India 4

Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.
-India Nuclear Agreement

Author(s): Dinshaw Mistry
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 5 (September/October 2006), pp. 675-698
Published by: University of California Press
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DIPLOMACY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND

THE U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
Dinshaw Mistry
Abstract
This article examines the U.S.-India agreement allowing the transfer of civilian
nuclear technology to India and the manner in which domestic politics affected
the implementation of the agreement.
Keywords: U.S.-India nuclear agreement, nuclear proliferation, India nuclear
program
In July 2005, President George Bush announced a major

new foreign policy initiativea commitment to attaining full civil nuclear
energy cooperation and trade with India.1 Such nuclear cooperation was intended to boost the U.S. strategic partnership with India, a partnership that
was an important priority for the Bush administration.2 Yet, the transfer of civilian technology, such as nuclear energy reactors, required amending U.S.
laws and international guidelines that could weaken the global nonproliferation
regime. The U.S. Congress, inuenced by nonproliferation interest groups, therefore sought substantial nuclear restraints from India before approving civilian
nuclear transfers.
From July 2005 to March 2006, the Bush administration negotiated with its Indian counterparts to secure nuclear restraints involving the separation of Indias
civilian and military nuclear facilities. Because most of Indias energy-generating
reactors were not under international monitoring and thus the plutonium from
Dinshaw Mistry is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.
1. See Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2005.
2. This priority was outlined well before the Bush administration entered office. See Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs 79:1 (January/February 2000).
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 5, pp. 675698, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.
2006 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests
for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California
Presss Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
675
676
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006
these reactors could be used for military purposes, the Bush administration
wanted India to place these civilian reactors under safeguards by which they
would be subject to international monitoring and inspection. However, Indias
government faced domestic resistance to safeguarding its reactors. As a result,
while Indias nuclear separation planannounced during President Bushs March
visit to Indiaplaced 14 thermal power reactors under safeguards, it shielded nine
additional reactors, including a contentious breeder reactor, from international
inspections.
Such a partial separation plan still raised nonproliferation concerns among Congress and the international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), both of which would
ultimately have to authorize nuclear cooperation with India.3 To secure congressional approval, the Bush administration then agreed to a compromise twostep legislative process. In the rst step, Congress would endorse the principle of
nuclear cooperation with India (the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
voted in favor of this in July 2005). In a second step, the administration would
submit and Congress would vote upon a formal bilateral U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement (called the 123 Agreement). The administration began
discussing this 123 Agreement with India immediately after it announced its
nuclear separation plan. This agreement formally specied that nuclear energy
sharing with India would be conditional upon the latters compliance with key
nonproliferation criteria, some of which were already in the July 2005 agreement.
This article analyzes the international diplomacy and domestic politics behind the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. It rst discusses Indias civilian and
military nuclear programs. It then examines the negotiation of the July 2005
agreement and internal politics in India and the United States that inuenced
and greatly delayed the implementation of the agreement. Finally, using the
theoretical framework of two-level games, it explains how interstate diplomacy
and domestic politics interacted during the negotiation and implementation of
the nuclear agreement.4 It shows how the current Indian governments political weakness prevented it from making nonproliferation concessions to Washington in its nuclear separation plan and in the 123 Agreement even though
it was structurally in a better position to implement the nuclear agreement because it did not legally require parliamentary approval for implementation. This
delayed U.S. congressional approval for the nuclear agreementapproval that
the Bush administration institutionally required. Yet, because the Bush admin3. The NSG is an informal group of over 40 countries that accept common guidelines restricting their exports of nuclear technologies, materials, and fuel to other countries. One of these guidelines restricts the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to countries not signatories to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including India.
4. The concept of two-level games is explained in Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988),
pp. 42760.
DINSHAW MISTRY
677
istration was a strong government, it could better bargain with its domestic opponents, and it successfully secured congressional endorsement for the rst steps
toward nuclear cooperation with India by mid-2006.
Indias Civilian and Military

Nuclear Programs
Indias Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is responsible for two nuclear
programs. It runs a military program based on the Cirus and Dhruva reactors,
which produce weapons-grade plutonium for Indias strategic nuclear forces,
and a civilian energy program involving several nuclear power reactors.
Indias Nuclear Energy Sector
India currently has 15 power reactors generating a total of 3,310 megawatts (mw)
of electricity and has eight more under construction that would generate an additional 3,420 mw. These include two U.S.-supplied reactors at Tarapur that
became operational in 1969 and are under safeguards; two Canadian-supplied
Canada Deuterium-Uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors that became operational in 1973 and 1981, respectively, and are under safeguards; and 16 Indianbuilt pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) derived from the CANDU that
are not under safeguards. The DAE was only able to build PHWRs with a relatively small 220 mw capacity until very recently. Only two of these reactors,
Tarapur-3 and Tarapur-4, have larger 540 mw capacities,5 and the DAE is also
building a 500 mw fast breeder reactor that could be completed by 2010. The
breeder represents the second phase of the DAEs long-term, three-phase nuclear
energy plan.6 Finally, Russia is building two 1,000 mw light water reactors
(LWRs), which, when completed by around 2010, would provide some 30%
of Indias nuclear power.
5. Indias reactors include two Canadian-supplied reactors at Rawatbhatta, Rajasthan (the 100
mw Rajasthan-1 and 200 mw Rajasthan-2); the Madras-1 and -2 at Kalpakkam, near Chennai;
Narora-1 and -2 in northern India; Kakrapur-1 and -2 in Gujarat; Kaiga-1 and -2 in Karnataka;
Rajasthan-3 and -4 at Rawatbhatta; and Tarapur-4 (operational since 2005) and Tarapur-3 (which went
critical in May 2006 and is expected to become operational in 200607). In addition, Rajasthan-5,
Rajasthan-6, Kaiga-3, and Kaiga-4 are scheduled to become operational in 2007 and 2008.
6. In the first phase, a 10,000 mw base in PHWRs would produce enough plutonium to fuel a
chain of fast-breeder reactors. In the second phase, these breeder reactors would produce a large
amount of uranium-233. And in the third stage, the U-233 and thorium would fuel Indias next
generation of thermal reactors, such as the Indian-designed Advanced Heavy Water Reactors
(AHWRs). Thus, the breeder reactors are a bridge between Indias current PHWRs relying on the
countrys finite uranium supplies and future AHWRs that would use Indias plentiful thorium reserves. Yet, DAE will take decades to realize this plan. It has not yet completed the first phase
building a 10,000 mw base in PHWRsand its first breeder reactor for the second phase is still
under construction.
678
In the decade after 2010, the DAE expects to build more reactors generating
perhaps 5,000 mw of electricity.7 This would still leave the DAE short of its goal
of generating 20,000 mw of nuclear power, which would represent 7% to 10%
of Indias total electric generating capacity, by around 2020. To meet these requirements, India seeks to import perhaps six to ten reactors in the next decade.
Yet, India would only be able to import reactors, as well as fuel for its reactors,
if the nuclear agreement with the United States is implemented.
The DAE has a signicant short-term need for uranium fuel from foreign suppliers. For example, it is entirely dependent on foreign suppliers for the enriched
uranium used in its Tarapur reactors.8 Furthermore, it does not mine and mill
enough natural uranium fuel for its existing PHWRs, which require an estimated 480 tons of uranium annually (assuming 30 tons each for the 11 operational
200220 mw reactors and 7075 tons each for the two 540 mw reactors). In
addition, the Cirus and Dhruva reactors require another 30 to 35 tons of uranium each year, and the four PHWRs currently under construction would require
an additional 120 tons of uranium when completed. Yet, because it operates just
one uranium mill, the DAE is only supplying about 220300 tons of uranium
per year.9 Thus, India would benet by importing uranium to fuel its PHWRs.
It should be noted that, while the imports of reactors and fuel would alleviate Indias short-term energy needs, this would also raise questions about DAEs
long-term nuclear energy plans. As noted above, most of Indias reactors are
PHWRs and Indian nuclear scientists have extensive experience with them. Yet,
very few countries operate, and could thus sell, PHWRs to India. Therefore,
Indias other viable alternative is to import LWRs that are more widely used
worldwide, but this would require India to further train its nuclear scientists to
use this type of reactor. These problematic issues raise the question whether it
7. Between 201020, the DAE plans to construct heavy water reactors (either four 220 mw and
several new 700 mw reactors, or ten 540 mw reactors) and three to four 500 mw breeder reactors.
8. This enriched uranium was originally provided by the United States, and then by France,
China (in 1995), and Russia (in 2001). In March 2006, just after India announced its nuclear separation plan, Russia agreed to again supply fuel to Tarapur. Indias sole uranium enrichment facility
at Mysore is believed to enrich uranium for Indias nuclear submarine project and is not intended
to supply fuel for Tarapur.
9. The DAE has overcome its uranium deficit in two ways. First, it has used uranium stockpiled
from prior years when India had fewer reactors that needed less uranium (although this stockpile
could be exhausted by 2007). Second, the DAE has operated its existing plants at less than full capacity to save fuel. For example, it lowered their capacity factor from 90% in 200203 to 81% in
200304 and 76% in 200405. DAE is building a second uranium mill with a processing capacity
of 3,000 metric tons per day. Its existing mill has a capacity of some 2,090 metric tons per day.
When completed, this second mill could supply some 300400 tons of uranium annually. See T. S.
Subramanian, Uranium Crisis, Frontline (Chennai, India), 22:27 (December 31, 2005); and Zia
Mian and M. V. Ramana, Feeding the Nuclear Fire, Economic and Political Weekly (Calcutta,
India), August 27, 2005.
DINSHAW MISTRY
679
is efcient for the DAE to pursue three types of reactorsPHWRs, LWRs,

