Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175723

February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L.

ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her
capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.;
STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL
CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolutions dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
1

The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are

as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its
treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the

taxable period from January to December 2002 against private

respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware
Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and
Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from
private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the
Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment
covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized
to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because
payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the
issuance of their business permits, private respondents were
constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated
as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or ErroneouslyCollected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before
public respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended
complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents
alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the
limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011
which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already
been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice.
2

In its Order dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private

respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
3

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC

denied it in its Order dated October 15, 2004.
4

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of
the RTC.
6

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA

dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has
no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
7

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of
Injunction the petitioners, their agents and/or
authorized representatives from implementing Section
21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as
amended, against private respondents.

III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court

gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction
despite failure of private respondents to make a written
claim for tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of
Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21
of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are
mere collecting agents of the City Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction
because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents
would result to greater damage and prejudice thereof.
(sic)
8

Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that
the instant petition should be denied for being moot and
academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this
Court discovered that a Decision in the main case had already
been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby

renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid
pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of
Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following
amounts:

P 11,462,525.02 moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,

thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical
3,118,104.63 use or value.

To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc.

To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc.

To plaintiff Star Appliances Center

To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc.

To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc.

To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care

Health

In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue

1,362,750.34 on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance
and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled
419,689.04 principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
231,453.62

To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp.

However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on

jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a
140,908.54 procedural error which petitioners committed.

To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp.

13

2,152,316.54

14

Stores Phils., Inc.

220,204.70 Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp.
94,906.34 instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
TOTAL:
P 19,316,458.77 dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no
dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under
nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition
Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the
SO ORDERED.
aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case,
petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records,
under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process
the above Decision had already become final and executory
over the original case.
per the Certificate of Finality issued by the same trial court on
October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution was issued by
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that
the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original
clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition,
or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion
which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if
issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in
remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a
the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and
substitute for a lost appeal.
that the same decision is now final and executory. Well
entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become
10

15

11

12

16

17

Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the

Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this
Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for
certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason
to justify the relaxation of the rules. Considering that the
present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the
significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it
proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari.

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in

cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges; seizure, detention or release of
property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs; and

18

Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the

central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this
Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special
civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125
(RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court
jurisdiction over the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law
or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;

(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of

Assessment Appeals in cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property or other
matters arising under the Assessment Law, including
rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic
Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the
jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating
its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides
thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as
herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges, penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges, penalties in relations
thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue
Code provides a specific period of action, in
which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
in cases involving liability for customs duties,
fees or other money charges, seizure, detention
or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures
or other penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other
laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property
originally decided by the provincial or city board
of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on
customs cases elevated to him automatically for
review from decisions of the Commissioner of

Customs which are adverse to the Government

under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product,
commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving dumping and
countervailing duties under Section 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs
Code, and safeguard measures under Republic
Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal
the decision to impose or not to impose said
duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein
provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses arising from violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs
Code and other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of
Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed is less than One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is
no specified amount claimed shall be tried by
the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the
CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or
the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all

times be simultaneously instituted with, and

jointly determined in the same proceeding by
the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
of such civil action separately from the criminal
action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal
offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by
them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection
cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: Provides, however, that collection
cases where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper
Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
and Regional Trial Court.

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of

the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally
decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction.
19

A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is

clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical
statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282,
which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in
local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of
certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which
must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
COMELEC, Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v.
COMELEC, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court
has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over
petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be
observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan, these rulings pertain not to regular courts but
to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to
the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides that
20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax

collection cases:

28

the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction

over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of
Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)
gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to
Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant
of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can
be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate,

is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these

cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise
its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable
reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held
as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et
al. that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or
body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This principle
was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the
Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review,
by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the
lower court." The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v.
Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.
29

30

31

32

33

34

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of

Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that
jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this
Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,

the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same

subject matter precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which
is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court
cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without
mention of any other court that may exercise such power.
Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued
in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court.
To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court
rules on an incident in the very same case.
35

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the

pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude
that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a
local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this
Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court
in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal
soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction
to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC
carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory
power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter.
36

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in

it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all
orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give
effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it
the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions
of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and
incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when
necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act
which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
1wphi1

37

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is

endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers
which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are
inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any
abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of
such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall
be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the
inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent
powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the
due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted
powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
38

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly
granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and
for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence,
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called
on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of
action, would not be within its cognizance.

petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued

by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers
granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably

concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution dated January
25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614. The assailed decision
reversed and set aside the September 9, 2005 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 58 in Civil Case
No. 03-1018; while the assailed resolution denied the separate
motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Medical Plaza
Makati Condominium Corporation (MPMCC) and Meridien
Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI).

39

40

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181416

PERALTA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

November 11, 2013

MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM

CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT H. CULLEN, Respondent.
DECISION

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not

abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are
concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasijudicial bodies.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI
condominium Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza Makati

covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of the

Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later cancelled and
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the
name of respondent.
On September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate
secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E. Dimayuga, demanded from
respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and
assessments amounting to P145,567.42. Respondent
disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously
paying his dues shown by the fact that he was previously
elected president and director of petitioner. Petitioner, on the
other hand, claimed that respondents obligation was a carryover of that of MLHI. Consequently, respondent was
prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for
during the 2002 election of petitioners Board of
Directors. Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the veracity of
petitioners claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same
had already been settled. This prompted respondent to
demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered
a delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation.
Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the
Complaint for Damages filed by respondent against petitioner
and MLHI, the pertinent portions of which read:
4

xxxx
6. Thereafter, plaintiff occupied the said condominium unit no.
1201 and religiously paid all the corresponding monthly
contributions/association dues and other assessments
imposed on the same. For the years 2000 and 2001, plaintiff
served as President and Director of the Medical Plaza Makati
Condominium Corporation;

7. Nonetheless, on September 19, 2002, plaintiff was

shocked/surprised to receive a letter from the incumbent
Corporate Secretary of the defendant Medical Plaza Makati,
demanding payment of alleged unpaid association dues and
assessments arising from plaintiffs condominium unit no.
1201. The said letter further stressed that plaintiff is
considered a delinquent member of the defendant Medical
Plaza Makati.
x x x;
8. As a consequence, plaintiff was not allowed to file his
certificate of candidacy as director. Being considered a
delinquent, plaintiff was also barred from exercising his right to
vote in the election of new members of the Board of Directors
x x x;
9. x x x Again, prior to the said election date, x x x counsel for
the defendant [MPMCC] sent a demand letter to plaintiff, anent
the said delinquency, explaining that the said unpaid amount is
a carry-over from the obligation of defendant Meridien. x x x;
10. Verification with the defendant [MPMCC] resulted to the
issuance of a certification stating that Condominium Unit 1201
has an outstanding unpaid obligation in the total amount
of P145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002, which again, was
attributed by defendant [MPMCC] to defendant Meridien. x x x;
11. Due to the seriousness of the matter, and the feeling that
defendant Meridien made false representations considering
that it fully warranted to plaintiff that condominium unit 1201 is
free and clear from all liens and encumbrances, the matter
was referred to counsel, who accordingly sent a letter to

defendant Meridien, to demand for the payment of said unpaid

association dues and other assessments imposed on the
condominium unit and being claimed by defendant [MPMCC].
x x x;
12. x x x defendant Meridien claimed however, that the
obligation does not exist considering that the matter was
already settled and paid by defendant Meridien to defendant
[MPMCC]. x x x;
13. Plaintiff thus caused to be sent a letter to defendant
[MPMCC] x x x. The said letter x x x sought an explanation on
the fact that, as per the letter of defendant Meridien, the
delinquency of unit 1201 was already fully paid and settled,
contrary to the claim of defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
14. Despite receipt of said letter on April 24, 2003, and to date
however, no explanation was given by defendant [MPMCC], to
the damage and prejudice of plaintiff who is again obviously
being barred from voting/participating in the election of
members of the board of directors for the year 2003;
15. Clearly, defendant [MPMCC] acted maliciously by insisting
that plaintiff is a delinquent member when in fact, defendant
Meridien had already paid the said delinquency, if any. The
branding of plaintiff as delinquent member was willfully and
deceitfully employed so as to prevent plaintiff from exercising
his right to vote or be voted as director of the condominium
corporation; 16. Defendant [MPMCC]s ominous silence when
confronted with claim of payment made by defendant Meridien
is tantamount to admission that indeed, plaintiff is not really a
delinquent member;

17. Accordingly, as a direct and proximate result of the said

acts of defendant [MPMCC], plaintiff experienced/suffered
from mental anguish, moral shock, and serious anxiety.
Plaintiff, being a doctor of medicine and respected in the
community further suffered from social humiliation and
besmirched reputation thereby warranting the grant of moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 and for which
defendant [MPMCC] should be held liable;
18. By way of example or correction for the public good, and
as a stern warning to all similarly situated, defendant
[MPMCC] should be ordered to pay plaintiff exemplary
damages in the amount of P200,000.00;
19. As a consequence, and so as to protect his rights and
interests, plaintiff was constrained to hire the services of
counsel, for an acceptance fee of P100,000.00 plus P2,500.00
per every court hearing attended by counsel;
20. In the event that the claim of defendant [MPMCC] turned
out to be true, however, the herein defendant Meridien should
be held liable instead, by ordering the same to pay the said
delinquency of condominium unit 1201 in the amount
of P145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002 as well as the above
damages, considering that the non-payment thereof would be
the proximate cause of the damages suffered by plaintiff;
9

Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the

complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. MLHI claims
that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) which is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the
following specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint:
10

(1) estoppel as respondent himself approved the assessment

when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case
involves an intra-corporate controversy; (3) prematurity for
failure of respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies;
and (4) the case is already moot and academic, the obligation
having been settled between petitioner and MLHI.
11

On September 9, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision granting

petitioners and MLHIs motions to dismiss and, consequently,
dismissing respondents complaint.
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific
performance filed by respondent clearly falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. As to petitioner, the court
held that the complaint states no cause of action, considering
that respondents obligation had already been settled by MLHI.
It, likewise, ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate
between the corporation and member.
12

THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
DECLARED THE INSTANT CASE AN ORDINARY ACTION
FOR DAMAGES INSTEAD OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE
CONTROVERSY COGNIZABLE BY A SPECIAL
COMMERCIAL COURT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL WHILE
RAISING ONLY PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW.
17

13

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial courts

decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held that
the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which
falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts. It explained that
the case hinged on petitioners refusal to confirm MLHIs claim
that the subject obligation had already been settled as early as
1998 causing damage to respondent. Petitioners and MLHIs
motions for reconsideration had also been denied.
14

15

16

Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court based on the

following grounds:
I.

The petition is meritorious.

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in
an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
the defendant. Also illuminating is the Courts pronouncement
in Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction,
Inc.:
18

19

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the

subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause

of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or

body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. x x x
20

Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint,

does the controversy involve intra-corporate issues as would
fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court or an ordinary action for damages within the
jurisdiction of regular courts?
In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate
controversy, the Court uses two tests, namely, the relationship
test and the nature of the controversy test.
21

An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of

the following relationships: (1) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the public; (2) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar
as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3)
between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among
the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. Thus,
under the relationship test, the existence of any of the above
intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate.
22

23

Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must

not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the
parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of
the corporation." In other words, jurisdiction should be
determined by considering both the relationship of the parties
as well as the nature of the question involved.
24

25

Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case
involves intra-corporate controversy. It obviously arose from
the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the
questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under
the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of
the corporation.
26

Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly

organized and existing under Philippine laws, charged with the
management of the Medical Plaza Makati. Respondent, on the
other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is
thus a stockholder/member of the condominium corporation.
Clearly, there is an intra-corporate relationship between the
corporation and a stockholder/member.
The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than
the title of the complaint. Though denominated as an action
for damages, an examination of the allegations made by
respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally
dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner
against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in
preventing respondent from participating in the election of the
corporations Board of Directors. Respondent contested the
1w phi1

alleged unpaid dues and assessments demanded by

petitioner.
The issue is not novel. The nature of an action involving any
dispute as to the validity of the assessment of association
dues has been settled by the Court in Chateau de Baie
Condominium Corporation v. Moreno. In that case,
respondents therein filed a complaint for intra-corporate
dispute against the petitioner therein to question how it
calculated the dues assessed against them, and to ask an
accounting of association dues. Petitioner, however, moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
alleging that since the complaint was against the
owner/developer of a condominium whose condominium
project was registered with and licensed by the HLURB, the
latter has the exclusive jurisdiction. In sustaining the denial of
the motion to dismiss, the Court held that the dispute as to the
validity of the assessments is purely an intra-corporate matter
between petitioner and respondent and is thus within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court. More so in this case as respondent
repeatedly questioned his characterization as a delinquent
member and, consequently, petitioners decision to bar him
from exercising his rights to vote and be voted for. These
issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is
just incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be
threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial
court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the
same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is
still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intracorporate disputes filed before it.
27

28

Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 902-A enumerates the

cases over which the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxx
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar
as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations,
partnerships, or associations.
29

To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of an intracorporate controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains to
the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been
transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special
Commercial Courts. While the CA may be correct that the
RTC has jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with
the regular court but with the branch of the RTC designated as
a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 58 was not designated as a special
commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction over cases
previously cognizable by the SEC. The CA, therefore, gravely
30

31

erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further

proceedings.

here because it might just create a red herring into the entire
thing and it will just complicate matters, hindi ba?

