Facts:

The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different

cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant
was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room
in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the
defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions
and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a
police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then
interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed,
written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the
jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 2030 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession.

A mug shot of Ernesto Miranda, whose wrongful conviction led to the landmark
case Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court held that detained criminal suspects
must be informed of their rights prior to police questioning.

In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that detained criminal
suspects, prior to police questioning, must be informed of their constitutional right
to an attorney and against self-incrimination. The case began with the 1963
arrest of Phoenix resident Ernesto Miranda, who was charged with rape,
kidnapping, and robbery. Miranda was not informed of his rights prior to the
police interrogation. During the two-hour interrogation, Miranda allegedly
confessed to committing the crimes, which the police apparently recorded.
Miranda, who had not finished ninth grade and had a history of mental instability,
had no counsel present. At trial, the prosecution's case consisted solely of his
confession. Miranda was convicted of both rape and kidnapping and sentenced
to 20 to 30 years in prison. He appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming

that the police had unconstitutionally obtained his confession. The court
disagreed, however, and upheld the conviction. Miranda appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1966.

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, ruled
that the prosecution could not introduce Miranda's confession as evidence in a
criminal trial because the police had failed to first inform Miranda of his right to an
attorney and against self-incrimination. The police duty to give these warnings is
compelled by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which gives a criminal suspect
the right to refuse "to be a witness against himself," and Sixth Amendment, which
guarantees criminal defendants the right to an attorney.

The Court maintained that the defendant's right against self-incrimination has
long been part of Anglo-American law as a means to equalize the vulnerability
inherent in being detained. Such a position, unchecked, can often lead to
government abuse. For example, the Court cited the continued high incidence of
police violence designed to compel confessions from a suspect. This and other
forms of intimidation, maintained the Court, deprive criminal suspects of their
basic liberties and can lead to false confessions. The defendant's right to an
attorney is an equally fundamental right, because the presence of an attorney in
interrogations, according to Chief Justice Warren, enables "the defendant under
otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and
in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogations process."

Without these two fundamental rights, both of which, the Court ruled, "dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," "no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice."

Thus, to protect these rights in the face of widespread ignorance of the law, the
Court devised statements that the police are required to tell a defendant who is
being detained and interrogated. These mandatory "Miranda Rights" begin with
"the right to remain silent," and continue with the statement that "anything said
can and will be used against [the defendant] in a court of law." The police are
further compelled to inform the suspect of his or her right to an attorney and allow
for (or, if necessary, provide for) a defendant's attorney who can accompany him

during interrogations. Because none of these rights was afforded to Ernesto

Miranda and his "confession" was thus unconstitutionally admitted at trial, his
conviction was reversed. Miranda was later retried and convicted without the
admission of his confession.

Miranda v. Arizona, in creating the "Miranda Rights" we take for granted today,
reconciled the increasing police powers of the state with the basic rights of
individuals. Miranda remains good law today.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

HO WAI PANG,

G.R. No. 176229

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.

October 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the socalled Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.[2]

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16,
2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459
affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused,
namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,[5] Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin
San Ho[7] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III[8]
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion
for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates

Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to
the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah
(Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner
Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane.
Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came
up. From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used
clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag
was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size
as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate
boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was
white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo
and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes
earlier discovered.

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger
manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first
found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains
nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the
chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing
Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages
of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three
similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the
baggages of the six accused.

NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of

Cinco pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he
conducted a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate
boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.[10] The result of his
examination[11] of the white crystalline substance yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were
bundled together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond

Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated
stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them.
Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the
representative samples were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[12]
Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only
as against petitioner and his five co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed
against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation[13] which the trial court granted. The reinvestigation
conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this
resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information[14] under Criminal Case
No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the other Informations.[15] The Amended
Information reads:

That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country without lawful
authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost
identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no
knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all the accused guilty
of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW
KA WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG, WU HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO,
AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating Section 15,
Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to transport
into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride,
locally known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY
OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY
EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00)
each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though
retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment
provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is
imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than]
that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER
SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the
offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @
SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.

SO ORDERED.[19]

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case
records were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.[20] Later,
all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective

withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after being satisfied that the withdrawing
appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the
withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997.
[22] Per Entry of Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final and executory on
July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.

Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief[25] for the respondent
People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this Court
referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and determination pursuant
to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the
RTC. While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the
custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that
there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also
rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory
right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] which the CA denied

in its Resolution[29] dated January 16, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI

INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A
CONSPIRACY.

IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION.[30]

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions
and admissions of the accused as against himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not
assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial
investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the
CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically ruled that
the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are]
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation.

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during
his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement
was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in
evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his coaccused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in
People v. Buluran,[33] [a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not excluding
evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen
Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are
semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the
present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the
trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective decisions.
Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the
signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their signatures thereon
as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused were not
informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission
was declared inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave
credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to
have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment
of conviction, the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength
of his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country
and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of
Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it
need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing
direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As
the Court held in People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a
testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive
and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to
produce a conviction.

Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another
case when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be
decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.

Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
providing for the right to confrontation, viz:

Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what
the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence
being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.

In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to
confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel
cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the
proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it
before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless
able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination
suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against
him.

We agree with the OSG.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco
despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the
lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is
that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the
other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.
In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the

Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine
them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure
the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for crossexamination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also
been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to
cross-examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the

witnesses against him was not impaired.

Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.

Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of
conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and
which we once again herein reproduce with approval:

On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude
conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually

established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds

that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently
prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have
known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although
Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior to the incident in
NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the one who assisted him in the
supposed tour in the Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel
agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal things of
Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency.
Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to
three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant in Hong Kong.
Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue,
Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to the
presumption that they have the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all
the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were contained in
chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in their
luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial prosecutor that under the
given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been perpetrated only
through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused
assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in order to ensure its
success.[37]

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.[38] [C]onspiracy which

determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at
least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.[39] It need
not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design.[40] The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some
complete whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced
from petitioner and his co-accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that
there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in
bringing about the crime committed.

Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes
were found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that
it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him the
possession of the two chocolate boxes.

Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.

True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992,
she declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects
in petitioners bag.[42] Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that
she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were
still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any
chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU.[43] To us, this
slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of
her testimony.

The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence in its Order[44] of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus

In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to

command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda
Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in
incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even testified that she found
nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June
3, 1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting
Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express
lane in going to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying
with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun
Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai
Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai

Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she
nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof, pointing to
Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from the
personal perception of the witness and out of her personal knowledge. Neither is
it conjectural.[45]

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony

must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a
conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must
be calibrated and considered.[46] Also, where there is nothing in the records
which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely
implicate the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner
presented no evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court
is convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Nothing else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact
that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his coaccused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage
considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears
stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum
because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere
commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices
to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished
regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has
not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the
prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.

[47]

All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging
petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the
country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Penalty

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate
court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be
recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No.
1683.[48] The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced
new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in
Section 15 was changed from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659
amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided
by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that
R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to
the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a)
that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than

the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded

retroactive application, x x x.

And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused,
have, as to him, a retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court
upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed
by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed

June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

RODEL LUZ y ONG,

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1]

Respondent.
G. R. No. 197788

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 29, 2012

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February
2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March
10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was

coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he
and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two
(2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of
scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked
the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to
be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two
(2) contained suspected shabu.[3]

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not

guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and
raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.

In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal

possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery
on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y

ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum,
to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (300,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with
law.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October
2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i)
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii)
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS
CASE.

(iii)
THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.

(iv)
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was
no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims
that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
held thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this
case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and
riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof.
The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when
he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his
possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending
officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the
said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.[8]

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons
alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors.[9]

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.[11]

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace

officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a
driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of
local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act,
confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor
vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of
issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension
and/or revocation of his license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12] provides

the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile

Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations.
The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x

m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT)

or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on
the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into
custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was
at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as
found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost
in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed

at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure
is conducted. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans
signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda

opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations
in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must
decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside
detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a
policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end
he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is
aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains
the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the
dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.

xxxxxxxxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to
pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable
as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with
formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a
motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected
to treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he will be entitled
to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was
not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation
was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated
by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not
be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine

only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be

made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to
have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent
to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show
that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they
might make could be used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this
case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which
work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free
courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain
view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to
be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to
take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was

alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to
a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full
search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a fullblown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police
officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search incident
to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But
neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception
is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and
weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is
a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated
that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer because of the extended
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him
to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that [t]he danger to
the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and is more
analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291,
296 (1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less
hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to
destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a
routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at
413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it

does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have
other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from
danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms,
supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a patdown of
a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed
and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant
is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger
compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest,
New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to
arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped
for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that
offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to
be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of
the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed
to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[23]
Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The drugs
are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction
dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga

City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is
warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND

MANUEL D. ANDAL,
Petitioners,

- versus -

SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE

ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND
HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 180308

Present:

CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,**
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 19, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the
implementation of and nullify Committee Report No. 312[1] submitted by
respondents Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on June 7,
2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic
of the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Factual Antecedents

The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a whollyowned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), a government-sequestered organization in which the Republic of the
Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.[2] Petitioner PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC), meanwhile, is a private corporation duly organized

and existing under Philippine laws and a holding company whose main operation
is collecting the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both directors and
corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the government to the board of
directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT.[3] By virtue of its interests in both
PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has, likewise, substantial interest in
PHC.

For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends
from POTC. In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004,
PHC sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By
2005, PHC's operating expenses had ballooned tremendously. Likewise, several
PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a
wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced
without the appropriate accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.[4]

On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to
incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the
Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution
(PSR) No. 455[5] directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the
mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455
was referred to respondent Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public hearings[6] on various dates.
Petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource
persons.

On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed

Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of the
PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due
proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming
mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and
PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the
government's interests in the said corporations. In sum, Committee Report No.
312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over
the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization
Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the
replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.

On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court,
questioning, in particular, the haste with which the respondent Senate approved
the challenged Committee Report No. 312.[7] They also claim that respondent
Senator Richard Gordon acted with partiality and bias and denied them their
basic right to counsel,[8] and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite
having voluntarily recused himself from the proceedings in view of his personal
interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to participate actively in the hearings.
[9]

Issues Before The Court

The basic issues advanced before the Court are: (1) whether the respondent
Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312; and (2) whether it should
be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily
approved by the respondent Senate.

The Court's Ruling

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455
has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,[10] which cited Article VI,
Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon
any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees,
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.[11]

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when
it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to
conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing
so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide
latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long
been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.[12]

Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in the Sabio case, and as

suggested[13] by the parties in their respective pleadings, the issues put forth in
the petition[14] have become academic.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation[15] that their constitutionallyguaranteed right to counsel was violated during the hearings held in furtherance
of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can only be
invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission
of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation.[16]
Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as
resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40294

July 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS, ROSENDO ANOR
and RODOLFO TORRES, defendants-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is
now before us for automatic review.

There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico
Basas, Rosendo Anor, Rodolfo Torres and Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New
Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Rizal One of the however, Loreto Rivera, died during
the pendency of the case.

We find the facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the trial Court, home
by the evidence thus:

From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18, 1971, at about
7:56 o'clock in the evening, prisoners from brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal
succeeded in opening the door of their dormitory by means of a false key (tin
can) and attacked the inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the latter were then
getting their food rations from the delivery truck wherein the victim was among
them. Records further show that while the victim Bernardo Cutamora, was getting
his ration he was sandwiched by the accused who rushed towards the door and
stabbed the victim simultaneously whereby the latter sustained multiple stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds caused his death as
evidenced by Necropsy Report marked Exhibit 'A'. To gain exit from their brigade,
accused Tobias Ribadajo used a false key (tin can) and immediately the door
was opened and his co-accused rushed towards the place where the prisoners of

brigade 3-a were waiting for their ration and with respective matalas on their
hands they stabbed the victim to death. All the assailants confessed participation
in the killing claiming that they did it because they were being mocked by the
inmates of 3-a who were members of the OXO there was a time when these
inmates threw human waste on their brigade shouting that 'you Commando
members could not do anything', and then they would laugh at them; that in order
to avenge this mockery the accused headed by Tobias Ribadajo called up a
meeting in the afternoon of November 18, 1971, at around 1:00, and they
planned to kill any prisoner from brigade 3-a in the evening and they would do
the killing at the time they (inmates from 3-a) were waiting for their 'rancho'. Soon
their plan was consummated and the victim, Bernardo Cutamora was the unlucky
guy overcome by their respective bladed weapons. 1

In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid

Prisons on November 20, 1971, all the accused executed statements admitting
their participation in the slaying of Bernardo Cutamora. 2 Consequently, an
Information for Murder was filed against them on April 24, 1973 with the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing was due to the
separation from the service of a principal investigator.

Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz,

Loreto Rivera (who died on August 15, 1974, p. 46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres,
all with the assistance of counsel de officio, pleaded Guilty, while the other two
accused Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias Rolando Amor, alias Rolando
Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Guilty. 3 The Information was amended
to correct the name of Rolando Aunor to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro, alias
Tagalog. Thereafter, evidence was adduced.

At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo,

Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo Torres withdrew their pleas of Guilty. 4 Accused
Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their participation in the killing of Bernardo
Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that they had signed the
same under duress. Accused Federico Basas and Rodolfo Torres admitted
having executed their respective confessions, 5 while accused Rosendo Anor
changed his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty of the lesser offense of Homicide. 6

On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follows:

WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused,

namely: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor and
Rodolfo Torres, the Court finds them GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P12,000.00,
jointly and severally; to pay moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and
another P10,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and to pay
their proportionate shares of the costs. 7

Appellants claim infirmity of the Trial Court Decision on the following grounds:

The Trial Court erred in admitting as evidence, and in giving weight to the
supposed extrajudicial confession of the accused.

II

The Trial Court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism.

III

The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused and in imposing the death
penalty.

Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force;

that they had been exposed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and
the wetness and coldness of the rain, and had been subsequently beaten up and
placed in a "bartolina "

On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious
circumstance Casting doubt on their integrity. On the contrary, they are replete
with details only appellants could have supplied. In those statements, they called
their co-accused by their nicknames, not knowing their true names, like "Lilat" for
Basas, "Manok" for Anor and "Bukid" for Torres. The investigators could not have
concocted that on November 18, 1971, at around 1:00 P.M., appellants had
planned to kill any prisoner from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the
"rancho"; that they are members of the Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang and their
leader is accused Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same date at around 8:00
P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin can opened the door of their dormitory and
an the accused rushed towards the place where the inmates from Brigade 3-a
were waiting for their food; that they stabbed the victim with their "matalas"; and
their motive was to avenge the throwing of human waste on them by inmates of
Brigade 3-a.

What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they were all
admitting their guilt but for the lesser offense of Homicide, as manifested by their
de officio counsel.

Atty. Galvan

Your Honor, inasmuch as I have also conferred with all the accused and that
having appointed me as counsel de oficio before when Fiscal Guerrero was here
and after a long conference with the accused, and if the Fiscal will not object if all
the accused will change their former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, as that was
their proposal and they were very insistent, that if the Court will allow them to
withdraw their former plea of not guilty and substitute with a plea of guilty to a
lesser of homicide, your Honor. 8

Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution, however,

opposed the change of plea because it had already finished with the presentation
of its evidence.

We find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness

of appellants' confessions. The presumption of the law is in favor of the
spontaneity and voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession of an accused in a
criminal case, 9 for no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission
of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. 10 The burden of
proof is upon the declarant to destroy this presumption. 11 Mere repudiation of
confession by the accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession.
12 Concrete evidence of compulsion or duress must be presented to sustain their
claim of maltreatment. No such evidence has been put forward. No report of such
maltreatment was made to the prison authorities nor to the Fiscal who conducted
the preliminary investigation. During cross-examination, Corpuz admitted that he
was not maltreated. 13 Ribadajo himself did not protest when he was brought to
Exequiel Santos, Administrative Officer III, Bureau of Prisons, who, in his own
words, was "like a father to me." 14

As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence
and to counsel during custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the
proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused
during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural safeguards,
applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 15
No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the
1973 Constitution, 16 even if presented after January 17, 1973. 17 That
Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial
investigation does not have any retroactive effect. 18 The Trial Court committed
no reversible error either in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism.

Treachery was present because the attack on the victim was sudden and
unexpected. 19 When the inmates from Brigade 3-a went out to get their food
ration appellants immediately rushed out of their own cell and attacked, with their
improvised weapon, the unsuspecting victim. There was a collective effort on
appellants' part, who were all armed, in assaulting the victim who was unarmed,
20 and who was completely deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the attack

or to defend himself, 21 or to prepare for a fight or retreat. 22 Evident

premeditation was also present because the plan to kill any prisoner from
Brigade 3-a was hatched around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 18,
1971, and the plan was consummated at about 8:00 in the evening of the same
day. Evident premeditation is present when murder was contemplated at least
one hour prior to its execution. 23 Appellants had ample time to desist from the
execution of the offense but they clung to their determination to achieve their
criminal intent.

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be considered because all the

accused at the time of the commission of the offense, were serving their
respective sentences by virtue of a final judgment for other crimes embraced in
the same Title of the Revised Penal Code (Corpuz for Homicide; Ribadajo for
Murder; Basas for Murder; Anor for Murder; and Torres for Homicide).

No error either was committed by the Trial Court in imposing the death penalty.
The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 24
Considering that appellants committed the present felony after having been
convicted by final judgment and while serving their respective sentences, they
should be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for
the new felony. 25 Given this circumstance, Anor's change of plea from Guilty to
Not Guilty will not change his liability besides the fact that it was made after the
prosecution had rested its case. 26

The defense contention that appellants should be held guilty only for "Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray" and sentenced to prision mayor under Article 251
of the Revised Penal Code, upon the allegation that the commotion was
spontaneous, lacks merit. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or
affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression between both parties. 27 Appellants
rushed out of their cell with the common purpose of attacking the victim of a rival
group, which unity of purpose indicates appellants' common responsibility for the
consequences of their aggression. 28

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED. However, for

lack of the necessary votes, the penalty to be imposed on all the accused-

appellants is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs

of the deceased is hereby raised to P30,000.00. Proportionate costs against the
accused.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79543. October 16, 1996]

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is constitutionally

guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished of these is the right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. The 1987
Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants that such guarantee
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the present
case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of
the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial
investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial
confession was extracted through torture, and that the prosecutions evidence
was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner, the
question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed is likewise
motu propio addressed by the Court in this Decision.

Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision[1] of respondent

Sandiganbayan[2] in Criminal Case No. 8496 promulgated on June 19, 1987
convicting petitioner of brigandage, and the Resolution[3] promulgated on July

27, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A
recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and
performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he
would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected
mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.

Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator,
Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y
Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel
Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was charged
in the following Information:[4]

That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauyan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, two of whom were armed with guns, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat
and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it
was travelling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of
their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:

1) Postal Delivery Truck

2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers

3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers

4) Treasury Warrants

5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government

Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private
Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to
the damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law.

On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles,

assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez,
Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and
remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody and was tried in
absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution.
Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial on February 21,
1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but
remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against
them were held in absentia.[5] Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent
Court rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution.

Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the prosecution for a stipulation
of facts, the defense admitted the following:[6]

The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737-B-82, consisting
of 343 pages from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused
Bernardo Relator was a PC Sergeant at Camp Bagond Diwa, Bicutan, Metro
Manila; as such PC Sergeant, accused Relator was issued a service revolver,
Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707 (Exhibit B) and holster
(Exhibit B-1) with six (6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts,

accused Eddie Saguindel was a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982,
accused Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles, a
former PC Sergeant, was invited for investigation in connection with the hijacking
of a delivery van by the elements of the Special Operations Group, PC, and the
three availed of their right to remain silent and to have counsel of their choice, as
shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the existence of the sworn
statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-11) as well as the
Certification dated May 30, 1982, subject to the qualification that said document
was made under duress.

The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of Bernardo
Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt.
Samuel Pagdilao, Jr.6-a and the submission of Exhibits A to K. In their defense,
accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented their respective testimonies plus those
of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also submitted his Exhibits 1-14Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution
proffered rebuttal evidence and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A31 and L.

Evidence for the Prosecution

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van no. MVD
02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up and deliver mail matters to and from
Manila. On board the vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two couriers
named Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were seated beside the
driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning at the Airmail Distribution Center
of the Manila International Airport where they were issued waybills[7] for the
sacks of mail they collected. They then proceeded to the Central Post Office
where they likewise gathered mail matters including 737 check letters[8] sent by
the United States Embassy. All the mail matters were placed inside the delivery
van, and its door padlocked.

As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they took the
MacArthur Highway on the return trip to Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue Mercedes Benz

sedan[9] overtook their van and cut across its path. The car had five (5)
passengers -- three seated in front and two at the back. The cars driver and the
passenger beside him were in white shirts; the third man in front and the person
immediately behind him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in
the back had on a long-sleeved shirt.[10]

Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at driver Nerito
Miranda as someone uttered, Are you not going to stop this truck?[11]
Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped the vans engine. Alighting from the
car, the armed group identified themselves as policemen.[12] They ordered the
postal employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out of the van,
Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when threatened, he surrendered it to
one of the car passengers.[13] The three postal employees were then ordered to
board the Benz.

As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw one of the
malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo Frias, going up the van. Inside the
car, the three delivery employees were ordered to lower their heads. They sat
between two of their captors at the back of the car while two others were in front.
Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up as he was feeling dizzy
for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a glimpse of the pimply face of the man
to his left. He also recognized the driver who had glanced back. These men
turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias, respectively.[14]

As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling densely confined.
He was allowed to raise his head but with eyes closed. However, he sneaked a
look and recognized the driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and the fellow beside
him who poked a balisong at him as Angel Liwanag. The man in uniform on the
front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he was about to enter the car,
Bautista looked back and recognized Frias.[15] These incidents yielded the
pieces of information critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza,
Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of suspects at Camp Crame later on.

The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came to a stop, the
captured men discovered that they were along Kaimito Road in Kalookan City.

They were made to remove their pants and shoes and then told to run towards
the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers had left,
they put on their pants and reported the incident to the Kalookan Police Station.

The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the postal
van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on
May 4, 1982. Discovered missing were several mail matters,[16] including checks
and warrants, along with the vans battery, tools and fuel.[17]

In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montao, then

Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the assistance of the Special
Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of
the hijacking incident.[18] Responding to the request, the SOG, which was
tasked to detect, investigate and neutralize criminal syndicates in Metro Manila
and adjacent provinces, organized two investigative teams. One group was led
by Capt. Rosendo Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they
conducted a massive intelligence build-up to monitor the drop points where the
stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.

On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian informer that two
persons were looking for buyers of stolen checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the
informer to arrange a meeting with them. The meeting materialized at about 9:00
P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao, Quezon City. With
cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The informer introduced him to
Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn showed Capt. Ferrer a sample
Social Security System (SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk of the
checks were in the possession of their companions in Obrero, Tondo, Manila.
After some negotiations, they agreed to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded
a car, Capt. Ferrer introduced himself and his companions as lawmen
investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and distressed, Frias calmed down
only when assured that his penalty would be mitigated should he cooperate with
the authorities. Frias thus volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG
team to Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza.

Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations officer who was in

another car during the mission, to accompany Frias to Obrero, Tondo while he
escorted Alcantara to their headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the
headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking although he
admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in possession of several
checks. Alcantara was turned over to the investigation section of the SOG for
further questioning.

Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilaos group was able to corner Ricardo Perez in his house in
Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking incident, Perez admitted participation
therein and expressed disappointment over his inability to dispose of the checks
even after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered the checks in his
possession to Lt. Pagdilao.[19]

An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over their two-way
radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza were in Lt. Pagdilaos custody. Capt.
Ferrer ordered that, instead of returning to headquarters, Lt. Pagdilao and his
companions should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to apprehend Martin Mateo.
They met at the designated place and proceeded to Gulod, Novaliches arriving
there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29, 1982.

Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two men
heading in their direction. Perez identified them as Martin Mateo and Angel
Liwanag. The latter threw something into the ricefield which, when retrieved,
turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic bag.
[20] As the two were about to board the SOG teams's car, Mateo said, Sir, kung
baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa panalo. Marami pa
akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na natin para di na natin babalikan.[21]
Capt. Ferrer accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved several other
checks in another plastic bag.

On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and Liwanag
admitted participation in the postal hijacking. At a confrontation with Perez and
Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the
mastermind of the crime.

Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany Mateo to the

house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen found petitioner at home. Upon
being invited to Camp Crame to shed light on his participation in the hijacking,
petitioner was dumbfounded (parang nagulat). Pursuant to standard operating
procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his constitutional rights,[22]
whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame. However, the group, including
petitioner, returned to the latters place to recover the loot. It was in the
neighborhood, not in petitioners house, where the authorities located the checks.
[23]

The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the hijacking, telling
him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered the information that
petitioner furnished the Benz used in the hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted
involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie
Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be a
discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30,
1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C.
Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero which, quoted in full, reads as follows:

BABALA: -- Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, na ang dahilan ng

pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol sa isang kasong Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na
naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982 doon sa Meycauyan, Bulacan, mga
bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saang maraming tsekeng
US, tseke ng BIR at iba pang mga personal na tseke ang nabawi mula sa iyo.
Nais ko ring ibigay sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20,
Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga
sumusunod:

a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik;

b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong sarili mong pili

upang may magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat;

c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga katanungang maaring

makasira sa iyo sa dahilang anumang iyong isalaysay ay maaaring gamitin pabor

or laban sa iyo sa kinauukulang hukuman;

d. Na ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, ako mismo ang makipagugnayan sa CLAO-IBP upang ikaw ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang
bayad.

1. TANONG:- Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang naipaliwanag sa iyo ay

iyong lubos na naiintindihan at nauunawaan?

SAGOT:- Opo.

2. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at sagot na ito bilang
katibayan na iyo ngang naiintindihan ang iyong mga karapatan at gayun na rin sa
dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito, at ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng
isang malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay, sumagot sa mga katanungan at
sumusumpang lahat ng iyong isasalaysay ay pawang mga katotohanan lamang?

S:- Opo, pipirma ako Ser.

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
(Affiant)

MGA SAKSI:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROMEO P. ESPERO THERESA L. TOLENTINO

Ssg., PC C1C WAC (PC)"

3. T:- Maari bang sabihin mong muli ang iyong buong pangalan, edad at iba pang
bagay-bagay na maaring mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?

S:- Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may asawa, isang Patrolman ng Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa
General Assignment Section, Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng
Pulisya at kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810 Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo,
Manila.

4. T:- Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang Kabatas?

S:- Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa, noong ako
ay mapasok sa serbisyo.

5. T:- Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?

S:- Noon lamang pong January 1982.

6. T:- Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saang bayan, lungsod or lalawigan?

S:- Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang aking ina naman

ay Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa Maynila noon July 17, 1951.

7. T:- Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?

S:- Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil hindi ko natapos ang

second semester ng 4th year ko.

8. T:- Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-MPF?

S:- Sa Follow-Up Unit ako.

9. T:- At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit ng GAS, ano naman ang iyong mga
specific duties?

S:- Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga at large sa mga
suspects namin sa mga kasong hawak ng investigation.

10. T:- Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon humigit
kumulang, saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S:- Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin iyong hinayjack namin
na Philippine Mail delivery van.

11. T:- Wika moy kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasamahan?

S:- Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin Mateo, Jr. who
was seated in the investigation room and asked the name and was duly
answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey Frias; Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at
ang mga taga LRP ng PC Brigade na sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravales
at isa pang Sergeant na ang alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag namin.
Walo (8) (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as SIYAM [9]) kaming lahat
doon noon at ang mga gamit naman naming kotse noon ay ang kotse ng
kumpare kong si Rudy Miranda na isang Mercedes Benz na may plakang NMJ659 kung saang ang driver namin noon ay si Raul Mendoza (corrected and
initialled by affiant to read as AKO) at ang mga kasama naman naming sakay ay

sina Angelo Liwanag, Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP

(affiant added and initialled this additional fact: AT RAUL MENDOZA). Ang isang
kotse namang gamit namin ay pag-aari daw ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na
kanya na rin mismong minamaneho na isang Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at
ang mga sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt.
Dan Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may kasama pa kaming contact ni Carding
Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina Alias NINOY na isang dispatcher at
Alias JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito sa trabahong ito ay si Carding PEREZ at
kami naman ng mga sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta upang
umeskort sa kanila sa pag-hijack ng delivery van.

