Ganzon vs CA 200 SCRA 271

The petitioners question the power of the President, acting through the Secretary of
Local Government,
to suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitution, the charter
did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or
the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission of
"as may be provided by
law" (Sec. 4, Art. X) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'
autonomy from Congress and
to break Congress' "control" over local govt. affairs. The Constitution did not,
however, intend for the sake of
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. This is a mistaken impression because legally "supervision" is
not incompatible with
disciplinary authority. "Control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter,
modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. "Supervision" on the other hand means overseeing or
the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Adapted.

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the
said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of
authority and grave misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
suspend and remove local officials.
RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority

because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that
the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan,
found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising
that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility
Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in
inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES VS DENR

AT ISSUE IS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17 (B )(3)(III) OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND SECTION 24 OF R.A. NO.7076.

HAS DENR CONTROL OVER SMALL-SCALE MINING IN THE PROVINCES? YES. IT IS

GRANTED UNDER THREE STATUTES: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, THE PEOPLES
SMALL SCALE MINING ACT AND THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT.

THE DENR SECRETARY DECLARED THE APPLICATION FOR EXPLORATION PERMIT OF

AMTC VALID AND CANCELLED THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS GRANTED BY THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. WAS THE DECISION OF THE DENR SECRETARY VALID? YES.
HIS DECISION EMANATED FROM THE POWER OF REVIEW GRANTED TO THE DENR
SECRETARY UNDER R.A. NO. 7076 (PEOPLES SMALL SCALE MINING ACT). Hence, the
decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit
of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF THE DENR TO DECIDE ON THE ISSUE
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SMALL-SCALE MINING
PERMITS? IT IS A QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION
OF WHAT THE LAW IS, AND WHAT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES
ARE, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY AND, ON THE BASIS

THEREOF AND THE FACTS OBTAINING, THE ADJUDICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE

RIGHTS.

The DENR Secretarys power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue
on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves
the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending
parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respectiverights.53

THEN, IS THE ACT OF THE DENR SECRETARY A SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE

PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OR CONTROL OVER HIM? NO. IT IS JUST THE
DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF AMTC. The DENR Secretary exercises quasijudicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to
the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated
with substitution of judgment of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale
Mining Permits nor control over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a
determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

TOPIC: Power of Appointment

CASE Number (including date): L-6898 April 30, 1954
CASE Name: Malang v Quitoriano
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
FACTS
THE CASE
EO 392, dated December 31 1950 created the Placement Bureau.
RA 761 (an Act to Provide for the Organization of a National Employment
Service) was enacted on June 20, 1952.
On June 1, 1953, Secretary of Labor Figueras recommended the appointment
of Manalang as Commissioner of the National Employment Service.
On June 29, 1953, Quitoriano, then Acting Secretary of Labor, made a
recommendation in favor of Manalang.
However, Quitoriano was designated, and sworn in, on July 1, 1953
as Acting Commissioner of the National Employment Service by the
Office of the President. Morabe was designated the same position on
September 11, 1953. De Venancio was designated the same position on
January 1954, and assumed the office as well.
RELEVANT LAWS

RA 761 Sec 1:
Upon the organization of the Service, the existing Placement Bureau and the
existing Employment Office in the Commission of Social Welfare shall be
abolished, and all the files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel
and unexpended balances of appropriations of said Bureau and Commission
pertaining to said bureau or office shall thereupon be transferred to the
Service.
ISSUES
1 Whether or not the designation of Quitoriano is illegal and
equivalent to the removal of Manalang from the office without
cause?
2 Whether or not RA 761 abolished the Placement Bureau? (As
opposed to the Service instead continuing the Placement Bureaus
functions and the title of Placement Bureau merely fading away)
3 Whether or not Manalang is entitled to the office automatically by
operation of law?
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
(1) No:
Manalang was never Commissioner of the Service, so he couldnt
have been removed therefrom.
To remove an office is to oust him from office before the expiration of the
term.
There is neither a removal nor a suspension of Manalang, but an abolition of
his former office of Director of the Placement Bureau.
(2) No:
Transfer connotes that the Service is distinct from the Placement Bureau,
because transferring something may only be from one place to another.
Had Congress intended service to be a mere enlargement of the Bureau, the
RA wouldve directed the retention of the qualified personnel, not their
transfer.
(3) No:
In his pleadings, Manalang admitted that he need a new appointment as
Commissioner of the Service.
He does not hold the Services item, as the right thereto may be
acquired only by appointment of the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. The President and the CA cannot
do this if the Director of the Placement Bureau automatically
became Commissioner of the Service.
The transfer of the qualified personnel provided under RA 761 does not
save him either/

RULING:
Wherefore the petition is dismissed

Topic : Powers and Functions of the President Power of Appointment

Case Number : G.R. No. 104732 (June 1993)

Case Name : Flores vs Drilon

Ponente : J. Bellosillo

FACTS

The case involves a petition filed by individuals who claim to be taxpayers,

employees of the

U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian

Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, assailing the

constitutionality of Sec

13 (d) of RA 7227 ("Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992") and praying
for

prohibition, preliminary injunction, and temporary restraining order.

o Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227

(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as

administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the

Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex

oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the

Subic Authority: Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the

effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the

chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority

Under RA 7227, respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was

appointed Chairman

and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).

Petitioners claim that the assailed proviso of RA 7227 infringes on the following
constitutional

and statutory provisions:

a. Sec 7 (1) Art. IXB no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation

in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure

o Petitioners: City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject

b. Sec 16, Art. VII of the Constitution the President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers

of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and

those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint

o Petitioners: Through the questioned proviso, it was Congress, and not the

c. Sec 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code

o Petitioners: The appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made

posts are public offices;

President, who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts

by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited

45day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections

ISSUES

1. W/N Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227 violates Sec 7 (1) Art. IXB (the constitutional
proscription against

appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts)

2. W/N respondents can invoke Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which
permits the

appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the

primary

functions of his office.

3. W/N SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City,
and

appointment to which, is an exemption to the constitutional prohibition

aforementioned.

4. W/N Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227 violates Sec 16, Art. VII of the Constitution (legislative

encroachment on the appointing authority of the President)

5. W/N the appointment of respondent Mayor Gordon as Chairman of the Board and
Chief

Executive Officer of SBMA is void.

HELD

1. YES. Sec 7 (1) Art. IXB expresses the policy against the concentration of several
public

positions in 1 person, so that a public officer or employee may serve fulltime with
dedication

and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227
violates this

because it directs the President to appoint an elective official to other government

posts

(Mayor of Olongapo City as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA)

2. NO. Respondents cannot invoke said provision for the very reason that no law can
prevail over

the constitution.

3. NO. SC held that Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as
ex officio or

automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of

appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to

make the

SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo
City. Had it

been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would
have, at

least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been
used.

4. YES.

o Appointment the designation of a person, by the person or persons having

authority

o SC held that under Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227, while Congress provided the President
with the

therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust, or the selection or

designation of a

person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public

function and discharge the duties of the same, or the selection, by the authority
vested with

the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.

Considering

that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a

discretion.

appointing authority, said appointing authority is limited only to only 1 eligible (the

incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City). The president is precluded from exercising his

discretion to choose whom to appoint. This situation is tantamount to not having

power at

all.

5. YES. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for

appointment to the

position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA. SC held that his
appointment

thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be

sustained.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . .
Provided, however, That for

the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City
of Olongapo shall be

appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is
declared

unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of

Olongapo City,

respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent
Gordon, if any, as

such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts
otherwise legitimate

done by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby
UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

TOPIC: Power of Appointment

DOCTRINE: president has the power to remove as well as appoint
CASE Number (including date): GR No. L-22754, Dec 31, 1965
CASE Name: villaluz v zaldivar
Ponente bautista angelo
FACTS
Plaintiff was appointed as administrator of motor office in 1958. He took his
oath after the nomination from the acting assistant executive secretary,
sofronio quiason
Congressman Roces, Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of the
House of Representatives sent a letter to the president informing the
president of the gross mismanagement and inefficiency made by plaintiff in
his office.
Congressman roces recommended that he be removed and that there be a
complete revamp of the department under a new chief.

Plaintiff was given 72 hours to send a letter explaining the accusations

against him to which he complied.
He was then suspended by executive secretary and an investigating
committee was made to address charges against him.
Committee submitted its report to the president who then issued
administrative order 332 removing plaintiff from his position and appointing
his replacement apolonio ponio
ISSUES
1 Whether or not the president has has jurisdiction to investigate and
remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the noncompetitive or unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
(1) yes. The principle that applies here is that the power to appoint is the
power to remove which can be implied from RA 2260. Only permanent
officers are under the civil service and his appointed office belongs to a noncompetitive unclassified category under the aforementioned article. The chief
executive can initiate action motu proprio (on his own) under EO 370 series of
1941 which reads:
o Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer
or employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned
motu proprio or upon complaint of any person which shall be
subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a
complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or
chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take
action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances of the
case, so warrant
RULING:
Wherefore the petition is denied

TOPIC: Power of Appointment

DOCTRINE:

CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. L17539 December 23, 1921

CASE Name: Concepcion vs Paredes

Ponente: Malcolm

FACTS

March 1921 judges of first instance were called to Manila by the Sec of
Justice

(Paredes) for the drawing of lots for judicial districts

Prominent judges (Concepcion et. al.) united to stop the holding of the
lottery and

challenged the validity of Act No. 2941, "An Act to amend and repeal certain
provisions

relative to the judiciary, etc, Sec. 1, which superseded Art. 148 par. 2 of
the

Administrative Code

o Unless otherwise provided, on March fifteenth, nineteen hundred and twenty

one, and every five years thereafter, the judges of first instance with the same

salaries shall exchange judicial districts, and the same shall be done by the

auxiliary judges as to the respective groups of judicial districts in which they

shall serve during the ensuing fiveyear period. The exchange of districts or

groups of judicial districts shall be determined by lot between the judges

affected, observing the following rule, which shall be mandatory: no judge shall

continue to serve in the district or group in which he has been serving during

the last five years.

J. Malcolm issued a preliminary injunction towards the Act while the case was
pending

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the paragraph is valid

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) No:

o The law before us would require a drawing of lots for judicial positions,
while the

organic law would require selection for judicial positions by the Governor
General

with the assent of the Philippine Senate. Chance has been substituted for
executive

judgment.

o Appointment by lot is not appointment by the GovernorGeneral. Appointment by

lot is

not appointment with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. To leave the

selection of a person for a given judicial office to lot is not to appoint, but is to
gamble

with the office.

o It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws which
either

expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the

Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature.

o The power of appointment and confirmation vested by the Organic Act in

the

GovernorGeneral and the Philippine Senate is usurped by a lottery of judicial offices

every five years. An independent and selfrespecting judiciary must continue to

exist in

the Philippine. The orderly course of constitutional government must be maintained.

RULING:

It is our holding that the second paragraph of section 148 of the

Administrative Code, as

superseded by Act No. 2941, is in violation of the provisions of the Organic

Act and,

consequently, invalid. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued shall be made

permanent.

No costs shall be assessed. So ordered.

Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549

F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the
Bar and law professors,
to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground
that his appointment, w/o
confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional.

HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power
of the 1986 Con Com
read:

Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on
Appointment, shall appoint the
heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments.

However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the
provision. The first was
to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after
the word "captain" and

substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The
first amendment was
intended to exempt the appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of
confirmation on the ground that
this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to
political influence. On the
other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those
mentioned in the frist
sentence, namely:
The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in the
Consti, i.e.,
(1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]
(2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IXB,
Sec. 1 (2)];
(3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IXC,
Sec. 1 (2)];
(4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IXD,
Sec. 1 (2)];
(5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)
The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation.
These are: (1) all
other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law; (2) those whom the Pres.
may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose
appointments Congress may by law
vest in the Pres. alone.

TOPIC: Emergency Powers

DOCTRINE:
CASE Number (including date): GR No. L-6266, February 2, 1953
CASE Name: Bautista vs Salonga
Ponente: Padilla, J.

FACTS
It was made clear in Sarmiento v Mison who the President may appoint with
and without the help of the Commission on Appointments (CA)
The court is again confronted with a similar question .
August 27, 1987, Presidewnt Cory Aquino designated petitioner as Acting
Chairman, Commission on Human Rights
December 17, 1988 = extended the appointment to be a permanent one.
January 9, 1989 after her oath of office, petitioner received a letter from the
Secretary of the CA requesting her to submit documents in connection with
confirmation fo her appointment as Chairman of the CHR

January 10 she received an invitation to a meeting wherein they would

deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the CHR
January 13, 1989 she wrote back to them giving reasons as to why her
appointment is not under their jurisdiction.
Feb 1 1989 CA wrote to Exec Sec Macaraig about Bautistas ad interim
appointment from Jan 14 1989 and informed him that, as previously
conveyed to him in a letter of 25 January 1989, the Commission on
Appointments disapproved petitioner Bautista's "ad interim appointment' as
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of her refusal to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments
On the same date, the CAs Secretary informed petitioner that the motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" was denied by the
Commission on Appointments.
While this case was pending, Cory Aquino designated another person as
Acting Chairman of the Commission until the resolution of Bautistas case
Senate President Salonga declared Bautista no longer able to hold on to her
position after her appointment was not confirmed the second time
He says that is she insists on staying in office- she may be accused of
usurpation of authority.
Jan 20 1989 before CA acted on her ad interim appointment as chairman
she filed for certiorari with prayer for restraining order on the CA on the
ground that they do not have jurisdiction over her appointments .
respondents given 10 days to respond
Feb 7 1989 petitioner filed an amended petition, this time with a prayer for
a restraining order impleading the nullification of the second appointment, to
Mallillin, as chairman of CHR (the appointment while her case is pending)
TRO to Mallillin granted
No TRO granted against the CA because it is a co-ordinate and co-equal
branch of government to them.
In accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution and the
doctrine in Mison Bautistas appointment on 17 December 1988 is
an appointment that was for the President solely to make.
The second appointment, to Mallillin, is not valid since there was technically
no vacancy to which an appointment could be made.
ISSUE
W/N the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is to be made with confirmation of the
CA?
NO
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not
among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the

confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the

appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made
without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, this appointment is pursuant to the second sentend of
the provision wherein it is one of the offices of government the President may
be authorized by law to appoint.
Specifically, in section 2 of Executive Order no. 163,
o (c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human
Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she

is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful
incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said
office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against
respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of the
Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.