Indeed, Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners Associations, approved on
January 7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010,
empowers the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association
and/or intra-association controversies or conflicts concerning
homeowners associations. However, we cannot apply the
same in the present case as it involves a controversy between
a condominium unit owner and a condominium corporation.
While the term association as defined in the law covers
homeowners associations of other residential real property
which is broad enough to cover a condominium corporation, it
does not seem to be the legislative intent. A thorough review of
the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee would
show that the lawmakers did not intend to extend the coverage
of the law to such kind of association. We quote hereunder the
pertinent portion of the Bicameral Conference Committees
deliberation, to wit:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I also agree with you

although I sympathize with them---although we sympathize
with them and we feel that many times their rights have been
also violated by abusive condominium corporations. However,
there are certain things that we have to reconcile. There are
certain issues that we have to reconcile with this version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Lets go back, Mr. Chair,

very quickly on homeowners.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Ang sa akin lang,
I think our views are similar, Your Honor, Senator Zubiri, the
entry of the condominium units might just complicate the whole
matters. So wed like to put it on record that were very much
concerned about the plight of the Condominium Unit
Homeowners Association. But this could very well be
addressed on a separate bill that Im willing to co-sponsor with
the distinguished Senator Zubiri, to address in the
Condominium Act of the Philippines, rather than address it

In the Condominium Code, for example, they just raised a very

peculiar situation under the Condominium Code --Condominium Corporation Act. Its five years the proxy,
whereas here, its three years. So there would already be
violation or there will be already a problem with their version
and our version. Sino ang matutupad doon? Will it be our
version or their version?
So I agree that has to be studied further. And because they
have a law pertaining to the condominium housing units, I
personally feel that it would complicate matters if we include
them. Although I agree that they should be looked after and
their problems be looked into.
Probably we can ask our staff, Your Honor, to come up already
with the bill although we have no more time. Hopefully we can
tackle this again on the 15th Congress. But I agree with the
sentiments and the inputs of the Honorable Chair of the House
panel.
May we ask our resource persons to also probably give
comments?
Atty. Dayrit.

MR. DAYRIT.
Yes I agree with you. There are many, I think, practices in their
provisions in the Condominium Law that may be conflicting
with this version of ours.
For instance, in the case of, lets say, the condominium, the
so-called common areas and/or maybe so called open spaces
that they may have, especially common areas, they are
usually owned by the condominium corporation. Unlike a
subdivision where the open spaces and/or the common areas
are not necessarily owned by the association. Because
sometimes --- generally these are donated to the municipality
or to the city. And it is only when the city or municipality gives
the approval or the conformity that this is donated to the
homeowners association. But generally, under PD
[Presidential Decree] 957, its donated. In the Condominium
Corporation, hindi. Lahat ng mga open spaces and common
areas like corridors, the function rooms and everything, are
owned by the corporation. So thats one main issue that can
be conflicting.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Ill just ask for a one-minute
suspension so we can talk.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Unless you want

to put a catchall phrase like what we did in the Senior Citizens
Act. Something like, to the extent --- paano ba iyon? To the
extent that it is practicable and applicable, the rights and
benefits of the homeowners, are hereby extended to the --mayroon kaming ginamit na phrase eh...to the extent that it be
practicable and applicable to the unit homeoweners, is hereby
extended, something like that. Its a catchall phrase. But then
again, it might create a...
MR. JALANDONI. It will become complicated. There will be a
lot of conflict of laws between the two laws.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Kaya nga eh. At
saka, I dont know. I think the --- mayroon naman silang
protection sa ano eh, di ba? Buyers decree doon sa
Condominium Act. Im sure there are provisions there eh.
Huwag na lang, huwag na lang.
MR. JALANDONI. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be best if your
previous comments that youd be supporting an amendment. I
think that would be --- Well, that would be the best course of
action with all due respect.
1w phi1

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Yeah. Okay.

Thank you. So iyon na lang final proposal naming yung
catchall phrase, "With respect to the..."
32

xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). xxx And so, what is their
final decision on the definition of homeowners?
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA).

We stick to the original, Mr. Chairman. Well just open up a

whole can of worms and a whole new ball game will come into
play. Besides, I am not authorized, neither are you, by our
counterparts to include the condominium owners.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI).
Basically that is correct. We are not authorized by the Senate
nor because we have discussed this lengthily on the floor,
actually, several months on the floor. And we dont have the
authority as well for other Bicam members to add a provision
to include a separate entity that has already their legal or their
established Republic Act tackling on that particular issue. But
we just like to put on record, we sympathize with the plight of
our friends in the condominium associations and we will just
guarantee them that we will work on an amendment to the
Condominium Corporation Code. So with that we skipped,
that is correct, we have to go back to homeowners association
definition, Your Honor, because we had skipped it altogether.
So just quickly going back to Page 7 because there are
amendments to the definition of homeowners. If it is alright
with the House Panel, adopt the opening phrase of Subsection
7 of the Senate version as opening phrase of Subsection 10 of
the reconciled version.
xxxx

which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be

members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective
units. The rights and obligations of the condominium unit
owners and the condominium corporation are set forth in the
above Act.
34

Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the

amendment. Thus, the intra-corporate dispute between
petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the
RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB.
The doctrine laid down by the Court in Chateau de Baie
Condominium Corporation v. Moreno which in turn cited Wack
Wack Condominium Corporation, et al v. CA is still a good
law.
35

36

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE

the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 10, 2007 and
Resolution dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614.
The Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 58, which is not a special commercial court, docketed
as Civil Case No. 03-1018 is ordered DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. Let the case be REMANDED to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for re-raffle
purposes among the designated special commercial courts.

33

To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to

specifically govern a condominium. Said law sanctions the
creation of the condominium corporation which is especially
formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in

SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 90503 September 27, 1990

court rendered its decision on January 19,1988, the dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the allegations and the prayer of the
complaint and the evidence adduced in support therefor,
judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff the following:

NESTOR SANDOVAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DOROTEO CAEBA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila,
Branch 20, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, Manila,
Branch 20), and ESTATE DEVELOPERS & INVESTORS
CORPORATION, respondents.

1. The sum of P73,867.42 plus interest and other charges

commencing from January 1, 1988 until fully paid;

Arnold V. Guerrero & Associates for petitioner.

3. Costs against the defendant.

Lino M. Patajo for private respondent.

4. SO ORDERED. 1

GANCAYCO, J.:

On September 28, 1988 the trial court issued an order

directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its
decision that had become final and executory.

The issue in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts

have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments
regarding a subdivision lot.
On August 20, 1987 private respondent filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for the collection of
unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot, pursuant to a
promissory note, plus interest. On January 29, 1988 the trial
court rendered a decision.
It appears that petitioner was declared in default so much so
that after receiving the evidence of private respondent, the trial

2. Such sum which shall not be less than P2,000.00 or 25% of

the amount of delinquency whichever is greater, as and for
attorney's fees.

On September 30, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to vacate

judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that
its decision is null and void. A motion for reconsideration of the
writ of execution was also filed by petitioner. An opposition to
both motions was filed by private respondent to which a reply
was filed by petitioner.
On February 17, 1989 the trial court denied the motion to
vacate the judgment on the ground that it is now beyond the

jurisdiction of the Court to do so. It directed the issuance of a

writ of execution anew.
Hence the herein petition wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion as follows:
5.1. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the complaint
before him notwithstanding
that exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject-matter
thereof is vested with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.
5.2. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and
acted without jurisdiction in refusing to vacate his judgment
rendered without jurisdiction and in issuing a writ of execution
to implement his abovesaid void judgment. 2
The petition is impressed with merit.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National
Housing Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide certain cases as follows:
SEC.1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by

subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, particularly, the second portion
thereof, leaves no room for doubt that exclusive jurisdiction
over the case between the petitioner and private respondent is
vested not on the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was renamed Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and
thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). 3
Undeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by
private respondent from petitioner represented unpaid
installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner
purchased. Petitioner alleges that he suspended payments
thereof because of the failure of the developer to develop the
subdivision pursuant to their agreement.
In Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing
Authority, 4 the suit which was filed with the NHA, likewise involved
non-payment of installments over a subdivision lot, wherein this
Court held that the NHA has exclusive authority to hear and decide
the case.

In Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Teresita Payawal, 5 this Court ruled that
upon the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 957, the trial court may
no longer assume jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 397. We even stated therein that the

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has the authority to award
damages in the exercise of this exclusive power conferred upon it by
Presidential Decree No. 1344.

In Estate Developers and Investors Corporation vs. Antonio

Sarte and Erlinda Sarte, G.R. No. 93646, which is a case
substantially similar to the instant case, in a resolution of
August 13, 1990 this Court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB over the collection suit.
Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the decision it rendered
is null and void ab initio. It is as if no decision was rendered by
the trial court at all.
When as in this case the attention of the trial court is drawn to
its lack of competence and authority to act on the case,
certainly the trial court has a duty to vacate the judgment by
declaring the same to be null and void ab initio.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992

BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in

This is as it should be. Inasmuch as the questioned judgment

is null and void, it is, as above observed, as if no decision had
been rendered by the trial court. It cannot become final and
exucutory, much less can it be enforced by a writ of execution.
The trial court, rather than reiterating the issuance of a writ of
execution in this case, which it did, should have recalled and
cancelled the writ of execution of the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the trial court dated January 29, 1988 is hereby
declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.

his capacity as the General Manager of the Philippine

Ports Authority, respondents.

MELO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
Resolution No. 90-962 dated October 19, 1990 of respondent
Civil Service Commission (CSC). Said CSC resolution set
aside and modified the decision dated February 5, 1990 of the
Merit System Protection Board in MSPB Case No. 449, which
ordered the immediate reinstatement in the service of herein
petitioner Benigno V. Magpale, Jr., without loss of seniority

rights and with payment of back salaries and other

emoluments to which he is entitled under the law.

charges he was ordered preventively suspended and has

been out of service since then.

The record shows that petitioner started his career in

government as an employee in the Presidential Assistance on
Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years later, or in
1975, he transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as
Arrastre Superintendent. He was promoted to the position of
Port Manager in 1977 of the Port Management Unit (PMU),
General Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in the same
year to PPA-PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharged
the functions of Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the PPA
General Manager designated Atty. William A. Enriquez as
officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban City effective
December 6, 1982. On January 6, 1983, petitioner was
ordered to immediately report to the Assistant General
Manager (AGM) for Operation, PPA, Manila, Petitioner
reported at PPA Manila on the same date and performed the
duties and functions assigned to him.

For almost four years the case remained unacted upon. The
formal investigation and hearing resumed on September 18,
1987.

In an Internal Control Department Report dated March 5,

1984, the PMU-Tacloban Inventory Committee and the
Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to
account for equipment of PPA value at P65,542.25 and to
liquidate cash advances amounting to P130,069.61. He was
found also to have incurred unauthorized absences from May
25, 1984 to July 23, 1984.

When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid

Decision was denied in the DOTC's Order of February 20,
1989, he appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board
(MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission.

On July 23, 1984, or nineteen months after he began reporting

in Manila, a formal charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit of Private
Business without permission as required by Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences
and Neglect of Duty was filed against petitioner. Based on said

After a careful review of the record of the case, this Board

found the appeal meritorious. Respondent cannot be held
liable for Gross Negligence for his alleged failure to account
for several properties and for failure to liquidate the cash

On January 18, 1989 a Decision was rendered by the

Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), through its Administrative Action
Board, finding petitioner guilty of Gross Negligence on two
counts: (a) for his failure to account for the forty-four (44)
assorted units of equipment, among them a Sony Betamax
and a TV Camera, and (b) for failing to render the required
liquidation of his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00 for
a period of four years. Petitioner was also found guilty of
frequent and unauthorized absences. Accordingly, he was
meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the
corresponding accessory penalties.

On February 5, 1990, the MSPB rendered a Decision

reversing the Decision of the DOTC. The pertinent portion of
the MSPB's Decision reads:

advances he received as there was no showing that he has

been specifically required to do so either by law or regulation.
The mere detail of respondent to PPA-Manila, in the absence
of an order requiring him to turn over and account for the funds
and property received for his office at PMU-Tacloban will not
necessarily obligate him to make accounting for the same.

On March 5, 1990, petitioner requested the Secretary of the

DOTC to direct the PPA to implement the MSPB decision as it
has become final and executory. Said request was reiterated
in another letter also dated March 5, 1990 by petitioner to OIC
Wilfredo M. Trinidad of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Legal Affairs, DOTC.

Moreover, Section 105, Chapter 5 of Presidential Decree

1445, otherwise known as "The Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines" measured the liability of an officer accountable
for government property only to the money value of said
property. Though respondent is the person primarily liable for
these funds and property, he holds this liability jointly with the
person who has the actual possession thereof and who has
the immediate responsibility for the safekeeping.

