PEACE

PEACE RESEARCHER
P.O. BOX 19683, No. 12, 1987
CHRISTCHURCH
'\
\ / � ----- =-0
XPLNV

Probability of Launch
� -- if no verification
XPC
XPL
Probability of a crisis Probabil ity
on a particular day of Launch
XUDT

MD CCEPT'S
Unresol ved
-
with in
XOT - -
Decision Time
-"''''
Decision
Time

ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR:

(
A COMPUTER MODEl
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X�s Strategic
Window

'Strategic Air Com/nand Underground Command Pust', three stories beneath Ojfi,1t air j()I'ce
base, in Omaha, Nebraska. SAC is one of the four u.s. command posts where the implications of
warning information are assessed.

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'The R
ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR:
A computer model*
by Barbara Leonard and Bill Rosenberg
Computer People for the Prevention of Nuclear War
(New Zealand)
Each of us has a mental model of the arms race
and the causes of accidental nuclear war. And each of
us has made an assessment of the likelihood of
accidental or unintentional nuclear war. It may be just
a vague feeling that an accidental nuclear war could
start at any moment. Or it may be a conscious
decision to assume that the probability is zero until
more data is available.
Whatever our assessment. we will use it to make
some very important decisions. It will influence who
we vote for, how we spend our money, and what we
do with our leisure time. We owe it to ourselves and
to future generations to make the best assessment
possible - however inadequate the data base.
Mathematical models can help us improve our
assessm0nt of the likelihood of accidental nuclear
war. They are tools for making our assumptions ex­
plicit and for examining the implications of various
sets o( assumptions. However imperfect, mathematical
models are an improvement over the mental models
we are already using.
In this paper, we present one mathematical
model of accidental nuclear war and the nuclear arins
race. Parameters for calculating the probability of
accidental nuclear war are obtained from a simplified
dynamic model of an arms race between countries
"X" and "Y". First we will describe a SEt of equa­
. also. The Strategic Windows are further reduced to
tIons that estimate the probability of an accidental
ntJclear war, triggered b y a "false alarm", occurring
when a Launch-On-Warning policy is in effect. We
will then tie those equations to nuclear arms race
variables. We will also describe equations that tie
probability estimates of other causes of nuclear war
to nuclear arms race variables. Our model is intended
as an interactive tool that can be used to explore the
relationship between the nuclear arms race and the
probability of accidental nuclear war.
Launch�On·-Warning Parameters:
The Launch-On-Warning equations use four para­
meters: (I). days of de facto Launch-On-Warning
(L-O-W) poilcy per year, (2) L-O-W decision time.
(3) "Missile Display Conferences Cailed to Evaluatc a
Possible Threat" (MDCCEPT's) per year, and (4)
mean "false alarm" resolution time. When a de facto
Launch-On-Warning policy is in effect, if a false
alarm (which begins as a MDCCEPT) were not
resolved within the L-O�W decision time, retaliatory
missiles would be launched and a nuclear war begun.
Days of de facto L-O-W policy per year:
Neither the CS nor the CSSR will renounce the
Launch*On-Warning option. A Launch-On-Warning
* This paper was originally titled "Accidental
Dynamic Model Equations." Description of the equations has
been edited out for readability. SeeAppendix for equations.
The original complete paper with tables of results can be
obtained from END.
Barbara Leonard is a compu�er programmer/analyst with
20 years of experience. Bill Rosenberg is a programmer!
analyst at the University of Canterbury's Computer Centre.
He has a doctorate in mathematkal psychology.
policy means that a country would attempt to launch
its own missiles prior 'lo the anticipated detonation of
the first incoming enemy warhead.
The model's cquations simulate the effect of a de
facto L.O.W. policy existing when a country's
military forces arc on crisis alert. The probability of a
de facto Launch-On-Warning policy being in effect
during a crisis is assumed to be 100%.
A de facto L-O-W policy would not necessarily
require attack verification b y a second family of
Early Warning sensors ("dual phenomenology")
(Aldridge, 1985). The model includes two factors to
describe the likelihood of a launch if there is no
second detection - one is used if there is no time for
a second detection, and the other is used if there is.
L-O-W decision time:
The L-O-W decision time for country "X"is the
antidpated Oight time of an incoming country "Y"
missile minus country "X"s sensor processing time
and minus "X"s launch time. For the purposes of this
paper we will assume that the L-O-W decision time is
equal to the country's Strategic Window (Wallace,
1984). The Strategic Window (SW) is the minimum
warning time that the country would have of a first­
strike attack on its strategic forces. The SW for both
the US and USSR used to be 25 minutes, based upon
a 30 minute ICBM flight time (Sleillbruner, 1984).
The USSR SW since 1984 is 6-8 minutes due to thc
deployment of Pershillg H's in West Germany (Babst
et aI., 1984). The US SW since 1984 is a matter of
debate. Soviet subs positioned off the US Atlantic
Coast could have reduced the US SW to 6 minutes
very narrow "windows of opportunity" (Ford, 1985)
if the respective decisionmakers intend to avoid
damage from Electromagnetic Pulse and X-rays from
high-altitude explosions (Richard L. Garwin cited in
Steinbruner, 1984).
.
Missile Display Conferences Called to Evaluate
Possible Threats:
A "false alarm" in the United States Strategic
Warning System is def1ned as a "Threat Assessment
Conference" (TACj; the next Emergency Action
Conference level after a Missile Display Conference.
It is assumed that any MDCCEPT which occurs in a
crisis and which is not resolved within the available
decision time would result in a TAC.
Each year thousands of "Routine Missile Disp1ay
Conferences" (RMDC) are called to evaluate data from
missile waming sensors. Often these routine confer­
ences are called because of detections of physical
phenomena in the earth's atmosphere or on its surface
that resemble missile launches (Babst et at., 1984).
The numbers of Routine Missife Display Conferences
from 1977 through 1983 fluctuated widely from year
to year.
But within that same period there were substantial
yearly increases in the number of conferences called
to evaluate detections of what appeared to be threat�
cning or ambiguous missile launches: "Missile Display
Conferences Called t o Evaluate Possible Threats"
(MDCCEPT's). The MDCCEPT's for 1977 througil
1983 were 43, 70, 78, 149, 186, 218 aud 255,
respectively. In 1984, the number of MDCCEPT's
C,...
dropped back to 153, a IJgure still well above those
for 1977, 1978, and 1979 (Wood, 1985). The 1984
figure may be just an anomaly or it might reflect a
change in the crit.eria for convening MDCCEPT's.
Because next-to-nothing is known of the number of
equivalent occurrences in the Soviet system, the
USSR "MDCCEPT's" will be assumed in this paper
to be the same as for the US.
Mean false alarm resolution time:
The US government wiU not release the informa­
tion (described as "classified") that would enable us
to determine the exact value of the US mean false
alarm resolution time (Wood, 1985). We do know
that at least two alarms have taken 3 minutes to
resolve and that at least one alarm has taken 6 minutes
to resolve (Torr-ey,· -
not include the 2 minutes necessary t o process signals
from satellite sensors and peripheral radar (Stein­
broner, 1984).
We will assume the minimum resolution time to be
1 minute. A mean resolution time of 2-3 minutes
would not be unreasonable.
[A series of Launeh-On,,·-Warning equations using
the variables defined above are developed and
applied.]
Launch-On-Warning Model Res ults :
Our L-O-W equations have been run as an indep­
endent "Launch-On-Warning" model to determine
the probability of an accidental nudear war (A.N.W.)
occurring within a decade given various realistic
parameters for US-USSR MDCCEPT, L-O-W decision
time, crisis, and false alarm resolution time. Simula­
tion runs of this L-O-W model, which did NOT
involve a dynamic arms race model, have produced
the following results:
Projection of Historical MDCCEPT Rate
If the MDCCEPT's of both countries increase
32.4% anllually as 1ndicated by NORAD data
�
(Crissey, 1984) - from 150 MDCCEPT's in the base
year, if dual phenomenology is not in force in a crisis,
and if the decision time for both countries remains 7
minutes, there is a high probability that a LO.W.
accidental nuclear war would occur within a decade
even if the number of days of crisis per year is very
low.
If the mean false a]ann resolution time is three
minutes, there is a 50% chance of an accidental
nuclear war occurring within three years if there are
5 days of crisis per year. There is a 95% chance of an
accidental nuclear war occurring within 6 years. Even
if there is only one day of crisis a year, there is a
95% chance of A.N.W. in an 11 year period.
Given the same assumptions regarding MDCCEPT
rate and decision time, if there are 5 days of crisis a
year and the mean resolulioIl lilIle is only 2 minutes,
there is still a 49% probability of A.N.W. within 11
years.
Second Detection Considerations
The preceeding results are based on the assump­
tion that attack verification by a second family of
