I do wish sometimes that people read the posts carefully before expressing agreements or

disagreements. Just before the sentence (8), I postulated a defintional equivalence

between immorality and corruption. In that case, 'some Indians are immoral' becomes
equivalent to 'some Indians are corrupt'. As such, there can be no scare quotes in sentence
(8).
On the other hand, the scare quotes will reappear when one suggests that Indians are
'corrupt' in the sense in which one proclaims that 'India is a corrupt nation'. Because, here
the notion of 'corruption' carries the meaning I have dealt with in sentence (31) to (34).

About the issues in the discussion

Dear Friends,
Having reread most of the posts twice and having thought about the best way to proceed
in this discussion, I thought of a possible line that might actually help us move forward.
Let me see whether this works.
(A) Consider the following sequence of sentences:
1. All Indians are perfectly and fully moral.
2. All westerners are perfectly fully moral.
3. All Indians are immoral.
4. All westerners are immoral.
For sentences (1) and (2), all it takes is one instance of immorality to be proven wrong.
Our proverbial municipal clerk would be immoral, and it would disprove the sentence
(1). The same example could also confirm sentence (3); an instance of a moral act would
also be a counter-example.
Now, when the municipal clerk is brought out as an instance, what exactly is its status? Is
it intended as an example of (3) or as a counter example to (1)? Probably neither, because
no one on this board believes either (1) or (3). Consequently, it can illustrate another
claim:
5. Some Indians are immoral.
This is undisputed; and we all take (5) to be true. In fact, we all believe
6. Some westerners are immoral.
Or, more generically,

7. There are immoral people in both the west and India.

So, the municipal clerk (and something analogous in the west) would be seen as a
confirmation of the sentence (7). Since nobody is disputing this, and yet there is a dispute
about the municipal clerk, the sentence (7) is not at issue either.
(B) Let us see whether the issue is about corruption. To begin with, let us simply say that
immorality=corruption. But this time, let us begin with the following sentence:
8. Some Indians are corrupt.
No argument from any one. (To me, this is true as much as the claim: some westerners
are corrupt, some Africans are corrupt, some Asians are corrupt and some AmericanIndians are corrupt.) The dispute about the municipal clerk cannot be with respect to the
above either. How about
9. All Indians are corrupt.
Most of us disagree with this; most of us do not believe it to be true either. In any case,
those with whom I am arguing (Kannan, Arun, Arjun, Tapori, Cynical, to name just a
few) do not definitely subscribe to this. Therefore, the municipal clerk example is not
seen by any of us as an example of sentence (9).
So, if the example of the municipal clerk, or the building contractor, is not an example of
either (8) or (9), what else is it an example of or counter example to? Logically, there is
only one option left:
10. No Indian is corrupt.
But every one of us, including me, believe sentence (8) to be true. From this it follows
that (10) is false. To make it clear, I do not subscribe to sentence (10) at all.
So, we are left with a problem. If there is consensus among us about which of the above
sentences are true, and which are false, why are we still disputing? Why do people feel
obliged to come with instances like the municipal clerk or the building contractor? *What
is it an example of, what is it a counter-example to*? What precisely are we disputing?
(C) There is also another common agreement because of the definitional equivalence. All
acts of corruption and ethics are *individual* acts, i.e., individuals are either corrupt
(immoral) or not corrupt (moral). So, we cannot be disagreeing about this either. So, why
do people feel the urge to come with some or another instance, some argument or the
other, and have a dispute with me? Where do we disagree?
(D) The next step is to break the definitional equivalence. Two of the issues about which
there could be a dispute (of the possible four):

11. Some corrupt acts are moral.

12. Some non-corrupt acts are not immoral.
There has been some discussion about the sentence (11), but at a very late stage in the
argument. (Especially in my post to Arun, where I invite him to think of scenarios where
11 could be true, using the Indian psychology). But whatever it may be, the clerk and the
building contractor could not be about this: I kept insisting that one is *not* defending
that corruption is either morally good or bad, and that one needed to understand what it
was before making a moral judgement either way.
So, what have we been discussing all along, and where is the dispute to be located?
(E) Here is my hypothesis. The discussion has been about the sentence corruption is a
social phenomenon and what we understand this sentence means. We are at loggerheads
about the scope of this sentence. I believe you do not quite appreciate the consequences
of your interpretation. Let me approach my hypothesis by steps as well.
(F) Consider the following sentences:
13 There are more corrupt Indians than there are corrupt westerners.
14 There are more corrupt persons in India than elsewhere.
15 In terms of the percentage of corrupt to non-corrupt people, India ranks 73rd in the list
of nations.
These are some possible ways of interpreting the claim that India is a corrupt nation.
None of these are acceptable because no research has been done by anyone, anywhere in
the world, at anytime that can provide us with any semblance of evidence that can justify
such a statement.
Quite obviously, that claim that India is a corrupt nation (or that corruption is rampant in
India) cannot refer to statements like above. Let us bring in the organisation to which the
municipal clerk belongs, in order to see whether it makes sense.
16 The Indian bureaucracy is corrupt.
17 In 72 other nations, bureaucracy is less corrupt.
18 The bureaucracy in some countries is more corrupt than bureaucracy elsewhere.
19 The manner in which the bureaucracy, the police, the justice system is corrupt in India
is different from the way similar organisations are corrupt in the USA.
The sentence is (16) is true, but no implications follow from this. May be, that is because
all bureaucracies are corrupt: because of Nehruvian Socialism in India, Fascism in
Germany, Democracy in the US, etc. etc. In other words, the claim could be about the
organisation that the bureaucracy is. But, of course, it is not: no one means that only the
Indian bureaucracy is corrupt, when they say that India is corrupt. Besides, no one has
done a comparative research. So, we have no clue about what 17 through 19 say or do not
say. Our dispute on this board, consequently, cannot be about any of the above sentences.

Suppose we add government to this list. Consider the following:

20 The Indian bureaucracy and the Indian government are corrupt.
21 The existence of corrupt organisations makes a culture or a nation corrupt.
22 If the society feeds corruption, such a society is corrupt.
Now, I have a feeling we are getting somewhere in the process of making sense of the
statement that India is a corrupt country. But, let us take small steps here. Regarding (21)
and (22) the following could be said: the existence of organised crime in all societies
would make all societies corrupt. But no one says that America is a corrupt nation
because the organised crime exists and grows in America. So, let us leave aside these two
sentences for the time being and focus on (20).
23 The present incumbents in bureaucracy and government are corrupt.
This is not what is meant when one says that India is a corrupt country or that corruption
is eating into the innards of the country. What one means is something stronger, more
like,
24 The Indian *regime* is corrupt: not merely the present incumbents but the Indian
*system* of bureaucracy and politics.
But (24) does not imply that the rule of law and democracy are corrupt. These institutions
are not corrupt.
25 The *way* the Indians *use* these modern institutions is corrupt. Or, The Indian way
is corrupt.
What is this Indian way? Some kinds of examples.
26 Such is the nature of corruption in India that anyone who has to do business in India is
forced to play the same game.
27 One cannot do business in India without paying bribes.
In other words, such is the *Indian way* that even those who want to play fair and square
are *forced* into playing the game of corruption. These business people themselves get
corrupted because, much like the building contractor, they are forced to pay bribes in
order to stay alive.
28 This means, that such is the pattern of interactions within the Indian society that
anyone who wants to interact with them is forced to become corrupt himself. Or, pithily
formulated,
29 One is taught to relate in a corrupt way to other people.
Both (29) and (30) imply the following:

30 One is not only corrupt; one corrupts the other as well. That is, their (i.e. the Indian)
way of interacting breeds corruption.
From this, it is a childs play (almost) to go to the following conclusions:
31 Corruption continues to grow in India because more and more people are taught to
become corrupt.
32 That is, more of more aspects of cultural life come under the scope of corruption.
33 The process of learning to be corrupt is part of the Indian culture and society.
34 A society or a culture teaches its members some ways of interacting with each other. If
these ways are themselves corrupt, the society or nation is corrupt.
In other words, the *commonsense* claims (and the scholarly treatises) about corruption
in India involve the above statements. This is what I think most of you are defending
*without* knowing it (or even explicitly rejecting it). Why do I say so?
(G) Because, now the examples of the clerk and the contractor begin to make sense. They
are examples of the fact that India is corrupt. It does not mean the sentence (8) [i.e., some
Indians are corrupt] but sentences 30 through 35. You feel that I am saying something
else, something different from the commonsense claims you are putting forward.
Therefore, you keep coming with examples and arguments that make no sense, have no
point or purpose, *at first sight*. But they do make sense. If you realise that a simple
statement like that of the Transparency International has its own logic and takes you
irresistibly towards one goal, you will also realise that your examples and arguments have
but one purpose: to show that India is corrupt in the sense we have just seen.
(H) When immorality increases in the West, people do not say the west is an immoral
culture because it *encourages* immorality. They bemoan this fact and say that the
fundamental western values (or Christian values) need to be revived. When immorality
(say corruption) increases in India, people do not say the same and call for a revival of
Indian values. No, they say that the Indian culture and society are corrupt. Why? Because
the values that the Indian society embody are not considered moral.
(I) In other words, the discussions on this board illustrate the colonial consciousness I
refer to in the article. Even when we *want to*, it is not that simple to break out of this
consciousness. Even when we talk about our own experiences in India, we remain within
the ambit of colonised consciousness. Because, Colonialism, as I have repeated a
number of times already, is about denying the colonised peoples and cultures their own
experiences; of making them aliens to themselves; of actively preventing any description
of their own experiences except in terms defined by the colonisers.
(J) I am, of course, aware that I have sketched out but a path in the above paragraphs.
This is not the only path, but one I found to be the simplest to show the logic involved in
the statement that India is corrupt. I say your discussions suggest that you are merely
following the logic of this statement. By saying this, I might alienate some of you. If that
comes to pass, so be it. As I have said in another post, I can only help you think, I cannot
convert you. You need to put in the effort and all I can provide are some tips.