On March 13, 1990, petitioner filed with the MSPB a Motion for
Implementation of the MSPB decision. This was opposed by
the PPA through its General Manager.

As to the charge relative to respondent's frequent

unauthorized absences had been sufficiently and convincingly
explained, due to which the Board found him not at all guilty of
the offense charged (sic).
IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed. Respondent-Appellant Magpale should immediately
by reinstated in the service without loss of seniority rights and
with payment of back salaries and other emoluments to which
he is entitled under the law. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
On March 1, 1990, PPA, through its General Manager, herein
respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an appeal with the Civil
Service Field Office-PPA, and the latter office indorsed the
appeal to respondent CSC in a letter dated March 5, 1990.

On April 27, 1990 petitioner filed with respondent CSC his

comment to the appeal of the PPA contending that he is not an
accountable officer and is under no obligation to account for
the property and equipment; that said property and equipment
were not received by him as custodian and he should not be
held liable for the loss of the same; that the said property and
equipment were place in PPA-PMU Tacloban City which the
herein petitioner left on October 8, 1982 and since then had
lost control over them. Moreover, petitioner averred that as to
the unliquidated cash advances of P44,877.00, the same had
long been liquidated. Finally, petitioner claimed that his failure
to secure the clearance for any possible property or financial
obligation in PMU-Tacloban was due to the urgency of his
transfer to PPA-Manila and the absence of any order or
demand to secure the clearance.
On May 29, 1990, the MSPB issued an Order for the
immediate implementation of its February 5, 1990 Decision
ruling that:
Records further show that a copy of this Board's decision was
received by the Office of the Honorable Secretary, that

Department, thru Mr. Frankie Tampus on February 6, 1990.

Records finally show that as of March 5, 1990, no motion for
reconsideration of this Board's aforementioned decision has
ever been filed as evidenced by the certification of even date
issued and signed by Director Adelaida C. Montero of the
Office for Central Personnel Records, this Commission.
Hence, said decision has long become final and executory. (p.
34, Rollo.)
On June 28, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
appeal of PPA claiming that:
1. Appeal of PPA was filed out of time and that the CSC has no
jurisdiction over it;
2. The PPA has not exhausted administrative remedies before
appealing to the higher body, the CSC;
3. The MSPB decision has become final and therefore cannot
be disturbed anymore.
(p. 22, Rollo.)
On October 19, 1990, respondent CSC rendered its now
assailed Resolution No. 90-962, the pertinent portion of which
reads as follows:
The Commission thus holds respondent Magpale guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty on two (2) counts for the forty-four (44)
equipments (sic) under his charge and to render an accounting
for cash advances amounting to P44,877.90. Accordingly,
considering two mitigating circumstances of length of service
and first offense in favor of respondent, the commission
hereby imposes a penalty of suspension for a period of one (1)

year against him. As he has been out of the service since

1984, the penalty is deemed served and he should now be
reinstated to his former position. This is, however, without
prejudice to any criminal or civil proceedings that the agency
concerned or the COA may institute as proper under the
premises.
Finally, the decision of the MSPB exonerating the respondent
Magpale for Gross Negligence is hereby reversed. Corollarily,
the order of payment of back salaries is hereby set aside.
MSPB is likewise reminded to be more circumspect on matters
of this nature, especially as the instant case involves
accountability of public funds and property.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Commission finds respondent Benigno V. Magpale, Jr., guilty
of Gross Neglect of Duty on two (2) counts for failure to
account for the forty-four (44) equipments (sic) under his
charge and to render an accounting for cash advance
amounting to P44,877.90. In view of the attendant mitigating
circumstances of length of service and first offense in favor of
respondents and the Neglect of Duty to account for cash
advance in the amount of P44,877.90 (second count) be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstances, the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year shall be imposed against
respondent. This shall be without prejudice to any criminal or
civil proceeding that PPA or COA may institute against
respondent. Accordingly, the Decision and Order of MSBP
dated February 5, 1990 and May 29, 1990, respectively, are
hereby set aside. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
Hence, the present recourse.

The petition alleges that respondent CSC, in issuing its

Resolution No. 90-962, gravely abused its discretion because:
1. The law did not authorize an appeal by the government from
an adverse decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSBP);
2. Respondent PPA General Manager did not have the right or
legal personality to appeal from the MSPB decision;
3. Assuming that the appeal was available to respondent
DAYAN, the same was filed out time after the MSPB decision
had long become final and executory. (pp. 6-7, Petition; pp. 78, Rollo.)
In support of this first contention, petitioner invokes Paragraph
2(a). Section 16, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provides:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall
have the following offices:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The Merit Systems Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following
functions:
(a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving
officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall
be final except those involving dismissal or separation from
the service which may be appealed to the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied.)

claiming that since the MSBP decision was for dismissal or

separation from the service, but reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and with payment of back salaries, the said
MSBP decision should be deemed final, immediately
executory and unappealable.
Petitioner next contends that assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the decision of the MSBP was appealable,
respondent Dayan, even in his capacity as General Manager
of the PPA, did not have the legal personality not the right to
appeal the decision of the MSBP, citing Paragraph 1, Section
49, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of Executive Order
No. 292 and the case of Paredes vs. CSC, G.R. No. 88177,
December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84.
Assuming further that the MSBP decision was appealable and
that respondent Dayan had the legal personality to appeal the
MSBP decision, petitioner still contends that the appeal should
not have been given due course by the respondent CSC
because the appeal was not filed with the proper disciplining
office in accordance with same Section 49 of Executive Order
No. 292, which in this case, should be the DOTC, not with the
CSC Field Office at the PPA.
On the merit of the petition, petitioner claims that assuming
even further that an appeal lies from the MSBP decision, that
respondent Dayan had the legal personality or standing to
institute the appeal that it was filed with the proper office, still
CSC Resolution 90-962 was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion because petitioner cannot be suspended for alleged
failure to account for pieces of equipment and cash advances
since this is not the neglect of duty contemplated by Section
36 of Presidential Degree No. 807 or Section 46 of chapter in

the Civil Service in Executive Order 292. At most, petitioner

can be held liable for the money value of the equipment and
advances as mandated by Section 105 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
For its part, respondent CSC maintains
First, that the finality of the MSPB decision in the disciplinary
cases as stated in Section 16, Paragraph 2(a), Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, relied upon by petitioner, is modified
by section 12, Paragraph 11, Book V, of the same Executive
Order No. 292, which reads:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative case instituted by or
bought directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices
and of the agencies attached to it.
Furthermore, relevant provisions of Executive Order No 135
dated February 25, 1987 amending Section 19(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 807 and Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 1409 state, thus:
WHEREAS, in the interest of justice, there is a need to confer
upon the Civil Service Commission jurisdiction over appeal in
contested or provisional appointments and to make its
decision thereon, as well as in administrative disciplinary
cases final and reviewable by the Supreme Court.

xxx xxx xxx

Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. The
Commission shall hear and decide appeals from other
decisions of the Board provided that the decisions of the
Commission shall be subject to review on certiorari upon
receipt of the copy thereof by the aggrieved part.
Thus, respondent CSC argues that it is deemed not to have
lost its appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the MSPB in
administrative disciplinary case.
Second, the case of Paredes vs. CSC is not applicable.
Respondent Dayan appealed the MSPB decision not in his
personal capacity nor in pursuit in his private interest, but as
head of PPA, being the general manager thereof.
Third, the appeal was filed with the proper disciplining office
because the decision appealed from was that of the MSPB,
one of the offices in respondent CSC. Thus, respondent CSC
was justified in giving due course to PPA's notice of appeal
filed with its (CSC) Field Office at the PPA.
Finally, petitioner's claim that he is liable only for the money
value of the property and cash advances and cannot be
administratively charged for such infraction is untenable and a
mockery of the civil service law. For his failure to account for
the property under his charge and to liquidate his cash
advances, petitioner is guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and
should have been dismissed from the service if no mitigating
circumstances were considered in his favor.
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
file their respective memoranda. After considering the same

and the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, We find that the

petition must be granted.
After Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, (204 SCRA 965
[1991]), the extent of the authority of respondent CSC to
review the decisions of the MSPB is now a settled matter.
The Court, in said case held:
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. (Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs,
153 SCRA 318).
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The
Philippines Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty day's salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. . . . (Emphasis
supplied) (p. 7. Rollo)
Said provisions must be read together with Section 39
paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates:

Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party

adversely affected by the decision . . . (Emphasis supplied) (p.
104, Rollo)
The phrase "party adversely affective by the decision" refers to
the government employees against whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case,
Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an
aggrieved party because he is not the respondent of the
administrative case below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the
city mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to
enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like
suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary
equivalent to one month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be
availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty
of the charges filed against him. But the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no
occasion on appeal. (pp. 967-968)
The above ruling is a reiteration of the earlier pronouncement
in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, (192 SCRA 84
[1990]) cited by petitioner, where We said:
Based on the above provisions of law, appeal to the Civil
Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to
the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person
or the respondent employee who has been meted out the

penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an

amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of
the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the
Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed
is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases
allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of
the decision.
Here the MSPB after hearing and the submission of
memoranda exonerated private respondent Amor of all
charges except for habitual tardiness. The penalty was only a
reprimand so that even private respondent Amor, the party
adversely affected by the decision, cannot even interpose an
appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
As correctly ruled by respondent, petitioner Paredes the
complainant is not the part adversely affected by the decision
so that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to
the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo vs. D. Roda, 64
SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head of the Administrative
Services Department of the HSRC as a complaint she is
merely a witness for the government in an administrative case.
No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the
offense is committed against the government. (pp. 98-99)
While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service
Commission that under Section 12 (par. 11), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Book V of Executive Order 292, the CSC does have
the power to

Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought

before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices
and of the agencies attached to it. . . .
the exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read
together with the other sections of the same sub-title and book
of Executive Order 292, particularly Section 49 which
prescribes the following requisites for the exercise of the
power of appeal, to wit:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected
by the decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of
the decision, unless a petition for the reconsideration is
seasonably filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining
office, which shall forward the records of the case, together
with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority within
fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its
comments, if any.
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of:
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve
dismissal or separation from office, rather, the decision
exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former
position. Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in
the aforecited cases of Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, the
MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has
been conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena
v. Civil Service Commission, 193 SCRA 623 [1991]).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24680

October 7, 1968

JESUSA VDA. DE MURGA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUANITO CHAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Go and Fernando P. Blanco for plaintiff-appellee.
Abelardo A. Climaco, T. de los Reyes, Enrique A. Fernandez
and Ernani Cruz Pao for defendant-appellant.
ANGELES, J.:
In this appeal, two issues involving questions of law are posed
for resolution: First, whether or not the allegations in the

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is

hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Merit Systems Protection Board dated February 5, 1990 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and
Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., and Medialdea, J., are on leave.

complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer,

and confer jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court
(now city court) of Zamboanga City, under the provisions of
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and decisions interpreting the
same, when particularly considered in the light of the
contexture of the pertinent letter of demand to vacate the
leased premises (Annex J of the Complaint), couched in the
following wise:
Please be advised further that we reiterate our demand made
to you in our registered letter dated February 4, 1959 (to
vacate the leased premises) which was received by you on the
10th instant, unless you pay the amount of Six Hundred pesos
(P600.00) or Seven Hundred pesos (P700.00) as new rental
per our letter of January 19, 1959, before the expiration of the
15-day period granted you for vacating the same.

and, Second, whether or not the lessor and the lessee had
agreed upon an automatic renewal of the lease of the
premises, under the stipulation in clause "7" of the
corresponding contract of lease, containing the following
agreement:
7. That upon the termination of the term of Ten (10) years
above expressed, the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall have
the option to purchase the building or buildings belonging to
and constructed by the said Juanito Chan, and the price of
said building or buildings shall be determined by three
commissioners, two of whom shall be appointed by each of the
parties, and the remainder commissioner shall be appointed
by both. However, in the event that the said Jesusa Vda. de
Murga shall not exercise the right granted her for any reason
or cause, this contract of lease shall be automatically renewed
but the period for said renewal shall, however, be fixed and
adjusted again by the parties. It is agreed further that in case
of said renewal, the rental shall also be adjusted by the parties
depending on the business condition which shall then at that
time prevail. (Exhibit A.)
Jesusa Vda. de Murga was the owner of two parcels of land in
the City of Zamboanga, designated as lots 36 and 38 of the
cadastral plan of the place, and covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3237 and 3238, respectively.
On January 31, 1949, a contract of lease over said two lots
was entered into by and between Jesusa Vda. de Murga as
lessor, and Juanito Chan as lessee, the basic terms of which
pertinent to the present case are: The period of the lease was
ten (10) years from January 31, 1949; the lessee to pay a
monthly rent of P500.00 within the first ten days of every

month; with the consent of the lessor, the lessee may

introduce improvements on the land; and Clause "7" quoted
hereinabove. (Exhibit A.)
Upon taking possession of the leased premises, with the
consent of the lessor, the lessee introduced improvements on
the land consisting of buildings of the total costs of
P70,000.00. It is not disputed that the lessee paid in full the
monthly rent during the ten- year period of the lease.
As early as July 23, 1958, before the expiration of the ten-year
period of the lease, there had been intercourse of
communications between the lessor and the lessee for the
renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an
agreement; hence, this action by the lessor against the lessee.
Thus, on July 23, 1958, the lessor informed the lessee of her
willingness to renew the lease for five years at a monthly rent
of P700.00. (Exhibit B.) In his reply the lessee said:
... Much as I am willing to consider the suggested increase of
rental, however, I would like to plead with you that due to very
poor business at present, I may not be able to consider your
indicated increase. (Exhibit C.)
On August 1, 1958, the lessor advised the lessee that:
Beginning February 1, 1959, ... the rental of my lots ... will be
P700.00. (Exhibit D.)
On January 18, 1959, the lessee advised the lessor that she
(lessor) should purchase the buildings constructed on the land
in accordance with the stipulation in the contract of lease, and