and breedersor whether it should terminate one of these programs and concentrate on just the other two main types. Furthermore, the main reason for having breeder reactorsthe need to lessen Indias dependence on uranium from
external suppliersbecomes less relevant if India can import LWRs and rely
on foreign suppliers to provide uranium fuel for both its LWRs and PHWRs
without international restrictions. Thus, the rationale for the continuation of
the DAEs breeder reactor program can also be questioned.
Indias Nuclear Weapons Program
India has three main sources of plutonium for its nuclear weapons. First, the
Cirus reactor, operational since 1960, produces enough plutonium for two to
three nuclear weapons a year, and the Dhruva reactor, operational since 1986,
produces plutonium sufcient for about ve nuclear weapons every year. Until
now, Cirus and Dhruva have produced enough plutonium for an estimated 65
to 110 nuclear weapons.10 Although Cirus will be shut down by 2010, these
reactors may have already produced, or will soon produce, enough plutonium
for India to maintain a minimum deterrent nuclear force vis--vis its neighbors
in the regions. For example, experts estimate that 100150 nuclear weapons
could provide India with a deterrent against China and Pakistan.11
Second, India has an inventory of approximately 8,00010,000 kilograms
(kg) of reactor-grade plutonium that it has produced with its PHWRs, which
are outside of international safeguards, over the past two decades. This would
sufce for hundreds of nuclear weapons assuming that it takes about 8 to10 kg
of such plutonium to make a simple nuclear weapon, but two limitations still
exist. The rst limitation is that reactor-grade plutonium is not well suited for
nuclear weapons, although press reports note that one of Indias ve nuclear
tests in 1998 used such plutonium. The other limitation is that much of this inventory would be required to fuel Indias breeder reactors. For example, if the
DAE builds three more breeder reactors by 2020 in addition to its breeder currently under construction, it would require some 12,00016,000 kg of plutonium because each breeder initially consumes 3,0004,000 kg of plutonium.
This plutonium would probably come from the 8,00010,000 kg of plutonium
10. David Albright, Indias Military Plutonium Inventory End 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, May 7, 2005).
11. Assuming that India has 100 to 150 nuclear weapons, and half to one-third of these weapons and their delivery systems survive an enemy first strike, India would still have 30 to 75 weapons
in its arsenal. These could inflict significant damage on several Chinese and Pakistani cities, thereby
providing India with a deterrent against China and Pakistan. However, India still has to develop
missile delivery systems for a credible deterrent versus China. India has capable aircraft and shortrange missile delivery systems against Pakistan, but its medium-range Agni-3 missile that could
reach Chinas major cities failed its first test in July 2006.
680
in Indias existing inventory, additional plutonium produced by Indias PHWRs