You do raise an important issue: whether it is possible to evaluate the ethos of two
cultures in terms of one being better than the other. Here is my answer: yes. The West has
claimed that theirs were better; I believe it is possible to show that they were wrong. Of
course, there will be some rational and objective criteria for deciding one way or another.
My point regarding this are two: (i) they never spelt out these criteria; (ii) they were not
able to say what the Indian ethos was but simply *assumed* that it was bad. Today, we
need commit neither of these two mistakes.
Dear Kannan,
As usual, you raise important questions. Not all, I am afraid, are capable of detailed
answers at this stage. But I will take a preliminary run-up to tackling some of them.
(a) Let me begin with the issue of my choice for a descriptor like the Indian Renaissance
and not place it in scare quotes. There are four relevant points to consider in this regard.
The first is already noticed by you: the nature of my audience. I am writing to a westerneducated audience, and I hope that this term resonates with some of us at least without
*sounding obscurantist*. Hence the first reason for not using the scare quotes. The
second reason has to do with the nature of the task we confront today. This is partially
touched on in how I explain the title Pratyabhigyaana. There is a third reason. [There
are two sides to this. On the one hand, I am *not* against some terminologies simply
because they come from the West. Should that be the case, we cannot accept the scientific
theories in the natural sciences at all]. On the other hand, the word picks out a
phenomenon that took place in the western culture whose analogue we are going to
experience (I hope). I merely hope that the impact of this Indian Renaissance will be akin
to the one that the Italian Renaissance had on the western culture: a revival of learning
and the development of scientific thinking. I have no idea of the form or fashion of this
impact, but merely a hope that it will regenerate our tradition and culture. To say that it is
not an idle dream is to point out that such a phenomenon has occurred in human history
*at least once*. Fourthly, it was *Satya*s description and I have been charmed by this
ever since she announced it. I hope that it will prove to be equally charming to some of us
as well.
(b) Why the scare quotes around words like reform? Because, I do not believe their
desire to reform our society arises from an understanding of the phenomena they want to
se reformed. Instead, it comes from accepting the *truth* of the colonial descriptions.
(c) Regarding the third voice. You are right that it has been around some time. When I
said today there is a third voice, I did not mean the literal today nor was I referring to
my voice. I was simply positioning myself with respect to the spectrum. Is this voice
colonial too? This question can only be answered when we get a story that is *better*
than the one the third voice tells. It is my hope that such a voice will soon come along
and better the current story: is this not what scientific progress all about?
(d) Your point about logical necessity. All I want to say is this: if one uses the ethical

terminology from the West (i.e. concepts like forbidden, obligatory, permissible,
etc.) to describe some of the Indian practices, then one is *compelled* to move forward
in certain directions. The meaning of these words, as they are used in the ethical
discourses, is worked out *precisely* in deontic logics, including their logical properties.
Of course, one might disagree on the meaning of these terms. In that case, one has to
build an alternate set of logics that do the job as well as contemporary explications of the
term. In other words, it is not all that arbitrary.
And then you ask the following question: even after such logic has been demonstrated,
whatever may have been achieved--even if a theory is established, clear communication
is not achieved as far as everyday conversation is concerned. Is there an easier way? The
import of this question escapes me. Could you please elaborate on this and clarify?

There is some disagreement about the nature of the response of the Bengali intellectuals,
as well as those of the Punjabis. Irrespective of where one stands with respect to this
particular issue, there is a broader concern here: the response of the Indian intellectuals.
*They just seem to have gone under, and succumbed to the colonial rule.* Why? One
hypothesis proffered here is the inferiority complex of the Indians and the suggestion is
that improvement in their material situation might change this state of affairs. There are,
however, some general issues here.
(a) For a moment, let us assume that there is truth to the observation that Indians suffer
from inferiority complex. This being a matter of individual psychologies, the general
problem is: in our culture, what induces this complex in individuals? Where or how do
we learn it? What mechanisms transmit this complex to individuals and how is this
sustained at the level of a culture?
(b) Would material success reverse this feeling? If the current crop of intellectuals is an
example, then the situation is not promising. Most of them are more servile than ever, and
reproduce western stories more fervently than their predecessors. I shall take up this
question (with examples) in one of the forthcoming articles on this column.
(c) Most disturbing for me is what happened before, during, and after the colonial period.
(I include both the Islamic and the western colonial rule here.) When the Indian
intellectuals met *alien* thought forms, which were unlike anything they had ever
encountered, they simply succumbed to them without being challenged to investigate the
nature of these alien thought forms. This raises a mammoth why and I have not been
able to come up with any satisfactory answer so far. I think this is the issue that underlies
the current debate on this board.
(d) It might, thus, be better to take up the issue in its general form. Otherwise, we are
likely to be sidetracked into problems that are both unproductive and harmful.
1. You raise the question whether one could call the phenomenon of the Indian
intellectuals succumbing to colonialism as an early instance of the Stockholm

Syndrome. Frankly, I am hesitant. Here are my reasons.

(a) Paolo Friere, a Brazilian educationalist, has spoken about such a phenomenon at
length in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. He calls it as an internalisation of the
oppressor by the oppressed. Whether we use Paolo Frieres terminology or the much
later one of Stockholm Syndrome, the problem is the same: both *name* the
phenomenon without *explaining it*. In and of itself, not such a big problem if it is not
for a cognitive tendency that is dominant in the social sciences, which brings me to the
second point.
(b) Often, names supplant the search for explanations by ending up as one. It is like
saying that patriotism causes one to fight for ones country. The former *names* the
latter and is not an *explanation*.
(c) Thirdly, once a name is given to a phenomenon, oftentimes it happens that the why
question gets *ad hoc* explanations. How to understand the Stockholm syndrome? has
been provided with so many ad hoc explanations that these explanations themselves are
in need of further explaining.
(d) Further, the problem itself has not been set up satisfactorily. (I aim to go some way
in reflecting on this issue in my next contribution to this column.) That is to say, it is not
quite clear what the range and scope of the problem is. For example: is the postcolonialism of today a mere continuation of the same tendency or itself a phenomenon of
a different kind? As has been suggested on this column by some, is the influence exerted
by Marxism on the Indian intellectuals an expression of this phenomenon or does one
have to look for an explanation elsewhere?
(e) Because I believe that these issues require to be answered by any satisfactory
explanation of why the intellectuals succumbed to the colonialist story, I am hesitant to
*name* it at the present moment.
2. Your point about the material conditions. You are right in that the world of a poor man
is *not* the world of a rich man minus money. One has to know some kind of material
comfort before one starts thinking about other issues. But I intended to draw your
attention to a social and cultural phenomenon, when I disagreed. I wanted to point out to
the fact that it is precisely the *privileged intellectuals* of today (as a social stratum and
a cultural force) who appear incapable of breaking out of the descriptive straight-jacket
they have been wearing for centuries. Not only that. They also actively *oppose* (often
polemically and abusively) any attempt at scientifically investigating certain kinds of
issues. My problem with calling it inferiority complex is this: this psychological term
might help one develop an insight into an individual; but when *generalised* to a social
stratum or provided as a cultural explanation, it loses its *explanatory force*. It simply
begs the question instead.
3. Regarding the conviction you express that the new ideas of today will end up as the
orthodoxy of tomorrow. I hope for the same too. However, basing such hopes on some

scientific analyses of the Indian culture would go a long way in transforming a dream
into reality.
Let me begin by proffering you and many others an apology and do so by putting it in a
context. The context first. Recently, I visited North America (both Canada and the US) as
a part of my visit to the AAR conference. I met many practising Hindus who were white
Americans. I read that you yourself are a Balinese Hindu. In some senses, both facts
have shocked me into an awareness of my own parochial stance: calling this column the
Indian Renaissance. Even though I was aware what Gandhara, Jambu Dweepa,
Suvarna Dweepa, Khamboja, etc. referred to, and that our ancestors had no problem in
recognising Dharmikas among them, for some reason or the other, the implication
never sunk in properly. It has partly to do with my own resistance to the BJP/VHP/RSS, I
suppose, in that I did not want to be associated with them and hence wanted to avoid the
term Dharmic. I owe you and many others an apology for this parochial stance. I think
it better to re-title my column as The Dharmic Renaissance and not The Indian
Renaissance. (For obvious reasons, I cannot accept the notion of a Hindu Renaissance.)
Now to your question.
IMPORTANT LINE
[[[1. You raise the question after reading my book which many on this board have not
done. So, I will try to keep my reply intelligible to them as well (discarding some nuances
along the way). The point I want to make is this: the Indian intellectuals *actively* took
over the description of the colonizer as though it was Gods own truth. This shows that
they were not *indifferent*. Should they have been that, given what I say in my book? I
do not think so: they are and were indifferent to explanations given about the Cosmos
and their own Rituals, but not so when it was about themselves and their culture. This
must have been a slow and protracted process, but happen it did.
2. There is a second aspect to what I call succumbing to the alien thought-forms. I am
convinced that they did not understand what Islam and Christianity were any more than
the Indian intellectuals do today. The latter strut around as though they do, just because
they *presume* they are familiar with these religions. Our ancestors did not have this
drawback of a presumed familiarity. That is to say, they *should* have been provoked
into studying what this entity, religion, was. Instead of doing so, all they seem to have
done (our modern day intellectuals simply continue this tradition) is to accept and
propagate notions about fictitious entities like Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and
such like.
3. You suggest that the visible intellectuals of today are not subservient but are
opportunists instead. I do not want to quite call them subservient (this is purely a
question of semantic choice) but I do hesitate to brand all of them as opportunists.[[[[[ I
think we are talking about a more insidious process. Even though these intellectuals are
*genuine*, I want to say, there is something to the process of colonisation (and to the
contemporary social sciences) that makes these explanations very *seductive*. We

