RDN Le Bourget 2015

LArme de lair,
an Instrument
of Power for France
SALON DU BOURGET 2013
This issue is downloaded from the website of RDN

www.defnat.com
Contents
7
Introduction - A New Approach to Strategic Functions

DENIS MERCIER
Permanent missions
13
French Command and Control of Air Defence a Brief History

MICKAL AUBOUT, YOHAN DROIT, MARIE-MADELEINE MARAIS, TONY MORIN
French command and control (C2) is now an essential element of air defence of the homeland, and of external operations. In tracing the history of C2 from the very beginning of air operations through to the latest
developments, this article highlights one of the fundamental capabilities of the French Air Force.
20
The Airborne Nuclear Component: an Approach to Excellence

EMAA
The Strategic air forces (FAS) are the airborne component of the French nuclear deterrent and, since 1964
have been fundamental to the expression of French power. This component remains a central and unifying
element for the development of the French Air Force.
23
The Air Force and National Security

EMAA
In responding to the challenge of maintaining national security, the French state can rely upon the fundamental capabilities of its Air Force. The very special capabilities of this Force contribute effectively and
appropriately to that national security.
The capability to act fast and far: three recent commitments
29
From Afghanistan to Mali:

The Afghan Model 10 Years on, Still Wholly Relevant
GRAUD LABORIE
The author takes us back to the Afghan model, and to its first use in Afghanistan, to remind us of its basic
principles. Study of recent conflicts has confirmed that the Afghan model, an air-dominated strategic tool,
is as relevant as ever and has high coercion value when used in the right conditions. Moreover, it is a tool
whose strength should be recognised and which should be integrated into the range of strategies that may
be put into effect by our forces.
41
Operation Harmattan: A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale

LOC RULLIRE
The air campaign in Libya was the fruit of careful preparation. Faced with a campaign in which the participants were sometimes difficult to distinguish, the French Air Force was able to adapt its resources to carry
out precision strikes.
45
Serval: an Exemplary French Air Force Operation

EMAA
An air force is a powerful tool: in Operation Serval in Mali, the French Air Force has fully demonstrated this
fact through its reactivity, command and ISR capabilities, and its strategic and tactical mobility.
The fundamental capabilities at the heart of modernisation
57
Air Force Command and Control,

the Strategic Heart of Defence and National Security
EMAA
Through its ability to supervise and drive air operations (using C2 Air), the French Air Force represents for
France a real instrument of power, and provides the country with a key capability in the execution of its
international responsibilities.
61
The Only Machiavellian Aspect of the Drone is its Human Element

CHRISTOPHE FONTAINE
The author, who is an expert in the field, considers that the drone differs from a combat aircraft only to the
extent that its in-flight endurance allows the pilot to remain on the ground. From this standpoint, he
explains the invalidity of any reticence to use the drone as a tool like any other during combat.
66
A Case for the Dynamic Management of French Overseas Bases
70
Immediate Action: the Contribution of Rafale to recent Operations
EMAA
This article spotlights the expansion of strategic space that will result from the introduction of A400M and
MRTT aircraft. French force and power projection can now be envisaged using a more dynamic approach
to the networking of our support bases.
YOHAN DROIT
Rafale is notable for its completely multi-role aspect. Its deployment in many different theatres of conflict
enables us to understand its development better, and to see how it has been able to adapt fully to all of the
types of operation to which the French Air Force has been committed over the past ten years.
75
Simulator Training for Future Combat Pilots

COLIN BLTTLER, CYRIL CAMACHON
There has been a gradual increase in simulation as an essential ingredient in the training of combat pilots.
That notwithstanding, real flight remains the cornerstone of training experts in the military aeronautical
environment. Could the best balance between the two be found in on-board simulation during real flight?
81
The Men and Women of the French Air Force

EMAA
By dint of the quality of their training, the men and women of the French Air Force are genuine assets to
defence in general, but also to the whole of civil society to which they contribute in terms of the values they
develop within their profession.
Looking to the future
87
The Battlefield and Air Power 15 Years From Now

GRGORY BOUTHERIN, CHRISTOPHE PAJON
Trying to identify changes in the battlefield fifteen years from now might seem to be attempting the impossible. In drawing inspiration from clear trends, it is nevertheless possible to see three major changes:
the number and type of players present on the battlefield, a proliferation of technologies, and the nature of
the environments of conflict. Such analysis is central to preparing aerospace power for the challenges of
tomorrow.
101
Adapting Military Capability
107
Franco-American Space Cooperation
EMAA
Over the past ten years the strategic landscape has been dominated by what are called asymmetric conflicts.
Whilst this context has served to highlight certain capabilities, it should not be used as a pretext for abandoning others which are best suited to high-intensity conflict.
BATRICE HAINAUT
Very early in the game France and the United States developed cooperation between their respective national space agencies. Scientific cooperation is today developing into more political cooperation in a framework for military use of space. This change partly results from the American administration, which would
wish to develop its space diplomacy.
Translation directed by Mike Storey

Translation team: Barry Cox, Richard Eyres, John Halford and Mike Storey
Cover : Emmanuel Batisse (Cesa CAD section)
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Revue Dfense Nationale - 2nd quarter 2013 - DL 80750
Glossary
AASM: Armement air-sol modulaire
ACCS: Air Command and Control System
APOD: Air Port of Desembarkation
ASMPA: Air-sol moyenne porte amlior
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
BITD: Base industrielle et technologique de dfense
C2: Commandement et contrle
Cafda: Commandement air des forces de dfense arienne
CAOC: Combined Air and Space Operations Center
CDAOA: Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CENTCOM: US Central Command
Csar: Complexe dexploitation semi-automatique du radar
CIE: Commandement interarmes de lEspace
Cnes: Centre national dtudes spatiales
CNOA: Centre national des oprations ariennes
CO.AIR: Centre des oprations de lArme de lair
Coda: Centre des oprations de la dfense arienne
Comanfor: Commandant de la force
Cos: Commandement des oprations spciales
Cosmos: Centre oprationnel de surveillance militaire des objets spatiaux
CPCO: Centre de planification et de conduit des oprations
DCA: Dfense contre aronefs
EATC: European Air Transport Command
ESA: European Space Agency / ASE: Agence spatiale europenne
F2T2EA: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAS: Forces ariennes stratgiques
FMV: Full-Motion Video
GGE: Group of Governmental Experts
Graves: Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale
GS: Gestion de systmes
IADC: Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Commitee
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFAC AFCP: Joint Force Air Component de lAfrique centrale et de lOuest
JSOTF-N: Joint Special Operations Task Force-North
JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller
Male: Moyenne altitude, longue endurance
MANPADS: Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems
MCCE: Movement Coordination Centre Europe
MRTT: Multi Role Tanker Transport
NADGE: NATO Defense Ground Environment
NRF: NATO Response Force
NSP: National Space Policy
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom
OODA: Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action / OODA: Observation-Orientation-Dcision-Action
Oscgane: Observation spectrale et caractrisation des satellites gostationnaires
OUP: Operation Unified Protector

OSF: Optronique secteur frontal
PT: Per cent Transfer
PPS: Posture permanente de sret arienne
RAF: Royal Air Force
RBE 2: Radar balayage lectronique 2 plans
ROVER: Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver
Satam: Systmes dacquisition et de trajectographie des avions et munitions
Scalp-EG: Systme de croisire conventionnel autonome longue porte-EG
SCCOA : Systme de commandement et de contrle des oprations arospatiales
SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SIC: Systme dinformation et de communication
Spectra: Systme de protection et dvitement des conduites de tir du Rafale
Strida II: Systme de transmission et de reprsentation des informations de dfense ariennes
TAA: Technically Advanced Aircraft
TACP: Tactical Air Control Parties
TER: Transfer Effectiveness Ratio
TIRA: Tracking and Imaging Radar
TST: Time Sensitive Target
A New Approach
to Strategic Functions
Denis Mercier
General (Air), Chief of the French Air Staff.
n the occasion of the Salon du Bourget, it with great pleasure that I preface
for the first time this special edition of Revue Dfense Nationale, dedicated
to the French Air Force. Through its many high quality contributions, this
edition offers the excellent opportunity to discover how the French Air Force puts
its five core capabilities into action across its numerous commitments. The five
capabilities, of planning, commanding and conducting air operations; collecting
intelligence; immediate response; rapid and long distance projection; and highlevel training are those which ensure the Air Force is ready for action within our
sovereign territory and beyond. Modernisation of these capabilities will ensure that
tomorrows Air Force will remain a powerful tool in the service of the nation,
supporting the five strategic functions of deterrence, protection, awareness and
anticipation, prevention and intervention. The very coherence and strength of the
Air Force is rooted in its ability to put all its capabilities into effect in support of
these functions.
The recently-published defence White Paper on defence and national security

(the Livre blanc) describes current threats and supports the approach by strategic
functions, which was originally introduced in the 1994 Livre blanc and broadened
somewhat in that of 2008. Il allows identification of those areas that need to be fully
understood in order for the state to ensure the protection and security of its citizens
and of Frances vital interests both on national territory and beyond its borders.
One of the major constraints affecting defence planning today is the essential need for control of public expenditure which, given the current deep financial
crisis, is significantly eating into any margin for manoeuvre. Despite that, the performance of new combat aircraft, be they helicopters, fighter or transport aircraft,
allied with more reactive ways of employing them, open up new possibilities for
perceiving the five strategic functions through a more holistic approach to how
their complementarity might be used in mutual support.
Better knowledge of the interlinking of these functions and understanding
each one of them with a view to greater dynamism will make it possible to respond
to the challenges facing us by greater emphasis on refocusing forces on national
Les Cahiers de la Revue Dfense Nationale
7
A New Approach
territory and a number of key points, thereby favouring concentration of assets,

which in turn brings savings.
In the first place we should take account of the many links between these
functions. These interconnections have value in terms of the assets they can call
upon, and also the fields of activity they cover, which are not isolated from each
other. In the same way, the ultimate objective of providing defence and security for
France does not result from some sequential application of these functions but
from one that is parallel, and frequently simultaneous. With this as the starting
point, and with the support of all that technology affords us, it is essential that we
work towards better exploitation of the multiplicity of roles that our assets and
procedures offer.
The very essence of the awareness and anticipation function is the best
illustration of the interdependence of functions, since complete understanding and
mastery of it is the guarantor of how the other four operate. That alone justifies
the effort expended upon it since 2008, in particular in the fields of space and
cyber-defence. The actions contributing to the success of this function need to be
exercised along two different paths.
On one hand, there are those actions which take place before crisis occurs,
and which allow the latter to be anticipated. Today, they rely on our capability in
space, on our computer, electromagnetic and human intelligence resources, and on
the use of specialised resources which are deployed as appropriate to the particular
areas of interest concerned. We could go further still by exploiting every opportunity afforded by missions for other strategic functions on which our assets are
deployed. In particular, we need to make greater use of our air projection assets,
and broaden their doctrine of use.
On the other hand, once the crisis has happened, getting on top of it
presumes reliance upon assets that can be maintained permanently in-area. To this
end, developing the use of drones must not only continue, but also be the subject
of significant effort.
Knowledge of this interlinking and of the multi-role aspect of our forces
can also contribute to a move away from the highly-focused role of deterrence
without in any way reducing the certainty of deploying assets for that role.
Similarly, we have to bring into our strategic thinking the fact that this function
affords French forces an area of expertise which enhances their operational capabilities, such as targeting, long-term missions, handling of strategic targets and initial entry to a zone. In doing so, it adds strength to other strategic functions and
puts France in the top league of credibility.
In the second place, todays environment makes it possible to envisage the
refocusing of forces on national territory and in a few areas of influence outside
Europe, without at the same time compromising the other strategic functions.
A New Approach
However, this is only possible under two conditions, which must contribute to the
construction of an agile system of defence and be part of an overall dynamic.
The first of these relates to planning the modernisation of our strengths
within the framework of a more dynamic approach that includes recovery ability.
This refocusing does not amount to some form of resignation, and is in no way
intended as a reduction in our traditional strengths, but to make it work we have
to rethink and renew our organisation in order to get greatest benefit from the new
strategic reach that our new projection assets will soon offer to our armed forces.
The second condition relates to the pressing need to continue to figure
among the most credible nations in terms of intervention capability, something
that is inseparable from our culture of international responsibility. Intervention is
hugely demanding of resources, and new ways have to be found in order to have
just what is needed, at just the right time without giving up our aim of honouring
our ability to impose our political will.
Any intervention relies on the three-pronged approach of immediate
action, force projection and staying power. Immediate action necessarily implies a
need to preserve essential assets at a high degree of competence in the most demanding of operational sectors, which in turn preserves our initial entry capability in
order for us to punch above our weight. Staying powerthe capacity to sustain
longer-term operationscomes into play after the high intensity phase of an operation, but has different requirements. As a consequence, the level of equipment
and preparation of the forces concerned have to be adapted accordingly.
Accepting these conditions, refocusing forces onto our own territory can
still be envisaged because we have robust command and control capabilities with
great potential and which more than ever before allow highly reactive centralised
command, yet decentralised execution, of any wide-ranging operation. Through
better use of these aspects we will be able to guarantee our overseas citizens rapid
arrival of French state forces should a major crisis arise, whilst at the same time
maintaining a reduced force level. In this way we will preserve our worldwide
ambition and economise on use of our assets in order to act within the entire range
of the strategic functions.
As a final note, the refocusing also means it will be possible to consider
strengthening inter-ministerial collaboration in order to improve the security of
our fellow citizens and the resilience of the state. We have to exploit all synergies
from support of assets to the links between command and crisis management
structures, and including improved training missions for the benefit of the countrys occasional needs.
So there we have it: interlinking, multi-role capability and a dynamic
approach all contribute to appreciation of the five strategic functions from a different angle without calling into question their relative importance. This different
A New Approach
viewpoint is aimed at exploiting the particular potential of each function in support of the refocusing of forces on national territory and at the same time offering
a solution that fits in with control of public expenditure.
Against the background of the Livre blanc on defence and national security,
it with all this in view that the French Air Force is continuing its modernisation
programme and consolidating its core capabilities in order to continue to fulfil its
permanent missions of deterrence and protection of our territory and its
approaches, and to maintain its immediate intervention capability at the very
highest level. It will continue to give France the force it needs to exercise its
responsibilities both internationally and in the defence of its citizens.
10
Permanent missions
RDN
French Command and Control

of Air Defence a Brief History
Mickal Aubout
Yohann Droit
Marie-Madeleine Marais
Tony Morin
Captains Aubout and Droit, Lieutenant Marais and
Second Lieutenant Morin are researchers at the Centre for
strategic aerospace studies (Cesa).
ifty years of effort have made the French system for command and control
of air operations (C2 Air) the nerve centre of air operations and as such it is
central to French air power. C2 Air brings together the command structure,
organisation, processes and technical and human resources which allow it to
command, plan, programme and conduct air operations above, from or beyond
national territory.
The history of C2 in France is intimately linked to the history of air defence
of the territory and the means of detection, command and control that go with
it. The basic principles of how C2 operates flow naturally from the way air power
is used.
Genesis of C2: from invention of the principles to the birth of modern C2

The First World War and the emergence of the first C2-type organisation
During the Great War, the first passive defence measures, against the
Zeppelins and Gotha bombers that threatened Paris, led to the establishment of an
organisation tasked with centralising through telephone messages information
coming from watchtowers and from acoustic detection systems, with analysing it
and then deciding what needed to be done. As a result, the fortified camp in Paris,
which had been set up by the military governor of Paris in 1914, received anti-air
defence equipment and fighter squadrons. This organisation lasted throughout the
entire war. Further east, confronted by the huge German offensive around Verdun,
the French command advanced the principle of mass use of aviation to regain the
advantage. The objective was to win and retain mastery of the air above the theatre
of operations by coordinated use of all air assets present there. After the success of
13

this move, an initial structure, the air division, was created in 1918 to coordinate
all combat aviation action on the Eastern Front.
Birth of modern C2 during the Battle of Britain
Despite these initial measures, C2 as we currently recognise it really took

off in 1940, during the Battle of Britain, at the start of the Second World War. In
the face of the Luftwaffes bombing offensive, the Royal Air Force established the
modern fundamental principles of how C2 should operate. They relied at first on
the detection capabilities of the Chain Home coastal radar chain, from which were
established the bearings of incoming attacks and the approximate number of
enemy aircraft. This information was then centralised and analysed in the operations centre of Fighter Command, which passed intercept axes and areas to cover
to the combat aircraft units. The key to Fighter Commands success lay in the
speed of information handling and promptness with which the air bases launched
their fighter aircraft. This process corresponded to the OODA loop (Observation,
Orientation, Decision, Action), which was conceptualised decades later by the
American John Boyd.
Thus from the First World War, and in particular from the Battle of
Verdun, there was coordinated use of air assets. The guiding principles of coordination of air assets were then brought up to date with centralised command and
decentralised execution.
In 1940, the Battle of Britain illustrated the importance of C2 in successful military operations, and indeed Fighter Commands organisation set up in the
Battle of Britain was the birth of modern C2 in the sense of bringing together the
different components (surveillance radar, air observers and fighter aircraft units) in
a single network under a single command which centralised information and planned operations.
Construction of a national capability post-World War Two
Management of ground and air assets (air defence, radar, and air bases) used
in air operations has been in constant development since the Second World War.
This evolution has followed the increasing complexity of equipment, the greater
number of units to manage and the geographical areas that it has been necessary to
keep under surveillance. Throughout the decades following the end of the war, the
development of C2 has been carried along by numerous technological advances,
among which figure the arrival of jet aircraft, the technological developments made
in detection systems in both range and discrimination capability, the exponential
growth in information technology, and the improvement in communications as a
spinoff from the continual modernisation of electronic components.
14

C2 in France reached a major turning point with the creation of NATO

and the emergence of an adversary with a vast range of air and ground assets at his
disposal. The establishment of modern French C2 has to be seen in relation to the
development of the French Air Forces air defence role. Once equipped with radar
supplied by the British, at the end of the nineteen-forties the Air Force took its first
step, in in setting up its operations centre on the RAF model in the centre of Paris,
in the basement of the mobile guards barracks on Place de la Rpublique. In 1957,
a new site became available in Taverny, which became the air defence operations
centre (Centre des oprations de la dfense arienne CODA, in the north-western
suburbs of Paris). In view of the necessary reactivity that this task imposes, a single
command was essential and in 1961 the Air Force created a centralised structure
dedicated to air defence, the air defence forces air command (Commandement air
des forces de dfense arienne CAFDA), still in Taverny. This brought together all
the assets, from the sensor and detection network to the interceptor aircraft,
thereby offering real-time information on a situation to the Prime Minister, who
is the political authority responsible for air defence of the country. This highly
reactive chain linked the highest authority of the state to the pilot in his aircraft,
and ensured sovereignty of national airspace everywhere and in all circumstances.
Air defence areas and their commanders were defined in 1965: in addition to his
HQ, each had a regional C2 with its operations centre, detection and control
equipment and the associated interceptors.
At the time, French C2 was undergoing considerable modernisation of its
detection and air control assets. The radar stations were being modernised and fitted with the Cesar semi-automatic radar system (Complexe dexploitation semiautomatique du radar) and the Strida II air defence communications and display system (Systme de transmission et de reprsentation des informations de dfense arienne).
Introduction of Strida in 1960 was a major step forward in C2, and the general
modernisation continued throughout the following decades. In parallel with all this,
the Air Force adopted the concepts of use common to other NATO air forces and
integrated the NADGE network (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment). In
doing so, the Air Force could thereafter exchange information, and maintain permanent liaison with NATO structures, thereby gaining access to information which
allowed an overview of the general air situation on approaches to mainland France.
The challenge for French C2 was to obtain overall aerial cover of the homeland,
fused together to give a single picture of its airspace. Despite Frances exit from the
NATO Integrated Military Structure in 1966, the Air Force retained its connection
to NADGE. Furthermore, in a similar fashion to the Tiger Meet exercises, French
Air Force units kept up their training with Alliance partners, particularly in the field
of C2, through organising simulated air missions. The permanent French C2 architecture remained until the beginning of the nineteen-nineties and the creation of
the air defence and air operations command (Commandement de la dfense arienne
et des oprations ariennes CDAOA) in 1994. Air defence assets have continued to
15

develop through successive modernisations and the entry into service of new equipment, such as the E-3F AWACS at the end of the nineteen-eighties.
French C2 Air: robust and interoperable
Developments in the concept and capability of French C2 Air
The start of the nineteen-nineties saw two major developments: the end of
the Cold War encouraged a more expeditionary posture, symbolised by the Gulf
war, and consequently increased use of C2 in external operations; and considerable
progress in information and communication technologies led to the arrival of the
concept of network-centric warfare.
The years following the end of the Cold War were particularly good for
French C2. First, the Air Force received E-3F AWACS airborne warning and
command system, which gave much greater scope, particularly in external interventions. Thereafter, the lessons learned from the Gulf War hammered home the need
for effective systems of Command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I)
in any modern war situation. In adapting itself to this new environment, in1994 the
Air Force brought its competence and systems for dealing with external operations
alongside the existing structure in mainland France, to create the CDAOA. Over and
above its air defence tasking, CDAOA maintains and develops the Air Forces expertise in commanding air operations.
With regard to capability, these developments led to the launch in 1993 of
the system for command and control of air (now aerospace) operations (SCCOA),
into which Strida was incorporated, thus networking together all players involved in
aerospace operations. SCCOA has become the backbone of the deployment of
French air assets. The programme was started in parallel with NATOs Air Command
and Control System (ACCS), which brings together all member countries systems
for conduct of air operations, including that of France. SCCOAs task is to:
l Ensure the permanent deterrent missions and protection of national
territory without any interruption;
l Allow all military air assets to conduct their missions 24 hours per day,
in national airspace and in complete security;
l Provide for the long-term deployment of one hundred combat aircraft in
three in-theatre air bases;
l Provide the air transport, surveillance and in-flight refuelling assets that
are operationally necessary to supporting the deployment of forces;
16

l Take on, if needed, the role of lead nation for command of the coalition air
component, and ensuring its participation at the in-theatre joint command level.
The development of SCCOA was just one step in a series of steps.