in the coming decade, and the expected 3,0004,000 kg of plutonium produced
by Indias rst breeder reactor during its rst 10 to 15 years of operation once
completed.12
Third, India could obtain weapons-grade plutonium from its breeder reactor
that is expected to be completed around 2010. A few years after it is operational,
perhaps around 201214, the breeder would begin producing plutonium sufcient for dozens of nuclear weapons annually. In fact, it could possibly produce
some 3,0004,000 kg of plutonium by 202025. Yet, as discussed above, the DAE
may require this breeder-derived plutonium to fuel additional breeder reactors
instead of using it for nuclear weapons.
In summary, India has three potential sources of plutonium for nuclear weapons, although two of them could also be used for fueling Indias breeder reactors. Furthermore, under the nuclear agreement with the United States, twothirds of Indias civilian reactors will be placed under safeguards. In exchange,
India would be able to import reactors to meet its energy requirements. Negotiations that allowed India to import civilian nuclear technology took place at
both the international and domestic levels as will be discussed below.
International Diplomacy
Initial U.S. Attempts toward Nuclear Cooperation
with India
The nuclear agreement with India stemmed from the Bush administrations
desire to transform U.S.-India relations and develop a strong strategic partnership with India. While the Clinton administration also sought improved ties with
Indiain fact, President Clinton visited India in 2000it had earlier imposed
sanctions on India and Pakistan after their May 1998 nuclear tests as required
by U.S. law.13 These sanctions, preceded by a long-standing U.S. denial of dualuse nuclear and space technology to India, were the major irritant to better
U.S.-India relations in New Delhis view. The Bush administration sought to
lift the post-1998 sanctions in its rst months in ofce, but it encountered bureaucratic resistance particularly from the Nonproliferation Bureau of the State
12. While the PHWRs generally produce reactor-grade plutonium, these reactors could also
produce refined weapons-grade plutonium if they are operated in a low burn-up mode. The DAE
reportedly explored this idea in the years after the 1998 nuclear tests. However, this would considerably reduce their electric output and also require significant amounts of uranium. Each PHWR
would require some 200 tons of uranium annually when operated at a low burn-up compared to 30
tons during a normal mode. See Ashley Tellis, Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and Indias Nuclear Arsenal (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2006).
13. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
DINSHAW MISTRY
681
Department. These sanctions were only lifted after September 11, 2001, when
they were simultaneously lifted on Pakistan as well because of changed geopolitical concerns. Thereafter, Prime Minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee and President Bush outlined a vision for a bilateral strategic partnership that November,
which would include deeper ties in high technology areas. Robert Blackwill,
the U.S. ambassador to India at the time, strongly promoted high-technology
cooperation as he wanted to integrate India in the global nonproliferation regime. He initially concentrated on removing U.S. policy impediments to cooperation in the civilian nuclear and space and high-technology areas with India.14
Washington then discussed civilian nuclear cooperation with New Delhi in
two sets of talksthe High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) and the Next
Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The HTCG was set up at a November 2002
meeting between undersecretary of commerce, Kenneth Juster, and Indias foreign secretary, Kanwal Sibal.15 It lowered barriers to bilateral technology trade,
resulting in increased dual-use technology exports to India from the U.S., which
exceeded $90 million in FY 2004three times the amount from two years earlier.16 Yet, it did not signicantly advance cooperation in the civilian nuclear
and space areas.
In 2003, the Bush administration conceptualized a glide path to bring closure to the debate about nuclear and space cooperation with India.17 In September that year, then deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley discussed
these issues with Indian ofcials during an unannounced visit to New Delhi. In
December, an Indian delegation visited Washington for further talks with Hadley.
In January 2004, the two countries formally announced the NSSP under which
each would take reciprocal steps to facilitate technology transfers.18
In the rst phase of the NSSP, which concluded in September 2004, India
agreed to accept a U.S. export-control attach at the American embassy in New
Delhi to monitor the end-use of U.S. technology transferred to India. The United
States, in return, removed the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from
its Entity List (a list of organizations to whom technology transfer was restricted),
14. Ashley Tellis, The Evolution of U.S.-India Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship, International Security, 30:4 (Spring 2006), p. 136.
15. Juster and Sibal chaired HTCG meetings in July and November 2003; Juster and the new
Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran chaired the meeting in November 2004; and Saran and Justers
successor (Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security David McCormick) chaired the
fourth meeting in November-December 2005.
16. See United States and India Hold Talks on Stimulating High Technology Commerce,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, press release, November 19, 2004.
17. Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, Washington Post Reporters Interview Powell, Washington Post, October 3, 2003.
18. NSSP also sought a dialogue on missile defense, but cooperation in this area faltered. See
Wade Boese, Proposed Missile Defense Sale to India Still in Limbo, Arms Control Today, 34:3
(April 2003).
682
and subsequently eased licensing requirements for exporting low-level, dualuse items to ISRO subordinates.19 Furthermore, the U.S. permitted exports of
items related to the non-nuclear balance-of-plant portion of safeguarded Indian nuclear facilities but still continued to hinder more substantial nuclear cooperation with India. This balance-of-plant portion of nuclear facilities included
the portion outside of nuclear reactors such as turbines and generators.
In 2005, the Bush administration sought to remove these obstacles and further advance the strategic partnership with India. By this time, U.S.-India political, economic, and military ties were expanding even further. The two countries
had revived a bilateral Defense Policy Group in December 2001; their armed
forces conducted a series of joint military exercises; and there was even limited intelligence sharing between the two countries.20 To place this emergent
relationship on a more secure footing, the Bush administration designed a bold
approach to address Indias energy needs while simultaneously strengthening
the U.S.-India strategic partnership.
The July 2005 Agreement
The nuclear agreement with India evolved during Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rices March 2005 visit to India. Rice informed Indian ofcials that the United
States planned to sell F-16s to Pakistan and offered India a broader strategic
relationship in return.21 She suggested to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that
both sides could vault ahead in their bilateral relations by cooperating in the
civilian nuclear sector especially if India adopted effective export controls. This
point was also mentioned by a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission team that
went to India soon after Rices visit. Indias foreign policy establishment was
surprised by the U.S. offer. It was not expecting such a signicant shift in U.S.
nonproliferation policy toward India, but the Indian Prime Ministers Ofce
quickly acted on this opportunity to engage the United States.22 In May that year,
19. In October 2001, when Washington lifted its post-1998 sanctions, the number of Indian
companies on its Entity List was reduced from 159 to 16 (comprising two primary and 14 subordinate entities). Washington then removed ISRO in September 2004 and six more subordinate entities in August 2005.
20. Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell, eds. Indo-U.S. Strategic Cooperation in
the Twenty-First Century: More Than Words (London: Routledge, 2006).
21. Soon after Rices visit to India, her counselor and long-time colleague Philip Zelikow (who
once headed the Aspen Strategy Groups dialogue with the Confederation of Indian Industry) consulted with Ashley Tellis (advisor to the former ambassador to India from 200102), who, by midMay, drafted a policy agenda. The agenda called for increasing U.S. defense cooperation with India,
assisting the growth of Indian power, and bilateral dialogues on energy, strategic, and economic
issues. See Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Agenda for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
22. C. Raja Mohan, Impossible Allies: The United States, India, and the Global Order (Delhi:
India Research Press, 2006).
DINSHAW MISTRY
683
Indias Cabinet and both houses of Parliament passed stronger export control
legislation by adopting the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery
Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill. This bill strengthened existing Indian laws against exporting sensitive nuclear, chemical, biological, and
missile-related technologies.
After about six weeks of negotiations, Washington and New Delhi nalized
a nuclear agreement. On June 24, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns held
talks in Delhi, after which Burns and Rice met Indias foreign secretary on the
sidelines of the G-8 Summit. Indias foreign secretary then held three days of
discussions in Washington in mid-July ahead of Prime Minister Singhs visit
to the United States. On the evening of July 17, Foreign Secretary Shyam
Saran informed Burns that no agreement was possible because India could not
accept conditions for safeguards and inspections.23 Nonetheless, Secretary Rice
persuaded Prime Minister Singh on the morning of July 18 to let the talks continue in the hopes of getting an agreement. In the next few hours, after U.S. negotiators resisted Indias demands that it be recognized as a nuclear weapons
state, the two sides nally clinched an agreement. The NSSP process formally
ended with the negotiation of this agreement.
In the July 2005 agreement, the United States accommodated India in two
important ways. First, without giving India formal status as a nuclear weapons
state, Washington nonetheless acknowledged that [a]s a responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benets and advantages as other such states.24 Second, and more substantively, the Bush
administration agreed to assist India in obtaining civilian nuclear technology
by, in part, seeking agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies to help facilitate technology transfers and cooperation. In addition, the
Bush administration stated that the United States will work with friends and
allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.25
In return, India undertook to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place the civilian component under international safeguards. It also
agreed to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing that thwarted it from testing
powerful thermonuclear devices. This was an important concession because most
of Indias nuclear weapons are believed to be rst-generation ssion weapons,
and Indias 1998 thermonuclear test was at best a partial success. It further
agreed to support talks on the Fissile Material Treatya treaty that would effectively cap the growth of Indias nuclear arsenal. Once this treaty is in place
23. Glenn Kessler, India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell, Washington Post, April 3, 2006.
24. See Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh.
25. Ibid.
684
and India signs it, India would not be able to use plutonium from any of its reactors for nuclear weapons. Finally, India agreed to adhere with international
guidelines controlling the export of nuclear and missile technology.
In summary, a small group of Bush administration ofcials developed and
negotiated a major U.S. foreign policy initiativethat of reversing a 30-yearold nonproliferation policy and allowing nuclear energy cooperation with India.
Moreover, negotiations took place in specialized groups such as the HTCG
and NSSP and did not involve extensive consultations with, and therefore did
not face resistance from, Congress and nonproliferation interest groups. Yet,
technology-cooperation discussions from 2002 to 2004 did not result in a breakthrough on nuclear energy transfer issues. These discussions had followed an
incremental approach with the United States making only small concessions at
a time partly because the State Department, headed by Colin Powell, was cautious about undermining long-standing nonproliferation policies against technology transfers. Although the State Departments South Asia Bureau favored
technology transfers to further the strategic partnership with India, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Bureau opposed such transfers that could undercut the nonproliferation regime.26
In 2005, however, the State Department was headed by a key proponent of
the nuclear agreement, Secretary of State Rice, and the Bush administration
opted for a bold, rather than an incremental, approach in the evolving strategic
relationship with India. Nonproliferation ofcials were largely left out of the
nal talks in mid-year for this reason and also somewhat unintentionally.27 To
explain, one possible opponent of the nuclear agreement, Undersecretary of State
for Arms Control John Bolton, was not involved in negotiations as he had been
appointed ambassador to the United Nations. His replacement, Robert Joseph,
took ofce on June 1, by which time the nuclear initiative was at an advanced
stage. By the time Joseph and National Security Council nonproliferation expert John Rood eventually drafted their positionsthey wanted India to place all
its power reactors under safeguards and to limit its ssile material production
they were too late to inuence the negotiations. Indian ofcials had already
informed Burns that they would not agree to limits on their nuclear program.
Thus, Washingtons discussions with India through July did not involve extensive consultation with Congress and nonproliferation interest groups. These
constituencies sought greater nuclear restraints from India, which subsequently
necessitated a second round of negotiations between India and the United States
beginning in the early-fall over Indias separation plan, and then another set of
talks over the 123 Agreement.
26. Ashley Tellis, The Evolution of U.S.-India Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship, International Security, 30:4 (Spring 2006), p. 145.
27. See Kessler, India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell.
DINSHAW MISTRY
685
A Second Round of Negotiations