TOPIC: Power of Appointment

DOCTRINE: APPOINTMENT of sectoral representatives need confirmation
by Commission of Appointments
CASE Number (including date): GR No. 83216 | Sept 4, 1989
CASE Name: Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commissions
Ponente: Bidin, J.

FACTS
Teresita Quintos-Deles and 3 others were appointed Sectoral
Representatives (Women, Youth, Peasant, Urban Poor) by the President in
1988 (pursuant to Art.7, Sec. 16-2 and Art. 18, Sec.7 of the Constitution). The
letter regarding the appointment were sent to Speaker Mitra, Jr.
The 4 appointees were not able to take their oaths because congressmenmembers of the Commission on Appointments opposed, insisting that the
sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the Commission. Mitra, Jr.
suspended the oath-taking of the four sectoral representatives.
As reaction to this, Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr. sent a letter to the
Commission submitting for confirmation the appointments of the 4 sectoral
representatives. Meanwhile, petitioner (via letter to Speaker Mitra, Jr.)
appealed to the HoR alleging that since no attempt was made to subject the
sectoral representatives* already sitting to the confirmation process, there is

no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present

batch would certainly be discriminatory. *
o * It appears that on August 4, 1987, President Aquino initially
appointed four sectoral representatives, namely: Romeo Angeles,
Ramon Jabar, Estelita Juco and Dionisio S. Ojeda, to represent the
Peasants, Labor, Disabled and Women and Veterans and Elders
sectors, respectively. Said sectoral representatives, after taking their
oaths of office, assumed the functions and duties of their offices
without having been required to undergo confirmation process by the
Commission on Appointments.
Speaker Mitra replied by saying that since Pres. Cory Aquino has submitted
the appointment to the Commission for confirmation, the Commission now
has sole jurisdiction over the matter.
A meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of
the Commission on Appointments ended with the Committee ruling against
the position of Deles.
Hence, this petition for prohibition/mandamus praying that Comm. On App.
be enjoined from subjecting to confirmation process the petitioner (Deles)s
appointment as sectoral representative for women and as member of
Congress. Meanwhile, the Comm.On.App. says that the appointment of Deles,
not being acted upon by the Commission when Congress went into
recess, has become moot and academic
o Sec. 23 of Rules of the Commission: Suspension of Consideration of
Nomination or Appointments to be Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the
Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session
of Congress shall be returned to the President, and unless resubmitted,
shall not again be considered by the Commission.

ISSUES
4 W/N the Constitution (Art. 18, Sec.7) requires the appointment of
sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments
5 If so, W/N the Constitution Art. 7, Sec. 16 provides an exception as
the appointment was done during the recess of Congress

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) Yes: In Sarmiento vs Mison, the Court held that only appointments
mentioned in the 1st sentence of Art. 7, Sec. 16 requires confirmation:
o First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for by law;
o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential
in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be
strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence
of Art. 7, Sec. 16 where it is clearly stated that appointments by the
President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. (Mison Doctrine)
It is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments .
(2) NO. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as
authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President
as appointing authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
o Art. 7, Sec. 16 (2): The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the
President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no
confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the
constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a
matter of fact, the President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had
expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress had
adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments
having
acted
on
petitioner's
appointment,
said
appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to
Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and "unless
resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission."
NOTE: 2 things matter in answering this. First, the appointment of sectoral
representatives are done by virtue of the constitution and therefore fall to the first
category of officers (requiring confirmation) identified in Sarmiento vs Mison.
Second, petitioner was appointed during recess which appointment ended when the
o

Congress adjourned as stated above (in Art. 7, Sec. 16 -2) and has become moot
and academic when the President submitted the appointment for confirmation to
COA.
Extra: While petitioner is right that Executive Order No. 198 does not specify that
sectoral representatives appointment need confirmation, the said EO does not deal
with the manner of appointment of sectoral representatives and thus cannot be
used to support petitioners argument. The power of the President to appoint
sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order No.
198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the
consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence
of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.
RULING:
Wherefore the petition is DISMISSED. ^_^

TOPIC: Power of Appointment

DOCTRINE:
CASE Number (including date):G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992
CASE Name:CALDERON VS CARALE
Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor
Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its
confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation
by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of
the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law,
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed
by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUES
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the
president to government officers additional to those expressly

mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the

Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) No: Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the
"third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC
are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.

DISSENTING OPINION | (CRUZ)

I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be reexamined instead of being automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I
do not believe we should persist in error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial
precedent, however unsound.

Endencia vs. David

By: Gayle Angeli Recto
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
FACTS
Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and
Justice Fernando Jugos compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which states that SEC. 13.
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a

diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to Solicitor General
Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by
Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
The Solicitor General also reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE
Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.
HELD
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of
a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The
rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the
courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as
used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only
of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990
judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

TOPIC: Power of Appointment

DOCTRINE: Art. 7, Sec. 10(3); Revised Election Code, Sec. 21(b) - Whenever in any
elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death, resignation, removal
or cessation of the incumbent, the President shall appoint thereto a suitable person
belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the
recommendation of said party, save in the case of a mayor, which shall be filled by
the vice-mayor.
CASE Number (including date): GR No. L-7870, Oct 31, 1955
CASE Name: Ramos vs. Alvarez
Ponente: Reyes, A., J.

FACTS
Aritao, member of Liberal Party, was elected the 3 rd member of the Provincial
Board of Negros Occidental in 1951, but he resigned in 1953 when he ran for
congressman.
To fill this vacancy, Pres. Quirino, acting on authority of Revised Election
Code, Sec. 21(b), appointed Ramos ad interim for the position and he
assumed office shortly thereafter (remember, immediate assumption pag ad
interim). Then his appointment was submitted to CA for confirmation.
Before CA could confirm though, there was a change in presidents and the
new Pres. Magsaysay then nominated Alvarez for the same office, which was
what CA unanimously confirmed in 1954. So they rejected Ramos
appointment and Alvarez assumed his office.
Ramos filed this petition to have himself declared legally entitled to the office
and to have Alvarez ousted therefrom.
ISSUES
Whether or not an appointment made by the President under section 21(b) of
the Revised Election Code is subject to the consent of the CA.
a If not subject to such consent, the appointment would not cease to be
effective upon its disapproval by the Commission, with the result that
petitioner would in that case still have title to the office and the
consequent right to have respondent ousted therefrom
b On the other hand, if the appointment is subject to the consent of the Commission,
then by express provision of the Constitution (Art. VII, sec. 10, clause 4) it would
cease to be effective upon its disapproval by that body, and in that case the
petitioner, with himself no longer entitled to the office, would have no right to insist on
respondent's ouster.
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) Yes: When a stature does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, it
must be by the President by and with the consent of the Senate (general rule
in US)
o Art. 7, sec 10(3) of the Constitution provides for the four groups of
officers the President shall appoint. The debate is on whether the
appointment is under the third group (those whom the President may
be authorized to appoint) or the fourth group (inferior officers whose
appointments the Congress has by law vested in the President alone).
o SC ruled that it is under the third group because Revised Election Code
Sec. 21(b) does NOT say it is to be made by the President alone. So SC
applied the general rule in US regarding constitutional provisions such
as this that it is assumed that Presidential appointments require the
CAs (in US its Senate) approval unless it is expressly provided
otherwise.
o The law in express terms authorizes the President to make
appointments to fill vacancies in certain elective local offices under the
conditions therein specified, but it does not say that the authority to
make such appointments is vested "in the President alone." The
appointees, therefore, come squarely under that group of officers
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, so that their
appointment is subject to the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
RULING:
Wherefore, the writ prayed for is denied. With costs.

Obiter Dictum:
During the debates of the commission for the Revised Election Code, it was
revealed that Sec.21(b) in its present form was the result of an amendment
introduced by Senator Imperial intended to do away with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments in the case of appointments to elective
provincial offices so long as the appointee belongs to the political party of the
officer whom he is to replace and is recommended by said party. But SC says this
does not hold because we cannot assume that all the members of the commission
had the same intentions. Statements of individual members during such debates on
the meaning of a provision is not admissible as an aid in interpreting it and are not a
safe guide because those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who
did, and those who did speak may differ from each other also. SO ALWAYS FOLLOW
TEXT IF IT IS CLEAR.

TOPIC: Non-delegability
DOCTRINE:

CASE Number: GR No. 92008; July 30, 1990

CASE Name: Binamira vs Garrucho, Jr.
Ponente: Cruz, J.
FACTS
Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed
without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. The petitioner bases
his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of
Tourism on April 7, 1986. Persuant thereto, petitioner assumed office on the
same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of
PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had
been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the
Office of the President. He complains that his resignation was demanded by
respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a
memorandum stating that petitioner's designation is invalid since it was
designated not by the President but only by the Secretary of Tourism.
Garrucho is then designated as General Manager until the President can
appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity. Garrucho
took over as the General Manager of the PTA and thereafter Pres. Aquino
appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of PTA.
ISSUES
Whether or not petitioner had been removed without just cause in violation of
security of tenure
HELD
(1) No: the designation is considered only on an acting or temporary appointment
which does not confer security of tenure.

Section 23-A of the P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority
provides that The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six years unless sooner removed
for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as
such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the
Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear
distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has
failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely
the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official as in this

case where the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of

Directors of the PTA.
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure of the person named.
The decree also provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the
PTA shall be made by the president, not by any other officer. Appointment
involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to
assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President
In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, the doctrine presumes the acts of the
Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, which was
true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner.
But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, as also happened in the
case at bar. With this ruling, it can be said that petitioner's designation is an
unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid
title to the position in question.
RULING:
Wherefore the petition is dismissed.

Bermudez vs Torres
G.R. No. 131429 | 1999-08-04

Subject:
Discretionary Nature of Power to Appoint; Power of Control of the President; Statutory
Construction-Discretionary
vs
Mandatory
Facts:
In the vacancy of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac, Oscar Bermudez
(current OIC of the office) and Conrado Quiaoit were both recommended as qualified to
the position. Quiaoit was the one appointed by President Ramos. However, Bermudez

refused

to

vacate

the

Office

of

Provincial

Prosecutor.

Bermudez challenges the appointment of Quiaoit on the ground that the appointment
lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice as prescribed under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, to wit: All provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary."
Quiaoit, nonetheless, performed the functions and duties of the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor and has been regularly receiving the salary, RATA and other emoluments of
the
office.
Held:
Appointment

to

Public

Office

1. An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or

selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform
the
duties
and
functions
of
an
office
or
trust.
2. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing
authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order
to
render
it
effective.
3. The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for
himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power. (citing Flores vs Drilon)
The President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him
or
altogether
ignore
their
recommendation
4. When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appointa
subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it
an
ample
discretion
of
whom
to
appoint.
5. The President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of
control over
all executive
departments,
bureaus
and
offices.
6. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even
nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his
duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former
deems
it
to
be
appropriate.

Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions
of an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom
that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or
altogether
ignore
their
recommendations.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary should be understood only as
advisory
and
not
binding
or
obligatory
7. It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the
Secretary, should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character but not binding or obligatory upon the party
to
whom
it
is
made.
8. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The
President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of
discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the
scope
of
his
authority.
Statutory

ConstructionDirectory

vs

Mandatory

9. There is no hard-and-fast rule in ascertaining whether the language in a statute

should be considered mandatory or directory, and the application of a ruling in one
particular instance may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be determined
on the basis of the specific law in issue and the peculiar circumstances attendant to it.
More often than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a
case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in
looking
at
the
legislative
intent.
10. Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and no
injury can result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed when substantially the same
results can be obtained, then the statute should be regarded merely as directory,
rather than as mandatory, in character.

TOPIC: Necessity of Discretion

DOCTRINE:

CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. 106677 | 19930723

CASE Name: HERMOGENES P. POBRE, petitioner, vs. MARIANO E. MENDIETA and

HON.

CORONA IBAYSOMERA in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 26, Regional

Trial

Court of Manila, respondents.