Currently, SCCOA is beginning stage 4, which will see the move from separate
command and control centres to a NATO integrated ACCS structure. Its development has followed the transformation of the French armed forces, and is aimed
at providing a mechanism that is capable of covering the entire spectrum of aerospace operations and adapting to changes in them.
Henceforth, the SCCOA should be thought of as a tool which allows independence of decision-making and action in air operations. At the time of the Iraq
war in 1991, French structures were ill-adapted to the conduct of a coalition air
operation, and there was a necessary dependence on coalition command structures. Twenty years later, during operation Unified Protector, the C2 Air capability
allowed France to conduct the first strikes on 19 March 2011, whose political and
strategic impact was a determining factor in the success of the operation.
Current C2 Air
Today, France has high performance C2 Air, which is robust and interoperable. From both fixed and deployable structures t allows command, planning,
programming and conduct of air operations over, from, and even outside national
territory. The French C2 Air can be divided into two major functional groups:
permanent C2 Air and expeditionary C2 Air. The permanent group provides for the
conduct of a wide range of air missions over national territory, while the expeditionary C2 concerns itself with the conduct of external air operations, be they directed
from C2 structures in France or overseas. French C2 Air can be set out as follows:
Air protection
Space surveillance and anti-missile defence
l Operations on national territory
l
l
External air operations :

- conducted from the homeland
- conducted from structures outside the homeland
}
}
permanent C2 Air
expeditionary C2 Air
The primary mission of the permanent C2 Air is surveillance and protection

of national skies: it relies on the command and control structure of the national air
operations centre (Centre national des oprations ariennes CNOA), and French
capability in this field recognised as robust. The French system for air security
provides for the surveillance of some 11,000 air movements daily over our soil.
Since the 11 September 2001, the C2 system for air defence of national
airspace has been focused on the terrorist threat. A consequence of this has been
the exceptional need for a greater level of inter-ministerial work. The presence
17

within CNOA, of representatives of the various ministries improves the flow of

operations, and their interface role improves inter-ministerial synergy. Everyone
involved in the fight against terrorism is therefore integrated into the same information loop. In parallel with this, there have been efforts towards better cooperation between countries. France has signed bilateral agreements with bordering
countries with the aim of achieving earlier warning and more effective action
against threats.
The kinds of operation that permanent C2 Air has supported include longrange raids, in-country training of air forces, and public service missions. Permanent
C2 Air gives France the ability to conduct long-range conventional strikes: for
example, France is now capable of projecting a patrol of Rafales carrying Scalp cruise
missiles, in company with air-to-air refuelling tankers and an AWACS, all fitted with
long-range communications, in order to command a cruise missile strike from
COAIR or from Lyon. This unique capability affords the political decision-makers
the ability to deliver precision military effects anywhere, and in just a few hours,
with a very smallor even noground footprint.
Permanent C2 Air allows the mounting of many public service missions
which require coordination of the use of civil and military assets, such as security
of the skies, search and rescue of aircraft in distress, fighting illegal activity such as
drugs trafficking, fighting forest fires and assistance to populations following
natural disasters.
CDAOA also conducts the space surveillance mission, and directs employment of the large space watch network (Grand rseau adapt la veille spatiale
Graves). The data obtained from it is analysed and regularly updated to build a space
picture. Improvements to Graves are planned for the near future, as well as the development of a demonstrator for spectral observation and characterisation of geostationary satellites (Observation spectrale et caractrisation des satellites gostationnaires
Oscgane), which will perform spectroscopy on geostationary satellites. The coordinated setting to work of these sensors and their associated software highlights the existence of spatial operational loop of Detection(1) Analysis(2) Orientation(3)
Action(4), which is essentially the OODA loop in a different disguise.
Since February 2010, a secure defence communications line has been established between CNES, a centre of expertise, and CDAOA, the operational authority. This has led to the establishment of a space centre that is planned for the Lyon
Mont-Verdun air base, and which will be able to give a very precise daily situation
by merging the information coming from all sensors. This future operational
(1) By Graves (for low orbit) and Oscgane (for geostationary orbit).
(2) Using CIBORG and STK software.
(3) Direction of trajectory-measuring (Satam) or imagery (Tira) sensors.
(4) For example, anti-collision manoeuvres, operations planning or political decisions.
18

centre for military surveillance of spatial objects (Centre oprationnel de surveillance

militaire des objets spatiaux Cosmos) will therefore be a centre for real spaceorientated C2.
Many years of dedicated work has given France a permanent C2 Air capability that enables the country to ensure the overarching mission of protection of national airspace and at the same time to conduct other missions of highly diverse nature.
19
The Airborne Nuclear Component:

an Approach to Excellence
EMAA
French Air Staff.
An airborne component based on nuclear sufficiency
The nuclear air forces are composed of assets that are allocated according
to the principle of strict sufficiency and sized to meet the appropriate nuclear
need. This need was redefined in 2008 and led to the reduction from three to two
Air Force squadrons of nuclear-capable fighter aircraft. These forces are capable of
inflicting unacceptable damage on any player who threatens the vital interests of
the nation. The permanent character of French nuclear deterrence, and the reaction times that such deterrence implies, requires the support of a considerable
volume of dedicated resources, including crews, aircraft and technical support, as
well as the security environment needed for effecting the overall mission, which
involves physical protection (on the ground) and in-flight escort. This permanent
tasking to provide nuclear deterrence requires the commitment of the entire Air
Force and is accorded the highest priority.
The dynamism created by the airborne nuclear component
The airborne nuclear component is notable for its permanent ability to

deploy at short notice. To do this it has some obvious intrinsic assets: it offers great
flexibility in its modes of action and great precision in strike. If faced with a
possible attack on our vital interests, these diverse modes of action enhance beyond
measure the credibility of nuclear deterrence.
The success of the nuclear mission relies on the most demanding of operational knowhow: taking into account the international implications, the distances
to be covered, the threats encountered and the precision required of the strikes, the
competence sought from the crews is of the highest order.
The necessary rigour and the need for security are the foundations of a
team spirit which lies behind all the operations of the strategic air forces (Forces
ariennes stratgiques FAS).
20

The first armed Mirage IV was put on nuclear alert in 1964: since then,
the nuclear deterrent mission has led to the creation of both operational and technical expertise.
Autonomy in use is essential to deterrence, and it has necessitated the development of particular types of hardened and often innovative materiel to guarantee complete operational effectiveness. As a result, advanced research has led to the
development of electronic countermeasures, a navigation system and an automatic
terrain-following capability, which have all added to the credibility of the component and guaranteed its operational reliability. These capabilities have naturally
been passed on to assets of the Air Force which perform a conventional role
electronic warfare measures and the Mirage 2000s terrain-following system, for
example. The same goes for communications systems, which also have a need for
robustness and performance: their development has led to general improvement in
aeronautical communications.
The deterrent mission is also the catalyst for industrial and technological
excellence within the defence industrial and technological base. Through cause and
effect, some major programmes which have been developed for the FAS have been
expanded into dual systems to the broader benefit of the Air Force. A further point
is that, by the very nature of the programmes undertaken, some skill areas have had
to remain strictly national. Because of this, investment in these skills has been of
benefit to other major industrial developments. Among these, in particular are
propulsion (ramjet technology), aerodynamics (flight from the lowest to the
highest altitudes), the extreme mechanical and thermal environments of longrange supersonic missiles, penetration of hardened and heavily defended targets
and hardening of electronic components against nuclear attack.
A recognised centre of nuclear excellence
The nuclear certification process for our new military nuclear systems
Rafale with the ASMPA (the advanced medium range air to ground missile), for
exampleis based on unique knowledge, and has had remarkable success.
Modernisation of the strategic air forces has highlighted once again the nuclear skill
of Air Force personnel and their competence in the subject. These skills concerning
the airborne nuclear mission are quite rare and highly regarded. It is worthy of note
that any loss of competence in the very specialised field of nuclear weapons has an
immediate effect on the credibility of the system overall and requires substantial
measures to be taken to rebuild the necessary knowledge. One of our allies has had
bitter experience of this as a result of pressure of external commitments over the past
20 years, during which its units neglected their preparation for the operational
nuclear role in favour of their conventional roles. The French Air Force affirms its
absolute commitment to the priority of the nuclear deterrent role.
21

Conventional capability within the constraints of the nuclear role
All that said, the crews of the strategic air forces are not channelled exclusively into the nuclear mission, albeit that role remains fundamental to operational preparation. The deployment of personnel to other roles is eased by the multirole capability of the aircraft, and provides the military chief with a range of capabilities within the conventional field. This is also true for the fleet of tanker aircraft
which every day and at all latitudes provide support to French and allied combat
aircraft. Soon, with the entry into service of the A330 multi-role transport tanker,
this capability will be further improved.
The strategic air forces contribute to the Air Forces conventional tasking
by supplying a pool of high quality crews who participate in the establishment of
air power on operations. This use of manpower and material dedicated to the
deterrent mission means careful choices have to be made with regard to the political authoritys view of the geopolitical situation at the time. Such use cannot be
allowed to become routine.
Analysis of recent conflicts shows that, when possible within the constraints
of the requirements for the nuclear role, the strategic air forces are completely adapted to participate from the outset and in the long term in conventional missions. In
this way, all involved in the operation can benefit from the remarkable tactical and
technical expertise that has been acquired during training for the nuclear role.
22
The Air Force

and National Security
EMAA
French Air Staff.
he legitimacy of the state depends, amongst other things, on its ability to

ensure the security of our fellow-citizens, both on national territory and
outside our frontiers. However, the resources which the state makes available to respond to this imperative are increasingly limited; the boundary between
defence and security is less and less clear and new actors (local government, NGOs
and so on) who are not directly under the authority of the state are playing an
increasing role. These are factors pushing towards a rapprochement of these two
spheres which were formerly well compartmented.
From a technical point of view, the major functions which underlie security
and national defence possess some remarkable similarities: both areas involve appreciating the threat or risk, collecting intelligence on the situation, evaluating all the
options for intervention and planning and coordinating the resources or measuring
the effects achieved. All of this requires information and communication systems
and is usually performed under pressure of events. Certainly, the constraints resulting from the environment may change, but it will always be necessary to seek to
save lives or to undertake a complex mission whilst keeping an eye on saving
resources.
When it finds itself in a national security context, the air arm can make an
effective and appropriate contribution. It can also propose positive approaches to
optimising inter-ministerial capabilities, whose deployment can be very rapid and
adapted to a short, medium or long-term perspective.
The short term: optimisation of state resources
The Air Force already carries out airspace control missions on a daily basis.
These may include in-flight assistance to aircraft which have technical problems or
are lost, as well as search and rescue missions following an air accident. It regularly
provides a protective bubble over Heads of States summits and other important
gatherings of people, such as D-Day ceremonies. In support of the struggle against
organised crime, it is able to participate in the search for or pursuit of aircraft being
used for illegal trafficking. As the experts in the third dimension, it has the means
23
The Air Force

and the capabilities to manage the coordination of civil-military air activity in an

emergency situation from fixed or mobile centres.
The Air Forces command and control (C2) centres are based on readilyavailable capabilities and, more to the point, on the air defence decision process,
which directly connects the Prime Minister to the systems for the defence of national airspace and its approaches. These include satellites, radars, interceptor aircraft
and helicopters. The C2 centres can serve as the backbone of a wider crisis management system, bringing together the inter-ministerial crisis cells.
In addition, to increase the efficacy of the system, the resort to ministry of
defence resources can be formalized. UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), designed
to watch over large regions for long periods, are capable of providing valuable help
to the civil authorities in making a permanent assessment of the situation, the
coordination of resources or as communication relays. Reconnaissance aircraft,
which already support the Gendarmerie in their work against crime, also prove
their worth. Finally, the Air Forces transport capability, consisting of aircraft and
helicopters, offer a speed of reaction and flexibility of use, which justify their rapid
requisition in a crisis situation.
This shared use of state resources can be made to work well, as long as civil
administrations are better aware of the capabilities for intervention that the military forces can offer. To achieve this we need to encourage regular inter-ministerial
exercises on the lines of the nuclear security exercises, which involve local, departmental and national level participation. The resilience of the state is bound up in
the logic of continuous and systematic preparation in which defence forces can aid
the civil power, based on their expertise in planning processes.
The network of military air bases offers another major advantage. First of
all, it offers the civil power secure strong points, readily available to inter-ministerial action with its accommodation capability, airport facilities, radar, reserves of
trained men, communications facilities, medical and other assistance and more
besides. Moreover, this network can immediately be placed at the service of the
state in the event of a loss of airports and civil air control following a general technical breakdown or a massive cyber attack, for example. It can also provide the safe
transport of critical cargoes such as medical evacuation, transport of senior officials
or repatriated nationals.
Medium term: new horizons
Globalisation and technological developments have together put the flow

of finance and resources at the heart of world business. In the aerospace domain,
air transport carries about three percent by volume of international trade in merchandise but 40 to 50 percent of its value. Maintaining freedom of movement
within it, guaranteeing it by the range of air defence resources and surveillance of
24
The Air Force

the skies, is already a considerable challenge. In addition, the third dimension

makes possible the surveillance of the vast spaces of land and sea across which this
flow of resources transits. It is time to envisage a new approach to the contribution
of the air arm to these issues of national stability.
With this in view, a forward-looking review of the deployment of our
pre-positioned forces is required. One approach consists setting up a network of
airport hubs based on possible complementarity with our allies, perhaps the
United Kingdom and the United States, establishing specific diplomatic agreements, or deploying staging facilities across the world.
Our current and, in particular our future, strategic projection capabilities
with the A400M and MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport), and the associated
pre-positioning of air resources, would then give us the ability to react quickly
when the security of our air, maritime or terrestrial trade is threatened.
In parallel, overseas Departments and territories are occasionally subject to
majorsometimes extremenatural disasters which require more than simple
coordination of emergency help, and therefore need rapid-response capabilities to
restore the vital functions of the state. In this scenario of long-distance and rapid
projection, the Air Force could provide important and organised aid to interministerial aid teams.
In general terms, this future system should be considered as available to the
state in its wider sense, so that the Air Forces strategic transport capability is available
to all ministries. The transport of banknotes from the Banque de France or other
sensitive government cargoes to the overseas territories might be a first example.
Long term: build a spirit of civil defence
Finally, the security of a country invariably relies on the commitment of its

citizens. The education of the young is a major element and warrants close attention. The promotion of a spirit of civil defence could therefore be engendered by
means of defence schools.
The model of air cadets who engage to serve in the reserves in exchange for
aeronautical training, inspired by the British example and set up in Air Force
schools, could form a policy objective promoting social cohesion, an expression of
popular feeling and of the values linked to security.
In the same way, it could be interesting to develop the promotion of the
defence and security dimension in university courses in general, following the
example of the courses in officer schools offered to students at teacher training
colleges.
25
The Air Force

Finally, the activities of the Trinmes acadmiques * could be enriched by

means of a wider participation by those connected with civil defence.
To respond to the issue of national security, the state can depend on the
solid foundation of the Air Forces capabilities, which offer the characteristics of
dual and inter-ministerial usage: C2 centres, a network of air bases, the capacity
for reconnaissance and surveillance, a strategic transport capability and a capacity
for training. After a first stage of inter-ministerial optimisation of these resources,
this approach suggests promising perspectives of a larger spectrum of missions in
the fullness of time.
* Trinmes acadmiques
Decentralised organisations bringing together the ministry of national education, defence and the Institute for
advanced studies in national defence (IHEDN) on the theme of security.
26
The Capability to Act Fast and Far:

three Recent Commitments
RDN

The Afghan Model 10 Years on,
Still Wholly Relevant
Graud Laborie
Colonel (Air), former commander of transport squadron
1/61 Touraine; Graduate of the Air Force Command
and Staff College and of the School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies.
n 10 November 2001, Northern Alliance forces captured Mazar-i-Sharif,

bringing about the collapse of the Taliban regime a month later. With this
important victory, the first since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom,
the whole world discovered pictures of western fighters on horseback amongst
General Dostums cavalry. This indication of the involvement of Special Forces
alongside the Northern Alliance, supported by coalition airpower would give birth
a year later to the Afghan Model concept, propounded and popularised by
Stephen Biddle, researcher at the US Army War College.
What is the legacy of the Afghan model ten years on? Has it been relevant
to other operational theatres? Is it still relevant in the framework of operations in
Mali or of future conflicts?
To answer these questions, we have to go back to the beginnings of the

model and its first implementation in Afghanistan, if we are to understand the
basic principles. Study of recent conflicts reveals that the model was also used in
northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, before reappearing in
Libya during Operation Unified Protector. These three examples offer a precise
definition of its characteristics, advantages and limitations. They confirm that the
Afghan model is a strategic tool, mainly airborne, that is still completely relevant,
with high coercive value when employed in the right conditions. It should be fully
recognised and incorporated into our armed forces range of strategic options.
Birth of a concept: Afghanistan, October 2001 to March 2002
The beginnings of the Afghan model concept date from the first weeks of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). After the 9/11 attacks, the National Security
Council gave President Bush two options for Afghanistan. The first, fruit of the
29

labours of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favoured the conventional approach requiring
the deployment of five divisions over a period of several months before starting the
assault on the Taliban regime. The second option, presented by the CIA, predicted the fall of the regime through the joint efforts of US airpower, Special Forces
and Afghan allies. This option was not to the liking of the Pentagon military. It
had too much of the flavour of unconvincing experiences during the Vietnam war,
where Special Forces, allied with Montagnard tribes tried unsuccessfully to stem
the flood of men and materiel along the Ho Chi Minh trail. For the Afghanistan
issue, however, it caught the eye of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for several reasons. Firstly, it offered a rapid response, in accordance with the expectations
of the White House and of the American people, traumatised by the scale of the
terrorist attacks. Isolated, with no access by sea, Afghanistan didnt lend itself to
massive troop deployments, requiring negotiations for transit and stationing with
neighbouring states. The 1979 Soviet invasion, initiated from its Central Asian
republics was not subject to the same restrictions. Next, the CIA plan was based
on airpower, whose lethality and accuracy were far beyond anything available in
Vietnam. Airpower, combined with Special Forces equipped with portable laser
designators, and able to give exact GPS coordinates offered new possibilities that
were still largely underestimated in 2001. Donald Rumsfeld glimpsed them, nonetheless. He initiated a major reform of the American military arm, considered too
ponderous and unable to make enough use of its superior technology.(1) The Shock
and Awe concept, developed in 1996 by researchers of the National Defence
University had drawn the Defense Secretarys attention: a combination of speed,
accuracy and firepower that paralyses the enemy with a minimum of force.(2) Its
first full-scale application later took place in Afghanistan, but with the ground
element restricted to Special Forces.
The CIA plan was finally adopted, chiefly because of the geographic and
diplomatic constraints of access to Afghanistan, and the political need to act quickly. The CIA could also make use of its solid relationship with the Northern
Alliance, established in the months before 9/11. What followed is well known: the
air campaign started on 7 October with an attack on the Talibans rudimentary air
defence network and command and control infrastructure (C2). On 15 October,
American Special Forces joined up with Northern Alliance forces to prepare the
offensive against the main Taliban strongholds, particularly Mazar-i-Sharif.
Without vehicles, they used the transport mode best adapted to the narrow trails
of the Afghan mountains: the pony. The entrenched positions defending the town
fell one after the other in the face of the joint action of coalition airpower and
General Dostums fighters. The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif on 10 November marked the
(1) Robert Kagan, Finding the Target: the transformation of American military policy, New York, Encounter Books, 2006,
p. 293.
(2) Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving rapid dominance, Washington, National Defense
University Institute of National Security Strategy, 1996, p. xxiv-xxvi.
30

beginning of the end for the Taliban regime, which abandoned its last stronghold
in Kandahar on 6 December after a campaign of just 60 days.
In November 2002 the first in-depth article on the new Afghan Model
appeared with Army War College researcher Stephen Biddles by-line. The author
defined its chief characteristicsnoting advantages and limitationsthat had been
demonstrated in the first months of the same year. The use of Afghan allies to
finish the job and liquidate the Al-Qaeda fighters who were dug in in Tora Bora or
in the Shah-e-Kot valley (Operation Anaconda) did not meet with the hoped-for
success. In the second case, the weak motivation of the Afghan soldiers who were
supposed to unearth and push the enemy out of the valley, led to their retreat at the
first sign of difficulty, leaving the US troops alone to face a determined enemy.
The application to Iraqi Kurdistan: March-April 2003
Whilst the first months of Enduring Freedom are fairly well documented in
France, application of the Afghan model in northern Iraq in spring 2003 is far less
so. Here again, geographic conditions and the diplomatic environment combined to
oblige the Pentagon to reproduce the Afghan operational pattern. US Central
Commands (CENTCOM) planning for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein envisaged the deployment from Turkey of the 4th Infantry Division (4 ID) into northern
Iraq. By mid-March, in spite of intense diplomatic activity, CENTCOM was forced
to recognise that Turkey would not join the coalition and would not authorise the
opening of a northern front from its border. Somewhat in despair, General Tommy
Franks decided to use special forces in order to tie down the 13 Iraqi divisions
deployed by Saddam Hussein to cover his northern frontier. For CENTCOM the
danger was to see these divisions redeployed to the south, opposite Kuwait, once the
Iraqi dictator realised that the danger from Turkey had dissipated. CENTCOM
then decided to commit 48 teams of 12 men from the 3rd and 10th Special Forces
Group, supported by coalition airpower and infiltrated alongside the Kurdish
Peshmergas, in an attempt to assume the role originally assigned to the 4 ID.
It was a difficult task: the 50,000 to 70,000 Kurdish militiamen were brave
and motivated, but had no heavy equipment, and their offensive capability was
non-existent. Their favourite tactic consisted of mounting costly frontal attacks on
positions held by the 70,000 to 110,000 men of the Iraqi regular forces, and the
20,000 soldiers of the Republican Guard. The American Special Forces who
constituted the Joint Special Operations Task-Force North (JSOTF-N) were infiltrated by air on 23 March without their vehicles and communications equipment,
which were held up in Turkey. Air strike guidance therefore had to be conducted
essentially by radio, without data links. Air support was also not up to Afghanistan
standards: the coalitions air resources were based in the Persian Gulf, a long way
from northern Iraq. Without the planned Turkish bases, only naval aviation from
31

carriers in the Mediterranean could be used, but that was also a long way away and
limited in capability.
However the American Special Forces were able to accomplish the three
missions assigned to them: to pin down the greater part of the Iraqi divisions on
the Green Line (the border between Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq), destroy
the training camps of the terrorist group Ansar-al-Islam, and stabilise the cities of
Mosul and Kirkuk. Spread out along the Green Line, in groups of 12 men plus a
US Air Force combat air controller attached to a unit of 100 to 300 Peshmergas,
the Special Forces used the local knowledge and intelligence of their Kurdish allies
to direct air strikes on Iraqi units. During the 16 days of operations, Saddam
Husseins troops never managed to sort the problem out. Airpower, effectively
directed by the combat controllers made up for the numerical, material and tactical inferiority of the Kurdish allies.
Nonetheless, the successes of JSOTF-N were sometimes achieved with difficulty and at the cost of collateral damage. As with the fighting in the Debecka
Pass, two American teams and their allies narrowly escaped annihilation at the
hands of an Iraqi Motor Rifle company reinforced by a large number of tanks.
Hindered by bad weather, American bombing led to the loss of 17 Kurdish
combatants hit by mistake by an F-14 D fighter. The Special Forces owed their survival to their Javelin anti-tank missiles which pushed back the enemy armour.
Fortunately an improvement in the weather the next day allowed them to finish
off the Iraqi column. The JSOTF-N was also faced with another major problem:
the lack of dedicated ISR capability (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance),
priority being given to covering the American advance from the south. The coalition lost all trace of the elite Nebuchadnezzar division, which managed to redeploy
to central Iraq to confront the attack through the Karbala breach.
The Afghan model is not, therefore, risk-free. Even if its application in northern Iraq can be justly qualified as a coalition success, it also reveals the limitations, particularly with restricted air resources.
The Afghan Model, an antidote to bogging down in Libya
As the Iraqi example shows, the role of catalyst for airpower played by the
American Special Forces demands a considerable ground element to be effective.
The JSOTF-N consisted of no less than 600 men alongside the Kurdish
Peshmergas. An operation on this scale is not within the capacities of the clandestine operations services alone, with their far fewer numbers. Hence the use of military special forces, too numerous to stay invisible, with the associated risks of fatalities, is not anodyne in political terms. Their activity requires a certain element of
recognition by their government.
32