That September, Washington and New Delhi set up a working group to discuss
the next steps each would take to implement the July agreement. The group
was headed by Undersecretary Burns and Foreign Secretary Saran and discussed
Indias nuclear separation plan. Negotiations that December and in January 2006
revealed important differences between the two sides. Indias draft plan presented to the United States in December 2005 placed less than half of its nuclear power reactors under safeguards and excluded Indias breeder reactor from
inspections. In Washingtons view, this was neither credible nor defensible.28
In early-February 2006, New Delhi indicated a willingness to place more power
reactors under safeguards, but it sought a seven year exemption from safeguards
for its breeder reactor.29 Burns then held talks in Delhi on February 23 and 24,
and the two sides agreed on the number of reactors to be safeguarded and on the
breeder reactor. Yet, on the eve of President Bushs March 1 arrival in Delhi,
the issue of permanent safeguards was still unresolved.30 Last minute discussions
on the evening of March 1 and then the next morning resulted in an agreement
on this issue.
Indias nuclear separation plan struck a balance between Washingtons position, which was inuenced by U.S. domestic lobbies, that India place most of
its nuclear facilities under safeguards, and Indias position, inuenced by its
nuclear scientists, of keeping key facilities away from international inspections.
Thus, New Delhi agreed to place 14 of its 22 thermal reactors in operation or
under construction, which represented 65% of its thermal power capacity, under
permanent safeguards by 2014. Six of these reactors were actually already
under safeguardstwo U.S.-supplied reactors at Tarapur, two Canadian-supplied
reactors, and two Russian-built LWRs under construction. Domestic politics
signicantly inuenced negotiations that led to this separation plan.
28. Commenting on Indias separation plan, the U.S. ambassador to India noted that the plan
thats put forward doesnt appear to put, you know, the great majority of nuclear reactors under
safeguards, and questioned, [W]hy are they putting so little on the civil side [i.e., under safeguards]? See India Must Put More Reactors in Civilian N-Program: U.S., January 29, 2006,
http://www.Rediff.com. See also Sharon Squassoni, Indias Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues
and Views (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2006).
29. Indian negotiators informed the U.S. that their breeder reactor would be completed around
2010, and after two years of its operation, they could consider safeguards for this reactor. See
Burns Leaves for India for Last Minute N-Talks, February 21, 2006, http://www.Rediff.com;
and Burns Holds Talks with Saran over Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal, Indian Express, February 23,
2006.
30. Secretary of State Rice noted on February 28 that the one thing that is absolutely necessary
is that any agreement would assure that once India has decided to put reactors . . . [under] safeguards, that it remains permanently under safeguards. See the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Press Gaggle by Secretary of State Rice and National Security Advisor Hadley,
Washington, D.C., February 28, 2006.
686
Indias Domestic Debate