... In case you do not agree with the purchase of the aforesaid
buildings, I am willing to continue occupying the land and
execute a new contract of lease, but I am appealing to you to
take into consideration the prevailing business conditions by
reducing the monthly rental to P400.00, ... (Exhibit L.)
On January 19, 1959, the lessor replied that
... she rejects the option to purchase the buildings, ... and her
present last offer is: (a) Six hundred pesos (P600.00) rentals
payable within the first fifteen days of every month, without
contract; or (b) Seven hundred pesos (P700.00) rentals
payable within the first fifteen days of every month, one year
advanced rental, with a five-year contract. (Exhibit F.)
On January 20, 1959, the lessor informed the lessee that the
conditions stated in the latter's letter of January 18, 1959, were
not acceptable to her. (Exhibit G.)
On January 21, 1959, the lessee advised the lessor that he
(lessee) cannot accept the conditions stated in her (lessor's)
letters of January 19 and 20, 1959
... y, insists que Vd. compre mis casas enclavadas en los lotes
objeto de arrendamiento. Y en caso de su negative seguire
ocupando el solar bajo el pago de un alquiler mensual de
Quinientos pesos (P500.00) debido al negocio reinante en
estos dias, tal como esta dispuesto en el contrato de
arrendamiento firmado por Vd. y yo el dia 31 de Enero de
1949." (Exhibit H.)
On February 4, 1959, the lessor made demand on the lessee
to vacate the premises

... for the reason that the lease contract had expired on
January 31, 1959, ... and the lessor had waived the right to
exercise the option granted her under paragraph "7" of said
contract, ... (Exhibit I.)
On February 16, 1959, the lessee sent his check for P500.00
to the lessor in payment of the monthly rental corresponding to
the month of February, 1959. (See Exhibit J.)
On February 19, 1959, the lessor returned to the lessee the
check which the latter had sent to the former, stating further in
the letter that she was demanding that the leased premises be
vacated, if he (lessor) would not agree to pay the new rental of
P600.00 or P700.00 a month beginning February 1, 1959, as
embodied in the letter, Exhibit J, hereinabove quoted.
Disregarding the written demand of the lessor, dated February
19, 1959, Exhibit J, the lessee chose to remain in the
possession of the leased premises and insisted that the
contract of lease stipulated an automatic renewal of the lease,
and conformably thereto, he has a right to continue occupying
the premises; and as token of his decision, he sent to the
lessor his check for P500.00 in payment of the monthly rent
corresponding to the month of February 1959. The lessor was
undoubtedly not satisfied with the tendered amount of
P500.00, because she had demanded P600.00 or P700.00, as
new monthly rent as a condition for the renewal of the lease.
And without any further definite demand on the lessee to
vacate the premises filed, on March 10, 1959, a complaint of
unlawful detainer in the municipal court of Zamboanga City
against the lessee, Juanito Chan, to eject the latter from the
leased premises. The facts alleged in the complaint as cause
of action, consisted in reproducing and reiterating the

substance of the correspondence exchanged between lessor

and lessee, as narrated above, and claiming that the
possession of the lessee of the premises had become illegal
by his failure and refusal to pay the increased new rental. For
relief, the plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered to
vacate the premises, and "TO PAY THE NEW RENTS
DEMANDED OF P600.00 or P700.00 FROM FEBRUARY 1,
1959 MONTHLY AS THE CASE MAY BE." Attached to the
complaint, as annexes thereto, were copies of the letters
exchanged between the lessor and the lessee, Exhibits B to J.
In his answer (as amended), the defendant admitting the
genuineness and authenticity of the letters annexed to the
complaint, but traversing some of the allegations therein,
raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
case, and lack of cause of action for unlawful detainer.
After a trial, decision was rendered ordering the defendant to
vacate the premises, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P600.00 as
monthly rent from February 1, 1959, and P500.00 as
attorney's fees.
The defendant appealed from the decision to the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City. Before this Court, the defendant
again raised the special defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the
municipal court and lack of cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Ruling on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the court
said:
With reference to the contention of defendant that the
municipal court had no jurisdiction to try this case because the
interpretation, application and enforcement of the terms of the
Lease Agreement is within the competence of a court higher

than that of the municipal court, deserves hardly any

discussion. Suffice it to say that the jurisdiction of the
municipal court is grounded on Section 88 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
After a trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment
ordering the defendant to vacate the premises, to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P1,200.00 from February 1, 1959, as
monthly rental of the land, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
From the foregoing decision, the defendant interposed a direct
appeal to this Court. Therefore, only questions of law may be
considered in this appeal.
Among the four errors assigned by the appellant in his brief,
the first two pose the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the
municipal Court and of the lack of cause of action for unlawful
detainer; the remaining errors delving on questions of fact
which, by reason of the nature of the appeal are, therefore,
deemed admitted and may not be reviewed in this appeal.
In relation to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal
court over the case, it is to be noted that, after the lessor and
the lessee had failed to agree on the renewal of the lease
which terminated on January 31, 1959, the lessor, on February
19, 1959, sent the demand letter hereinabove quoted, Exhibit
J. It was, then, as it is now, the contention of the lessee that
such demand is not that kind of demand contemplated in the
Rules of Court as complying with the jurisdictional requirement
that demand to vacate is indispensable in order to
determine whether the tenant's possession has become
illegal. On this matter, the rulings in the following cases are
pertinent and applicable:

The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the

increased rental or otherwise to vacate the land is not the
demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be
ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary
demand is first made. (Manotok vs. Guinto, L-9540, April 30,
1957.)
The lessor may, under Article 1569 of the Civil Code, judicially
disposses the lessee for default in the payment of the price
agreed upon. But where such default is based on the fact that
the rent sought to be collected is not that agreed upon, an
action for ejectment cannot lie. (Belmonte vs. Martin, 42 Off.
Gaz. No. 10, 2146.)
In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter of
February 19, 1959, that the obligation to vacate the leased
premises would be dependent on the failure of the lessee to
agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor. As the lessee,
however, was in the physical possession of the land by virtue
of a prior contract of lease, and the demand was in the
alternative imposing a new rental, even without taking into
account the efficacy of the stipulation for an automatic renewal
of the lease, which shall be discussed hereafter, in the light of
the ruling in Belmonte vs. Martin, supra, without any
subsequent definite demand to vacate the premises, subject to
no condition, the lessee did not incur in default which would
give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of
unlawful detainer.
Delving on the second special defense to wit, that the
allegations in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action

of unlawful detainer, it is the contention of the lessee-appellant

that clause "7" of the contract of lease, quoted hereinabove,
meant an express grant to the lessee to renew the lease at his
option, contrary to the claim of the lessor-appellee that there
must be a prior mutual agreement of the parties. As we read
clause "7", We find that it envisioned the happening of two
eventualities at the expiration of the lease on January 31, 1959
either the lessor may purchase the improvements
constructed by the lessee on the land, or in case the lessor
fails, for any cause or reason, to exercise the option to buy, the
lease shall be deemed automatically renewed. The evidence
has established that the lessor had refused to buy the
buildings on the land. The statement in said clause "7" that in
case of renewal the duration of the lease and the new rental to
be paid shall be adjusted by the parties, is of no moment in the
solution of the issue, whether or not the facts alleged in the
complaint constitute a cause of action of unlawful detainer.
The pleadings of the parties, and the annexes thereto, clearly
show that the jugular vein of the controversy hinges on the
correct interpretation of clause "7" of the contract of lease, a
matter outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The
lessor-appellee maintains that the lease had terminated on
January 31, 1959, renewable only upon a new agreement of
the parties; on the other hand, the lessee-appellant contends
that, inasmuch as the controversy hinges on the interpretation
of clause "7" of the contract, that is, whether or not said clause
contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease, the action
was not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, beyond the competence of the
municipal court.
The contention of the lessee-appellant must be sustained.

In Cruz vs. Alberto, 39 Phil. 991, the contract of lease had the
following provision:
That the term of this contract of lease shall be six years from
the date of the execution, and extendible for another six years
agreed upon by both parties.
It was contended by the lessor that the lease cannot be
extended except upon mutual agreement. Ruling on the
contention, the Supreme Court said:
We are of the opinion that the trial judge was entirely correct in
his interpretation of the contracts in question; and though it
must be admitted that this interpretation renders the words
"agreed upon by both parties" superfluous yet this does not
involve any strain upon the meaning of the entire passage. If
the interpretation which the appellant would have us adopt be
true, the entire clause relative to the extension of the term
would be superfluous, for if the extension is only to be effective
upon a new agreement of the parties to be made at the
expiration of the original term, why should anything at all be
said about an extension? Parties who are free to make one
contract of lease are certainly free to make a new one when
the old has expired without being reminded of their faculty to
do so by the insertion of a clause of this kind in the first lease.
This would not only be superfluous but nonsensical. The
clause relative to the extension of the lease should, if possible,
be so interpreted as to give it some force.
As we interpret the contracts before us, the parties meant to
express the fact that they had already agreed that there might
be an extension of the lease and had agreed upon its duration,
thus giving the defendant the right of election to take for a

second term or to quit upon the expiration of the original term.

The clause in question has the same meaning as if the words
"agreed upon by both parties" had been omitted and the
passage had closed with a period after the word "years" in the
first contract and after "extension" in the third contract.
It has been held by this court that the word "extendible"
standing without qualification in a contract of lease, means that
the term of the lease may be extended and is equivalent to a
promise to extend, made by the lessor to the lessee, and, as
unilateral stipulation, obliges the promisor to fulfill his promise.
(Legarda Koh vs. Ongsiako, 36 Phil. Rep. 185). Such a
stipulation is supported by the consideration which is at the
basis of the contract of lease (16 R.C.L. pp. 883, 884) and
obviously involves a mutuality of benefit, or reciprocity,
between the parties, notwithstanding the right of election is
conceded solely to the lessee. As a general rule, in construing
provisions of this character, the tenant is favored, where there
is any uncertainty, and not the landlord, upon the principle that
a grant should be taken most strongly against the grantor. (15
R.C.L. p. 884, 24 Cyc. 915.)
In the case of Legarda Koh vs. Ongsiaco, 36 Phil. 189-190,
the contract of lease had this provision:
The term of the said contract shall be for one year, counting
from the 1st of December of the present year (1963) which
term shall be extendible at the will of both parties.
Said the Supreme Court:
According to Article 1091 of the Civil Code, obligations arising
from contracts have legal force between the contracting

parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their

stipulation. Therefore, if the defendant bound himself to lease
his properties for the period of one year, which term should be
extendible, it is evident and strictly in accord with justice that
the plaintiff-lessee has a right, at the termination of the first
period of one year, to have the said contract of lease renewed
in fulfillment of the stipulated extension of the term of the
lease; otherwise, the clause contained in the document Exhibit
1, that the lease at its termination would be extendible, would
be worthless.
The defendant-appellant is wrong in his contention that the
renewal or extension of the contract depended solely upon
himself, notwithstanding the stipulations contained in said
contract, inasmuch as the renewal and continuation of the
lease could not be left wholly to the plaintiff's free will, without
counting on the defendant's consent a consent expressly
granted in the promise that the term would be extended, which
term, although its duration was not fixed, should be
understood to be for another year, a period equal to and not
greater than the term of the lease.