If this aspect posed no particular difficulty for the White House in the cases
of Afghanistan and Iraq, it has been shown to be much more of a problem for
France and Great Britain during Operation Unified Protector. Resolution 1971 of
the UN Security Council authorised the use of all measures necessary to protect
populations and civilian areas threatened by attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
including Benghazi, whilst excluding the deployment of any kind of foreign occupation force. The types of measure necessary for this being left to the discretion of
coalition members, the terms were sufficiently ambiguous to allow active support
to the Libyan opposition. However, the exclusion of ground troops put the responsibility for support solely on the air and sea resources, with not much possibility of tight coordination with insurgent action.
Officially, therefore, the use of Special Forces in the first weeks was limited
to the role of advisors to the CNT. But by late August, special forces from Qatar, the
Emirates, and also from France and Great Britain were to be found along with the
insurgents at the fall of Tripoli. Their role symptomizes a resort to the Afghan model,
as described by Jean-Christophe Notin, where the chain established by Special
Operations Command did much to lubricate the observation/destruction process.(3)
Why the change? Was it the result of coalition strategy from the beginning of
Unified Protector, or of adaptation to the situation? Early studies of the campaign
against Gaddafi lean towards the second hypothesis. Once the loyalist forces had
been stopped short in their offensive against Benghazi, the coalition ran a risk of
getting bogged down that was perceptible from the end of April.
A study for the (French) Strategic Research Foundation carried out in this
period already indicated the limitations of the insurrection, on its own incapable of
forcing the enemy to concentrate and manoeuvre thereby offering a more vulnerable
air target. The study also proposed the deployment of Special Forces Tactical Air
Control Parties to increase the effectiveness of airstrikes.(4) With stagnation on the
Brega and Misrata fronts, resort to the Afghan model seemed obvious also to the
political authorities of the more resolute coalition states. It is also relevant to observe
that despite the helicopter and fighter bomber attacks to free the coastal towns, the
insurrections salvation came from the Jebel Nefoussa, where the Western and Arab
special forces had been particularly active since spring 2011. Their role, alongside
the Berber insurgents covered a wide spectrum, as explained in a study by the Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI)(5): supply of weapons and materiel by air and land,
training insurgents for the assault on Tripoli, integration of the ground offensive
with the NATO air campaign, and intelligence and airstrike guidance during
combat.
(3) Jean-Christophe Notin, La vrit sur notre guerre en Libye, Paris, Fayard, 2012, p. 471.
(4) Philippe Gros, De Odyssey Dawn Unified Protector : bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de
lengagement en Libye, FRS, Note No. 04/11, April 2011, p. 18.
(5) RUSI, Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya operation, Interim RUSI Campaign Report, September
2011, p. 11-12.
33

Faced with the risk of bogging down, the coalition resorted to an escalation
based on the Afghan model, using special forces, in order to counter the pro-Gaddafi
forces adaptation to the operational methods of an air campaign insufficiently
integrated with insurgent action. The Libyan example therefore confirms the intact
relevance of the Afghan model 10 years after its birth. It shows also one of the paradoxes of airpower in the OUP situation: it gives satisfaction at the political level by
affirming determination from the earliest moments of operations, without a ground
commitment. However, it is only really effective in military terms if it integrates a
ground element capable of catalysing its effects to help the insurrection win the day.
The Afghan model under the microscope strengths and weaknesses
The Afghan, Iraqi and Libyan examples allow us to define the chief characteristics of the model, and to explore the advantages and the limitations. It can be
summed up simply in the form of the following triptych: airpower, and special
forces in partnership with local forces, for the conduct of air-ground operations.
Special forces operate primarily as a catalyst for airpower, allowing local forces to
carry the day in spite of numerical and materiel inferiority. As happened in the
battle for Mazar-i-Sharif, the Northern Alliance with 2,000 men was able to win
against 5,000 well-entrenched and well-equipped Taliban fighters. Special Forces
can also assume roles beyond airstrike guidance: training, supervision, technical
advice and intelligence support to the local command. In targeting terms, the
concept of full spectrum targeting is best adapted to seizing the totality of the
effects that the model makes possible: lethal airpower guided by special forces
strike the enemy forces, non-lethal resources provide intelligence and resupply of
men, equipment and rations. Morale, military capabilities, and the population
supporting the local allies are the targets for preservation, just as the morale,
command and control and military capabilities of the enemy are the targets for
destruction. The psychological impact of the air arm on the adversary is that much
stronger in that he is incapable of countering its effects, as testified by Taliban
prisoners captured during Enduring Freedom.(6)
A number of conditions are needed for the Afghan model to function correctly. They affect the three components, and determine the limitations of the model.
In airpower terms, success in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya should not make us forget
that the prerequisites indispensable to any attempt to apply the model are the acquisition and maintenance of air superiority. This prerequisite may impose a long,
costly and crippling campaign against an enemy with robust air defence. The discussions in the media of a possible military intervention in Syria are a good example.(7)
(6) Charles J. Dunlap, Short changing the Joint Fight? An airmans assessment of FM 3-24 and the case for developing truly
joint COIN doctrine, Maxwell AFB, Air University Monograph, 2007, p. 41.
(7) See the reaction following the loss of a Turkish fighter in Syrias downing of Turkish jet demonstrates sophisticated air
defence, Seattle Times, 27 June 2012.
34

Without air superiority, the model is quite simply inapplicable. Even once acquired,
all is not yet won. Local allies and Special Forces are still particularly vulnerable when
faced with enemy troops with superior numbers and equipment, as shown by the
battle of Debecka. Such inferiority must be compensated by unfailing air support.
High endurance ISR capabilities are vital to avoiding nasty surprises, hence a campaign whose ultra-sophisticated air component is often in contrast with the rusticity
of troops on the ground. According to a RAND study, the first months of Operation
Enduring Freedom were far more demanding of data links than the more conventional Iraqi campaign of 2003.(8)
Support for friendly forces equally requires great air support know-how, in
both its lethal and non-lethal aspects. The accuracy of a guided weapon must go
hand-in-hand with adjustable lethality according to the enemys ability to adapt.
Having experienced the devastating effects of allied airpower on its very exposed
motorised columns, as at Tarin Kowt on 18 November 2001, the Taliban retreated
to well-prepared and camouflaged defensive positions that even the 2,000lb JDAM
could not totally destroy. During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, the
American heli-borne forces on objective Ginger had a very hard time with Al-Qaeda
militants well dug in to positions that resisted a number of consecutive strikes.(9)
Unified Protector also confirmed the need for a wide range of armament covering the
full spectrum of destructive effect. In the Libyan case, limited-effect munitions were
in short supply, shown by the recourse to using laser-guided inert bombs, to strike
the enemy scattered in a densely populated urban environment without collateral
damage. The Royal Air Force likewise made intensive use of its well-adapted
Brimstone munitions, to the point of virtually exhausting its stocks.(10)
In the non-lethal category, there is a vital need for solid and reliable tactical transport aircraft support, to be able to infiltrate special forces, to resupply
them and to supply equipment to local forces, as at the Jebel Nefoussa in Libya.
Precision airdropping capabilities can offset the lack of secured landing sites and
the isolation of friendly forces.(11) To that must of course be added the inherent
resources of any air campaign: C2, in-flight refuelling, combat search and rescue,
and more still. Clearly, a whole range of air operational capabilities has to be mastered, which de facto puts a limit on the number of air forces capable of applying
the Afghan model independently, or at least of making a decisive contribution
within a coalition. This necessary major air effort can quickly reduce the attraction
of a model, whose ground component might seem less demanding in human and
(8) Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower against Terror: Americas conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Santa Monica, Rand,
2005, p. 352.
(9) Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the future of warfare: implications for army and defence policy, Carlisle Barracks,
US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, p. 37.
(10) Royal United Services Institute, op. cit. footnote 5, p. 6
(11) RUSI, op. cit. foot note 5, p. 11, Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. foot note 3, p. 391-392, and Jean-Marc Tanguy,
Harmattan : Rcits et rvlations, Paris, Nimrod, 2012, p. 51.
35

materiel resources. Operating in a coalition will clearly compensate for certain

shortcomings.
As to the ground sector, special forces must obviously be able to master all
the techniques and procedures of air support. Their role however goes way beyond
simple air strike guidance. Operation Anaconda illustrated the limits of air-portable
ISR capabilities: in spite of a month of intensive observation of an operational zone
covering no more than 100 square kilometres, half the enemy positions had escaped
detection before the start of the operation. When the geography is unfavourable, the
forces in contact have to make up for these limitations. This is the case in the mountainous terrain of a great part of Afghanistan, but also in urban environments, which
are increasingly the theatres of modern conflict. The role of special forces is therefore
to compensate as far as possible for the limits of sensors, by sending information
obtained at first hand or gathered by local allies. That works in both directions, allowing the allies to benefit from information gathered by airborne sensors. The
employment of Western special forces in this role during the rebel advance on Tripoli
emerges clearly from the initial studies of Operation Unified Protector.(12)
Interaction with local allies also needs the maintenance of a pool of linguists
and regional experts within the special forces, capable of interacting quickly and
effectively with the local partners. Although in Afghanistan the American teams were
able to draw on the CIAs contacts with the Northern Alliance, it took several weeks
for the Western and Arab special forces to build an effective partnership with the geographically scattered Libyan allies, who lacked a unified command.
The existence of these local allies is the third component of the Afghan
model, whose chief quality lies in their availability as allies of circumstance. The
presence of forces that have a degree of political and military credibility is of course crucial to the success of the model. The choice of local partner cannot be a neutral one, for in an insurrection gathering together different movements against a
common enemy, the support given to some rather than others gives rise to political consideration of the organisation of force relationships which will dictate the
future government of the country.
Amongst the criteria which determine the choice of this ally, the level of
military credibility is not necessarily determining if it is compensated by the ability to rally sufficient numbers of potential combatants. Experience shows that it is
possible to adapt to a wide range of situations. The future combatant does not have
to be particularly well trained if it is possible to instruct him in the necessary rudiments of combat in areas out of hostile range. Equipment can be supplied by air
if needed, as at Jebel Nefoussa. Once the combatant is on a war footing, the special forces can give advice to the leaders, ensure the coordination of airstrikes and
contribute to the synchronisation of ground force action with the air campaign
(12) RUSI, op. cit. footnote 5, p. 12, and Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 470-471.
36

plan. Against all expectations, the result is the victory of the armed greengrocer
over the professional soldier.(13)
It is nonetheless essential to be well aware of the tactical limitations of the
local partner, not necessarily able to understand or execute complex manoeuvres
against an experienced enemy. Special forces in their limited numbers are always
vulnerable to a sudden collapse of their allies. A capital point for the models success is that the protagonists must share essentially the same strategic objectives. The
fall of the Taliban regime in the first weeks of Enduring Freedom or of the Gaddafi
regime gave the common interest needed for common success. On the other hand,
the examples of Tora Bora or of Operation Anaconda reveal the danger of not
having enough ground troops to offset the shortcomings of the Afghan ally, poorly
motivated for the pursuit of foreign Al-Qaeda fighters, especially in the depths of
winter, in particularly mountainous terrain.(14)
The Afghan model and Operation Serval
On 12 January 2013, France set in motion Operation Serval in Mali, to stop

the terrorist offensive south of the river Niger and to hinder these movements from
threatening the State of Mali. After an initial phase of reaction and stabilisation, the
offensive was launched to retake the Niger loop and then to restore the integrity of
Malis northern territory. Do the first lessons learned from Operation Serval indicate
recourse to the Afghan model? It has to be admitted that the first few weeks did not
really lend themselves to its application, because of the extreme weakness of the Mali
armed forces, incapable of playing the role of a sufficiently militarily credible local
ally. The French intervention was shaped as a response to this weakness. French soldiers were on the front line, alongside those Malian units which had retained a degree
of cohesion, and whose morale and military effectiveness were boosted by strong air
support and the presence on the ground of an impressive number of French combat
elements. This strong French presence up front, notably during the recapture of the
Niger loop, ruled out the application of the Afghan model.
Nonetheless, the model evidently played a more important role at the start
of the offensive into the Adrar Mountains, in its application to an African ally of
considerable military credibility in desert warfare: the Chadian armed forces. The
intervention of General Mahamet Idriss Deby Itmos troops, especially during the
Ametettai valley battle, included French combat aircraft and helicopters, which
imply the presence of forward air controllers attached to the Chadian units to
coordinate and guide them.(15)
(13) Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 526.
(14) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, Winning with Allies: the strategic value of the Afghan model,
International Security, vol 30, No. 3, Winter 2005/2006, p. 34.
(15) See particularly Larme tchadienne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali, Le Monde, 4 March 2013; and Lappui
crucial des Tchadiens au nord du Mali, Le Figaro.fr, 17 March 2013.
37

The Afghan model retains all its relevance, therefore, in the Mali conflict,
having finally found an African ally sufficiently militarily capable for its application,
which alone confirms the crucial importance of this condition for its effective application. The Afghan model could not have worked in the first days of Operation
Serval, but with militarily capable African units it became viable.
Implications for the Air force
The Afghan model is far from being a panacea in modern warfare. To succeed it must meet precise criteria. It is not risk-free for the indigenous allies, is
dependent on foreign air support or special forces commandos, and is vulnerable
in the event of the defection of its local partner. It needs a dose of strategic patience
before its effects can be seen, even if, by comparison with a more conventional
campaign it offers the possibility of swift execution, which fits well with the intrinsic qualities of air power: rapid power projection, long reach, agility, ubiquity, firepower and flexibility. It cannot guarantee to win the peace once the campaign is
over: the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the deterioration of the situation in
northern Iraq in the months following the fall of Saddam Hussein,(16) and the
uncertainties still prevailing over Libyas future are all reasons for prudence.
Nonetheless, ten years after its appearance, the Afghan model reaffirmed its
relevance in Libya. Its intrinsic qualities of catalyst for the air arm serve to increase
its strategic utility. Its political and financial cost is lower than for a conventional
campaign. It may not resolve conflicts on its own, but that is so for all military
interventions, conventional or not. It opens possibilities for its application in the
crisis arc where there is a number of hostile regimes, totalitarian but vulnerable to
a determined insurrection. That, at any rate is the opinion of American strategists:
the withdrawal from Iraq, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the need to reduce
the budget deficit have led President Obama to announce new strategic directions
that break with the previous decades. More demanding in the type and place of
their commitments, the United States is seeking to make use of credible partners,
with whom tasks can be sharedparticularly those whose vital interests are not at
stake. The Afghan model allows the United States to commit minimally, making
best use of their superiority in the air.
For France, at a time of decisions regarding capabilities, it has to be said that
the model arouses suspicion, even outright rejection. Calling it delegated interventionism is proof of an under-estimation of the political and military commitment
it involves. Its limitations are regularly highlighted, to the detriment of its coercive
value, when in fact it reinforces the effectiveness of military interventions whenever
(16) Largely due to the clumsiness of the 101st Airborne Division deployed after the battles were over, according
to Richard Andre in The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq, The Journal of Strategic studies, vol.29, No. 3, June 2006,
p. 414-417.
38

the situation imposes the support of a local partner without large-scale deployment
of ground troops. Its potentially damaging effects on the evolution of the size and
shape of the armed forces also comes under fire, as seen in a recent article: this
model.could be used to justify reductions in ground forces.(17) This criticism
tends to forget too quickly the necessary conditions for the models use, which are
special enough to prevent it from being regarded routinely as the most desirable
method of operation.
It would therefore be detrimental to our armed forces if they were deprived of this tool of demonstrated coercive value, not least because they already have
all the elements needed for its implementation. We must preserve the air support
expertise forged in Afghanistan and demonstrated in Libya, a solid component of
special forces airmen trained in those techniques, as part of a larger grouping of allarms special forces capable of training and advising foreign partners. It naturally
goes hand-in-hand with an air force capable of supplying the framework for application of the model, its C2, its ISR capabilities and its lethal and non-lethal
resources. All these elements exist and have proved their worth. We must now
acknowledge their symbiotic character within the framework of the Afghan model,
and incorporate it fully in the range of strategic options for our armed forces. As
one of its best advocates sums it up, planners in the future should consider the
model as an operational method of primary importance rather than as an emergency procedure.(18)
(17) Dfense et Scurit International, Les limites de linterventionnisme par dlgation, DSI No. 87, December 2012,
p. 10-11.
(18) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, op. cit. footnote 14, p. 47.
39
Operation Harmattan: A Rafale

Squadron Commanders Tale
Loc Rullire
Lieutenant Colonel (Air) and fighter pilot. Former
commander of Rafale squadron 01.007 'Provence' from the
start of operation Harmattan until 6 September. Currently
head of the Retex (lessons learned) innovation and coordination division of the Air Staff's monitoring bureau.
peration Harmattan began on 17 March 2011. The preceding two weeks

were used to gather the elements of intelligence necessary to enable the
chain of command to take the decision to launch its first mission of the
campaign, a challenge which the Air Force took up with enthusiasm. It did so fully
conversant with the situation, after an analysis based on those two weeks of study.
Of course, daily reports on the analyses in progress had been requested in order to
be as well prepared as possible. Reconnaissance missions were considered but these
did not in the end take place. The work did nonetheless enable preparations to be
moved forward.
Late on the morning of 19 March, the pilots of fighter squadron 01.007

Provence walked towards their aircraft knowing that the mission was achievable,
thanks to all the preparatory work. It was nevertheless a strange moment for the
crews, who were passing from peacetime to a time of crisis without any transition
or additional preparation. They were working from their peacetime base, thus
confirming the combat function of an airbase. Some psychological transition was
necessary, however: an artificial disconnection was created, and most of the personnel involved in the operation slept on the base the night before that first mission.
This helped the crews to be ready not only physical, but also mentally, for D-day.
To react quickly to such changes it is highly advisable to have undergone a
long period of operational preparation. This is why crews train throughout the
year, to be able to cope with a wide range of missions. The reaction of the proGaddafi forces remained to be seen. The air threat was known to be weak,
although it was difficult to take into account because of the relatively restrictive
rules of engagement which had been imposed on the Air Force. The main unknowns concerned the location and level of readiness of the ground-to-air defence
systems. Once in theatre the enemy aircraft proved to have been relocated to the
southern part of the country but the ground-to-air systems remained in place and
very active, in particular to protect the troops moving towards Benghazi. An SA-8
40
Operation Harmattan:
A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale
was also very active throughout the day of 19 March, and during the three hours
of the initial phase it tried in vain to gain an easy victory. This SA-8 was destroyed
a few days later by other coalition aircraft.
On the first day, the French force included a first patrol of four Rafales, in
an air-air configuration, whose task was to impose the no-fly zone to the southwest of Benghazi in order for a second Rafale patrol, in a reconnaissance configuration, to carry out intelligence gathering over the coastal strip from Benghazi to
Syrte. The aim was to provide the coalition members with a complete initial picture of the tactical situation in this coastal sector. Also, it was necessary to prepare
for the arrival of a second wave, made up of Mirage 2000D, Rafale and Mirage
2000-5. This second wave carried out strike missions, which enabled the vice to be
tightened around Benghazi.
These strikes proved to be accurate, as were all those of the operation. All
of the munitions fired by the French combat aircraft were precision weapons. This
reflected the careful selection of targets and a total mastery of the effects. To be
selective, however, requires the ability to discriminate. For the units involved this
was certainly the biggest challenge of the operation. The absence of troops on the
ground deprived them of the cultural and operational support of the Joint
Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). In this respect, the units were following very
different procedures from those used in Afghanistan. In addition to a conventional air campaign they had to protect the population, which meant directly engaging the pro-Gaddafi forces which threatened them on the ground, without the aid
of specialized support teams. As might be expected, the pro-Gaddafi forces quickly appreciated and exploited these difficulties. They abandoned their heavy and
highly visible equipment and took to pickup trucks, which were less identifiable.
They also tried continually to mingle with National Transition Council (NTC)
forces and with the civilian population. This inevitably complicated our operations. Their aim was of course to complicate the Air Forces task, generate problems
with identification and decision-making, and ultimately to increase considerably
the political risk of each strike, seeking to hamper the coalitions cohesion.
To counter this asymmetrisation of the conflict, it was necessary to set up
an extremely effective collaborative organization. All the players worked in a
network, connected by tactical data links or by phone, and the appropriate level of
information had to be shared among the participants to ensure that everyone
understood the situation. Combat aircraft, UAVs, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance assets (ISR), AWACS and headquarters had never worked with
such a degree of synergy, while the latter organizations integrated the intelligence
from all sensors in the area. When the intermingling became too close, it was often
a longer-term analysis which enable the reality of a target to be established. Its true
allegiance as well as the reality of a direct threat to the population could thus be
determined. The UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or drones) represented a
precious resource, working in harmony with the combat aircraft.
41
Operation Harmattan:
A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale
One of the missions which I carried out in May illustrates the combined
effectiveness that resulted from using a range of assets, to a degree which I have
never met in other theatres in the past. That day, we were working in total autonomy with my patrol in the Jebel Nafoussa region when the Combined Air
Operations Centre (CAOC), via AWACS, asked us to join and work with a
Predator UAV far to the South of our position. This UAV had watched a resupply
route for the Jebel Nafoussa fronts over more than three hours. The CAOC
subsequently committed three different patrols in succession which were to attack
all the targets identified during this long period of analysis.
As for the authorisation for opening fire, a compromise had to be found
between a very centralised and a very de-centralised process. Ultimately, the working of the system on a daily basis was delegated to the lowest acceptable level.
From one day to another the reality of the situation changed so that sometimes the
crews had the authorisation to open fire while sometimes it was retained at a considerably higher level.
In such an operational context, the Rafale was an adaptable tool which
enabled the whole range of missions to be covered during a week and, above all,
allowed a reduced number of aircraft to be deployed to cover a relatively wide
diversity of missions. During this time missions were undertaken in Afghanistan.
In the Libyan theatre the aircraft gave a very convincing demonstration of its adaptability. Its sub-systems also showed remarkable qualities of precision, performance and reliability.
By way of conclusion, for the crews, Libya was a deployment which was
close to the Afghan standard with regard to its complexity, but very different in its
political, strategic and tactical context. The terrain was altogether different too.
We also had to abandon the Afghanistan model: to get rid of the strategic and
tactical culture which Afghanistan deployments had instilled in us. In Libya, the
aircrews had to relearn an important functionwhich, in the Afghanistan model,
lies with the JTACthat is, the ability to designate and identify a target. This was
a constant challenge. However, experience in Afghanistan gave us a culture of
certainty of action, which has enabled us to appear selective. A certain culture of
doubt has taken root in its place as well as an awareness of the effects produced.
Let us say that the crews involved in this conflict have displayed great humility and
restraint whenever necessary.
42
Serval: an Exemplary
French Air Force Operation
EMAA
French Air Staff.
he Serval is a mid-sized African wildcat. The feline is blessed with a long