The Politics of Domestic Opposition
Indias government set up two subcommittees dealing with strategic and nuclear matters to draft its nuclear separation plan. These committees included
representatives from Indias National Security Council Secretariat, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Department of Atomic Energy, the armed forces,
and the Prime Ministers Ofce. In these committee discussions, the Ministry
of External Affairs and the Prime Ministers Ofce generally favored nuclear
concessions as they gave higher priority to accommodating and furthering ties
with the United States. Yet, DAE representatives objected to concessions on
safeguarding their reactors. They doubted that the U.S. would sell nuclear reactors to India, and they mainly sought to obtain nuclear fuel for Indias reactors.
The subcommittee discussions were inuenced by a broader debate involving
Indias opposition parties, security analysts, nuclear scientists, and the media.
Indias opposition parties initially objected to the fact that, by opening Indias
nuclear sector to inspections, the U.S.-India agreement would restrict Indias sovereignty and its sovereign right to independent nuclear decisionmaking. Indias
government largely addressed these opposition concerns when Prime Minister
Singh claried that Indias research program would not be affected and that
only civilian nuclear facilities were to be opened for inspection.31 As a result,
by February 2006, Indias main opposition partythe right-wing Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)did not ofcially oppose Indias separation plan.
In April, the BJP reversed its position and again began opposing the nuclear
agreement after another issue became politicizedthe issue of Indias moratorium on nuclear testing. Domestic critics noted that this moratorium was equivalent to India accepting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that it would
potentially prevent India from countering any nuclear tests by either Pakistan
or China. Yet, by this time, Indias government had already announced its nuclear separation plan regardless of the oppositions objections. It also pressed
ahead with this plan despite objections from Indias leftist parties, which opposed
the entire nuclear agreement on the grounds that it reduced Indias autonomy
in foreign policy making.
Technical Criticisms
Indian scientists raised many technical issues against Indias nuclear separation
plan. First, they argued that it was hard to separate nuclear and civilian facili-
31. Prime Minister Singh noted, We will not allow our research program to suffer in any way
in the process of separation of the civilian and the nuclear program. . . . That is the commitment
that I give on behalf of the Government of India. See Parliament of India, Statement by the Indian Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha, New Delhi, August 3, 2005.
DINSHAW MISTRY
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ties because both were interrelated.32 Hundreds of Indian nuclear specialists divide their time between civilian and weapons research. Yet, in July 2000, Indias
government had designated some of its nuclear facilities as being civilian as
a part of its regulation of the nuclear sector and thereby subject to review by
Indias nuclear safety watchdog.
Second, Indias nuclear scientists wanted to keep all nuclear facilities that
were indigenously built and which did not have imported components outside
safeguards. Further, some analysts and scientists noted that Indias PHWRs
should not come under international safeguards because they were a source of
tritium for thermonuclear weapons.33 India eventually kept eight of these reactors outside safeguards. Shielding these reactors allowed India to keep an entire fuel cycle for its breeder reactor outside safeguards. These reactors could
also be a source of plutonium for nuclear weapons during the time that Indias
existing plutonium inventory is depleted for use in the breeder reactor. Third,
Indias nuclear scientists were also wary of permanent safeguards, and they
opposed the typical International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocol that
allowed for intrusive inspections.34 Eventually, Indias government secured concessions from Washington that permitted it to negotiate an India-specic protocol with the IAEA.
Finally, Indias nuclear scientists very strongly opposed opening their breeder
reactor to safeguards. This reactor is part of Indias three-phase nuclear energy
plan, and therefore could also be considered a civilian energy technology. Yet,
Indian scientists argued that placing the breeder under safeguards would hurt
both Indias strategic security (its ability to use plutonium from the breeder for
nuclear weapons) and its energy security (the ability to pursue research on a
three-phase energy plan without hindrance from inspectors).35
Thus, Indias December 2005 draft separation plan kept the breeder reactor outside of safeguards, but, after U.S. insistence during talks in January 2006, Indias
government agreed to exempt the breeder from safeguards for only seven years.
Also, in late-January and early-February, articles in the Indian press criticized
32. Richard Stone, India Struggles to Put Its Nuclear House in Order, Science, 311:5759
(January 20, 2006), pp. 31819.
33. Bharat Karnad, Remember the Tritium, Deccan Chronicle, August 7, 2005.
34. Indian scientists noted that clauses in the safeguards agreement and its Additional Protocol will have to be suitably modified to ensure that the inspection activity is not misused to extract
intellectual property information from our R&D programs or to . . . snoop into the details of our
indigenous nuclear developments over the past 30 years. See A. Gopalakrishnan, Dont Compromise Indias Dignity, Asian Age (Delhi, India), March 1, 2006.
35. Pallava Bagla, Anil Kakodkar Interview: Breaking Up a Nuclear Program Is Hard to Do,
Science, 311:5762 (February 10, 2006), pp. 76566. Scientists also noted that [r]esearch on fast
breeders involves a trial-and-error process and it cannot function efficiently in an atmosphere of
intrusive inspections. See Meddling Fuel Feeds Nuclear Fire, Telegraph (Calcutta, India), February 9, 2006.
688
Indias nuclear establishment for refusing to place the breeder program under safeguards and generally being obstructionist.36 In response, Indias nuclear scientists, feeling pressured by the government and by media criticism, went public
with their concerns.37 In a February 6 interview (published on February 8), the
DAE secretary strongly opposed placing the breeder reactor under safeguards.38
Indias government eventually accepted the position of its nuclear scientists.
It kept its breeder reactor located at Kalpakkam as well as other facilities at Kalpakkam and at a second strategic enclave, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center
that has the Cirus and Dhruva reactors, outside safeguards. It still committed
to safeguarding all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder
reactors even though it retained the sole right to designate such reactors as
being civilian. Such a separation plan was less comprehensive than that desired by the nonproliferation lobby in Washington but it weighed the input of
various internal constituencies within India.
The U.S. Domestic Debate

The Politics of Domestic Opposition
The Bush administration did not consult Congress when it negotiated the nuclear agreement with India primarily because negotiations moved quickly in
June and July 2005. Instead, it only briefed congressional leaders immediately
after the agreement was announced. Congressional leaders, disturbed at not
having been consulted, sought substantive discussions with the administration
after the agreement had been reached.39
Congress held hearings and heard the testimony of nonproliferation and
South Asia experts on October 26, November 2, and November 16, while Bush
36. For example, commentators noted that [t]he breeder programs contribution to Indias
power generation would be minimal for the foreseeable future. . . . It is even more incredible for
the DAE to ask the nation to wait until 2040 to see breeders becoming the mainstay of Indias nuclear power program. C. Raja Mohan, Half Reactions and Easy Solutions, Indian Express, February 11, 2006.
37. A former Indian prime minister referred to this pressure in his letter to Prime Minister
Singh, noting, I wish to express serious concern that even after Dr. Kakodkar, Chairman of our
Atomic Energy Commission, felt pressurized to the extent that he had to make public his reservation . . . See V. P. Singh, Text of Letter Dated February 17, 2006, Addressed to the Prime Minister from Shri V. P. Singh, Former Prime Minister, New Delhi, February 17, 2006.
38. Pallava Bagla, The Fast Breeder Program Just Cannot Be Put on the Civilian List, Indian
Express, February 8, 2006; and India-U.S. Nuclear Deal Runs into Troubled Waters, Washington
Post, February 8, 2006.
39. On October 17, in a letter to Secretary of State Rice, the ranking members of the Senate
Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees asked that the administration
begin substantive discussions with our respective committees as soon as possible before final
decisions are made on any new legislative proposals. Wade Boese, Suppliers Weigh Indian
Nuclear Cooperation, Arms Control Today, 35:9 (November 2005), p. 42.
DINSHAW MISTRY
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administration ofcials briefed Congress on September 8 and November 2. In