12. T:- Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng Post Office
patungong norte?

S:- Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng alas-4:00 hanggang
alas-5:00 ng hapon.

13. T:- Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga naganap noong
hapon na iyon?

S:- Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post Office, sinundan na
namin, una ang van, sumunod ang Lancer at huli ang Mercedes Benz namin.
Pagdating namin sa Malinta, Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng
puwesto sa pagsunod, van naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes Benz at huli na
ang Lancer. Noong makapasok na kami ng boundary ng Meycauyan, Bulacan ay
kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon makatiyempo kami ay kinat namin ang
delivery van. Tumigil naman ito at bumaba kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt.
Jun ng LRP dahil sila noon ang may hawak ng kanilang Armalite Rifle pero may
service pa silang maiksing baril. Pinababa nila ang tatlong maydala ng delivery
van at pinasakay sa Mercedes Benz, habang nakatutok ang kanilang mga baril
sa kanila. Ako naman ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at sumakay ng delivery van
at ako na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako nina Junior Mateo at
si Rey Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post
Office na maydala ng delivery van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na
namin sa Manila ang van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minamaneho pa rin ni Raul

Mendoza ay dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang Lancer naman ay nag-U-turn

din at sumunod sa amin. Noong makarating na kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila ay inunahan na kami ng Lancer at iyon na nga, parang follow the
leader na dahil siya na noon ang aming guide.

14. T:- Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?

S:- Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina Carding
Perez, at noong nakarating ng kami roon ay iniyatras ko na ang van sa kanilang
garahe at doon ay ibinaba namin lahat ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na po alam
kung ilan lahat iyon, na siyang laman ng delivery van at pagkatapos ay umalis
kaming muli ng mga kasama ko rin sa van papuntang Quezon City kung saan
namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung
hindi ako nagkakamali.

15. T:- Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?

S:- Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding Perez sa
may bahay nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at inabutan na namin sila na
nagkakarga na noong mga duffle bag sa (sic), madilim na ho noon, sa isang
kotseng mamula-mula o orange na Camaro at isa pang Mercedes Benz na
brown, dahil ang Lancer ay isinoli na raw nila sa may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon ang
mga duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi ang usapan namin noon dahil
sumilip lamang ako noon at kasama ko si Carding Perez, kami naman ngayon ay
pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy Miranda sa San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na
sakay ng isang Toyota Corona na brown na si Carding Perez ang nagmaneho.
Pagdating namin doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay naroon na rin noon ang
Mercedes Benz na ginamit namin, pero wala na ang crew ng delivery van dahil
ibinaba at iniwanan daw nila sa Caloocan City. Ang naroroon na lamang noon ay
sina Angelo Liwanag, si Raul Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si Sgt. Jun na
parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon ang Mercedes Benz namin doon kina Rudy
Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi doon sa kamag-anak, dahil hindi nila alam ang
trabahong ito. Sumakay na iyong apat naming kasama sa Toyota Corona na
sakay namin at inihatid namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun doon sa tinitirhan
nitong huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit sa Del Pan Bridge sa may

Recto Avenue sa San Nicolas yata iyon sa Manila. Kami naman ngayong apat,
sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa
Bocaue, Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa North Diversion Road at paglabas namin sa
exit papuntang Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam ang
lugar pero alam kong puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak ni Carding
Perez iyon pero hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Naroon na ngayon ang buong
tropa, maliban sa mga dalawang sundalong naihatid na namin sa may Manila, at
may mga nadagdag pang ibang mukha pero hindi ko ito mga kakilala. Si JACK o
Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay naroon din noon. Kumain kami, pagkatapos ay
nagbukasan na ng mga duffle bag. Iyon na nga,nakita na namin ang mga
tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to the checks he voluntarily surrendered) at aming
inihiwalay ngayon sa mga sulat na naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa
bahay ni Junior Mateo sa Novaliches. Di magdamag ngayon ang trabaho namin,
kinabukasan ay kanya-kanyang uwian na, pagkatapos ay pahinga. Kinabukasan
muli, gabi, inilipat na namin doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito
(Affiant again referred to said checks). Isinakay namin noon sa isang cargo truck
na pag-aari din daw nina Carding. Iyong mga tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay
noon doon sa isang sikretong compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may
chassis. Sikretong compartment iyon, na mahirap mahalata.

16. T: Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung ganoon, sabihin
mo nga kung anong uring baril iyon?

S:- Wala po akong baril, Ser.

17. T:- Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the checks recovered from
the Affiant was referred to) sa iyo?

