Philos Stud (2016) 173:25912604

DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0670-y

An anti-realist account of the application

of mathematics
Otavio Bueno1

Published online: 8 April 2016

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of

mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In
this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully
accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism
provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist
account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to
accommodate these features of the application process. In this way, a better account
of mathematical applications is, in principle, available.
Keywords Application of mathematics
Representation
Inference,
Realism

Anti-realism
Nominalism
Platonism

1 Introduction
Platonism, or a robust ontologically committing form of realism about mathematics,
involves three basic claims: (a) Mathematical objects (such as sets, functions, and
numbers) exist. (b) These objects are abstract, in the sense that they are causally
isolated and they are not located in spacetime. And (c) the theories that describe
such objectsmathematical theoriesare taken to be true (they express true claims

& Otavio Bueno

otaviobueno@mac.com
1

Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA

123

2592

O. Bueno

about mathematics objects and their relations), and their terms refer.1 One of the
main (alleged) reasons for platonism emerges from the indispensable need for
quantifying over mathematical objects in the formulation of our best theories of the
world. Given that reference to mathematical objects is indispensable to such
theories, and since the latter cannot be rewritten without quantification over these
objects, the commitment to the existence of mathematical entities cannot be avoided
(Quine 1960; Putnam 1971; Colyvan 2001).
Mathematical notions seem to play three basic roles in the application of
mathematics. (1) They play an inferential role in that mathematical principles
provide additional models (or, syntactically, additional premises) in terms of which
inferences can be carried out. For instance, one of the most significant uses of group
theory in quantum mechanics came at the applied level, helping to obtain certain
solutions to Schrodingers equation, and thus allowing inferences from that equation
to be obtained (Wigner 1931). (2) Mathematical notions also play a representational
role, given that mathematical structures are used to represent features of the physical
world, not only by providing objects and relations that may be associated with
aspects of the latter, but also by providing various mappings that provide different
types of relations between mathematical posits and the world. (Such relations
include, e.g., various kinds of isomorphism and homomorphism.) The representational role is found, for example, in von Neumanns use of Hilbert spaces to represent
certain states of quantum systems (von Neumann 1932). (3) Finally, mathematical
notions play an expressive role, given that they can be used to express certain
relations among physical objects. For instance, Weyls characterization of the nature
of quantum particles in terms of certain sets of invariants illustrates one expressive
role of group-theoretic notions in the foundation of quantum mechanics (Weyl 1931).
There are, of course, close connections between these three uses of mathematics.
Often, the expressive role is achieved by invoking a particular representation of certain
mathematical structures. But, still, these roles are distinct, since certain representations are established without the aim of expressing connections among physical
entities, but are introduced, in some cases, to make certain inferences possible.
Consider, for instance, the use of maximization techniques in economics. One need not
take economic agents to be attempting literally to maximize their profits or their
budgets all the time. The maximization offers a regulative norm, which need not
express what is going on at the actual economic setting, but which allows economists
to draw inferences based on what is admittedly a very idealized representation.
In other words, the distinction between these three rolesin particular, between
the expressive and the representational rolesis not sharp. But, despite the lack of
sharpness, there is still a distinction to be drawn. It is a distinction of a pragmatic
sort. The representational role invokes mathematics as a proxy for certain nonmathematical objects. The expressive role invokes mathematics as a means of
1

Of course, mathematical theories also need to meet additional constraints, such as being informative
and mathematically tractable. A true but uninformative mathematical theory wont be of much use.
Similarly, a mathematical theory that is so computationally intractable that hardly any results can be
derived from it will not offer significant gainseven if it were true. But these constraints may be taken to
be mostly pragmatic.