sensors would not be required i:1 a crjsis.
However, if we assume that tl1ere is sufficient time
for a second family of sensors to verify the attack but
no second detection occurs, and the probability of a
false alarm being believed under such circumstances is
only 25%, we get the following result:
If the MDCCEPT's of
both countries increase 32.4% annually alld both have
a decision time of 7 minutes, a mean false alarm
resolution time of 2 minutes, and there are 5 days of
crisis a year, there is a 50% chance of all accidental
nuclear war in a 16 year period.
Narrow Window of Opportunity
The decisionmakers of both countries would have
only about 3 minutes to evaluate an alarm before
making fInal launch decisions if they intended to
avoid disruption by E.M.P. effect from submarine
launched missiles (Steinbruner, 1984).
Given a 3 minute decision time, if MDCCEPT's
increase at 32.4% per year� there is a 50% chance of
A.N.W. in a 2 year period using a mean false alarm
resolution time of 2 minutes and 5 days of L.O.W.
policy per year - assuming the probability of an
unresolved false alarm being believed is 100%. If the
second detection point is 5 minutes, as for an SLBM
attack (Marsh, 1985), (minus 2 minutes sensor
processing time) thus providing insufficient time for
verification by a second family of sensors, and if the
probability of a false alarm being believed under such
circumstances is 75%, there is a 50% chance of
A.N.W. in a 3 year period.
Even lf MDCCEPT's are kept at a constant 150 per
year, there is a 50% chance of A.N.W. in a 3 year
period using the same �ssumptions.
Full-time Launeh-On-Warning Policy
If one country were to perceive itself to be vulner­
able to a totally disarming or unanswerable first strike
by the other country, it might put its military forces
on a continuous crisis alert. This can be simulated on
our computer model.
If both countrks were to establish a permanent
Launch-On-Warning Policy, there would be more than
a 50% chance of A.N.W. within 1 year (based upon 7
minute decision time, 2 minute mean false alarm
resolution time, and 100% probability of launching).
L-O-W Model Sensitivity
The model shows sensitivity to low "L-O-W
decision time" values: the number of years required
to obtain a 50% accidental nuclear war probability
for decision times ranging from 1 to lO.minutes. A
series of simulation runs, using the 32A% annual
MDCCEPT rate and 5 days of crisis per year, prod­
uced a curve which shows a 6 year period (50%
CPANW) (cumUlative probability of nuclear war) if
the decision time is 5 minutes, and an 18 year period
if the decisicHl"time is 9 minutes (probability of
an unresolved -false alarm being believed, is assumed
to be 100%). More dramatically, a series of
simulation runs using a fixed number of 150
MDCCEPT's per year and 5 days of crisis per year
produced a curve which shows a 5 year perioli (50%
CPANW) if the decision time is 4 minutes, but a 26
yea_ r
longer (6 minutes). Even more dramatic is the curve
produced when the second decision point was
involved.
Of course, these curves also illustrate the sensitiv­
ity of the model to the MDCCEPT rate.
Nuclear Arms Race Model:
We will now describe how the preceding L-O-W
equations have been incorporated into a simple
dynamic model of the nuclear arms race. We will also
�
'--'"
4
describe how probability estimates of other causes of
accidental and unintentional nuclear war have been
included in the nuclear arms race model.
Our nuclear arms race model was inspiricd by the
"Dynamics of Arms Race" system dynamics model
being developed at the Sloan School of Management,
M.I.T. (Kreutzer, 1985). Both models simulate an
arms race between countries "X" and "Y". The
M.LT. model has two nuclear arms variables for each
country ("Arms" and "Arms Under Development")
and about ten factors including "Average Life of
Anns", "Time to Authorize Arms" and "Time t o
Perceive Opposing Arms". By contrast our model has
four nuclear arms race variables for each country
("Missile Tests", "S trategic Window", "Strategic
Warheads", and "Tactical Warheads") plus one
common nuclear arms race level ("Members of
Nuclear Club"). But our model is much simpler and
does not include any delays for arms production. We
have only one factor (per arms race variable) that
controls the speed of the race, a "bias in estimating
opposing arms" factor. The factor could just as easily
be considered to be "desired margin of superiority".
The arms race variable "Members of Nuc1ear Club"
is calculated simply b y adding a fixed increment each
year.
[A description is given here of how the arms race
variables are calculated.]
The Launch-On-Warning equations are linked with
the nuclear arms race model by equating L-O-W
decision tjme to Strategic Window and by relating
MDCCEPTs to Missile Tests.
In addition to L-O-W accidental nuclear war
probabilities for countries "X" and "Y", the model
includes seven other accidental/unintentional nuclear
war probabilities. The seven probabilities are to be
"best guess" estimates chosen by each individual
using the model. The probabilities are tied to approp­
riate arms race variab'les. We have chosen to make the
relationships directly pIOportional, but the relation­
ship in some cases may be more complex.
The probability of an unauthorised nuclear deton­
ation (such as by a NATO field commander) for
country "X" is assumed to be proportional to the
number of tactical warheads for country "X". The
probability of an accidental nuclear detonation (such
as might occur in a plane crash) for country "'X" is
proportional to the total number of warheads for
country "X".
Because as more countries obtain nuclear weapons,
more individuals will have access to nuclear weapons,
the probability of a terrorist-initiated nuclear war is
assumed to be proportional to the number of members
of the nuclear club. Increased reliance upon nuclear
rather than conventional defences is assumed to
increase the likelehood of nuclear weapons being used
in a conflict. We assume the probability of uninten­
tional nuclear war caused by escalation of a conflict
involving country "X" to be proportional to the
ratio between "X"s total number of nuclear warheads
and "X"s conventional forces. An annual "Conven­
tional Forces Rale" for country "X" is the rate by
which "X"s conventional forces increase or decrease
each year.
[An example is given here of an equation illustrat­
ing how the base year probabilities are related to
the arms race vadabJes].
Base model v alues :
Base year values for the arms race v;niablcs can be
obtained from recent literature. The number or
"major" Soviet rocket launches, requiring scrutiny by
the US Early Warning systcm, is 400 for tlie base
year. The number of strategic warheads for the US is
14000. US tactical warheads is 11000. The number of
Soviet strategic warheads is roughly 11000,20000 (we
chose 15000). The number of Soviet tactical war,
heads is roughly 13000. (All preceding data from
Arkin, 1985). The current number of members of the
nuclear club is 9,11.
India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa are
assumed t o have built nuclear bombs. Argentina and
Taiwan soon will, if they haven't already. (Chant,
1983). For the base model, we have assumed that the
number of members of the nuclear club will increase
by 1 each year.
The "bias in estimating opposing arms" factors
drive the other nuclear arms race variables. For the
base modeL we have chosen 10% bias factors for both
countries, which drive a nuclear arms race similiar in
speed to the US-USSR nuclear stockpiles race
(Kreutzer, 1985). We have set the "Conventional
Forces Rate", the percent by which the conventional
forces increase or decrease each year, to 0 in the base
model.
As with the L-O-W model, we have llsed a base
year value of 150 for each country's MDCCEPT'.s.
NORAD will not release information about the
proportion of MDCCEPT's initiated by various events.
But although wc do not know the relative propor�
tions, we do know that MDCCEPT'.s have been
initiated by missile tests, space debris, and com­
puter malfunction (Babst et aI., 1984). For the
base model, we have arbitrarily assumed tha� two
thirds of the base year false alarms were initiated
by missile tests. Thus the "Missile Test Proportion"
is 25%. Having established the missile test and
related MDCCEPT parameters, we then ran the model
several times to determine a realistic "MDCCEPT
Rate". We assumed that the 1984 MDCCEPT drop to
the 1980 level of about 150 reflected a change in
criteria for convening MDCCEPT's. We thus choose
a MDCCEPT rate of 13% which resulted ill a very
close simulation of the actual MDCCEPT values for
the four years 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983. (The
base model missile test and MDCCEPT parameters
for country "X" have been used for country "Y"
also).
In the base model, we assume that dual phenom­
enology is not in force in a crisis.
Nuclear Arms Race Model Results:
Base Model Projections
A simulation run using the base model values
described above and 1 % for each of the "other"
accidental nuclear war (ANW) base year probab,
ilities, showed a 50% probability of accidental nuclear
war in a 5 year period. Simulation runs using base
year probabilities of 0.1 % or less all showed a 50%
probability of accidental nuclear war in a 6 year
period.
When the Strategic Window was not aIlowed to
decrease from 7 minutes simulation runs using
base year probabilities of 0.01% or less (for "other"
ANW causes) showed a 50% probability of accidental
Gr

