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would be shut down. Small powers which get nuclear weapons actually
buy into their own deterrence. Memory of the Holocaust is neutralised by
its constant repetition on television.
While this shuts down resistance, it also makes the systems power
unusable. Power becomes frozen and self-deterred. It creates a protective
zone of maximum security which radiates through the territory held by
the system. It is a kind of glacis, a zone where any assailant is constantly
under fire from the systems defenders.
In a simulated world, events are prevented because no social logic or
story can be deployed according to its own logic. A social force risks
annihilation if it tries this. This leads to an evacuation of any historical
stake from society. We are now living through the death pangs of strong
referentials, including of the sense of being in the march of history or in
hope/at risk of a pending revolution.
It might actually be better to think of it as incapacitation rather than
deterrence. People become unable or afraid to act because the capacity to
fight and win has been taken away. This means that everything is
neutralised, and reinscribed in the system. This absolute model of
security is according to Baudrillard elaborated from nuclear war. The
nuclear battle station is the point from which the model of deterrence
radiates out through social life.
Deterrence is directed against a range of phenomena such as complexity,
finality, contradiction, accident, rupture, chance, and transversality. Yet
paradoxically, events continue to happen at ground level, below the level
of data-control. Misfortunes and personal crises multiply. The social
becomes organised like a disaster-movie script, with constant struggles to
survive, states of exception, discourses of risk-avoidance and riskmanagement a situation of everyday precarity. The function of
deterrence is not to prevent this permanent crisis. It is rather to prevent it
from having system-level effects.
Phenomena such as the Gulf War, Watergate, and other political/media
events are treated by Baudrillard as instances of deterrence. They are
based on a simulation of a situation where the old stakes still matter,
keeping old antagonisms and lost phenomena artificially alive as
simulacra. They thus exude operational negativity preventing the
emergence of real antagonisms.
Non-war in the Gulf
The theory of deterrence is exemplified in Baudrillards analysis of what
happened in 1991, when according to him, the Gulf War did not take
place. What took place, instead, was a non-war. This is a type of conflict
specific to the third order of simulation.
A non-war is a simulated war. It reproduces exactly the elements of a real
war, down to its destruction, death, propaganda, and so on. But it is not a
situation which arises between adversaries, which is a real, unpredictable
event. A true war is a strategic conflict over an absent centre of power
which no-one can occupy. Both sides believe in a cause; the outcome is
unpredictable. This is why a non-war is not a true war.
Real power, according to Baudrillard, is a strategy, a relation of force, and
a stake. It is subject to death and the symbolic. On the other hand, power
exercised to conceal its own absence is no longer subject to death and the
symbolic. It can persist indefinitely, as an object of consumer demand.
For Baudrillard, war is pointless and impossible to wage in the nuclear
era. There is no proportion between means (total annihilation) and ends
(strategic objectives). Hence, the scene of war the scenario of total
conflict to the death, or of adversity over stakes between combatants
will never again take place. War becomes impossible to exchange; it
escapes symbolic exchange. The distillation of war in everyday fear
prevents the final apocalyptic clash. Arguably, non-war is to war as
hyperreality is to reality.
A non-war is a simulation in the sense of derivation from a prior
model. Western powers fight non-wars based on models, and go to war
based on models. The non-war, at least on the western side, is an
operational unfolding of models and signs already planned in
advance. The symbolic dimension, the exchange with the enemy, the
reversibility of actions, are absent.
This is why, for Baudrillard, it is not a war, even though all the other
characteristics of war are very much present. He emphasises repeatedly
that non-war is still as deadly as war ever was. What it has lost is the
adversity of the adversaries, the ideological seriousness of a war
between two counterposed possibilities, the reality of victory or defeat as
systemic changes.
For Baudrillard, western non-wars are now simulations in that there isnt
really a fight to the death between two adversaries. Rather, the purpose
of western power, and usually of both adversaries, is to prevent the
liquidation of the systems deterrence. This requires the destruction of
symbolic exchange, and hence of pre-capitalist societies and groups.
Non-war is missing the symbolic dimension a true war might have the
possibility of reversibility, or conflictual dialogue with an enemy so to
speak. Contact between America and Iraq did not happen during the Gulf
War. America can only imagine an adversary in their own image. They are
invulnerable to symbolic violence, due to their pragmatism and
masochism.
America has been caught in a spiral of unconditional repression by the
aspiration to be a global police force. They try to humiliate by defeating
the enemy impersonally nothing personal and avoid seeing or
meeting the adversary. They seek to show the infallibility of their machine,
displaying signs of relentlessness. They seek to avoid any reaction or
living impulse.
In electronic war, the enemy no longer exists there is only refractory
data to be neutralised and brought into the consensus. Non-war entails
non-recognition of the enemy as such, with precision and abstract
operations displacing direct conflict. On the American side, it is like safe
sex war with a condom on. But on the other hand, America cannot
imagine the other and therefore seeks to annihilate whatever cannot be
converted to the American way of life.
Meanwhile, the TV audience are also deterred, and experience voyeurism
and repentance over the fate of hostages. They consent to be gently
terrorised, but never lose their underlying indifference. Yet even this
minimal participation is enough to rescue war and politics, for now.
America played the Gulf War as a game of deterrence. They refused to
bargain. Saddam, in contrast, played it as a symbolic game of ruses,
bargains, trickery and disguise. As a result, both missed their target. They
fought in two different times and spaces. The enemy was
foreclosed. There was not enough communication for deterrence or war to
be effective.
Non-wars are not, however, directed primarily at rival nation-states. They
are primarily waged to domesticate or liquidate grassroots movements
and symbolic challenges which restore the dimensions of the real and the
event which the system fears. Non-war is waged to absorb and reduce
what is singular and irreducible. The Gulf War, Baudrillard suggests, was
aimed at the Islamic world. The French colonial war in Algeria was aimed
at the revolutionary movement. The Vietnam War was aimed at guerilla
revolt.
Baudrillards reading of Vietnam (which could equally apply to Iraq and
Afghanistan) is that the real goal was to make the enemy predictable. This
is why the American defeat did not destroy American global power. Each
war ended as the revolutionary impulse was tamed or
bureaucratised. Non-wars are usually won or lost by which regime comes
under threat from its own population first. Sometimes, they are lost
because an accident, an event, or a loss of power to the other, breaks the
machine of war and its appearance of infallibility as in Somalia