repeat the latter as *mantras* blind to the fact that we do not know what we are talking
about. Any challenge to these beliefs is met abusively and with ad hominem attacks; and
this is an index of their blind faith. I think we need to look at this phenomenon as an
objective given, and not take to imputing individual or collective psychological motives
to their actions. ]]]]]]
4. Finally, the issue is not about assimilating these alien thought forms. [[[[It is about how
one accepts opacity as the height of transparency itself.]]]]
Have the investigations of our earlier generations of intellectuals lost to us, or did they
succumb to the alien thought-forms? Of course, this is a historical question that requires
investigation. However, focussing on the *effects* (until such an investigation is
undertaken) leads me to say succumbed.
(a) Let us assume that they did investigate. The fact remains that the results have not been
*transmitted* to us. This means either (i) the link between the intellectuals and society
were severed by colonisation, in which case we need to find out the how and why of it.
Further, we need to ask ourselves too whether any intellectual tradition that reflects on
social and cultural experiences could ever survive as a *living tradition* when its links to
such a life is lost. Or (ii) there never was such an investigation in the first place; which is
why the results have not been transmitted to us. This appears plausible because of the
behaviour of the majority of the intellectuals during the last 200 years or more.
(b) Even the minority of the intellectuals who resisted succumbing to the colonial
description of India seem to have done so *without* exhibiting much insight into what
they were confronting. In contradistinction to Pradip, I am not sold on Vivekanandas
critiques. What I have read of him (which is a reasonable quantity) does not at all
convince me that he had much of an idea of what he was fighting against. In other words,
he seems to resist without much help from an earlier generations of intellectual critiques.
This makes me suspect that there were not many such critiques (about Christian religion
or the western culture) in our intellectual traditions.
(c) By saying this, I do not imply that there was no resistance. But I do say that they
appear pretty ineffectual because they are not pro-active but are purely defensive instead.
The defensive nature of such resistances (as long back as the nineteenth century) makes
me suspect that there could not have been many attempts at understanding these alien
thought forms. Instead, I believe that the Indian intellectual succumbed. Understanding
the why, of course, is beyond my ken at the moment. But should I be proved wrong, I
would only be happy.

You raise two issues: one regarding the difference, if any, between the Indian ethics and
the western ones; the second is about the Orientalist division between the West and the
East.
Regarding the first issue. Yes, I do think that there is a *fundamental divide* between

these two cultures as to the nature of the ethical domain. This forum is not the place to
argue for it: in a book I have almost completed, I show what this difference is. Very
briefly put: the structure of western ethical thinking is normative in nature. (That means
to say, it makes use of ethical categories like obligatory, forbidden and permissible to
evaluate actions. Or that the moral ought is central to its talk about morality.) By
contrast, the Indian ethics is non-normative. There is no distinction between the
normative and the factual statements in our culture, whereas it is fundamental to the
western intellectual thinking. (For example, the scientific statements are seen to be
factual whereas the ethical statements are said to be normative in nature.)
You are right, therefore, in sensing that this divide is the backbone to my argument in the
passage you cite. This divide, however, is not a simple postulation from my side but one
based on arguments and evidence which, as I have already said, are not presented in this
article.
Your second issue is addressed partially already. Is the division between the West and
East Orientalist in nature? [[[[Well, that is what Edward Said says in his Orinetalism; that
is what many writers in his wake say too. I beg to disagree. In my next article, I intend to
address this issue with the care it deserves. Here, let me make but three points. One: that
there is an Indian culture and a western culture has been established in my book. (Of
course, it is also an experiential given.) Consequently, I have just presumed this
distinction here. Second: some distinction does not become Orientalist just because the
Orientalist thinkers use the distinction. Thirdly: that there exist empirical distinctions of
culture etc. is not *denied* by Edward Said but only that speaking about these
distinctions leads to violence. A rather funny stance, to say the least, dont you
think? ]]]]]
Finally, I am not looking for pure Indian traditions either. (I do not want to give such an
impression and if I did, I have clearly not succeeded in my aim of wanting to
communicate clearly and unambiguously.) Much like you, I am trying to understand the
present India and am not going in search of a pure and unsullied Indian culture. We are
what we are today, influenced in uncountable ways by other cultures and traditions.
(However, I do not think we have become 'mongrels' because of this!)No, my foray into
the past is strictly determined by the present in order to work within the limits set by that
present. But thanks for making me realise that I need to be more careful in how and what
I write.
a) [[[[If we focus on the persecution and the time span over which such an event has
taken place, I can only think of one: the persecution of the Jews in Europe during the
course of European history. They were discriminated against; there were intermittent
violent pogroms, and they were under pressure from a religion that fancied itself as its
competitor. Many Jews also converted to Christianity. Of course, other parameters are not
applicable to the Indian situation. (For example, the Jews thought that Christianity was
not the true religion and that they were heretics of sorts; sections of the Jews were welloff; they had no nation to call their own even though they thought of themselves as a
nation, etc.) We need to look at the *intellectuals* in order to study whether their

behaviour parallels that of the Indian intellectuals during the last couple of hundreds of
years. From what little I know of the Jewish intellectual history, the reaction of their
intellectuals during this period does not exhibit the same kind of reaction. But we need to
do further study. ]]]]]
(b) The role of the non-Judaic intellectuals during the Nazi regime. Many Jewish friends
were sold out; many intellectuals gave up their ideals and wrote tracts defending the
Fascist movement and its ideas. This may not be a good place to look at because the
fascist movement was intense, short-lived and immediate rewards and punishments were
set in place. [[[[The only parallel I can think of in the Indian context is the bloody reign
that the Jesuits set up in Goa in order to punish the Pagan religion and the Brahmins. ]]]]]
(c) The growth of Marxist ideas among the intellectuals during the periods of severe
economic crises in Europe. Again, not a good period to study because Marxism was a
product of a [[[ long *tradition* of radical and socialist thinking within the European
political philosophy]]]. This cannot be considered as an aberration.
(d) There is, however, one phenomenon I can think of from the post-war history of
European intellectuals. And that is, the defence put up by the leftist intellectuals of
Europe almost sequentially for: Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of China, Cuba and the
Red Khmers of Cambodia. These intellectuals (in a period of *prosperity*, nota bene!)
systematically *sold out* all their radical inheritance, all their revolutionary and/or
political principles, contorted themselves into all kinds of positions to sell stories about
the glory of the above countries, their leaders and their regimes. At first sight, the way
these intellectuals responded seems to *mimic* what I have in mind. These intellectuals
were under the spell of revolution, they were mesmerised by the superiority of socialism
(as they saw it), and no contortion was good enough to praise the superiority of the
socialist doctrines or socialist countries.
If the last example holds water, then we may have to look at the sociological behaviour of
the intellectuals (under certain conditions) and not couple this behaviour directly to the
material circumstances or the material conditions of this sociological stratum. (Of course,
not *all* leftist and radical intellectuals took this position: there was a minority that
consistently resisted the pressure to sell socialism by trying to sell these countries to the
European public.)
In other words, we need to distinguish between two aspects in the phenomenon we want
to study: the behaviour of the Indian intellectuals when they were directly under pressure
and persecution, and when they were under no such threats. Our question then becomes:
why did (and do) the intellectuals in India succumb to the siren songs when they can do
research into the phenomenon instead? In the absence of historical research, we can
perhaps compress the question so that it becomes contemporaneous: to day, why do the
Indian intellectuals in India (a majority among them) not do research to understand the
*western culture*
Thank you for reminding me once again that my style of writing requires becoming

simpler and less difficult on the reader. I have no excuses or apologies to give: in all
probability, I slip into certain modes of thinking and writing without thinking of the
audience (at times). I promise to be more vigilant in the future.
Let me take some of the issues you raise ad seriatim.
1. Regarding corruption. The first thing to note is that there is no distance between how
we use corruption in our daily language and the way it is used in political and
sociological theories of corruption. You see, the problem we (Indians) face is the
asymmetry *in the way the word is used* while talking about us and the way it is used
when talking about India. I want to signal this by putting up the red flag: I want to
suggest the reader not to assume the truth of these descriptions.
If we restrict ourselves to the recent past, then Gunnar Myrdals *The Asian Drama* can
be used as a reference point for a way of talking that signals the current use of the term.
He claimed that corruption (among other things) stood in the way of economic
development of these countries. Since then, it has entered the popular discourse to such
an extent that corruption is almost seen as a typical problem of developing countries
today.
Consider the fact that you complain that one has to pay bribe to get a duplicate of ones
birth-certificate from the municipal office. *Why do you complain*? Is it because you
have to pay money? If you had to pay for any and every such duplicate by law, would
you call it corruption as well? (In Belgium, one has to pay for these things over and
besides the taxes one pays for organising public services.) I presume not. Then why do
you complain? Because, I suggest, you assume that (a) the clerk is not doing you any
personal favour; (b) he is paid by the tax-payers money to provide you the service free of
charge; (c) he is *violating* some or another moral precept by charging for what *ought*
really be free; and such like. If this is the case, it is these *assumptions* that are
responsible for transforming his action into corruption. These are (a) moral assumptions
about some or another set moral codes; (b) moral assumptions about the role and function
of public offices; (c) moral assumptions about the duties that such a function imposes on
the incumbent; and so on. All of these belong to what I have been calling the western
normative ethics. In other words, your complaint is a moral one, and it is that thanks to
the western normative vocabulary that is available to you through the use of English and
the western education.
Let us assume, for a moment, that this clerks function was privatised. (After all, why
should I or someone else pay for this clerk so that you may get your duplicates?) That is,
only those who make use of his office pay for the services they receive. Assume that the
clerk charges you a fixed rate by keeping in mind he has to live too and not everybody in
the community wants duplicate birth-certificates every day. (To keep the discussion
simple, let us assume that the amount is fixed by him.) Would you call this corruption as
well? I suppose not.
If you think deep enough on these two *modes* of organising public services, you will
notice the problem. The clerk acts as though he is doing the second, whereas he appears