Ponente

FACTS

These consolidated petitions filed by Hermogenes Pobre to set aside the

decision and writ of

prohibitory injunction issued by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Corona Ibay
Somera, annulling

the appointment extended by President Aquino to the petitioner as

Commissioner/Chairman of the

Professional Regulation Commission (hereafter PRC for brevity) and enjoining him
from discharging

the duties and functions of that office.

controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio
B. Francia as PRC

Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the

senior Associate

Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of

the PRC.

On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of

Acting Secretary of

Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint the
Commissioner of the

Professional Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, as

amended, which

provides:

o "Sec. 2. Composition. The Commission shall be headed by one fulltime

Commissioner and two fulltime

Associate Commissioners, all to be appointed by the President for a term of

nine (9) years without

reappointment to start from the time they assume office, except the first two
Associate Commissioners who

shall be appointed, one for six (6) years and the other for three (3) years, and
thereafter, any vacancy in the

Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most senior of the
Associate Commissioners

succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or

removal. No person shall be

appointed chairman or member of the Commission unless he is at least forty (40)

years of age, familiar with

the principles and methods of professional regulation and/or licensing and has
at least five (5) years of

executive or managerial experience.

The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may

appoint as

Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person

other

than the Senior Associate Commissioner.

Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered: Section 2 of P.D. No.
223 does

not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. A contrary

interpretation

would taint the provision with unconstitutionality since it would countenance a

usurpation

by the legislature of a power which does not belong to it but pertains to the
executive. It

has been said that 'those matters which the Constitution specifically confides
to the

executive, the legislative cannot directly or indirectly take from his control'

President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate

Commissioner, as

the PRC Commissioner/Chairman.

Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent,

Mariano A.

Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for

declaratory relief

against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary

of Justice

Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or

recommending,

the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because

under

Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was
legally

entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC

ISSUES

1. Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict the
appointing power of the

President to appoint PRC Commissioner

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) No: Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of Mendieta which she
rationalized as follows:

o "The clear intent of Sec. 2 of P.D. 223 is to systematically provide a law allowing
succession

to the Office of the Commissioner. More so, the Court could not take credence on
the claim

of respondent to the effect that the most senior Associate Commissioner may only
succeed

to the Office of the Commissioner of the PRC only for unexpired portion. The
unexpired

portion emphasized under P.D. 223 merely pertains to that of the Associate
Commissioner's

term and has precisely nothing to do with the term of office of the Commissioner.
Hence, if

the law does not distinguish neither the Court should distinguish nor may any other
person

be allowed to do so.

Filling the vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate
Commissioner) by

"succession" or by "operation of law" would deprive the President of his power to

appoint a new PRC

Commissioner and Associate Commissioners "all to be appointed by the

President" under P.D. No.

223.

o the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would
be when the

o Court cannot presume that the when the President issued the PD, he limited his
power to

position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant.

appoint to only of the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the
ladder in

that agency.

past 19 years that the PRC has existed, it has not been the practice to fill the
unexpired term of a

departing PRC Commissioner or Associate Commissioner by "automatic

succession." Instead, the

incumbent was allowed to "hold over" beyond his 9year term until someone was
appointed by the

President to succeed him.

said provision of P.D. 223 applies only to the unexpired term of the
Chairman/Commissioner, the

underlined clause: "at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal" can not
possibly refer to

the Chairman/Commissioner for it would contradict the first clause providing

that he will be

succeeded by the senior Associate Commissioner "for the unexpired portion of

his term only."

There can be no more "unexpired term" to speak of if the Chairman stepped down
"at the expiration

of his term." It is more logical to assume that the underlined clause refers to the
senior Associate

Commissioner who should serve only up to "the expiration of his term, resignation
or removal."

The substitution of "until" for "at" in this case is justified for the following reasons:

o (1) the term of the commissioner and associate commissioners is fixed at

nine (9) years

without reappointment. Hence, the senior Associate Commissioner who serves

the

unexpired term of the chairman, may not exceed his own 9year term.

o (2) to preserve the staggering of the 9year term of the Commissioner and
Associate

Commissioners so that the president need not appoint a Commissioner or

Associate

Commissioner except once every three (3) years.

o (3) to fix the "expiration of the term" of the Commissioner and Associate
Commissioners on

a definite date which is January 2nd every three (3) years, beginning January 2,
1974 when

the PRC was first organized.

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to

succeed Julio B. Francia,

Jr. at the expiration of his term, did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in
fact conforms

with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the
legality of said

appointment should be upheld.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned decision dated
August 5, 1992

and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by respondent
Judge in Civil Case

No. 9260272 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The appointment of petitioner
Hermogenes P.

Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission is

declared lawful and

in order. No costs. .\

Topic: Prohibitions during Election Period on Appointments

Doctrine: President cannot appoint anyone during the election ban
Case Number: [ A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 09, 1998 ]
Case Name: IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF HON. MATEO A.
VALENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH 24, CABANATUAN CITY,
RESPECTIVELY.
Ponente: NARVASA, CJ
Relevant Facts

Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed
by His Excellency the President under the date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo
A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively.

There was a conflict of views between the members of the JBC. Senior Associate
Justice Regalado, as adviser to the JBC, said that the election ban does not cover
appointments to the Judiciary while the Chief Justice was of the opposite view.
This was manifested in an exchange of letters between the Chief Justice and
Malacaang.

The Chief Justice stated that Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition
on the President: he "shall not make appointments" within the period mentioned,
and since there is no specification of which appointments are proscribed, the
same may be considered as applying to all appointments of any kind and nature.
This is the general rule then, the only exception being only as regards "executive
positions" as to which "temporary appointments" may be made within the
interdicted period "when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety." As the exception makes reference only to
"executive" positions, it would seem that "judicial" positions are covered by the
general rule.

After the exchanges in correspondence, the Office of the Oresident sent the
appointment papers of the two judges, rendering an obligation upon the Chief
Justice of acting thereon.

The Court then resolved to have the matter docketed and instructed that the
appointments of the two judges and the JBC take no action whatsoever in the
meantime.

Issues

W/N THE PRESIDENT CAN ISSUE APPOINTMENTS IN THE JUDICIARY

DURING THE ELECTION BAN ON APPOINTMENTS.
Ratio Decidendi

No.
o

The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution - "(t)wo months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term" - the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It
is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect
only once every six years.

The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII - allowing

appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein
provided - is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The
exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly
restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the
ban.

Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling
vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of
appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in
case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the
prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for

avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of

some cases.
Ruling

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively,
and to order them, forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to
forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to
which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998. This, without prejudice
to their being considered anew by the Judicial and Bar Council for re-nomination to
the same positions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Posted by kaye lee on 11:22 PM
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]

FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On
the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next
day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed,
thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered
void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia
administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare
for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which
he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for
him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended
or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before
the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as
an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort
to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

FACTS:
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through regular and
successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in
December 13, 1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the CoA in
26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim appointment.
President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim appointments extended and
released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13 1961.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration, informed Jorge that
pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment was among those
revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands was considered vacant.
Jovencio Mayor had been designated by the President to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a
petition for mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed Director of Lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid revocation of Jorge's
ad interim appointment.
RULING:
No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on
record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the
same day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial
cognizance, that the session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore,
after regular office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be
presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that
being the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor
intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked.

Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA and thereafter, the office never became
vacant.

TOPIC: Power of Appointment - Prohibition During Election Period

DOCTRINE: The ban on midnight appointments does not extend to the
appointment of the Chief Justice in an instance of vacancy. (According to
the majority opinion)
CASE Number (including date): GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010 and April
20, 2010
CASE Name: De Castro vs JBC
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
FACTS

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
o
Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, says that [a] vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy."
December 22, 2009: Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC,
addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
January 18, 2010: Meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution opening the position
for application or recommendation; such announcement was published in the Inquirer
and the Philippine Star. the JBC "automatically considered" for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the
names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint,
written report, or opposition.
ISSUES & HELD
(sorry if i renewed the format, marami kasi so its easier this way)

PRELIMINARY ISSUE: LOCUS STANDI

YES: The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in
the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The
issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the
petitioners in particular.

JUSTICIABILITY OF THE ISSUE

YES: We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe
for judicial determination. The JBC has already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the

President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the
next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began
the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to
decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or
to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination
o

We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for
the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough
that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. The reasonable certainty of the
occurrence is enough.

ISSUE #1: W/N the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments
to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary
o Relevant provisions:
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1).The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
COURT SAYS: NO, the prohibition does not stand, on three (3) grounds:
1) The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
o
The framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and
arranging the Constitution. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of
which embody the allocation of the powers of government among the three
great departments. Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and
the presidential power of appointment is dealt with here. Article VIII is
dedicated to the Judicial Department and it is here where we can find the
provision about a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
o
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could have included the
explicit prohibition in Article 7 instead of in Article 8. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

The records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in

the Constitution "a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein
within 90 days from its occurrence," which even Valenzuela conceded.
Additionally, the use of the word shall in Sec 4(1), Article 8 poses an
imperative duty on the President to fill up the vacancy. The language is clear.
Reversal of a precedent case Valenzuela: Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the
JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former
member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to
apply to appointments in the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly
mentioned, should prevail. We reverse Valenzuela.

2) Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in
the Judiciary, only to the Executive Department.
o One of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII
was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section
15, Article VII, the Court has no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.
a. They did not intend for it to extend to judicial departments, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process
of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the
Judiciary. The JBC is an effective measure against midnight appointments
precisely because of its screening process.

ISSUE #2: The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of
1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the
successor.
COURT SAYS: NO. For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be
permanent, not one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 12 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief
Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to
perform the duties and powers of the office

ISSUE #3: W/N Writ of mandamus lies against the JBC

NO: We find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a
writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature,
because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which
to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

ISSUE #4: W/N Writ of prohibition lies against the JBC

NO: The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly
unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates
for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance with
the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners' actual interest, because they
have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some
vacancies in the Judiciary. Petitioners have no locus stand on the issue.

RULING:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. The case is
remanded for the District Court's reconsideration of the question
whether respondent's pretrial showings were insufficient to
withstand petitioners' motion for summary judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION | CARPIO-MORALES, J.
The prohibition against appointing the Chief Justice should stand.
1) Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional
construction.

Section sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of Article VII, as explained in the
fourth ratiocination, does not suffice to signify functional structuring. That the power of
judicial appointment was lodged in the President is a recognized measure of limitation
on the power of the judiciary, which measure, however, is counterbalanced by the
election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from the political climate of
presidential elections.

2) The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils of midnight
appointments in the judiciary.

The Constitutional Commission (ConCom) saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on
midnight appointments, finding that the establishment of the J BC is not enough to
safeguard or insulate judicial appointments from politicization.

3) All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the
ponencia

The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL kinds of midnight
appointments. The Constitution made no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

4) The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is suspended during the ban
on midnight appointments.
5) The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight appointments ban
without an appointed Chief Justice.

TOPIC: Prohibition during Election Period

DOCTRINE: Art. 7 Sec. 20
CASE Number (including date): GR#131136 Feb 28, 2001
CASE Name: De Rama vs. CA
Ponente: Ynares Santiago

FACTS
Conrado de Rama won as mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon. One of the first things
he did upon assumption of office was to write the Civil Service Commission
and seek the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees.
According to him, said appointments should be recalled as they were
midnight appointments of the former mayor, Evelyn Abeja. The CSC denied
his request saying that the appointments of the 14 employees were made in
accordance with law and that the sec.15, art.VII of the Constitution which is
being relied upon by Mayor de Rama, pertains only to the appointments of
the outgoing President and not of local elective officials.
Upon appeal to the CA, Mayor de Rama filed a supplemental pleading to the
appeal alleging that the appointments were also tainted with fraud since the
former mayor did not follow the rule in sec.80 of Ra 7041 that appointments
can only be made within 4 months from the publication of the vacancies.
CSC ruled that Article 7 Section 15 specifically applies to appointments made
by the president or the acting president 2 months immediately prior to the
next presidential elections

ISSUES
7 Whether or not appointments made by the former mayor can be
recalled by De Rama for being unconstitutional.

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) NO: The CSC has correctly ruled that the appointments were made in
accordance with the law. It was already too late for Mayor de Rama to claim
that appointments were tainted with fraud since he did not raise this in his

first complaint, which only relied on his allegation that the same were
midnight appointments. Only the CSC has the power to recall the
appointments upon grounds mentioned in the Revised Administrative Code.
However, none of the grounds exist to warrant the recall of the said
appointments. To grant the mayors request is to violate the security of
tenure of the appointed employees. Aside from this, the Court ruled that it
was error for Mayor de Rama to invoke the constitutional prohibition against
midnight appointments. According to the Court, this only pertains to
appointments made by an outgoing President and is not applicable to
appointments made by an outgoing mayor.
RULING:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC Resolutions Nos.
96-2828 and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
DISSENTING OPINION | Justice Mendoza
The prohibition against midnight appointments is not limited to those made by an
outgoing President. The same covers those made by outgoing elective officials since
midnight appointments in general are bad because they are made hurriedly, without
due deliberation and careful consideration of the needs of the office and the
qualifications of the appointee. Moreover, the offend principle of fairness, justice
and righteousness.

Pimentel vs. Ermita

Post under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the

appointments issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B.
Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C.
Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.

On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to

respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23
September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in
an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents
as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislatures interference in the executives power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose
on the President the duty to appoint any particular person
to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is

composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have
appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in
case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an
Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting
Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill
an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an
office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as
the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary
as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether

temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust

and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant
while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the
Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may not
be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that
person competent.

