/15)

As Democratic lawmakers try to repair a deeply flawed bill on electronic eavesdropping, the White House is
pumping out the same fog of fear and disinformation it used to push the bill through Congress this summer.
President Bush has been telling Americans that any change would deny the government critical information, make it
easier for terrorists to infiltrate, expose state secrets, and make it harder to save American lives. There is no truth
to any of those claims. No matter how often Mr. Bush says otherwise, there is also no disagreement from the
Democrats about the need to provide adequate tools to fight terrorists. The debate is over whether this should be

or FISA,
requires a warrant to intercept international communications involving
anyone in the United States. A secret court has granted these warrants quickly nearly every time it
done constitutionally, or at the whim of the president. The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,

After 9/11, the Patriot Act made it even easier to conduct

surveillance, especially in hot pursuit of terrorists. But that was not good enough for
has been asked.

the Bush team, which was determined to use the nations tragedy to grab ever more power for its vision of an

Bush ignored the FISA law and ordered the National

Security Agency to intercept phone calls and e-mail between people
abroad and people in the United States without a warrant, as long as the
target was not in this country. The president did not announce his
decision. He allowed a few lawmakers to be briefed but withheld key documents. The special
intelligence court was in the dark until The Times disclosed the spying in
December 2005. Mr. Bush still refused to stop. He claimed that FISA was too
limiting for the Internet-speed war against terror. But he never explained those limits
and rebuffed lawmakers offers to legally accommodate his concerns. This year, the administration
found an actual problem with FISA: It requires a warrant to eavesdrop on
communications between foreigners that go through computers in the
United States. It was a problem that did not exist in 1978, and it had an easy fix. But Mr. Bushs lawyers
imperial presidency. Mr.

tacked dangerous additions onto a bill being rushed through Congress before the recess. When the smoke cleared,
Congress had fixed the real loophole, but also endorsed the idea of spying without court approval. It gave legal
cover to more than five years of illegal spying. Fortunately, the law is to expire in February, and some Democratic
legislators are trying to fix it. House members have drafted a bill, which is a big improvement but still needs work.
The Senate is working on its bill, and we hope it will show the courage this time to restore the rule of law to
American surveillance programs. There are some red lines, starting with the absolute need for court supervision of
any surveillance that can involve American citizens or others in the United States. The bill passed in August allowed
the administration to inform the FISA court about its methods and then issue blanket demands for data to
communications companies without any further court approval or review. The House bill would permit the
government to conduct surveillance for 45 days before submitting it to court review and approval. (Mr. Bush is
wrong when he says the bill would slow down intelligence gathering.) After that, ideally, the law would require a real
warrant. If Congress will not do that, at a minimum it must require spying programs to undergo periodic audits by
the court and Congress. The administration wants no reviews. Mr. Bush and his team say they have safeguards to
protect civil liberties, meaning surveillance will be reviewed by the attorney general, the director of national
intelligence and the inspectors general of the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. There are two
enormous flaws in that. The Constitution is based on the rule of law, not individuals; giving such power to any
president would be un-American. And this one long ago showed he cannot be trusted. Last week, The Times
reported that the C.I.A. director, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, is investigating the office of his agencys inspector general
after it inquired into policies on detention and interrogation. This improper, perhaps illegal investigation sends a
clear message of intimidation. We also know that the F.B.I. has abused expanded powers it was granted after 9/11
and that the former attorney general, Alberto Gonzales, systematically covered up the presidents actions with

Mr. Bush says the law should give immunity to

communications companies that gave data to the government over the
last five years without a court order. He says they should not be punished
for helping to protect America, but what Mr. Bush really wants is to avoid
lawsuits that could uncover the extent of the illegal spying he authorized
after 9/11. It may be possible to shield these companies from liability, since the government lied to them
deliberately misleading testimony.

about the legality of its requests. But the law should allow suits aimed at forcing disclosure of Mr. Bushs actions. It
should also require a full accounting to Congress of all surveillance conducted since 9/11. And it should have an
expiration date, which the White House does not want. Ever since 9/11, we have watched Republican lawmakers
help Mr. Bush shred the Constitution in the name of fighting terrorism. We have seen Democrats acquiesce or
retreat in fear. It is time for that to stop.