stride; it can leap more than three metres with precision from a standing
start, generating so much force that it stuns or even kills its prey on impact.
It has very good hearing, conceals itself in the bush, and can listen and observe
while itself remaining unseen. It is a formidable killing machine which overpowers
its prey, and it surpasses other predators in its qualities as a hunter. One could not
dream up a more descriptive codeword for an operation in which the French Air
Force has so well demonstrated the same characteristics.
Operation Serval was launched by decision of the President of the Republic
on 11 January 2013. It resulted from a certain number of options which had been
taken up by the Air Force, allowing them to be tested against strategic and operational reality. This operation highlighted four fundamental, intimately linked
capabilities which frame the Air Forces aptitude for combat, point to its future
development, and give it the strategic reach which makes it the pivot of our defence
capability. These are:
l
Immediate reaction capability;
A structure of command and operations working in real time;
Continuity of surveillance and intelligence gathering;
Strategic mobility.
Immediate reaction
Analysis of the Mali operation underlines the first of the Air Forces
fundamental capabilities: its immediate reaction capability. This is even more a key
quality when, in operations, immediacy becomes the normal when the political/
news/public opinion cycle becomes foreshortened. The first demonstration of this
was by the Mirage 2000D detachment stationed at NDjamena in Chad. Having
been first alerted of the Presidential decision during the morning of 11 January, it
carried out its first strike on enemy objectives the same night. Similarly, although
43
the fighter-bomber Squadron 1/7 (Provence) at Saint-Dizier was not on alert

status on that day, on 13 January (36 hours after the Presidential decision), its
Rafales destroyed more than 20 targets in the centre of Mali with pinpoint precision. This mission of more than 4,000 km lasted 9 hours and 35 minutes, the longest ever raid by French fighter-bombers. In three days some forty objectives were
destroyed: they included weapon systems, command centres, training and logistic
bases, and they deeply demoralised the enemy.
This operational excellence was only made possible by the quality of our
Air Force serving men and women, who are trained to be reactive and overcome
difficulties. While the prowess of the various teams is impressive, it needs to be
borne in mind that reactivity is a function of the slowest element involved. As on
19 March 2011, the Air Force showed that it is a finely tuned instrument whose
air bases are a particularly efficient combat organisation. It demonstrated exemplary integration with our system of defence bases, whose function is operational
support. The air base was where the lines of operational support and technical support were melded; it operated under the base commander who had all decisionmaking responsibility. It is an air bases 24-hour operating cycle which allows it to
switch instantly from peacetime operation to crisis management mode; it is also
the base which supports its aircraft when they are detached elsewhere.
Finally, it was also because Air Force men and women benefit from individual training and continuous activity. Their standards of training combined with
regular exercises are high enough for procedures to be thoroughly learned and
practised properly, for reflexes to be acquired, and for agility to be developed over
a wide range of activities. The key to all this is sufficient flying hours to allow crews
to develop the expertise needed for complex operational missions. As the beneficiaries of realistic training and 180 flying hours per year, some Rafale pilots flew
their first warlike mission on 13 January. This reactivity could not be achieved just
by a cyclic timetable alternating operational preparation, action and then recuperation: the aircrew activity levels and (through them) those of the entire Air Force
are major guarantees of efficiency.
Coherence and efficacy of command and working procedures,
adapted to real operations
The skill of rapid intervention is based on the Air Forces fundamental

capability of exploiting the coherence and the efficacy of its command system and
working procedures. This is even more fundamental in operations such as Serval,
which encompass operational components of all nature wherever they happen to
be, and which are set in motion at short notice with a very short decision cycle.
For its action to be fully effective and responsive in a joint force operation, the Air
Force has to master a complex and reactive environment. It needs a chain of
command and standardised procedures capable of interacting in real time with all
44
involved; this leads to continuity of planning and operations based on a common

view of what is needed.
The first air missions of Serval, mounted directly by CPCO, were planned
and controlled by the JFAC AFCO (Joint Force Air Component de lAfrique
centrale et de lOuest) recently established at NDjamena to direct those air
resources pre-positioned in Africa. This command structure greatly eased the work
of CPCO since it permitted an immediate launch of air operations and the
pre-planning of follow-on strikes.
The concept of operations was the responsibility of the Air Officer
commanding the air component, who was also the air adviser to Comanfor Serval.
He was responsible for the organisation of the airspace in the zone of operations:
he took part in the joint service allocation of air resources to tasks, and he was responsible for the planning, programming and execution of the overall air campaign,
integrating all air resources.
This command architecture is even more important when coordination of
a variety of air resources is needed, operating diverse missions simultaneously in an
operational zone. In- theatre about one hundred missions were launched daily,
operating round the clock: these included deep penetration, reconnaissance,
surveillance, monitoring, fire support, parachute operations, tactical and strategic
air transport, air-to-air refuelling, combat and transport helicopters.
The role played by the National Air Operations Centre (CNOA) in Lyon
should also be mentioned. Serval demonstrated that the Air Force can now look at
the planning and conduct of air operations in a new way. The technical resources
which are being steadily acquired by Lyon (essentially SIC and satellites,
SATCOM, HF, IP, LDT and POLA), and the skills available on site (planners,
controllers, intelligence officers, experts in tactical data linkage, radio and IT
specialists etc), mean that the operational units of CDAOA Lyon (JFAC, CNOA
and CRA), reinforced by other elements drawn from the entire Air Force, are now
entirely capable of planning, programming and conducting air operations on a
world-wide basis, both from French soil and elsewhere.
The projection into the theatre of E-3F, point to point links using SATCOM,
HF and Chat Iridium, the installation of Link 16 equipment (MIDS-JRE), and the
ability to receive Harfang (FMV) video on site give the Lyon C2 centre the real-time
supervision capability needed to direct air operations.
It is particularly instructive to look at the challenge represented by the firstever offensive operation carried out by Rafales on 13 January, which was mounted
directly from their base in Saint-Dizier. It would have been impossible to mount
it at such short notice without an operations centre such as Lyon where the sortie
was planned to the last detail, and where tactical control was exercised right up to
the final debriefing at NDjamena. The principle of reach back using Lyon has
45
demonstrated its full value ever since the start of the operation. It is a continuing
process: the basic principle is that air campaign planning takes place in Lyon, while
operations are run from NDjamena.
Finally, so as to exploit to the maximum air powers trump cards of quick
reaction and flexibility of use, the command and control network must also be able
to change objectives in real time.
When the enemy makes only fleeting appearances it is essential to reduce
the detection-to-strike reaction time to the minimum. We must be able to network
ISR assets (Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) with appropriate C2
arrangements and strike assets. In a theatre where distances are so great, the availability of an AWACS is a crucial factor. For example, on 19 February French
ground reconnaissance elements in the Massif de lAdrar (some fifty kilometres
south of Tessalit) were engaged by terrorists. A Mirage 2000D patrol was in the
area, armed for close air support missions: it attacked rapidly, destroying two heavy
machine guns. Equally, it is not infrequent for the CNOA to change the objectives
of reconnaissance missions in real time. None of this is possible without wellproven procedures, reliable technical capabilities and well-trained personnel.
In this respect the SIC manuvre is integral to the exercise of air power
because it must be perfectly in phase with the campaign objectives in order to be
able properly to dimension both the nature and the flux of data. The data source
can be one or more of ground-based radio, satellite or IT, and the data itself may
be in the form of text, image, video or voice.
Less visible, but equally essential support for air operations must be based
on a reliable technical and logistic command structure. This has also to synchronise perfectly with the air campaigns objectives in order to achieve maximum availability of the resources committed.
The need for permanent surveillance and intelligence data
A third fundamental capability of air operations derives from the acquisition and monitoring resources it must have to support operations effectively; this
applies to joint as well as to air operations. This involves the airframes themselves,
the offensive systems, the objectives listed in each zone of engagement, the coordination of resources in both time and space, and the ground and air communications links needed. The result is a mass of data from many types of sensor, ranging
from humans to satellites, and includes that from aircraft and drones. For the
13 January mission, for example, the weapons programming and the data needed
to designate the targets ordered by the CPCO was arriving in Saint-Dizier until
late in the night, and was supported by target dossiers which had to be produced
under severe time constraints.
46
The organisation was initially supported by a troika of satellite/FICR/ATI,

rapidly supplemented by the deployment of Harfang drones. The processing of the
data collected was designed to go beyond simple sequential processing by each of the
players involved; it was instead merged by real-time processing, leading to much
more rapid handling of the surveillance-identification-designation-launch cycle.
A real-time capability is essential for this type of operation where targets are agile,
fleeting and dispersed over vast areas, and is a major characteristic of airpower.
Fielding the Harfang drone therefore completed the operational effectiveness of the organisation, by integration of its images into the decision-making
process. It has a loiter capability of 14 hours per mission over the entire zone of
operations; immediate action by Rafale or Mirage 2000D combat patrols could be
(and indeed were) triggered by targeting data uploaded to them in real time by the
drones controllers. This technique is proof of a trend which has been growing year
by year: the drone is fast becoming the single most essential element in all air operations and is increasingly being used prior to any strike to verify that there will be
no collateral damage, a practice which is growing even when planned strikes have
benefited from prior detailed analysis.
Furthermore, this theatre covers a vast area, which both reduces the loiter
time of air patrols over a combat zone and evidently increases the number needed
to maintain constant coverage. In the absence of AWACS, drones act as vital
rebroadcast stations for information transfer between air patrols. Nevertheless, our
drone capability remained notoriously insufficient, bearing in mind the size of the
area to be covered and the continuous surveillance that was needed. The waste of
time due to long transit flights from Niamey would have been much reduced had
we been able to field a few MALE drones acting in concert; the coverage would
also have been better, and we would have been able to deal with sudden emergencies, or a new task such as the recent French hostage crisis on the NigeriaCameroon frontier.
Strategic mobility
The fourth fundamental capability is the strategic projection capability

whose importance is constantly being emphasised in this theatre the size of Europe,
and 4,000 km from France. In 1946 General Gradot, the then Chief of Air Staff,
remarked that transport aircraft are the indispensable partners of fighter aircraft if
we want the latter to be strategically mobile. While at the time this assertion applied
only to the Air Force, it is now obviously relevant to all our armed forces.
It is only the Air Force which can give France a true strategic capability and
respond to the major logistic and operational challenges involved. During the first
five weeks of Operation Serval France projected some 19,000 tons of materiel into
the theatre: this is more than was repatriated from Afghanistan over a whole year.
47
The scope of this logistic feat should not be underestimated. While the Air Force
is currently organised to project joint transit capabilities and the mounting of overseas detachments in a modular way, only a true strategic air transport capability
will allow the logistic chain to function properly in what is such a challenging scenario in terms both of time and range.
Similarly, the missions with which our combat aircraft are tasked are long,
multiple and long range. They require major air-to-air refuelling capabilities: this
operation saw the deployment in-theatre of more than half our C135 fleet. This
success should not be allowed to hide the limiting factor imposed by the relative
unreliability of these tankers; their advanced age (some 19 years) brings with it the
permanent risk of capability failure, making it urgent to bring MRTT into service
as soon as possible.
Furthermore, we need to keep in mind a simple rule learned from the
Kosovo crisis, which is that the number of tankers available has a direct relationship with the number of combat sorties that can be flown. Our shortcomings in
this field have constrained us (as in Libya) to have to rely on American assets since
the end of January. Even so, this particularly valuable help is still not enough to
meet all our needs. During the ground action of 19 February, for example, a
Mirage 2000D patrol had to quit the combat zone before disengagement because
the tanker was no longer able to carry out its task. The arrival of another combat
air patrol from Bamako was made possible only by the arrival of a further tanker
on its orbit; our troops had no close air support for several hours.
The entry into service of A400M and MRTT will therefore represent a step
change. Not only will our airlift capability be significantly increased, but also our
speed of projection and the use of air transport as a whole will both be improved.
Bamako is currently a choke point which slows down logistic activity due to the
saturation of the base platform. The result is that long and slow-moving convoys
have to be organised to deliver materiel to the combat zone, some 350 km away.
An air bridge using A400M could have delivered cargo to airheads much closer to
the zone of operations such as Mopti, Timbuctou or Gao, allowing us to concentrate our forces several days earlier than we did.
Furthermore, the use of this aircraft would have much simplified intratheatre logistics, which are complicated today by the need to tranship cargoes on
the airfields at Bamako, Niamey, Dakar and NDjamena: 26 tactical transport aircraft from 6 different nations are involved. The A400M can make a daily rotation
into the theatre inside 24 hours, dividing projection time by a factor of three. Over
and above this operational performance, local transit resources and the processing
capability of the logistic chain are also affected, and in consequence the control of
logistic flow has to be adapted.
48
The 13 January mission highlights the operational benefits we will be able

to enjoy. Three C135 accompanied the four Rafale delivering nearly 100 tons of
fuel, but at the same time they were able to carry only a very small proportion of
the materiel and personnel needed to give such a detachment a 24-hour operating
capability. In the near future the same task will be carried out by two MRTT,
which will be able to lift the entire detachment, and two A400M, which will be
capable of lifting the entire cargo load to NDjamena in six hours. The Air Force
will thus be able to project a significant operational capability over some 4,000 km
inside 48 hours.
Such an operation serves to remind us that strategic inter-theatre mobility
is overlain on the needs of intra-theatre tactical support. The airborne assault on
Timbuktu carried out on 29 January, certain aspects of which are classic, illustrates
above all the way in which the projection of air power in a theatre can be switched
instantly to support joint operations, contributing directly to their acceleration.
The concurrency of the requirements for mobility and support means that
the formats of air projection must not be based solely on the requirements of intertheatre projection. Furthermore, the tactical dimension also dictates that we need
transport aircraft whose operational characteristics need to include the guarantee
of combat-ready delivery. The tactical capabilities of the A400M, together with the
militarisation of its cargo hold means that it can deliver ground force assets such
as helicopters and armoured vehicles which are operational immediately on delivery into the operational zone, using unprepared airstrips.
Co-operation with allies
This campaign throws a new light on the degree of our dependence on our
allies: it could not have taken place without their active cooperation. In the field
of inter- and intra-theatre logistic projection (25 per cent), no less than 110 allied
missions were needed. In the field of ISR the USA and the UK deployed a JSTAR,
a Predator and a Sentinel R1. These two countries, with France, are alone in being
capable of deploying such sophisticated assets, with such powerful military performance, at such short notice. The intimate strategic dialogue which links our three
air forces contributed in great measure to easing the sharing and integration of
these allied resources. This aspect was reinforced by the credibility of the Air Force
chain of command: it gave our partners the guarantees of coherence and security
for their resources that they needed when the latter were tasked by Comanfor.
Finally, it is useful to emphasise that at the same time that the Mali operation was taking place, the Air Forces permanent mission of nuclear deterrence
continued without the slightest change, an essential condition for maintaining the
49
credibility of this strategic function which is fundamental to the security of our

country. The operational task of the strategic air squadrons, Air Forces priority task,
is fulfilled every single day.
Similarly, the Air Force maintains the permanent airspace security posture
which guarantees the sovereignty and protection of our national airspace, particularly against terrorist threats. This mission has become even more necessary since
Frances policies have significantly increased the threat which looms over our national territory. The resources committed to its operational continuity have had to be
reconfigured: air defence Mirage 2000s have replaced the Rafale for this task, thus
allowing our most modern aircraft to be allocated to the African theatre.
Rafales qualities, already demonstrated in Libya, make it perfectly adapted
to that continent. Its multi-role capability allows it to be tasked for both strike and
reconnaissance. Its range and endurance give it a very good loiter capability over a
zone where it can attack high value targets in real time or, when necessary, provide
close air support to troops on the ground. Its wide range of sensors and weapon
configurations give it the firepower needed to deal with a variety of targets with a
maximum of precision.
To conclude, the unique properties of the Air Force contributed to the
rapid and significant blocking of a terrorist offensive which was particularly threatening to Malis integrity. This operation showed yet again that the Air Force is an
entirely coherent operational tool, and a major player in a military strategy whose
success meets political expectations.
50
The fundamental capabilities

at the heart of modernisation
RDN

the Strategic Heart of Defence
EMAA
French Air Staff.
A robust and credible C2 developed

from long experience of the air security mission
The lessons of the Second World War have consecrated the importance of
achieving air superiority at the outset of any military operation, which means that
to protect French territory we had to create a credible and effective air defence
capability. The Air Force progressively acquired the tools (radars, communications
and aircraft) and the knowhow (procedures and staff competence), which devolve
from this need: evaluation of the general air situation, the ability to identify threats
and guide interceptors to potential targets. The need for rapid reaction dictated
unified command, and in 1961 the Air Force created a central structure dedicated
to air defence. This command absorbed all the resources, from the detection
network to the interceptor aircraft, and is able to give real-time situation reports to
the Prime Minister, the political authority responsible for the nations air defence.
This highly reactive chain links the highest levels of the State with the pilot in his
aircraft, and ensures at all time and in all places sovereignty over the nations air
space. Today, the French air security network is capable of the surveillance of some
11,000 air movements daily, and can put in train either an interception mission to
take active air security measures, or an aid mission to an aircraft in difficulty.
The events of 9/11 underlined the relevance of Frances air security apparatus,
acknowledged as one of the best-adapted to counter terrorist threats. Stability,
reactivity, rules of engagement and mission success all go to build a firm background in the development of the airman, acquired through his experience of the
air security mission.
Similarly, the Air Force rapidly integrated the new dimension of space activity in the daily life of the nation and its security. It has extended its surveillance
and situation analysis capabilities to this new area and has created a system of alert
warning, based on recognised threats (such as space debris falling to earth or observation satellite tracking)
53

the Strategic Heart of National Defence and Security
Recent conflicts have led to the build-up of expertise

in the conduct of large-scale air operations in overseas theatres
The geopolitical upheavals of the nineteen-nineties have led France to intervene more and more frequently beyond its borders in a joint-service and inter-allied
framework. Air missions now mobilise fleets of aircraft that are complex in number,
diversity and the multiplicity of effects to be achieved against an adversary perceived as a global entity and with vulnerabilities.
The French Air Force is adapting to change. With its experience of
command acquired from the air defence role and with a staff trained in similar
processes, it bracketed onto its existing structure in metropolitan France the skills
and tools dedicated to overseas air operations. The Air defence and air operations
command centre (Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CDAOA) came into being: apart from its air defence mission, the command
maintains and develops Air Force expertise in the command of air operations; it
trains its staff,(1) provides fixed and mobile reception structures with adapted procedures offering all the flexibility needed for operations in hand.
This parallels NATO conceptual and doctrinal development. The implementation of a reaction force decided at the Prague Summit in 2002 constitutes a
powerful tool for the development of interoperability between member states. The
credibility of the Air Force, recognised by the allies, and supported by the technical expertise that French industry has developed in matters of command and
communications networks has given it the right to claim command of the NATO
Reaction Force (NRF). It is today an essential contribution to the Alliances operational capability.
Lyon, a strategic heartland for supervision of air missions
in France and overseas
The ability to command and control air operations is the essential condition for operational effectiveness of an air force, and confers on the country that
possesses it a real capacity for influence and a training capability that benefits any
coalition set up to deal with crisis or emergency situations.
The development of information technology today opens even wider perspectives. In the medium term we can see new balances emerging in operational
command, conjugating more closely the synergies between the resources deployed,
ever lighter, and the permanent Command and Control Centre in Lyon. This
centre is progressively developing its capabilities to supervise, direct and coordinate
(1) The Air Operations Preparation Analysis and Simulation Centre (CASPOA), created in 1997, has become a NATO
centre of excellence, and apart from training French staff, trains a number of foreign personnel in air operational
command and control.
54