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments

in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners
fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed
one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this
safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting
appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused,
they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.

TOPIC: Power of Appointment Confirmation by Commission on Appointments,

Appointments
Not
Subject to Confirmation
DOCTRINE: Art. 7, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution
CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. 153881 (Mar. 24, 2003)
CASE Name: Soriano III vs. Lista
Ponente: Justice Corona

FACTS
Summary: Petition for prohibition of President Gloria MacapagalArroyos
appointment
of respondent eight Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) officers
without
submitting their name for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments.
Petitioner Elpidio Soriano III, a lawyer, filed the petition on the grounds
of a taxpayers suit. He argues:
1 Respondent PCG officers should be prohibited from
exercising their duties and functions since their
appointments were unconstitutional.
2 Respondent Department of Budget and Management Secretary
Emilia Boncodin should desist the disbursement of the PCG
officers salaries and emoluments until they are confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES
8 Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing.
9 Whether or not the respondent PCG officers appointments are
illegal.
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
(1) No. The Court ruled that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
he has personally suffered actual or threatened injury. It should be
emphasized that a party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an
act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but
also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Additionally, the Court
said that the petition cannot be a taxpayers suit because the case
does not involve the exercise of Congresss taxing power.

(2) No. The Court ruled that Art. 7, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution
pertains only to military officers. However, the PCG is under the

Department of Transportation and Communication, thus making it a

civilian law-enforcement agency. As such, the officers appointments
without confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and the
disbursement of their salaries and emoluments are valid and legal.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
TOPIC: Confirmation by COA
DOCTRINE: Art 7, Sec 16
CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. 107369. August 11, 1999
CASE Name: Manalo v Sistoza
Ponente: Justice Purisima

FACTS
This case is similar to Sarmiento v Mison re: construing Art 7, Sec 16 (PresCOA confirmation)
RA 6975 was passed in 1990 creating DILG. Sec 26 and 31 are about
appointing PNP officers:
o Sec 26: The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President
from among the senior officers down to the rank of the chief
superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
o Sec 31: The appointment of the officers and members of the PNP:
(c) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General - Appointed by
the President upon recommendation of the PNP chief, with the proper
endorsement by the Chairman of the CSC and subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; and
o (d) Director General - Appointed by the President from among the
senior officers down to the rank of chief superintendent in the
service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
Pres. Cory Aquino appointed Sistoza and others as Directors and Chief
Superintendents within the PNP. The Commission on Appointments did not
confirm these appointments and so Manalo questioned their validity saying
that Sistoza and co. are acting without jurisdiction.

ISSUES
10 Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) Yes: No. The provisions are unconstitutional. According to the
Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be
appointed by the President (ART 7, SEC 16):

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
The first group is the only one that needs confirmation from COA. Officers of
the PNP are not included and PNP officers are not akin to officers of the
armed forces.
o

RULING:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition under consideration is hereby
DISMISSED
TOPIC: Power of Appointment
DOCTRINE:
CASE Number (including date):G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992
CASE Name:CALDERON VS CARALE
Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor
Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its
confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation
by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of
the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law,
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed
by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUES
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president
to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) No: Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.
DISSENTING OPINION | (CRUZ)
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be reexamined instead of being automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I
do not believe we should persist in error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial
precedent, however unsound.

RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, July 21, 2006

Article VII, Section 16
-

Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary
purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board
from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, increased further the trustees to 11.
Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga Group
Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga
group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The Rufino group took their oaths of office and assumed
the performance of their duties.
the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's appointment of seven new
members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the
President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
o
The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP
Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee
survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with
the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies
shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same
ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow
trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow
trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms.
o
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only
one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10
incumbent trustees. They maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year
term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause."
Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10
incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board.

The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the
President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy
autonomy of policy and operation x x x."
Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in
rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their
fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.
CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.
o

Issue: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:

A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;
B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the CCP
Held: UNCONSTITIONAL

POWER TO APPOINT
-

The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the
power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: the
President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall
have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution
provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial
branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican
government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers.
1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution.
w/ the Commission of
Appointments consent
2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. consent not required
3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
consent not required

appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or
if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the
trustees fall under the third group of officers.
o
* there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter
of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose
certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of
subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by
the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. 28 The power to appoint
conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional
Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. these inferior
or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies,

commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint . The express language
of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those
vested by law with the power to appoint.
Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named offices. The word "heads" refers
to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and NOT TO THEIR MEMBERS, for several reasons:
o
a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that term, namely,
the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other
related provisions of the Constitution.
o
agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief executives or
heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is
untenable.
o
all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the Constitution
speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the
word "heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards.
o
the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution limited the grant
of the appointment power only to "heads of departments." 32 The 1973 Constitution expanded
such grant to other officers, namely, "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies,
commissions, and boards x x x." 33 If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to
members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the same language used for
"members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the
1973 Constitution could have placed the words commissions and boards after the word "courts"
so as to state "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the
1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
o
the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body.
Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the
heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet,
courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
o
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also applies to
the succeeding offices mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to
"departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the other offices listed in the
enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being governed by a board, is
not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to
appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.
Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not
"appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP
Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by
filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner
of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their
fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's
power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP
trustees every time a new President assumes office.

POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

-

The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive
employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. 35 This constitutional power of the
President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the
President's power of control over the Executive branch.36
The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises control over "all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an

office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive x x x
offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one
performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the President's
power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or
quasi-judicial functions.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside
the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If
the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President.
Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over "all the
executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can
also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts
beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely
structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the
Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and
pressure, specifically from the President. 44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a selfperpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot
legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

TINGA dissents

Upon JBSs recommendation

Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012, Apr 16 2013
Doctrine: Art. VIII, Sec. 7-9
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:

The case is a motion for recon filed by respondent JBC because of a prior
decision that JBCs allowing more than one member of the congress to
represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
1994-- instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added
to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives
one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it
should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress.
Respondent contends that the phrase a representative of congress refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that

these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of congress

as part of the bicameral system of legislature.
Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be
7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
WON JBCs practice of having 8 members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.
The court held that the phrase a representative of congress should be construed
as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.

the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC
to be allotted for the legislative.
the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is
explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be
said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.

TOPIC: Appointment of Subordinate Officers

CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. L-20864 August 23, 1963
CASE Name: Valencia vs. Peralta
Ponente: Justice J.B.L. Reyes

FACTS:
Quo warranto proceeding (A legal proceeding during which an individual's right to hold an office
or governmental privilege is challenged) involving the position of Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the National Waterworks and Sewage Authority
On October 4, 1961, petitioner Elpidio Valencia was designated as Acting Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the National Waterworks and Sewage Authority (NAWASA) by then
President Carlos P. Garcia.
He claims to have taken an oath of office to the position of Chairman Ad Interim (temporary).
o He also CLAIMS that his oath of office was subscribed and sworn to by him on October
25, 1961 before the President.

His appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on April 27,1962,

stating that his tenure was set to expire in July 1967.
However, in June 1962, when President Diosdado Macapagal took over, he appointed Macario
Peralta, Jr. to the same position.
Valencia assailed the appointment of Peralta on the following grounds:
o That the office was not vacant and he was the incumbent chairman when Peralta was
appointed.
o That his appointment (by Garcia) fixed his term of six years and his tenure will have to
expire on October 25, 1967.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General provided the following claims:
o That the appointment given to Valencia was as Acting Chairman and it was in such
capacity that the petitioner accepted said office.
o That the respondent denies, for lack of sufficient information, that the petitioner took the
oath of office upon the information from President Garcia that he had extended an ad
interim appointment to Valencia.
o That the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments produced no legal effect
there beg no valid appointment
o That while an ad interim appointment was prepared for Valencia, it was never released
to him and the original was still with the Office of the President (which was included in
the scope of Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal withdrawing all midnight
appointments made by the former president)
o

ISSUE: W/N Peraltas (the latter appointed) appointment is valid

HELD: Yes.
-

The only designation for the petitioner with any reliable evidence on record is his
designation as Acting Chairman of the NAWASA Board of Directors.
o

This designation, being revocable and temporary in character, could not ripen
into a permanent appointment even if it was subsequently performed by the
Commission on Appointments (Confirmation presupposed a valid nomination and
there is no trace of such in this case).

The petitioner also argues that his oath and confirmation imply a prior ad interim
appointment. The Court held that Valencia, to substantiate his claim over the said position,
is required to give some kind of written document that proves such.

The Court held that the danger of relying on alleged verbal or implied designations to office
is most apparent in this case.
o

While the petitioner took his oath of office as ad interim appointee on 25 October
1961, the letter of transmission received by the Commission on Appointments
recited as follows:

Hon. Elpidio Valencia, as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority, for a term expiring July 20, 1967, date of appointment November 6, 1961";

The Secretary of the Commission has also certified on 27 April 1962, they
confirmed petitioner's appointment of 6 November 1961.

The Office of the President also provided a certification stating that the draft of
petitioner's ad interim appointment dated November 6, 1961, was processed on
December 25, 1961 but wasnt released and was still in the office.

The Supreme Court held that there could not be two appointments for the same position.
Hence, if an ad interim appointment existed, either it preceded the petitioner's oath of office of
25 October 1961, and it lapsed because it was not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, or the appointment was only made on 6 November 1961, was duly confirmed,
but also lapsed because petitioner Valencia never took a qualifying oath of office under it.
He could not have qualified by taking an oath of office on 25 October, ten days before the
appointment was extended. To cap it all, there is on record only one written designation of
petitioner, but is mere Acting Chairman, dated 4 October 1961, that was not a permanent
appointment, and was revocable at any time by the Chief Executive, and actually revoked by his
subsequent designation of Peralta.
RULING: Petition for a writ of quo warranto is denied.

TOPIC:Limitations on the Appointing Power of the President

DOCTRINE:

CASE Number: GR NO. L65439

CASE Name:Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) vs IAC

Ponente: J. Gutierrez Jr.

FACTS

May 20, 1973

Dr. Hernani Esteban (private respondent) was extended an adinterim

appointment as VicePresident for Administration by Dr. Consuelo Blanco, president of PLM

Board Resolution No. 485 was passed by the Board of Regents of PLM, confirming the ad interim

appointments of academic and nonacademic personnel including Dr. Esteban, effective May 21,

1973. In 19731975, Esteban received 5 notifications from the Secretary of PLM, regarding the
frequent

confirmation and reconfirmation of his TEMPORARY appointment, always with the ending

phrase unless sooner terminated June 1975

recommended by the President for

Dr. Esteban found that he was not among those

permanent appointment. He requested that he be converted to permanent, but Pres. Blanco said

no Dr. Esteban received a notice of adinterim appointment as Professor III and as Director of an

Institute. 6 days later, Pres. Blanco issued a memo terminating Dr. Estebans appointment as VP

for Admin and his appointment was also withdrawn before it can be confirmed by the

Pamantasan Board of Regents Dr. Esteban appealed to the Civil Service Commission. He was denied,
then when he filed an

MOR the CSC reversed itself. On PLMs MOR, the CSC suddenly clarified that their certification

(saying that Dr. Esteban was qualified for the position of VP for Admin and certifying him for

appointment under permanent status) did not mean that he should be reinstated Dr. Esteban asked
the CSC to reconsider and asked also for his backpayment. CSC denied his

requests, but upon MOR reversed its ruling again saying that Pres. Blanco had no authority to

extend to Dr. Esteban an ad interim appointment PD 1409 was issued, which created a Merits System
Board (MSB) within the CSC that could hear

and decide cases by officers and employees of the civil service. The MSB asked PLM to submit

its complete record on the appointment and termination of Dr. Esteban as vice president PLM
submitted copies of all documents EXCEPT Board Resolution 485, which confirmed Dr.

Estebans ad interim appointment effective May 21, 1973 CSC ruled that Dr. Estebans appointment
was considered approved as permanent since PLM

could not produce the minutes of the meeting when Estebans ad interim appointment was

approved. The temporary appointment that was given to him (in the notices by the Secretary) did

not alter his status, as Dr. Esteban had acquired a vested right to the appointment and a right to

security of tenure. HIs termination was declared illegal. The CSC directed his immediate

reinstatement and payment of his back salaries PLM

Resolution. CSC denied PLM and affirmed their

filed

an

MOR

and

submitted

the

Board

current decision. PLM then filed with the Court of First Instance in Manila. CFI reversed the CSC
decision and held

that Dr. Estebans appointment was invalid, though he could be considered the de facto VP of

PLM until the CSC decision that his appointment was temporary (October 9, 1975 decision) Dr.
Esteban appealed to the IAC, which reversed the CFI decision. The most recent CSC

decision was affirmed. PLM filed an MOR and was denied.

ISSUE

1. W/N, in view of his appointment, Dr. Esteban held the position of VP for Administration of

PLM in a permanent capacity as to guarantee his security of tenure.