2NC Solvency
Alt Causes
6 more alt causes the Aff doesnt resolve any of them
Kehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New Americas Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin
Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a
Research Associate at OTI, New Americas Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance Costs:
The NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014// rck)
The U.S. government has already taken some limited steps to mitigate this damage and begin the slow, difficult process of rebuilding
trust in the United States as a responsible steward of the Internet. But the reform efforts to date have been relatively narrow,
focusing primarily on the surveillance programs impact on the rights of U.S. citizens. Based on our findings, we recommend that the
U.S. government take the following steps to address the broader concern that the NSAs programs are impacting our economy, our
foreign relations, and our cybersecurity: Strengthen privacy protections for both Americans and non-Americans, within the United
States and extraterritorially. Provide for increased transparency around government surveillance, both from

the government and companies. Recommit to the Internet Freedom agenda in a way that directly
addresses issues raised by NSA surveillance, including moving toward international human-rights based
standards on surveillance. Begin the process of restoring trust in cryptography standards through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Ensure that the U.S. government does not undermine cybersecurity by
inserting surveillance backdoors into hardware or software products. Help to eliminate security vulnerabilities in
software, rather than stockpile them. Develop clear policies about whether, when, and under what legal
standards it is permissible for the government to secretly install malware on a computer or in a network.
Separate the offensive and defensive functions of the NSA in order to minimize conflicts of interest.

Circumvention

The executive can circumvent via national security letters

Sanchez 15
(Julian Dont (Just) Let the Sun Go Down on Patriot Powers, May 29, 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/dontjust-let-the-sun-go-down-on-patriot-powers)
Also permanent are National Security Letters or NSLs, which allow the FBI to obtain a more limited
range of telecommunications and financial records without even needing to seek judicial
approval. Unsurprisingly, the government loves these streamlined tools, and used them so

promiscuously that the FBI didnt even bother using 215 for more than a year after the
passage of the Patriot Act. Inspector General reports have also made clear that the FBI is happy to
substitute NSLs for 215 orders when even the highly accommodating FISC manages a rare
display of backbone. In at least one case, when the secret court refused an application for
journalists records on First Amendment grounds, the Bureau turned around and obtained the same
data using National Security Letters.
Executive will circumvent the NSA- FDR wire tapping proves
Katyal and Caplan 08 (The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the
NSA Surveillance Program: FDR Precendent,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu /cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1058&context=fwps_papers, accessed 7-15-2015, EHS MKS)
This Article explains why the legal case for the recently disclosed National Security Agency
surveillance program turns out to be stronger than what the
Administration has advanced. In defending its action, the Administration
overlooked the details surrounding one of the most important periods of
presidentially imposed surveillance in wartimePresident Franklin Delano
Roosevelts (FDR) wiretapping and his secret end-run around both the
wiretapping prohibition enacted by Congress and decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. In our view, the argument does not quite carry the day, but it is a much heftier
one than those that the Administration has put forth to date to justify its NSA program. The secret history,

we
believe that compliance with executive branch precedent is a critical
element in assessing the legality of a Presidents actions during a time of
armed conflict. In the crucible of legal questions surrounding war and
peace, few judicial precedents will provide concrete answers. Instead,
courts will tend to invoke the political question doctrine or other
prudential canons to stay silent; and even in those cases where they reach
the merits, courts will generally follow a minimalist path. For these and other
moreover, serves as a powerful new backdrop against which to view todays controversy. In general,

reasons, the ways in which past Presidents have acted will often be a more useful guide in assessing the legality of

as Presidents face pressures on security unimaginable to

any other actor outside or inside government. At the same time as Presidents realize these
a particular program,

pressures, they are under an oath to the Constitution, and so the ways in which they balance constitutional
governance and security threats can and should inform practice today