the Strategic Heart of National Defence and Security
on a permanent and reactive basis the whole panoply of air missions that France
may have to undertake above or beyond its national territory. Mastery of a projectable C2 capability allows France to assume its role in a coalition as a cadre nation.
Expanded cooperation for the benefit of national security
The capability to evaluate the air situation has also led to an opening
between ministries. This has developed into cooperation between the Customs
authorities, civil aviation, police and gendarmerie, and missions are regularly
conducted in their support.(2)
These examples of fruitful cooperation open perspectives that have not yet
been fully explored. What potential has a tool as effective as the Lyon Centre to
offer national security in its widest sense, not merely limited to military threats?
In the event of natural or industrial catastrophes, the Defence Minister could be
able, at short notice, to put at the disposal and under the authority of a Prfet the
Lyon C2 Centre and some of its human and materiel resources, so that the latter
could exercise his responsibilities in evaluating the situation and coordinating
national resources committed to rescue operations. As a way of optimising State
resources on a routine basis, training missions for Air Force drones, with their surveillance capabilities, endurance and discretion could be enhanced by the choice of
zones of specific interest to a Ministry, controlled from the C2 centre in Lyon,
where air missions are programmed.
The optimisation of its human and materiel resources is leading the Air
Force to concentrate its decision-making structure while maintaining the decentralisation of its operational capabilities: a strong C2 in Lyon based on a network
of air bases in France, the Overseas Territories or in foreign countries, as departure points for any air mission. This new C2 Air structure is a strategic heartland
where greater cooperation between the Ministries involved in national security
matters can be encouraged. Opening towards Europe is also foreseeable, and would
add another advantage. It could contribute to the development of European planning and civil-military operational conduct in response to crises and emergency
situations.
(2) These include air photo reconnaissance missions in advance of police intervention; surveillance of the airspace around
sensitive installations, (nuclear power stations, petrochemical sites and prisons, for example); surveillance of demonstrations surrounding high-visibility events (Heads of State Summits or the Olympic Games); monitoring flight plans by aircraft suspected of illegal activity.
55
The Only Machiavellian Aspect

of the Drone is its Human Element
Christophe Fontaine
Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, graduate of the French War
College, Second in Command of 1/33 Drone squadron
Belfort.
Editors note: Fisrt published in Revue Dfense Nationale on line (Tribune n 358, www.defnat.com), April 9, 2013.
ccording to a number of writers who specialise in law or in modern conflict,

drones are the new danger that everyone should fear. Aside from ethical
questions about their use, and the moral aspects of their commitment, they
could constitute a grave danger, should they fall into the wrong hands. Needless to
say, the aeroplane is quite the opposite: it is more human and more civilised, and is
less prone to error. The proliferation of such extravagant terminology is designed to
make us think that the drone is nothing other than a robot that goes around killing
automatically according to some mechanised form of decision-making, and in the
process making blunders right, left and centre whilst willy-nilly eliminating those
citizens declared undesirable according to processes or actions unrelated to any form
of legal framework. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Permanent surveillance and real-time dissemination of data
The main reason for using drones (or Unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs)
today is certainly not to deliver weapons onto targets secretly from the other side of
a border. It is, first and foremost, to try to compensate for the intrinsic weakness of
air power, which is the inability to assert long-term control over captured airspace in
order to conduct surveillance of activity on the ground. Whatever its role, be it air
defence, bombing or reconnaissance, an aircraft cannot fly indefinitely.
It has to land to change pilots, since not only are long flights testing for the
aircraft, but also, and especially, for the aircrew. Because of this, drones are mainly
used on missions that cannot be performed by crewed aircraftthose long surveillance missions using a variety of optical, radar or laser sensors. Freed from the
major handicap to endurance in flight, the human on board, the drone becomes the
ideal machine to maintain a potential target and its environment under constant
surveillance. But therein lies the paradox, for man remains firmly in the decisional
and operational cycle. Satellite transmission technology allows us to have a sentinel
57

permanently in the air, whose electronic eyes transmit real-time information on

what they see to the decision-makers.
Once the surveillance process is completedand remember that intelligence gathering is the primary role of dronesa decision may be made to strike.
However, the French Male drone (Moyenne altitude, longue endurance medium
altitude, long endurance) does not always carry weapons, since being armed
drastically reduces its time on task: for a given total weight, the more armament
carried, the less fuel. Moreover, during the surveillance phase, and the attack phase
if there is one, the drone is not a robot. Quite the contrary.
The cockpit is the real nerve centre of an aircraft, and it is from there that
an entire human crew directs it. The aircraft has to be piloted, its sensors directed
correctly, intelligence analysed and classified, targets identified, checks made with
the headquarters regarding the legal position on the targets and the missions objectives, and the most appropriate weapons chosen for the mission. After all that, it
requires a human being to give the order to launch a precision weapon onto the
target. All of this is performed with a transparency to which no other weapon system is constrained. The transparency is aided by the filming of every phase, from
intelligence gathering to firing, and the live pictures are sent to the decisionmaking level in real time, are recorded and saved. The process is supervised by legal
advisors and conducted under the direction of military or political chiefs. It is therefore easy to imagine the members of parliamentary enquiry committees consulting the recordings of these firings, in order to verify all the legal elements of their
planning, organisation and activation.
A few words on the main criticisms of the use of drones
Issues of ethics and morals
The fact that pilots are at the controls of drones ought to put an end to the
rumour of the marauding killer robot that assassinates brutally and without restraint.
In the end, drones are only aircraft like any other with the exception that they are
piloted from the ground. Hard though it might be to accept, no system is more
humanised in its operation and in the control of its action than a drone. It is true
that the crew acts via a digital eye and a satellite link, and is not physically committed in the field, yet for war to be ethical, were that even possible, are we really expected to return to the olden days of sword fights and hand-to-hand combat? Is it not
entirely legitimate to operate remotely from an adversary who uses improvised explosive devices or human suicide bombers? At every stage in the process man is, and
remains, in the loop, right up to the terminal guidance phase of the weapon.
As for the decision to kill this or that person, it is not taken by the drone, nor
by the pilot, nor even by the commander of the mission: it is taken by the political
58

leader. The same process is followed, whether the action is overt (that is, a legitimate
action from the legal point of view) or covert (in which the state decides to act
outside any legal framework and use secret assets to achieve certain effects on targets).
In the past, some used poisoned umbrellas; today, others use a different weapon, the
drone. Despite all that, and unless they are stealth machines (and the American
Predator and Reaper drones are not), for drones to fly in any given airspace they must
at least have the tacit agreement of the overflown state in order to operate. Otherwise,
how do we suppose that aircraft that fly barely faster than modern private light planes
could remain for hours above a territory in complete impunity?
The belief that use of drones is against the law
There are those who claim that drones act, or even assassinate, outside any
judicial and legal framework. If we accept as a premise that drones are subject to
the same rules as other military aircraft operating in an airspace governed by a defined judicial framework, then any question of the legality of their use is irrelevant.
If they are used according to an agreement between two countries, one the user of
the drones, the other possessing the territory overflown, once again the question is
irrelevant. No, the real challenge lies in ensuring that those who govern the processes of decision-making and use of weapons, and those appointed to piloting and
putting the policy of the nations elected representatives into effect, are made abundantly aware of the ethical issues involved, and receive training in the legal aspects.
Additionally, the notion of parliamentary control of the actions of the armed forces
in general, and of special forces in particular, is a vital issue for any self-respecting
democracy, and it is precisely that which must guard against any inhuman use of
a weapon system. Whether it is a drone, a sniper, a GPS or laser-guided bomb, a
cruise missile, a mortar round or a torpedo is not the issue. The tool has no value
without the human will and decision to use it. On the other hand, the introduction of artificial intelligence into future combat systems is something altogether
different: it raises real ethical and moral questions. Nevertheless, the drones which
are being described here, and which France wishes to procure in the short term, do
not fall into that category.
The belief that drones are dangerous
Drones could fall into the wrong hands, they say, or even be used by belligerent powers or armed terrorist groups. Apart from the vulnerability of the platform itself, that has already been mentioned, the weakness of drones lies in their
dependence on multiple satellite links. These links are needed to pilot it remotely
and to transmit the information gathered by its various electronic eyes and ears.
Although it is theoretically possible to intercept a drone and take control of it
remotely, actually doing it requires complex technology, if only because its cockpit,
or rather, the place from which the pilot controls the system, is elsewhere and is
59

manufactured to very specific industrial standards. And although information technology has advanced in massive strides which, paradoxically, is exactly what gives
hackers the technology to penetrate computer networks, the fact remains that to
intercept a drone, take control of it and reprogram its mission and trajectory is for
the moment pure science fiction. If a drone were stolen, when its owner knows it
has been lost, would not alter the fundamentals of air warfare, because any unidentified object would be intercepted and, if it did not respond to orders or to flight
directions, it would be shot down.
It is of note that what frightens the average person is not necessarily what the
terrorist sees as the most effective means of action. The 9/11 attacks are a good
example of the fears of the former and the achievements of the latter. There have long
been fears of a terrorist strike with nuclear weapons stolen from the former Soviet
Union, and yet al-Qaeda used civil airliners as missiles against the twin towers of the
World Trade Center. That action was also a demonstration that, for Islamic terrorism,
the dimension of dying a martyrs death remained fundamental. Everyone would
agree on the impossibility of achieving such a goal from the cockpit of a drone
which, by definition, is on the ground. Contrary to a widespread belief, drones still
remain extremely dependent on humans, and so paradoxically no other weapon system is more humanised in its deployment and in control of its action, than the drone.
Its remote eye transmits constantly, and in real time via a digital umbilical cord which
links the real world to the team that looks at it, and the information gathered to the
political authorities who decide whether or not to use a weapon.
Any attack is considered long and hard and is therefore never a sort of
robot-driven assassination simply as a result of using a drone, for there are always
humans behind these futuristic-looking flying objects. And these humans work
within a political and legal structure, which conforms to the laws of armed
conflict. The moral values on which their training is based guard against inhuman
actions. The current priority for France is to increase effort on the multi-sensor
Male surveillance drone component, rather than to procure a new strike capability.
The Air Force has enviable knowhow and expertise in all theatres of operation, and
it would be to its great detriment to lose them because of some gap in capability.
The checks and balances ensured by parliamentary enquiry committees should in
any case assure the citizen that the use of Male drones for surveillance or, in the
longer term, armed attack, is conducted within the law. Above all, it is the politicians who decide whether to kill, using the hands of responsible, professional, military personnel to act for them, not the drones.
So if there really is anything Machiavellian about the use of drones, it is
that man remains its instigator.
60
A Case
for the Dynamic Management
of French Overseas Bases
EMAA
French Air Staff.
he geostrategic and geopolitical developments that are foreseeable in the

short, medium and long term will not fundamentally affect Frances continuing role as a major influence in world affairs. This influence is the result
of a mix of factors: a culture of international responsibility; an independent nuclear
deterrent; her place in a globalized economy; multilateralism underpinned by a
strong diplomatic network; a worldwide network of friendships and alliances; and
the wide geographic spread of her overseas departments, administrations and economic zones, among others. This discussion paper concentrates more on the question
of the depth and intensity with which France should fulfil her role of influence in
the world, rather than the questioning of any worldwide ambition.
All that said, the evolution of many factors, whether they be economic,
diplomatic, political, societal, technological or military, obliges us to define the
innovative options which will allow France to fulfil her worldwide role and
concentrate on her new strategy of access. At the same time these options must be
realistic with regard the resources available.
New technical factors
In this context, our thinking must lean towards how diversification of

certain elements might increase force mobility. By their very nature they must
integrate the increased reach which we can now give to our interventions (which
is a function of our projection capability), but equally on our forces in theatre so
as easily to increase their range of action. This thinking is made even more urgent
by the impending arrival of new equipment such as the A400M from 2013
onwards, and then the MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport) in 2017: these will
bring step improvements in speed, range and carrying capacity.
Not only will their new capabilities facilitate direct interventions mounted
from France itself, but they will also create the major political advantage of
61
A Case for the Dynamic Management

reinforcing the visibility and flexibility of independent French action: potentially,

France will instantly have a significant worldwide presence. The changes will be
revolutionary, in the true sense of the term. Currently three days are needed for a
Transall to reach La Runion with 7 tons of freight; an A400M can do this trip
with three times the load in only fourteen hours. It will also be possible to do a
return journey from France to Djibouti in a day. Similarly, when France partnered
Australia in Operation Santal in West Timor in 1999, the speed of our intervention and the volume of materiel initially deployed were constrained by the range
and capacity of our C130s, which needed four days to reach Darwin. In an identical scenario, from now on France will be able to deploy two to three times more
materiel in less than 24 hours.
Extension of our strategic space
With this new capability of moving more, further and quicker, we are witnessing a real expansion of our strategic space, leading to an increase in our diplomatic influence. It will create a physical, rather than a virtual, link between the
French homeland and its overseas possessions on the other side of the world in an
even more dynamic way. In this way, and as a complement to the French maritime
presence, the Air Force will be able to add its quick reaction capability directly
from Paris itself. It will reinforce our credibility, and above all it will further underpin Frances presence in the many regional forums in which the country partakes
as a function of its economic exclusion zones, particularly in the Pacific and Indian
Oceans. Defence cooperation, such as the FRANZ Agreement with Australia and
New Zealand, will gain in substance.
Finally, Alain Boinet and Benot Miribel remind us of humanitarian action in
crisis and post-crisis situations: The armed forces have an important role to play in
disaster situations with their transport and logistic capabilities. They can also help
effectively with the evacuation of French and other countries citizens in emergencies,
such as from Lebanon in the summer of 2007. Furthermore, in sudden medical
emergencies such as that in Kashmir in the autumn of 2005, field hospitals can deal
with casualties and save lives.(1) These new characteristics will give us an increased
intervention capability, which will further give backing to French influence and the
countrys role as a permanent and responsible player on the world scene.
The case for the dynamic management of French bases overseas
The added boost that this will give to French foreign policy will only be
seen if the nature and use of these new resources are looked at in a way which takes
advantage of their intrinsic qualities, and which can also be based on a new and
(1) Report made in March 2010 to Bernard Kouchner, the then Foreign Minister.
62

dynamic hub and spoke arrangement to give the country the ability to intervene
and exert influence from overseas bases at minimum cost.
It is obvious that the conditions necessary for rapid intervention include,
among others, the existence of a solid overarching infrastructure which adds further, complementary solutions to our traditional overseas bases, thus increasing
our guarantee of easy access. Our forces currently pre-positioned overseas, whilst
already contributing significantly to international security and stability, do not
fully fit in to these future requirements. We need to develop further the relevance
of this network in a win-win way by establishing individual partnerships whose
objective must be to allow deployments of military or civil assistance in very short
reaction times from staging points which can be rapidly brought up to fighting
standard. This arrangement, which must offer a variety of solutions, has to begin
with the negotiation of diplomatic agreements designed to accelerate the deployment of French and/or allied resources. This non-constraining approach can be
adapted easily to any strategic development. It must be complemented by the prepositioning of materiel and the establishment of carefully positioned, permanent
staging points of varying size.
In this respect, France has the good fortune to hold many trump cards
which will allow the country to meet this requirement at minimum cost.
She has close relationships with a number of states close to areas of strategic interest, whose potential can be further exploited. Countries such as Singapore
(whose pilot training takes place in Cazaux), and India are partners upon whose
services we can call increasingly. Beyond the fruitful operational cooperation with
these countries, the local programmes of joint exercises must help to prepare and
perfect procedures for establishing these potential bases should the need arise, even
to the extent of to pre-positioning materiel in them.
The benefits of allied networks
Our British and American allies, both powers with global interests, are supported by networks which are complementary to our own. We could possibly take
advantage of these either by using our bases as bargaining counters, or by contributing to their running costs. The British and, especially, American bases open doors to
the routes to South East Asia and the Pacific. Use of them would allow us to develop,
and even facilitate, our zone of action towards new areas of interest. As far as our traditional French operating zones are concerned, they would offer case-by-case projection facilities (for both deployments and support activities), and allow us to consider
new areas of cooperation, notably in the field of operational preparation.
The same applies to our partners in the European Air Transport Centre and
the Multimodal Coordination Centre for European Transport, who share our
common problems of force projection. The joint development of a worldwide
63

network must be a key area of work which will among other things contribute greatly to cementing the construction of European defence. There is a real strategy to
develop here, dealing with both equipment and deployment, one which should
result in economy of resources and concentration of effort.
Furthermore, the airlines which fly Airbus (and that includes our A400M
and MRTT) offer potential worthy of exploitation. On the basis of obvious
common interests, partnerships could be built to contribute to the creation of a
network based around hubs, to broaden our worldwide coverage. They would
also allow us to share our spare parts, technical support and staging points, or even
assistance to, and reinforcement of, our own aircrews.
Raising Frances profile
Finally, the development and maintenance of such a secured network,

encouraged by regular personnel exchanges or joint exercises with the host nations,
would contribute to Frances reputation and international influence. It cannot be
denied that this will require a major diplomatic effort to establish cooperation
which will be sufficiently robust in the longer term.
To conclude, the new systems which are about to enter service will lead to an
expansion of our strategic sphere of influence. They will give us a virtually instant
response capability and demand a dynamic approach to a renovated network of overseas bases. When considered in parallel with the complementary networks of our
British and American allies, a new dimension will be added to Frances capability for
action, rendering it even more visible, more flexible and more all-encompassing.
64
Immediate Action:
the Contribution of Rafale
to recent Operations
Yohan Droit
Captain, researcher at Centre for strategic aerospace studies.
For airmen and the Rafale community, 19 March 2011 was a great unknown.
At the time we didnt know the full Libyan order of battle,
but we did know that there were active ground-to-air missiles.
And yet we sent our pilots thousands of kilometres from their bases,
with rules of engagement practically made up on the spot.
Put yourself in the mind of the pilot taking off at that time
General Denis Mercier, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force.
he Rafale is the emblematic programme and backbone of the French fighter force. It is special because of its total versatility and its destiny as the
sole fighter aircraft of the French armed forces. It entered service with the
Air Force in June 2006 and has already acquired considerable operational experience from its participation in operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Mali. Its
deployment in these different theatres has enabled us to foresee its development
possibilities, both operationally and in capability, and to appreciate its relevance to
service in recent operations.
Operational build-up in Afghanistan
Immediately after its entry into operational service, the decision was taken
to deploy the Rafale to the Afghan theatre. It was deployed in four phases, in 2007,
2008, 2009 and 2011, initially at Dushanbe and subsequently to Kandahar.
Operations in Afghanistan required the Rafale for a specific part of the spectrum
of operations, namely, close air support in a counter-insurgency environment.
In the first phase, the Rafale to F2 standard, was employed in mixed patrols
with the Mirage 2000D, armed with GBU-12 laser-guided bombs. In this F2
version, the Rafale has ground attack capability but was originally limited by the
absence of a laser designation pod and of AASM.(1) It was therefore assisted by the
(1) Armement air-sol modulaire a precision air-to-ground, propelled, GPS-guided bomb. Two AASM bombs were launched in Afghanistan by a Rafale B on 20 April 2008, less than six days after its entry into operational service.

65
Immediate Action:
the Contribution of Rafale to recent Operations
Mirage 2000D in the designation of ground targets. During its various detachments
the Rafale gained in operational maturity, in which the entry into service of AASM
in 2008 was an important step. The AASM afforded an all-weather capability at a
safe distance and complemented laser-guided munitions. Its use in Afghanistan
allowed the validation of the Rafale/AASM combination on operations.
At the time of its latest deployment in 2011, as well as carrying the GBU-12
and AASM, the Rafale was equipped to F3 standard with the Damocles pod, the
ROVER video system and an integrated air-to-ground fire control system for its cannon, which gave it maximum operational effectiveness. These considerable improvements confirmed the self-sufficiency of the Rafale in ground attack missions.
Operations in Afghanistan also confirmed the effectiveness and reliability of the
Rafale system for operations in a harsh environment. Although the practicalities of
operations in Afghanistan are far from requiring all the Rafales operational capabilities, the versatility of the aircraft and its crews have been validated in an operational
theatre. The integration of air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities in the same aircraft confers a very significant operational bonus. In particular, the merging of data
from the Link 16 data link, the air-to-air mode of the electronic sweep radar RBE2,
improved optronics and the Spectra (Systme de protection et dvitement des conduites
de tir du Rafale) threat warning system, provides the crew with an excellent appreciation of the tactical air situation.
The engagement in Afghanistan marks the first use of Rafale on operations.
After a build-up phase, involving an eight-month period between its entry into
service and its first deployment, the F3 Rafale has now reached its full operational
status.
Rafale first in the skies over Libya
This battle-hardening proved its value at the start of Operation Harmattan

and enabled Rafale to be deployed quickly in the Libyan conflict. In accordance with
the orders given by the President following the vote on the UN Security Council
resolution on 17 March 2011, the French Air Force was ready to intervene 48 hours
later at the time of the international summit in Paris on 19 March. In order to put
the political decision into effect, a first raid on Benghazi was organized to end attacks
on the population.
For this strategic mission, the aircraft had to operate against a defended
theatre more than two thousand kilometres from their home bases in mainland
France. This first mission to Benghazi, on 19 March 2011, was organized in three
waves of aircraft, each including Rafales. The first wave had the mission of imposing the no-fly zone, the second carried out a reconnaissance mission to determine
the situation on the ground and the third wave had the objective of striking military resources threatening the population of Benghazi. This first raid, whose story
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Immediate Action:
has been widely publicised, achieved all its objectives in that the installation of the
air exclusion zone prevented any Libyan air attacks on the population, and the
destruction of six armoured vehicles threatening Benghazi led the pro-Gaddafi
forces to withdraw.
For the Air Force, the large distance to cover, the unknown situation in
Libya and the presence of active ground-to-air systems in the area of operations
give an idea of the achievement of the airmen on this very first penetration of a
defended theatre more than two thousand kilometres from their bases. This was a
major first for the Air Force, which demonstrated its ability to project force over a
long distance and make the first incursion into a theatre without any support. This
rare and demanding military capability places the French Air Force among the air
forces of the world that count. The success of this mission validated the organization as well as the training and preparation of the personnel. At the strategic level,
the close interlocking of the political timing and the tempo of air operations
enabled the Presidents will to be turned into reality immediately and thus ensure
the credibility of France on the international scene. The Air Force demonstrated
that it is capable of responding to political requirements, in just a few hours.
At the heart of this perilous strategic mission the Rafale is literally in the
front line. Sending the aircraft in first on an air superiority mission demonstrates
once more the confidence the Air Force has in its versatile fighter. The performance of its weapon systems, especially of its SPECTRA self-defence system, the
best in the Air Force, and of the GPS-guided AASM, enabling it to be fired at a
safe distance, mark out the Rafale as an effective and dependable tool, well adapted to the mission. What is more, the Rafales sent to Libya on 19 March achieved
three different missions: air superiority, reconnaissance and the attack of opportunity targets, demonstrating the range of their versatility.
The whole of the air campaign demonstrates the flexibility of the Rafale in
its final F3 Standard form. It successfully carried out all the missions devolved to
the fighter force: air superiority, ground attack on planned or opportunity targets,
and reconnaissance of a demanding theatre of operations not entirely devoid of
an air threat. The engagement of Rafale in Libya also saw the first use of the
SCALP-EG cruise missile in a strategic depth strike mission. The Libyan air campaign was proof of the technical and human maturity of the Rafale system within
the French Air Force.
Apart from the operational effectiveness that the adaptability of Rafale brings
to aerial manoeuvre, the savings in resources which it makes possible is also considerable. The same Rafales which carry out an air superiority mission one day can
conduct a ground-attack mission the next. And, beyond the aircraft themselves, it is
the same pilots, crews and ground technical support staff who operate the aircraft.
This versatility allows the deployment of fewer aircraft to carry out a wide range of
missions. How many specialised aircraft, with their dedicated equipment and
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Immediate Action:
personnel, would it take to conduct the same missions? And at what cost? Savings in
technical and human resources have turned out to be a major parameter for the Air
Force in the maintenance of a rapid operational tempo over a long period.
Compared with its usual role in Afghanistan, Rafales engagement in Libya
is distinguished by a more uncertain environment, the confirmed presence of
ground-to-air threats and the use of a wider spectrum of capabilities. During
Operation Harmattan, French aircraft destroyed more than 1,000 targets and carried out around 5,600 sorties, of which more than 4,000 were for the Air Force.(2)
For their part, Rafales made 1,039 sorties, totalling 4,539 flight hours. Air Force
Rafales contributed 20 per cent of French combat sorties and 25 per cent of all
combat sorties, providing an essential part of the French participation in operations over Libya. The participation of French air assets in Libyan operations is a
hallmark of the excellence of French aviation in Europe. At a time when the
American air resources we have become used to are being reduced, we must not
underestimate the contribution of Rafale. Its effectiveness and unique capabilities
greatly enhance the credibility of French action in support of our allies, and clearly
demonstrate to everyone that France possesses a powerful military tool.
Rafale and power projection
At the start of Operation Serval in Mali, a flight of four Rafales was