to belong to the first. The problem of corruption in India, I want to submit, arises due to
the *superimposition* of the first on the second.
If this is the case, it ceases being corruption in any sense of the term. Hence my scare
quotes as signals. It is intended to signal that the western normative ethics is structuring
our experience itself, even when we think that we do not know what that normative ethics
is all about. We need not study a western text-book on ethics in order to find out what it
is. We merely need to interrogate the way we talk and the way (we think) we experience
our own culture. What I have tried to do in the article is to draw your attention to the
consequences of this way of structuring our experiences at a social and cultural level. In
other words, I was hoping that these scare quotes would *force* one to interrogate ones
own experience. Hence the speed bumps: do not read further without pausing to think
through the implications. Quite obviously, I have failed in my aim.
2. About what I have shown and what I have to show. Of course, Kannan, I have not
proved that each of my claims is true. Within the purview of an article or even a book,
one cannot prove the truth of all the claims one makes. This is so in every enterprise,
including that of the natural sciences. What I was getting at, in my reply to Arun, was the
nature of the task. It is not sufficient, I wanted to say, that we merely provide some
interpretations of the Kama Sutra. We also need to explain our ethics. We face so many
intellectual challenges on so many levels that we should not underestimate the nature and
the tasks that confront the Dharmic Renaissance.
3. You speak further about the limitations that endeavours like mine confront on their way
to becoming sciences. Actually, this discussion is about what it is to be scientific and
what it is for some theory to become a science. I would rather postpone this metadiscussion to a future date, if you do not mind. However, there is just one point I want to
make. Some of the limitations that you talk about confronts every science (e.g. the
evidence is finite), does confront some sciences even today (example the ambiguity of the
natural languages whenever evolutionary biology tries to develop some or another
hypothesis) or that they were the initial difficulties faced even by sciences like physics
(back when one wrote such tracts in Latin or Italian). I do not consider them daunting, but
merely as a phase scientific theory building passes through. I am not sceptical about the
possibility of undertaking serious scientific research about issues that keep me awake; nor
am I sceptical about the possibility of its success.
4. You say it is still unclear what exactly I have shown. In this article, not much. In the
book you have read, at least this much: [[[the reason why western culture has constructed
religions in other cultures has to do with the nature of religion itself. This has been
shown, and the hypothesis can be tested. ]]]
Thanks again for your timely warning. I hope this post does not suffer from the faults you
have warned me about. Let us pick up the other issues as and when they re-emerge again.
Here is how, rightly in my view, you formulate the challenge facing us:

So, the challenge you (and people like me who find your explanations very interesting)
face is to figure out a comprehensive, viable and sustainable alternate clustering
structure (the modern complex organization) that will deliver the complex goods and
services needed in todays economy while getting rid of the cultural distortions which
give rise to corruption.
Here, then, is my invitation and the reason for extending it.
(a) Are there people out there who are well-versed in Management theories (theory of
firm, management control systems, organisational theory, etc) and sufficiently practical
enough to undertake a medium to long-term research on the relation between culture and
management? This research requires an intermeshing of the theories of organisation, my
own studies on culture, and historical research into how public services were organised in
India. Such research would help us develop an alternate clustering structure, as Arjun
calls it.
(b) If there are people out there well-versed in any of the above three areas and are
willing to work along (either directly through participation or indirectly by facilitating
others to undertake such a research), could you please get in touch with me off-line? We
can have exchanges through the e-mail and we can meet up with each other sometime in
April in the US to talk the concrete steps through. (I will be coming to the US in April.)
(c) Such a research would enable us to develop not just an alternate description of India
but also help evolving an alternate theory of organisation, which could get tested in
practical life.
(d) About my reason for extending the invitation. Not being a management specialist, it
would take me at least a few years to become familiar with the extant theories about it. I
simply do not have that time. I am willing, however, to work along and guide those who
want to do research because I have *already* spent some time doing preliminary work on
the subject. I am convinced that this is a gold-mine and I do believe that we will advance
our understanding about the relation between culture and management (which every
business manager confronts practically when he sets up business in India) in very
interesting and concrete ways.
Any takers?
You raise three inter-related questions in your post. Let me take them up one by one.
(a) The first question: By saying that there exist "Western" and "Indian" cultures arent
you somehow essentializing cultures into monoliths?
I do not see how. When we talk of the human species (in the singular), or about life
(again in the singular) while doing evolutionary biology, we do not presuppose or imply
that either of the two is a monolithic entity, do we? In fact, *diversity* is a presupposition

for any kind of knowledge and this is my presupposition as well. I presuppose (and my
theory requires) diversity in both the Indian and the western culture. Without it, one
cannot test the theories.
(b) Your second question: by talking about these entities in the context of intellectual
colonialism are you not implying that the interaction between the two was/is necessarily
that between the victimizer/victimized?
In fact, I dislike using notions like victimhood in this context. That is why I speak about
Indian intellectuals in terms of succumbing and not in terms of being victimised. In
the larger context of my research, I speak in terms of the Indian intellectuals taking
over the western descriptions. One reason, only one of the reasons though, has to do
undoubtedly with colonialism. In my next article on this column, while speaking about
Said, I shall speak of what (I think) post-colonialism really means. That is where we have
to head for.
(c) Your third question is this: if you do make the water-tight distinction between an
essential India and its Western counterpart, dont you think it is very likely that your
argument be used to ask for the "unsullied" past (the return to an essential Indian tradition
and the rejection of any Western attempts to study things Indian except on terms
acceptable to the thekedaars of Indic traditions?)?
You are right about this danger, even though I am not sure what you mean by watertight distinction. I do make the distinction that each of us experiences, viz., that there is a
difference between our culture and the western one. In my book, I explain how I
conceptualise cultural differences in such a way that it becomes amenable to a scientific
investigation. In such a conceptualisation as the one I make, it is not even remotely
possible to say that we should keep the Indian culture pure.
. The article *invites* the reader to reinvestigate issues about which he has a firm moral
opinion: the cases of corruption and caste. I am *not* suggesting that the social structure
which the caste system is supposed to be is morally just or that the social phenomenon of
corruption can be defended as morally good. I want the reader to realise that we have a
poor understanding of these phenomena and that, therefore, we should get to know what
they are *before* we form firm moral opinions on the subject. I wanted to show that our
*present knowledge* has to do with how the issues have been presented to us during the
last two hundred years or so and that this presentation also entails that our ethics are
immoral by nature.
2. Kannans post shows the nature of the issues poignantly. He suggests, for example, that
even his grandmother finds the behaviour of the clerk is municipal office morally bead
(cheating as he calls it), my attempts at exonerating the clerk not really successful, and
that the problem remains at the ground level no matter what we call it and brings up the
issue of the building contractor. Let us look at the issues a bit analytically in order to
figure out what has gone wrong with this argument.

Why does he bring up the issue of his grandmothers judgement as a counter-example?

First, what do I say? That he *calls* it as corruption, I said, has to do with western
normative ethics. Does it follow from this that the action of the municipal clerk is
ethically *good*? It does not, unless one assumes either (a) I am presenting an
*alternate* moral principle, which will make the action of the clerk morally good; or that
(b) the only morality that will make the action of the clerk ethically bad is the one that
construes it as corruption. I am not presenting an alternate moral rule that justifies the
action of the clerk. But I want to know why the so-called corruption comes about and
whether it is that. My attempt at doing this is *assumed* to make the action of the clerk
or the building contractor morally good. Why this assumption? I suggest that it comes
about because of the assumption (b).
Secondly, consider the underlying rhetorical force of the counter-example: even we
Indians call it ethically bad. But whoever said that the action of the clerk or the building
contractor is ethically good? Did I say that we do not have notions of *adharma* or
*paapa*? I did not; so why does he *assume* that my reconstruction to *explain*
corruption of the clerk is an exoneration of the clerks action?
So, it appears that there are but two options open to me: either I condemn it as corruption
or I am doomed to defend the action as morally good. This is how the issues get set up in
the normative ethics. The possibility that one can criticise the clerk or the contractor
without making it into corruption *and* yet call it unethical is not even entertained.
When vaguely entertained, it becomes a matter of labels as Kannan puts it. The problem,
though, is that this label makes all the difference about how we tackle it: whether as a
social phenomenon or as something else. That is to say, it is not a label which is at stake
but one of re-conceptualising ethics. Is there the problem of corruption in India that
makes about 20% of the adult Indian population into immoral people, or is something
else going on? Surely, there is something wrong with a theory that makes us massively
immoral but leaves the western culture intact. This is the issue I wanted to focus on. But
such is the *logic* of the western normative ethics that there is little possibility of
discussing it without being forced either into a defence of immorality or into the
assumption that normative condemnation is the only way of conducting an ethical
discussion.
True, I have not offered an alternate theory either of ethics or of corruption. The first will
very soon (I hope) come out as a book, and research is needed on the second. I claim that
we need to do research on this phenomenon, but Kannan and others know what the
phenomenon is without doing any such research. Where do they get this certainty from?
From two things, I would like to suggest. One from the conviction that the clerk and the
contractor are being unethical (but this is *not* being discussed); second from the belief
that the moral talk that has made this *into corruption is also the only talk* that will make
it unethical. To challenge that it is corruption is to doubt its immorality. In other words,
the *only* way of indulging in moral talk is to talk the way the western ethics does.
The above are ones *cognitive* assumptions, probably not those one is *aware* of
making.