123

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

2593

expressing certain claims about the world. This is a form of representation, of

course, and in this sense the representational role is more basic.2 But it is still
important to highlight the expressive role. Consider, for example, the notion of a
field. This is a mathematical notion, which drops out very naturally from the
mathematical formalism, but which (suitably interpreted) is used to denote a
physical object. In this way, having the mathematics of fields allows us to assert
things about the physical world that we could not express otherwise.
Moreover, we may be interested in representing mathematically certain physical
situations, but without taking the point of that representation to be the expression of
certain claims about the physical system in question (even though we might be able
to make such claims). For example, we can represent the degrees of belief of an
epistemic agent in terms of the continuum, given the inferential power this
representation provides, without thereby aiming to express literally claims about the
agent in terms of the mathematical model. No human agent literally has such finegrained beliefs.
In this paper, I defend two claims. First, despite what has often been alleged,
platonists do not fully accommodate these three features of the application of
mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling these issues.
Second, I develop an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of
mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features
of the application process. In this way, a way of undermining the indispensability of
mathematics is provided, one in which although mathematical theories are taken to
be indispensable to a variety of applications in the sciences, their truth plays no role
whatsoever.
The resulting account is thus different from three of the main anti-realist views in
the philosophy of mathematics. As opposed to Hartry Fields mathematical
fictionalism (1980, 1989), it is granted that mathematics is indeed indispensable, but
in contrast with Geoffrey Hellmans modal structuralism (1989, 1996) and Jody
Azzounis deflationary nominalism (2004), mathematical theories are not taken to
be true. For the modal structuralist, mathematical theories come out true in a modalstructural reformulation, which does not require the existence of mathematical
objects, but only the possibility of certain structures. For the deflationary nominalist,
mathematical theories are true, but given the adoption of an ontologically neutral
reading of the quantifiers, the truth of mathematical statements does not require the
existence of mathematical objects. (A critical evaluation of these three nominalist
views can be found in Bueno 2013.)
On the view favored here, truth is just irrelevant for the application of
mathematics. As a result, the view does not depend on the introduction of modal
operators to reformulate mathematical theories (as does the modal-structural

In some cases, the representational and the expressive roles can, of course, overlap. For example, when
we measure the temperature of a gas under pressure, we seem to be representing the temperature by using
certain numbers as a proxy for a physical property. But we also seem to be expressing a claim about the
temperature of the gas. (Thanks to Russell Marcus for raising this point.) What is important here is the
function played by each usage: we establish a certain mathematical representation in order to express a
particular claim about the temperature of the gas.

123

2594

O. Bueno

approach), since applied mathematical statements are not taken to be true. Nor is the
proposed anti-realist view committed to the nonstandard interpretation of mathematical statements recommended by the deflationary nominalist, according to
which, for instance, it is true that there are twice differentiable functions that are
solutions to a wave equation, even though functions do not exist. After all, truth is
not the relevant norm of assessment of applied mathematics. And since mathematical theories are typically taken to be indispensable to applications in the sciences,
the anti-realist view advanced here is not committed to the reformulation of
scientific theories without invoking mathematicsa crucial feature of Fields
mathematical fictionalism.

2 Problems for platonism in applied mathematics

2.1 The inferential role of mathematics
Let us start by considering the inferential role of mathematics. Prima facie,
platonists should be able to accommodate this aspect of applied mathematics
without difficulty. After all, for platonists mathematical theories are (taken to be)
true, and so they can be easily added as premises in an argument involving other
premises, such as those describing physical features of the phenomena. In this way,
accommodating the inferential role of mathematical theories, at least in this form,
should be unproblematic.
But there are three difficulties here. First, to accommodate fully the inferential
role of mathematics, we will also need to accommodate mixed statements,
statements connecting mathematical and physical statements. These statements
would also need to be (taken to be) true. This need not be a problem for platonists,
as long as they are also scientific realists, or are in a position to assert that scientific
theories, and related claims about the physical world, are true. This is, however, a
significant restriction, given the difficulties associated with asserting the truth of
such theories in the presence of idealizations, simplifications, and other known
approximations inherent in scientific theorizing and modeling. If we are not in a
position to assert the truth of the scientific theories themselves, we will not be able
to assert the truth of the conjunction of such theories and the relevant mathematical
theories.
Of course, it might be objected that, in many casesparticularly in mathematical
physicsthe formulation and expression of scientific theories already requires the
use of mathematics. It is not a simple matter of adding mathematical principles to an
already formulated theory about the physical world. The formulation of the theories
themselves demands mathematics.
This response correctly highlights the fact that the application of mathematics is
no simple business. And it certainly is not just a matter of adding mathematical
statements to a non-mathematical body of statements, given that the language that is
used to express some scientific theories already presupposes some mathematics. But
this means that the original objection is still harder to meet. How can we reconcile
the truth of mathematics with the partial truth of most scientific theories?