nuclear war in a 16 year period. Using the same
parameters and a base year probability of 1%, the
results showed a 50% chance of accidental nuclear
war in a 7 year period.
Elimination of L-O-W Policy
The effect of both countries refusing to allow a de
facto L-O-W policy can be simulated by setting the
number of days of cdsis to O. We can thus analyse the
impact of the "other" causes of ANW:
Simulation runs using the ba�e model arms race
values showed a 50% probability of accidental nuc1ear
war in an 8 year period if the "other" base year AJ"\IW
probabilities were each I %, a 50% probability in a 26
year period if they were each 0.1%, and a 50%
probability in a 50 year period if they were each
0.01%.
If the "Conventiona1 Forces Rate" for both
countries is set to -0.10, indicating an annual decrease
of 10% of conventional forces, we can simulate the
effect of an increasing rcllance on "nuclear deterr­
ence". The results show a. 5CPIo probability of
accidental nuclear war in an 7 year period if the base
year ANW probabilities were each 1 %, a 50% prob·
abIlity in a 20 year period- if they were each 0.1%,
and a 50% probability in a 33 year period if they
were each 0.01%.
To illustrate the cumulative effect of low annual
probabilities, we made two simulation runs holding
the "'other" ANW probabilities at base year values.
The results show that even if there were a nuclear
weapons freeze, there would still be a likelihood that
accidental nuclear war would occur within decades.
With "other" ANW probabilities each held at 1% per
year, there was still a 50% chance of accidental
nuclear war in an 1 1 year period. Even with "other"
ANW probabilities each held at 0.1% per year, there
WaS a 50% chance or accidental nuclear war in a 99
year period.
Policy Proposals
Renounce Launch-Oil-Warning
Obviously the most effective policy to reduce the
danger of accidental nuclear war triggered by a "false
alarm" would be the renunciation of a Launch-On-J
Warnin g option. But in orde, for a government to
forswear Launch-On-Warning, it would have to be
convinced that it was capable of a retaliatory
"Second Strike" if it were victim of a "First StrL1<e"
attempt. "Second Strike" capability requires
command, control, and communication (C3) survival
as well as invulnerable retaliatory forces. Therefore,
two policies that would greatly decrease dependence
on an opponent upon L-O-W are ( I) refusal to target
the opponent's command and control centres and
(2) refusal to track the opponent's submarine force,
It is in the superpowers' mutual interest (prevent­
ing accidental nuclear war) to exchange technology
that would enhance C3 survivability and submadne
invulnerability.
Ban Certain Nuclear Weapon Deployments
The sensitivity of the L-O-W model to short L-O-W
decision times indicates the danger of any policy
which contributes to the decrease of another coun try's
Strategic Window. Concern about this danger has
5
prompted Computer People for the Prevention of
N oclear War (CPPNW) a New Zealand national
_ .
organization of computer professionals - to call for a
ban on nuclear weapon deploymcnts which cause
short L-O-W decision times. CPI'NW urges the USA
and the Soviet Union, and subsequently all other
nations possessing nuclear weapons, urgently to con­
clude a verifiable treaty banning the deployment of
any nuclear weapon system whose use would give less
than twenty minutes warning of first strike attack on
each other's l�omelands.
Unfortunately, in order for such a treaty to be
verified, US and USSR submarine forces would have
to be tracked a situation in apparent conflict with
�
the need [or "Second Strike" capability. One proposed
solution is the establishment of an internationally
monitored tracking system that would identify
submarine locations but with 'a half-hour delay.
Submarine locations could be verified but not
targeted.
Reduce Nuclear Arsenals 98%
The model results have demonstrated that even jf
L-O-W were HO longer a threat, low yearly probab­
ilities of accidental/unintentional nuclear war would
still produce a long term likelihood of nuclear war.
An unauthorized nuclear detonation, an accidental
nuclear detonation, a terrorist nuclear detonation, or
a nuclear escalation from a conventional conflict is
virtually inevitable. Only by severely reducing the
world's nuclear arsenals can accidenta.1 nuclear war
possibly be prevented. With invulnerable submarine
forces, the nuclear weapons arsenals of the super­
powers could be reduced to 2% of existing levels and
still prOVide a "nuclear deterrent".
No amount of international arms reduction can
prevent a terrorist nuclear detonation. But by
severely reducing the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, a
nuclear weapon detonation could at least be prevented
from triggering a global holocaust.
REFE RENCES
Aldrldge, R.e. (1985)
"Background Paper on the Probability of a United States
Launch-On-Warning Policy for Strategic Land-Based
Missiles", Pacific Life Research Center, Santa Clara,
California, 25 November,
Arkin, W.M" Fieldhouse, R.W. (1985)
Nuclear Battlefields. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company.
Babst, D,V., De1y, A., Krieger, D., andAldridge, R.e. (1984)
"Accidental Nuclear
Research Reviews, v. IX, No, 4-5, Dundas, Ontario: Peace
Research Institute,
Chant, C., Hogg, L (1983)
The Nuclear War File. London: Ebury Press.
Crissey, RL. (1984)
"Computer Predicts Dangers in Nuclear Launch..Qn­
Warning Policy", press release. 1 January. Normal,
Illinois: Illinois State University.
l'ord,D. (1985)
The Button, New York: Simon and Schustcr.
Kreutzer, D.P. (1985) . ,
A
"
Arms Race:;", draft. Cambridge: Stean School of Manage­
ment, Massachusetts Institute o f Technology.
Marsh, B. (1985)
"The Prekbility ofAccidental Nuclear War", study based
upon M.S. thesis, Monterrey, California; U.S. Naval Post­
graduate School.
Steinbrunne.r,J. (1984)
L
" aunch
No. 1 . 23-33.
Torrey, L. (1980)
"The computer that keeps 011 crying wolf", New Scientist,
26 June. 375-376. Editorial Footnote:
Wallacc, M.D. (1984) American technologic,tl optimisim is pervasive even in
A
" ccid.ental New Zealand. In a letter dated 17 Dee 1984 from our Exter­
presented to the Second World Congress o fAx.,ts and nal Intelligence Bureau, the Bureau stated "Wc believe,
Sciences, Erasmus Univ., Rotterdam, Netherlands. however that the danger of nuclear war between the super­
Wood, CA (1985) powers arising through computer error is remote ::md that
Letter from C.
A.W. (PetersonAir Force Base: NOA R D) with technological advances the risk is l'eccdiug".
to David C. Morrison, Center for Defense Information.
13 February.