3. VC comes up with a totally irrelevant issue in order to make another, related point.
We are savages, he feels, when confronted with the tragedy of the girl who committed
suicide because she was not found a suitable bride. It is totally unclear whether it is a
moral criticism of arranged marriages, or of the taste of the would-be bridegrooms, or
about extravagant weddings, or something else. None of it seems to matter as long as one
can make some or another point about the immorality in the present-day Indian society. Is
keeping up with the Joness an immoral phenomenon? Has anyone chronicled the
tragedies this attitude has led the American families into? Does one find the
advertisement industry and the producers of consumer goods who intensify this feeling
immoral? Is the American society massively immoral the way extravagant weddings
make the Indian society immoral? Who knows, or even who cares? As long as we can
reproduce nonsense about the immorality of the Indians, what does it matter what one
says?
4. Vikmas gets into another kind of quandary when he comes up with *other* texts that
criticise adultery. Of course, I am aware of any number of such texts. That is why, I
wrote, I want to focus on an unlikely candidate. Why the defensive attitude that makes
us want to say that even we have texts that criticise adultery? What exactly is one
trying to prove? That my consistent opponent should not think that we only have immoral
texts? And that we too are moral? Why this need unless one
5. Several people have come up with human greed to explain corruption in India. I will
leave aside the assumption that one knows what corruption is but will concentrate,
instead, on the explanation. Let us assume that the explanation is true. Does our problem
disappear or become even worse? We have only three major routes we can travel with
this explanation: (a) all cultures are equally corrupt because greed is present
everywhere; (b) Indians are genetically more greedy when compared to the rest of human
kind; (c) the moral principles supposed to check greed are weak in the Indian culture. If
(a) is true, then there is no specific problem of corruption in India; there is a special
problem in India if the other two are true. Why this is even offered as an explanation is a
mystery for me.
6. May be, this is not a uniquely Indian phenomenon but one that inflicts specific kinds of
economies. This was the explanation that Gunnar Myrdal popularised. Corruption is
endemic to underdeveloped countries. The problem with this explanation is that it
*masks* the moral judgement by providing a pseudo-scientific explanation. That is why I
focussed on the ethical aspect of this judgement.
7. We need transparency says Bhadraiah. Good. Is it a secret in the Indian society who
is corrupt? Does corruption exist in India because people do not know who the corrupt
are?
8. I would really urge the readers to re-read the article in order not to lose focus. The
discussion is *not* about (a) whether immoral practices exist in India; (b) whether we
should be for or against corruption; (c) whether the caste discrimination is good or bad.

The issues I am raising are *anterior* to them all. It is one of giving up the assumption
that we *know* what corruption and caste system are. We do not know what they are. We
assume we do because certain moral ideas have structured and presented some
phenomena to us. Our current ideas (about either of the two) logically compel us make
some kinds of claims about the nature of Indian ethics. We will be *forced* into this, I
am hinting, because the nature of Indian ethics is non-normative and the western ethics
makes *alternate* conceptualisation of the ethical domain difficult. The only way
alternate ethics can exist, implies the western ethics, is by defending immorality. The
discussions on this thread so far has *proved* this. The only question is: will you take the
time to reflect and think about what has been going on in these discussions.
To answer the questions raised hitherto, one needs to have some understanding of what I
have called the western normative ethics. One of the difficulties that hinder and
understanding of this, however, is precisely what I have called the colonial experience.
That is, the feeling that one knows what one is talking about and the absence of
awareness that one does not understand it at all. I thought I could *force* the issue by
engendering a cognitive dissonance, but it does not seem to have worked. So, let me try
another route.
1. What is western normative ethics? It is a structure or style of thinking about ethics.
What is its structure? It makes use of norms. What are norms? Rules or principles
which have a characteristic structure that use certain concepts like the moral ought and
moral ought not. That is, some actions *ought* to be performed (i.e. they are
obligatory); some actions *ought not* to be performed (i.e. they are forbidden) and some
actions are neither of the two (i.e. they are permitted). What is important to note is that
these norms (i.e. for example, some action is obligatory) hold irrespective of time, place,
condition or the person. [For instance, the norm that one ought not to torture people
because of their religious or political beliefs is indifferent to place, person, time, or
culture. No human being ought *ever* torture another human being just because the latter
subscribes to some or another political or religious belief.] In other words, norms are
supposed to hold universally. From what I have said above, it logically follows that
violation (or transgressing) some moral norm or the other is immoral (or unethical) and
following some moral norm is moral (or ethical).
2. One of the important consequences of 1 is that *all norms* are universal in scope:
that is, it is linguistically and logically *impossible* to have a particular norm or a
context-dependent norm. Let me just illustrate with an example. Let us consider the norm
that Balu ought to reply to the Sulekha posts. This appears as a particular (or contextdependent) norm. As soon is we ask why we see that the chain of arguments leads us
very quickly to a universal norm from which this particular norm is *derived*. Because
authors ought to reply to their readers, where it is possible to do so or some such thing.
(I have skipped the scenario because constructing any such scenario is easy.) This norm
applies to all authors (in a position to reply to their readers) independent of their place,
time, country or culture. This is what is meant by the universal nature of the norms. The
particular norm is justified only because of the universal norm. If and only if the
universal norm is justifiable is its derivation also justifiable.

3. When I speak of western normative ethics, this is *all* I have in mind. In one sense,
the confusion in the discussion is indicative of our lack of understanding: most of us *do
not* understand this type of ethics. (We do not, that is, have the foggiest of what we are
talking about, when we indulge in normative discussions.) At the same time, because the
above ideas sound and look very familiar we think we know what we are talking about
and, in fact, will go to absurd lengths to show that we know what we are talking about!
An ignorance of the issue coupled to the conviction of knowledge of the same issue is the
trajectory of discussions with Indians on ethics. It is extremely difficult to make them
understand what norms are; it is equally difficult to make them understand what norms
are not. (I shall shortly say why.) Let me begin by rephrasing what I have said in my
earlier posts.
4. According to 1, Kannans clerk in the municipal office or his building contractor are
immoral because they violate a moral norm. (One shall not take bribes or whatever else
takes your fancy.) According to western normative ethics, one can be immoral, if and
only if one violates some or another moral principle. [What, in this case, that principle is,
is totally irrelevant to my discussion. The only requirement that this norm should be
*universalisable*: it must apply at all people in the relevant situation - i.e. all clerks in the
world, past, present and future -- irrespective of time, place, people, culture, etc.]
Otherwise, not.
5. Not only is the phenomenon that we call corruption in India immoral but so is the
caste system: the latter, because, let us say, it violates the norm that all human beings
ought to be treated equal. Therefore, it is simple to condemn both corruption and the caste
system as immoral because their existence and practice violate some or another moral
norm. My opponent in the article simply represents such a person who, as I have said,
reasons consistently, rationally and logically.
6. If you are with me so far (despite the drastically simplified presentation), I can now
answer the following question: where is the colonial awareness in accepting this ethics?
Let me begin with the following claims: this mode of ethical reasoning is *absent* in our
culture. Even worse (or better!), we cannot formulate norms in the Indian (not just Indian,
but let me leave that aside) languages! And further, we cannot even *understand* the
western ethics because we are mapping this onto our Indian (non-normative) ethics. Do
not expect me to argue for the truth of any of these claims: they will get taken care of (to
some extent) in my book. Even one book is not sufficient to do this.
6.1. Let me begin with an example and an anecdote. The example first. In Indian
languages, I claim, there is no equivalent of the moral ought. That is, we cannot say
one ought not kill, one ought to respect their parents, the way one can do these in the
European languages. In our languages, these sentences have the *same structure* as one
should not stand up and drink water, you should come home today and such like. How
can we know whether the should and should not (or must and must not) do not
have the same logical and semantic properties in our languages that the moral ought
and ought not have in the European languages? Simple. There exist systems of Deontic
Logics (anyone with some understanding of the mathematical model theory can follow