these briengs, the administration pointed out the strategic, nonproliferation,
and environmental benets of nuclear cooperation with India. It noted that,
strategically, such cooperation would both strengthen India and also strengthen
U.S. ties with India. It argued that this would further U.S. interests in promoting a stable power balance in Asia. It added that Indias placing its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards and adopting stronger export controls would
bring it into compliance with important parts of the nonproliferation regime although nonproliferation experts still had concerns about Indias unsafeguarded
nuclear program.
Accordingly, Congress sent a set of questions to the Bush administration on
November 18 about the steps India should take to implement the accord partially based on the testimony of these experts.40 The administrations replies in
January 2006 did not satisfy the nonproliferation lobby, and this delayed congressional action on the agreement.41 In short, Congress and the nonproliferation lobby raised signicant concerns about the July 2005 agreement. This
delayed its implementation until well after President Bushs March 2006 visit
to India. In contrast, the Bush administration had initially expected Congress
to act on the accord before the president visited India.
Technical Criticisms
Within the United States, the biggest concern about nuclear transfers to India
was that bending the full-scope safeguard rule for India would weaken the international nonproliferation regime. The full-scope safeguard rule is not an NPT
requirement but is part of U.S. law and the NSG guidelines that reinforce the
NPT. It bars civilian nuclear exports to countries that do not have all their nuclear facilities under safeguards. It is therefore an important sanction against
countries that do not accept safeguards and, at the same time, a major incentive
for countries to accept full-scope safeguards by joining the NPT. Nonproliferation specialists therefore opposed abandoning this 30-year-old policy, and argued
that India should signicantly restrain its nuclear program before Congress bent
the rule.
First, the nonproliferation lobby called for India to end its production of ssile material for nuclear weapons. It argued that India should do this because it
40. See Joint Letter from Arms Control and Nonproliferation Experts to Members of Congress:
Issues and Questions on July 18 Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India, Arms Control
Association, Washington, D.C., November 18, 2005.
41. U.S. Department of State, Letter from the U.S. Department of State Responding to the
Questions from Representative Edward Markey, from Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary for
Legislative Affairs, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2006; and Responses to Questions for the
Record Submitted to Undersecretaries Nicholas Burns and Robert Joseph by Senator Richard
Lugar, released January 17, 2006, Washington, D.C.
690
had committed to accepting the same obligations as the ve major nuclear states
(the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, and China), which had themselves stopped
ssile material production. It should be claried, however, that the ve major
nuclear states have much larger inventories of ssile material than India, and
China has not ofcially declared its cessation of ssile material production.
New Delhi would not unilaterally end ssile material production,42 and nonproliferation experts acknowledged that India may only do so if China and
Pakistan also took this step.43 Yet, the Bush administration did not seek a multilateral ssile material moratorium to include China and Pakistan. The Bush
administration did introduce a draft ssile material treaty at the Conference on
Disarmament in May 2006, but negotiations on such a treaty are likely to take
many years during which time India will continue ssile material production.
In this contextwith India continuing ssile material productionnonproliferation experts noted that any U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to India
would enable India to enlarge its nuclear weapons arsenal because foreignsupplied uranium fuel for Indias civilian reactors would free up Indias limited uranium supplies for use in military reactors. This raised further concerns
because, if U.S.-supplied uranium assisted India in enlarging its nuclear arsenal, the United States would not be in compliance with Article I of the NPT.
However, as stated earlier, India would not be able to signicantly enlarge its
nuclear arsenal as long as it has only one main reactorthe Dhruva reactor
producing weapons-grade plutonium, and its nuclear expansion could also be
capped in the future under a ssile material treaty.
Second, the nonproliferation lobby called for India to shut down the Cirus
reactor. India had pledged in its 1960 agreement with Canada to use Cirus for
peaceful purposes, but plutonium from this reactor was used in Indias 1974
nuclear test and presumably in Indian nuclear devices produced since then.
U.S. nonproliferation experts thus argued that Indias past violations of international nuclear transfer agreements [should] be rectied by placing the Cirus
reactor, as well as all plutonium produced from this reactor, under safeguards.44
42. Commenting on this issue, Foreign Secretary Saran noted that these suggestions are deal
breakers and are intended as such. The proposal for a moratorium on fissile material production
was not part of this agreement and will not become so. See Carnegie Endowment, Transforming
India-U.S. Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership: Address by Indian Foreign Secretary Mr.
Shyam Saran at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., December
21, 2005.
43. Thus, one expert noted that India need not stop such [fissile material] production unilaterally, but as part of a multilateral moratorium pending completion of an international fissile material cutoff treaty. See Statement by Robert J. Einhorn before the House International Relations
Committee, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2005.
44. See Testimony of Leonard Spector, before the International Relations Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2005.
DINSHAW MISTRY
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The administration eventually accepted the position of the nonproliferation

lobby, and India agreed to close the Cirus reactor by 2010 while retaining the
plutonium produced by this reactor.
Third, the nonproliferation lobby wanted all of Indias thermal power reactors and its breeder reactor to be safeguarded. Indias December 2005 draft
separation plan fell far short of the nonproliferation lobbys expectations. By
February 2006, Indias government placed a majority of its power reactors under
safeguards but kept the breeder reactor outside safeguards.
Fourth, beyond reactors, the nonproliferation lobby called for safeguards
on other Indian nuclear facilities. These included nine heavy water production facilities; six fuel fabrication plants (four at Hyderabad, and one each at
Tarapur and Kalpakkam); four reprocessing plants (three at Kalpakkam and
one at Tarapur); and four enrichment facilities (including laser enrichment facilities at Indore and Trombay, and the Rare Materials Project [RMP] at Mysore). Indias March separation plan struck a balance on this issue by placing
many of its heavy water and fuel fabrication plants under safeguards but excluding all facilities at the strategic enclaves of Kalpakkam and the Bhabha
Atomic Research Center (BARC) near Bombay. It also excluded the RMP from
safeguards.
Fifth, the nonproliferation lobby urged that India adopt permanent safeguards
so that it would not have the option of importing fuel or technology for a civilian nuclear facility and later withdrawing the facility from safeguards.45 In initial talks with India, U.S. negotiators had not specied whether safeguards
would be permanent, and they mainly took up this issue after it was raised by
the nonproliferation lobby. Thereafter, Indias foreign secretary noted during
his December 2005 visit to Washington that India could accept permanent safeguards if there was a guaranteed lifetime supply of fuel. Yet, the United States
did not traditionally provide such lifetime assurances on fuel supplies to other
countries. U.S. and Indian negotiators eventually resolved this issue during President Bushs March 2006 visit to India. India accepted permanent safeguards
for its reactors, and Washington assured the supply of fuel to the safeguarded
reactors through three mechanismsa bilateral U.S.-India agreement; a threeparty agreement between the IAEA, India, and the United States; and via a
group of friendly supplier countries such as Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, which would supply fuel to India in case of any dispute in the other two
mechanisms.
45. See Joint Letter from Arms Control and Nonproliferation Experts to Members of Congress: Clarifying the Record on the July 18 Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India, Arms
Control Association, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2006. The IAEAs INFCIRC/66 safeguards
for non-nuclear states are permanently applied, while the IAEAs special safeguards agreements
with the nuclear states are not permanent.
692
Negotiations after Indias March 2006