When a contract of lease provides that the term thereof is

extendible, the agreement is understood as being in favor of
the lessee, and the latter is authorized to renew the contract
and to continue to occupy the leased property, after notifying
the lessor to that effect. The lessor can withdraw from the said
contract only after having fulfilled his promise to grant the
extension of time stipulated therein, unless the lessee has
failed to comply with or has violated the conditions of the
contract. It is not necessary that the extension be expressly
conceded by the lessor because he consented thereto in the
original contract.
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We declare
that the municipal court (now city court) of Zamboanga City
had no jurisdiction over the case; therefore, the appealed
decision is set aside and reversed, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
*

SECOND DIVISION
EDGARDO V. QUESADA,
Petitioner,

-versus-

G.R. No. 150325

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Present:
and CLEMENTE TERUEL,
Respondents.
PUNO, J., Chairperson
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 31, 2006

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
docketed as I.S. No. 00-29780-C. The affidavitcomplaint alleges that on June 13, 1998 at Shangrila
DECISION
Plaza Hotel, EDSA, Mandaluyong City, Quesada,
Camacho, and Corgado represented themselves to
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Teruel as the president, vice-president/treasurer, and
managing director, respectively, of VSH Group
Corporation; that they offered to him a
For
our
resolution
is
the
Petition
telecommunication device called Star Consultant
for Certiorari[1] (with prayer for a temporary
Equipment Package which provides the user easy
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction)
access to the internet via television; that they assured
assailing the Resolutions dated January 17, 2001 and
him that after he pays the purchase price
September 17, 2001 issued by the Secretary of Justice
of P65,000.00, they will immediately deliver to him
in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, entitled Clemente M.
two units of the internet access device; that relying on
Teruel, complainant, versus Ramon P. Camacho, Jr.,
their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the
Edgardo
V.
Quesada
and
Rodolfo
two units; and that despite demands, they, did not
Corgado, respondents.
deliver to him the units.
On March 1, 2000, Clemente M. Teruel, herein
respondent, filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City, an affidavitcomplaint[2] charging Edgardo V. Quesada (herein
petitioner), Ramon P. Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo
Corgado with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code,

It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a

counter-affidavit.[3] He alleged that he, Camacho,
and Corgado are Star Consultant Trainers of F.O.M.
Philippines, Inc., a corporation engaged in the
business of selling and marketing telecommunication
products and technologies; that they formed the VSH

Group as a corporation for the principal purpose of

pooling the commissions they will receive as Star
Consultant Trainers and then dividing said
commissions among themselves according to their
agreement; that while he admitted that the two units
of internet access devices purchased by herein
respondent Teruel were not delivered to him, however,
this was not due to their alleged fraudulent
representations since they merely acted as sales agents
of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.; and that they found out too late
that the said company could not cope with its
commitment to them as it ran short of supplies of
telecommunication products.
On April 25, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor
Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. issued a Resolution[4] finding
probable cause against petitioner Quesada, Camacho,
and Corgado, and recommending the filing of the
corresponding Information.
Consequently, an Information for estafa against
petitioner Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado was filed
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court

(RTC), Mandaluyong City,

docketed as Criminal Case No.
MC-00-2510. This
case was later raffled off to Branch 208.
In the meantime, petitioner filed with the
Department of Justice a Petition for Review
challenging the April 25, 2000 Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor. On January 17, 2001, the
Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[5] dismissing
the petition. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution[6] dated September 17,
2001.
While the RTC was hearing Criminal Case No.
MC-00-2510, petitioner filed with this Court the
instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the
Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his Petition for
Review in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the element of
fraud or deceit in the crime of estafa is not
present[7] and that there is no evidence which will

prove that the accuseds promise to deliver the

purchased items was false or made in bad faith.[8]
The Solicitor General, in his Comment,
maintains that the Secretary of Justice, in finding a
probable cause against the three accused, did not act
with grave abuse of discretion and prayed for the
dismissal of the instant petition for being
unmeritorious.
Initially, we observe that the present petition
was directly filed with this Court, in utter violation of
the rule on hierarchy of courts.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be
filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision may
then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the same
Rules.[9] A direct recourse to this Court is warranted
only where there are special and compelling reasons
specifically alleged in the petition to justify such

action. Such ladder of appeals is in accordance with

the rule on hierarchy of courts. In Vergara, Sr. v.
Suelto,[10] we stressed that this should be the constant
policy that must be observed strictly by the courts and
lawyers, thus:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a
court of last resort, and must so remain
if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts
for some reason or another are not
controllable
by
the
Court
of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a

Regional Trial Court, it is in either of

these courts that the specific action for
the writs procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue
to be the policy in this regard, a policy
that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe. (Underscoring supplied)

We later reaffirmed such policy in People v.

Cuaresma[11] after noting that there is a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have
their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs,
and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land. We again emphasized that:
x x x. This Courts original
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of certiorari (as
well
as
prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive. x x x. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals x x
x. This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an

absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice

of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is, after
all, a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate
forum
for
petitions
for
the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard
for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level
courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a
policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts
time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts
docket. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Here, we cannot discern any special and

compelling reason to justify the direct filing with this
Court of the present petition. Clearly, it should be
dismissed outright.
Even assuming that the petition can be filed
directly with this Court, the same must fail. Petitioner
contends that the element of fraud or deceit as an
element of the crime of estafa is absent. Consequently,
the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the
Investigating Prosecutors finding that there exists a
probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
The issue of whether the element of fraud or
deceit is present is both a question of fact and
a matter of defense, the determination of which is
better left to the trial court after the parties shall have
adduced their respective evidence. It bears stressing
that a preliminary investigation is merely an inquiry
or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime

has been committed and that the respondent

is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.[12] It does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits.[13] As implied by the
words probably guilty, the inquiry is concerned
merely with probability, not absolute or moral
certainty.[14] At this stage, the complainant need not
present proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties evidence.[15] A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by petitioner and his
co-accused. As ruled by the Investigating Prosecutor
and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, petitioners
representation and assurance to respondent Teruel that
the telecommunication equipment would be delivered
to him upon payment of its purchase price was the
compelling reason why he parted with his
money. Such assurance, the Investigating Prosecutor
added, is actually a misrepresentation or deceit.

Thus, we hold that the Secretary of Justice did

not gravely abuse his discretion. An act of a court or
tribunal may only be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[16]
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the
petition. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117970. July 28, 1998]

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On leave)
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

instant

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ULYSSES M. CAWALING,
ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE
LOS
SANTOS,
and
HILARIO
CAJILO, accused-appellants.

DECISION

Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all

the appellants, an administrative case had been filed
before the National Police Commission, in which
Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos,
Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Andres
Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan with the
killing of his brother Ronie Ilisan. On April 6, 1986,
Adjudication Board No. 14 rendered its Decision which
found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and
Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their
dismissal from the service with prejudice. On June 26,
1986, the Board issued a resolution, dismissing the
respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
[4]

PANGANIBAN, J.:

It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits

killing the victim, he bears the burden of establishing the
presence of any circumstance like self-defense,
performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double
jeopardy, which may relieve him of responsibility, or
which may mitigate his criminal liability. If he fails to
discharge this burden, his conviction becomes
inevitable. In this Decision, we also reiterate the following
doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over informations for
murder committed by public officers, including a town
mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies deserve great respect;
(3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming; (4) alibi
cannot be believed in the face of credible testimony
identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence.
[1]

The Case
Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision dated
October 21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon in Criminal Case No. OD269. Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M.
Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo
De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.
[2]

[3]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant

Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, an
Information for murder against the appellants and
Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion reads:
[10]

[11]

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at

around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the
Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of
Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent
to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation and
taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic]
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms,
inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in

different parts of his body which were the direct

and immediate cause of his death.
Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and
Fontamillas, with the assistance of their lawyers Atty.
Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988; while
Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio Q.
Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988.
[12]

[13]

After due trial, the court a quo rendered its

Decision dated October 21, 1994, the decretal portion of
which reads:
[14]

[15]

[16]

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1)

ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS SANTOS,
(4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES
FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER under the Information,
dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the law.
The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED
to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of P6,000.00 as
actual damages and the heirs of the deceased
Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way of
lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for
death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED

CANCELLED and all said accused are ORDERED
immediately confined in jail.
The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3
empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and the
slug of bullet (Exh. H) are confiscated in favor of
the government.
After the judgment has become final, the Officer-inCharge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is
ordered to deliver and deposit the foregoing
Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the Provincial
Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly
receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached
to the record of the case and shall form part of the
record.
The period of preventive imprisonment the
accused had undergone shall be credited in their
favor to its full extent pursuant to Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS
who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED pending
his arrest.
[17]

Hence, this appeal.

[18]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The trial court gives this summary of the facts as
viewed by the prosecution witnesses:

The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at

around 9:00 oclock in the evening at the ricefield of
Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon when the bright
moon was already above the sea at an angle of
about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about
9:00 oclock in the morning (Imelda Elisan
Tumbagahon, on direct examination, tsn, Jan. 17,
1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18,
1989, p. 22).
On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 oclock or 8:30
oclock in the evening, Vicente Elisan and his elder
brother Ronie Elisan, the victim, were drinking tuba
at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres
Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose,
Romblon. When they stood up to go home, Luz
Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them not
to go out because the accused were watching
them outside about three (3) meters from the
restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them
upon their request and they went out and walked
towards home. About a hundred meters from the
restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor
Cawaling, the four (4) policemen, namely, Hilario

Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan

and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex
Batuigas, the mayors brother-in-law, flashlighted
them and Diosdado Venus ran going back. The
two (2) brothers also ran towards home to the
house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan
Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and
Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the gate of the fence
of their sisters house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the
ricefield. The accused were chasing them. Vicente
Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll down on the
ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y]
on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling
and raising his two (2) hands. All the six (6)
accused approached him with their flashlights and
shot him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters
from the bushes where Vicente Elisan hid behind
the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said []you
left him, he is already dead.[] Mayor Cawaling was
armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres
Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both with
armalites, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos
Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with
civilian Alex Batuigas. They left towards the house
of Mayor Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente
Elisan ran towards the house of his older brother
Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him, Vicente told
Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said
nothing. While they were there, elder sister Imelda
Elisan Tumbagahon, who was crying came. She

said: Manong, patay ron si Ronie. (Brother, Ronie

is already dead). Nelson said []do not be noisy;
they might come back and kill all of us.[] Imelda
stopped crying.
After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan
went to the house of barangay captain Aldolfo
Tumbagahon. The three (3) went to the townhall
and called the police but there was none
there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police
Oscar Montero, they were told by his wife that
Commander Montero was in the house of Mayor
Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where
Ronie Elisan was shot. The cadaver was brought
to the house of Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found
an empty shell of a .45 caliber about three (3) arms
length from the body of the victim. They
surrendered it to the Napolcom.
[19]

Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds

of the victim as follows:

Gunshot Wounds:

2. Right Axilla:
Gun shot wound x inch in diameter, 2 inches below
the right nipple with contussion [sic] collar
s[u]rrounding the wound.
3. Left Axilla:
Exit of the gun shot wound from the right axilla,
measuring x inch with edges everted, one inch
below the axilla and one inch below the level of the
nipple.
4. Back:
Gun shot wound measuring x inch, along the
vertebral column, right at the level of the 10th ribs
with contussion [sic]collar.
5. Leg, Left:
Gun shot wound measuring x anterior aspect
upper third leg with contussion [sic] collar, with the
exit x posterior aspect upper third leg, left.
[20]

1. Shoulder:
Gun shot wound x inch in diameter shoulder right 2
inches from the neck with contussion [sic] collar
s[u]rrounding the wound.

Based on the death certificate (Exhibit E) issued by

Dr. Flores, Ronie Ilisan died of severe hemorrhage and
gun shot wo[unds].
[21]

Version of the Defense

Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief, presented

his own narration of the incident as follows:
[22]

At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4,

1982, Ulysses Cawaling, then the mayor of the
[M]unicipality of San Jose in the [P]rovince of
Romblon, arrived aboard a hired motorized boat
from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the
seashore, he immediately proceeded to his
home. At around 7:30 in the evening, Cawaling
went to the municipal hall to check on
administrative matters that piled up in the course of
his trip to Manila. He also went inside the police
station (located inside the municipal building) to be
apprised of any developments, afterwhich he went
out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo
who were standing near the flagpole in front of the
municipal building. The three engaged in a
conversation. Cawaling learned that the two police
officers were the ones assigned for patrol/alert for
that night. The three of them went inside the INP
office and there Cawaling informed the two
policemen that he received information from
reliable persons that certain persons were plotting
to kill him and a member of the towns police
force. It is to be noted that this occurred at the
height of the communist insurgency and political
violence in the countryside in the early 80s. Hence,
such information was taken very seriously, having
been relayed by sources independent of each
other.

Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with

supervisory authority over the local police,
accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo in
conducting patrol and surveillance operations
around the small municipality. He usually did this
as routine since Romblon was then plagued with
political assassinations and armed conflict. On
their way to the seashore, they passed by C & J-4
Kitchenette, and chanced upon Ronnie Ilisan and
his brother Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and
discussing in very loud voices. They stopped right
in the front of the restaurant and there they heard
Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will
kill a person that night. Inside the restaurant,
without the knowledge then of Cawaling and the
two police officers, witness Gil Palacio, who was
buying cigarettes and Luz Venus, the cook/server
of the restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk,
brandishing in the air a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with a protruding screw.
Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisans statement as just
another hollow swagger of an intoxicated person
(salitang lasing), Cawaling and the two policemen
proceeded on their way. After the patrol, they
returned to the municipal building and stationed
themselves in front. At around 8:30 in the evening,
Ronnie Elisan passed by the municipal hall walking
towards the direction of the house of Nelson Ilisan,
another brother, and shouted the challenge, gawas

ang maisog, meaning THOSE WHO ARE BRAVE,

COME OUT. Cawaling and the two police officers
again brushed aside [the] challenge as just another
foolish drunken revelry [o]n the part of Ronnie
Ilisan, a well-known troublemaker in the small
municipality.
A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed
by, they distinctly heard a gunshot and hysterical
female voices shouting, pulis, tabang meaning
POLICE! HELP! four times. Impelled by the call of
duty, Cawaling and the two policemen immediately
ran in the direction of the gunshot and the
desperate female voices until they reached the
house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At this
point, they saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber
revolver. They also saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco
Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of Nelson and Delma
Ilisan, the wife of Vicente, the latter two being the
same persons who cried pulis, tabang four
times. Cawaling then told Ronnie to surrender his
gun but the latter responded by pointing the gun at
Cawaling and pulling the trigger.
At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling
warned the two policemen to drop to the ground by
shouting dapa. Fortunately, Cawaling was not
hit. Ronnie Ilisan then turned around and ran
towards the church. The two policemen gave
chase. Cawaling, still shaken and trembling after

the mischance was initially left behind but followed

shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan reached the church, he
turned around and again fired at the pursuing Pfc.
Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired. When they
finally reached the ricefield, Pfc. Cajilo fired two (2)
warning shots in the air for Ronnie to
surrender. Ronnie responded by firing once again
at Pfc. Tumbagahan but failed to hit the latter. At
that instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at Ronnie
Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. Tumbagahan also fired his
weapon in the heat of exchange and also hit
Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds,
Ronnie Ilisan later on succumbed.
Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the
hand of the dead Ronnie Ilisan and gave it to Pfc.
Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who subsequently
caught up with them after the incident, and the two
police officers, then proceeded to the police station
located in the municipal building to formally report
the incident in their station blotter.
[23]

The Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants filed by

Atty.
Napoleon U. Galit and the Brief for Appellants Ernesto
Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo submitted by Atty. Joselito
R. Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the
trial court.
Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the prosecution witnesses and their

testimonies credible, the court a quo convicted the
appellants. The killing was qualified to murder because of
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there
was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim
and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number
and armed with guns. It further ruled that abuse of
superior strength absorbed treachery, as it ratiocinated:

Certain cases, an authority wrote, involving the

killing of helpless victim by assailants superior to
them in arms or numbers, or victims who were
overpowered before being killed, were decided on
the theory that the killing was treacherous, when
perhaps the correct qualifying circumstance would
be abuse of superiority. In these cases the attack
was not sudden nor unexpected and the element
of surprise was lacking. (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the
qualifying treachery should be considered as an
exception to the general rule on treachery because
it was not present at the inception of the
attack. The killing was not sudden nor unexpected
and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for
this reason that we hold that alevosia should be
deemed absorbed or included in abuse of
superiority. Even assuming ex-gratia argumenti
that it should be the other way around, the
situation will not be of help, penaltywise, to the
accused.
[24]

The defenses raised by the appellants were

dismissed and their witnesses declared unworthy of
belief for the following reasons:

5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the

victim, was in fact owned and used by Alex
Batuigas.

1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness

Tesnado would not tell his wife (Dory) and
Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapao about the incident he had
allegedly witnessed; more so when Sacapao was
the victims first cousin.

6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to

prove that Imelda Ilisan Tumabagahan had an
obstructed view of the killing. The trial court ruled
that such evidence was misleading, because the
window, from where said witness allegedly saw the
incident, was at the eastern side of her house, and
thus afforded a clear view of the incident, while the
window referred to by the defense was at the
southern portion.

2. The spot report prepared by Station

Commander Oscar M. Montero, the testimonies of
Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the medical findings
of Dr. Flores contradicted one another on the
following details: the caliber of the gun used in
shooting the victim, the wounds inflicted and the
whereabouts of Cawaling during the shoot-out.
3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could
have immediately disarmed the victim at the initial
encounter. The court could not understand why the
victim was able to fire his gun, run, then stop and
again fire his gun, without being caught.
4. The positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses prevails over the alibi posed
by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a defense that
was not corroborated by any other witness.

7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores,

Nelson Ilisan and Provincial Prosecutor Pedro
Victoriano, Jr., though not formally offered as
evidence, may be admitted because of the failure
of the defense to object thereto at the time they
were called to testify.
8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution
witnesses had any ill motive to testify falsely
against the appellant.
9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson
Ilisan testified that his brother Ronie (the victim)
had witnessed Bonifacio Buenaventura (a former
chief commander of the San Jose Police Force) kill
a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was

Buenaventuras first cousin, wanted Ronie dead,

because the latter had not followed his instruction
to leave town to prevent him from testifying in said
case.
Assignment of Errors
The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty.
Napoleon Galit, assign the following errors to the lower
court:

1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining

prosecutors theory of conspiracy and thus renders
nugatory or has totally forgotten that policemen
when in actual call of duty normally operate in
group but not necessarily in conspiracy.
2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the
theory of the prosecution that accused-appellant
Ulysses Cawaling was one of the alleged coconspirators in the killing of the deceased Ronnie
Elisan.
3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the
defense of accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling
that he has nothing to do with the shooting incident
except to shout to arrest the accused[,] which
prompted his co-accused policemen to chase the

accused and sho[o]t him when he resisted, after he

fired at Mayor Cawaling.
4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight
to accused-appellant policemen[s] testimonies
which carry the presumption of regularity.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all
the accused-appellants by applying the equipoise
rule thereby resulting [i]n reasonable doubts on the
guilt.
[25]

In their joint brief, Appellants Tumbagahan and

Cajilo cite these other errors:
[26]

1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the

theory of the prosecution that accused-appellants
Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo were
alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the victim,
Ronie Ilisan.
2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the
defense that herein accused-appellants merely did
a lawful duty when the shooting incident happened
which led to the death of Ronnie Ilisan.
3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting
herein accused-appellants by applying the
equipoise rule, thereby resulting in reasonable
doubt on their guilt.

4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accusedappellants do press and hold, that the lower court
committed grave, serious and reversible error in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia).

1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting

herein accused-appellant, Ulysses M. Cawaling,
considering that he had no part in the killing and
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt;

5. The lower court committed grave, serious and

reversible error in convicting both accusedappellants of murder, instead merely of homicide,
defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
Code.

2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the

shooting incident a result of hot pursuit and shootout between the deceased Ronnie Ilisan and the
police officers in the performance of their duty and
self-defense, and in sustaining the prosecutions
conspiracy theory;

6. The lower court committed grave, serious and

reversible error in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength.
7. The consummated crime being merely
homicide, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be considered to lower the
penalty of homicide.
8. The lower court committed error in not
considering double jeopardy.
9. The lower court committed error in not
dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.

[27]

Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to

the court a quo:

3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting

Accused-Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling
considering that there was blatant absence of due
process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial.

[28]

This Courts Ruling

We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so
ruling, we will resolve the following issues: (1) jurisdiction
of the trial court, (2) double jeopardy, (3) credibility of
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) selfdefense, (5) performance of lawful duty, (6) alibi, (7)
conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise, (9) qualifying
circumstances, (10) damages and (11) attending
circumstances as they affect the penalty.

We shall address the first two issues as important

preliminary questions and discuss the merits of the
remaining ones, which we have culled from the errors
cited by the appellants in their aforementioned briefs.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

Section 4 of PD 1606 reads:

[31]

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall

exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
xxxxxxxxx

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the

trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the
criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not
the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the
case against the appellants, as they were public officers
at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed
by reason of or in relation to their office.
We do not agree.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is
determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires
jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing
such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another
tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule,
which find no application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or
(2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions
pending before its enactment.
[29]

The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as

amended; and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and
BP 129.
[30]

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public

officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that
offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
xxxxxxxxx
However, former President Ferdinand Marcos
issued two presidential decrees placing the members of
the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of

courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952, amending Section

1 of PD 1850, reads:
[32]

SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over

Integrated National Police and Members of the
Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding -- (a) uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police who commit any crime
or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial
pursuant to and in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all
persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of
the aforecited Articles of War who commit any
crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by
courts-martial or their case disposed of under the
said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the
aforementioned situations, the case shall be
disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial
authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the
offense has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended,
or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated National Police
personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of
their separation from the active service without
jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand
unless otherwise provided by law:

PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT

MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER
OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME BEFORE
ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE
TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of
the Integrated National Police shall refer to police
officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts
over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129,
the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder:

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Trial

Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of
by the latter.
[33]

In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as

amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites
that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may
exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a
case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccionalor
imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of

six
thousand
pesos
(P6,000). Sanchez
vs.
Demetriou clarified that murder or homicide may be
committed both by public officers and by private citizens,
and that public office is not a constitutive element of said
crime, viz.:
[34]

[35]

The relation between the crime and the office

contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion,
direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of
the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in
the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without
the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the
statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not the essence of murder. The
taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant,
and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary, took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in
which event the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to

the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises,
not from the allegations but on the proof, not from
the fact that the criminals are public officials but
from the manner of the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the Information filed against the
appellants contains no allegation that appellants were
public officers who committed the crime in relation to their
office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified
in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., [I]n the absence
of such essential allegation, and since the present case
does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019
(the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs.
People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986] Even before considering
the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it
is thus essential to determine whether that offense was
committed or alleged to have been committed by the
public officers and employees in relation to their offices.
[36]

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information. In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was committed in relation to
the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with
the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court,
not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case.
[37]

[38]

Second Issue:

Double Jeopardy

shall be referred for trial to a military commission.

Where a prima facie case is found against the accused,
formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned officer
designated by the judge advocate general. The accused
shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and
specification shall be read and the accused shall enter
his plea. After hearings, a record of the trial shall be
forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for proper action.
[43]

In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan

and Cajilo also invoke their right against double
jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy attached
when a criminal case for murder was filed before the
Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was
allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been
conducted. We are not persuaded.
[39]

There is double jeopardy when the following

requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted
or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
[40]

For a better appreciation of appellants argument, we

must consider PD 39 and its implementing rules, which
prescribe the procedure before a military commission. A
summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted
before trial for the purpose of determining whether there
is prima facie evidence to pursue trial before a military
commission. The investigation report shall contain a
summary of the evidence, the acts constituting the
offense or offenses committed, and the findings and
recommendations of the investigating officer. Thereafter,
the report shall be forwarded to the judge advocate
general, who shall determine for either the defense
secretary or for the AFP chief of staff whether the case
[41]

[42]

[44]

[45]

[46]

In the present case, the appellants have presented

no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they
were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military
commission, or that the case was dismissed therein
without their consent. The defense merely offered as
evidence certain disposition forms and a letter, dated
March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against
Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be
dropped and considered closed. No charge sheet and
record of arraignment and trial were presented to
establish the first jeopardy.
[47]

[48]

[49]

As pointed out by the solicitor general, appellants

were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the
Judge Advocate Generals Office, there was no trial, and
no judgment on the merits had been rendered.
[50]

Third Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts
deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have
been
overlooked,
misapprehended
or

misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially affect the

disposition of the case. This rule, however, does not
apply when the judge who penned the decision was not
the same one who had heard the prosecution witnesses
testify, as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have
carefully perused and considered the voluminous records
of this case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of
the court a quo in regard to the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.

Q. Why?

Vicente Ilisan, the victims brother, narrated before the

trial court the circumstances relevant to the crime:

A. We did not go out.

[51]

A. Because we were being watched by Mayor Cawaling,

Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo and Alex Bat[ui]gas.

xxxxxxxxx

[52]

Q. In the evening of December 4, 1982, at about 8:00 or

8:30, where were you?
A. I was inside the restaurant of Andres Fontamillas.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. What were you doing there?
A. I was drinking tuba.
Q. When you were about to finish drinking tuba, what did
you do?

Q. When you were informed by Luz Venus that you should

not go out because Mayor Cawaling and the persons
you mentioned were outside watching for you, what did
you do?
Q. Since you remained inside, what did you do?
A. I also viewed thru the window.
Q. Did you see them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far were they from the restaurant?
A. About three meters.
Q. What were they doing outside the restaurant?
A. They were also viewing us.

A. I stood up preparing to go home.

Q. For how long did they remain there viewing you?

Q. Were you able to leave that restaurant actually?

A. Just a short time.

A. No, sir.

Q. And later on, do you know where did they go? [sic]

Q. Why?

A. No, sir. I went out from the restaurant and when I went
out, I did not see them anymore.

A. Luz Venus told us not to go out when [I] stood up to go

home.

Q. Before you went out of the restaurant, what did you do?

Q. Do you know why you were advise[d] not to go out?

A. Diosdado Venus accompanied us.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you ask Diosdado Venus to accompany you?

A. Yes, sir. Because we were aware that we were being

watched from outside so we asked to be accompanied
by Diosdado Venus.

A. That of my older sister Imelda [E]lisan.

Q. From the restaurant accompanied by Diosdado Venus,

what did you do?

A. No, sir.

A. Towards home.

A. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were blocking us

on the gate of the fence of my sisters house.

Q. Were you able to reach home?

A. No, sir.
Q. Why, what happened on the way?

Q. Were you able to reach that house?

Q. Why, what happened when you ran away?

Q. Since your way was blocked, where did Ronie Elisan

go?
A. We ran towards the ricefield.

A. Diosdado Venus ran going back because we were

lighted by a flashlight.

Q. When you ran, what did Mayor Cawaling do?

Q. How many flashlight[s] were trimed [sic] to you?

A. They were chasing us.

A. Six.

Q. What about Alex Batuigas, what did he do?

Q. Did you come to know who trimed [sic] the flashlight

towards you?