123

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

2595

This brings us to the second difficulty, which is a consequence of the first. For
platonists to make full sense of the inferential role of mathematics, they need to be
able to know (or, at least, assert) that both mathematical and mixed statements are
true. What are the grounds for that knowledge (or that assertion)? Note that for
platonists to accommodate fully the inferential role, it is not sufficient to have true
mathematical statements at ones disposal. One needs to know (or be in a position to
assert) that such statements are true, so that we can then infer statements about the
physical world from the relevant mathematical and mixed statements. But, in this
case, some ground needs to be provided for the knowledge (or for the assertibility
conditions) that we are expected to have of such mathematical and mixed
statements. If these grounds are not provided, the platonist would offer, at best, a
conditional account of the inferential role: (*) If mathematical (and mixed)
statements are true, then the role such statements play in applied mathematics can
be accommodated. But unless we are in a position to know (or assert) which
mathematical (and mixed) statements are true, we will not be in a position to infer
the consequent of the conditional (*) above.
It is unclear, however, that platonists are in a position to assert that both
mathematical and applied statements are true. After all, since idealizations and
simplifications cannot be taken to be true, they cannot be made compatible with the
assertion that mathematical theories are true. Thus, it is not clear that platonists are
able to accommodate fully the inferential role of mathematics.
The third difficult emerges at this point. Let us grant that we can devise a strategy
to assert that idealizations and simplifications in scientific practice are true. This
would still leave the platonist proposal in trouble. After all, it is not sufficient for
platonists to assert that any conjunction of mathematical and physical statements is
true. They need to know which mathematical statements are relevant to the
particular application so that the statements can be used in true mixed statements.
To accommodate the inferential role of mathematics, it is not enough simply to
make any odd conjunction of mathematical and physical statements. We need to
accommodate the relevant onesnamely those that emerge in the context of
scientific practice.
However, there seems to be a tension here. Platonists presuppose the existence of
mathematical objects. But to accommodate the inferential role of mathematics the
existence of these objects is not required at all. In fact, to draw conclusions from
mathematical statements no commitment to mathematical objects has to be in place.
After all, to establish the relevant inferences, all that is needed is to establish
relations of logical consequence between the statements in question. No platonist
ontology is needed for that.
It may be objected that the tension I am pointing out cannot be right. After all,
even the notion of consequence, as traditionally formulated in terms of the modeltheoretic account, presupposes platonism. We say that A is a consequence of B if
every model of B (that is, every interpretation in which B is true) is also a model of
A. Clearly these models are abstract objects. Thus, even the statement of the notion
of inference, according to the model-theoretic account, seems to require platonism.
Hence, rather than being in some conflict with the platonist picture, the inferential
role of mathematics seems to support this view.