them) that very precisely delineate the property and behaviour of the moral concepts like
forbidden, obligatory. That is, we can show that the Indian equivalents do not exhibit
this logical and semantic behaviour.
6.2. One of the reasons that cultures like India were called immoral by the Western
thinkers lies here: there is nothing resembling a universal moral norm in our traditions. In
the lens of the western culture, it appeared (logically) that all actions are permitted within
the Indian culture. Hence the appellation immoral. This is also the reason why people
like Shweder and others (please re-read the relevant portions of the article) transform us
into moral imbeciles. (We have not even learnt to formulate the moral norms.)
6.3. However, this does not mean (that is where I would like to go) that the Indian
cultures are immoral (or that we are moral imbeciles). I would like to show that nonnormative ethics exist (i.e. ethics that works without using or needing norms to make
ethical judgements) and that India is one such culture.
6.4. Let me take, as an example, one of the many frustrating discussions I have had with
Indians on this subject. All of them have taken objection to my claim in 6.1 and want to
show that we too have the moral ought. In one such discussion in JNU, here is how one
person tried to refute me: the Hindi word tha is the moral ought in Hindi. (He had,
most probably, a sentence like Aap aiyse nahin karne tha in mind.) I drew his attention
to the fact that tha was the past tense for hai and that it was not the equivalent of
moral ought at all.
6.5. Why did he think that this was a counter-example? He confused the ethical force in
the above sentence with the structure of the sentence. He thought that I was denying that
Indians had ethics, because, he felt, denying a normative language is to deny the
possibility of doing ethics in the Indian languages. He was convinced, and probably still
is, that he understands what western ethics is because he does ethics in his native
language; because he learnt an English language through the medium of his own native
language, he has understood the meaning of moral vocabulary in the English language.
6.6. Most (if not all) Sulekha readers are in this boat. They think they know what moral
language in English means because they think they can use it. Actually, they do not
understand it: they are talking Indian while trying to be an angreji.
7. We have a colonial experience not only when we think that devas are gods, puja is
worship etc. We exhibit exactly the same experience when we say that corruption is
rampant in India or that the caste system is immoral. Each and every time we
criticise the immorality of the Indians, we exhibit this colonisation. The tragedy is that
we genuinely believe that we are modern, progressive, reform-minded when we do these
things. My hope in writing the current article was to force an induced break in this
experience. Would this all-too-brief-an-explanation, together with the article bring this
about? I await your verdict. Only one request: please, please think about these issues and
the article seriously.

To answer the questions raised hitherto, one needs to have some understanding of what I
have called the western normative ethics. One of the difficulties that hinder and
understanding of this, however, is precisely what I have called the colonial experience.
That is, the feeling that one knows what one is talking about and the absence of
awareness that one does not understand it at all. I thought I could *force* the issue by
engendering a cognitive dissonance, but it does not seem to have worked. So, let me try
another route.
1. What is western normative ethics? It is a structure or style of thinking about ethics.
What is its structure? It makes use of norms. What are norms? Rules or principles
which have a characteristic structure that use certain concepts like the moral ought and
moral ought not. That is, some actions *ought* to be performed (i.e. they are
obligatory); some actions *ought not* to be performed (i.e. they are forbidden) and some
actions are neither of the two (i.e. they are permitted). What is important to note is that
these norms (i.e. for example, some action is obligatory) hold irrespective of time, place,
condition or the person. [For instance, the norm that one ought not to torture people
because of their religious or political beliefs is indifferent to place, person, time, or
culture. No human being ought *ever* torture another human being just because the latter
subscribes to some or another political or religious belief.] In other words, norms are
supposed to hold universally. From what I have said above, it logically follows that
violation (or transgressing) some moral norm or the other is immoral (or unethical) and
following some moral norm is moral (or ethical).
2. One of the important consequences of 1 is that *all norms* are universal in scope:
that is, it is linguistically and logically *impossible* to have a particular norm or a
context-dependent norm. Let me just illustrate with an example. Let us consider the norm
that Balu ought to reply to the Sulekha posts. This appears as a particular (or contextdependent) norm. As soon is we ask why we see that the chain of arguments leads us
very quickly to a universal norm from which this particular norm is *derived*. Because
authors ought to reply to their readers, where it is possible to do so or some such thing.
(I have skipped the scenario because constructing any such scenario is easy.) This norm
applies to all authors (in a position to reply to their readers) independent of their place,
time, country or culture. This is what is meant by the universal nature of the norms. The
particular norm is justified only because of the universal norm. If and only if the
universal norm is justifiable is its derivation also justifiable.
3. When I speak of western normative ethics, this is *all* I have in mind. In one sense,
the confusion in the discussion is indicative of our lack of understanding: most of us *do
not* understand this type of ethics. (We do not, that is, have the foggiest of what we are
talking about, when we indulge in normative discussions.) At the same time, because the
above ideas sound and look very familiar we think we know what we are talking about
and, in fact, will go to absurd lengths to show that we know what we are talking about!
An ignorance of the issue coupled to the conviction of knowledge of the same issue is the
trajectory of discussions with Indians on ethics. It is extremely difficult to make them
understand what norms are; it is equally difficult to make them understand what norms
are not. (I shall shortly say why.) Let me begin by rephrasing what I have said in my

earlier posts.
4. According to 1, Kannans clerk in the municipal office or his building contractor are
immoral because they violate a moral norm. (One shall not take bribes or whatever else
takes your fancy.) According to western normative ethics, one can be immoral, if and
only if one violates some or another moral principle. [What, in this case, that principle is,
is totally irrelevant to my discussion. The only requirement that this norm should be
*universalisable*: it must apply at all people in the relevant situation - i.e. all clerks in the
world, past, present and future -- irrespective of time, place, people, culture, etc.]
Otherwise, not.
5. Not only is the phenomenon that we call corruption in India immoral but so is the
caste system: the latter, because, let us say, it violates the norm that all human beings
ought to be treated equal. Therefore, it is simple to condemn both corruption and the caste
system as immoral because their existence and practice violate some or another moral
norm. My opponent in the article simply represents such a person who, as I have said,
reasons consistently, rationally and logically.
6. If you are with me so far (despite the drastically simplified presentation), I can now
answer the following question: where is the colonial awareness in accepting this ethics?
Let me begin with the following claims: this mode of ethical reasoning is *absent* in our
culture. Even worse (or better!), we cannot formulate norms in the Indian (not just Indian,
but let me leave that aside) languages! And further, we cannot even *understand* the
western ethics because we are mapping this onto our Indian (non-normative) ethics. Do
not expect me to argue for the truth of any of these claims: they will get taken care of (to
some extent) in my book. Even one book is not sufficient to do this.
6.1. Let me begin with an example and an anecdote. The example first. In Indian
languages, I claim, there is no equivalent of the moral ought. That is, we cannot say
one ought not kill, one ought to respect their parents, the way one can do these in the
European languages. In our languages, these sentences have the *same structure* as one
should not stand up and drink water, you should come home today and such like. How
can we know whether the should and should not (or must and must not) do not
have the same logical and semantic properties in our languages that the moral ought
and ought not have in the European languages? Simple. There exist systems of Deontic
Logics (anyone with some understanding of the mathematical model theory can follow
them) that very precisely delineate the property and behaviour of the moral concepts like
forbidden, obligatory. That is, we can show that the Indian equivalents do not exhibit
this logical and semantic behaviour.
6.2. One of the reasons that cultures like India were called immoral by the Western
thinkers lies here: there is nothing resembling a universal moral norm in our traditions. In
the lens of the western culture, it appeared (logically) that all actions are permitted within
the Indian culture. Hence the appellation immoral. This is also the reason why people
like Shweder and others (please re-read the relevant portions of the article) transform us
into moral imbeciles. (We have not even learnt to formulate the moral norms.)

6.3. However, this does not mean (that is where I would like to go) that the Indian
cultures are immoral (or that we are moral imbeciles). I would like to show that nonnormative ethics exist (i.e. ethics that works without using or needing norms to make
ethical judgements) and that India is one such culture.
6.4. Let me take, as an example, one of the many frustrating discussions I have had with
Indians on this subject. All of them have taken objection to my claim in 6.1 and want to
show that we too have the moral ought. In one such discussion in JNU, here is how one
person tried to refute me: the Hindi word tha is the moral ought in Hindi. (He had,
most probably, a sentence like Aap aiyse nahin karne tha in mind.) I drew his attention
to the fact that tha was the past tense for hai and that it was not the equivalent of
moral ought at all.
6.5. Why did he think that this was a counter-example? He confused the ethical force in
the above sentence with the structure of the sentence. He thought that I was denying that
Indians had ethics, because, he felt, denying a normative language is to deny the
possibility of doing ethics in the Indian languages. He was convinced, and probably still
is, that he understands what western ethics is because he does ethics in his native
language; because he learnt an English language through the medium of his own native
language, he has understood the meaning of moral vocabulary in the English language.
6.6. Most (if not all) Sulekha readers are in this boat. They think they know what moral
language in English means because they think they can use it. Actually, they do not
understand it: they are talking Indian while trying to be an angreji.
7. We have a colonial experience not only when we think that devas are gods, puja is
worship etc. We exhibit exactly the same experience when we say that corruption is
rampant in India or that the caste system is immoral. Each and every time we
criticise the immorality of the Indians, we exhibit this colonisation. The tragedy is that
we genuinely believe that we are modern, progressive, reform-minded when we do these
things. My hope in writing the current article was to force an induced break in this
experience. Would this all-too-brief-an-explanation, together with the article bring this
about? I await your verdict. Only one request: please, please think about these issues and
the article seriously.
1. Are western traditions innately richer because they have the moral ought?
My answer: No. In fact, in my book on ethics I will prove the following: the nonnormative ethics are *richer*: Under specific assumptions, in limited conditions, one can
*derive* a normative ethics from a non-normative one. The relation between nonnormative ethics and normative ethics is analogous to the relation between Einsteinian
theory and Newtonian theory: under specific assumptions, in limited conditions, you can
derive the Newtonian theory from the Einsteinian theory.
2. Uchit and Unuchit do *not* function as ought and ought not do. They mean