MODEL EQUATIONS

x = country X, Y = country Yi see list of model variables for

definitions of acronyms

If YMT (prev. year) < (1 + YBEMT) x XMT (prev. year)

then YMT (l + YBEMT) x XMT (prev. year)

XMDC =- (YMT x XM'fP) + (XHDC{prev. y_ear) - YMT (prev. year) x XMTP)

x (1 + XMDCR)

If XSW (prev. year) > (1 - YBESW) x YSW (prev. year)

then XSW "" (1 - YBESW) x YSW (prev. year)

XDT = XSW

-(XDT -l)/(XM - 1)
XUDTM = e

XUDT = (XMDC) (XUDTM)

If XDT not > (XSD - 2) then XPL = (XUDT) (XPC) (XPLNVT)

If XDT > (XSD -2) then XPL =

(XUDT) (XPC) (XPLNV)

If XSWH (prev. year) < (1 XBESWH) + x YSWH (prev. year)

then XSWH =
(1 +, XBESlilH) x YSWH (prev. year)

If XTWH (prev, year) < (1 + XBETWH) x YTWH (prev. year)

then XTWH =
(1 + XBETWH) x YTWH (prev. year)

XPU "" XPU (base year) ). XTWH/XTWH (base year)

XPA = XPA (base year) x (XTWH + XSWH) / (XTWH(base year)

+ XSWH (base year)

XCFF = XCFF (prev. year) x XCFR

XPEC =- XPEC (base year) x [(XTVJH + XSWH) / XTWH (base year)

�XSWH(bnse year))] / XCFF
MNC = MNC (prev. year) + MNCR

PT = PT (base year) x MNC/MNC (base year)

PANW = 1 - (1 - XPL) (1 - YPL) (1 - XPU) (1 - YPU) (1 - XPA) (1 - YPA)

(1 XPEC) (1 - YPEC) (1 - PT)

CPANW = 1 - (1 - PANW) (1 - CPANW(prev _ year))