123

2596

O. Bueno

In response, note first that the model-theoretic account of consequence, despite its
widespread use, is of course not the only account available. There is also the modal
account: A is a consequence of B if it is necessary that: if A, then B; here the notion of
necessity is defined in terms of a primitive notion of logical possibility. Clearly, no
reference to mathematical objects is required by this account. (I will return to the modal
conception below.)
Second, independently of the concerns surrounding platonism, the model-theoretic
account of consequence faces a serious limitation. It does not apply to classical set
theory, in particular to a set theory such as ZermeloFraenkel with the axiom of choice
(ZFC). After all, to use the model-theoretic account, first a domain of interpretation
needs to be in place. The domain is typically a set, and in this case it needs to include all
sets, since these are the objects that comprise the relevant domain. Thus, a set of all sets
seems to be needed. However, no such set exists in a classical set theory (presumed
consistent), and hence there is no suitable domain of interpretation for the modeltheoretical account to get off the ground (see Field 1989).
Suppose this difficulty is circumvented by the introduction of larger totalities that
are not sets as the domain of interpretation. In this case, the consistency of the
resulting set theory still remains an issue. Moreover, in invoking the model-theoretic
concept of logical consequence, one needs to be able to consider the interpretations
in which every axiom of the theory is true in order to determine whether a given
statement is true as well (or not). But how can the truth of all the theorys axioms be
properly assessed while the consistency of the theory is still open?
Now, set theory plays a significant role in contemporary mathematics, and it is widely
used in applications to the sciences. If the model-theoretic account of consequence does
not apply to this theory, platonists cannot argue that this account supports their attempt to
accommodate the inferential role of mathematics. In fact, the limitation of the modeltheoretic account suggests a significant limitation to platonist attempts to accommodate
the inferential role. In the end, this role is in tension with the model-theoretic approach to
logical consequence: given that the abstract object that is required by the model-theoretic
account (namely, the set of all sets) does not exist if classical set theories are consistent, it
is unclear how the platonist can make sense of the inferential role in general.
In other words, the platonists attempt to accommodate model-theoretically the
consequence relation requires the existence of an object that cannot exist as long as
set theorys consistency is assumed. And typically, set theory is taken to be
consistent when it is usedfor example, in applied mathematicsand in particular
when inferences are drawn from the theory. Thus, as opposed to the model-theoretic
account and its underlying platonism, to draw consequences from set theory, we
cannot be committed to the existence of a set of all sets. I conclude that platonism
cannot fully accommodate the inferential role of mathematics.
Can the platonist give up the model-theoretic account of consequence, and adopt
the modal account instead? This is certainly a possibility. But since the modal
account is not platonistic, the platonist cannot take the resulting account of the
inferential role of mathematics as supporting platonism. And a significant
motivation underlying the use of the success of applied mathematics in support
of platonism is undermined. After all, the crucial work is done by a non-platonist
view: modalism (for details, see Bueno and Shalkowski 2013, 2015).

123

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

2597

2.2 The representational role of mathematics

It might also be thought that platonists should be able to accommodate the
representational role of mathematics. After all, they are committed to an ontology of
mathematical objects and relations that can be immediately used to accommodate
the way in which mathematical theories represent. Platonists would point out that
there are mathematical structures (thought of as a domain of objects and relations
defined on that domain) and various sorts of relations between such structures (such
as isomorphism, homomorphism, and so on). The representational role of
mathematics is then characterized by specifying particular structures and particular
relations between such structures. Some of these structures are used to represent
relations among physical objects and states of physical systems. To do that,
information about the relevant physical objects and states are encoded in a model of
set theory, which allows for the study of the relations among the representations that
are thus generated. Given that platonists are genuinely quantifying over all of these
objects (structures and relations between structures), they should have no trouble
making sense of the representational role of mathematics.
But even here it is unclear whether platonists fully succeed. Clearly, they will
have all sorts of mathematical objects, structures and relations to quantify over. The
trouble is that to account for the representational role, one has to select the right sort
of structures and relations. The problem then emerges: how can the platonist choose,
among the various mathematical objects and relations, those that provide the
appropriate structure? The issue is especially delicate for the platonist since
mathematical objects are abstract. So, how can we have access to these objects, and
how should the selection process between the various abstract structures be carried
out?
The obvious answer is to argue that the choice is made based on the structures
that emerge from the physical phenomena. After all, these structures are the relevant
ones that need to be accommodated. This response, however, is not open for
platonists, for two reasons. First, physical structures are importantly different from
those dealt with in mathematics. Physical structures are typically finite, and so, a
plurality of different mathematical structures will fit the same structures that emerge
from the physical world. As a result, in trying to choose among the various
mathematically possible structures, platonists face a problem of underdetermination.
In other words, physical structures do not uniquely determine the huge plurality of
mathematical structures that are still possible for platonists. Several mathematical
structures that agree with physically observable phenomena differ when we move
beyond them. Consider, for example, Hilbert spaces and von Neumanns type II1
factor algebras. Both can be used to represent states of quantum systems, and will
essentially agree on the representation of quantum states and probability assignments when restricted to quantum systems with finitely many degrees of freedom.
However, they diverge in their probability assignments when systems with infinitely
many degrees of freedom are considered (Redei 1997). The choice between such
structures cannot be made on empirical grounds.
Second, to make sense of physical structures, and to characterize them properly,
it is crucial to identify their distinctive features. To do that, mathematical structures