something like appropriate and inappropriate. That we have different words with different
meanings to pick out the moral ought and moral ought not suggests (merely suggests!)
that, perhaps, there is a greater richness to our ethical languages than those governed by
the moral ought and moral ought not.
3. We can neither map the moral imperatives (let me call the ought and ought not this
way in order to avoid using scare quotes to mention these words) at the phrase level or at
a sentence level. What we map are the *ethical nature* and the *ethical force* of some
statements in some context or the other.
4. Yes, many systems of Deontic logics make use of one or another version of modal
logics. They *enrich* the propositional and predicate logics with deontic terms (which
the moral imperatives are) and allow us to track the logical and semantic behaviour of
these deontic operators.
5. Decidability presupposes expressibility and, as you say, the converse does not hold.
(See 1.) The trade-off between the two depends on what human situations require: a
decision-procedure or a learning-heuristic. The western ethics sees the ethical event as
one that requires a decision procedure; it is my claim that in our traditions an ethical
event requires an action heuristic.
6. Which is better? This does not depend on the semantics of ethical languages but on
what ethics is supposed to do: teach you how to act ethically, or decide which *type* of
action is ethical. In the latter case, you still have the problem of performing the ethically
correct action.
An important point is your side remark about the inability of the Chinese language to
express counterfactuals. In fact the situation is even more intriguing. As you know,
Confucius wrote his Analects in the Classical Chinese language. In order to see where I
am heading, consider some of the thoughts that Rosemont, Jr. expresses. (Rosemont, Jr.,
H., Against Relativism. In Larson G. J. and E. Deutsch (eds.), *Interpreting Across
Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988) Not only is there an absence of the concept of morality in the Classical
Chinese, but also the very cluster of concepts required to speak about moral issues.
Consider as a specific example the classical Chinese language in which the early
Confucians wrote. Not merely does that language contain no lexical item for moral, it
also does not have terms corresponding to freedom, liberty, autonomy, individual,
utility, rationality, objective, subjective, choice, dilemma, duty, rights, and
probably most eerie of all for a moralist, classical Chinese has no lexical item
corresponding to ought - prudential or obligatory (Rosemont Jr. 1988: 61).
This claim is as puzzling as it is startling: in classical Chinese it is not possible to speak
of moral duty or moral dilemmas or moral choices. It is not even possible to
formulate a rule which uses the notions of ought - either obligatory (All ought to do
X) or prudentially (If one desires X then one ought to do Y). In the western

intellectual tradition, we believe it to be the essence of a moral principle or norm that it

is formulated using the ought - either in obligatory or prudential form. Without ought,
there would be no difference in kind between factual and evaluative statements. Yet, it is
impossible to do precisely that in Confucianism. The philosophical significance is
immense:
Speakers (writers) of languages that have no terms (or concept clusters) corresponding to
moral cannot logically have any moral principles (ibid.: 60).
But, rightly enough, we take Confucianism at least as an example of a moral system.
What is the upshot of the above remark? Rosemont formulates the issue as follows:
If one grants that in contemporary western moral philosophy morals is intimately linked
with the concept cluster elaborated above, and if none of that concept cluster can be
found in the Confucian lexicon, then the Confucians not only cannot be moral
philosophers, they cannot be ethical philosophers either. But this contention is absurd; by
any account of the Confucians, they were clearly concerned about the human conduct,
and what constituted the good life. If these are not ethical considerations, what are?
(ibid.: 64).
The intriguing question, apart from the truth-value of these claims, is about their
intelligibility. What is the structure of the moral domain if it is not defined by norms? If
one does not act morally simply by following rules, how does one learn to act in a
moral way? How is an ethical judgment possible without referring to norms? How are
ethical disputes settled? And, above all, how is an identification of such a domain
possible at all?
What I am trying to say is that these questions arise typically (at the least) in all Asian
traditions, including the Indian one. And that what has been argued as the weakness of
these traditions is actually their *greatest* strength.
The universalisability of norms does not mean that the western people all factually follow
these norms. Even if everyone were to lie, the ethical statement No one ought to lie is a
universal moral statement.
The existence of *debates* about abortion, war, etc. are indicative of the nature of
normative rules. Because one ought not to kill, debates and doctrines about justified
war come into being. It is important to note that these doctrines do not contradict the
injunction not to kill but provide justifications for undertaking such an immoral action.
(They provide, so to speak, the mitigating circumstances.)
Same about abortion. If you follow the debates, one side tries to argue that abortion is
not murder of a human being (e.g. the foetus is not yet a human person); the other urges
against it because it is murder.
1. Regarding your first point. It is important to keep the general issue in mind, while

arguing about specifics. The corruption we are talking about refers to the social
phenomenon in India which makes about 20% of the adult population into immoral
people. When I said that I refuse to call the clerk corrupt or that the issue I raise is
anterior, I am talking about this phenomenon. Your grandmother, you said, uses the word
cheating (something like the Hindi Dhoka probably). One could, for instance, use this
word to describe the individual action of the clerk as an unethical one without *making*
it into corruption.
Are these two conversationally synonymous? I suppose it depends on the person with
whom you are having a conversation, the context and the language used.
The distinction, you say, is in my head. You are right, of course. Why is this distinction
useful? Well, I am a bit surprised that you ask this question on this thread. The article
tries to show that some logical conclusions (about our social structure, about the nature of
ethics) follow if we use the word corruption the way it is used to describe the Indian
society. I am not willing to buy any of them. That is why I resist using the word
corruption to describe the action of the municipal clerk or the building contractor or
whoever else. This is the first reason. (I use a variant of the reductio et absurdum
argument to show why we better make the distinction. Obviously, I have not made this
point with the clarity I desire.)
There is a second reason. Let us continue using the examples of the clerk or the building
contractor or a telephone linesman. The bribes you pay do not merely line the pockets of
these individuals without them being *distributed* within the hierarchy of whatever
organisation to which these people belong (the clerk and the linesman) or the one to
whom (say the assistant engineer) the contractor has paid. You do realise, of course, that
there is an enormous *integrity* within this hierarchy. The bribes are distributed among
the relevant people in a very honest way. Not only that. Once one pays the bribe, one
feels that one is morally entitled to the service one has paid a bribe for. The one who
receives the bribe also feels that he is morally obligated to provide you with the necessary
service once he has received the bribe. You are not cheated from this entitlement once
you have paid the bribe. What you get is what you pay for. These index the
*extraordinary integrity* of the bribe-receiving structures. In fact, these individuals lose
their credibility and trustworthiness (look at the words I am using) if they do not perform
after they have received the bribe. That is, a tremendous trust and honesty is required
from both the parties. It is almost as though that in this perverse (these scare quotes are
red flags) system, there is an extraordinary honesty and integrity. Why, if they were
corrupt, could they not tell you to take a hike after they receive bribes? Because, the socalled corruption works if and only if those who are corrupt are honest and reliable!
The above is the second side to the so-called corruption in the Indian society. What I am
trying to do is make use realise that, because the so-called corruption involves both
*honesty* and *bribes*, to figure out what this phenomenon is requires that we go
beyond mere ethical characterisations the way the western culture uses them.
To repeat myself, let us first find out what this phenomenon is which involves both these

dimensions. To simply call it corruption not only has implausible consequences but also
blinds us to the issues.
These are two of the reasons why I want to distinguish between ethically bad action and
corruption. There are more, but they are irrelevant in the present context.
2. About your second point regarding my shoddy rhetorical reasoning. In a way, I have
implicitly answered it. I shall waive my right to answer it explicitly.
3. I do not see why you become polemical. Precisely *because* I was talking to a nonwestern, and presumably an Indian audience, I did not speak of the second aspect to
corruption. I thought that you would be familiar with it. To a western audience, that
would have been my first point. In a very simplified fashion, I would have said, using the
word corruption to describe a social phenomenon in India leads one to say the following:
Indian society is corrupt if and only if the corrupt Indians are individually ethically
good. (Each corrupt individual has to be extraordinarily ethical, if corruption has to
work at a social level.) However, a corrupt individual cannot be ethically good. The
problem I have had with the western audience is that they do not believe that corruption
works. They are simply hung up on its alleged immorality. I thought that an Indian
audience would have had enough experience with corruption to see where I was getting
at
Dear Arun,
1. The translation is a plausible one when we want to translate it into *English* or some
other European language. It is plausible when the *context* is a moral one (i.e. we know
what the context is before the translation takes place) and we add the word ought
because it would not otherwise be syntactically well-formed. This should already tell us
that we are *adding* ought in English in order to *signal* that it is a moral statement.
This is enough to alert us to what I have drawn attention to.
2. You describe your process of moral reasoning and ask the question whether this is
western normative ethics. Let me quote from my 1985 paper, which you so kindly
transformed into an electronic version:
An example might illustrate the point. (I have taken this from one of my experiences
where I was discussing a moral issue with a group of philosophers.) Let us say that X
does something which Y considers corrupt. To keep it simple, let us say that Y
expresses the aforementioned judgement. In order to express it, or persuade others about
the validity of this moral judgement, Y will have to do something like this:
(a) Y defines corruption: All actions which exhibit ________ properties are corrupt
(b) Ys ethical principle (itself justified): All actions which satisfy _______ (the
principle) are moral.
(c) Y infers: Because all corrupt actions violate principle (b), all corrupt actions are