dispatched from its base in St Dizier to carry out a bombing mission on the rear
bases of the terrorist groups.
The four Rafales, armed with AASM and GBU-12, and accompanied by
C-135 tanker aircraft, took off from the St Dizier air base on 13 January 2013 on
a journey of over 6,000 kilometres. During this mission, which took 9 hours
40 minutes flying time, the crews targeted and destroyed training camps, infrastructure and logistic depots of the terrorist groups, before landing at the
NDjamena air base.
This Rafale bombing mission was historic by virtue of its range, its duration and the demonstration it provided of the projection capability of air power.
For all that, such combat aircraft only constitute the final essential link in a coherent operational chain. This chain is constructed around essential capabilities such
as an aptitude for the command and control of air operations, intelligence and
in-flight refuelling, which enables combat aviation to carry out its bombing
missions more than six thousand kilometres from home territory.
Taken overall, the development of Rafale in Afghanistan and Libya has been
impressive. The aircraft underwent a major capability revolution between its first
(2) Libye: les aviateurs dans lopration Harmattan, Air actualits, hors srie 2012, pp. 72-73.
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Immediate Action:
deployment in Afghanistan and its engagement in Libya in 2011. It evolved from the
F2 standard, limited to launching the GBU-12 with the aid of laser designation from
a Mirage 2000D, to the F3 standard, capable of carrying laser-guided weapons and
launching them independently using its Damocles pod, as well as carrying AASM
and SCALP missiles. This as much due to lessons learnt from operations as from the
normal development of standards and planned equipment upgrades.
The contribution of Rafale from the point of view of immediate action is
evidenced by two firsts for both the aircraft and the Air Force: our capability for
initial entry to a non-permissive theatre in Libya, and the completion of the longest bombing mission in the history of the Air Force in Mali. This guarantees
France a capability of action over very long distances and at very short notice.
69
Simulator Training
for Future Combat Pilots
Colin Blttler
Cyril Camachon
The authors are Doctors in experimental psychology and
researchers in the Human factors and operational environments team at the Air Force research centre (Crea).
oday, more than ever, combat pilots need the best tools available to learn
their trade as quickly as possible and to get the best out of the latest generation of combat aircraft, such as the Rafale, A400M, MRTT (Multi Role
Tanker Transport) and NH90. In this context, methods of simulation, on the
ground or in-flight, are presented as the answer to all these challenges. Where are
we in fact? This article will shine some light on the value and limitations of these
training methods.
Introduction
Budgetary constraints, reorganisations of air bases and units, training airspace restrictions and the level of deployment of the forces throughout the world all
combine to make the preparation of pilots increasingly difficult. They have the effect
of considerably reducing flying hours in combat aircraft, and additionally, combat
aircraft of the latest generation are more difficult to master because their on-board
systems are more comprehensive and the missions more varied. As a result, the training time required is increased. In these conditions, how is it possible to train highlyqualified pilots as quickly as possible to operate the ultra-technological systems of the
latest-generation aircraft, in order to meet operational demands? And all this while
keeping costs under control and ensuring safety for all.
In aeronautics, the usual answer to cope with a lack of flying hours is
ground-based simulation. It may seem superfluous to specify ground-based when
it appears self-evident, but it is nevertheless a necessary distinction given that technological innovation has made in-flight simulation available. This apparent contradiction in terms is a powerful tool for the current and future training of combat
pilots. In-flight simulation enables some or all of the functionalities of a combat
aircraft to be reproduced but at a much lower operating cost. It allows training in
the manoeuvres and tactical procedures used in operational combat situations to
take place at the flying school level. Also, as we will see later, embedded (that is,
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Simulator Training
in-flight) simulation allows certain limitations of ground-based simulation to be

overcome, so these two training aids would appear to offer a panacea to respond
to the drastic limitation of flying hours in operational combat aircraft. Of course,
this assertion is only partly true, and the object of this article is to show how these
tools should be used to squeeze extra value from military aviation training.
Ground-based simulation: not a real Swiss Army knife
Ground-based simulation is a preferred resource in pilot training in order

to reduce the number of flying hours required. This reduction is only possible if
the skills acquired in the simulator can make the transition positively to actual
flying or, in other words, if a skill learnt in the simulator is reused effectively in real
flight so that the consequence is that fewer actual flying hours are necessary to
learn this skill. The risk, though, with ground simulation is twofold: either no
transfer takes place, so there is no saving in flying hours, or a negative transfer takes
place and more flying hours are needed to compensate for it. The object of this section is to suggest considerations for limiting the potential negative aspects of simulation, namely bad lessons.
It is widely recognised that the technical side of simulation design has received the most attention, to the detriment of the teaching aspect. It has to be accepted that technological development does not necessarily result in better training,
for everything depends on the type of skills it is required to instil, and they do not
always transfer effectively. Moreover, the dilemma which confronts all trainers is
that of finding the ideal balance between the number of flight hours and the number of hours in the simulator, the aim being to find the best compromise between
efficiency and finance. Firstly, we will consider the relation between the types of
skills to be learnt in the simulator and their transferability. Secondly, we will see
that to find the ratio between the number of flying hours and the number in the
simulator, we have to evaluate the efficiency of the simulators in service.
The appropriate use of the ground-based simulator
For a number of years it has been accepted that training which combines
simulation with true flying saves money. However, most scientific research on the
subject concentrates almost exclusively on skills connected with the on-board instrumentation, which amounts to knowing how to use the instruments in the cockpit.
The technical limitations of simulators in the past meant they did not offer a good
quality view out of the cockpit. With improved technology, this problem was largely
overcome and research also sought to improve the quality of training over a wider
range of skills. Recent research has enabled us to assess the effectiveness of simulator
training for skills running from the use of on-board instrumentation to visual flight,
and even to simulate aircraft manoeuvring, which involves psycho-motor skills.
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Simulator Training
Research indicates that the acquisition of the skills involved with system
management, (when the display is not composed of instruments with needles but of
on-board computers) are those which transfer best. Positive transfer is systematically
observed even with a low cost simulator such as an ordinary personal computer
using commercial software. On the other hand, the results are mixed in the case of
the motor skills involved in manoeuvring the aircraft. A simulator which reproduces
the movements of the aircraft increases the realism and the sense of immersion in
the virtual world. Although immersion is desirable in simulation there are much
cheaper ways of achieving this, for example, to put the training into the context of
a scenario, the better to introduce the trainee into the virtual world. However, this
effect is not clearly apparent in the case of motor skills. For these skills it is preferable to train them in real flight and not in a cheap, or for that matter even a sophisticated, simulator. For the last category of skills, those involved in visual flight, there
is no definitive answer. Research shows that some visual flight skills can be taught
effectively with a rudimentary visual input (for example, landing) whereas others
require high-quality visual effects (for visual navigation, as one example).
The quality of simulator training is therefore largely a function of the skill
being learnt. This is why it is necessary to evaluate the simulators objectively when
they are in service to decide which skills are effectively transferred and which provide no, or even negative, benefit.
Beware of the trap!
This is a matter of evaluating the effectiveness of the simulator. This evaluation has two objectives. The first is to find out if the training on the simulator
can be transferred, skill by skill, to actual flight. The second objective is to determine the best ratio of flight hours to simulator hours during training.
Usually, this evaluation is subjective, based on the opinions of the users.
Objective measurements now exist such as the Per cent transfer (PT) and the
Transfer effectiveness ratio (TER). The PT enables the number of flying hours
saved by the use of the simulator to be calculated, while the TER allows a more
accurate measurement of the simulators contribution for each type of skill taught
on it. If a skill is not, or is badly transferred to real flight, the simulator can be
abandoned for that task. This means that the simulator can eventually be used to
best effect.
The next step is to calculate the optimal ratio between the hours of real and
simulated flight. The cost effectiveness ratio is an extension of the TER by including the cost dimension for the simulator and for real flight. Finally, it is possible
to calculate the amount of simulator time required at its maximum efficiency and
the amount of flight time to just meet the need, in order to arrive at the optimal
amount of training at the least cost.
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Simulator Training
The sensible use of these objective methods of the evaluation of the transfer
of training and thus, of the effectiveness of the simulator, allows:
l
avoidance of the risk of negative transfer;
direction of the use of each simulator towards its potential maximum;
l calculation of an optimal ratio of simulator hours to actual flying hours

in a training programme.
Taken overall, these measures also enable the effectiveness of different

training methods to be compared.
Ground-based simulation has made great strides over recent decades. It has
established itself as a serious solution for certain types of training. For all that,
pilots are unanimous as to the limitations of ground-based simulation, unreal
bodily sensation and stress reaction amongst others. A new form of simulation
could overcome these deficiencies. Aircraft fitted with modern all-screen cockpits
are capable of accepting embedded simulation. This affords the possibility of
injecting virtual situations into their displays which present the illusion of a realistic tactical environment to the pilot. The second part of this article will deal with
this capability in more detail.
Embedded simulationthe way of the (near) future
Embedded simulation works by generating a virtual tactical situation in

which artificial threats or other incidents are simulated and presented on the cockpit interfaces. For example, a cockpit screen can show movement tracks representing adversaries or allies as would the radar of an operational combat aircraft, even
though no radar may be fitted to the training aircraft. It thus becomes possible for
the pilot to use the training aircraft in simulated operational tactical conditions.
This increases the effectiveness of the training by providing a simulated rich tactical environment in real flight conditions.
Several advantages result from this technology. Firstly, it will be possible to
surpass current levels of tactical complexity in training, since the embarked simulation will reduce the cognitive load on the pilot by relieving him of some mental calculations. This will promote his ability to divide his attention and cope with more
tasks of increased complexity than he can at present. In addition, the possibility of
enriching the tactical environment in training will enable the pilot to accumulate
experience in conditions very close to the operational ones he will experience later.
This will be to his advantage when he joins the forces as a pilot.
Of course, not all activities can be reproduced by embedded simulation. For
example, it will be difficult to train for missions during which the pilot has to interact with other aircraft by visual contact through the canopy when in fact they exist
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Simulator Training
only on his computer screen. For this reason, while waiting for certain technologies
such as augmented reality to arrive at maturity, it seems reasonable for the moment
to train only in activities requiring interactions with objects beyond visual range. In
these conditions, the risk of contradictions between what appears on the embedded
simulator screen and what can be seen from the cockpit is reduced. Other limitations
shared with ground-based simulation also exist, such as the degree of artificial intelligence of the virtual entities or the fidelity of the behaviour of the virtual threats.
However, the risks posed by this new tool are difficult to anticipate by virtue
of a severe lack of scientific research or lessons learnt by experience. The newness of
this technology within the forces, and even more so its application to training,
means that thinking must be based on existing technology which approaches the
characteristics of embedded simulation as closely as possible. This includes modernising the cockpits of training aircraft, such as the Technically Advanced Aircraft
(TAA). In fact, while this technological modernisation is supposed to reduce the
risks of flight, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has noted a higher attrition rate for the previous generation of these aircraft. The factors producing the
most errors come under two headings: an increase in the quantity of information to
absorb and the automating of systems. The FAAs recommended solution to reduce
these problems is to greatly increase pilot training in the new skills required by systems management. It seems that in order to promote the efficient use of embedded
simulation while limiting the risks, it may be necessary to include the acquisition of
new kinds of basic skills very early in a pilots training. While the previous generation of aircraft demanded more training in the basics of flying, the new systems
need more in systems management skills. Inevitably the training of future pilots will
have to incorporate these two types of basics.
To sum up, the Air Force must confront a reduction in training on operational combat aircraft. The aim is therefore to train young pilots in the particular skills
required by the operational aircraft before they begin to fly this type of aircraft.(1)
Three major areas of skills are needed:
l
flying skillsthe basics;
systems management skills;
tactical combat skills.
Ground-based simulation is powerful and reliable for developing the last

two of these. However, it is not so effective in creating flying skills. Real flying is
(1) J. Donnot and V. Ferrari, Loptimisation de la formation du pilote de combat par downloading: limites et risques, Research
report EMAA/B Plans, 2012.
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Simulator Training
the most efficient training for this type of skill. This is why embedded simulation
in flight represents such an asset as it provides training in all three classes of skills.
Nonetheless, to acquire the ability to master embedded simulation the pilot must
first be able to master systems management. It is therefore through progressive training, based on sound knowledge and carefully integrating these new tools, such as
ground-based and embedded simulation, that the Air Force will be able to deal
with current and future issues regarding the training of the combat pilot.(2)
(2) C. Camachon and C. Blttler, La simulation embarque: limites et risques pour la formation et lentrainement du PN,
Research report EMAA/B Plans, 2012.
75
The Men and Women

of the French Air Force
EMAA
French Air Staff.
he airman, like his brothers in arms, is first and foremost a combatant, fully
aware that his duty may involve the deaths of others, as well as his own. He
must face up to difficulties with the same bravery and the same dedication as
his illustrious forbears. Both at home and overseas he has to deal with increasingly
complex situations, frequently dangerous and with a minimum of notice.
He faces ingenious adversaries who are capable of varying their tactics both
in the air and on the ground. In order to meet these threats he needs to possess intellectual, technical and moral dynamism to arm himself for the different challenges
which he may have to meet. He also needs to develop the qualities of respect,
integrity, service and excellence which will guide him on an everyday basis.
Training to develop values and a sense of mission
For the Air Force, training is a vital element of the quality of excellence that
it seeks in order to execute its missions. The technical and human demands of the
aeronautical environment form the basic framework of this excellence, and mastery
of this framework guarantees the coherence of the Air Forces everyday activity.
With this in mind we have to bring together three separate aspects of training, which must join to form a coherent whole: training the combatant; training
the aeronautical specialist, and the level of skill required. This concept fundamentally shapes an organisational model which is peculiar to the Air Force.
The men and women of the Air Force thus represent a real team with some
fifty different skills, who are federated by their joint activity in the third dimension. Whatever their individual responsibilities or their field of activity, they share
a unique culture which allows them to work together smoothly and achieve success
in their missions.
Their training enables aviators to think for themselves in the midst of doubt
and stress, while remaining true to their values. They know how to operate in
situations of extreme autonomy which are further complicated by the constraints of
individual responsibility. It is always a question of serving, of striving for excellence;
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The Men and Women

this implies a sense of duty and a continuous effort to dedicate ones efforts to the
service of the Nation.
Values which extend beyond the Air Force
Inseparable as they are from the performance of the Air Force, the aviators
values inspire performance in any organisation.
The technical skills acquired and the qualities developed by aviators (such
as rigour, the willingness to accept responsibility, the taste for command, and instructional aptitude) are further elements which can be highlighted as experiencebased skills. Greater emphasis should be placed on these values, which are so easily
transferable to the wider world of government and business.
At each level of responsibility, from the lowest to the highest, a career in the
Air Force can be the key to success in life. An Air Force career can not only be attractive to young French people, but its training can also make an enormous social and
economic contribution to the country. A large number of companies recruit their
skilled technicians from the Air Force, valuing their wide-ranging professional skills,
and many officers possess the management skills and experience so vital to the
success of French enterprise, and, where appropriate, to their recovery. For many the
Air Force is one of the last places where the social elevator still functions.
In this way, through their education and training, the men and women of
the Air Force bring these values to the entire Nation.
Where do we go from here?
Human resource management in the Air Force must pursue its modernisation process. It needs to be particularly flexible, and use training to guarantee that
operational objectives are attained while at the same time keeping costs under control.
The Air Forces mission is characterised by its everyday activities, so vital to
the security and defence of the French people; its quick reaction capability is implicit. This is why its personnel must acquire a broad, common base of operational
preparation appropriate to these requirements.
In addition, when the most difficult and ambitious missions are demanded
of it, such as initial entry to a theatre of conflict, the Air Force must be capable of
providing the highest standards of operational preparation for a more limited section of its resources.
Finally, it must be able to undertake long term tasks by careful management of the different training and skill levels of its personnel.
77
The Men and Women

It is a corollary that, in this period of overall force reductions, to be able to

call on reservists to fill the gaps when generating forces is essential to operational
flexibility. The objective of a size of reserve force that was set out in the last Livre
blanc (2008), has not been achieved. It is vitally important to implement a coherent overall policy which encourages enterprises to commit themselves to supporting national defence, and defines appropriate financial arrangements to recognise
the economic value of the reservists to civil society.
Modernity is also a synonym for the ability to escape from the straitjacket
of regulations which have hitherto constrained the career management of our officers and NCOs. It is vital to be able to change the specialisation of our personnel
in mid-career. Adopting this organisational model means we need to think seriously about the training and direction of senior officers into one of two streams:
towards senior command appointments for some, or towards their transfer to other
government departments or industry for others.
The Air Force gives France a remarkable military tool which is has a firm
eye on the future. It has a rich supply of dedicated personnel, and exemplary motivation. Widely dispersed in many different stations, it is composed of French citizens who are proud of their commitment to serving their country, whose colours
they hold high. The Air Force continues to give them the high quality training
which allows them to serve the Nation at the highest level. In return, the benefits
to the Nation go way beyond the mere results of operational tasking.
78
Looking to the future
RDN
The Battlefield and Air Power

15 Years From Now
Grgory Boutherin
Christophe Pajon
Doctor of public law, Captain Boutherin is Head of the
Prospective et tudes de scurit (Forecasting and security
studies) team at the Air Force research centre. Doctor of
political sciences and authorised researcher, Christophe
Pajon is a researcher in this team.
Preliminary note: The ideas and opinions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of
the French Air Force or Ministry of Defence.
he Ministry of Defence in general, and the armed forces in particular, have

begun a process of transformation and adaptation to the international
environment in which they will be called upon to operate in the future.
The Air Force is, of course, involved in this evolution, and in the same vein has
begun its own transformation process, intended to carry it beyond 2025. It is quite
logical that this transformation should occur hand in hand with a broader consideration of how the battlefield is likely to change over the same period. The ideas
proposed in this article are intended to add to this broader consideration.
Recent interventions have borne witness to the role played by aerospace
power in the nature of conflicts, the environment of interventions and the adversary, and, as a result, to the ways of using that power. The latter point shows a clear
break from its use during operations in the nineteen-nineties. Should we therefore
see this evolution as some defining trait in the character of our future commitments? Do all changes in the nature of the battlefield have a causal effect on the
characteristics and use of aerospace power? The aim of this article is to detect the
current and future changes in the battlefield which could have an impact on the
exercise of aerospace power.
An increasing number of players on the battlefield
To say that the number and type of players on the battlefield is increasing
is hardly new, and yet the changes in, and complexity of, this veritable mosaic of
networks have accelerated since the phenomenon was identified several decades
ago. On a wider scale, the state is no longer the sole organisation to possess the
resources needed for acting internationally. Non-governmental organisations
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15 Years From Now
(NGOs), international organisations, trans-national movements, private companies and private military and security providers have also become significant
players. Even those working in international relations have seen the collective
nature of their vocation demolished. The role of the individual, be he tourist or
terrorist, would seem to be the final sign of the blowing apart of international
society. Through his action (perhaps an attack, or by posting a video on Internet)
or simply by his presence (as a victim of some action, or of a kidnapping), the individual becomes a player in international relations. From a domestic point of view,
each state is aware of competition from collections of players acting within that
same state, who call into question the legitimacy of the political structure
sometimes to the extent of its collapse.
Are conflicts necessarily counter-insurgency in nature?
The battlefield therefore becomes a smaller reflection of the questioning of