MODEL VARIABLES:
(PA!'.'WCumulative ProbabHity of Accidental XMT Mi"iie TeSls - Country "X"
Nuclear War XMTP Missile Tests Propor!ion for country "X"
MNC Member> of Nuclear C]Llb XPA Probability of Accidental Detonation -
MNCR Yearly Increase in Members of Nuclear Country "X"
Club XPC Probability of a Crisis occurring on a
PANW Probabil"ity of Accidental Nuclear War partkular day Country "X"
PT Probability of Terrorist Nuclear Detona­ XPEC Probabilitv of Nuclear Escalation [ram a
tion Conventional Conllict
XOEMT Bius in Estimating Missile Tem for country XPL ProbabilLy of J False Alarm triggered
"X" Launch -Country "X"
XI3ESW Bias in Estimating Strategic Window for XPLNV Probabi!j!\, 0[' a Llunch if there is No
country "X" Verification - Country "X"
XBES\VH Bias in Estimatmg Strategic Warheads for XPLl\'VT Probabilj�y of a Laundl jf there IS No
country "X" Verificatioll Time - "X"
XBEnVH Bias in Estimating Tactical Warheads for XI'U ProbabililY of Unauthorized Detonation -
country "X" Country -'X"
xc Crisis Days (Launch-On-Waming policy) - XSD Second' Detection Point (minutes) -
Country "X" Country "X"
XCFF COllventional Forces Factor -Country "X" XSW Strategic Window (minutes) - Country
XSFR Conventional Forces Rate - Country "X" "X"
XOT L-O-W Decision Time (minutes) -Country XSWH Strategic Warheads - Country "X"
"X" XTWB Tactical Warheads - Country "X"
;(,\1 Mean 'false alarm" resolution time XUDT MDCCEPTs Umesolved \vllhin Decision
(minutes) - Country "X" Time "- Country "X"
XMDC MDCCEPTs - Country "X" XUDTM Unresolved within Decision Time - Multi·
XMDCR MDCCEPT Rate for country "X" piier -� Country "X"
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WARNS OF
NUCLEAR WAR RISK
A paper titled "Accidental Nuclear War Dynamic
Model Equations", was presented at the conference
on Risk of Accidental Nuclear War held at the
University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada)
May 26-30, 1986. The Conference organizers invited
Barbara Leonard, of the New Zealand organization
Computer Peop1e for the Prevention of Nuclear War,
to present a paper based on the work she and Bill
Rosenberg have done linking accidental nuclear war
probability equations to arms race computer models.
All expenses were paid by the conference sponsors:
Canada's Department of External Affairs' Disarm·
ament Fund and the Canadian Institute for Inter­
national Peace and Security_
Barbara was one of twenty-one speakers at the
conference. Other speakers included Professor Daniel
Frei of the University of Zurich (author of Risks of
Unintentional Nuclear War), Professor lohan Neizing
of Free University of Brussels (author of several
works on nuclear weapons accidents), and Lieut­
enant-General Mikhail Milstein of the Soviet Union.
Participants included both natural and social scient­
ists, defence analysts, and computer professionals
engaged in research. Participants came from ten
different countries. At least two of the participants
received funding from their governments to attend
the conference: Bent Natvig of Norway and Sven
Hellman of the Swedish Department of Defence.
The conference programme was divided into fIve
day themes: (1) "Modelling, Political Analysis of
Variables", (2) "Data Processing: Demands and
Constraints", (3) "Command and Control Systems",
(4) "Danger of Accidental Nuclear War: Crisis Behav­
iour", and (5) "In tegrative Overview, Military Pers­
pective, Evaluation of Risk". Three papers were
presented on mathematical models. In addition to the
paper presented by Barbara Leonard, papers were
presented by Linn Scnno tt Professor of Mathematics
, equations to Oe the two models together. His paper
at Illinois State University, and by Brian Crissey,
Head of the Department of Computer Science at
Linfield College, Oregon.
Linn Sennott (the only other woman speaker)
presented two models of overlapping false alarms in
the ballistic missile warning system. The models afe
an attempt to quantify the gain in safety that results
if there is the requirement that an apparent incom­
ing missile attack must be verified by et second family
of sensors ("dual phenomenology") before retalia­
tory missiles are launched. Linn's results indicate
that, assuming a constant fah; alarm resolution time
of 3.5 minutes, if there weIe only 5 serious false
alarms per year in each of two families of sensors (ie
satellite and radar) it would take 12,000 years for a
dual phenomenology raIse a1arm event to occur. How­
ever if larger false alarm numbers are used, tIle lenglh
or time until a dual phenomenology false alarm event
occurs decreases dramatically. If there are 10 serious
false alarms per year in each sensor family the
length of time until such an event is 3,000 years. If
there are 50, 100, or 200 serious false alarms per year
in each sensor family the length of time until a dual
phenomenology false alarm event occurs is 120, 30 or
7.5 years respectively.
Briall Crissey demonstrated his recent "expected
lifetime of the planet" model on his own Apple
Macintosh computer using parameters specified by
various members of the audknce. He also presented a
history of the use of analytical and computer-based
models which evaluate the dangers of accidental
nuclear war. Brian is the leading pioneer in this field.
He has produced many papers over the last three
years (some of them with Linn Sennott) in which he
has explored the probability of accidental nuclear war
resulting from a Launch-On-Warning strategy.
The pape, which Brian Crissey had intended to
present at the conference focusses on the work by
Barbara and Bill which was published recently in
"The Nuclear Time Bomb" (Babst et al., 1986).
Brian duplicated the "Dynamics of Arms Race"
model developed at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Kreutzer, 1985) and augmented it
with the "Leonard-Rosenberg equations" as
proposed in "The Nuclear TIme Bomb". Brian's
synthesis involved the development of additional
THE 'wt:f(LD HAS
TEM\DRARILY LOST
iTS SANITY
PLEASE 5TAt-.lD BY
includes several graphs showing the results of a
simulation run of the resulting composite "Acciden­
tal Nuclear Warl Arms Race Model" (ANWARl\1).
Unfortunately when Brian was preparing his talk, he
was not aware that Barbara was going to attend the
conference. He decided at the conference that the
ANWARM description would be too similiar to
Barbara's presentation and dropped it from his talk.
Copies of the complete paper were available to the
participants however.
Henry Thompson, head of the Artifical Intelli­
gence Programme at the University of Edinburgh,
Sevcro Ornstein, President of Computer Profess­