123

2598

O. Bueno

whose properties are well known are invoked, and we try to embed the physical
structures in question into the relevant mathematical structures. What typically
happens at this point is that several abstract structures turn out to be adequate to the
same physical structure; that is, several mathematical structures can be used to
generate the same physical structure. As a result, underdetermination emerges
again.
But the problem that underdetermination yields here is different from the one
considered above. What is at stake at this point is the understanding of physical
structures. The reason why mathematical structures are brought into play is to help
making sense of exactly how to represent the physical structures under
consideration. Now, several different mathematical structures do the job, and
some of them may generate a different understanding of the physical structures in
question, since they embed the latter into different mathematical settings. Hence,
the physical structures end up having different meanings in each embedding, since
they are ultimately embedded in different mathematical structures that have
different properties. For example, in the case of Hilbert spaces and von
Neumanns type II1 factor algebras, depending on the degrees of freedom of
the system we consider, different properties (regarding, e.g., probability assignments) will emerge. As a result, the understanding of the physical structures
change depending on the particular embedding that is adoptedfor instance,
which probability assignment can be defined for the physical structures
themselves? In the end, given the underdetermination, platonists are left with
the question: which of the several embeddings (if any) provide the correct
understanding of the physical structures? Once again, it is unclear that there is a
unique answer to this question.
It may be argued that platonists need not be committed to a unique answer to the
question of the understanding of physical structures via mathematical ones. Each
answer provides a different approach to the issue of how the physical world could
be, and so, in each case, a different understanding emerges. (A related scenario
occurs with the various interpretations of quantum mechanics in an empiricist view;
see van Fraassen 1991).
I am very sympathetic to this response. In particular, I agree that having a
plurality of embeddings from physical to mathematical structures does increase our
understanding. However, this response fails to support platonism. After all, the
approach is compatible with a thoroughly anti-realist understanding of the
mathematical structures invoked by the embeddings in question. The different
mathematical structures need not capture all aspects of the physical worldand
clearly they do not. For different mathematical structures are compatible with the
same physical configurations. So, the various mathematical structures and their
physical interpretations provide distinct descriptions of the physical phenomena.
Consider, for instance, mathematical descriptions that are not equivalent, but which
still agree with the predictions about the physical phenomena. Different mathematical objects are referred to in each mathematical description: some structures
posit vectors in a Hilbert space; others posit elements of a von Neumann algebra.
Since these are very different objects, and they both have successful empirical
consequences (given suitable interpretations of the mathematical formalism), which

123

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

2599

of the resulting picture (if any) is true? It is unclear how to decide this issue. In fact,
as will become clear soon, the mathematical objects in question need not even exist
for this process to go through. (I will return to this point below.)
2.3 The expressive role of mathematics
Similarly, the expressive role of mathematics is not clearly accommodated by
platonists. To account for this role, we need to provide the right framework to
expressthat is, formulate and characterizerelations between objects in the
physical world. It may look as though platonists are well positioned to make sense
of this issue. After all, on their view, mathematical objects and their relations exist
and we are able to refer to them. Thus, platonists seem to have resources to express
mathematical relations between physical objects.
The difficulty here is that reference to mathematical objects is left quite open in
mathematical practice, in the sense that nothing in that practice requires the existence
of the corresponding objects (see Azzouni 1994, 2004). Clearly, mathematicians
quantify over mathematical objects, but this quantification, as I will discuss below,
need not carry ontological commitment. This means that mathematical objects are
not needed for us to make sense of the expressive role of mathematical language.
Ultimately, what is required is a language that expresses certain relations, but this
language does not require the existence of the corresponding objects. As an
illustration, consider the fact that physicists often distinguish between the
mathematical and the physical content of their theories, indicating explicitly their
commitment to the physical rather than the mathematical parts (see, for instance,
Dirac (1958), and Bueno (2005) for discussion). In this sense, platonists are
unnecessarily adding extra ontology, which fails to play a role in mathematical
practice.
The additional ontology that platonists add does seem to play a role in semantics,
since by quantifying over mathematical entities, platonists can provide a unified
semantics for both mathematical and scientific discoursestaking both types of
discourses literally. But this is, of course, a separate issue from the expressive role
of mathematics. And as will become clear below, the semantic issue can also be
accommodated without commitment to the existence of mathematical objects.