two conventional state monopolies: that of control of international relations, and
that of domestic political legitimacy. The form taken by players on the battlefield
confirms this fogging of the boundary between domestic and external issues, and
is exemplified by those NGOs concerned with international solidarity, which
appear on the battlefield via their operational divisions. They are financed by states
and inter-governmental organisations by the action of their supporters and structures established principally in Western countries. They are not necessarily transnational: indeed, they are occasionally identifiable with a single nation.
Communication aimed at promoting their action on the battlefield has a twopronged aim: fundraising, and expanding their media value for presentation to
Western audiences. The legitimacy thus acquired helps them in their negotiations
(mainly financial) with national and/or international public authorities. Private
companies providing military support act on the ground and also develop contractual relations with some countries according to distinct systems of regulation and
legal issues which are defined with each country concerned and which to some
extent they bring onto the battlefield. Those two examples well illustrate how the
state has lost its monopoly of control of the battlefield, a symptom of one of the
consequences of the multiplicity of actors thereon. The other consequence which
carries with it a growth in the complexity of the battlefield, is the confrontation
between a similar multiplicity of and divergence in rationale. Each rationale identifies its own priorities and stakes, and each is different, be it based on, for example,
military, political, media or regulatory issues.
From the belligerent parties point of view, one of the main, and perhaps
most notable, developments on the battlefield in recent years clearly relates to the
non-state nature of the adversaries that Western forces have to face. With the
exception of the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, contemporary conflicts for the most part cast a collaboration of conventional forces against
insurgents or non-state movements. Iraq, Afghanistan, south Lebanon, Libya and
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15 Years From Now
Mali are cases in point. The dominant question in many current analyses is that of
the adaptability of aerospace power, which is essentially designed for confrontation
with a state actor. This latter form of military engagement was formalised by
Warden, in his theory of five concentric circles, in which he envisaged the adversary as a pseudo-organic decision-making system with the capacity for making
decisions and action. How, then, do we organise ourselves when facing an adversary who, in principle, has no centres of gravity? Firstly, buy not having too truncated a vision of Wardens model, which defined a strategic entity in terms of an
organisation capable of operating autonomouslythat is, of moving and supplying itself. If, as the Belgian political analyst, Joseph Henrotin, wrote, Wardens
typical adversary were a state, then one could identify a system which allowed
understanding of insurgent groups rationale, since they, too, function with forms
of leadership (leaders and ideological advisors), communication services (on-line
media, for example), infrastructure (a financial system or smuggling network),
population to support the insurgents, and deployed forces. Todays crying need to
design ways of responding to these situations will be no less crying fifteen years
from now, when we can be sure that the non-state adversary will still be in a position of indirect action, fleeting in his appearances and hence fast, unpredictable,
lightweight and difficult to identify and discriminate. These are of course the very
things that characterise what Clausewitz referred to as irregular warfare. In postulating the existence of such conflict in the future, there must automatically be a
supposition that an adversary might display these traits. That being so, we should
also beware of another danger, which would be to consider counter-insurgency
inevitably and invariably as the only form of warfare over the next fifteen years.
Non-belligerent players
The nature of the adversaries aside, this type of conflict has put the spotlight on the importance of other, non-belligerent players. Among them figure principally the local or national population, the media and NGOs. Depending on the
type of analysis undertaken these groups of individuals, whether or not they live in
the theatre of operations, can be considered in three different ways yet simultaneously: as a tool, an objective or even a centre of gravity; as an autonomous
player; or as a context in itself.
Territory can be held, but not a population. A population is not an inert
object: it possesses its own character and advanced thought processes. And because
it is a player it is susceptible to persuasion by one or other of the parties.
Considering it solely as an object, or as an element of the physical landscape, risks
its conversion into a willing ally of the asymmetric adversary, in terms of logistic
support and as a recruitment pool, at least. Hence the population, or rather the
support of that population, becomes a strategic objective for the parties in conflict.
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The ways of gaining popular support, be they by persuasion or terror, vary

from one protagonist to another and with their value systems, but the population
nevertheless remains an element of conquest. The need to win hearts and minds is
real and an important development on the battlefield. As General Sir Rupert Smith
highlighted in his book The Utility of Force., the end states for which we fight today
have changed, and the population has become the centre of gravity of contemporary operations. As a strategic goal, winning over the support of the population
calls for a redefinition of the use of force and especially an evaluation of its impact
on the population seen from the point of view of public opinion.
From this goal flows a number of constraints, principles and models, which
can be summed up as follows:
l Understand the population in order to understand better how it perceives,
or might perceive, the actions of conventional forces;
l
Ensure the aims are understood, and gain the support of the population
for them;
l Support the population, and bring it wide-ranging structural and medical assistance, (it seems evident here that air-mobility assets play an essential role
in this support, in particular in bringing in supplies and in medical evacuation);
l Control violence, maintaining proportionality in the use of force and
avoiding civil casualties. Possess in advance a strict set of rules of engagement and
a wide range of weapons for progressive use if needed, so as to avoid the insurgents
using such an armoury as an argument in their struggle for influence;
l
Respond to the adversarys persuasive arguments and actions point by
point.
These rules and objectives make the population a significant constraining
factor for Western forces, a situation the adversary will seek to turn to his advantage.
Air power and the population
On first sight, a number of factors might lead one to think that aerospace
power is little concerned by this strategic focus on the population, and yet such a
view is clearly erroneous. Preservation of the population and limitation of collateral damage have become a central challenge for aerospace power because of several
factors: the major principles of the law of armed conflict (distinction, necessity,
proportionality and humanity); the increasing recourse to judicial proceedings
within warfare; the importance that has to be given not only to the legitimacy of
action, but also to the perception of it by public opinion; and information warfare,
and therefore, to a certain extent, the spin that can be put by the adversaries on the
results of non-discriminatory strikes.
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Additionally, it is clearly essential to keep in mind how political effects are

taken into account, as we now have to remember that a tactical success can easily
end up as a strategic failure. The destruction of an electricity distribution grid
could, for example, lead to loss of power to a water treatment plant. Such failures
could have consequences on the day-to-day life and health of the local civilian
population.
These different aspects confirm that, if air power was once the central weapon in industrial warfare and of a North American concept of confrontation, developments (both technological and in use) have made it particularly appropriate to
action within the population. Far from a rather Orwellian conception of technology that would lead to centralisation and to a break with operational reality, its
sophistication is in fact bringing it back down to earth and to a human level
through decentralisation of decision-making, reinforcement of horizontal links
and a short decisional cycle, and close and discriminatory observation of the
pattern of life of both population adversary by drones. It seems somewhat odd,
perhaps, that the technology now used by air power offers substantial savings in
men and machines.
The multiplication of players of many and varied nature, together with an
ever-present state actor whose own methods may equally be broadly derived from
methods of irregular warfare, form the main strong trend in the evolution of the
battlefield.
Aerospace power and a complex adversary: rustic with high-tech
In a similar way that has been outlined for the players involved, it is not
possible to understand technological change in just one single context. Air power
is going to have to remain in a position to confront adversaries who possess
comparable technological potential, others who may be technologically asymmetric, or yet others who, depending on the time and the place, ally the high-tech
with the completely out-dated.
That said, and on the assumption that technological advance remains a key
factor in the conduct of warfare and central to the third dimension, in which the
law of survival of the fittest applies, the issue remains of the number of competitors and of exactly how they challenge the air superiority of the most advanced
armed forces. It comes down to considering two sources of tension: their financial
backing and availability of material (which to some extent brings us back to the
state or non-state nature of the adversary in question), and their level of technological sophistication.
Because of the ever-increasing costs of research and development of sophisticated technology, and of the numerous fields of expertise that have to be coordinated, the entry fee to the air power club is very high. It follows that the only members
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are state actors, with the exception, perhaps, of embryonic air forces such as that of
the Tamil Tigers. But to be a state actor is not a sufficient condition: the number of
members is even smaller if one only counts those states that can generate an air force
capable of doing something other than conducting purely self-defence missions. Seen
from this angle, the landscape shows a dramatic contrast between a reducing number of credible competitors (because of escalating costs) and a sort of technological
desert. The broader reality of the situation is much more complex.
First of all, there is, and will continue to be, proliferation of aeronautical
technologyprincipally Russian and Chineseeven if the proliferation of those
countries aircraft does not necessarily or inevitably call into question Western
forces air superiority, since it is more an issue of quantity than quality. This development is directly linked to the entry into service of fourth generation aircraft
and, not so far off, the arrival of the fifth generation, even though the latter will be
limited to just a few states.
Next, we should note that, between 2005 and 2015, 4,000 combat aircraft
(including light aircraft) will be produced across the world, of which two-thirds
will be multi-role combat aircraft. This will be followed between 2015 and 2025
by the replacement of third generation fleets. There will probably be a global
reduction in the total number of combat aircraft as a result of research into greater multi-use of equipment and better overall performance. Moreover, research
into the advantages of drone systems will not only increase but also be more generalised and will certainly no longer remain the privilege of high-tech forces.
Aerospace power will therefore have to develop highly effective detection
and identification systems in order to face up to the simple systems that are
deployed in particular by non-state adversaries. That being so, the statement regarding the proliferation of aerospace technology does not automatically mean that
credible competitors will emerge, and even less that they will be numerous and
widespread fifteen years from now, essentially for three reasons:
l These weapon systems require very specific competencies, which are
acquired through initial training, the acquisition and transmission of significant
operational experience and the maintenance of such expertise through regular participation in joint and combined exercises. The fact is that there are few states
capable of combining advanced technology with all of these requirements;
l These weapon systems must additionally be integrated within a highperformance C2 system in order for their full potential to be exploited;
l Finally, apart from the fact that these weapon systems must of course
have adequate armament, they must also be closely linked to an efficient and effective network of air surveillance and air defence.
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Despite all that, it is right to consider the trend towards proliferation of

anti-air systems as well, even if, once again, ground-to-air missiles are likely to pose
less of a threat if they are distributed piecemeal, than if they are integrated into a
defence structure.
To sum up this review of technology on the battlefield, three potential axes
of development become apparent:
l Pursuit of, and acceleration in the proliferation of weapon systems, including those of the latest generation;
l
Proliferation to the advantage of non-state actors;
l The ever more striking capability of actors, non-state in particular, to

adapt, convert and divert weapon systems and/or civilian technology.
Air power therefore has to account for a wide range of threats and great
unpredictability. Quite apart from responses in terms of strategy, assets and action,
it seems essential that we remember that the adversary is not necessarily our technological inferior at all times and in all places on the battlefield, and also that even
if he were, he could still have considerable nuisance value.
Aerospace power on the battlefield and the front line
Complex environments
In addition to looking at the players and assets, analysis of evolution of the

battlefield has to look in depth at the terrain on which armed forces in general, and
air power in particular, are engaged. Such analysis will then bring out the resulting
constraints on the assets deployed and their desired and actual effects. Once again,
recent events highlight the evolution of one particular spacethe town, more
generally referred to as the urban environment. Again, our initial reservation, that
current developments are not necessarily tomorrows realities, leads us to maintain
a certain distance from an all urban perception: confrontation in mountainous
regions, for example, calls for the application of certain aerospace assets in manners peculiar to that complex environment. This has very clearly been demonstrated in operations in Mali, especially in the offensive phases which targeted the
strongholds of armed groups in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. They led to the
mobilisation and coordination of a large number of different types of aircraft
(including Rafale, Mirage 2000D, C135 Stratolifter, Harfang drones and
Atlantique 2) in order to conduct simultaneous strikes on several targets.
Moreover, confrontation of the willing is no longer limited to the surface of the
earth, and does not necessarily imply the use, even limited, of armed force. Any
physical space, like cyberspace, is now a space for confrontation, an extension or
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component of the battlefield, whose resident nature and threats, and those transiting through it, call for very special consideration.
Contemporary conflicts show a shift of the battlefield in the general direction of complex, especially urban, environments. Afghanistan, Iraq, Israeli confrontations with Hezbollah and Hamas in southern Lebanon and Palestinian regions,
and, of course, Libya, all bear witness to this trend. For sure, neither town nor
mountain is new to fighting forces: indeed, can there be any environment in which
man has not already fought? Military history is full of examples of battles or wars
waged in such environments as a direct consequence of the fact that a town has an
intrinsic value because of the concentration of political, economic, social and cultural bodies within it, which endow it with symbolic status. It is natural that towns
will continue to represent an important stake in future conflicts, but more than
that, the urban battlefield will certainly become more usual, not only because of
the predicted increase in urbanisation throughout the world, but also because of the
deliberate choice of certain actors. Adversaries of Western forces are therefore inclined to seek a position of better balance in this environment by turning the military
technology of those same Western forces against them. Urban combatfighting in
built-up areas, in an enclosed spaceis now tending to become a preferred mode
for the weaker party because, for one thing, the adversary has far better knowledge
of the environment in which he lives and in which he has been able to prepare for
his fight, and, for another, the other partys intervention is made infinitely more
complex. The town environment therefore offers great advantages to the defender:
refuges, mixing with the population, obstacles to the deployment of armoured
vehicles and to the use of air power. Moreover, apart from the geographical location
of the town itself (in a dip, on a summit or on a plain, for example), the geography
within it can be very varied, with perhaps a Western-style centre, an ancient one,
residential suburbs, housing schemes, industrial zones and so on. In a broad sense
the town is therefore tending to become a more complex physical environment as a
result of its own evolution.
In his treatise on air power and the urban environment, Olivier Zajec points
out that urban combat will unquestionably be the most likely type of combat in the
future, and the most demanding for Western armed forces. Air power is not the only
force to try to resolve the difficult problems it raises: for both aviation and ground
forces, says Zajec, the complex and changing urban theatre presents a major challenge. That being so, aerospace power plays an eminent role in the urban milieu for
several reasons. On one hand its permanent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance) capability provides fundamental situational knowledge of the
complex environment via the use of drones. The advantage of drones is that they can
be kept out of range of threats from lightweight ground-to-air weapons and
MANPADS, unlike rotary-winged aircraft, which find it difficult to hover in that
environment without being exposed. The use of drones here, but in advance of
armed action is equally justified, as was illustrated particularly well during the four
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months of intelligence gathering and mapping that preceded the second offensive on
Fallujah in November 2004, and also during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in the
summer of 2006. On the other hand, aerospace power allows for atypical modes of
action in order to limit collateral damage, such as the use of non-explosive munitions
to penetrate concrete, as used by the French Mirage 2000Ds in Libya.
Dematerialisation of the battlefield
But once again, we must recognise that the urban environment is not the
be-all and end-all: it does not represent the sole stage on which future confrontations will be played out. Any attempt to define the battlefield would tend to
expose just how difficult it is to map it out, partly as a result of its intangible characteristics. The latter have not suddenly appeared, but are the result of the development, and now maturity, of technology with increasingly high performance.
Digitisation of the battlefield, and its key advantage of linking players in a
single network, is proof of another confrontation in which the adversaries seek to
gain control or, at least, to challenge our control, over the advantages it offers. This
prime space, generally known as cyberspace, is an increasingly strategic environment in which threats are growing, and upon which military operations are increasingly dependent, as, in a more general sense, are our modern societies. For this
reason it is also important to have a clear grasp of this sphere of confrontation. In
other words, even if the Air Force is to a very large extent dependent on this sphere,
and even if it falls to that Force to ensure the security of its own information
networks and systems, cyberspace itself nevertheless remains a domain common to
the various military players and, more broadly, to everyonecivil and military.
Furthermore, acknowledgement of vulnerabilities and threats, and therefore application of surveillance, results from cooperation between authorities, including
forces, agencies, services and ministries.
Extension of the battlefield
Exo-atmospheric and extra-atmospheric space is also emerging as an environment in which rivalries and power struggles are being played out: they are currently embryonic in terms of threat, but are nevertheless a cause for concern. This
is understandable, given the vital nature of space both to the conduct of military
operations, and to its strategic importance to the development of our societies.
One of the main reasons is linked to the fact that mastery of space, rather like mastery of nuclear weapon technology, represents high stakes for any country. The race
between the United States and the USSR to launch the first satellite, unmanned
then manned, then the conquest for the moon, is just such an example. Such motivation is still with us today, and can be seen in the debates over the space
programmes of certain countries such as Iran, now the tenth space power in the
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world, following the launch of its satellite Omid (Hope) on 4 February 2009,
during the celebrations of 30 years of the Islamic Republic.
Beyond issues that guide space programmes, such as sovereignty and
influence, there are also strategic, tactical and operational interests which encourage countries or groups of countries to gain access to space, to try to control it and
even to go as far as preventing others from having access to it. Because of this, the
spatial domain as an extension or development of cyberspace has become essential,
something no military operation can do without, by virtue of its use in the fields
of telecommunications, observation, navigation and advance warning. In the same
way that they are dependent on cyberspace, modern armed forces are obliged to
use space in broad support of ground-based military operations. Space capability
now appears as a sensitive issue, given that its neutralisation in the broadest sense
would undoubtedly hinder the conduct of operations. It therefore seems logical to
incorporate it into the overall analysis of the battlefield and hence to try to identify future developments.
More than any other force component, the Air Force has a special responsibility here, albeit one that might seem natural for that service. It is simply a practical reality, in spite of the scientific debate regarding the physical continuity (or
not!) of the third dimension into space.
The adaptations needed can be summed up as the development and hardening of satellite fleets, either on a strictly national level or, more likely, on a
European level. The effort already made this field has promoted France and Europe
into top-ranking space powers. Continuing effort is needed if we are to have true
and total autonomy of decision-making and conduct of operations. In light of the
rate of technological and political developments, and of what has been achieved by
some countries, the least budgetary and technologicaland even doctrinal
retrenchment risks highly prejudicial consequences. With the Graves system (Grand
rseau adapt la veille spatiale), France now enjoys a real advantage in spatial situational awareness. It is, of course, important not only to maintain and protect this
advantage but also to expand it in order to be in a position to anticipate any risk of
threat in this domain, which is likely to see considerable challenge in the next fifteen years. Thought needs therefore to be given to responses and mechanisms for
spatial deterrence, in the event that certain states start working towards possible
arming of space. Strengthening surveillance and detection capabilities would have a
deterrent effect in that they would allow pinpointing of the origin of an attack
against a satellite body.
Timethe central element on the battlefield
When examining developments in the battlefield and the effects they are
likely to have in the coming years, one unavoidably comes back to the age-old
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central notion of time. And central is indeed the right idea, since it has become a
significant factor in conflicts in which each party seeks to control it and to impose
his rhythm on the other. To maintain a temporal advantage over the adversary, to
keep a step ahead of the game and to retain the initiative all relate to one of the
classic conditions for military success. And yet the acceleration of time, the evolution in the nature of the adversary and the way in which he acts, are all imposing
a slight change in this basic tenet.
Permanence, or mastering long time
One of the challenges for aerospace power in a future environment notable

for the fleeting nature of targets and the avoidance by adversaries of direct confrontation, would seem to be that of bringing together control of force, situational
knowledge and reactivity. The last two of these brings us back to the need for
aerospace power to have mastery of long (permanent air patrols) and short periods
of time. From this point of view, recent operations have shown the central role
given to drones for this task. Apart from the fact that they remove man from risk
zones, they offer the special advantage of mastering long periods of timeon-task
endurance. In other words, they have the advantage of permanence, a characteristic that is even more vital, given that time has become a significant factor in
contemporary conflicts, and is likely to form a structural element of future ones.
The adversaries operate on two different timescales: on one hand they seek
to stretch out the commitment of forces in order to exhaust them while benefitting more and more from media channels in their long-term strategy of influencing public opinion, of steering perceptions on the legitimacy of the intervention,
or even attempting to gain an advantage from their weak capacity for resistance.
On the other hand, they operate on a short timescale, tactical level: having no
assets with which to confront the force head-on, they prefer, as we have seen, to
play the transient cardto merge into the physical environment, benefitting as
they do so from its complexity. The deployed force therefore needs to know how
to master the short term, and this is where permanence brings sure operational
gain. Permanent occupation of the sky, together with a network of sensors and
receivers opens up full situational awareness, an overall view of the battlefield and
a common picture of the operational situation. It offers tactical and operational
mastery of the long term, which in turn allows action in the short term to catch
that transient moment. Whilst the war around Kosovo revealed a number of limitations in this field, permanence of all-weather ISR platforms, appears today as
a real tactical and operational innovation in the geographical coverage and the
instantaneous and continuous intelligence picture it offers to ground and air forces
alike. Numerous examples bear witness to this: in Lebanon or Gaza, Iraq or
Afghanistan, no force committed to a conflict can henceforth do without the
permanence that drones bring into play.
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These permanent platforms can offer more advantages than intelligence

alone. In a similar manner to the shorter-term show of presence and show of force
operations, drones have a deterrent role on the tactical level in terms of presence, and
contribute to controlled use of force. In making a presence, but not necessarily a
threat, fly around over an area, and in making the adversaries understand that they
are under constant observation and that the reaction time of the force is getting shorter and shorter, drones contribute to influencing the adversaries decision-making and
inciting them not to act. This deterrent function of drones, which is further reinforced if the aircraft are armed, offers an extra step in the graduated use of force, which
is of great value in counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations, in which the
protection of, and assistance to, the populationand, indeed, the support of the
population for the actionare determining factors.
Adapting to a faster rhythm
Implicit in the advantages offered by drones in intelligence and control of