ionals for Social Responsibility, and Joseph Weizen­
baum, Professor of Computer Science at M.I.T., gave
talks on the inherent unreliability of computers.
Marcus Carmailli of M.I.T. and BWL:t: BIalr of the
Brookings Institution gave talks on Command and
Control Systems. Marcus Carmailla, an Italian,
discussed NATO Command and Control from a
European perspective.
Bruce Blair, former member of the U.S. Depart­
ment of Defensc Task Force on Nuclear Command
and Control, presented a chilling picture of the lack
of central control over nuclear force operations
during a crisis. "The detail requi�ed is simply too
great to be handled centrally without substantial
v,r
8
deJegation of authority over force operations down
through the chain of command. As a crisis widens and
deepens only the most critical alert items would be
put on the agenda for consjderation by national
political leaders." Alert authority extends down to
the lowest echelon in the chain of nuclcu command.
"Individual weapon commanders have the independ­
ent authority to take steps NORMALLY not taken
until the formal declaration of the highest level of
dcfcnsc condition,"
Bruce Blair observes that both the V.S. and
U.S.S.R. have low conHdence in their ability to
absorb an attack before retaliating and therefore both
have a de facto Launch-On-Warning strategy as their
principal strategic option. He sees a real danger of
accidelltal nuclear war resulting from the very rapid
transition from "negative con trol" (to avoid
accidental launch) to "positive control" (to insure
intentional launch) required by Launch-On-Warning.
He said that too much has to happen too quickly for
anyone to believe that there is not a significant risk
of someone making a mistake that would trigger a
nuclear conDid. He proposes that 'both countries
concentrate upon improving the survivability of
forces and command systems rather than being pre­
occupied with getting forces ready to Hre jn a crisis.
He suggests that nuclear forces should be deliberately
constrained so that they can NOT respond quickiy.
He mentioned several novel ideas including placing all
nuclear submarine forces in "sanctuaries" far from
their targets (to increase warning time) and piling
tonnes of gravel on top of missile silos so they can
not be launched on warning.
One other paper was particularly n)teworthy:
"Accidental Nuclear War: The Human Element" by
Lloyd Dumas a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Control Steering Committee of the American
Association [or the Advancement of Science. Lloyd
Dumas presented a compelling picture of "drug
abuse, mental illness and aberr311t behavior observed
year after year, in thousands of V.S. military person­
nel with access to or control over weapons of mass
destruction". He sees no reason to believe that the
situation jn the Soviet military is significantly better.
Other factors affecting human reliability in military
systems are stress, boredom and isolation, factors
which are particularly prevalent in the nuclear forces.
"Spending endless hours interacting with electronic
consoles, repeating essentially the same lengthy and
detailed routine over and over, sitting silently in a
missile silo hour after hour, 0, sailing for months in a
submerged submarine, purposely isolated from most
of humanity, yet constantly poised to destroy it on a
moment's notice - this is the stuff of life in the
strategic forces".
Lioyd Dumas finished by saying "We have created
a world in which perfection is required if a disaster
beyond history is to be permanently avoided. But in
our world, the world of human beings, perfection is
unacWevable." "If we cannot escape from our
fallibility - and we cannot - then we must exercise
the wisdom and instinct for survival that are also
fundamental parts of our humanHy. It is time to
recognize that the only effective military strategy for
increasing national security is general nuclear disarrna�
mcnt."
Two themes emerged from the conference. One
was than an accidental nuclear war is not at all likely
to occur durjng peacetime, but that during an intense
cdsis between nuclear superpowers �
such as the
Cuban missile crisis - accidental nuclear war is a very
real possibility. The other theme concerned the risk
of nuclear war. Risk of a particular event occut-ring is
the product of its probability of occurring and a
quantitative expression of loss due to its occurring.
Therefore, even if the probability of accidental
nuclear war is very low, the risk is essentially infinitely
great because the loss rrom a nuciear war would be
infinitely horrible.
The conference concluded with the participants
drafting a statement that". . the danger of accid­
ental nuclear war is substantial and increasing for the
following reasons among others:
1. Deteriorating global political relations coupled
with the lack of real progress in disarmament and
arms control, and the high frequency of inter­
national crises;
2. Escalation of the arms race leading to the devel­
opment and deployment of destabilizing weapons
systems amI tedlIlologie.s;
3. Increasingly complex and unmanageable command
and control systems with reduced warning tjmes
demanding decisjons and actions on a time scale
exceedjng human capabHiUes;
4. Increasing reliance on automated decision-making
systems leading to a greater likelihood of catas­
trophic error.
Measures must be taken t o halt this continuing
drift towards unparalleled catastrophe. The forth­
coming conference report will include detailed
proposals for reducing the risk but cautions that
purely technological measures will not eliminate the
risk. "
Footnote: An article on the conference appeared in
the 5 June, 1986 issue of New Scientist (p.21).
New Scientist 5 June 1985
Hush-up on accidental war
I MERICAN researchers are being
A denied information that allows them
to construct computer models of the like­
lihood of a nuclear war breaking out by
mistake. The information involves the
annual'rate of false alarms of enemy
missiles heading for North America. Data
were supplied under the US's Freedom of
InformatIOn Act by NORAD, the North
American Aerospace Defense command in
Colorado.
But a conference in Vancouver last week
on the risk of accidental nuclear war heard
that the supply of information had
suddenly dried up.
"Our models are increasingly out of
date," said Brian Crissey, head of the
Department of Computer Science at
Linfield College in Oregon. "It seems that
the defence department does not. want
researchers to point out how close an acci­
dental nuclear war could be." Crissey
claims NORAD was "embarrassed" by the
increasing rate at which false alarms
Gr

happened,
Under NORAD's system of classi­
fication, the Department of Defense has
admitted only six "false alarms" between
1977 and 1984, On four of these occasions,
the US's strategic nuclear forces were
placed on alert in response to erroneous
information. In one case, a computer simu�
la1ion of a nuclear attack was treated as the
real thing until the mistake was discovered
after six minutes. The alerts occurred as
a result of so-called "threat-assessment
conferences", At least six of these have
been held,
NORAD claims that no alerts of US
nuclear forces in response to a false alarm
have occurred since 1980. Some research­
ers doubt this. Rumours of more recent full
scale alerts exist, but have never been
confirmed, Crissey says.
The researchers also label as false alarms
an earlier stage of the alert system called
"missile display conferences". Between
1977 and 1984, 1 152 of these took piace,
There was a sudden 40 per cent dip from
255 to 153 between 1983 and 1984,
NORAD has been accused of changing the
criteria for these conferences to reduce their
number deliberately. The average annual
increase in such conferences was 20 per
cent.
Crissey calculates that 285 missile
display conferences will take place this
year. Typically, the alarms are explained by
natural phenomena such as meteorites or
·by such things as rocket boosters and
missile tests. Glitches in software are
believed to be another cause. Critics say
that the time to respond to these alarms is
becoming so short that the chance of error
is unacceptably high.
Information from NORAD was being
sent to the Cent er for Defense Information
in Washington, which distributed it to
researchers. More data were expected from
NORAD for 1985, but never turned up,
The centre has been told that NORAD no
longer considers itself a US agency and
therefore it does not have to abide by the
Freedom of Information Act. This is
because Canada is part of the NORAD
system ...It took them a while to work out
a strategy for not supplying the informa�
tion," Crissey said.
Last week's conference heard that acci­
dental nuciear war could be perilously close
unless drastic changes were made in
nuclear arsenals. Martin Hel1man, an
,expert in cryptography and probability
theory from Stanford, said the world is
playing "'nuclear roulette" and war is inevi­
table, A retired Soviet general, Michael
Milstein, now with the Institute of US and
Canada Studies in Moscow, agreed. "We
must lid the world of nuclear weapons,"
9
General Milstein said. "It is the only way to
save humanity. There is no security of one
country any more. The world is now inter­
dependent." But participants accused
Milstein of being short on details of
procedures in the USSR.
Other speakers were less apocalyptic.
Bruce Blair, a former member of the US
Department of Defense's task force on
nuclear command and control, said the
chance of accidental nuclear war was negli­
gible in peacetime-because of built-in
safeguards. But during a crisis, the safe­
guards would be removed. The current
need to respond within minutes could lead
to a catastrophic mistake.
Blair, now at the Brookings Institution,
believes that the US should strengthen its
command and control system so that it
could survive an attack. If the US was
confident this could be done, it need not
rely on the «hair trigger" strategy which
adds to the risk of an accident.
"Speed is not an imperative but a dogma
of nuclear strategy and is not only dan­
gerous but unnecessary," Blair said.
"Deterrence does not depend on the ability
to strike quickly, but on the survivability of
forces and command systems.11 It means
that the country under attack could still
strike a devastating blow.
Computers were tenned the "'most
misunderstood artifact ever produced" and
capabie of causing an accidental war if
poorly programmed. By coincidence, i n
Washington last week, a respected
computer consultant, James J. Horning,
said that computers could never be trusted
to run the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Computer scientists in Vancouver viewed
Homing's remarks as being the start of a
campaign to show that David Pamus, a
Canadian computer expert who caused a
furore last year when he resigned from the
panel advising the Pentagon on "'star wars",
had support from other prominent people
in the field, "It's time for people to stand up
and be counted," one computer scientist
said.
Drug and alcohol problems among
people working for the US nuclear forces
were another cause for concern, according
to Lloyd Dumas from the University of
Texas, Dumas said that about two-thirds of
the 5000 people who were removed each
year from the military's nuclear workforce
sutTered from psychological. alcohol or
drug problems, General Milstein denied
that there 'were any similar drug and alco­
hol problems among Soviet strategic
nuclear forces.
Duhlas said this is hard to believe. Drug
abuse had risen among the Soviet military
following the drawn out conflict in
Afghanistan, he said, 0
 TIME ZERO TO GROUND ZERO
By Dean Babst and Clifford Johnson