Separation Plan
After India announced its nuclear separation plan, the Bush administration
sought quick approval of the nuclear agreement from Congress and the NSG
and also negotiated a formal bilateral agreement with India on the terms for
nuclear transfers. First, on March 14, the Bush administration gave India a
draft bilateral cooperation agreement, also called the 123 Agreement, specifying the terms for U.S. civilian nuclear exports to India. Such an agreement
was required by Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. These terms were
generally similar to Indias commitments made in July 2005 and March 2006,
but they still created negotiating problems in areas where they differed from
Indias July 2005 and March 2006 commitments. In April, after a press leak,
Indias government rejected a section of the draft agreement that noted that the
U.S. would discontinue nuclear cooperation if India detonated a nuclear device. In further talks in late-May and early-June, the two sides negotiated a
compromise whereby nuclear cooperation with India would be terminated if it
tested a nuclear device, but the U.S. president and a majority of Congress could
override this provision. This compromise assumed that Congress would be
sympathetic to continuing nuclear cooperation if any Indian nuclear test was
justied, for example, if it was in response to testing by Pakistan or China.
Washington and New Delhi continued discussions on the 123 Agreement in
August just after the U.S. House voted to approve the rst legislative steps
toward nuclear cooperation with India.
Second, on March 16, the House and Senate had introduced identical bills
at the request of the administration that would allow the president to waive
portions of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear energy cooperation
with India. The waivers would be conditional upon a presidential determination of seven to eight criteria. These include Indias implementing a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA; working with the United States on the ssile material treaty; supporting efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, which could potentially restrict Indias uranium enrichment
efforts; and not testing a nuclear device.
Secretary of State Rice then testied before Congress on April 5, 2006, and
Congress held hearings in late April and May. Congress still hesitated to endorse an agreement that did not substantially cap the growth of Indias nuclear
arsenal.46 Congress also did not want to approve the bill before India signed a
formal bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. In midyear, the Bush administration actually had not disclosed the details of the 123
46. Wade Boese, Congress Ponders Conditions for Indian Deal, Arms Control Today, 36:4
(May 2006).
DINSHAW MISTRY
693
Agreement to Congress, which therefore remained suspicious that the administration may have made too many nonproliferation concessions to India before
the nature of Indias safeguards with the IAEA was claried. The administration then considered a compromise two-step congressional process that was
suggested by Democratic Representative Tom Lantos in May and endorsed by
a Council on Foreign Relations report in June.47 The compromise was that
Congress would rst vote on a bill to accept the basic framework of U.S.-India
nuclear cooperation, and this bill would outline some key requirements for the
123 Agreement and for Indias safeguards with the IAEA. Second, once
these requirements were satised, Congress would quickly vote on the 123
Agreement authorizing nuclear cooperation with India.
The rst step commenced on June 27 and 29 when the House International
Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees overwhelmingly approved
bills that were somewhat different from those introduced in March. These bills
endorsed and set the conditions for nuclear cooperation with Indiaconditions
such as Indias accepting a permanent safeguards agreement the IAEA, working with the United States on a ssile material treaty, maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing, and maintaining very strict export controls. They also
specied that nuclear cooperation with India would only be implemented once
the administration submitted and Congress approved the completed 123
Agreement between Washington and New Delhi, and after Congress received
a copy of Indias safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The House approved
this bill on July 26 by a vote of 359 to 68.
Finally, the Bush administration negotiated with the NSG, which also moved
slowly on the agreement. Indias government discussed the issue with NSG countries such as France, Russia, Australia, and Japan both before and after it announced its separation plan, while U.S. negotiators rst explained the nuclear
agreement to the NSG in October 2005. At the time, NSG members expressed
the opinion that Indias adoption of a credible split of its civilian and military nuclear programs would largely determine NSG support for the agreement.48 On March 23, 2006, U.S. negotiators presented an NSG consultative
group with a draft text of criteria that could allow NSG members to transfer civilian nuclear technology to India. The criteria were generally similar to those in
the draft legislation introduced in Congress on March 16. Yet, while major NSG
countries such as Russia, Britain, and France generally supported nuclear cooperation with India, the NSG deferred acting on the issue at its May meeting.
In short, after India announced its nuclear separation plan, the Bush administra47. Michael Levi and Charles Fergusson, U.S.-India Nuclear CooperationA Strategy for
Moving Forward (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006).
48. Boese, Suppliers Weigh Indian Nuclear Cooperation, p. 42.
694
tion pursued negotiations on many frontswith Congress, the NSG, and India
and India also began discussing a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to secure
approval for nuclear energy transfers to India.
Two-Level Games
International agreements involve negotiations at more than one level.49 They
involve talks at the international level (L1) between states and talks at the domestic level (L2) between national governments and domestic groups whose
support is required to ratify and implement an agreement. Talks at these two
levels are linked in that national negotiators often consult key constituencies at
L2 to hammer out bargaining positions at L1. Domestic constituencies also affect the degree of latitude that national governments have in negotiating agreements at L1. In the case of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, consultations at
L2 were generally absent in the run up to the July 2005 agreement. Domestic
consultations took place largely after July that year, as both governments sought
and, in the case of the Bush administration required, legislative support to implement the agreement. These protracted L2 discussions held back the implementation of the nuclear agreement.
An important aspect of two-level games is the win-set, which is the set of
all L1 agreements that would win approval at L2. In general, larger win-sets
make L1 agreements more likely. The political-institutional requirements in a
country for domestic approval, the political power of governments, and the participation rate of domestic groups all affect the win-set. Regarding politicalinstitutional structures, if the executive branch of government requires legislative
approval to implement a policyand especially if it requires approval of a
large number of legislators such as half to two-thirds of the legislaturethe
win-set decreases. On issues of political power, strong governmentsfor
example, those where the executives political survival is not dependent on
the legislature or where the executive has the support of a comfortable majority
of the legislaturecan better confront domestic opponents allowing for larger
win-sets. The participation rate involves the extent to which domestic interest groups mobilize for or against an issue and the extent to which the issue is
politicized. A high participation rate against a government policy can decrease
the win-set, whereas a low participation rate allows for a larger win-set.
Excluding the Breeder Reactor from
Indias Win-Set
Political-institutional factors allowed Indias government to have a potentially
large win-set because the government did not legally require legislative approval
49. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, pp. 42760.
DINSHAW MISTRY
695
for its nuclear separation plan.50 Yet, the Indian governments win-set became
smaller both because the government was weak in that Prime Minister Singhs
Congress party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was a minority coalition government and also because the increased participation rate of domestic
groups against the nuclear agreement created obstacles for negotiation.
Ideally, a favorable political-institutional structure should have allowed the
UPA government to make many concessions to Washington at L1. Thus, while
India was unlikely to halt ssile material production, an agreement in which
India closed the Cirus reactor, safeguarded a signicant majority of its thermal
reactors, accepted permanent rather than temporary safeguards, and also safeguarded the breeder reactor should theoretically have been within the winset for the UPA government. But, other conditions were not as favorable to
having such a large win-set for Indias nuclear separation plan. In particular,
Indias government was not stable but was a relatively weak minority coalition
government, and the rate of domestic group participation also increased in
January-February 2006, thus making the potential win-set even smaller.
At this time, the UPA coalition faced a signicant domestic challenge from
leftist parties whose support it needed to remain in power. The UPA coalition
held approximately 215 seats in the 545-seat lower house of Parliament, and
relied on the support of leftist parties, which held some 60 seats, to remain in
ofce. These parties had strongly criticized the UPA government for aligning
with the United States and voting against Iran at the September 2005 IAEA
meeting. They expressed similar strong objections to any vote against Iran ahead
of the February 2, 2006, IAEA meeting. The U.S.-India nuclear agreement was
further politicized in the Indian media in January especially after the U.S. ambassador declared that the U.S. Congress would oppose the agreement if India
did not vote against Iran. The UPA government successfully tackled the Iran
issue by February 2 after timely domestic and international developments muted
much of the lefts criticisms.51 Yet, the high domestic participation rate at
50. However, Indian governments have traditionally sought a domestic consensus in foreign
and security policy. Following this consensual approach, Prime Minister Singh briefed Parliament
on July 27, 2005 (soon after the July 18 agreement was announced), and Parliament discussed the
accord on August 3 and 4. The prime minister again briefed Parliament on February 27, 2006, just
ahead of President Bushs visit to India, and on March 7 and 8, after announcing Indias nuclear
separation plan.
51. In late January 2006, under pressure from domestic critics, the UPA government was considering abstaining from a vote against Iran. However, Indias right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) group and the BJP then spoke out against Irans nuclear program because of its prior
ties with Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Further, Russia and China declared that they would
vote against Iran. Both these developments made it politically easier for Indias government to eventually vote against Iran. See Reuters, India Says It Will Abstain in Iran Nuclear Vote, International
Herald Tribune, January 30, 2006; and Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Indias Dilemma on the
Iran Nuclear Issue, February 10, 2006, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/reaction/india.htm.
696
this time involving an intense discussion in the media, criticism from political
parties, and opposition from nuclear scientists made it more difcult for the
weak UPA government to continue confronting its domestic critics. The weak
UPA government clearly preferred to avoid a domestic confrontation over a
second contentious issuethat of the breeder reactorespecially after Indias
nuclear scientists publicly came out against safeguarding it on February 68.
This opposition from Indias scientists caused its potential win-set to shrink
even further by mid-February to exclude the breeder reactor from any L1
agreement. Thus, Indias March nuclear separation plan excluded the breeder
reactor from its list of civilian nuclear facilities, and this created problems for
U.S. congressional approval of the agreement as explained below.
Bringing the Nuclear Agreement into
the U.S. Win-Set
The win-set for the Bush administration was affected by the basic politicalinstitutional issue that the administration could not unilaterally implement the
nuclear agreement without required congressional approval. The high participation rate of domestic groups further decreased the win-set for the Bush
administration. Inuenced by a very active nonproliferation lobby, the U.S.
Congress hesitated to act on the nuclear agreement before India accepted deep
nuclear restraints. In this situation, the administration had less room for L1 concessions to India as its win-set was quite small. Thus, only a restrictive L1
agreement where India closed down the Cirus reactor, safeguarded most of its
thermal power reactors, accepted permanent safeguards, and safeguarded the
breeder reactor, would have been within the potential win-set for the Bush
administration. An L1 agreement without safeguards on the breeder reactor would
give India the ability to considerably enlarge its nuclear arsenal over the long
term once the breeder became operational. Such an L1 agreement, therefore, fell
outside the U.S. win-set in March-April, and the Congress would not approve such a nuclear agreement at the time. Yet, the Bush administration could
still inuence the win-set because it was a strong rather than a weak government
and could bargain with its domestic opponents from a position of strength.
Thus, instead of substantially accommodating the nonproliferation lobby by
re-opening L1 negotiations with India to extract concessions on the breeder
reactor, the Bush administration pursued other options to secure L2 approval.
It sought to specify, in domestic legislation and in a bilateral agreement with
India, that nuclear energy transfers would be conditional upon Indias acceptance of important nonproliferation criteria such as a moratorium on nuclear
testing and the implementation of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It
opted for a compromise in a two-step congressional action process.
A strong Bush administration could also afford to spend political capital in
persuading congressional members to support such a compromise. An increased
DINSHAW MISTRY
697
participation rate among supporters of the nuclear dealincluding lobbyists