A. He also followed helping chasing us. [sic]

A. Yes, sir.

A. The same. They were also chasing us.

Q. Who were they?

Q. About how far is that restaurant [from] the spot where

you were first lighted by the flashlight of the accused?

A. Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo,

Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo delos Santos and Alex
Batuigas.

Q. What about the four policemen, what did they do?

A. About one hundred meters.

Q. How were you able to recognize them when that was

night time?

Q. Now, according to you, you ran towards the ricefield,

what happened while you were running towards the
ricefield?

A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.

A. I saw my brother fell [sic] down.

Q. When Diosdado Venus ran back to his restaurant, what

did your brother Ronie Elisan and you do?

Q. Fell down where?

A. We also ran towards home.

Q. To whose house?

A. On the ricefield.
Q. What about you, where were you when your brother fell
down in the ricefield?

A. I ran towards the bushes.

A. He fell down.

Q. What did you do upon reaching the bushes?

Q. And how far is that spot where your elder brother had
fallen down to the spot where Diosdado Venus left you
when he returned to the restaurant?

A. I la[y] on the ground with my belly touch[ing] on the

ground behind the coconut tree.
Q. When your brother according to you had fallen on the
ricefield, what did he do thereafter?
A. He rose up, [raised] his hands and surrender[ed] to
them.

A. To my estimate it is about 300 meters.

Q. After your brother had fallen down, what did the accused
do?
A. Mayor Cawaling said, []you left him, he is already dead.[]

Q In rising, what was his position?

Q. Where did they go?

A. He was rising like this. (Witness demonstrating by

kneeling [and] raising his two hands).

A. They went towards the house of Mayor Cawaling.[53]

Q. While Ronie Elisan was kneeling and raising both of his

hands, what happened?
A. Mayor Cawaling approached him together with the four
policemen and his brother-in-law and they shot him.
Q. Do you know what weapon[s] were used in shooting
your brother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What weapon were used?
A. The weapon of Mayor Cawaling is .45 caliber and that of
Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both
armalite and that of Ernesto Tumbagahan, Alex
Batuigas and Ricardo delos Santos were .38 caliber.
Q. How were you able to identify their weapons?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
Q. Now, what happened to your brother when he was fired
upon by the accused in this case?

Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child

when she heard her brother Ronie shouting for
help. After getting a flashlight and looking through the
window of her house, she saw Cawaling and Alex
Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running towards her
house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos prevented Ronie
from entering the fence of her house, as a result of
which, her brother ran towards a rice field nearby. There,
on bended knees and with hands raised, Ronie was shot
by Cawaling and his men.
[54]

Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie

shouting for help while being chased by the group of
Cawaling. As Cajilo and Fontamillas blocked Ronie from
entering the gate of Imeldas house, the victim ran
towards a rice field. Nelson stopped Cawaling and asked,
Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo ang acon hali? (Nong, why
do you chase my brother?) But the mayor merely
continued chasing Ronie. Thereafter, Nelson saw his
brother, on his knees with both hands raised, shot by
appellants.
[55]

The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in

detail the assault against their brother Ronie and
positively
identified
the
appellants
as
the
perpetrators. The trial court cannot be faulted for relying
on their testimonies and accepting them as true,
especially when the defense failed, to prove any ill
motive on their part. In addition, family members who
have witnessed the killing of their loved one usually strive
to remember the faces of the assailants. Thus, the
relationship per se of witnesses with the victim does not
necessarily mean that the former are biased. On the
contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel
them to seek justice and put the real culprit behind bars,
rather than impute the offense to the innocent.
[56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution

witnesses tampered with the evidence by cleaning the
cadaver before an autopsy could be done. Such irregular
washing of the cadaver by a close relative of the
deceased, who is educated and who presumably knew
perfectly well the need to preserve it in its original state
for the medico-legal examination[,] is highly suspicious. It
points to the fact that the relatives of the deceased
wanted to hide, or erase something that would bolster
and assist the defense (that is, state of drunkenness,
powder burns or lack thereof, indicating the firing of a
weapon or the proximity of the weapon used on the
deceased, etc.).
[60]

Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia

Sacapao merely cleaned the cadaver and made no
further
examination. Second, appellants
had
an
opportunity to have the body examined again to
determine or prove important matters, such as whether

Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many and what

caliber of guns were used in shooting him; they did not,
however, avail themselves of this opportunity. As public
officers, appellants knew that it was within their power to
request or secure from the court, or any other competent
authority, an order for another autopsy or any such
evidence as may affirm their innocence. Third, their
conviction lies in the strong and convincing testimonial
evidence of the prosecution, not in the corroborative
testimony of Bebelinia Sacapao.
[61]

Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil

Palacio, Appellant Cawaling also pointed out that [t]he
power of observation of alleged eyewitness Vicente was
severely affected by his intoxication. It may be inferred
that an intoxicated persons sense[s] of sight and hearing
and of touch are less acute than those of a sober person
and that his observation are inexact as to what actually
occurred.
[62]

This argument is not persuasive. The evidence

presented fails to show that Vicente was so intoxicated
that night as to affect his powers of observation and
retrospection. Defense Witness Palacio merely saw the
witness drinking tuba on the night of the killing.
Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the matter
mainly reveals that Ronie was the person she was
referring to as drunk, as shown by this portion:
[63]

[64]

Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered

the C & J-4 kitchenette what if any did you observe?
A I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing).
Q Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?
A Ronie Ilisan sir.

Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the

appellants is still inevitable in view of the positive
declarations of Witnesses Nelson and Imelda, who
unequivocally identified appellants as perpetrators of the
senseless killing of their brother Ronie.
Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial courts
reliance on the testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores,
Nelson Ilisan and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr.,
for failure of the prosecution to offer them as
evidence. In People vs. Java, this Court ruled that the
testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in
evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other
party does not object to its presentation. The Court
explained: Section 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an
objection in the course of the oral examination of a
witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor
shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to
the admissibility of evidence was made in the court
below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will
not be considered. In the present case, a cursory reading
of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the
appellants did not raise any objection when said
witnesses testified on the matters now being
impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined
the witnesses, which shows that they had waived their
objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
[65]

[66]

[67]

[68]

Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the

motive of Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention
is likewise bereft of merit. Unlike judges who are
mandated to display cold neutrality in hearing cases,
prosecutors are not required to divest themselves of
their personal convictions and refrain from exhibiting
[69]

partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for

Prosecutor Victoriano to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the accused was probably guilty
thereof. Under the circumstance, it is his sworn duty to
see that justice is served. Thus, [h]e may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor - - indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one. Further,
[70]

[71]

[72]

Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscals

sphere of action is quite extensive, for he has very
direct and active intervention in the trial, assuming
as the Governments representative the defense of
society, which has been disturbed by the crime,
and taking public action as though he were the
injured party, for the purpose of securing the
offenders punishment, whenever the crime has
been proved and the guilt of the accused as the
undoubted perpetrator thereof established.
[73]

Fourth Issue:
Self-Defense
To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke
the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful
performance of duty. Allegedly, Ronie was firing his gun
and shouting Guwa ang maisog! (Come out who is
[74]

brave!). Then the mayor and the policemen arrived at the

scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at them, which forced
them to chase him and return fire.
We find this scenario bereft of plausibility.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a
condition sine qua non for the successful invocation of
self-defense. As factually found by the trial court,
unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but
rather with the appellants. Cawaling and his men
proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited for
Ronie to come out. When the victim did, they chased and
shot him without giving him any opportunity to defend
himself.
[75]

Granting arguendo the veracity of the defenses

factual version, it is important to note that appellants
admitted that Ronie was running away from them when
they chased and shot him.Thus, unlawful aggression -assuming it was initially present had ceased, and the
appellants no longer had any right to pursue the
offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or
even wound the former aggressor. Upon the cessation of
the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and
limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of
hostilities on the part of the person defending himself.
[76]

Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the

attack was unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the
appellants could have easily ordered the victim to
surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would have
been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they fired a

succession of shots at him while he was in no position to

put up a defense.
Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits
having committed the crime but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, the burden of proof is reversed
and shifted to him.He must then prove the elements of
self-defense. It necessarily follows that he must now
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if the latter
evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused has admitted the killing. Thus, appellants must
establish with clear and convincing evidence that the
killing
was
justified,
and
that
they
incurred no criminal liability therefor. They failed to do
so, and their conviction thus becomes inevitable.
[77]

[78]

[79]

[80]

Fifth Issue:
Lawful Performance of Duties
Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted
from the lawful performance of their duties as police
officers. However, such justifying circumstance may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that
(1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and
(2) the injury or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise
of such duty. These two requisites are wanting in this
case.
[81]

The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in

uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed
Ronie. The victim was not committing any offense at the

time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this

case cannot in any wise be considered a valid
performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to
maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the
people. As aptly held in People vs. De la Cruz,
Performance of duties does not include murder. That
Ronie was a troublemaker in their town is not an excuse;
as the Court declared in the same case of People vs. De
la Cruz, Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim.

Alibi is always considered with suspicion and

received with caution, not only because it is inherently
weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily
fabricated and concocted. It is therefore incumbent
upon the appellant to prove that he was at another place
when the felony was committed, and that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed. This he failed
to prove.

Sixth Issue:
Alibi

Seventh Issue:
Conspiracy

We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and

denial raised by Appellant De los Santos. Prosecution
witnesses positively identified him and Fontamillas as
part of the group which chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is
elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by
positive identification that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of

conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy
is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their
lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a
crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from
acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of intent. It does not matter who
inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of
all, and each incurs the same criminal liability. We
concur with the trial courts elucidation:

[82]

[83]

In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear

and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its
commission. The
evidence
he
had
presented
demonstrated only that, at the time, he was sleeping in
his house, which was near the locus criminis.
[84]

[85]

[86]

[87]

[88]

All of the accused chased the victim and his

brother; four (4) of whom blocked their ways, first,
to their elder brother Nelson Elisans house and,
second, to their elder sister Imelda Elisan

Tumbagahons house. Having changed course by

proceeding to the ricefield in their desperate
attempt to evade the accused, all the six (6) armed
accused continued their pursuit. Their victim,
having fallen on the rice paddy, and rising and
kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said
accused with their flashlights beamed on their
victim, in a united and concerted manner, shot
him. After Ronie Elisan had fallen down, coaccused Mayor Cawaling was even heard as
saying (Y)ou left [sic] him, he is already dead. x x
x.

test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to

support a conviction.
In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one
conclusion: appellants are guilty. As amplified in the
discussion above, the Court agrees with the trial court
that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ninth Issue:
Murder or Homicide?

[89]

Eighth Issue:
Equipoise Rule
We reject appellants position that the equipoise rule
should apply to this case. In People vs. Lagnas, the
Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado described
this rule, as follows:
[90]

[91]

Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and

cumulative consideration in view of the preceding
disquisition, the equipoise rule finds application in
this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the

The Information alleges three qualifying circumstance

s: treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage
of superior strength. If appreciated, any one of these will
qualify the killing to murder. However, Appellants
Tumbagahan and Cajilo posit that there was no
treachery, reasoning that Ronie was not an unsuspecting
victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of
the presence of the appellants inside the restaurant and
there had been a chase prior to the killing. Further, they
contend that abuse of superior strength is deemed
absorbed in treachery, and that the addition of abuse of
superior strength to qualify the case to murder is nothing
more than mere repetition - a legal chicanery, so to
say. Similarly, where treachery is not proved, there can
be no abuse of superior strength, vice-versa.
[92]

We partly agree.
Treachery exists when the malefactors employ
means and methods that tend directly and especially to

insure their execution without risk to themselves arising

from the defense which the victims might make. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person attacked. While we do not disregard the fact that
the victim, together with his brother Vicente, was able to
run towards a rice field, we still believe that treachery
attended the killing.
[93]

In People vs. Landicho, we ruled that treachery

might still be appreciated even when the victim was
warned of danger to his person, for what is decisive is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
[94]

The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the

restaurant. All of them chased the victim and prevented
him from seeking refuge either in the house of his sister
Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried
firearms and flashlights. They fired their guns at the
victim while he was on his knees with arms raised,
manifesting his intention not to fight back.
We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength, however, as we have
consistently ruled that it is deemed absorbed in treachery.
[95]

We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the

prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of
evident premeditation. To prove this aggravating
circumstance, the prosecution must show the
following: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of
time, between the determination to commit the crime and

the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to

reflect upon the consequences of his act. Nothing in the
records shows how and when the plan to kill was
hatched, or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out.
[96]

Tenth Issue:
Damages
The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00,
as civil indemnity; (b) P6,000.00, as actual damages; and
(c) P116,666.66, for lost earnings. In computing the latter,
the trial court used the following formula:

Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross

income
= .10 x P25,000.00
= P2,500.00
xxx xxx xxx

Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (9020) x P2,500.00 = P116,666.66.