information is the notion of reactivity. There is nothing new to this, of course, as
it is at the heart both of the OODA loop (Observation, orientation, decision,
action) and of the target indication cycle, called F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target,
Engage, Assess). Contemporary operations, such as those conducted by Israel, or
those in Afghanistan and Iraq, reveal the central nature of this aspect and the
important of being able to go for opportunity targets as well as Time sensitive
targets (TST).
In recent counter-insurgency operations, opportunity targeting has been
the mainstay of offensive aerospace missions. The necessity to have control over
what we are calling short time, and, in extremis, over real time, is one of the main
consequences of developments on the battlefield. By melting into the background
of population and shadowy urban areas, the adversaries attempt to impose their
rhythm. We need, therefore, to have mastery of long time, permanence, in other
words, and to shorten the period between observation and action. It is in this that
drones offer an immeasurable advantage: their permanence and their ability to
transmit information directly, constantly and in real time allows the rhythm to be
increased and hence control of time.
The need to control the tempo arises from the delay between the observation and strike parts of the cycle, since it is critical to the reactivity factor when initiating an operation. Yet it also requires a high level of decentralisation, which is
now having quite an impact in organisational terms. The Air Forces capacity for
this was illustrated well in the Mali operations, particularly in terms of reactivity:
they showed the value of being able to conduct operations from the National air
operations centre (CNOA) at Lyon Mont-Verdun.
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Changes in the battlefield come in many shapes and sizes, of which only a
fewthose which are likely to have a direct with air powerhave been exposed
here. We have described a complex environment with the aim of outlining an
admittedly subjective landscape, yet not exhaustively. If a single trend, or evolutionary path, emerges from this analysis of the battlefield, it is the continued growth in its complexity, closely linked to the increase in the tempo and the changing
rhythm of the battlefield.
This central trend leads to a number of sometimes contrasting consequential effects on aerospace power. In amplifying these consequential effects, the trend
may well give a boost to its own role on the battlefield. The widespread differences
in the nature of the battlefield (for example, if it is spread out or confined, or even
devoid of space; without human life or peopled; with diffuse or permanent threats
and so on) give voice to the traditional cry of higher, faster, further which characterises aerospace power.
That said, to maintain this initial advantage, and even to multiply the
effects and benefits achieved by this trinity of characteristics, it is perhaps worthwhile emphasising more strongly the qualities brought by operating in the third
dimension: flexibility (or adaptability) and permanence. These qualities have already been defined in the French Forces Instruction 1000, which sets out joint doctrine for the use of forces on operations, and should become the defining characteristics of aerospace power. The quintet of higher, faster, further, more flexibly,
for longer, would now be more appropriate to the increasing complexity of the
battlefield and to the intensification of its rhythm. Although time will remain the
central element of future, armed engagements, it is the ability to take control of it
that will be the measure of operational success.
Bibliography
Joseph Henrotin, Peut-on penser une campagne coin en strategie aerienne ? Lapport de Warden, Dfense & scurit
internationale No. 54, December 2009, p. 29.
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World, Vintage, February 2008, 448 pages.
Olivier Zajec, Puissance arienne et milieu urbain, Compagnie europenne dintelligence stratgique, 10 July 2007,
p. 5-6.
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EMAA
French Air Staff.
hile the nature of war remains constant, its forms are fluid and
frequently complex. The conflicts in which our armed forces have been
regularly involved are proof of this, covering a particularly wide range
of warlike activity, from inter-state wars to both high-tech and low-tech asymmetric confrontation with sub-state actors.
A quick historical perspective reminds us that the domination of Western
powers in many conventional state conflicts in the past (such as the Korean, Vietnam,
Falklands, Israeli-Arab, Gulf and Kosovo Wars) has been due to the superiority of
their aviation in general. That air superiority was achieved through tactical innovation (such as Mig Alley in Korea and Operation Bolo in Vietnam), and through technical innovation (superior speed prior to the nineteen-seventies, and manoeuvrability
and stealth since the nineteen-eighties). That same air superiority was threatened
by the introduction of missiles during the Vietnam War, but has been thoroughly
re-established with mastery of electronic warfare, and by substantial improvements in
preparation and training techniques (Red Flag exercises, for example).
Since the beginning of this century successive conflicts in Iraq (the Second
Gulf War in 2003) and Afghanistan have focused strategic thinking on asymmetric models and counter-insurgency approaches which tend to minimise the role of
air power. However the lessons learned from these two experiences demonstrate to
us that as far as air power is concerned there is continuity of risk between the
phases of coercion and stabilisation. There are no frontiers in the sky, and in it the
strongest wins: in Lebanon in 2006 Israel had the painful experience of its strategic planning being confounded by paramilitary units equipped with modern and
powerful weapons.
Operations Harmattan and Serval remind us of the difficulty of planning
for future conflicts. It was the preparation and adaptability of our armed forces
which allowed us to respond to both crises.
In parallel with this, the economic expansion of Third World countries,
together with their access to technology, increases the risk that we may find ourselves facing adversaries equipped with militarily significant forces. While Western
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Military Capability
defence budgets are reducing, emerging countries are in the throes of an arms race
and investing heavily in advanced military technologynotably military aviation
and the many advanced technologies which accompany anti-air and anti-ship operations. These weapons can range from the semi-obsolescent to those of the latest
generation, such as the Russian S300. They offer good value for money to the
countries concerned, and can deny free access to a more powerful attacking force.
If there is no counter-strategy, these capabilities confer on an ill-intentioned
state the ability to deny access to a common space such as a strait or air route, with
obvious economic implications. To respond effectively to this type of challenge the
armed forces must be capable of action in all the spaces involved: air, sea, land, cyber
and extra-atmospheric space. The air sea battle concept developed in the United
States seeks to frustrate the anti-access/air denial strategy of a peer competitor and
favours an integrated, inter-connected system of forces with a resilient communications network, capable of launching multiple attacks on both physical key points and
the control of enemy weapons systems. For the foreseeable future this will form the
concept of operations of all coalitions led by the United States, and to which we will
need to adapt ourselves.
The question at issue is this: how do we adapt our capabilities and our military structures to the evolution of todays way of warfare? The concentration upon
asymmetric threats which has dominated our planning over the past ten years
could still lead to results in the strategic short term; it could also be dangerously
inappropriate when faced with a possible brutal resurgence of high intensity war.
Moreover, budget cuts must not be allowed to lead to rivalry between these two
paradigms, giving the impression that an exclusive choice has to be made between
the two.
In this context we must drive change in our military capabilities to allow
us to carry out missions (probably with reduced resources), while at the same time
minimising the impact on the degradation of our operational tasking. If we can
succeed in identifying the way ahead, our key objective must be to preserve our
overall capability. France currently fields a solid, highly credible military machine:
a significant force offering a wide spectrum of military options, possessing the rare
capability for initial entry, to act as an influential partner in a coalition, and to
maintain its shape.
The fundamental capabilities needed to retain Frances influence
At all costs, France must retain its capability to react quickly and effectively,
and to effect initial entry into a theatre. To do this, the exploitation of air power is
primordial. Control of air space is the precursor to any operation; it guarantees to
the Government the ability to make decisions and to exert influence in the decisionmaking of a coalition, and offers freedom of action. This is a French sphere of
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excellence shared by only two other Western powers, the United States and the
United Kingdom. The capability is based on the sharing and mastery of information in real time, on being able to set in motion complex command and control
structures, and on quick implementation of strategic reach.
It is the overall coherence of air power that allows government authorities
to benefit from a wide spectrum of crisis management options until the last
possible moment, so allowing them to retain an acceptable measure of autonomy
to express our national will. This coherence is the product of both complementarity and the close interdependence of separate capabilities, which include planning,
command and control of operations, situation evaluation, varied modes of action
producing a wide range of military effects, logistic and other support of the forces
engagednotably air-to-air refuelling and electronic warfare, both home-based
and local. Among other constraints, this implies the need to maintain a consistently high level of personal qualification and training standards, for French Air
Force equipment demands a high level of technical ability, and considerable autonomy for its operators.
While major budgetary constraints legitimise a tendency to revise formats,
Frances credibility and its capability to influence events make it essential for the
country to maintain a certain level of capability, not only over the operational spectrum concerned and the force levels which can be committed, but in particular in
the domains which are most critical at the European level: AWACS, in-flight
refuelling and strategic transport.
What to adapt to achieve savings
While France must to retain its fundamental capability of autonomous

intervention in a state of interest, it can nevertheless draw upon a new approach to
its existing reach capabilities in order to extend them. Extended reach and upgraded performance of equipment and infrastructure, together with the dynamic
management of a network of overseas bases (yet to be set up), will enable the country to respond to the increasingly distant areas of major crisis.
Further study is needed in order to adapt our modes of operation, particularly those which involve the generation and maintenance of capabilities demanding major effort, such as air combat capability. We need to adapt the systems we
use and the entire process of maintaining capabilities to new requirements. There
is more than one way of achieving this, and we might consider broadening the
scope of training using simulation, or shifting a proportion of the basic and continuation training currently being carried out in busy frontline units to less expensive virtual reality platforms, in order to preserve the value and the quality of training hours. This principle should allow us to preserve our high intensity initial
96
Adapting
Military Capability
entry capability, and also a long-term endurance capability based on a force trained
in a different way, and at lower cost.
We could also look at pooling certain capabilities with our principal
partners. The first possibility is to exploit the synergy that already exists between
members of NATO, with the aim of having a common finance pool, which could
be to our advantage. One example already in existence is infrastructure financing
for some of our bases through the Air Basing project.
A second approach is to establish convergence in operating procedures, for
example the development of European structures based on existing cooperation in
the fields of strategic transport and in-flight refuelling. These new structures would
be flexible, evolutionary and have strong growth potential, and would allow us to
identify mutual interests and savings, and favour cooperative agreements.
Ultimately, they could lead to the sharing of tools and structures on the basis of a
common range of applications: these might include maintenance, training, flight
security or mission preparation. They would avoid sensitivities affecting national
sovereignty, since each state would retain operational control over its own
resources.
In this context of cost savings through adaptation of capability while at the
same time ensuring that impact on operational tasking is minimised, we could also
examine making increased use of our reserve forces. Reserve units could usefully
compensate for reductions made in capabilities which are particularly vulnerable
to peaks of activity: an example of this would be the mobilisation of C2 structures.
There are other possibilities available to us in the search for new sources of
finance outside the main budget. We could consider further sales of radio frequencies, notably in the field of telemetry. Another idea might be to make the case
for European financing for those dual capabilities which support European security; R&D expenditure in the civil and military aircraft industry, for instance, represents the major proportion of the European and French defence industrial and
technological base, researching 20 of the 27 areas of technology defined as critical.
Furthermore, the side effects and other benefits which these technologies bring to
the industrial sector are many, and go well beyond benefiting just the aerospace
industry. Moreover, since R&D is an area well suited to supporting the construction of European defence, this all bodes well for the future.
Finally, it would be fruitful to consider exploring new concepts (within reasonable cost constraints) which would be distinct from those developed by our
American partners. The use of gliding bombs or cruise missiles associated with new
ISR capabilities (such as satellite navigation combined with Rafales Spectra electromagnetic sensors) is a promising approach to the suppression of enemy air defences.
97
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
Batrice Hainaut
Lieutenant (air), Researcher with the Future and security
studies team at the Air Force research centre (Crea);
Doctor in political science from the University of Paris II
Panthon-Assas.
t is hard to miss the signs: the French and the Americans have been quietly
getting closer together. Primarily, this involves collaboration in the area of
general foreign policy. As recently as 2003 Dominique de Villepin, Foreign
Minister at the time, delivered a hard-hitting speech on 14 February of that year
before the Assembly General of the United Nations, opposing armed intervention
alongside the Americans in Iraq. This diatribe contributed to tension in FrancoAmerican diplomatic relations. To make matters worse, it was based on Frances
possession of an independent decision-making capability, thanks to the optical
sensors of its Hlios satellites, whose images did not support the American claim
that weapons of mass destruction were present on Iraqi soil. But time passed and
the diplomats did their work. The election of a new French President in 2007
ushered in a new era in Franco-American relations. The two states worked together on many issues brought to the United Nations and, in some cases, to the
Security Council. In time, the rift of 2003 was forgotten and confidence was gradually restored. The apt expression used by Hubert Vdrine sums up the relations
between the two states: friends and allies but non-aligned.
Although the space dimension can be the source of profound diplomatic

disagreement (for example, involvement in a theatre of operations with the aim of
conducting a war), it can also prove to be a fruitful area of cooperation between
states. France and the United States are both space powers and share a certain mutual
confidence. These two elements constitute a fundamental base for cooperation.
Long-standing and fruitful inter-agency cooperation
Franco-American cooperation between their respective space agencies is a

long-standing reality: NASA and the French centre for space studies (Centre national
des tudes spatiales Cnes) have established solid partnerships in the various
domains. Two important examples are the Jason programme and cooperation on
orbiting space debris. Although this inter-agency cooperation may be seen as
98
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
exclusively civilian, the military applications are apparent in both cases. The
success of the Topex-Poseidon experimental programme in 1992 opened the way
to long-term cooperation in the field of radar altimetry. The aim is to capture precision data on ocean currents and their variations as well as measuring sea levels.
This CnesNASA cooperation continues today, especially in connection with the
planned launch in 2014 of a third satellite (Jason 3).
A second area of cooperation symptomatic of good inter-agency relations
is that concerning space debris. Although this is a long-standing problem, it is
taking on a more strategic dimension thanks to the growing interest which the
problem is creating within multilateral groupings. Initially, NASA scientists grew
concerned about the creation of debris resulting from anti-satellite trials by the
American Defense Department, in particular one in September 1985. The NASA
experts at the time tried to alert the international scientific community to this
question of debris via the national space agencies. The explosion of an Ariane stage
on 26 November 1986 also motivated NASA to make contact with the European
Space Agency and to set up working groups on space debris. The problem also
struck a chord with Cnes. Informal contacts were later institutionalized in 1993
with the creation of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC), a technical organisation which brings together analyses on the topic.
A recent example of this fertile collaboration was the construction and
dispatch to Mars of the Curiosity rover, whose mission was to analyse the soil of the
planet. The fact that it was the fruit of collaboration between France and the United
States, and in particular between Cnes and NASA, is however relatively little-known.
From these examples it is clear that cooperation was made possible by the
pursuit of common scientific interests and the fact that scientists on either side of
the Atlantic were able to establish durable and mutually confident relationships by
virtue of their many exchanges.
Military cooperation through exchange of information and practices
This type of relationship is more difficult to establish on a military level

because the areas of cooperation tend to affect national sovereignty and are therefore generally the province of political decision-makers. France made the choice,
more than half a century ago, to become a space power. Owing to its connection
with the nuclear deterrent, space has since acquired a strategic dimension. Around
this original ambition France has gradually developed the full spectrum of space
capabilities (telecommunications, observation, navigation, monitoring and early
warning). The use of space has therefore become a key component of military activities and a force multiplier, especially in external operations. In July 2010 France
created a unified command centre, the joint space command (Commandement
99
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
interarmes de lEspace CIE), which constitutes the point of contact for any militarily-relevant space matter.
To be considered as a complete space power, France must fulfil four indispensable criteria: have independent access to space, have an industry capable of
designing and building launchers and satellites, be capable of operating a ground
control system and, finally, be able to monitor space. The first three exist and the
ability to monitor space is in full development. The Defence Code includes the latter capability in wider air defence coming under the air defence and operations
command (Commandement de la dfense arienne et des oprations ariennes
CDAOA) and in particular its space surveillance division. The Air Force, under the
direction of the CIE, is responsible for the surveillance of extra-atmospheric space.
The responsibility attributed to the Air Force is expressly military and touches on
the intelligence area. The sensitivity of this sector makes the establishment of
cooperation more difficult but not impossible.
Intelligence is by far the most sensitive area. The Americans are Frances allies
in space matters and we are often dependent on American data. Although a channel
exists it is nonetheless very restricted. France does not belong to the intelligencesharing community known as five eyes. This community consists of a remarkable
forum for information sharing headed by the United States and including the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These states are clearly not renowned for their space capabilities, but the existence of the community is based primarily on the historical links which they share, and the alliance benefits from total confidence between the members. The United States have thus recently (in 2010) signed
a cooperation agreement with Australia concerning space surveillance. This agreement is all the more useful for the United States because it gives it coverage of the
southern hemisphere, a region which is otherwise out of their reach.
Although France does not belong to this intelligence community, which
nevertheless allows it to preserve a certain independence of view of a situation, one
development has promoted Franco-American relations in intelligence matters. This
is the acquisition by France of the space surveillance radar network (Grand
rseau adapt la veille spatiale Graves). It was delivered to the Air Force in
December 2005 and is capable of detecting any object larger than one square metre
overflying French territory at between 400 and 1000 km altitude. The acquisition
of this capability, originally conceived as a demonstrator, has given France eyes in
space. The radar has performed beyond expectations. According to American and
European estimates dating from 2012, more than 23,000 objects larger than 10 cm
are currently circling the Earth at an average speed of 25,000 kph. In watching
low-earth orbit, which is the most crowded orbit for satellites and debris, the
Graves system can catalogue some 3,000 objects.
An operational tool has therefore been transformed into a diplomatic one,
able to detect hitherto unknown satellites. With the acquisition of this technical
100
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
capability, French credibility as a space power was reaffirmed. From the moment
that France possessed something with a trading value, it became a credible partner
with which it was worth cooperating, if only to find out what it was able to see.
This event sparked off Franco-American cooperation and, after two years of informal existence, the Franco-American space cooperation forum was formalized on
14 May 2009. Later, on 8 February 2011, a declaration of principles was signed by
Alain Jupp, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Robert Gates, the United
States Secretary for Defense, in order to improve Franco-American cooperation in
space surveillance.
Another sign of openness was the historic participation of France in the
Schriever Wargame in 2012. The 2012 version of this simulation, organised by the
US Air Force Space Command, was the first open to NATO member countries.
The object of this exercise is to plan and coordinate the space and cyber capabilities of the member states in a specific scenario. Although NATO is only in the early
stages of its involvement in space matters, the development possibilities are important. Participation in this simulation should not be considered mere window dressing. It is an opportunity to rub shoulders with allies, to compare points of view
and procedures, and thus to enhance the coordination of space capabilities between states. In addition, it is likely that the reintegration of France into the NATO
Integrated Military Command in 2009 will allow these developments to be optimized. Finally, it is possible that the Franco-American space relationship could use
the privileged NATO structure to reach its full potential.
Changing American spatial diplomacy
This recent rapprochement also owes much to Barack Obamas arrival in

power in January 2009. Even though a turning point in the space dimension
occurred at the end of George W. Bushs term of office, it did not lead to a real
renewal of cooperation. On the other hand, the 2010 publication of the US
National Space Policy (NSP), marked a change, at least in tone. The previous
NSP (2006) had raised concerns as to the possible design and use of anti-satellite
weapons, and its tone reflected the unilateralist, if not militarist approach of the
Bush administration. The 2010 NSP contrasted sharply in its tone with the 2006
version, particularly in that it emphasized that the space systems of all nations
should be able to develop without interference from other states. In addition, it
clearly emphasized cooperation, including in the military sphere. The goal was to
avoid misunderstandings or miscalculations in space, which had become an increasingly sought after, congested and contested domain. The calls for cooperation
were of course not directed solely at France, but the fact remains that they constituted a window of opportunity to achieve closer collaboration. This opportunity
was seized by France and Europe, which decided to promote a Code of Conduct
in space. This project, aimed at avoiding any conflict in space by sponsoring
101
Franco-American
Space Cooperation
contact between the increasingly numerous space countries, is an initiative

promoted under the French presidency of the European Union during the second
half of 2008. While the United States habitually opposes on principle any text
capable of limiting their freedom of action in space, this project was not rejected
out of hand. It was, of course, the subject of lively internal debate. Nonetheless,
the American presidential will inclined more towards declared support for the
development of the Code, and the status of the text of a code of conduct allows
the American President to adopt it without having to have it ratified by the Senate,
which is much more cautious on these questions. In the case of a treaty, the Senate
would have had to ratify it with a two thirds majority. The code of conduct for
space approach was therefore supported in the main by the American administration, subject to a few modifications.
This diplomatic and political approach incorporated an inter-agency rapprochement and military collaboration. International consultations on the Code
were initiated, which also aimed at promoting the Code internationally. Although
the project was supported by various United Nations agencies, it was discussed
outside all the multinational fora, especially UN ones, in order to avoid any of the
usual stumbling blocks such as those which routinely occur in disarmament negotiations. A Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) has recently been set up: representing a dozen countries, it is charged with discussing the possibilities of regulating inter-state relations in space. This group is quite active and can advance the
cause of the Code. Within the GGE, France, the United States and Great Britain
consult prior to the meetings in order to adopt a common position with the other
partners. Although this approach culminates at the level of foreign ministers and
departments of state, it is symptomatic of a certain renewal of transatlantic relations. It is also interesting to note that the air forces of these three states have created a privileged partnership in the trilateral strategic studies group, whose objective is to strengthen mutual comprehension and understanding to ensure greater
interoperability. Space is naturally involved because of its operational applications,
which directly involve the aerospace resources of these three forces.
The French and the Americans thus have more opportunities to meet and
exchange ideas. This has the effect of homogenizing ideas, preferences and beliefs
before the development and dissemination of rules and multilateral policies. But
the existence of a common objective (principally, not to turn space into a battlefield) must not hide the fact that the two space powers have a different strategy for
the occupation of space. The United States has developed the doctrine of space
dominance which still guides their actions today. Nevertheless, there exists between the two states great potential for future cooperation, especially in space surveillance, a domain in which the French Air Force has sole responsibility for these
questions. It therefore plays a pre-eminent role, since beyond these exchanges of
data it also enables France to keep a sufficient degree of sovereignty to ensure autonomy in situational appreciation and decision-making.
102
D LIVR E R
L E N C E S SA I R E
L'E N D R O I T
PR C I S
O IL E ST
I N D I S P E N SAB LE
CANONS AUTOMOTEURS
VHICULES BLINDS LOURDS
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ENGINS LOURDS DE CONSTRUCTION
VHICULES LGERS
TROUPES
PARACHUTISTES
PALETTES ET CONTENEURS
VA C U A T I O N S A N I T A I R E
Pour livrer un combat, prvenir une guerre ou porter

secours. Vos quipements doivent rapidement tre
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This issue is downloaded from the website of RDN

Introduction - A New Approach to Strategic Functions

French Command and Control of Air Defence a Brief History

The Airborne Nuclear Component: an Approach to Excellence

The Air Force and National Security

The capability to act fast and far: three recent commitments

From Afghanistan to Mali:

Operation Harmattan: A Rafale Squadron Commanders Tale

Serval: an Exemplary French Air Force Operation

The fundamental capabilities at the heart of modernisation

Air Force Command and Control,

The Only Machiavellian Aspect of the Drone is its Human Element

A Case for the Dynamic Management of French Overseas Bases

Immediate Action: the Contribution of Rafale to recent Operations

Simulator Training for Future Combat Pilots

The Men and Women of the French Air Force

Looking to the future

The Battlefield and Air Power 15 Years From Now

Adapting Military Capability

Franco-American Space Cooperation

Translation directed by Mike Storey

OUP: Operation Unified Protector

The recently-published defence White Paper on defence and national security

territory and a number of key points, thereby favouring concentration of assets,

French Command and Control

Genesis of C2: from invention of the principles to the birth of modern C2

French Command and Control

Despite these initial measures, C2 as we currently recognise it really took

French Command and Control

C2 in France reached a major turning point with the creation of NATO

French Command and Control

French Command and Control

The development of SCCOA was just one step in a series of steps.

External air operations :

The primary mission of the permanent C2 Air is surveillance and protection

French Command and Control

within CNOA, of representatives of the various ministries improves the flow of

French Command and Control

centre for military surveillance of spatial objects (Centre oprationnel de surveillance

The Airborne Nuclear Component:

An airborne component based on nuclear sufficiency

The airborne nuclear component is notable for its permanent ability to

The Airborne Nuclear Component:

The Airborne Nuclear Component:

Conventional capability within the constraints of the nuclear role

The Air Force

he legitimacy of the state depends, amongst other things, on its ability to

The short term: optimisation of state resources

The Air Force

and the capabilities to manage the coordination of civil-military air activity in an

Globalisation and technological developments have together put the flow

The Air Force

the skies, is already a considerable challenge. In addition, the third dimension

Finally, the security of a country invariably relies on the commitment of its

The Air Force

Finally, the activities of the Trinmes acadmiques * could be enriched by

The Capability to Act Fast and Far:

From Afghanistan to Mali:

n 10 November 2001, Northern Alliance forces captured Mazar-i-Sharif,

To answer these questions, we have to go back to the beginnings of the

From Afghanistan to Mali:

From Afghanistan to Mali:

From Afghanistan to Mali: