The SIS Cockup Patchup Bill

(see page 2)

The Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, and Labour leader Helen Clark of the Intelligence
and Security Committee: "If it ain't legal, change the law."

In this issue: �
• The SIS Cockup Patchup Bill 2
• ABC's submission on the Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 5
• Secret European Plan to tap all mobile phones - Is NZ involved? 7
• Is your computer being used to spy on you? 8
• Intelligence agencies and the toothless Privacy Act 9
• The Navy Ski-Hercules Squadron is gone 11
• New book lifts veil on Nurrungar - US spied on
Australian Anti-Bases Movement 12
• Update from Britain 14
• ABC submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee 15
• CIA Briefs - Unlaundered! 19
• Philippines - Toxic legacy from US bases 20
• The dirty world of the SAS 21
• Bits and Pieces 23
• Remember the United States Information Agency? 24
 The SIS Cockup Patchup Bill
Murray Horton
Highest Court Rules SIS Has Been
Breaking The Law For 30 Years
The December 1 998 decision by the Court of Appeal
that the July 1 996 Security Intelligence Service (SIS)
break-In at the Christchurch home of Aziz Choudry
was illegal really set the cat among the pigeons. The
full bench of the country's highest court overturned the
August 1 998 finding by J u stice Panckhurst that the
1969 SIS Act, and subsequent amendments, gave the
spies an implicit right to covertly break and enter
premises In the execution of their interception
warrants. Instead, the Court of Appeal accepted the
argument by Rodney Harrison QC, Aziz's lawyer, that
New Zealand law is explicit, not implicit, ie, if
something IS not specifically permitted by law, then it is
illegal. The judges could find nothing in the 30 year old
Act that permitted break-ins. This exposed the
untenable position of the Inspector-General of
Intelligence and Secunty (Laurie Greig). He had ruled,
In response to Aziz's official complaint, that "nothing
u nlawful" had taken place, whilst never actually
confirming or denying that the SIS was in any way
involved. Greig h a s since written to Aziz admitting that,
in light of the Court of Appeal decision, he was wrong.
That was Aziz's appeal. The SIS had also appealed
Justice Panckhurst's finding that he was not prepared
to accept a blanket defence of "national security" as
good enough reason to withhold from Aziz a large
number of documents (including the interception
warrant) needed to pursue his $300,000 civil damages
claim against t h e Crown (arising from the break-in).
Panckhurst had specifically rejected a certificate
signed by Jenny S h ipley, Minister in Charge of the SIS
(it's always the P M ) asserting immunity from producing
the documents. Panckhurst ruled that he wanted to
inspect the documents for himself, at the SI S's
Christchurch office, before ruling on their release.
Even this was too much for the SIS. The Court of
Appeal ruled that Shipley be given until February 1999
to produce an a m ended certificate with more details on
why the documents should be withheld; then it would
rule on whether or not they should be released. This
amended certificate was duly produced and was the
subject of a further Court of Appeal hearing, in April
1 999. Once again, decision was reserved. The judges,
In their December 1998 ruling, were quite scathing in
their opinion of the Crown case. Justice Thomas said:
"The Courts today are not prepared to be awestruck by
the 'mantra' of national security".
Although the Crown announced plans to appeal the
ruling regarding turning over documents, it decided not
to appeal the ruling declaring all SIS break-ins illegal.
Instead, the Government, with the connivance of
Labour, decided to rush through a Bill giving the SIS
explicit powers to covertly break and enter, and making
Peace Researcher 18 - Page 2 - May 1999
such power retrospective (with the exception of Aziz's
case). The so-called intelligence oversight body, the
Intelligence and Security Committee (which must
never be confused with a Select Committee, because
it very deliberately isn't one), suddenly found a new
lease of life (its 1 998 annual report to Parliament had
been "nothing to report") and the 1 998 SIS
Amendment BW was introduced into Parliament Just
before Christmas, with submissions due in by the end
of Jan uary 1999. This is a very old trick. National,
Labour, ACT and the various mercenaries voted for it,
only the Alliance, the Greens and Independent Neil
Kirton voted against it Rank and file Labour supporters
felt totally betrayed by their Parliamentary party.
The Court of Appeal decision and the NatLab cynical
reaction (retrospectively legalising burglary by the
buggers) touched off a storm of public protest For
years, law and order supporters have always
supported each erosion of civil liberties by j ustifications
such as "the innocent have got nothing to fear" or
"what have you got to worry about if you've got nothing
to hide?". But this whole saga strikes at one of the
foundations of the Kiwi Way Of Life - home ownership
and the inviolable sanctity of private property. It
became a mainstream issue, featuring extensively in
the media (including numerous cartoons) and in
everyday conversations in homes and workplaces
throughout the country. It was no longer just a political
activist with a foreign name up against an obscure
State agency; people realised that this could very well
be them next time. The hypocrisy of the Government
legalising State burglars whilst simultaneously
fulminating about "home invaders" was not lost on
people either.
S u bmissions Against The B i l l
Rod Donald, Green MP, launched a petition calling for
the Bill to be scrapped. Despite being launched right
on Christmas, and having only until February to get
around, it got over 7,000 signatures. The Intelligence
and Security Committee (Shipley, Don McKinnon, Sir
Douglas Graham, Helen Clark and Mike Moore) heard
public submissions in February 1999. It refused to
travel outside Wellington, meaning that those who
wanted to personally appear had to travel there at their
own expense for their few minutes in front of the bored
senior politicians who had already made u p their
min'd s. But the Government was quite happy to fly out
Dame Stella Rimington, former head of Britain's MI5
(at a cost of over $18,000, paid for out of the SIS
budget) to tell the Committee how vital it is for spies to
have the power to break and enter. To their shame,
former Labour PMs, David Lange and Sir Geoffrey
Palmer, both testified ,' n support of the BilL Don Mclver,
Director of the SIS, testified that it had foiled n uclear
terrorists and was on the lookout for Islamic terrorists
targeting U S embassies in "soft" countries, None of
which explains what his agents were doing in Aziz's
house during a 1996 activity opposing an APEC Trade
Ministers' Conference, No plutonium was found in his
laundry cupboard and despite being Pakistani, he is
definitely a lapsed Muslim.
The vast majority of submissions opposed all or part
of the Bill. Of the latter, some wanted the power to
issue interception warrants transferred from the PM to
a Judge (both Lange and Palmer strenuously opposed
any involvement by judges, This whole saga has
become a very interesting constitutional battle
between the Executive and the judiciary), Many
submissions pointed out the danger of allowing the
SIS to covertly enter and seize "things" (the actual
wording of the Bill), This gives them the power to
cripple organisations by legally stealing the likes of
computer discs or other documents such as
membership lists, financial records, etc, There is no
obligation to return them, produce them in court, or in
any way acknowledge that the SIS are the thieves,
Don Mclver, the SIS Director, reinforced this fear by
stating, in his submission, that computer discs are
exactly the sort of "things" the SIS would be targeting,
Maori organisations were concerned about being the
targets of State spying, That's not mere hypothesis
either - a December 1998 sweep of the Maori Legal
Service's Wellington office revealed that phone calls
were being intercepted (media coverage of this was
silenced by threat of legal sanctions under the
I nspector General of Intelligence and Security Act),
SomE' submissions went way beyond calling for
amending or scrapping this Bill. They called for the
scrap ,ing of the I ntelligence and Security Committee,
and fqr the abolition of the SIS itself (see ABC's
subm ';sion below),
Subm ;sions were heard in Wellington over two days,
There Nas a protest outside Parliament (Aziz was one
of the 3peakers) and, in Christchurch, more than 100
peoplE marched to the "secret" SIS office (which was
well g larded by police), where there was a rally
outsid, , in the middle of the street, and a protest
bannel was hung from the top of the building, I
presenred the ABC's submission, by megaphone, to
the raiL, One third of the total submissions had come
from C h ristchurch, but the Intelligence and Security
Committee refused numerous requests to come to
Christchurc h , So Christchurch organised its own
hearings, in front of local worthies including the
Chancellor of the University of Canterbury, the
Cathoi'l c Bishop, the Human Rights Commissioner
(Southern), the national co-president of the
Conference of Churches, a Ngai Tahu representative,
a Canterbury Regional Councillor and wellknown
writer and lawyer, AK. Grant Several local OppOSition
MPs also attended, These very busy people were all
prepared, at less than a week's notice, to give u p
several hours of their time t o hear C h ristchurch
submiss' l ons (the City Council was happy to make the
h istoric Provincial Chambers available for the
hearing), This eminent persons group produced a
Peace Researcher 1 8
report calling for an inquiry into the SIS, before
Parliament allows any increase in its powers,
Government Does A No. 2 On Us
The SIS Amendment Bill was duly rushed into law, in
March, Labour's Michael Cullen said it was always
Parliament's understanding that SIS officers had the
right of entry, "It's hard to u n derstand how any
intelligence agency anywhere i n the world could
operate without some limited form of entry right It's in
the nature of the work they do" (Chris/church Press,
2 6 March 1999), But substantial doubt was cast on
that retrospective assumption by David Small, the
man who had caught the SIS agents at Aziz's house,
back in 1996, David wrote to the Crown Law Office
asking for the earliest dated legal opinion that an
interception warrant e mpowered agents to break into
private homes, Back came the answer - September
18, 1996 - Le, after the Choudry break in, and nearly
20 years after the 1977 SIS Amendment Act cited
throughout as the legal j ustification for SIS break-ins,
The Governmeht obviously had misgivings about the
whole thing, too, I n March 1999, it introduced the SIS
Arnendment Bill (No,2), once again with Labour's full
support, Submissions were set down for May, with No,
2 to come into effect in midyear. It changes a n u mber
of things - for instance, the PM can no longer solely
authorise interception warrants against New
Zealanders in the domestic context These warrants
have to be co-authorised by the newly created
Commissioner of Security Warrants, who must be a
retired High Court judge Oust what the country needs,
more warrant officers, The I nspector General is or was
a High Court judge - his performance fills us with no
confidence that yet another one will make any
difference), But, in a huge loophole, the P M can solely
authorise warrants against New Zealanders with
"foreign" connections, whose activities "endanger New
Zealand's international or economic wellbeing", The
new Bill tightens up the definition of "thing" used
throughout the original Bill and claims to bring in
safeguards to warrant procedures, Aziz Choudry
accurately described it as weasel words and "window
dressing", Shipley assured protesters against APEC
that they would have nothing to fear from the SIS, To
which, Aziz replied: "Why would anyone expect me to
believe them?" (Christchurch Press, 17 March 1999),
C h ristchurch people produced a wonderful little
booklet entitled "The Whoppa Book of SIS Fairy Tales:
The Gospel According to Jenny a n d Helen", It was
read aloud by David Small (good practice, as he's
recently become a father) at a March protest outside
the C h ristchurch office of the SIS, The demo also
featured the delivery to the SIS of a large bag of house
keys, to save them the trouble of breaking in, The
book of fairy tales concluded about the new Bill that:
• The SIS will still be given the power to break into
people's homes,
• This power will still be backdated to legitimise the
SIS's history of illegal activities, even before 1977,
- Page 3 - May 1999
• The inadequate complaints procedures remain
untouched.
• The definition of security to include the country's
"international or economic well-being" remains.
• As long as the SIS alleges foreign influence, the
Prime Minister alone can still sign interception
warrants
• Individual New Zealanders can still be placed
under SIS surveillance at the discretion of the
Director of the SIS.
• Devices and equipment other than listening
devices can still be planted in people's houses
(press release, 23/3/99).
And chinks are starting to appear in the wall of official
secrecy around the Choudry break-in. Helen Clark,
Leader of the O p position, told North and South (April
1999) that the SIS broke into Aziz's house not to spy
on him but "foreign visitors". The only foreigner he had
staying with him at the time was Dr AleJandro Villamar
Calderon, a Mexican speaker at the 1996 Trading
With Our Lives conference. One problem with Clark's
story - the warrant used to authorise the break-in was
dated September 1995; Aziz didn't meet Alejandro
until November, and it wasn't until December 1995
that GATT Watchdog invited him to NZ. The New
Zealand Herald ran a front page headline: "Secrecy
slip by Clark h a s SIS fuming" [18 February, 1999].
We're sure there are plenty more j uicy revelations to
come in this most fascinating of stories.
The APEC Clampdown
Of course, the SIS break-in at Aziz's house and
everything that has happened since has not
happened in a vacuum. It has all taken place in the
general context of free trade/foreign
investmentig lobalisation being the prevailing
ideological orthodoxy, and the specific context of New
Zealand's gungho membership of APEC. The break­
in took place d u ring GATT Watchdog's activities
Peace Researcher 1 8
opposing an APEC Trade Minister's Conference, the
SIS Amendment Bill and other new laws (such as the
Arms Amendment Act, which allows foreign
bodyguards to bring their guns into the country) are
being rushed through as part of the security
clampdown accompanying New Zealand's hosting of
all APEC meetings in 1999, climaxing in the
September Leaders' Summit in Auckland The media
is pouring out the propaganda - on the one hand, the
highly dubious claim about how marvellous these
APEC meetings will be for New Zealand (including a
travelling road show of "celebrities" whose Job it is to
"sell APEC") and, on the other, how the biggest
security operation in New Zealand's history is needed
to protect all these VIPs from "terrorists" and
protesters
For example, throughout March, the RNZAF
conducted helicopter night flying exercises qver the
Canterbury Plains. "The RNZAF has a requirement to
provide daylnight counter-terrorist capability for
government. This is necessary for any contingencies
that may arise during APEC" (Press, 13/3/99; public
notice). The specific point of this exercise was to
practice landing Special Air Service (SAS) troops at
night. In February, Judge Louis Freeh, the Director of
the FBI, visited NZ to meet the PM, the Commissioner
of Police and the Director of the SIS, to discuss APEC
security In Auckland, an RNZAF lroquois helicopter
has been systematically checking city high rises, such
as the Sky Tower, for their usefulness to would-be
snipers. All police leave has been cancelled; court
cases postponed; public access to certain areas
restricted; public roads will be closed for motorcades;
student holidays rearranged to get them out of town,
cops will be carrying guns; a Navy decontamination
unit will be on standby in case of a chemical weapon
attack. And so on, and so forth.
So, fasten your seatbelts everybody, it's going to be a
bumpy old ride. And you'd better wear your g umboots.
Very handy for wading through all the bullshit.
- Page 4 - May 1999
 ABC'S SUBMISSION ON THE
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE AMENDMENT ACT 1998
The Anti-Bases Campaign is primarily concerned with
the Govern ment Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB), which operates the Waihopai spybase. We
have lodged a petition and su b mission before this
same Committee calling for the GCSB to be abolished
and both Waihopai and Tangimoana to be closed (see
elsewhere in this issue. Ed). But we also have more
than a passing interest i n the Security Intelligence
Service (SIS), and have no doubt that the attraction is
mutual We made a submission in 1996, the last time
the Government, with the connivance of Labour, tried
to cobble together legislation "bnnging our spies into
the post-Cold War world".
We can see ne reason for the SIS to exist now, if
Indeed there ever was one. It is useless, dangerous, a
waste of public money, and an anachronism in this day
and age. The words "intelligence" and "security" are
misapplled in the Bill's title - the New Zealand public
has seen precious little evidence of either. Every other
organ of the State has been restructured,
corporatlsed, flogged off or closed down. So why not
add the SIS to the list? What's so special about it? This
IS one cut In Government spending which would be
both fully Justified and popular
Judged even in its own terms, the SIS is a failure. This
ill considered and hasty Bill (being rushed through
under cover of the silly season, as usual) is the
Government's respons.e to the Choudry case. What
have we gleaned from that case? That the SIS can't
even pull off a routine covert break-in without being
caught and traced. Presumably, considerable sums of
taxpayers' money are spent training intrepid SIS
agents for Just such operations. This outfit couldn't
organise the old proverbial in a brewery. Pension them
off. They'll have no trouble getting work in the benefit
fraud squad or some other Government spy agency.
Who is "the enemy" that the SIS is guarding us from?
Terrorists? Where was any evidence of its
"Intelligence" or "security" when real foreign State
terrorists attacked this country in 1985? The "Rainbow
Warrior" killers were caught by good old fashioned
police work, not by any covert agency. The 1996 Act
broadens the scope of the SIS to include those
threatening New Zealand's " international andlor
economic wellbeing". And who might they be?
International currency speculators? Transnational
corporations exporting vast profits whilst laying off
thousands of Kiwi workers? Corporate tax dodgers?
The Business Round Table and the Employers
Federation? C h ilean orchardist, stealing our apple
cuttings to wreak havoc with our fruit exports?
Peace Researcher 18
Apparently not Once again, the Choudry case (which
precipitated this Bill) provides the clue - the SIS
defines those who threaten New Zealand's
" international andlor economic wellbeing" to be
individuals and groups who actively oppose the
Government's economic policies and the prevailing
ideological orthodoxy. This is exactly what was
forecast in 1996 when submissions were heard on the
last attempt to give some legitimacy to this bunch of
bungling burglars. Thus, the SIS is to be the private
police force of the Government, to spy on and flarass
its political opponents.
Let's turn to the specifics of this 1998 Bill (the
Christchurch Cockup Patchup Bill). At the outset, the
ABC wants to say that we support the Shipley
government, in at least one area. We entirely agree
that home invasion is a despicable crime whose
perpetrators are deserving of the full force of the law.
Why then is the same Government rushing through
legislation allowing a privileged elite of burglars
impunity to invade any home the Government deems
fit to so violate? The Bill does not address a critical
grey area - what happens if the householder confronts
one of these SIS home invaders? Will they identify
themselves and say "Don't touch me, I ' m on high
affairs of State"? Will they make a run for it without
identifying themselves? How is the householder
expected to identify these intruders and is slhe in legal
jeopardy if slhe uses reasonable force to a'pprehend
these home invaders? It must be said that we don't
agree with the more excitable commentators who
advocate deadly force against home invaders, not
even SIS agents (after passing the first Bill, the
Attorney-General, Sir Douglas Graham, said that he
would consider an amendment proposed by Alliance
MP, Matt Robson, requiring SIS officers breaking into
houses to have to carry ID cards. So that's' all right
then, isn't it? Ed.).
The Bill authorises the SIS to break in and legally steal
"things". This is a breathtakingly broad field. Does this
mean that the next time Mr Subversive can't find a
letter in his office, he should assume that the SIS has
paid him a visit? Mind you, on h istorical precedent, it's
more likely to be his copy of Penthouse that will be
seized. This power of legalised theft bestows on the
SIS the power to cripple an organisation, by seizing
(and, unlike the Police, having no legal obligation to
produce in court or return to its rig htful owners)
computers, correspondence, membership and
financial records. This authorises the SIS to carry out
covert dirty tricks operations of the kind made
infamous by Richard Nixon and the Watergate
Page 5 - May 1999
burglars We strongly suspect that this power will be
used to try and hamstring groups campaigning against
this year's APEC meetings throughout NZ; to suppress
dissent and prevent the Government from being
embarrassed while the eyes of the world are upon it
Instead of trYing to retrospectively cover up SIS
blunders and illegalltles with this Bill, we urge you to
take the bull by the horns and abolish the SIS. And
while you're at It vote your committee out of a job too.
The Intelligence and Security Committee is a joke as
far as any oversight of the SIS goes. like the British
committee you are modelled on. you are entirely
dependent on the agency you are supposed to be
overseeing for the Information you need to "oversee" it
There IS no Independent means of auditing SIS
operations. As for the Inspector-General - that office is
equally Ineffective The present occupant ruled, on Aziz
Choudry's official complaint, that "nothing unlawful" had
taken place, whilst never confirming or denying that the
SIS was involved in the break-in, 80 much for the
"proper channels"l If Aziz hadn't taken civil action, at his
own expense, the Court of Appeal would not have had
the opportunity to rule that, in fact, everything about this
SIS break-in was unlawful and what's more that the Act
which "governed" the SIS for 30 years gave them no
right to covertly enter anyone's property. Where was
the oversight of the 1 969 SIS Act? It had never been
put to the test and as soon as it was, it was deemed to
be fatally flawed and illegal,
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11/ ! '
1:1; I,
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Peace Researcher 18
That's not to say that there isn't such a thing as
effective oversight We need look no further than
Australia In the 1 970s. The then Attorney General, the
late lionel Murphy, feared that the Australian Security
I ntelligence Organisation
(ASIO, the equivalent of the SIS) was not giving him
accurate Information about the likelihood of Croatian
fascist terrorists, resident in Australia, trYing to
assassinate the Yugoslav PM during a forthcoming
State visit So Murphy did something unheard of· - he
led a March 1 973 police raid of ASIO's HQ to inspect
their files for himself. We look forward With 'eager
anticipation to this happening In Stout Street (515 head
office, 111 Wellington. Ed.).
If it is felt that some of the functions of the SIS need to
be retained, then give them to the Police. Their
warrants. powers of entry and whole operational scope
are subject to regular perusal by the courts There is
some accountability involved with the Police, as
opposed to none with the SIS (but, no, we're not
advocating the setting up of a Special Branch within the
Police. Overseas experience shows that they are as
bad as the spy agencies), On the whole, however,
situations such as this will keep cropping up (and
needing makeshift legislation to repair them) as long as
the SIS exists, So, the ABC's recom mendations are
simple'
Scrap this Bill! Abolish the SIS!
Disband the ISe!
- Page 6 - May 1999
 SECRET EUROPEAN PLAN TO TAP ALL
MOBILE PHONES
Is New Zealand Involved?
A fascinating Reuters story, from December 1998
["Europe readies police techno-surveillance law",
by NiaJ/ McKay), raises some very interesting
questions about whether New Zealand is involved
in the international agreement detailed below, Ed,
"United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway,
agreement allows authorities to conduct telecom
surveillance across international borders, according to
a Europol document leaked to members of the
European Parliament [Europol is the European police
agency Ed]
"The European Union is quietly getting ready to
approve legislat on that will allow the police to either the
eavesdrop both cn Internet conversations and Iridium
satellite telephone calls without obtaining court
authorisation [Iridium satellite phones got extensive
free publicity from sponsonllg Peter Hillary's illfated
and illtempered 1'198/99 trek ''a the South Pole, Ed.j.
"The legislation is part of a m Jch wider memorandum
of understanding ')etween th', E U , the U nited States,
Canada, New Zelland, and Norway, a non-member
-
European nation, , hat agreement allows authorities to
conduct telecom surveillan::e across international
borders, accordirr) to a Eur' , 'pol document leaked to
members of thE' European Parliament. "Secu rity
measures are oftEl necessary in the cases of
terrorism or orgar sed crime, ' said Glyn Ford, liijiiii
a member of the r uropean Parliament for the
British Labour Party and a di'ector of the EU's
Civil Liberties and 'nternal Aifairs Committee,
"But what we need is some ',;ort
control. It seems '.0 me Unt many secu rity
services are a law unto themselves".
"That will presumabi'/ be a topic of discussion when the
European Council lA Ministers meets behind closed
doors to update a 1S195 wiretap agreement known as
the Legal Interceotion of Telecommunications
Resolution. If appruved, it would permit real-time,
remote monitoring or email, as well as of calls placed
on satellite teleph ne networks such as those
maintained by Iridiurr and Globalstar. Unlike most laws
m Europe, the agreement will allow law enforcement to
listen in without a court order.
"ThiS IS a US export," 3aid Marc Rotenberg, director of
the Electronic Priva,:y Information Center. "It's a
European version of iile Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement �ct". That act, passed in 1 994,
was mtended to alloVl law enforcers to tap the digital
Peace Researcher 18
lines of tomorrow, just as they tap analogue phone
lines now. Ironically, in September 1998, the European
Parliament called for accountability of Echelon, the US
National Security Agency's spying network that is
reportedly able to intercept, record, and translate any
electronic communication - telephone, data, cellular,
fax, email, or telex [Echelon is the system first exposed
in Nicky Hager's landmark 1996 book, "Secret Power".
Ignored by politicians and media in New Zealand, it
has created a sensation throughout Europe. Edj.
" U nder European law, representatives of each
member nation can pass legally binding resolutions.
Further, the resolutions don't require the approval of
European Parliament or the individual
parliaments of EU members. Many European
Parliament members are outraged that the Council of
Ministers has been acting in secret. They are
especially concerned about the inclusion of non-EU
narlons in the agreement. Patricia McKenna, a
representative for Britain's Green Party, is requesting
what she described as an 'open debate on the crucial
and far-reaching measures, with enormous potential
impact in the realm of privacy'. Another member of the
European Parliament believes that the so-called
'u pdate resolutions' will have staggering implications
for personal privacy. "This legislation is not just a
technical update", said Johannes Voggenhuber, an
Austrian representative for the European Parliament.
"It places
carrier to
the onus
provide
on the telecommunications
a watertight back door to
police".
"The European Council for General Security
prepared the amendment with technical
assistance from the FBI, according to the
Europol document leaked. The four major
satellite telephone operators - Iridiu m , Globalstar,
Odyssey,and ICO - will be required by the law to
provide access to European law enforcement through
ground stations in France, Italy, England, and
Germany. It is unclear how the memorandum of
understanding will affect U S citizens. "I find it very hard
to believe that a fore'l gn nation - any foreign nation -
could eavesdrop on U S citizens," said John Pike, a
security analyst with the Federation of American
Scientists. "It's one thing for the FBI to try and track
terrorists across international borders, but it's entirely
another to let Europeans tap US citizens' telephones"
"The FBI would neither confirm nor deny any
relationship between the United States and the other
nations involved in the memorandum of
- Page 7 - May 1999
 understanding. However, Rotenberg said such
provisions are already in place under the 1 994
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act. While the new European law is being sold to EU
member states as a means of combating what the
legislation calls 'serious and organised' crime, there is
no clear definition of this phrase. 'It simply concerns
any punishable offence," said Tony Bunyan, director
of Statewatch, a European civil liberties group" ,
This story was the first time ABC has seen a mention
of New Zealand involvement A similar article in the
Observer [6 December 1 998; "Secret plan to tap all
mobile phones" by Duncan Campbell) .
named the non-European countries involved as the
US, Canada and Australia. ABC asked the
Government about it - the first response was
Ignorance and then, in March 1 999, a letter from the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade denying any New
Zealand involvement (as opposed to Shipley's "neither
confirm nor deny" answer to ABC's inquiry
IS YOUR COMPUTER BEING USED TO SPY ON
YOU?
Shipley Will Neither Confirm Nor Deny
Don't laugh, it's n o joke Read the following story from
The Australian ( 1 3 January, 1999; "Secret plan for
spies to bug PCs"): "Personal computers would
become police spy stations under secret proposals put
to the Federal Government by a former deputy director
of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO, the equivalent of the NZSIS). The Australian
Federal Police, ASIO and the National Crime Authority
would be empowered to alter software to turn PCs into
covert listening devices, according to the 1996 report
by one-time spy chief Gerald Walsh.
"The report also recommends changes to the
Commonwealth Crimes Act to allow police and
Govern ment investigators to hack into computer
systems for evidence. While Mr Walsh called for
public discussion of his proposals, the report was
withdrawn by the Attorney-General's Department.
But a copy of the 96-page document was obtained last
week by Internet privacy campaigners Electronic
Frontiers Australia (EFA) .. .A spokesman for Attorney­
General Daryl Williams confirmed last night that Mr
Walsh's recommendations were under discussion but
the report was 'Just one element' of policy being
considered. He would not say whether the
controversial recommendations would be acted
on through legislation.
Peace Researcher 18
as to whether NZ intelligence agencies seek to turn
personal computers into spy stations, as do their
Australian counterparts. See article elsewhere in this
issue. Ed.). But regardless of whether or not New
Zealand is involved, this plan represents a very
alarming extension of State international
phonetapping powers, and even more ironically. it's
being rammed through by the very political body that
recognised the dangers posed by the covert State
spying unmasked In Hager's book. If it's happening In
Europe, then it will be happening here in the near
future, if not already
•
State watch is an excellent European publication
available from Box 1516, London N16 OEW, UK.
Ph (0044) 0 18 18021882; fax (0044) 01811727, e-mail
statewatch-off@ge02. popte/. org.uk
++++++++
I
"Mr Walsh warns that widespread use of PC-based
data scrambling is a big concern for law enforcement.
Criminals were already using computer encryption -
programmes that encode data so it cannot be
intercepted - to prevent police from mOnitoring
phonecalls and e-mail. Widespread encryption to
scramble sensitive data would make crimes harder to
prove in court, Mr Walsh warns. 'The principle of non
self-incrimination may well represent the polite end of
the possible range of responses,' the report says.
"Mr Walsh's plan would clear the way for police to
eavesdrop on computer conversations at the source.
A 'target computer may be converted into a listening
device' that could seek out passwords a n d other
private communications without the PC owner's
knowledge. EFA spokesman Greg Taylor said
author 'lties might set up Trojan horse software that
would record all PC activity, including passwords and
e-mail, before encryption. 'If you have access to
someone's PC and you change their software you can
do anything you want,' said Mr Taylor. 'If it's connected
to a network such as the Internet the P C could
transmit data to another site' . . . "
This proposal to turn home computers into spy
stations was discovered purely by chance. "A Hobart
un iversity student has unearthed secret Federal
Government plans to let Australia's top spy agencies
hire computer hackers to break into the PCs of
- Page 8 - May 1999
suspects. Former Hutchins student Nick Ellsmore
stumbled on the plans in the State library in H obart.
The 1 9-year-old information systems and
management student was researching an
assignment on Australian cryptology restrictions
when he found the secret Government report. . .
"Uncensored copies of the Walsh report were
Inadvertently sent to university and state libraries
around Australia before Canberra banned its
publication for reasons of 'national security, defence
and international relations'. Aware of the background
to the Walsh report, Mr Ellsmore immediately alerted
pnvacy campaign group Electronic Frontiers
Australia to his discovery, which posted the
unabndged report on its Internet site and sparked a
national media sensation. 'I found i t i n the l ibrary
about a month ago - it had been sitting there since
the first print run in about October, '97,' he said from
Sydney yesterday, still shocked by his find. His
discovery comes as a major embarrassment for the
Federal Attorney-General's office , which is now
scrambling to find if any other top secret reports have
accidentally been released to libraries" (Hobart
Mercury, 1 5/ 1 /99; "Student exposes spying plans").
Intelligence Agencies and the
Toothless Privacy Act
Bob Leonard
The Pnvacy Act does not and never will protect the
privacy of your communications from the prying ears
of the GCSB. The Government Communications
Security Bureau (GCSB) has no enabling legislation
of its own ( u nlike the SIS). I t simply exists by
government edict (since 1 977) and can spy on your
electronic communications to its heart's content.
Neither the Privacy Act nor the Privacy
Commissioner can have any real impact on spying
and violations of your privacy of communications.
Privacy Commissioner Bruce Slane published his
review of the Privacy Act 1 99 3 as a weighty tome
entitled " N ecessary and Desirable" (November
1998). The full report runs to 435 pages and ABC
bought it because of its coverage of the role of
intelligence agencies in privacy issues. ABC had
made a submission to Mr Slane primarily on the
exemptions of intelligence agencies from certain
Privacy Principles. We were disappointed and a little
surprised that our concerns about exemptions from
issue of the I nformation Privacy Principle 4 (lPP-4)
were not dealt with in the report in any way.
"Personal information shall not be collected by an
agency by unlawful means . . " says IPP-4.
. privacy of New Zealanders" in view of this
We had a chance to discuss th',s with Mr Slane in
person at a briefing on 20 January 1 999 in
Christchurch. We prepared the following five
Peace Researcher 1 8
ABC wanted to find out if any such proposals existed
in New Zealand and wrote accordingly to Jenny
Shipley, the M i nister i n Charge of the Security
Intelligence Service (and of the Government
Communications Security Bureau, although you
won't find that title in any Ministerial portfolio). Shipley
replied: "I am not prepared to say whether or not the
NZSIS or the GCSB has sought covert access to
personal computers in New Zealand on the grounds
that to do otherwise would prejudice the security of
New Zealand" [letter to ABC, 4 March, 1 999]. Draw
your own conclusions
Meanwhile the SIS is making sure that it doesn't
inadvertently bug itself. How? By ensuring staff don't
take their Furbies with them into areas where
sensitive material is kept, as Furbies (high tech toys)
contain a chip allowing them to mimic speech. So if
you come home and find no other sign that your
house has been broken into, except for a cute toy
you don't remember buying - it could be the SIS's
cunning new bug. The new SIS Amendment Bill
constantly refers to their right to covertly enter
premises to install "things" - could Furbies be those
very things?
questions to address to Mr Slane in that meeting (the
end notes refer to relevant sections in the Review
document):
1. There is no significant discussion of I PP-4 in the
report. Does this mean that the Privacy
Commissioner is not concerned that intelligence
organisations may use illegal means to gather
'
personal information on New Zealanders?
2. How can privacy violations by the GCSB be
complained about or dealt with at all? 'Its spying
is completely secret and beyond effective
oversight for at least two compelling reasons: a)
the sheer volume and complexity of the
i ntercepted communications, and b) the
D irector of the GCSB has exclusive control of
access to i nformation held by his agency'
3. The GCSB and the Prime Minister have refused
to define "domestic" as it applies to spying on
our international communications. Does the
Commissioner accept the GCSB assertion that
their "activities have little or no impact on the
refusal?'
- Page 9 - May 1999
4. How can anyone. i n government or otherwise,
control the flows of spy data out of New Zealand
from the GCSB? The agency operates as an
integral member of the UKUSA community of five
nations whose systems of data transfer are
extensively interlinked and automated? '
5. How can the Inspector-General of I n telligence
ensure compliance with the laws of New Zealand
when intelligence organisations are specifically
exempted from parts of some laws, including the
Privacy Act?'
At one point i n the discussion, Mr Slane made one
possible concession to our concerns regarding I P P-4.
He suggested it m ight be possible to include
intelligence organisations in that PrinCiple and then
leave it to the I nspector-General to oversee legal use
of the information. Mr Slane did not make that
suggestion in any formal context and it is easy to see
why. It would mean that the GCSB would have to use
legal means to collect its information (and satellite
spying is surely illegal under both national and
international law) and the information and its use would
have to be available in detail to the I-G. Section 27 of
the Privacy Act effectively precludes any such blanket
disclosures to the I-G. So applying IPP-4 to the GCSB
would require major changes in the Act and would
effectively abolish the GCSB.
The discussion was polite but fruitless; the conclusion
is inescapable that the Privacy Commissioner cannot
effectively i nfluence the all-powerful Government
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) or the
Security Intelligence Service (SIS). The Government
has made sure of that. No direct answers were
provided to any of the above questions. These
questions among others cut to the heart of the problem
with the GCSB - near total secrecy defies control and
oversight
We have read all of the submissions on intelligence
organ'lsations made under the Privacy Act Review (it is
available as a bound volume from the Commissioner).
There were 24 submissions, including ones from the
SIS and GCSB and the I nspector-Ge�eral. I t is not
surprising that both agency d irectors were against
bringing their spying activities under the control of IPP-
4.
Nicky Hager expressed the opinion that" . . . the heart o f
the problem of ensuring reasonable privacy is section
27 of the Act . . This is the same wording as in the
Official Information Act and also the same wording that
restricts information being Provided on intelligence
activaies to the I ntelligence and Security Committee of
MPs'" Nicky went on to say, "The effect of this
wording in the Privacy Act is that virtually all
information relevant to privacy that is sought from
intelligence agencies can be withheld, with the result
that the Privacy PrinCiples 6 and 7 appear to be
rendered useless".
Peace Researcher 18
The Privacy Commissioner introduced the volume of
Intelligence Organisations Submissions with the
following quote:
" I t is the essence of a free society that a balance is
struck between the security that is desirable to protect
society as a whole and the safeguards that are
necessary to ensure individual liberty."
-Justice Brennan, Alisterv The Queen ( 1 984) 58 ALJR
97, 1 1 8
ABC entered into the review of the Privacy Act wah
considerable optimism that this was a mechanism by
which some of the evils and excesses of the GCSB
and the SIS might be addressed and corrected. We
were dead wrong. Our concerns were barely
addressed, particularly with respect to the GCSB,
which considers its activities to be irrelevant to privacy
issues. Our Government is far from striking the
balance referred to by Justice Brennan. We have
virtually no protection from spying by the GCSB and
that situation is not likely to change under either a
National- or labour-led Government.
Endnotes:
1 Privacy Act 1993 Review, p. 70: "I have no suggestions
for amendment of principle 4 which was considered bymost
submissions to have worked well." Peace Researcher notes
that a number of submissions to the Commissioner
recommended that IPP-4 should apply to intelligence
organisations. We disagree strongly with the
Commissioner's dismissive treatment of this issue.
2 Review, p. 224, 6.13.2: " ... there should be redress for
actions of intelllgence organisations which breach individual
rights without justification, including the right to privacy."
3 Review, p. 228, 6.13.22: "The GCSB is a foreign
intelligence organisation and, by defin',tion, our activities
have little or no impact on the privacy of New Zealanders."
(from submission bythe GCSB)
4 ,Review, pp. 103-104,2.18.17: "The recommendations
also suggest that measures should be taken to avoid data
being subject to automatic transborder communication
without the knowledge of the individuals concerned."
5 Review, p 229, 6.13.27: "Two part',cular functions [of the
Inspector-General of Intelligence and SecurityAct of
1996] are to ensure that the activities of the agencies
complywith the law and the complaints relating to them are
independentlyinvestigated."
6 Sect 27 Security, defence, international relations, etc
(1) An agency mayrefuse to disclose anyinformation
requested pursuant to prinCiple 6 if the disclosure of
the information would be likely -
(a) To prejudice the securityor defence of New
Zealand or the international relations of the
Government of New Zealand; or
(b) To prejudice the entrusting of information to the
Government of New Zealand on a basis of
confidence by -
(i) The Government of anyother countryor any
agencyof such a government; or
(ii) Anyinternational organisation..
- Page 10 - May 1999
 The Navy Ski-Hercules Squadron
is Gone
Bob Leonard
There it is in the flight data sheets we receive from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Mission
LCH0 1 7 , Navy ski-Hercules XD-04 returned from
McMurdo, landing at 1 804 on 1 7 February 1 999 at
Christchurch airport. The Herc was deployed to
CONUS (continental US), along with its sister ski­
planes XD-03, 06 and 07, within four days and was
soon to be scrapped in the Nevada desert (Press, 1 8
Feb 1 999) They were the last four Hercules of US
Navy Squadron VXE-6. Three other Navy Hercules
had been retired within the last 2-3 years. It was the
end of 44 years of service to the US Antarctic
program.
Ski-Hercules will continue to carry cargo to the
Antarctic but they will be strictly US Air Force planes
piloted by m e mbers of the New York Air National
Guard (see PR-1 5). Their planes saw ice service
formerly in the Arctic supplying early warning radar
bases (the DEW Line) in places like Greenland. The
phase-in of the NYANG 109th airlift wing began way
back in January 1 988 [see PR-17, first series]. They
have returned in various numbers ever since and
now have the whole show to themselves. There
appear to be seven NYANG ski-Hercules used i n
recent years replacing a n equal number of
Navy planes.
One of the retired Navy Hercules was rescued from
the Ice in the late 80s in a costly exercise i n terms of
both lives and money [PR-1 7, first series]. The plane
crashed i n a remote location i n 1 97 1 and was left
locked in the ice for nearly 20 years before the
unfathomable logic of the military mind led to its
recovery a n d lengthy rehabilitation in an Air New
Zealand hangar in Christchurch. Now it's headed for
the scrap-heap i n Nevada. Having been in the deep
freeze for so many years, one would think it would
still be in pretty good condition. But the relentless
pressure of the ice probably took its toll on the
structure of the buried plane.
Signs of a slight diplomatic, and even military, thaw
in relations between the US and NZ have appeared
in recent months, stimulated perhaps in part by all
the nostalgia over the Navy departure. Our nuclear­
free policy has long "iced" things up with our old ally
the US of A
Peace Researcher 18
I t even led to the avoidance since 1 987 of L yttelton
harbour by US ice-breakers which have used Hobart
instead.
This self-imposed ban has always seemed pretty
absurd since the ships operate under the US
Department of Transportation and have never been
considered to be nuclear-capable, certainly not by
NZ. But the US considers them part of the Navy and
thus they supposedly fall under the "neither confirm
nor deny" nuclear weapons policy.
Of course that infamous policy has never stopped
the US Navy and Air Force from using Christchurch
airport. The Starlifters a n d Galaxys and Hercules
and various other US military a i rcraft involved i n
Operation Deep Freeze and in the
militarylintelligence flights to and from Australia are
never questioned by either government.
But they are all capable of carrying nuclear weapons
as cargo aircraft and continue to carry the neither
confirm nor deny policy to this day. This is just one
of the larger distortions of diplomatic logic dictated by
the bizarre realities of US-NZ relations. "The
operations manager for a civilian contractor that
provides support services for the US Antarctic
programme, Brian Stone, said it was logical for the
ice-breakers to use Lyttelton as staging point
because all the other US activities were based in
·Christchurch. " (Press, 1 6 Feb 1 999) ABC would
prefer the reverse logic which would see all US ships
and aircraft banned from NZ territory.
- Page 1 1 - May 1999
 NEW BOOK LIFTS VEIL ON NURRUNGAR
US Spied on Australian Anti- Bases
Movement
Nurrungar is an Australian place name that is familiar
to the Anti-Bases Campaign (although not as well
known as Pine Gap). For decades, the US Air Force
channel flights, operating under the cover of providing
Antarctic logistic support for Operation Deep Freeze,
have used Harewood to service both Nurrungar and
Pine Gap. That continues today, meaning that
Chnstchurch Airport is still being used as a key link in
the chain of US intelligence gathering bases in
Australia.
Nurrungar, near Woomera (central South Australia), is
one of three ground stations which process a
continuous stream of data from US spy satellites. Their
Job is to detect missile launches anywhere in the world
and so, Nurrungar has a key role in American nuclear
warfighting capability. Jeffrey Richelson is a name also
familiar to New Zealand peace activists. He is a
researcher with Washington's National Secu rity
Archives, co-author (with Australia's Des Ball) of "The
Ties That Bind", and co-foreword writer (along with
former PM, David Lange) for Nicky Hager's seminal
book "Secret Power". Richelson has written a new
book - "America's Space Sentinels: DSP (Defense
Support Program ) Satellites and National Security".
This book is based on decades of once-classified US
documents secured under the Freedom of I nformation
Act Its release was a major news event in Australia -
the national paper, The Australian, gave it front page
lead status, plus an entire inside page ( 1 8/2/99). The
most interesting are the revelations (surprise, surprise)
that the US spied on our good friends in the Australian
Anti-Bases C a mpaign Coa.lition
Force Office of Special Investigations undertook a
secret 1989 investigation of the AABCC and other
groups. The report was classified "CON FIDENTIAL
NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals)". The
results of the report remain classified and it's not
known if it involved covert operations. However,
Professor Des Ball, of Canberra's Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, has no doubt that the
investigation would have involved extensive
cooperation with the Australian Security I ntelligence
Organisation (ASIO). Denis Doherty, AABCC
coordinator, said that the book confirms the suspicions
of anti-bases activists that they had been spied on:
"Whenever we said anything about being investigated
we were accused of being paranoid. This confirms
what we have always believed - that our phones were
tapped and our demonstations monitored" (Australian,
1 8/2/99; "Anger as activists' suspicions confirmed'}
The AABCC organised a whole series of militant
protests at all three major US bases in Australia (North
Peace Researcher 18
West Cape, Nurrungar and Pine Gap), plus played a
leading regional role in regional anti-bases struggles In
the Philippines and New Zealand. Throughout the late
1 980s and early 90s, h undreds were arrested at demos
at the Aussie bases.
The most militant demo of them all was at N u rrungar.
in September 1 989. H u ndreds of protesters entered
the base ("stormed through the fences", according to
the Australian); four made it as far as the main
complex; over 500 were arrested. The then Labor
government had to call in 50 troops, the first time that
soldiers were used against civilians in Australian
history, and the then Defence Minister, Kim Beazley,
ordered a review of security at N u rrungar to reassure
the US. It was th'l s demo that obv'l ously set the alarm
bells ringing in the highest circles of U S intelligence
and military. Des Ball, whilst saying that he knew
nothing of the secret investigation, said that he was not
surprised. "Nurrungar is the most im portant element of
the whole US strategic early warning system. It is the
only system in the world that provides immediate
warning for an attack on America itself, so if there is a
threat to it - if people are trying to break in - it could
easily go all the way up to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff
and maybe even to the President" (Australian, 1 8/2/99;
"Confidential: US spied on our peace activists over
desert base").
,Nu rrungar Is Central To US Nuclear
War Fighting
That was not the only revelation about N u rrungar in
Richelson's book. When construction was first mooted,
in 1 969, the USAF was concerned about "political
hazards" of building "a large secretive installation in a
foreign country" (Australian, 1 8/2/99; "War role j ustifies
history's questions"). In the early 1 970s, US documents
record that the Nixon Administration thought that the
Australian Liberal government was being too secretive
about Nurrungar's role, being primarily concerned with
"its political consequences as the ruling party
confronted certain political realities in trying to conceal
the purposes of a mysterious installation within its
boundaries" (Australian, 1 8/2/99; "Too secretive for
Nixon"). I n 1 974 President Nixon ordered the CIA to
conduct a secret review of the US-Australian security
alliance, in light of the re-election that year of the
Whitlam Labor government (the role of American
intelligence in the 1 975 "constitutional coup" that
overthrew that government has been well
documented). In the 1980s, the Hawke Labor
- Page 12 ' May 1999
government had to ask the US for help i n answering
Australian questions about Nurrungar's role in the
proposed Star Wars project (which is still going, under
Clinton, albeit under another name).
And the book reminds us that Nurrungar is involved in
real non-nuclear wars. During the 1 99 1 Gulf War it
was directly i nvolved in failing to detect the launch of
an Iraqi Scud missile that hit a building in Saudi
Arabia, killing 28 US soldiers and wounding more than
1 00 The relevant satellite relayed data to Nurrungar
that the Scud had been launched but, for unexplained
reasons, that data was not monitored by operators at
Nu rrungar and it went undetected. "A secret US Air
Force investigation into the incident concluded that:
'The overall result was that due to (a) worst
combination of events, this launch was not reported
(as a final missile warning report) by the composite
(Defense S upport Program) system in spite of the fact
that sufficient data existed for the detection and
reporting'" (Australian, 1 8/2/99; "N urrungar played
fateful role in Desert Storm tragedy"). You can bet
your bottom dollar that Nurrungar is heavily involved in
"neutralising" Yugoslav anti-aircraft defences during
the NATO aerial bl'ltzkrieg.
The book refutes the Australian government's claims
that Nurrungar and the DSP does not play a part in US
I N_TERN�IIQNAL
Peace Researcher 18 - Page 13
nuclear war fighting plans. Richelson says: "DSP
could only be considered to have no war fighting
functions if it was assumed that the system was
neutralised in a (Russian) first strike. Any system that
provided launch detection information d u ring the
course of the war would be used in conducting that
war" (Australian, 1 8/2/99; "Confidential: US spied on
our peace activists over desert base"). Des Ball said:
"In addition to being a warning facility, it's been critical
to American war fighting capabilities. It's able to say
this missile has now been fired from its silo, redirect
yours over to these ones, and re-prioritise the whole
American war plan. That's always troubled me, plus
the fact that it's a nuclear target" (Australian, 1 8/2/99;
"ASIO was in on it, says top analyst"). And on the
subject of being a nuclear target, as recently as 1 99 1 ,
U S Air Force Space Command Intelligence Threat
Assessments discussed direct attacks on Nurrungar
by a whole array of Russian nuclear missiles and
bombers.
Nurrungar is 29 years old, and due to close in 2000,
rendered redundant by developments in satellite
communications. Richelson's book reveals just what a
central role that it has played, and continues to play, in
the American war machine. Our very own U S base, at
Harewood, plays a key part in servicing Nurrungar, so
this involves New Zealand as well.
- May 1999
 Update From Britain
Melanie Thomson
We don't often print much detail in PR about peace
actions and protests happening over in other parts of
the world, but so much has been happening in Britain
over the past few months that we thought you might like
to read about a few bits and pieces.
Li ndis Percy Jai led
The Menwith Hill Breach of Injunction/Byelaws case
against Lindis Percy, a well-known peace activist, went
ahead on 1 1 th March. The judge, Mr Justice lan
Kennedy, sentenced Lindis to 9 months in Holloway
(she was later moved to Highpoint prison in Suffolk -
ironically, H M P Highpoint is an ex-RAF base ) . He
reimposed the six month suspended sentence she
received last April (also for trying to bring the Ministry of
Defence police to account for displaying invalid Military
Land Byelaws around the American National Security
Agency Spy Base at Menwith Hill) and he imposed a
further three month sentence for "ignoring order after
order" not to enter the land known as RAF Menwith Hill.
Lindis has been living in dreadful conditions while in
Highpoint, and this has been impacting on her health.
She has consistently declhed to be stri p-searched and
this has led to being puni;,hed in a variety of ways for
' breaking' prison rules, including being marched off to
the Segregation Wing WhE 'e she stayed for 24 hours in
a filthy cell with a 'slop ou ' bucket, and having trouble
sorting out visiting rights a! d phonecalls.
Please send messages of ;upport to Lindis c/o-!
The Governor, H M P High� lint,
Stradishall, Newmarket
Suffolk CB8 9YG (Fax NC!01 440-823095)
Women Protest Against War - Under the
852s at RAF Fairford
On April 1 6th three memt,ers of a Women in Black
group - an international net vork of women opposed to
war - <:;limbed into RAF F, i rford U nchallenged the
women - Juliet Mc Bride, Si,'n Jones and Giulia Gigliotti
- climbed over two fence ! and walked towards a
number of parked B52s bombers. The women held u p
banners for twenty minutes - which read "Bread not
Bombs", "NATO bombing will not help the people of
Kosova", "NATO bombing dOllS not uphold international
law", and "Because we mourn the dead". They tied two
banners to the planes, des l ite the arrival of armed
American troops.
Britis h/American BasEls - Security fences
p o p p i n g u p ev erywhere ! !
I t seems that AmericanlBritish military bases are getting
a mite concerned at their sel urity being breached by
those darned peac', activists ti' ne and time again. Since
the beginning of he year a ash of applications has
been received bl the conCE rned local bodies from
Menwith Hill St, lion (York ;hire), Fylingdales (N.
Yorkshire) and Mil 'enhall (Suf olk). A description of the
Peace Researcher 18
proposed Menwith fence sounds a little like the security
fence at our own little spybase, Waihopai "weld mesh
security fence topped with rolls of U S m ilitary
specification razor wire and 27 CCTV cameras". Just
goes to show that they really do have something to
hide . .
Bomb Accidentally Dropped a t USAF
Fairford - OOPS ! !
April 8th According to the media office at USAF
Fairford, Gloucestershire, England, the Americans
accidentally dropped a 500 pound Mark-82 bomb early
this morning while transferring it from a tractor to one of
their B-1 B bombers. Roads around Fairford were sealed
off around a four mile radius until the situation was
'under control', An American military spokeswoman was
anxious to say that the bomb was not one of the cruise
missiles being used by the American B-52's that are
also being used to bomb Kosovo but she was
apparently u naware whether or not the dropped Mark-
82 contained any Depleted Uranium! According to her
the Americans who dropped the bomb 'butter-fingered
it' !
The official Media Release dated THU, 08-APR-99
RAF Fairford, U K - A 500-pound, Mark-82 bomb was
dropped on the f1ightline during a transfer-operation at
RAF Fairford today. The incident occurred d u ring a
transfer operation from a tractor to a B-1 B bomber.
"We're in the middle of a safety investigation now to
determine the exact cause of the mishap, " said Master
Sgt. Barry Morris, a weapons safety representative from
EI/sworth Air Force Base, S.o., home of the B- IB
Lancer "Based on the information we receive from
'photos and interviews, we will determine the cause of
the incident and make recommendations so the incident
doesn't happen again, " he said. "The incident was
handled professionally, expediently, " said Richard
Palmer, the safety officer from RAF Fairford. "It was
rectified in a minimum amount of time and no personnel,
military or civilian, were in immediate danger "
According to base officials, residents in the local area
were i n no danger, a n d all safety precautions were
taken to ensure no one was hurt The bomb received
minor scratches, and was returned to the inventory.
For further information:
There are some excellent web-sites around for
information about American m ilitary bases, British
peace actions, etc. Some of these are . .
http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/mhs/index. htn
hUp:llwww.gn.apc.orglcndyorkslcaabl
hUp:llwww.wagingpeace.orglpeacelinks. html
hUp:llwww.cnduk org
hUp:llwww.gn.apc.orglpeacenewsl
Thanks to the CAAB newsletterlwebsite for some of the
information for this article.
- Page 14 - May 1999
 ABC submission to the Intelligence
and Security Committee
Bob Leonard
The lengthy item below is our submission in
su pport of the "Abolish the G C SB" petition
(GCSB = Government Communications Security
Bureau). You may find it a hard s log, but pity the
poor Inte l ligence and Secu rity Committee
members who, we hope, wi l l have to make some
pretence of actu a l ly studying it before rejecting
both the s ubmission and our request to appear
before them in person. The text may look
fami liar to avid readers of Peace Researcher as it
is based on o u r artic le in issue Number 1 1
(December 1 996) entitled "Is the GCSB a lawless
agency?". We have modified (made more
forma l?) much of the text and updated it
considerably. We think it makes a good case
that the GCSB is indeed a bunch of outlaws and
it wi l l be hard for the ISC to dismiss it out of
hand. It was s ubmitted in mid-February at the
invitation of the Committee. We have yet to hear
back from them.
S u bmission on the Petition to
Abolish the GCSB
by Robert L . Leonard, Anti-Bases Campaign
The Petition
"Recogn ising t h e following facts:
• That the GCSB is a government spy agency
outside the democratic control of the people and
Parliament of AotearoalNew Zealand;
• That the GCSB exists primarily to serve the
intelligence interests of the U n ited States and
Britain;
+ That Waihopai can intercept your email, fax and
phone communications and is exempt from key
provisions of the Privacy Act and the Crimes Act;
• That the spy stations at Waihopai and
Tangimoana do not serve the interests of
AotearoalNew Zealand and are a waste of
millions of tax dollars; therefore
The signatories to this petition request the House of
Representatives to abolish the GCSB and close its
two signals intelligence bases at Waihopai and
Tangimoana immediately
Peace Researcher 1 8 - Page 15
"It was not until I had read [Nicky Hager'sj I
book that I had any idea that that we had
been committed to an international
integrated electronic network. . It is an
outrage that I and other ministers were
told so little, and this raises the question of
to whom those concerned saw
themselves ultimately answerable. "
David Lange, from his Foreword to "Secret
Power" by Nicky Hager
Introduction
We were invited to prepare this submission by the
Intelligence and Security Committee in response to
a petition presented to the Clerk of the House i n
November of 1 998 b y Robert L. Leonard of the Anti­
Bases Campaign. Over 1 500 New Zealanders
signed the petition. Its main thrust , is to ask the
Government to abolish the Government
Communications Security Bureau. We thank the
members of the ISC for this opportunity to submit
more detailed arguments i n support of the petition.
We would hope that this submission will lead to an
opportunity for one or more members of the ABC to
appear in person before the Committee.
Members of the ABC have read Nicky Hager's 1 996
book, "Secret Power", in its entirety. We encourage
members of the Committee to do likewise if they
have not already done so. The book speaks for itself
and there is little or nothing in the way of technical
detail that our group can add. We believe that any
informed discussion of the GCSB should include
thorough familiarity with the book and its impressive
range of meticulously researched information.
To our knowledge, there is no other comparable
research document available to the public i n
existence. T h e book has been acclaimed b y several
overseas signals intelligence authorities as unique
and highly credible A Committee charged with
oversight of the GCSB should read every scrap of
information on international signals intelligence that
is available. Our reading of the Committee's
enabling legislation leads us to conclude that its
members are severely constrained in their ability to
obtain, directly from the GCSB, i nformation about the
agency and its day to day activities
- May 1999
We seriously doubt that the current Prime Minister is
any better i n formed by the GCSB about the GCSB
than was Mr. Lange (quote above).
As we have stated, we cannot add to the store of
available technical information in the face of the wall
of secrecy surrounding the GCSB. Our submission
concentrates on the implications of signals
Intelligence activities, as we understand them, in the
context of the laws and fundamental rights that are
supposed to protect the private commu nications of
New Zealanders Frankly, that protection appears to
us to be a fiction given the powers of satellite and
radio signal interception in the hands of GCSB spies
at Waihopai and Tangimoana.
The followin g text is presented under headings of
relevant New Zealand legislation and related topics.
Although the primary focus is on the GCSB and the
Waihopai U nit, we object to the high frequency radio
interception at Tangimoana. Our concerns and
arguments apply equally to that Unit as well, except
perhaps in some technical details.
The New Zea land Bill of Rig hts Act
( 1 990)
Section 21 ofthis act reads: "Unreasonable search
and seizure Everyone has the right to be secure
- accepted that fact without comment in his report 1
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of
the person. property, or correspondence or
otherwise."
"Correspondence or otherwise" can be reasonably
interpreted to include telecommunications. [The term
"correspondence" is used in a telecommunications
context in Article 22 of the Nairobi Convention (see
below).] The operations of the Waihopai station, in
the interception of international telecommunications
without legal warrant, violate the rights of all New
Zealanders to protection from u n reasonable search
and seizure under the provisions of the Bill of Rights
Act
We are aware that the Bill of Rights does not take
precedence over provisions in other Acts. The effect
of this critical weakness is to make a mockery of New
Zealand's Bill of Rights. Its provisions are simply not
enforceable, a n d New Zealanders have no security in
telecommunications.
The Privacy Act ( 1 993)
I ntelligence agencies get very special treatment i n the
Privacy Act A s in the case of the Bill of Rights, the
effect of this treatment IS to severely weaken the
protections of the P rivacy Act Section 6 sets out
twelve Information Privacy Principles (I PP). But the
government of the day in its wisdom saw fit to exempt
(,n sec 57) intelligence agencies (named as the GCSB
and the SIS) from nine of those Principles (1 to 5 and
Peace Researcher 18
8 to 1 1 ). Principles 1 and 4.are particularly relevant to
our call to abolish the GCSB.
Principle 1 states, " Personal information shall not be
collected by any agency unless - (a) The information
is collected for a lawful purpose connected with a
function or activity of the agency . (emphasis added)
..•
PrinCiple 4 states, "Personal information shall not be
collected by an agency - (a) By unlawful means " ...
(emphasis added)
Section 57 of the Privacy Act thus appears to condone
the conduct of unlawful or extra-legal acts by
i n telligence agencies - the GCSB and the SIS - by
excluding them from adherence to the relevant
principles in the act
I n his recent review of the Privacy Act, Commissioner
Bruce Slane stated that the Privacy Principles are the
heart of the Act, and has recommended that the
exemption of the GCSB and the SIS fwm Privacy
Principles 1, 5, 8 and 9 be removed from the Act
Both agencies have indicated that they would find
those changes acceptable with minor caveats. But
the Commissioner failed to recom mend that the
exemption from IPP 4 be removed. Adherence to
Principle 4 would create operational problems for the
two intelligence agencies and Mr. Slane apparently
It seems to follow logically that it is i m possible for
intelligence organisations to spy by strictly legal
means But if an agency wishes to collect ', nformation
using methods that are illegal for ordinary citizens
(e.g., electronic eavesdropping, breaking and
entering, seizing private property, wire-tapping), we
would hope and expect those methods would be
rigorously j ustified by the agency a n d be approved
prior to every instance of use by an independent and
unbiased authority within the j udiciary. (By
independent we mean free of political and
professional bias and interest) Most New Zealanders
probably assume that such oversight and control
measures protect them from unwarranted invasion of
privacy. They are of course, dead wrong, and
especially with regard to the GCSB.
The gathering of intelligence by intercepting satellite
signals generates vast amounts of i n formation that
can only be handled by powerful computers with
special programming. By its very nature this kind of
"vacuum-cleaner" spying defies effective oversight.
No warranting system is possible for obvious reasons
and so none is even attempted. The "warrant", such
as it is, is simply a blanket licence to snoop non-stop
on people's satellite communications of all kinds. The
GCSB says it has internal operational rules that
constrain its spying activities .' But no one outside the
agency has any access to those rules, let alone any
ability to check that they are being followed. Again.
oversight is impossible; we believe it is irresponsible
to give the public the impreSSion that GCSB sPYing
- Page 16 - May 1999
can be controlled by parliamentarians in the interest of
New Zealanders
The electronic links among the five nations under the
UKUSA intelligence agreement' preclude any
effective controls on the flow of information from
GCSB computers to overseas sister agencies, most
importantly the United States National Security
Agency, ThiS a gross and totally uncontrollable
violation of the rights to privacy of New Zealanders
As In the case of IPP4, the Privacy Commissioner
fails to make any mention of this serious intelligence
issue m his report on the review of the Act Quite
clearly, It is beyond the powers of the Commissioner
to deal with and so was left without comment
How can an agency with such sweepmg powers and
Inherent i m m u nity from oversight be tolerated in a
democratic society? The only solution is to abolish
the GCSB.
The Crimes Act (1 964)
According to one New Zealand barrister who
speCialises in information and privacy law, "The
Crimes !',ct contains an offence of intercepting private
commun'cat,or s by means of a listening device,
However, this rrohibition is on eavesdropping on oral
communications only, There is no offence of
intercepting data, or facsimi!e transmissions, which
are more and more commonly being sent across
telephone Ilne� " (emphasis added) We should add
electronic mc, 1 (email) to this updated list The
bamster goes on to say that, "The fact that such
interceptions are not expressly prohibited under
5.2 1 6 , means ihat the lawfulness or otherwise of such
interceptions 1 5 governed by,default, by the Privacy
Act 1 993". ' " he old Crimes Act referred to in the
quotes simpl/ wasn't u p-ta-date with
technology
When it ca ne time to expand and
upgrade th,' Waihopai station with
another sate ite dish and the capacity to
Intercept and process oral
communlcat<lns (i.e., telephone
conversation,;), section 2 1 6 of the
Crimes Act hdd to be patched up in order to take into
account the facts related above. The patch-up was
done with the simple expediency of "The Crimes
[exemption 01 listening device] Order 1 997". With little
more than tt: , stroke of a pen , and not a whiff of
democratic pi )cess for so momentous a change, the
GCSB cou'(j now "legally" intercept oral
communications from satellites.
It is illuml natiilg that the editor of the Chnstchurch
Press cited se ' 'tion 2 1 6 of the Crimes Act as evidence
that the GCSfI "is prevented by statute from spying
domestically'" It is likely that the editor's source for
thiS statement Nas the GCSB itself since soon after
Peace Researcher 18
this note from the editor was published, the GCSB
entered the debate about domestic vs foreign spying
via the letters column of the Press.' The 1 997 Order
in Council of course made all of this debate q U ite
moot But it was never fully relevant to the issue of
domestic vs foreign spying in the first place; it was
essentially a red herring, but a vital issue in itself.
The Issue of Domestic or
Foreign S pying
As we noted above, the GCSB tried unsuccessfully to
duck this issue initially by citing the Crimes Act The
GCSB submission to the Review of the Privacy Act
states, "The GCSB is a foreign intelligence
organisation and, by definition, our activities have little
or no im pact on the privacy of New Zealanders" 7
Thus does the GCSB persist i n hiding its domestic
spying under the undefined title of "foreign".
When pressed for a definition of "domestic" i n the
context of satellite spying both Director Parker and the
Prime Minister have refused to respond. ' This can
reasonably be interpreted as an admission that the
international communications of New Zealanders are
indeed spied upon by the GCSB.
The GCSB has also admitted as much in the media
by citing " internal rules" which we are led to believe
cause the agency to discard any domestic
communications inadvertently intercepted in the
course of "foreign" intelligence gathering ' But we
emphasise it is cold comfort for New Zealanders
concerned about their privacy in communications that
protection from GCSB spying lies with u n p u blished
internal GCSB rules whose enforcement is totally
beyond effective oversight.
We conclude that both the Crimes Act and
the Privacy Act leave the legal status of the
GCSB in limbo when it comes to spying on
New Zealanders. The uncertain legality of
GCSB activities sits i n stark contrast to the
following GCSB statement contained i n
their response to a letter i n The Press:
"The GCSB, which i s subject to oversight and review
by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security
(one of whose statutory functions is to examine the
legality of the GCSB's activities), complies at all times
with the law of New Zealand". '
This amounts to legalistic mumbo-jumbo from an
agency with almost unlimited powers of signals
intelligence operating without warrants and without
any possibility of effective oversight of its day-ta-day
activities,
- Page 17 - May, 1999

The International
Telecommunications Convention
(Nairobi Convention 1 982)
There is yet another intended but "theoretical" restraint
on the activities of our intelligence agencies that must
be considered It is theoretical in that it is apparently
totally Ignored in New Zealand and probably every
other signatory country,
New Zealand is a sig natory member of the Na'lrobi
Convention ( 184 member nations), Article 22 is
entitled "Secrecy of Communications", It contains the
following two sections:
" 1, Members agree to take all possible
measures, compatible with the system of
telecommunication used, to ensuring the secrecy
of international correspondence,
"2, Nevertheless, they reserve the right to
commun icate such correspondence to the
competent authorities in order to ensure the
application of their internal laws or the execution
of international conventions to which they are
parties "
From what we know about Waihopai, its spying on
satellite com m u nications violates the secrecy
protection provisions (section 1) of the Nairobi
Convention, Section 2 can be logically interpreted to
mean that a n y interception of correspondence (Le"
phone, fax, telex, email) must be for use only by
"competent authorities" for lawful purposes, GCSB
activities would be expected to violate this section as
well because much of its spying is exempted from key
provis'l ons of the Crimes Act and it is exempted from
key principles of the Privacy Act
Signatory countries probably pay little attention to such
prohibitions, Spying on your neighbours is big
business and "everybody does it", Meanwhile, the
public may feel reassured that New Zealand has
signed the convention, but it means nothing in
practical terms, One reason often given for this is that
the convention is not part of New Zealand law, We do
have our own Telecommunications Act (1987), but it
says nothing about adhering to the international
convention,
However, adherence to the Nairobi Convention cannot
be dismissed lightly, In a recent New Zealand
controversy s u rrounding a fatal plane crash near
Palmerston North in 1995, police tried to gain access
to the plane's cockpit voice recorder tape, According
to a newspaper account, "The Transport Accident
Investigation Commission has refused to release the
tape, saying it is protected under the International Civil
Aviation Organisation's Chicago Convention annex" , '
Counsel for the police argued that the annex is not part
of NZ law, But the TAl Commission lawyer " " , told the
Peace Researcher 1 8
court the convention was part of New Zealand law,
New Zealand ratified it in 1947 and has consented to
be bound by it", While the legal issues are far from
resolved, international conventions should not be
ignored, The government should be taken to task for
its lax attitude to the Nairobi Convention,
GCSB Leg is lation
There is no GCSB law, The GCSB is not like the SIS,
which has its own statute and whose intelligence
gathering activities are restrained by the need for
warrants and by other provisions of the act The
GCSB is a "non-statutory agency" (quoting d i rector
Parker) which sprang out of thin "executive­
government" air in 1977 (not quite as old as the
Universe, but with similarly mysterious origins), There
is nothing in law, or elsewhere as far as we can
determine, that restrains the activities of the GCSB,
I n the Choudry case, the legality of the SIS break-in is
being judged in the context of the SIS Act This
pro,cess is not possible with the GCSB; the agency's
extra-legal status is thus intolerable,
I nternational Agreements and
Democracy
While the executive government of NZ ignores the
Nairobi Convention, its agency, the GCSB, must
adhere rigidly to the rules of the five-nation U KUSA
agreement ' That agreement, ' not Parliament, directs
the activities of the GCSB and the ultimate fate of the
information it generates by spying, Are we a signatory
to that agreement by virtue of public discussion, and a
democratic decision by Parliament? No, I n fact, " " , a
significant proportion of law-making in New Zealand -
relating to international agreements is
undemocratic", according to the Clerk of Parliament,
Mc. David McGee, "He says that the executive, the
cabinet, is empowered to enter into international
agreements without reference to Parliament " 'I think
that is not just unsatisfactory, it is unsupportable and
,,
anti-democratic', "
Mc. McGee goes on to say, "I suggest that the ordinary
person should be involved before the Government
assumes the international obligation," The U KUSA
agreement (dating from 1948) is a prime example of
anti-democratic behaviour with ongoing and
potentially serious consequences for ordinary persons
in New Zealand,
Natural Law and J ustice
The legal systems of New Zealand, Britain and many
other western countries derive their authority from
natural law, And natural law is based on "the rule of
reason" In placing its intelligence agencies above the
- Page 18 - May 1999
law (in proviSions of the Privacy Act and the Crimes
Act) the New Zealand Parliament is seriously eroding
the bedrock authority of our legal system
Summary
• The Government Communications Security
Bureau violates the rights of New Zealanders to
private and secure commun ications which are
purported to be assured under the Bill of Rights
and the Privacy Act
• S PYing actiVities of the GCSB are exempted from
key provisions of the Privacy Act and the Crimes
Act but because of the impenetrable secrecy
surrounding the agency, these "extra-legal"
activities cannot be effectively overseen and
controlled by Parliament.
• By the inherent nature of the spying activities of
the GCSB at Walhopai and Tangimoana, those
activities are Incapable of effective oversight and
thus constitute an unreasonable and unjustifiable
intrusion into ' the lives and affairs of New
Zealanders and of our neighbours in the Pacific
region '
• The spy stations run by the GCSB are under an
unacceptable degree of control and influence by
foreign intelligence agencies and are inextricably
linked to those agencies. Therefore, the GCSB
does not pnmarily serve the interests of New
Zealanders.
We respectfully request the Intelligence and Secur'lty
Comm ittee to consider thiS petition, our arguments
supporting it, and the substantial evidence which
underpins it in the book "Secret Power", and to
recommend that Parliament u ndertake to abolish the
GCSB and close the spy stations at Waihopai and
CIA Briefs - Unlaundere d!
Commiting Genocide:
Clinton has admitted that US support for the vicious
military forces that formerly controlled Guatemala was
"wrong and must not be repeated". A United Nations
sponsored commission has accused the Central
American armed forces of genocide - more than
200,000 people died - and stated that the C I A
"supported directly o r indirectly s o m e o f t h e illegal
operations of the Guatemalan state.' [Bangkok Post,
1 2 March 1 999]
Censorship:
The recently retired spook responsible for deciding
what material about the CIA may be published has
claimed that the organisation is now much more open.
John Hollister Hedley was heavily criticised by officers
inside the CIA for allowing far too much "spy-and-tell"
material to be released, but critics of the agency have
a different view. Frank Snepp, a former CIA analyst
who was responsible years ago for demonstrating that
CIA estimates of communist support in Vietnam were
rubbish, says he tries to bypass the review (read
Peace Researcher 1 8 - Pag e 19
Tangimoana. We would welcome the opportunity to
appear before the Committee to a n swer any
questions members might have regarding our
submission
Robert L. Leonard, on behalf of the signatories to
the petition and the Anti-Bases Campaign , 16
February 1999
E n d n otes
1 Members of the ABC would be most Interested to
know Just how the S I S exemption from Principle 4
applies in the case of Choudry vs Attorney-General.
2 "Records of NZ conversations 'disposed of" , The
Press, 1 0 January 1 998, p. 4 .
3 See Hager's Secret Power and Peace Researclwr
No. 3 (Feb. 1 983, 1 st senes) for details of the
UKUSA agreement
4 Edwards , John. 1 995. Current privacy issues In
telecommunications. Unpublished paper for a
conference.
5 Letter to the editor, and reply, in The Press, 1 9 July
1 996.
6 GCSB reply to letter to the editor, in The Press, 9
August 1 996.
7 Privacy Act 1 993 Review, item 6 . 1 3.22, p. 228.
8 Letter from Ray Parker to the author, 1 7 February
1 997; letter from Prime Minister to Warren Thomson,
9 November 1 998.
9 The Press, 30 October 1 996, p 6.
1 0 "Law-making seen as not democratic", New
Zealand Herald, 29 October 1 996
censorship) process because it is "completely
corrupt". Snepp says the review process just goes
after the critics of the CIA, and he has been continually
harrassed by the Agency through the courts. [Bangkok
Nation, November, 1 998]
K i l ling the Kurds:
While the NATO forces sanctimoniously bomb Serbia
into the dust, member state Turkey continues its own
genocidal polic'ies against the Kurds living in
neighbouring Iraq and contiguous areas. Last year the
Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan was kidnapped from
Kenya to be put on trial in Turkey. Kenyan sources say
that the CIA, along perhaps with Israel's Mossad, were
involved in the snatch. The CIA's presence in Eastern
Africa has been boosted since car bomb attacks o n
U S Embassies in 1997. Ocalan h a d been smuggled
into Kenya by the Greeks (another NATO member with
a long history of confrontation with Turkey). Kenyan
intelligence sources said the Americans told the
Kenyan Government about Ocalan's presence and
then pressured them to return him to the Turks. The
kidnapping followed with the sources claiming CIA
involvement. [Bangkok Post. 1 9 September 1 998]
- May 1999
 PHILIPPINES
Toxic Legaoy From US Bases
Mu rray Horton
1 99 1 was a bad year for the Pentagon's Philippines'
desk - the combination of Mt Pinatubo's eruption and
the popular eruption of nationalist anger culminating in
the historic Senate vote to not renew the bases treaty
put an e n d to the American military's occupation of
Subic Bay Naval Base, Clark Air Force Base and a
host of smaller U S military bases. Gone
but their smell lingers. The Philippines continues to
grapple with the toxic legacy of hosting huge American
bases for nearly a century.
The internationally renowned Or Rosalie Bertell,
president of the Canada-based International Institute of
Concern for P u blic Health, has overseen the first study
of the health of residents around the former Clark AFB
(no government agency has ever bothered conducting
such a survey). Starting in 1 996, 747 mothers were
randomly sampled from 1 3 communities in and around
Clark. Those with the worst health problems - kidney,
urinary, nervous and female health problems, children
Cif abnormally low height and weight - came from
communities most heavily contaminated by toxic
pollutants d u m ped on or around the former base (other
fxtors being the disruption caused by the Pinatubo
eruption. and pi, tin old poverty). Bertell recommended
evacuation until l1e areas could be cleaned up. Lack of
clean water is the biggest problem, seriously affecting
30,000 househoi js in at least five villages.
Bertell's survey, publicly released under the aegis of
the People's Task Force for Bases Cleanup, had an
IInmediate resulf. Only days after its November 1 998
release, rationin" of potable water was announced for
ten of the worst affected villages. Bertell warned that
boiling the water (a common precaution throughout the
Philippines) would kill bacteria but double the toxicity of
pollutants. She u rged residents to distill their water.
The US d e n ies any responsibility for toxic
contamination; the Philippines government's concern
is not for affected residents but on how the pollution
might affect conversion of the former bases into new
economic zones. Rosalie Bertell vowed to join the fight:
'We are with you in your efforts to have a clean
environment. We will intercede for you In the U S
Congress" [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 7 November
1 998J. She added: "The facts are clear. People have
s:"ious health problems. Let us stop granting time to
the U S to evade responsibility to clean up at the cost of
human lives" (POI, 8 December 1 998)
The adverse consequences of the US bases manifest
themselves in all sorts of ways. In 1 945, the US Navy
closed the Morong gate, at the southern end of Subic
8ay, forcing Bataan residents to have to make a
Peace Researcher 18
circuitous three hour journey to the city of Olongapo. It
remained closed for the next 47 years that Subic was
a US base and then for six more years, u n d er the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, I n November 1 998,
President Estrada ceremonially cut the gate open with
a boltcutter (he might come in handy at Waihopai some
time). He said: "For a long time, we were like strangers
in Subic. We could not enter it freely, and if there were
Filipinos who were able to benefit from it, there were a
great many others who lost their dignity as human
beings" (POI, 2911 1/98), It was a reconciliation also for
Estrada - in the past, the set of an anti-bases movie he
was starring in had been stoned by pro-bases
supporters of Richard Gordon, the then Mayor of
Olongapo, Anti-bases politicians had not been
welcome in Olongapo. As Estrada told the crowd: "I am
happy at being met with expressions of support, not
with protests or barricades. When I ran for senator and
then for Vice President, I was unable to hold a rally
here" (ibid),
Nor have the gloom and doom predictions of the pro­
bases lobby come to pass. They had forecast mass job
losses with the bases' closure, Not so - the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority reported a gain
to the Government of 26.2 billion pesos (divide by 20
for $NZ) from the conversion, privatisation and sale of
former US and Philippine m ilitary bases. The single
biggest earner was the privatisation and development
of Fort Bonifacio, formerly the largest (Filipino) military
base in Metro Manila. The former Clark has brought in
P83.6 billion i n total investments since 1 994; the
former Subic P 1 00.8 billion since 1 993. Both zones
have employed over 1 30,000 workers since the start of
their respective operations - a significantly higher figure
than when the US military ran them as bases. Camp
John Hay, a former U S military R&R resort in the
cooler climes of Baguio, is being developed into a
family-oriented vacation resort.
Visiting Forces Agreem ent
But, of course, the Philippines is not rid of the US
m ilitary yet, not by a long shot. There is still the very
controversial issue of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), which was signed by former President Ramos
and fully endorsed by the Estrada government
(including a high powered multi-media campaign
urging Filipinos to accept it), It requires ratification by
the Senate, where a two thirds vote is needed to pass
it. Essentially the VFA opens up all of the Philippines to
the US military - the next best thing to actual bases -
with special rights at 22 ports and other facilities. I t
bestows the equivalent of diplomatic immunity o n US
- Page 20 - May 1999
military personnel in the Philippines, exempting them
frol l l local law. PR 1 7 detailed the massive protest
movement against it in 1 998, opposition which has
raged unchecked in 1 999. For example, in March, 80
women activists from the Movement for National
Democracy d umped trash in front of the US Embassy
dUring a rally and wrote "No Way VFA" on the road.
Tha! same month a rally outside the Embassy by 50
mei11bers of Youth for Nationalism turned into a riot
when red paint was thrown onto the Embassy seal,
startling its guards, and leading to cops attacking the
protesters. Twenty people were hurt

! The extemely influential Catholic

,
Bishops Conference has joined the
opposition to the VFA and has also

�:;;;�S�§ called on the Philippines to

abrogate the 1 953 Mutual Defense
Treaty with the US, which remains
ii
I II
I It
in force indefinitely. The Bishops

'
described the VFA a s a "deceptive,

I
I il
anomalous and unequal
I I1 agreement between two sovereign
i nations. Its provisions grant special
. .. J privileges to the visiting forces
while relieving our country with only verbal
aSSJrances that are not contained in the VFA
provisions" (POI, 1 013/99). For its part, the
Go ,ern:nent harps on about the "Chinese threat" to
the hot I disputed Spratly Islands as justification for
strengtl ening the military alliance with the US. But
haVing ' Jot rid of the bases less than ten years ago,
after a titanic struggle, the Filipino people are not
gOing te let Uncle Sam back in again without a fight

THE DIRTY WORLD OF THE SAS

M u rray Horton

For y ,ars Peace Researcher (and, before it, Foreign
ContlOl Watchdog) has kept a close eye on the
SpecidJ Air Service (SAS), a particularly shy sector of
the N;' military. Between us, we have run story after
story (!n the dirty deeds of this secretive killer elite,
which s at the disposal of our current and former
i r lperio I m asters, namely the US and the UK.
For instance, in 1 98 1 , Watchdog broke the story that
two m e m b e rs of the NZSAS had been among 23
soldien from the US, Australia and the Philippines
ktlled ir the crash of a US military aircraft inside the
gigantic U S base at Subic Bay, in the Philippines.
WatchC,Jg
followec this particular story for several years, as part
o f Its e> )osure of NZ's military links with both the US
m i l itary in the Philippines, and with the late Ferdinand
Marcos' m u rderous and kleptocratic d ictatorship. It
transpired that the SAS regularly took part in Special
Warfare Exercises with special forces from the US,
Australia, the Philippines inside the U S bases in the
Philippines.
Well, that's all history now - Marcos was overthrown
and died in exile; New Zealand was expelled from
ANZUS and all exercises with the US military ceased;
and the US military itself was kicked out of the
Philippines and the bases converted to something
useful. So why bring it u p now?
The final TVNZ Assignment progra m m e for 1 998
["Secret Soldiers"; 26 November 1 998] was about the
NZSAS. It was a very interesting piece of work, much
more so than the 1 997 piece of PR puffery it did on
the British SAS. Indeed the 1 998 Assignment

Peace Researcher 1 8 - Page 21 - May 1999

 r:s= continued fron previous page

was so interesting that the British government went
to the extraord inary lengths of trying
(unsuccessfully) to get an injunction in a New
Zealand court to stop it being screened. This was
because it detailed, via a former Kiwi member of the
British SAS, what that latter body actually does and
revealed the ongoing colonial relationship between
the NZ and British militaries. The New Zealander
had served with the British SAS in wars from
Northern Ireland to Iraq, with other exotic spots like
Belize tossed in. (The British government also tried
to get an injunction, in NZ, to stop the New
Zealander publishing a book).
Assignment also featured some quite incredible
NZSAS home v'l deo footage of an exercise starring
the then P M , David Lange, as the 'hostage"
rescued by masked SAS troops firing live bullets
inside what was called the 'killing house'. Lange
. loved it so m uch he tried out the
weapons, and asked if it could be restaged for the
benefit of his kids (permission denied)!
Assignment also featured that 1 98 1 fatal plane
crash in the Philippines. That wasn't co'l ncidental.
We had been approached and asked for help in
researching the NZSAS, Wllich we gladly did. We
provided Assignment with a wealth of material from
back issues of Watchdog and PR. The programme
spoke to the widow of one of the two New
Zealanders killed (back in 1 981 , when Watchdog
broke the story in the mainstream med'la, one
widow had rung the journalist for help i n finding out
how her husband died, because the Army wouldn't
tell her). S h e is still searching for the truth - his
death certificate describes his occupation as
"fisherman"!
Mysterious deaths o f NZSAS m e n i n Third World
countries have happened much more recently too.
In 1 995 one was killed in Zimbabwe. The Army
stated h is cause of death to have been 'trampled by
an elephant". His family found no signs of this on
his body, but did find several bullet holes in his
chest Assignment u ncovered that he had been on
a covert exercise with the British SAS and local
special forces. Accidental death by 'friendly fire' i s
suspected.
The SAS is still in business. 1 99 9 will see them
glamourised once again for their behind the scenes
role in providing VIP protection during the APEC
Leaders' Summit They are still supplying men to
their counterpart units in Britain and Australia. They
are even being used as guinea pigs in an
international trial of perforrnance enhancing drugs.
Most recently, they featured as hosting the All
Blacks at a boot camp. Should our World C u p
squad take the field this year blindfolded, dressed
in matching overalls and carrying a power pole,
we'll know who to blame. It was shortly after that
camp that one All Black waged his own one man
war by smashing his way barehanded into a
Q u eenstown private residence, whilst somewhat
the worse for wear (not to mention nearly bleeding
to death in the process). No wonder the SAS are
keen to keep secret everything about themselves.
They call it mystique. Others would simply call it
brutality, and a dangerous anachronism.
"Secret Soldiers" is available for hire for $10
(including postage) for one week. Make
cheques to ABC, Box 2258, Christchurch.

At the time, there were persistent rumours that the

low flying U S plane, specially adapted for covert
infiltration and exfiltration, had been shot down
(presumably by the Communist New Peoples Army,
which is still fighting the Philippines military today).
We went to the length of actually securing, under
the US Freedom of I nformation Act, the official US
'
Air Force re port on the crash. They were happy to
release the most intimate personal details (eg, an
itemised list of what was found on the bodies of the
dead soldiers and airmen) but nothing about the
cause of t h e crash. Assignment tracked down the
sole survivor, who is still in the US m ilitary, but he
said he couldn't speak about it until he becomes a
civilian aga i n .

Peace Researcher 1 8 - Page 22 - May 1999

[ Bits and Pieces
Spy Satellites
China will put six military satellites into orbit in the
year 2000. Two will provide navigation systems to
the Peoples Liberation Army, and four will produce
high definition pictures. China's developing technical
expertise will give it much greater intelligence on
military movements and production in the Asian
region. Taiwan has expressed g rave concern at
Beijing's increasing military surveillance capability.
In April this year Japan annou nced plans to develop
its own spy satellites. Four satellites will be produced
for launch in 2002. Tokyo says the move is i n
response to missile threats from North Korea. ( Last
year the North Koreans fired a missile that overflew
Japanese territory.) Japan's National Space
Development Agency has the technical capacity to
build its own satellites, but some parts, including
possibly analysis programming systems, are likely to
come from the USA Washington has a number of
secret spy bases in the north of Honshu. The exact
relationship of the US and Japanese spy agencies is
difficult to ascertain, but in recent years Tokyo has
massively boosted its intelligence budget and the
signals following the Korean missile incursion are
that it intends to develop a much bigger independent
intelligence capability.
Systems Failure - Again
The most advanced U S missile defence system
under development failed on Monday in its sixth
consecutive attempt to intercept an incoming missile,
according to Pentagon spokespeople. [Bangkok
Post, 31 March, 1 999J The test of the Theater High
I
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system was carried
out in New Mexico and is another in a long line of
Pentagon weapons development failures. It seems
that this time the weapons developers will not need
to falsify test results - as they have done several
times in the past - in order to get production funding
In March the US Senate voted overwhelmingly for a
national policy that puts into place a defence system
supposed to protect the US against a limited missile
attack. This policy basically negates the key Anti­
Ballistic Missile Treaty forbidding such deployment
Again Washington refuses to abide by a major
international agreement seen as desirable by a
majority of other countries.
Fear of Cyberterrorism
In December 1 9988 the Washington-based Centre
for Strategic and International Studies released a
report stating that thirty computer experts
strategically located globally could bring the U nited
States to its knees. The report says cyberterrorists
could shut down everything from electric power grids
and air traffic control systems to essential military
technology and mainstream economic systems.
"Bytes, not bullets, are the real ammo" according to
the Centre. [Bangkok Post, 1 7 December 1 999]
n,e Pentagon has also begun an investigation into
continual efforts by computer hackers in Russia to
access sensitive US defence computer systems. It
says this "atttack" is a major concern but so far
claims no breaches of systems have been made. [An
official line that somewhat obscures past problems
with hackers - Ed J

About Peace Researcher

Peace Researcher i s p u blished three times a year by the Anti-Bases Campaign,
C h ristchurch. The editors are Bob Leonard and M u rray Horton and PR i s laid out by
Warren Thomson (currently overseas) and Melanie Thomson. Our journal covers a
ra n g e of peace issues with emphasis on fore i g n m i l itary bases a n d i n te l l igence
topics. Contributed articles will be considered for publication based on s u bject m atter
a n d space requirements. We are particularly interested i n reports of original research
on peace topics in Aotearoa and the wider region of Australasia and the Pacific. Our
ad d ress i s:

Peace Researcher
P O Box 2258
C hristchurch
Aotearoa/ New Zealand

Peace Researcher 18 - Page 23 - May 1999

 Remember the United States Information Agency?

If you depend on Peace Researcher to keep you
Informed about the USIA and its sister agency the
US Information Service (a service few would ask
for), we confess to a serious lapse. We haven't
mentioned these obnoxious American propaganda
mills since our Aug�st issue in 1 992. That was the
year the U SIS office in Christchurch closed with
much moaning and gnashing of teeth by The Press
in a sickening editorial.
The USIS disappeared from our backyard after being
featured in ten major articles in PR between 1 986
and 1 992. The old NZ Monthly Review did a few
articles as well. So what reminded us of the USIS
after all these years? We received a book review via
the Internet of "Selling America's Culture to the
World" by Nancy Snow (Seven Stories Press, New
York, 1 998, 80 pp.) The review was written by Rose
A. Dyson, a Toronto-based writer and researcher.
We're s u re she won't mind if we give you a few
choice quotes from her review. (We don't yet have
our own copy of the book.)
Sounds familiar doesn't it. The USIA/USIS are
effectively a corporate arm of the US government -
dominated by corporate . interests merged with
government interests since before World War I. The
USIA was heavily Involved in educating "the NAFTA
generation" in the U.S., Mexico and Canada, during
the period of deal-making and hard-sell of the North
American Free Trade Agreement i n the early '90s.
" I nternational outreach is achieved through
broadcasting such as Voice of America, Worldnet,
the USIA Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting,
Radio Free Asia, cultural exchange programs and
the US's most popular exports - Hollywood movies
and the myth that the U . S . economy is a model for
how other market economies, both developed and
less developed, can successfully adapt to the global
marketplace." No other country on Earth bought into
that myth with such blind fervou r as little NZ. Since
1 984 we have led the world in selling our economic
soul to international bidders, and not necessarily the
highest bidders.

"The book offers a cogent analysis of U S . foreign
and domestic policy since the beginning of the 20th
century She [Snow] begins by introducing us to
the work of its foreign branch. [ That's the USIS
branch that set up camp for years in several NZ
cities. Ed. ] Coined as 'public diplomacy' its real
function is worldwide dissemination of propaganda
designed for the purposes of influencing the actions
of human beings in ways that are compatible with
American corporate interests."
It has been a massive g iveaway, helped in no small
measure by the USIS propaganda machines in our
midst. By 1 992 the sell-off of our assets had gained
almost unstoppable momentum . No wonder the
USIS felt it could close a few offices in NZ and save
some bucks They had sown the seeds and the free­
market grass was growing nicely. Best leave it to the
GATT, the WTO and APEC to finish us off as a
prosperous and Independent economy with a livable
environment.

. .. . . . . " .. . . .. . . . .
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