immoral.
(d) Y describes: ________ action of X shows _______ properties.
(e) Y infers: By definition, therefore, Xs action is corrupt.
(f) Y argues: All corrupt actions are immoral. (reiteration c)
Xs action is corrupt. (reiteration e)
(g) Y infers: Therefore, Xs action is immoral
The goal of Western ethical philosophers is to construct a theory, which allows us to
justify moral judgements or moral actions and choices in the above, albeit simplified,
manner.
You can see for yourself whether your moral reasoning proceeds this way or not.
3. You say that the context helps you decide which principle has to be modified, which to
discard. Within the western normative ethics, the context is *irrelevant* to the process of
deliberation. Maximally, what contexts do is create the so-called ethical dilemmas, i.e.
situations where the moral principles conflict. So-called, because most ethical
philosophers do not believe that ethical principles could, *in principle*, be in conflict.
They ascribe the empirical conflict either to the insufficient information the agent has, or
to the moral imperfection of the actual world, or to the absence of a good theory of ethics
which creates a hierarchy of norms, or whatever else. That is because, within the western
normative ethics, it is not possible for an ethical principle to impose an *immoral*
obligation. If it does so, such a principle *has to be immoral*. (In a situation involving a
moral dilemma, following any one ethical principle entails violating the other moral
principle. In this sense, the first imposes an immoral obligation to violate the second.)
One of the most popular ways to account for a moral dilemma has been to speak of two
kinds of obligations: a prima facie obligation and an actual obligation. Prima facie
obligations refer to situations involving moral conflict (i.e. a moral dilemma). They say
that this is merely an apparent conflict (i.e. a prima facie conflict) and not real at all. In
a morally perfect world, they say, there could be no conflict of moral principles. So, all
you have to do is accept that ours is a morally *imperfect* world, where it appears as
though we have conflicting obligations when there could be no such conflicts between
moral obligations. In simple terms: they say moral dilemmas tell us that we live in a
morally imperfect world but nothing about the nature of moral principles. Moral
principles could *never* in conflict. In other words, moral dilemmas are a curse on
humankind; they show us that we are imperfect creatures.
Do these ideas resonate with your understanding of morality? If they do not, it shows that
you do not know what ought means (philosophically speaking).
4. I beg to disagree with you as to why there is no cognitive dissonance. According to me,
it has to do with what it means to have a colonial experience. But that does not matter.
You say I have to show that Kannans clerk is not corrupt. Let us see what *exactly* you
are asking me to do.

Am I to show that according to Indian ethics, the action of the clerk is ethically good?
That is to say, are there *situations* where one could call the actions of the clerk an
ethically good act? Surely Arun, if you use your Indian psychology, you can think of any
number of such situations. Imagine that the clerk is looking after abandoned children of
prostitutes, helping in their education, keeping them away from the streets and crime.
Imagine further too that he asks bribe only from those he thinks are capable of paying
them and this money goes entirely to feed these children. Is your Indian psychology
willing to call this clerk corrupt? Or even unethical?
Am I to show that the clerk is corrupt and ethically good at the same time? See my
recent answer to Kannans post. The social phenomenon of corruption *works* if and
only if the individuals are honest and possess integrity.
In other words, there are at least two possible routes one could travel in order to have a
cognitive dissonance. Strangely though, *both* require using the Indian-ness in us.
The first issue is whether the notion of relative ethics makes sense within the context of
the western ethics. There are some attempts to develop ethical relativism, even though
it is not clear what is relativistic about them. One would be a kind of factual claim:
different people, different groups, different cultures have different principles which they
consider as morally good. This does not make for ethical relativism. The issue still
remains: are these principles also ethically good? That is to say, one undertakes a
normative enquiry in order to find out whether all these principles are also morally
acceptable. The second would be to come up with a moral norm that is relative to some
person or group. Any examination would very quickly lead to the conclusion that, in so
far as it is a norm, it is universalisable even if the *domain of objects* appears restricted.
(That is because all universal laws specify the domain of objects, whether implicitly or
explicitly, where they are applicable. The relativistic norms appear relativistic because
they specify the domain explicitly.) In other words, no one has been able to come up with
any coherent explication of what relativistic ethics means. (According to me, it is
impossible to do so when we speak of normative ethics.)
No, all I am trying to do is to make a case for just one thing. The manner in which
Indians (not just Indians alone) think about ethics is not normative in nature. I am trying
to explicate in English what is ethical about us without using the normative language. I
want to say too that we appear immoral from within the western ethical tradition not only
because the western intellectuals are Eurocentric or Orientalist but also because our
traditions do lack normative notions. But that does not make us immoral but only moral
in a *different way*. And that difference has hitherto been conceptualised only one way:
through the lens of the western normative ethics. What I have done in the article is to say
in an explicit fashion what westerners have written (and still write) about us. Either they
are right that we are immoral; or we refuse to be logical and thus not accept such
conclusions; or we better ask ourselves *why* the Indian intellectuals hitherto have not
woken up, recognised their way of being ethical and articulated them.
At the risk of treading on some sensitive toes and alienating a probably sympathetic

audience, some reflections are nevertheless in order about the nature of these discussions.
1. The first thing that is really striking involves what I will call the *burden of proof*.
That is, I am being asked to prove that my assertions are true. In one sense, it appears an
entirely reasonable demand to make: after all, one should not entertain gratuitous claims.
But what seems to have escaped the attention of many is this: what precisely do I have to
prove? Who has the burden of proof?
1.1. Let us strip the issue to its barest form. I am supposed to prove that we Indians are
not corrupt, immoral and/or moral imbeciles. Without proof, is it difficult to accept these
claims? But who has proved that we are any or all of these things? Not the western
theorists, surely. Not any on this board either. All that exist are bare-bone assertions that
some moral principles are violated in a systematic fashion in India. So, what exactly do I
have to prove?
1.2. It could be said that people will accept my theories only if I can prove them. But I am
not presenting a theory of corruption or caste, surely. I am merely extending an invitation
to start looking at things in a way that *enables* research. There are some things I have a
partial insight about; I can share them with you. There are some things I have some
hunches about; I can try and communicate them as clearly as I can. Where and when I
have a theory about some things, I can present them to the scientific public in a form that
is adequate. [I am doing research on caste, but it is nowhere near complete. I do have a
theory of non-normative ethics, and I am writing a book about it. I have written a book on
religion and it is up to the scientific public to judge its adequacy.] On those issues where I
have hunches, insights and intuitions I can only go some distance.
1.3. But then, it is not as though the western theorists have a well-worked theory about
these issues either. No theorist has ever shown either why some ethical principles
(whatever they are) ought not to be violated; what happens to a culture when such a thing
happens; why it is not morally good (whatever that means) that these principles are
violated. Which theorist has done (or ever did) a research on the Indian ethics that
*proves* that we are immoral? No one. Yet, we do not ask *proof* of this; but, I have to
*prove* we are not immoral. Which theory explains corruption in India, let alone the
actions of a municipal clerk? None. Yet, I have to prove that this clerk is not corrupt. This
is strange: there is no burden of proof imposed on those who call India a corrupt nation,
but one has to prove that India is not corrupt. If I say that America is corrupt, I have to
prove it and no silly anecdote will do in its stead; but if I come with silly examples of
India, it suffices. Have we reflected on this strange cognitive asymmetry in imposing the
burden of proof?
2. When for more than 200 years, the West went around trumpeting the evils of the caste
system, we meekly accepted it without asking for proof. We inanely repeat the demand
that the Harijans be allowed into the temples, without even knowing why or whether
this demand entails abolishing the evil that the caste system is supposed to be or where
this demand originated from or even what it signifies. Even to this day, when the Hindu

reform groups go around peddling silly stories about the evil that the caste system is, we
do not lay the burden of proof of them. But when someone asks what that system is, and
whether we could have moral opinions on a subject we know very little about, the burden
is on him to prove his claims. One has to prove that we Indians are ignorant of the Indian
caste system; but, I suppose, if one says it is evil then the person demonstrates his
knowledge.
3. In other words, I have difficulty in understanding the nature of these discussions. One
is not merely requesting a clarification of some or another abstruse point. Instead, if you
read the posts, many are telling me what I have to show, or prove if I want to be
believed. Friends, I cannot (at this moment) prove that Indian culture is not immoral, or
that we are not moral imbeciles. Nor am I am asking you to believe that Indians are not
immoral. You can believe what you feel like: if like some, you are ashamed of our
barbarism, so be it. I am not going to (nor am I able to) prove to you that we are
civilized or that we are cultured. I believe that the burden of proof lies on those who
make such implausible claims about non-western cultures. I cannot hope to convince you
by providing proofs: I have no such proofs. All I can do is draw your attention to the fact
that those who call us barbaric have even *less* to go on than I have. If people are
already convinced about corruption in India, there is nothing I can do to dispel this
conviction except draw attention to the fact that it does not rest on any kind of a proof
either. All it draws upon is some moral principle and some subjective feeling induced by
some anecdote or the other. I ask for research into corruption because, I say, we do not
understand it. But if your conviction tells you that you are against such a research, there
is pretty little I can do about it.
4. The only thing I can do is help you think about the possible reasons why we show the
kind of resistance we exhibit. I have some ideas about why our intellectuals have not
done the kind of research they should have done. I can share these ideas with you: not to
convince you but to help you reflect. I do that because I feel that you might be open to
thinking about our culture and our traditions in a different way than our earlier
generations. I might be wrong in assuming this, but that is irrelevant. However, what I
cannot do is *prove* to you that you need to think differently. I can give my reasons why
I think a Renaissance is due. It is beyond my ability (any human beings ability, for that
matter) to demonstrate and prove that such an event is due. Perhaps, it would be for the
best if we keep these points in mind while we continue with our future conversations.