[97]

Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of

the trial court awarding the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the victim.
[98]

We cannot do the same to the award of actual

damages and lost earnings, however. The award of
actual damages has no basis, as no receipts were
presented to substantiate the expenses allegedly

incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be established

by credible evidence before actual damages may be
awarded. Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of
earning capacity, which should be computed as follows:
[99]

[100]

2/3 x [80 - age of victim at the time of death] x

[reasonable portion of the annual net income
which would have been received as support by
heirs]
As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had
been earning an average of P100 daily or P3,000
monthly. From this monthly income must be deducted
the reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living
and other necessary expenses of the deceased. Hence,
the lost earnings of the deceased should be computed as
follows:
[101]

Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the

Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan
argue for the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion
temporal, contending
that
their
filing
of
bail
bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest
was issued, should be treated as voluntary surrender.
[102]

[103]

We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it

has no factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein
appellants was issued on August 18, 1987, but
appellants counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail only
thereafter, on September 2, 1987. In the second place,
appellants failed to prove the requisites for voluntary
surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a
person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the
surrender is voluntary. The records reveal that a
warrant of arrest was actually served on Tumbagahan
and Cajilo on September 2, 1987 and that they were in
fact detained.
[104]

[105]

[106]

= 2/3 x [80 - 22] x [P24,000]

= 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000]
= 2[P 1,392,000]
3
= P2,784,000
3
= P928,000.
Eleventh Issue:
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

[107]

[108]

In view of the absence of any other aggravating or

mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposed reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award
for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155713

May 5, 2006

MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN,* Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated April 12, 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 and its Resolution2 dated
October 14, 2002, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The salient facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,3 are as
follows:
Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot
19-A, Block 2844 with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 193264,
located in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. On February 20, 1995,
she leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of
three years with a monthly rental of P5,000. The parties also
agreed that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent for the

succeeding two years, i.e., 1996 and 1997,4 and the leased
premises will be used exclusively for the respondents fastfood
business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioners
prior written consent.5
While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood
business, he later used the premises as residence without the
petitioners prior written consent. He also failed to pay the 10%
annual increase in rent of P500/month starting 1996
and P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite repeated
verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the
arrears and vacate the leased premises.
On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to
the Barangay Chairmans office but the parties failed to arrive
at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued a
Certificate to File Action.6
On December 8, 1997, the petitioner filed against the
respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil
Case No. 157922-CV. It was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 6. On December 15, 1997,
the respondent received the summons and copy of the
complaint. On December 24, 1997, he filed his Answer by
mail. Before the MeTC could receive the respondents Answer,
the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated
January 7, 1998.7 Acting upon this motion, the MeTC rendered
a decision8 on January 15, 1998, ordering the respondent to
vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises; to
pay the petitioner the amount of P46,000 as unpaid rentals
with legal interest until fully paid; and to pay the
petitioner P5,000 as attorneys fees plus cost of the suit.

The respondent then filed a Manifestation calling the attention

of the MeTC to the fact that his Answer was filed on time and
praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC denied the
prayer, ruling that the Manifestation was in the nature of a
motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under
the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, and docketed as Civil Case No.
98-87311. On July 8, 1998, the RTC rendered its
decision9 setting aside the MeTC decision. The RTC directed
the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong
Barangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly with
the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable
settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded to
MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, for it to decide the case anew.
The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied
the motion in an Order dated March 15, 1999. Thus, he sought
relief from the Court of Appeals through a petition for
review.10 On April 12, 2002, the appellate court promulgated a
decision, reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the
dismissal of the ejectment case. The appellate court ruled that
when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the
mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level
had not been complied with, the court should dismiss the case
and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that
the parties may go through the prerequisite proceedings.

In the meantime, while this petition was pending before this

Court, the parties went through barangay conciliation
proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38.
Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement
prompting the RTC to issue an Order11 remanding the case to
the MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, where the proceedings took
place anew. On April 25, 2000, the MeTC rendered a second
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the merits
is hereby rendered for the plaintiff as follows:
1. Ordering defendant and all persons claiming right of
possession under him to voluntarily vacate the property
located at Lot 19-A Block 2844, Gagalangin, Tondo,
Manila and surrender possession thereof to the
plaintiff;
2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of
P387,512.00 as actual damages in the form of unpaid
rentals and its agreed increase up to January 2000 and
to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until
the same is actually vacated;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus cost of the
suit.
SO ORDERED.12

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

denied by the appellate court. Hence, this present petition.

The respondent appealed the foregoing decision. The case

was raffled to RTC of Manila, Branch 22, and docketed as Civil
1avvphil.net

Case No. 00-98173. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner

and dismissed the appeal. The respondent elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, where it is now pending.

Republic Act No. 716015 requires the parties to undergo a

conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or
the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court,16 thus:

The sole issue for our resolution is:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR THE ALLEGED
FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY LEVEL.13
With the parties subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman
or Punong Barangay for further conciliation proceedings, the
procedural defect was cured. Nevertheless, if only to clear any
lingering doubt why the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the complaint, we shall delve on the issue.
The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through
barangay conciliation proceedings to settle their dispute as
shown by the Certificate to File Action issued by the
Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat
Chairman. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that
whether there was defective compliance or no compliance at
all with the required conciliation, the case should have been
dismissed.
The primordial objective of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules,14 is to reduce the number of court
litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice
which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of

SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of

Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman
or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman.
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat
Secretary signed the Certificate to File Action stating that no
settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly
no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties
met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible
settlement. The efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however,
proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although
no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial
compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the
aforequoted provision, the confrontation before
the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance
with the precondition for filing the case in court.17 This is true
notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same
law that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if
he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be
construed together with Section 412, as well as the
circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this

score, it is significant that the Barangay Chairman

or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon
under the Local Government Code.18

prevent us from rendering a sound judgment in this case.

Thus, we are left with no alternative but to leave the matter of
ruling on the merits to the appellate court.

Finally, this Court is aware that the resolution of the substantial

issues in this case is pending with the Court of Appeals. While
ordinarily, we would have determined the validity of the parties
substantial claims since to await the appellate courts decision
will only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a
futile exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with
this Court, we find that we cannot do so in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Civil Case No.
98-87311 is AFFIRMED.

It must be underscored that supervening events have taken

place before the lower courts where the parties have been
adequately heard, and all the issues have been ventilated.
Since the records of those proceedings are with the Court of
Appeals, it is in a better position to fully adjudicate the rights of
the parties. To rely on the records before this Court would

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146195. November 18, 2004]

AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORANICOL,

SONNY
NICOL,
TERESA
ZAMORA-UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI,
ROBERTO
ZAMORA,
ROLANDO
ZAMORA,
MARY
ANN
ZAMORA,
MICHELLE ZAMORA and RODRIGO

The Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal in

CA G.R. No. 73453 and decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS

of
CARMEN IZQUIERDO, represented by
their
attorney-in-fact,
ANITA
F.
PUNZALAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review

on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals dated September 12, 2000 and its
Resolution dated December 1, 2000 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54541, entitled Avelina Zamora, et al.,
petitioners, versus Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo,
represented by the executrix, Anita F. Punzalan,
respondents.
The records show that sometime in 1973,
Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into
a verbal stipulation whereby the former leased to
the latter one of her apartment units located at 117B General Luna Street, Caloocan City. They
agreed on the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per
month; the leased premises is only for residence;
and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her
attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the
heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract
of lease wherein the rental was increased
from P3,000.00
to P3,600.00
per
month.
[3]
However, petitioners refused to sign it.

In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife,

Avelina Zamora, and their children (two of whom
have their own families), herein petitioners,
continued to reside in the apartment unit. However,
they refused to pay the increased rental and
persisted in operating a photocopying business in
the same apartment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied
with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage
System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the
premises. Since a written consent from the owner
is required for such installation, she requested
respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However,
the latter declined because petitioners refused to
pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions
on the use of the premises by using a portion
thereof for photocopying business and allowing
three families to reside therein.
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file
with
the
Office
of
the Punong
Barangay of Barangay 16, Sona 2, District I,
Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against Anita
Punzalan (respondents attorney-in-fact), docketed
as Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi

Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng

Tubig.
On
August
24,
1997,
during
the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner
Avelina Zamora declared that she refused to sign
the new lease contract because she is not
agreeable with the conditions specified therein.
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina
a letter[4] informing her that the lease is being
terminated and demanding that petitioners vacate
the premises within 30 days from notice.
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions,
the parties failed to settle their dispute amicably.
Hence,
the Barangay Chairman
issued
a
Certification to File Action dated September 14,
1997.[5]
Consequently,
on
October
2,
1997,
respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49,
Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful detainer
and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil
Case No. 23702.[6] Forthwith, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss[7] the complaint on the ground

that the controversy was not referred to

the barangay for conciliation. First, they alleged
that the barangay Certification to File Action is
fatally defective because it pertains to another
dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents attorneyin-fact to give her written consent to petitioners
request for installation of water facilities in the
premises. And, second, when the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, the Punong
Barangay
(as Lupon Chairman),
did
not
constitute
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom
mediation or arbitration proceedings should have
been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b),
Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One,
Book III of Republic Act No. 7160[8] (otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991),
which reads:
SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.
(a) x x x
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman Upon receipt of the
complaint, the lupon chairman[9] shall, within the next
working day, summon the respondent(s), with notice to
the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to

appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting

interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within
fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties
before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents opposed the motion to dismiss,
the same being prohibited under Section 19 of
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
They prayed that judgment be rendered as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint,
pursuant to Section 6[11] of the same Rule.
[10]

On July 9, 1998, the MTC issued an

Order[12] denying petitioners motion to dismiss and
considering the case submitted for decision in view
of their failure to file their answer to the complaint.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of failure to refer the
complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed
under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, which partly provides:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The

following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the
complaint or information except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to
comply with the preceding section [referring to
Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation];
x x x.
On August 26, 1998, the MTC rendered a
Judgment[14] in favor of respondents and against
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering
defendants and all persons claiming right under them:

[13]

1) To vacate the leased premises located at

No. 117-B General Luna Street,
Caloocan City and to surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2) To pay the amount of three thousand six

hundred (P3,600.00) pesos per month
starting January, 1997 until the premises
being occupied by them is finally
vacated and possession thereof is
restored to the plaintiff;
3) To pay plaintiff the sum of five
thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as and for
attorneys fees; and
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 125, Caloocan City, rendered its
Decision[15] dated February 15, 1999 affirming the
MTC Judgment. Subsequently, it denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.[16]
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54541. On September 12, 2000, it rendered a
Decision[17] affirming the RTC Decision.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate
Court in its Resolution dated December 1, 2000.[18]
Hence, the instant petition.
I

The primordial objective of Presidential Decree

No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law),
now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has
been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts.[19] To attain this objective,
Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the
parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman
or
the Pangkat as
a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, thus:
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to
Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly
in court or any other government office for adjudication,
unless there has been a confrontation between the

parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and

that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested
to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as
Chairman
of
the Lupong
Tagapamayapa,
conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the
dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to
petitioners contention, the complaint does not only
allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of
respondents attorney-in-fact to give her consent to
the installation of water facilities in the premises,
but also petitioners violation of the terms of the
lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for
their photocopying business and their failure to pay
the increased rental. As correctly found by the
RTC:
The records show that confrontations before the
barangay chairman were held on January 26, 1997,
February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997, February 28,
1997, July 27, 1997, August 3, 1997, August 10, 1997,
August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997 wherein not only
the issue of water installation was discussed but also the

terms of the lease and the proposed execution of a

written contract relative thereto. It appears, however,
that no settlement was reached despite a total of nine
meetings at the barangay level.
It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made
by defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora because herein
plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang
Barangay the authority to bring her grievance to the
Court for resolution. While it is true that the
Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled Ukol
Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng
Tubig, this title must not prevail over the actual issues
discussed in the proceedings.
Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay
level as a sine qua non for the filing of the instant case
would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no
new issues would be raised therein and the parties have
proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to
settle their differences amicably.[20]
We cannot sustain petitioners contention that
the Lupon conciliation
alone,
without
the
proceeding
before
the
Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes
the
law
on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of

R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that,

as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation
process either before the Lupon Chairman (as
what
happened
in
the
present
case), or the Pangkat.
Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,[21] we
held that notwithstanding the mandate in Section
410(b)
of
R.A.
No.
7160
that
the Barangay Chairman
shall
constitute
a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts, the
same Section 410(b) should be construed together
with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted
earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in
and peculiar to the case. Here, while
the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the
parties met nine (9) times at the Office of
the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein
not only the issue of water installation was
discussed but also petitioners violation of the lease
contract. It is thus manifest that there was
substantial compliance with the law which does not
require strict adherence thereto.[22]
II

We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the

complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by
Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, quoted earlier. Section 19(a)
permits the filing of such pleading only when the
ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored
on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
or failure by the complainant to refer the
subject matter of his/her complaint to
the Lupon for conciliation prior to its filing with
the court. This is clear from the provisions of
Section 18 of the same Rule, which reads:
SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral
to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement, shall
be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived
only after such requirement shall have been complied
with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
(Underscoring supplied)
As discussed earlier, the case was referred to
the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Obviously,

petitioners motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is

bereft of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54541 sustaining the Decision of the RTC which
upheld the MTC Judgment is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Corona, J., on leave.

Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,