NO DECISION TIME
The earth's fate rests on nuclear hair triggers, and the public is little aware of it. Due to the
Soviet Union's submarines off of the United States coast, the U.S. has only about six minutes
attack warning time. ( 1 ) Since it usually takes the U.S. six minutes to make a complete "attack
assessment"(2), no time is left for deciding the world's fate in an emergency. Similarly, with
the U.S. Pershing 2 missiles in Europe, the United States is allowing the Soviet Union li11le or no
decision time. (3)
We all know what ground zero is in relation to nuclear weapons. We must now confront not
only the potential devastation of ground zero, but also the fact that we have reached t i m e zero
- a situation i n which decision-makers have no effective decision time to evaluate whether or
not they are u ndamuclear attack. Needless to say, this situation is fraug ht with danger because
it does not allow nations sufficient time to handle crises. Consider the following emergencies.
I , How would leaders limit a nuclear war that breaks out between small n ucl ear
nations If nuclear mlssUes land on U.S. or Soviet Union positions and there Is no
time for determining the source of the missiles? For instance, what if a nuclear war
unexpectedly erupts between Pakistan and India, how will it be contained if there is no time to
discuss what is happening? (4) The U.S. Congressional Research Service reports that many
Tnird Wortd nations ars attempting to build nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles as an offshoot of
space technology provided by the superpowers. Nations reported with nuclear research
programs are Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea, North
Korea, Brazil and Argentina (5)
2. How are lead..rs to determine the source of an unreliable nuclesr rocket that
detonates? This year, one test nuclear missile landed 1 ,500 miles off course. (6)
Fortunately, it did not explode.
3, What would leaders do If there Is a false alarm that lasts longer than six
minutes? The United States' warning system has to decide about three times a weak that the
Soviet Union has nol launched a nuclear attack. (7) When more decision time was available, the
U.S. had one false alarm that lasted six minutes. (8)
4. How would leaders determine the source of an unexpected nuctear explosion
by terrorists or revolutionaries with no aSS6Ssment time? As knowledge and
materials for making nuclear bombs grows, the danger of an unexpected explosion increases.(9)
5. How a .... leaders 10 determine that a satelllle blinded by space j u nk Is nol a
prelude to a n attack with no time for an assessmant?(1 0) In 1 983, a window of the
Soviet Salyul 7 space station was struck and crate red, but fortunately not blinded. Also in
1 983, an Indian communication satellite was struck by an eight-inch space object (1 1 )
6. How would other nuclear powers ( Eng land, France and China) handle
emergencies? They are probably operating with no decision time. Their capitals can
probably be hit faster than they can process warnings. How many times a waek do theirs and tha
Soviats Union's computers and sensors have to decide they are not being attacked? How long does
it take them to clear false alarms?
7. How could nations use the hotllna and crisis control canters If there Is no
time to talk? Nuclear missiles could 00 launched "'!jthcyt ::In iatpmationa! crisis er pub tic
warning. Despite space shuttle Challenger and Chernobyl trgedias, will we continue to wait
before acting? Then it could be too late. If any nation launches to a mistake it could trigger a
nuclear war. With no decision time the frequently practiced civil defense radio alerts are
meaningless and misleading.
Due to little or no decision tima, the United States has developed a launch on warn ing
pcsition. (12) The Soviet Union and other nuclaar powers probably have developed launch on
warning positions. The danger of such positions are that computers could cause the launch of
mi ssiles 10 a false alarm with og meaningful human joteryenljoo.
 ., .,
! 1

NUCLEAR HAiR TRIGGER THINK TANK

A coordinating group has been meeting to consider ways to increase public awareness of short
decision time dangers through tha press, movies and TV. Many of the concerns presented in this paper
ware raised in thsss meetings.

Nuclear A!!e Peace Foundation

�

1187 Coast Village Road #123

San.ta Barbara, CA 93108

December 1 986

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N u clear Free Kiwis are actively p u rsuing research and publi ci t y on the threat
of destabilisation of our N u clear-Free govern m e n t . We offer a kit of writings
from our group and other sources on the actions and tactics of the "nuclear
righ t" � including the United S tates I n formation Service and right wing
groups in New Zealan d .
S e n d y o u r name and address and $5 p e r k i t t o cover costs t o :
. N u clear Free Kiwis
P . O . Box 2
Lin coln College
Canterb ury

DIG IN YOUR TOES, NEW ZEALANDERS

preserve our nuclear free zone

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KEEP NEW ZEALAND ON A NUCLEAR FREE COU RSE