HELD AND RATIO

YES, Dr. Estebans appointment is permanent. PLM

appointments are they thought it meant temporary in

misunderstood

what

ad

interim

nature Possibly, its the literal meaning of ad interim that caused the confusion. In Blacks
Law

Dictionary, ad interim meant in the meantime or for the time being. Officer ad interim meant one

appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or

temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent This is, however, not the meaning it has within
Philippine law ad interim doesnt describe the

nature of the appointments given to him. Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which the

appointments were made An ad interim appointment means that the President of the Pamantasan
made the appointment in

the meantime, while the Board of Regents (which is the body vested by the University Charter

with the power to appoint) is unable to act Summers v Ozaeta: an ad interim appointment is one
made in pursuance of Art VII, Sec 10, Par 4

of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make

appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only

until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress

o this is an appointment that is permanent and the fact that it is subject to confirmation by

the COA doesnt make the appointment any less permanent

o this is distinguishable from an acting appointment, which is merely temporary, good until

another permanent appointment is issued Also have to take note that it is a CONFIRMED ad interim
appointment, per the Board Resolution

No. 485 dated June 20, 1973. As of this moment, the appointment became a regular and

permanent one. When the BOR is not in session, the Pamantasan President is authorized to
issue ad interim

appointments. These appointments are permanent, but their terms are only until the Board

disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointees term is converted into the regular term inherent in

the position PLM still argued, however, that they gave notice to Dr. Esteban regarding the temporary
nature of

his appointment with fixed start and end dates, unless sooner terminated SC
conflict between issuances of the Secretary of the Pamantasan (which is

holds

that

in

supposed to reflect the resolution) and the Board of Regents actual resolution, the latter is

controlling. The Secretary has no authority to alter or add something which is not provided for in

the resolution

o Also, nothing in the Board Resolutions said that Dr. Estebans appointment was

temporary. If it was really temporary, it should have been expressly stated.

APPOINTING POWER (important part) With regards to the appointing power of the PLM President
The power to appoint is discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may

exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those

who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

GSIS vs Ayroso: Its the prerogative of the appointing power, PROVIDED that he exercises it in

good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or

circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws, or under valid agreements, and

PROVIDED FURTHER that such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh,

oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice/spite. The

power of appointment must remain unhampered by judicial

general

rule

is

that

the

intervention. However, if the law is violated or where there is grave abuse of discretion, the courts

have to step in. Therefore, Dr. Estebans termination was improper and not sanctioned. Since his
appointment

was permanent, the Civil Service Law and the Constitution guarantee his security of tenure No

officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as

provided by law PLM failed to substantiate its allegations that Dr. Esteban was incompetent, since
his record as a

government employee appears very impressive. Dr. Esteban was not dismissed for cause after

proper proceedings, just because it was supposedly temporary

RULING:

Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. IAC decision affirmed.

TOPIC: Limitations on Appointing Power of the President

DOCTRINE:
CASE Number : G.R. No. 183449 (August 28, 2007)
CASE Name: Matibag v Benipayo
Peralta, J.

FACTS
COMELEC en banc temporarily appointed petitioner Matibag as Acting
Director IV of the Education and Information Department
Chairperson Demetrio renewed the temporary appointment
Commissioner Javier did the same.
PGMA subsequently appointed Benipayo as ad interim COMELEC Chairman,
and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, with the latter two having
7 terms each.
Since the CA did not act on their appointments, they were deemed to be
denied. However, PGMA just renewed their ad interim appointments. This was
done multiple times.
COMELEC Chairman Benipayo reassigned petitioner to another position

ART 9 SEC 1(2) - The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

1
2

ISSUES
Whether or not petitioner enjoys security of tenure
Whether or not Respondents were validly appointed
DISCUSSION
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
o Its permanent, it takes effect immediately, and it can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office.
o It is permanent regardless of its need for Commission on Appointments
approval, or until the next adjournment of congress.
o Ad interim =/= temporary. It merely means that it was done when
Congress was not in session!

Rights of an Ad Interim Employee

o A qualified ad interim employee enjoys the constitutional protection
that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law
o Once qualified employee already has right to office.
How Ad Interim Appointments are terminated
o Firstly, disapproval by C.A.
o Second, is adjournment of Congress w/o the CA acting on the
appointment
Ad Interim v Temporary Appointment
o Ad Interim
Permanent and Irrevocable except as provided by law
Enjoys security of tenure
o Temporary
Can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power
No security of tenure regardless of how long it was.
HELD
No Read highlighted text just above.
Yes.
There is no dispute that an Ad Interim appointee expressly disapproved
(i.e. through actual disapproval and not just inaction) by the Commission
on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment
Disapproval is final.
The Constitution provides for no means of appeal of CA decisions. As such,
it shall be considered as final and binding. The President is therefore
bound by the CA

BUT, disapproval thru inaction (called bypass disapproval) may be

renewed by the President, because there is no actual final disapproval by
the CA.
In this case, CA never acted upon their appointments, and so their
appointments were merely bypassed, and may be renewed by the
President.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
TOPIC: Appointment of Subordinate Officers Limit on Appoint Power
DOCTRINE:
CASE Number (including date): G.R. 93867. Dec 18, 1990
CASE Name: Brillantes vs Yorac
Ponente: Justice Cruz
FACTS
The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d etat
attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional
provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an
independent constitutional body and the specific provision that (I)n no case shall any
Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and
that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The
Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should
therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative expediency, to prevent disruption
of the functions of the COMELEC.
ISSUES
WoN Yoracs appointment is constitutional
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi):
NO. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. They are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions,
orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by
the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular
chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in
favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the

Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however

well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and
not the President to make.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee
B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby ordered to desist from serving as
such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent Associate Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they so desire, or
choosing another member in her place, pending the appointment of a permanent
Chairman by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.

TOPIC: Executive Department Limitations on Appointing Power of the President

DOCTRINE:
CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. L-3081 | October 14, 1949
CASE Name: Lacson v. Romero
Ponente: Montemayor, J.

FACTS
July 25, 1946 Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the President of the Philippines as
the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
August 6, 1946 The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
August 10, 1946 He took his oath of office and thereafter performed the duties of
that office.

May 17, 1949 Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the

President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of
Tarlac, and respondent Romero as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.

May 19, 1949 Commission on Appointments approved both

appointments. Lacson neither accepted nor assumed office as the
fiscal of Tarlac.

June 16, 1949 Respondent Romero took his oath of office for the
appointment in Manila, notified the Solicitor General, and proceeded to
his station. The next day, he notified petitioner Lacson that he is taking
over the office, but Lacson objected.

June 24, 1949 Respondent Romero appered before Judge Narvasa as

fiscal in a criminal case. Petitioner filed his objection and asked that
the appearance of Romero be stricken from record. Romero, in
response, showed his credentials so the Judge denied the petition and
recognized him as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.

June 27, 1949 Romero appeared in a Special Proceedings case before

Judge Ocampo. Lacson again filed an objection which was also denied.

Petitioner asked for his salary from June 16, 1949 to June 23, 1949 but
was turned down by the Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer.
Instead, they paid respondent Romero his due salary from June 16 to
present based on the reply given by the Secretary of Justice that
Romero is the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental.

Petitioner file quo warranto proceeding alleging that Romero was

unlawfully usurping his position as provincial fiscal.

ISSUES
W/N the Commission on Appointments alone, without the acceptance of the
nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the thereof, created
a vacancy in the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental so that Romero
could be lawfully appointed to said vacancy
W/N the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and the confirmation of Commission
on Appointments thereof serve as and is equivalent to a removal of Lacson
as fiscal of Negros Oriental
a W/N the removal was lawful
W/N the President can remove the appointee at his will and without cause
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
No. The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be
complete involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then
to make that nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of
the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance
thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination
and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive
and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make
the appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He
may or he may not accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the case of
Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 327, "there is no Power in this country which can
compel a man to accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to
accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do
so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said
office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros
Oriental.

Yes. As to the second question, it is obvious that the intended transfer of Lacson to
Tarlac on the basis of his nomination thereto, if carried out, would be equivalent to a
removal from his office in Negros Oriental. To appoint and transfer him from one
province to another would mean his removal or separation from the first province.
The reason is that a fiscal is appointed for each province (see. 1673, Rev. Adm.
Code), and Lacson could not well and legally hold and occupy the two posts of fiscal
of Tarlac and Negros Oriental simultaneously. To be fiscal for Tarlac must mean his
removal from Negros Oriental.
a Yes. The Court found and held that the transfer of Lacson to Tarlac by his
nomination to the post of provincial fiscal of that province was equivalent to
and meant his removal as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that said
removal was illegal and unlawful for lack of valid cause as provided
by law and the Constitution; that the confirmation of the nomination
by the Commission on Appointments did not and could not validate
the removal, since the Constitution is equally binding on the Legislature; that
a provincial fiscal is a civil service official or employee whose tenure of
office is protected by the Constitution; and that Antonio Lacson could
not be compelled to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of
Tarlac; that having declined said appointment, he continued as provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental; that inasmuch as he neither left, abandoned nor
resigned from his post as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, there was no
vacancy in said post to which the respondent could be legally
appointed; and that consequently, the appointment of the
respondent was invalid.
No. The Constitution itself denies the right of the President to remove the provincial
fiscal, even with the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments, without cause.
Article XII, section 4 of said instrument provides that "no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
This constitutional provision is reproduced word for word in the in the paragraph of
sec. 694 of the Rev. Adm. Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177, section
22.
While it is true the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, the
President is forbidden by the Constitution to remove civil service officials or
employees without causes provided by law. Even though the respondents cited
American cases to support their theory of inherence of removal to the power of
appointment, it cannot be applied in our country, as there is no counterpart of the
limitation provided for in our Constitution in the Federal Constitution of the US.
Moreover, considering the security and protection accorded a provincial fiscal from
arbitrary and illegal removal from office, and considering the provisions of section
1673 of the Administrative Code which among other things provides, that "after
December 31, 1932 any city fiscal or assistant city fiscal of Manila, provincial fiscal or
deputy provincial fiscal over 65 years of age shall vacate his office, the logical
inference is that a provincial fiscal duly appointed, until he reaches the age of 65 has
the right to continue in office unless sooner removed for cause. In other words, he
enjoys tenure of office, which is duly protected by statute and by the Constitution.
On the contention that there is no law that enumerates the possible cause or causes
for which a CS official may be removed from office, the Court said that there are a

number of possible grounds for the removal of a civil service employee one of them is
the falsification of daily time record
RULING:
Wherefore the petition is AFFIRMED.

TOPIC: Limitations of the Appointing Power of the Acting President

DOCTRINE: Art. VII, Sec. 14-16
CASE Number: G.R. No. 191560; 29 March 2011
CASE Name: General vs Urro
Ponente: Justice Brion
FACTS

On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C.
Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector. On
January 25, 2006, PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. When Roces
died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta
(Escueta) as actingNAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice
Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner (General), Constancia
P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners.
Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De
Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010.[7] On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his
oath of office before Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Alberico Umali.
On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took their oath of office
as NAPOLCOM Commissioners before DILG Secretary Puno and Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Jose R. Hernandez, respectively.[12]
On July 30, 2010, Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) Recalling,
Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of
the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE

W/N the respondents appointments, in light of E.O. No. 2 and the subsequent filing before the court of
several petitions questioning said executive order?
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioner in this case failed to establish
his cause of action in filing a quo warranto case against the respondents, rendering a discussion
of the constitutionality of their appointments completely unnecessary.

In determining whether or not the petitioner has cause of action, the court formulated and then answered
the following issues:
1 What is the nature of the petitioners appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commisioner?
- To answer this question, the court first clarified that appointments can be classified in tWo
ways: by its nature (permanent vs. temporary), and by the manner in which it is made (regular
vs ad interim).
- Petitioner contends that his appointment was a regular one, hence, he has the right to finish
what was left of Roces term, pursuant to RA 6975
- The court stressed that a regular appointment does not guarantee that such appointment is a
permanent one
- General was appointed as an acting NAPOLCOM Commisioner, thus, such position was
temporary, and as stipulated by law, shall last for not more than a year
- After a year, Urro was appointed as the permanent NAPOLCOM Commisioner
- Moreover, contrary to Generas contention that the staggering terms of office inherent in
NAPOLCOM prohibits the President to appoint acting Commissioners, the court argues that,
Given the wide latitude of the Presidents appointing authority (and the strict construction
against any limitation on or qualification of this power), the prohibition on the President from
issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or there must be a clear repugnancy
between the nature of the office and the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the
Presidents appointing power appears to be clearly deducible from the text of R.A. No. 6975
in the manner we ruled in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista.[52] In that case, we nullified the
acting appointment issued by the President to fill the office of a Commissioner of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the ground that it would undermine the
independence of the COMELEC. We ruled that given the specific nature of the functions
performed by COMELEC Commissioners, only a permanent appointment to the office of a
COMELEC Commissioner can be made.
- Additionally, the petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was permanently appointed
2

Does the petitioner have a clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust
respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM CComissioner?
NO. As early as 1905, the Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be
successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. [67] His
failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action; it is
not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment,
continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.[68] Since the petitioner merely holds an
acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to
maintain the present petition.[69] The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness
and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.[70] The petitioner in a
quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation
or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right [71] to the office for his suit to succeed;
otherwise, his petition must fail.