3 An anti-realist alternative
3.1 Anti-realism in applied mathematics
Isthereananti-realistalternativetoaccommodatetheprocessofapplicationofmathematics?
Ithinkso;atleastinprinciple.ThealternativeIsketchhereisanti-realistinthesensethatitis
notcommittedtotheexistenceofmathematicalobjects.Morebroadly,thealternativemight
beconsideredasprovidingaframeworktointerpret(applied)mathematicswithoutrequiring
that mathematical entities exist, but leaving it open that they may. Given the lack of
commitment, the resulting view still counts as a form of anti-realism about mathematics.

123

2600

O. Bueno

After all, the proposal distinguishes between two types of commitment: a quantifier
commitment and an ontological commitment (Azzouni 2004).3 We incur a quantifier
commitment by (existentially) quantifying over a given domain of objects. The factthat we
quantify over certain objects does not require that such objects exist: we often quantify over
objects whose existence we have no reason to believe, such as fictional entities. But the
quantification indicates that the objects in question are in the range of the quantifiers.
On the view proposed here, to have ontological commitment to a given object
requires, besides quantification, the satisfaction of an existence predicate is required.
The objects that satisfy the existence predicate exist. Various sorts of existence
predicates could be proposed, from causal efficacy through ontological independence
to observability. But to avoid begging the question against platonists, I provide only
sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for the existence predicate. Interestingly,
these conditions can be found in scientific practice, and so are motivated
independently of the issue regarding platonism in mathematics. They involve
having a particular form of access to an object, an access that is counterfactually
dependent on the objects in question, in the sense that: (1) had the scene before us
were different, the objects in question would have been correspondingly different,
and (2) had the scene before us been the same, the objects would have been
correspondingly the same (see Bueno 2011).4 From these conditions three important
epistemic conditions follow: the relevant access (1) is robust, (2) can be refined, and
(3) allows us to track the objects in question in space and time. (Azzouni 2004 calls
these sorts of conditions thick epistemic access.) If these conditions are met, and we
have at least good reason to believe that they are indeed met, we will have sufficient
reason to claim that the corresponding objects exist.
Clearly, mathematical objects fail to satisfy the existence predicate. There is no
need for us to be ontologically committed to them. However, given that such
conditions are taken only as sufficient (but not necessary) for existence, the issue of
the existence of mathematical objects is left open. For all we know, mathematical
objects may exist. But it is still possible that they do not. Since it is unclear how we
could establish the existence of mathematical objects, or their non-existence, the
best attitude toward this issue is to suspend judgment. Thus, we have here an
agnostic view regarding the ontological status of mathematical objects. This makes
the interpretation proposed here anti-realist.5

Azzouni (2004) explicitly introduces these two types of commitment, but on his view mathematical
objects do not exist. In Bueno (2013) some difficulties are raised to his approach.

These conditions can be seen as a generalization of corresponding conditions on observation advanced

by Lewis (1980). Since certain instruments also satisfy them, we have here a broader conception of
instrument-mediated observation (see Bueno 2011).

Azzouni (2004) distinguishes quantifier commitment and ontological commitment, but refuses to adopt
an agnostic interpretation. Thus, he does not seem to be in a position to claim that when we quantify over
certain objects, we quantify over something, even though it might be something that does not exist (for
further discussion, see Bueno and Zalta 2005; Azzouni 2009, 2010; Bueno 2013). The approach suggested
here does not face this difficulty, since it allows one to talk about properties of nonexistent objects. We
may quantify over certain objects, but this is not enough to claim that these objects exist: an existence
predicate also needs to be met (Zalta 2000; Bueno and Zalta 2005).