from the inuential Indian-American community, strategic and business groups
that benet generally from strengthened U.S.-India ties, and those specically
beneting from defense and nuclear cooperation with Indiafurther swayed
Congress to vote in favor of the rst steps toward nuclear cooperation with
India in July.52
Conclusion
Two factors brought the rst steps to implementing the July 2005 U.S.-India
nuclear agreement into the U.S. win-set by mid-2006a strong U.S. government willing to spend political capital to advance the agreement and a high
participation rate among supporters of the agreement in the United States. Yet,
a continuing high participation rate among the U.S. nonproliferation lobby may
still inuence Congress to impose stringent criteria for nuclear cooperation with
India. For example, Congress considered but ultimately rejected three amendments of concern to India during the July House vote. These amendments required the administration to provide annual assessments of Indias uranium
production and to certify that foreign-supplied uranium was not enabling India
to expand its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. had also sought Indias support for its
policies to contain Irans nuclear program. A further Indian concern was a provision in the July congressional bill that restricted enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers to India. These restrictions were not in the July 2005
agreement.
If the Bush administration accommodates the nonproliferation lobby and
Congress on the above issues to bring the nal 123 Agreement within the
U.S. win-set, Indias government may nd it difcult to maintain the agreement within its win-set. In the run up to and after the July 2006 vote in the
U.S. House, Indias government faced domestic criticism over concerns that
the U.S. was imposing conditions beyond those that New Delhi accepted in
July 2005 and March 2006. That August, Indias main opposition party, the
BJP sought a resolution in Indias Parliament that would oppose such conditions, but Manmohan Singhs government persuaded its coalition partners and
leftist parties to refrain from introducing this resolution.53 Yet, because it is a
weak government, Prime Minister Singhs UPA coalition could nd it difcult
to counter any greater domestic mobilization that could arise if the U.S. Congress imposes stringent conditions for nuclear cooperation.54
52. See Mike Mcintire, Indian Americans Test Their Clout on Atom Pact, New York Times,
June 5, 2006.
53. Sanjay Basak, Left Nuke Stand Confusing, Asian Age, August 13, 2006.
54. Reflecting on such mobilization, Indias leading daily carried a front-page headline on Indias independence day titled Top Scientists Wary of N-Deal. This article highlighted the concerns of eight prominent Indian nuclear scientists, who noted that the nuclear agreement with the
698
In conclusion, domestic politics signicantly delayed the implementation of

the July 2005 nuclear cooperation initiative between Washington and New Delhi.
This nuclear cooperation initiative can only become effective once the U.S.
Congress approves the nal 123 Agreement. The key variables affecting the
approval of this agreement are government strength and domestic mobilization. A stronger Bush administration is better placed to counter the nonproliferation lobby and secure congressional approval of such an agreement. On
the other hand, although it does not legally require parliamentary approval for the
123 Agreement, a weaker Indian government would nd it harder to counter
any substantial domestic mobilization against this agreement. Such mobilization could arise if the 123 Agreement requires conditions for nuclear cooperation that are substantially different from those that New Delhi accepted in
July 2005 and March 2006.
United States should not curb indigenous research and development. They also argued that Parliament should lay down additional rules for the nuclear agreement. See Top Scientists Wary of
N-Deal, Times of India, August 15, 2006.

India 4

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Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.

-India Nuclear Agreement

DIPLOMACY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND

In July 2005, President George Bush announced a major

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

Indias Civilian and Military

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

is efcient for the DAE to pursue three types of reactorsPHWRs, LWRs,

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

in Indias existing inventory, additional plutonium produced by Indias PHWRs

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

A Second Round of Negotiations

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

Indias Domestic Debate

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

The U.S. Domestic Debate

administration ofcials briefed Congress on September 8 and November 2. In

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

The administration eventually accepted the position of the nonproliferation

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

Negotiations after Indias March 2006

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

participation rate among supporters of the nuclear dealincluding lobbyists

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

In conclusion, domestic politics signicantly delayed the implementation of

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