TOPIC: Limitations of the Appointing Power of the Acting President

DOCTRINE:

CASE Number (including date): GR No. 192926, Nov 15, 2011

CASE Name: Sana vs. Career Exec. Service Board
Ponente: Carpio, J

FACTS
May 28, 2010 Pres. GMA issued EO 883 granting the rank of CESO III or
higher to officers and employees occupying legal positions in the
government executive service who have obtained graduate degrees in law
and successfully passed the bar examinations.
It invoked as basis the invoked the granting of CESO "rank to government
personnel who successfully complete certain graduate programs, such as
Masters in Public Safety Administration (MPSA) and Masters in National
Security Administration (MNSA)"
June 2, 2010, CESB issued Resolution No. 870, finding no legal impediment to
Pres. To vest CESO rank to executive officials during periods covered by ban
on midnight appointments and pre-election appointment. CESB then
endorsed recommendation to vest CESO rank to 13 officials, including 3 from
them who signed Res. No. 870.
July 30, 2010, Pres. Noynoy issued EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883
(encroaches upon power of CESB as basis).
August 4, 2010, Atty. Elias Sana filed present petition contending that EO 883
and appointment of 13 officials is void due to violation of midnight ban on
appointments. Appointments to positions and ranks are executive in nature.
CESB contends that case is moot due to EO 3 and that appointment to a
CESO rank is not equivalent to an appointment of an office. (Conferment of
authority to exercise functions of office vs. completion of previous
appointment.)
OSG argues that EO 883 violates, if valid, Sec. 15, Article VII.

11 Whether or not
constitutional.

EO

ISSUES
883 and CESB

Resolution

No.

870

are

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1) Yes: Dismissed on grounds of mootness. Seeks review of EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Sec. 15, Article VII of Constitution but
Pres. Noynoy had already Issued EO 3 revoking them. There is also no injury as he is
not among the 13 officials. It also holds no certainty of evading judicial review as
question can be decided even beyond the appointments-ban period under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution.

RULING:
Wherefore the petition is dismissed

G.R. No. 196271, : October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in

representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially
assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No.
6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM
on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM
under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional
elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in
a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different
parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No.
10153 questioning the validity of said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority

vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of
the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in
complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections
B. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A.
10153 in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials,
done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning
senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all
future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission
deliberations.
Furthermore,
to
achieve
synchronization,
Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular
elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333)
with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166
to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the
terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local
officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on
the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the
term
ofsynchronizationis
used
synonymously
as
the
phraseholding
simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure
on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the
election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise
evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for
the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected
officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective
of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local
Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections
15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor
is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of
discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.If their compelling force
differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests

directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-theway arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to
the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected
in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as
an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their
term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness
that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years
for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and
cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA
No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office."This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized that
the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.

TOPIC: Executive Clemencies

DOCTRINE: Civil liability from a crime committed is not extinguished by a
pardon; Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
CASE Number (including date): GR No. 78239; February 9, 1989
CASE Name: Monsanto v. Factoran
Ponente: Fernan
FACTS

March 25, 1983: Sandiganbayan convicted Salvacion Monsanto (then

asst. treasurer of Calbayog City + 3 others of estafa through falsification
of public docs

Monsanto appealed to SC which affirmed the same.

She filed for a Motion for reconsideration, while this was pending, she
was given by Marcos an absolute pardon
o

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer

requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant plus backwages

Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position

without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry

on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has
wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for
the entire period of her suspension;

The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of

the President for further review and action. Office of the President said that
she had been convicted for the crime she was accused; acquittal not
absolute pardon of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his
salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
o

Monsanto is not entitled to automatic reinstatement on the

basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding
said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability
concomitant to her previous conviction
ISSUE

Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

NO.

Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her

appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no

amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government anys obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This would explain
why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

We do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the
guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial
dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral
changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one
who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility
for appointment to that office.

the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her

disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer,
she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Petitioner: VICENTE GARCIA

Respondents: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO.
IV

FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in
Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an
executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later
recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioners
reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant
to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by
reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a
new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person
is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all
punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation
and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of
executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This
signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored
to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is

meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he
has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to
those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally
dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

Subject: Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights; The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited
by legislative action; Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot serve to
abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon
persons convicted of violating penal statutes; Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation; The right to seek public elective office is unequivocally
considered as a political right; Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from
running for any elective local position but Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar
prohibitions but it provides for an exception; A preamble is not an essential part of an
act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment; The third preambular clause was not integrated as an integral part of the
decree of pardon
Facts:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder and impose the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada wherein he is restored to his civil and political
rights. Former President Estrada received and accepted the pardon. Former President
Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Risos-Vidal, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before
the COMELEC on the theory that Former President Estrada is Disqualified to Run for
Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan. She relied on
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution. Rios-Vidal invoked the
Supreme Courts jurisdiction over the present petition. She pointed that that the pardon

granted to former President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latters

express acceptance thereof. The acceptance, she claims, is an indication of the
conditional nature of the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third
Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e., WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office.
While this case was pending before the Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were
conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office. The next
day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City
of
Manila.
Lim, one of former President Estradas opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for
leave to intervene in this case. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidals theory that former
President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted
to
the
latter
failed
to
expressly
remit
his
perpetual
disqualification.
In defense, former President Estrada argues that: the factual findings of public
respondent COMELEC are binding on this Honorable Supreme Court; that he was
granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and political rights,
including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral position in the City
of Manila; that the text of the pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully,
complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was
categorically stated in the said document that he was restored to his civil and political
rights; that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be construed favorably in favor of
the
grantee.
Held:
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all
his
civil
and
political
right
1. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action
2. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The
1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,

provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency. The only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have
not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
the
pardoning
power
of
the
President.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot serve to abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon
persons
convicted
of
violating
penal
statutes
3. Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot serve to abridge or diminish the
exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the
power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart
is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the
accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in
the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency
and to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or
to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided
upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
4. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties
are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency
extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty
pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states
that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion
perpetua.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
5. It is well- entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Thus, the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that

former President Estrada is hereby restored to his civil and political rights
substantially
complies
with
the
requirement
of
express
restoration.
The right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a
political
right
6. The right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right.
Hence, the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation
other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained
his FULL civil and political rights including the right to seek elective office.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position but Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar
prohibitions
but
it
provides
for
an
exception
7. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him. Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from
running for any elective local position: Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence. Likewise,Section 12 of
the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an exception that is unless
he
has
been
given
plenary
pardon
or
granted
amnesty.
8. Section 12 of the OEC is one of the legal remedies that may be availed of to
disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. (See Jalosjos, Jr.
v.
Commission
on
Elections)
The third preambular (whereas) clause was not an integral part of the decree
of
pardon
9. A preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory
clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word
whereas. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they
are
not
part
of
the
operative
language
of
the
statute.
10. The third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office, neither makes
the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is
especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term civil and political rights as being restored.

11. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree
of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned
commitment
nor
to
limit
the
scope
of
the
pardon.
12. Besides, a preamble is really
introduction to show its intent or
obligations. Where the meaning of
can neither expand nor restrict
(See Echegaray
v.

not an integral part of a law. It is merely an

purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
its operation much less prevail over its text.
Secretary
of
Justice)

13. If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on

Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo
did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition
to
the
pardon
extended
to
former
President
Estrada.
14. Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyos silence on former
President Estradas decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections against,
among others, the candidate of the political party of former President Arroyo, after the
latters receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore
him
to
his
rights
to
suffrage
and
to
hold
public
office.
15. Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is
in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon
itself. From a detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing therein
gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation,
proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the
mentioned commitment not to seek public office will result in a revocation or
cancellation
of
said
pardon.
16. The statement [h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, is crystal
clear the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was
not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character,
as the term political rights adverted to has a settled meaning in law and
jurisprudence.

People v Vera G.R. No. 45685. November 16, 1937.

7/11/2010
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Facts: Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid
criminal
case.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prison mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party,
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the
sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six
months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and
submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this
court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court
of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule
because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on
the
defendant
Mariano
Cu
Unjieng."

This court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the
said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for
probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with
the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200).

Issue: To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for
the
following
reasons:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the
provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of
Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special
provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws
of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply
only to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation
officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable to it
because it has not provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial
that there is an Insular Probation Office willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Office provided for in
section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the
same
Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to
entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had

promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason
that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of
applications
for
probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28, 1937, it
became
final
and
executory
at
the
moment
of
its
rendition.
(3)
No
right
of
appeal
exists
in
such
cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he
was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact
and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim
judge
of
first
instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative when
he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for
persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section
1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it
confers upon the provincial board of each province the absolute discretion to make said law operative

Held: Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted.
Without

any

pronouncement

regarding

costs.

So

ordered.

Ratio: The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power; and (3)
that
it
denies
the
equal
protection
of
the
laws.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation.
Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged
from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have
submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation.
The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the control of the
probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation
and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him.
A 'pardon' is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts
the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a
remission of guilt or a forgiveness of the offense. 'Commutation' is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. A 'reprieve' or 'respite' is the withholding of a sentence for
an interval of time, a postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of execution.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant
to the equal- protection clause of our Constitution. Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for
the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided. It is also contended
that the Probation Act violates the provision of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal
protection of the laws. We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

In

view

of

the

Courts

discretion

"By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted
concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original
jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction. It has been held by that Court that the question of the validity of a criminal statute must usually be raised
by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. But in this case where a new
act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of
actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of the act's validity promptly before it and
decide
it
in
the
interest
of
the
orderly
administration
of
justice.
Both petitioners and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in
probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by
Act
No.
4221
of
the
Philippine
Legislature.

In

view
of
Governmental
Standing
And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide
we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in
having
it
set
aside.
". . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their
representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their government, a statute
enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in
justification is unconstitutional, it is a statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to
justify
action
under
it
than
if
it
had
never
been
enacted.
". . . The state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is always interested
where
the
integrity
of
its
Constitution
or
statutes
is
involved.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may
impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they
appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the
present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners
herein, the principal reasons being that the validity of the Probation Act cannot be attacked for the first time before
this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not being authorized to enforce
laws outside of the City of Manila, cannot challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, this court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a
new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that many
persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are
already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction.

In

view
of
confict
with
Executive
Power
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning
power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law
had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the
court
to
order
his
rearrest
and
imprisonment.

In

view
of
the
applicability
of
the
Probation
Act
"In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to
elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent
and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected
by
the
process."
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards have provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional
grounds,
the
remainder
of
the
Act
would
still
be
valid
and
may
be
enforced.
The welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while
we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed,
we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of repugnancy to our fundamental law. In arriving
at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both parties,
as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and
others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the
examination of the cases and in the analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of
action
which
in
our
opinion,
is
supported
by
better
reasoned.
authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.)
Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our
attention, except where the point or the principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative
pronouncements
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States.

In
view
of
respondent's
defense
As
special
defenses,
respondents
allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of
prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy
prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present
petition
was
filed
with
this
court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the trial court,
said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying
probation
is
unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the
question as to whether or not execution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the
Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over
the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and
dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great
dignity."
(6) That, under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending
resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation
is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal
from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final
order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being
appealable, the same had not yet become final and executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an
alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial
court was not able to resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying
probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed

to
the
postponement
of
the
hearing
of
the
said
motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent
upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial
court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of
criticism because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have. an opportunity to correct or cure the
same.
(10) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is not appealable, the trial court retains its
jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter
or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercised either motu proprio or upon petition of
the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondents allege, said court
cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors
of probation would be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence

TOPIC: Pardon distinguished from Parole

DOCTRINE:
CASE Number: G.R. No. 46437 | May 23, 1939
CASE Name: Tesoro v Director of Prisons
Ponente: Justice Moran

FACTS
October 10, 1934 - Eufemio Tesoro was convicted in the CFI of Manila for
falsifying a public document. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from 2 to 3 years, 6 months, and 21 days to a fine of P100, or undergo
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Penalty was to expire on
October 28, 1937.

November 14, 1935 - Gov. Gen. Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a parole,
which he accepted subject to the following conditions:
1 That he will live in Manila and would have to obtain consent of
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence to change his residence
2 That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself
in an orderly manner
3 That he will report during his parole to the Executive Secretary
of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year,
once a month, and thereafter, once every 3 months.
Should any of the conditions were violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect.

December 3, 1937 - petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court
of San Juan, Rizal with adultery committed with the wife of his brother-in-law,
Jose Nagar. The case, forwarded to the CFI of Rizal was dismissed for
nonappearance of the complainant.

February 1938 - Nagar lodged a complaint supporting the criminal action

aforementioned, and charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of

his parole. Petitioner denied the charge of illicit relations. Simeon Figalang,
the parole officer assigned to investigate the case, addressed a
communication to the President, recommending the arrest and
reincarceration of the petitioner to which the President issued the order to
arrest him.

Petitioner was then arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director
of Prisons. He then sued the Director of Prisons for a writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant contends that section 64(i) of the Administrative Code has been
impliedly repealed by the constitutional provision.

ISSUES
12 Whether or not Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code was repealed
13 Whether or not the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to
investigate the conduct of the petitioner and recommend the revocation of
his parole
14 Whether or not judicial pronouncement that he has committed a crime
necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his
conditional parole

HELD
(1) NO. The power to pardon given to the President by the Constitution
includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the omission of the power
of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the
President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who,
before the adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by
the Chief Executive. Such effect was never intended by the Constitutional
Convention
(2) NO. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report to the board.
By his consent to this condition, he has placed himself under their
supervision. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a
corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and
to make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting.
Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the
power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees.
In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and investigation, the
President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution
from making use of any agency of the government, or even of any individual,
to secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the President chose to
intrust his power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a
government agency created precisely for the concern of persons released on
parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.

(3) NO. The mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other
crime that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have
violated his parole. Under Section 64(i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief
Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and reincarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."

The determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively

in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by
way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having
consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that
has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
There is no statutory provision squarely governing the case with respect to the
duration of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. In the absence of
such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express
terms of the parole that "should and of the conditions stated be violated,
the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is evident
that the petitioner herein should serve the un-expired portion of the
penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.
RULING:
Judgment is affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION | Concepcion, J.
Dissent with respect to the interpretation given to the second condition of the
appellants parole. The commission of the crime may only be determined upon the
conviction of the accused. It is not sufficient that a person be charged with having
committed a crime in order to consider that he is convicted thereof. His innocence is
a legal presumption which is overcome only by his conviction after he is duly and
legally prosecuted. And the courts of justice are the only branch of the government
which has exclusive jurisdiction under the law to make a pronouncement on the
conviction of an accused.
In these circumstances and an exception to the general rule, the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence was justified in conducting the investigation of the crime
complained of and in recommending to the President of the Philippines the arrest
and recommitment of the appellant for violation of his conditional pardon, for it is
not just that by the omission or negligence of a witness who fails to appear in court,

the violation of the pardon granted conditionally to the appellant should be left
unpunished.
Note:
Section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was
granted parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:
"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional, or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and
order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions
as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such
person who in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides
as follows:
"The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of
impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he
may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the National Assembly."

TOPIC: Executive Clemencies Pardon distinguished from Parole

DOCTRINE: The acceptance of a conditional pardon carried with it the power of the
President to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have
been violated.
CASE NUMBER: GR No. 76872; July 23, 1987
CASE TITLE: Wilfredo Torres y Sumulong vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales
Ponente: Justice Feliciano

FACTS
Torres was convicted of estafa in 1978. On 1979, President Marcos granted
him conditional pardon, on the condition that he shall not violate any penal
laws.
In 1982, petitioner was accused of multiple counts of estafa. In 1986, the
President cancelled his pardon upon the request of the Board of Pardons and
Parole headed by Neptali Gonzales. With this, the Minister of Justice ordered
the arrest of the petitioner.
Torres appealed his case to the Supreme Court arguing that the President
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling his pardon because his
estafa charges against him are not yet final and executor.
ISSUE

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judicial pronouncement is necessary

before the petitioner can be validly re-arrested and recommitted for the violation of
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly serve the balance of his sentence.
HELD
No.

RATIO
In the case of Tesoro vs Director of Prisons, the Court held that conditional
pardon is upon the prerogative of Executive.
In the case of Sales vs Director of Prisons, Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code (a judicial act) and Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
stand one another (a purely executive act). It is false to argue that the former
has superseded the latter. These are the choices of the President.
The grant of pardon is a purely executive act.
The President used Section 64 of the RAC, an exercise of executive
prerogative, which is not subject to judicial scrutiny

DISSENTING OPINION | Justice Cruz

A mere commission of a crime, as determined by the crime, is not sufficient
to justify recommitment. Conviction is still necessary.
The Presidents prerogative on determining whether or not the person
violated the conditions of the parole is an encroachment of judicial power.
Thus, there is a need to reverse the Espuelas doctrine.

TOPIC: Pardon distinguished from Amnesty

DOCTRINE:
CASE Number (including date): 161 U.S. 591 (March 23, 1896)
Case Name: Brown vs Walker
FACTS

The provision in the Act of February 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat. 443, affords absolute immunity
against prosecution, Federal or state, for the offence to which the question relates, and
deprives the witness of his constitutional right to refuse to answer.
It appeared that the petitioner had been subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury, at a
term of the district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to testify in relation to a
charge then under investigation by that body against certain officers and agents of the
Alleghany Valley Railway Company, for an alleged violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Brown, the appellant, appeared for examination, in response to the subpoena, and was
sworn. After testifying that he was auditor of the railway company, he was asked several
questions regarding the transactions of the company (discrimination in favor of the Union
Coal Company by rebates, drawbacks, or commissions on its coal, by which it obtained
transportation at less than the tariff rates) and to these questions, he answered:

"That question, with all respect to the grand jury and yourself, I must decline to
answer for the reason that my answer would tend to accuse and incriminate myself."

The grand jury reported these questions and answers to the court. Upon the presentation of
this report, Brown was ordered to appear and show cause why he should not answer the
said questions or be adjudged in contempt, and, upon the hearing of the rule to show cause,
it was found that his excuses were insufficient, and he was directed to appear and answer
the questions, which he declined to do. Whereupon he was adjudged to be in contempt and
ordered to pay a fine of five dollars, and to be taken into custody until he should have
answered the questions.
He thereupon petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, stating, in his petition,
the substance of the above facts. It was ordered that the petition be dismissed, the writ of
habeas corpus discharged, and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the marshal. From
that judgment, Brown appealed to this Court.

This case involves an alleged incompatibility between that clause of the fifth amendment to
the constitution which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself,'
and the act of congress of February 11, 1893 ( 27 Stat. 443), which enacts that
'no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers,
tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the interstate commerce commission, or in
obedience to the subpoena of the commission, on the ground or for the reason that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said
commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any
such case or proceeding.'
The act is supposed to have been passed in view of the opinion of this court in Counselman
v. Hitchcock, providing that no evidence given by a witness shall be used against him,
his property or estate, in any manner, in any court of the United States, in any criminal
proceeding, did not afford that complete protection to the witness which the
amendment was intended to guaranty. The gist of that decision is contained in the
following extracts from the opinion of Mr. Justice Blatchford, referring to section 860: 'We are
clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution,
after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the
privilege conferred by the constitution of the United States. In view of the constitutional
provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecutions for the offense to which the question relates.
ISSUE
WON the witness is compellable to answer.
HELD (RATIO)
Yes, the clause of the constitution in question should be construed, as it was doubtless designed, to
effect a practical and beneficent purpose, not necessarily to protect witnesses against every
possible detriment which might happen to them from their testimony, nor to unduly impede,
hinder, or obstruct the administration of criminal justice. That the statute should be upheld, if it

can be construed in harmony with the fundamental law, will be admitted. Instead of seeking for
excuses for holding acts of the legislative power to be void by reason of their conflict with the
constitution, or with certain supposed fundamental principles of civil liberty, the effort should be to
reconcile them if possible, and not to hold the law invalid.
The danger of extending the principle announced in Counselman v. Hitchcock is that the
privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason, or for a purely fanciful protection of the
witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of securing immunity to some third
person, who is interested in concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is
bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to permit himself, under the pretext of
shielding his own good name, to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter
behind his privilege.
The act of congress in question, securing to witnesses immunity from prosecution, is
virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to a class of legislation which is not uncommon
either in England or US. (This provision But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said commission, or
in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or
proceeding.)
Although the constitution vests in the president 'power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment,' this power
has never been held to take from congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty, and is
ordinarily exercised only in cases of individuals after conviction, although, as was said by this
court in Ex parte Garland, 'it extends to every offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any
time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or
after conviction and judgment.'
The distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance. It was said in
Knote v. U. S, 'The constitution does not use the word 'amnesty,' and, except that the term is
generally applied where pardon is extended to whole classes or communities, instead of
individuals, the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal
importance.' 'Amnesty' is defined by the lexicographers to be an act of the sovereign power
granting oblivion, or a general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in
favor of single individuals, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, who
are subject to trial, but have not yet been convicted.
Thus, in State v. Nowell, the court observed 'that the legislature, having undertaken to obtain
the testimony of the witness without depriving him of his constitutional privilege of protection, must
relieve him from all liabilities on account of the matters which he is compelled to disclose; otherwise,
the statute would be ineffectual. He is to be secured against all liability to future prosecution as
effectually as if he were wholly innocent. This would not be accomplished if he were left liable to
prosecution criminally for any matter in respect to which he may be required to testify. The
conditional exemption becomes absolute when the witness testifies, and, being no longer liable to
prosecution, he is not compelled, by testifying, to accuse or furnish evidence against himself. The
constitutional privilege of the witness protects, not another against whom the witness
testifies, but the witness himself. The legal protection of the witness against prosecution for crime
disclosed by him is, in law, equivalent to his legal innocence of the crime disclosed. The witness,
regarded in law as innocent if prosecuted for a crime which he has been compelled by the statute to
disclose, will stand as well as other innocent persons, and it was not the design of the common-law
maxim, affirmed by the bill of rights, that he should stand any better.'

It is entirely clear that Brown was not the chief, or even a substantial, offender against the
law, and that his privilege was claimed for the purpose of shielding the railway or its officers from
answering a charge of having violated its provisions. To say that, notwithstanding his immunity from
punishment, he would incur personal odium and disgrace from answering these questions, seems
too much like an abuse of language to be worthy of serious consideration. But, even if this were true,
under the authorities above cited, he would still be compelled to answer, if the facts sought to be
elucidated were material to the issue.
While the constitutional provision in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable
prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, and we are
therefore of opinion that the witness was compellable to answer, and that the judgment of the
court below must be affirmed.

KNOTE v. U S, (1877)
Argued: Decided: October 1, 1877
APPEAL from the Court of Claims.
The petition of the claimant alleged that he was the owner of certain described personal property in West
Virginia, which was seized and libelled by the authorities of the United States on the alleged ground of his
treason and rebellion; that, by a decree of the District Court for that district, the property was condemned
and forfeited to the United States, and sold; and the net proceeds of the sale, amounting to the sum of
$11,000, were paid into the treasury of the United States, the proceedings for its condemnation and sale
having been taken under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862; that subsequently, by [ Knote v. U S 95
U.S. 149 (1877)
virtue of the amnesty proclamation of the President, of Dec. 25, 1868, the claimant was pardoned and
relieved of all disabilities and penalties attaching to the offence of treason and rebellion, for which his
property was confiscated, and was restored to all his rights, privileges, and immunities under the
Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and thus became entitled to receive the said
proceeds of sale; but that the United States, disregarding his rights in the premises, had refused to pay
them over to him, and therefore he prayed judgment against them. Upon demurrer for insufficiency of the
facts thus alleged to constitute a cause of action the petition was dismissed, and hence the present
appeal.
The proclamation of President Johnson relied upon is in the following words:-'Whereas the President of the United States has heretofore set forth several proclamations offering
amnesty and pardon to persons who had been or were concerned in the late rebellion against the lawful
authority of the government, which proclamations were severally issued on the eighth day of December,
1863, on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1864, on the ttwenty-ninth day of March, 1865, on the seventh
day of September, 1867, and on the fourth day of July, in the present year.
'And whereas the authority of the Federal government having been re- established in all the States and
Territories within the jurisdiction of the United States, it is believed that such prudential reservations and
exceptions, as at the dates of said several proclamations, were deemed necessary and proper, may now
be wisely and justly relinquished, and that a universal amnesty and pardon for participation in said
rebellion, extended to all who have borne any part therein, will tend to secure permanent peace, order,
and prosperity throughout the land, and to renew and fully secure confidence and fraternal feeling among
the whole people, and their respect for and attachment to the national government designed by its
patriotic founders for the general good.

'Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, by virtue of the power
and authority in me vested by the Constitution, and in the name of the sovereign people of the United
States, do hereby proclaim and declare unconditionally, and without reservation, to all and to every
person who directly or indirectly participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full [95 U.S. 149,
151] pardon and amnesty for the offence of treason against the United States, or of adhering to their
enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the
Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof.' 15 Stat. 711.
Mr. Thomas Jesup Miller, and Mr. Linden Kent, for the appellant.
As to offences against the United States, the pardoning power of the President is unlimited, except in
cases of impeachment. Const. U. S., art. 2, sect. 2; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307; Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333.
The pardon relied on here is in general terms, and its meaning and intent are clear beyond cavil. Even if it
were ambiguous, it is to be construed most beneficially to the parties who claim its benefits. 4 Bl. Com.
401; Wywill's Case, 5 Co. 49; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128.
In England, a restoration of forfeited estates, if they have not inured to the benefit of some third person, is
inherently incident to a full and complete pardon. 3 Coke, Inst. 233; 4 Bl. Com. 402; 1 Russell, Crimes,
175; 3 id. 621; Bac. Abr., tit. Pardon; Cole's Case, Plow. 401; Brown v. Brashaw, 1 Bulst. 154; Toomb's
Adm'r v. Ethrington, 1 Sand. 353; Ludlam v. Lopez, 1 Stra. 529; Biggin's Case, 5 Co. 50; Burgess v.
Wheat, 1 Eden, 201; Brown v. Waite, 2 Mod. 133.
The same rule prevails in this country. Such a pardon, therefore, wipes out an offence and its
consequences. Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264; United States v. Wilson, 7 id. 160; Ex parte Wells, 18
How. 307; Ex parte Flavel, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 197; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 380; Perkins v. Stevens, 24
Pick. (Mass.) 280; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766; United States v. Padelford, 9 id. 531; United States
v. Klein, 13 id. 128; Armstrong v. United States, id. 154; Pargoud v. United States, id. 156; Carlisle v.
United States, 16 id. 147; Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 ; 2 Op. Att.-Gen. 329; 3 id. 317; 4 id. 458;
6 id. 488; 8 id. 281; 10 id. 452.
The proceeds of the sale of the claimant's property are held by the government, and no third party is
interested in them. His right to them under the pardon imposes legal obligations on the government, and
may be judicially enforced. Brown v. [95 U.S. 149, 152] United States, 1 McCahon, 229; Osborn v.
United States, supra United States v. Klein, supra.
The Solicitor-General, contra.
1. At common law, a simple charter of pardon did not restore forfeited property which had already vested
in the crown A special clause of restitution in the cha ter was required for that purpose. Chitty on
Prerogative, 102.
2. The clause of restitution in the present case being limited to rights, &c., under the Constitution, does
not include rights of property. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v. Cruikshank et al., 92
U.S. 542 .
3. At all events, without authorization by Congress, the President has no power, whether by a clause in a
charter of pardon or otherwise, to render to the claimant the moneys derived from the sale of his property,
under a decree of forfeiture, which have been paid into the treasury of the United States.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented for determination in this case is, whether the general pardon and amnesty
granted by President Johnson, by proclamation, on the 25th of December, 1868, will entitle one receiving
their benefits to the proceeds of his property, previously condemned and sold under the confiscation act
of 1862, after such proceeds have been paid into the treasury.
The proclamation of the President extended unconditionally and without reservation a full pardon and
amnesty for the offence of treason against the United States, or of giving aid and comfort to their
enemies, to all persons who had directly or indirectly participated in the rebellion, with a restoration of all
rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof. Some
distinction has been made, or attempted to be made, between pardon and amnesty. It is sometimes said
that the latter operates as an extinction of the offence of which it is the object, causing it to be forgotten,
so far as the public interests are concerned, whilst the former only operates to remove the penalties of the
offence. This distinction is not, however, recognized in our law. The Constitution does not use the word
'amnesty;' and, [95 U.S. 149, 153] except that the term is generally employed where pardon is extended
to whole classes or communities, instead of individuals, the distinction between them is one rather of
philological interest than of legal importance. At all events, nothing can be gained in the consideration of
the question before us by showing that there is any difference in their operation. All the benefits which can
result to the claimant from both pardon and amnesty would equally have accrued to him if the term
'pardon' alone had been used in the proclamation of the President. In Klein's case, this court said that
pardon included amnesty. 13 Wall. 128.
The rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and laws which the proclamation restored to
parties embraced by its terms, are such as all citizens possess and enjoy. That instrument does not
declare that any subjects of property are restored with reference to which such rights, privileges, and
immunities might be invoked; nor can its language be thus construed without a manifest perversion of its
sense.
The effect of a pardon upon the condition and rights of its recipient have been the subject of frequent
consideration by this court; and principles have been settled which will solve the question presented for
our determination in the case at bar. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 id. 766;
United States v. Padelford, 9 id. 531; United States v. Klein, 13 id. 128; Armstrong v. United States, id.
155; Pargoud v. United States, id. 156; Carlisle v. United States, 16 id. 147; Osborn v. United States, 91
U.S. 474 . A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his
offence, so far as such release is practicable and within control of the pardoning power, or of officers
under its direction. It releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offence, and restores to
him all his civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offence, that afterwards it cannot be
imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit and capacity, and
rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position. But it does not make amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or
otherwise; it [95 U.S. 149, 154] does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor
does it impose upon the government any obligation to give it. The offence being established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. Neither does the pardon
affect any rights which have vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the offence, or
which have been acquired by others whilst that judgment was in force. If, for example, by the judgment a
sale of the offender's property has been had, the purchaser will hold the property notwithstanding the
subsequent pardon. And if the proceeds of the sale have been paid to a party to whom the law has
assigned them, they cannot be subsequently reached and recovered by the offender. The rights of the
parties have become vested, and are as complete as if they were acquired in any other legal way. So,
also, if the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right to them has so far become vested in the
United States that they can only be secured to the former owner of the property through an act of
Congress. Moneys once in the treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law. However large,
therefore, may be the power of pardon possessed by the President, and however extended may be its

application, there is this limit to it, as there is to all his powers,-it cannot touch moneys in the treasury of
the United States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress. The Constitution places this restriction
upon the pardoning power.
Where, however, property condemned, or its proceeds, have not thus vested, but remain under control of
the Executive, or of officers subject to his orders, or are in the custody of the judicial tribunals, the
property will be restored or its proceeds delivered to the original owner, upon his full pardon. The property
and the proceeds are not considered as so absolutely vesting in third parties or in the United States as to
be unaffected by the pardon until they have passed out of the jurisdiction of the officer or tribunal. The
proceeds have thus passed when paid over to the individual entitled to them, in the one case, or are
covered into the treasury, in the other.
The views here expressed have been applied in practice, it [95 U.S. 149, 155] is believed, by the
executive departments of the government. In 1856, the question was submitted by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the Attorney- General, whether, under a pardon of the President remitting a forfeiture to the
United States, imposed by a judgment of a United States district court, the proceeds of the forfeiture
deposited by the marshal in one of the public depositories to the credit of the United States, but not
brought into the treasury by a covering warrant, could be refunded to the marshal, and through him to the
party entitled, in execution of the remission granted by the President; and the Attorney-General replied,
that the pardoning power was completely vested in the President, and did not require in its exercise any
aid from Congress, nor could it be curtailed by Congress, but that, if the money had actually passed into
the treasury, it could not be refunded without an act of Congress; for the Constitution itself, in the
provision that 'no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by
law,' opposed an insuperable obstacle to such a proceeding, and that this provision was of equal
efficiency with the pardoning power, and operated as a restriction upon it. But the Attorney-General held,
and so advised the Secretary, that, if the money had only gone into the hands of some officer of the
government, and the right of third parties had not attached, it might be refunded. 8 Op. A t.-Gen., p. 281.
As an instance where property acquired by a third party, whilst the judgment against the offender is in
force, cannot be affected by a subsequent pardon, he cited the case of the disposition of a convict's
property during the time of his civil incapacity. The pardon does not restore the property. And, as an
instance where a right, other than of property, acquired during the same period, is also unaffected, he
cited the case where, by the law of the country, a conviction of felony operates to dissolve a marriage,
and the innocent party contracts new bonds of matrimony. The subsequent pardon does not dissolve the
new bonds. Matter of Deming, 10 Johns. 232.
The same views were, to some extent, applied in the recent case of Osborn v. United States, supra,
where proceeds of property, confiscated under the act of July 17, 1862, for the alleged treason of the
claimant, remaining in the registry, were [95 U.S. 149, 156] ordered by the Circuit Court to be delivered
to the claimant who had been pardoned, Mr. Justice Miller, presiding in the Circuit Court, holding that, until
an order of distribution of the proceeds was made, or the proceeds were actually paid into the hands of
the party entitled, as informer, to receive them, or into the treasury of the United States, they were within
the control of the court, and that no vested right to the proceeds had accrued so as to prevent the pardon
from restoring them to the claimant, and impliedly holding, that, had they been thus paid, either to the
informer or into the treasury, the right to them would have passed beyond the control of the court. On
appeal, this court affirmed the decision, observing, that it was of the essence of a pardon that it relieved
the offender from the consequences of his offence; and as in that case the forfeiture of his property was
one of those consequences, it restored the property to him, unless the rights of other parties had vested,
and the power of restoration was thus gone.
An attempt is made by counsel to give some expressions used in the opinion of the court a wider
meaning, so as to support the claim here presented; but the language will not sustain the conclusion
sought. There was no consideration of the effect of the pardon upon the proceeds of the forfeited property
when paid into the treasury, but only of its effect upon those proceeds whilst under the control of the court

in its registry. Any language which seemingly admits of a broader interpretation must be restricted to the
facts of the case. There was no intention of expressing any opinion that a pardon could do away with the
constitutional requirement as to money in the treasury; whilst there, it is the property of the United States.
There is another view of this case, which must lead to an affirmance of the judgment of the Court of
Claims. The jurisdiction of that court is limited to claims founded upon a law of Congress, or upon a
regulation of an executive department, or upon a contract, express or implied, with the government. The
claim here presented rests upon a supposed implied contract to pay to the claimant the money received
as the proceeds of the forfeited property. To constitute such a contract, there must have been some
consideration moving to the United States; or they must have received the money, charged with a duty
to [95 U.S. 149, 157] pay it over; or the claimant must have had a lawful right to it when it was received,
as in the case of money paid by mistake. But here there was no consideration moving to the United
States; they were charged with no duty in respect to the money; there was no legal claim by any one to it
when received into the treasury; and no law since has required it to be paid to the claimant. There can be,
therefore, no implied contract in the case.
Judgment affirmed.
- See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/95/149.html#sthash.9tSbkGvB.dpuf

Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez

G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Not Needed in Amnesty

FACTS

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the
war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became
aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty
as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14 th Amnesty Commission refused to process
the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as
charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD:

Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons
or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason
it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36,
RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the
criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is
sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say
that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared
by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether
or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the
benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded
or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that
the accused is entitled to said benefits.

Effects of Pardon
Cristobal vs. Labrador, GR No. L-47941, Dec 7, 1940

Doctrine: The pardoning power of the Pres cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action
Laurel, J.
FACTS:

CFI of Rizal found respondent Santos guilty of estafa and was confined in the provincial
jail for 6 months.
On 1938, Commonwealth Act No 357 or the Election Code, was approved by the
National Assembly. Section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from
voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property.
He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he was already
holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his
conviction.
Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of
electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment for any crime
against property. T
On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos from the list of
voters in precinct no. 11 of Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the latter is disqualified
under par (b) of Sec 94 of the Election Code.
After hearing, the court denied the petition for exclusion and declared that Santos is
exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to
his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office
or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pardoning power of the President applies to legislative prohibitions

HELD: Yes.
there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative of the President: (a)
that the power be exercised after conviction and (b) that such power does not extend to cases
of impeachment.

Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it
and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. In this case, the disability is the result of the conviction without
which there would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only

punishment, which the law imposes upon those who violates its command. There are accessory
and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such left of the
consequences of conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional
in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual
in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights.

The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code, does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of his
pardoning power not contemplated in the Constitution and would lead furthermore to the result
that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.

TOPIC: effects of pardon

DOCTRINE: pardon cannot be restricted by legislative action
CASE Number (including date): GR No. L-48100, June 20, 1941
CASE Name: Pelobello vs. Palatino
Ponente laurel

FACTS
Petitioner-appellant, pelobello instituted a quo warranto case against
palatino, respondent-appellee mayor-elect of Torrijos, marindque.
Respondent was convicted in 1912 ans sentenced to two years and 4 months
imprisonment. It was alleged that the respondent was disqualified from
voting and running for public office pursuant to the provisions of section 167,
in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.
357)
Governor general gave him conditional pardon in 1915 and president of the
Philippines gave him absolute pardon(restors full civil and political rights in
1940.

ISSUES
15 Whether or not the pardon of the president restores the right to
public office even with the ban on previously convicted candidates
as stated by provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94
(a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357)
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
(1) No: legislative action (election code and Commonwealth act) cannot
restrict or control the constitutional power of the president to pardon. It

removes all the disabilities from conviction. If the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all consequences of the conviction.
o the respondent has exercised the right to suffrage in 1915 after the
conditional pardon
o elected municipal president three times
o elected mayor in 1940
RULING:
Wherefore the petition is denied
TOPIC: Effects of Pardon
DOCTRINE:
CASE Number: GR No. L-28613; Aug. 27, 1968
CASE Name: Lacuna vs Abes
Ponente: Reyes, JBL, J.

FACTS
Mayor-elect Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury
warrants and sentenced to prision mayor and a fine. After he had partially
served his sentence, he was released on April 7, 1959 by virtue of a
conditional pardon granted by the President, remitting only the unexpired
portion of the prison term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum
sentence would have been served on Oct. 13, 1961.
With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a
voter but said application was denied. Despite this, Abes filed his certificate
of candidacy for the office of mayor and later won. On Nov. 16, 1967, he was
proclaimed the fully elected mayor. Lacuna placed second.
Lacuna filed his petition for quo warranto with preliminary injunction in CFI
Nueva Ecija. On the same day that the hearing was held on the application
for preliminary injunction, the President granted Abes an absolute and
unconditional pardon and restored to him full civil and political rights.
CFI dismissed the petition, declaring Abes' eligibility to the position of mayor.
Lacuna contends that the restoration of Abes' civil and pol. rights did not
retroact to remove the disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the
pardon.

ISSUES
Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed
by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualifications
prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.

HELD
Yes: The view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's
effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment
of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution.
As laid down in the Pelobello case, "xxx subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by

legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. Thus the better
view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty
to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or
parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction.

RULING:
Wherefore the petition is affirmed.

LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC. ORBOS, OCAMPO III

October 26, 2012 Leave a comment

October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 99031)

PARTIES:
Petitioner: RODOLFO D. LLAMAS
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III

FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III
was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed
office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was
pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say
that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no
other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an
administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.

HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative
cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in
criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases
from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the
Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is
mere substantial evidence to support a decision.