123

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

2601

For Azzouni, if the three conditions above are met, we have thick epistemic
access to the corresponding objects (Azzouni 2004). On his view, however, these
are not conditions for existence. Instead, ontological independence (from our
linguistic practices and psychological processes) provides the criterion for
existence. As a result, on his view, given that mathematical objects are just made
up by mathematicians, and are, therefore, dependent on mathematicians linguistic
and psychological processes, they do not exist.
The trouble is that the platonist would draw exactly the opposite conclusion!
Given that, for the platonist, mathematical objects would exist even if no person had
ever existed, these objects are actually ontologically independent from our linguistic
practices and psychological processes, and hence exist. This illustrates the difficulty
of establishing, in a non-question-begging way, a criterion of existence (a point
Azzouni is, of course, completely aware of).
However, if counterfactual dependence and thick epistemic access are understood as only sufficient conditions for existence, this difficulty is avoided. In the
end, it is left open whether mathematical objects exist or not. But given these
objects are quantified over they are in the scope of the relevant quantification,
although they need not exist. In this way, no questions are begged against platonists,
and one can still make sense of quantification over mathematical objects that is so
significantindeed indispensableto scientific and mathematical practice.
Note that the truth of mathematical theories plays no role in the account
suggested here. In fact, the truth of these theories is often incompatible with
scientific practice. As noted above, idealizations and simplifications are key
components in scientific activity, and this includes those idealizations in which
mathematical theories are involved. Let us call them mathematical idealizations.
The use of group theory to obtain solutions to Schrodingers equation provides a
familiar example. Since idealizations, including mathematical ones, are not taken to
be true, the mathematical theories that are part of mathematical idealizations are not
taken to be true eithereven though such idealizations are compatible with the
physical outcome in question. In other words, mathematical theories need not be
taken to be true to be good (Field 1989).
But why is it that mathematical theories seem to be true no matter what? The
reason is that, without a physical interpretation, a mathematical theory is compatible
with any physical outcomeexcept perhaps for cardinality claims about the
domain. Interpreting the mathematical formalism of the theory in an empirically
adequate way does the crucial work. What typically happens is that the physical
interpretation of the mathematical formalism, rather than the formalism itself, is
incompatible with certain physical results (Bueno 2005). So, the mathematical
formalism is always preserved. What changes is its physical interpretation.
It is this feature of mathematicsthe preservation of the mathematical
formalismthat gives the impression that mathematical theories are true. But this
is only a superficial impression. If we distinguish carefullyas physicists such as
Dirac dothe physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism and the
mathematical formalism itself, it becomes clear that interpreted mathematical
theories are not true; some of them are not even empirically adequate. This is the
case, for instance, of Diracs original interpretation of his celebrated equation. This

123

2602

O. Bueno

interpretation led him to formulate the hole theory, which ended up assigning the
same mass to protons and electronsan empirically inadequate claim (see Bueno
2005 and references therein). This provides a further reason why mathematical
theories need not be true to be good.
Azzouni insists that mathematical theories should be taken to be true (2004,
1528). On his view, without asserting the truth of mathematical theories, we cannot
derive consequences from theories that cannot be explicitly formulated, for
example, because they are not finitely axiomatizable. In response, of course we do
not just derive blindly consequences from theories that cannot be explicitly
formulated. We work with fragments of these theoriesindeed, with certain
modelsand these models can be fully expressed. The consequences are drawn in
these simplified models, rather than in the context of the original theory. And there
is no need to assert the truth of the original theory in this process.

3.2 Anti-realism and the three roles of mathematics

How does the agnostic account suggested here accommodate the three roles of the
application of mathematics? With regard to the inferential role, there is no need for
one to claim that mathematical theories are true, or to be taken to be true, for these
theories to play an inferential role. After all, as noted above, one can easily
characterize inferences in modal terms: B logically follows from A if necessarily
(A . B), where necessarily is a modal operator of logical necessity, that can be
easily defined from a primitive modal operator of logical possibility (Field 1989). In
this way, mathematical theories can be used as premises in an argument regarding
the application of mathematics, or can be invoked as yielding additional models,
without mathematical theories being taken to be true. The notion of consequence,
characterized (modally) in the object language rather than (model-theoretically) in
the metalanguage, simply expresses certain logical connections between statements.
The representation role can be similarly accommodated. First, it should be noted
that the various relations between mathematical structures mentioned above
(isomorphism, homomorphism etc.) can all be formulated in second-order logic,
and so they need not presuppose mathematical objects. (In this sense, this is a matter
of the application of logic, rather than mathematics.) Moreover, by quantifying over
mathematical objects, and by clearly distinguishing quantifier commitment from
ontological commitment, we can make perfect sense of the way in which one can
use mathematical objects (which, on the interpretation advanced here, are in the
range of the quantifiers in question), but refuse to be committed to their existence.
Finally, the expressive role of mathematics can be accommodated as well. This
role is basically a matter of using predicates of mathematical theories to express
relations among physical objects. This is, ultimately, a matter of providing
suitable interpretations of the mathematical formalism (see Bueno and French
2012). But to make sense of this role, there is no need for one to be committed to the
existence of mathematical objects. At issue is how to interpret mathematical
theories so that they can have empirical implications about the world, and the fact
that by quantifying over mathematical objects, suitably interpreted, we can express

123

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

2603

more easily certain relations among physical entities. However, as noted, quantifier
commitment does not entail ontological commitment.
There is, of course, far more to be said about each of these points. But my
purpose is simply to indicate that the anti-realist approach sketched here is, in
principle, in a better position than platonist accounts to make sense of the
application of mathematics.

4 Conclusion
If the three roles that mathematical theories play in applications can be
accommodated without the commitment to the existence of mathematical objects,
what emerges, in outline, is an anti-realist account of the application of
mathematics. In the end, although there is no incoherence in adopting platonism,
there is no need to do that either. An anti-realist alternative is, in principle,
availablean alternative that is worth exploring further.
Acknowledgments My thanks go to Jody Azzouni, Newton da Costa, Steven French, Russell Marcus,
and Ed Zalta for extremely helpful discussions.

References
Azzouni, J. (1994). Metaphysical myths, mathematical practice: The logic and epistemology of the exact
sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Azzouni, J. (2004). Deflating existential consequence: A case for nominalism. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Azzouni, J. (2009). Empty de re attitudes about numbers. Philosophia Mathematica, 17, 163188.
Azzouni, J. (2010). Talking about nothing: Numbers, hallucinations, and fictions. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Bueno, O. (2005). Dirac and the dispensability of mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 36, 465490.
Bueno, O. (2011). When physics and biology meet: The nanoscale case. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 42, 180189.
Bueno, O. (2013). Nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2013 edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/
nominalism-mathematics/
Bueno, O., & French, S. (2012). Can mathematics explain physical phenomena? British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 63, 85113.
Bueno, O., & Shalkowski, S. (2013). Logical constants: A modalist approach. Nous, 47, 124.
Bueno, O., & Shalkowski, S. (2015). Modalism and theoretical virtues: Toward an epistemology of
modality. Philosophical Studies, 172, 671689.
Bueno, O., & Zalta, E. (2005). A nominalists dilemma and its solution. Philosophia Mathematica, 13,
294307.
Colyvan, M. (2001). The indispensability of mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dirac, P. (1958). The principles of quantum mechanics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Field, H. (1980). Science without numbers: A defense of nominalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Field, H. (1989). Realism, mathematics and modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hellman, G. (1989). Mathematics without numbers: Towards a modal-structural interpretation. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Hellman, G. (1996). Structuralism without structures. Philosophia Mathematica, 4, 100123.

123

2604

O. Bueno

Lewis, D. (1980). Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58,
239249.
Putnam, H. (1971). Philosophy of logic. New York: Harper and Row.
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Redei, M. (1997). Why John von Neumann did not like the Hilbert space formalism of quantum
mechanics (and what he liked instead). Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 28,
493510.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1991). Quantum mechanics: An empiricist view. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
von Neumann, J. (1932). Mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Weyl, H. (1931). The theory of groups and quantum mechanics. New York: Dover.
Wigner, E. P. (1931). Group theory and its application to the quantum mechanics of atomic spectra. New
York: Academic Press.
Zalta, E. (2000). Neologicism? An ontological reduction of mathematics to metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 53,
219265.

123