S:- E, di ganoon na nga ho, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang situwasyon sa

aming grupo, dahil iyong partehan sana namin ay puro pangako ang nangyari.
Kaya napagpasiyahan namin na hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang
onsehan sa amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan
Miravalles Alias JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay doon muna sa amin ito
nakatago (The checks recovered from the Affiant was referred to). Pero habang
tumatagal ay umiinit at nalaman namin pati na may alarma na, kayat inilipat

namin doon sa may Raxa Bago sa may likod ng Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette
Factory sa Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago sa isang kumare ko doon,
pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong kumare ko ang laman noon dahil mahigpit
kong ipinagbilin na huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin kinuha iyon
noong isurender ko ang mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa kinuha na
namin ang supot na ito (the checks placed in a plastic bag was again referred to)
ay wala pa rin kamalay-malay ang kumare ko.

18. T:- Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa Central Post
Office, mga kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito?

S:- Iyong araw na lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon ko noon silang
nakikita, itong si Alias NINOY lamang ang dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya
noon at nakikipag-usap kina Carding Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias.
Makikilala ko itong si Alias NINOY kung makita ko siyang muli.

19. T:- Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa trabahong ito?

S:- Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong tropa na
namin.

20. T:- Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa iyo, mayroon ka

bang nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya sa salaysay na ito?

S:- Wala na po.

21. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang patotoo sa
katotohanan nito nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan or pinangakuan kaya ng anuman
upang lumagda lamang?

S:- Opo.

WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . . . /ac

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO

MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:

(Sgd.)
SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC

(Sgd.)
CIC THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC)[24]

Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May 30, 1982. One
was a certification stating that he voluntarily surrendered voluminous assorted
US checks and vouchers, that because of the large number of pieces of checks,
he affixed his signature upon the middle portion of the back of each check to
serve as identification in the future, prior to the completion of its proper inventory
and listing conducted by elements of SOG in his presence, and that he guided
the elements of SOG to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of the
sky-blue Mercedes Benz car which was surrendered to the SOG Headquarters.
[25] The other document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to
his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the
following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights under Section
20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all his rights
thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP
but he refused to avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG men in
his house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982 sa dahilang ako ay kasangkot sa
pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants, SSS Pension Checks and Vouchers

at SSS Medicare Checks and Vouchers mula sa delivery van ng Philippine Mail;
(c) that the SOG men confiscated from him numerous checks and a Mercedes
Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not hurt or maltreated nor was
anything taken from him which was not duly receipted for.[26]

As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document), he led the SOG
operatives to the house of Rodolfo Miranda on Singalong where the latter
admitted that petitioner was his friend. He denied, however, having knowledge
that his car was used in the hijacking until the authorities came to his house.
According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his car would be used for
surveillance purposes because petitioners jeep was not available. The car was
not returned until the evening following that when it was borrowed.[27] After the
trip to Mirandas house, petitioner informed the investigators that some more
checks could be recovered from his kumare. Said checks were retrieved and
turned over to headquarters along with the car surrendered by Miranda who later
executed a sworn statement dated May 31, 1992 at the SOG.[28]

Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie Saguindel and Bernardo

Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the
afternoon of May 30, 1982. They met Miravalles along the way to his house.
Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were already under custody
and that they implicated him as one of their confederates, Miravalles reacted by
saying, Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob niyan, eh.[29]

Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie Saguindel. At the
barracks of the Long Range Patrol in Bicutan, Metro Manila, Saguindel
voluntarily accepted the invitation to proceed to the SOG headquarters, after
Miravalles initially informed him of the facts obtained during the investigation.
Saguindel was heard saying, Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa mga tsekeng iyan
kasi isang buwan na hindi pa nabebenta.[30] With Miravalles and Saguindel,
Capt. Ferrer and his team moved on to Binondo, Manila to look for Bernardo
Relator. When they found him at home, Relator excused himself, went upstairs,
returned with a .32 caliber revolver with six bullets[31] and said, Sir, ito yong baril
na nagamit.[32] The three suspects were brought to Camp Crame for further
investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer submitted an after-operations report about
their mission and executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao on affidavit on the same
matter.[33]

Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed sworn statements.[34]
Prior to doing so, they waived their right to counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted
their participation and implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez, on the other
hand, denied having driven a Lancer car in the hijacking and stated that he was
implicated in the crime only because in one drinking spree with petitioner, Mateo
and one alias Buro during that month of May, they had a heated altercation. Like
petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they voluntarily surrendered
vouchers and checks which were part of their loot in the hijacking; they also
executed waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For his part,
Relator executed a certification to the effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .
32 caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used in the commission of the crime.
In spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a lawyer, petitioner did not manifest
that he needed the assistance of counsel. During the taking of his statement,
petitioner was visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade from the General
Assignment Section of the WPD.

For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint affidavit[35]
manifesting their option to avail of their right to remain silent until such time as
they would have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias and Mendoza executed
a similar joint affidavit.[36] Severino Castro, the postal employee implicated, also
chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in court. However, he linked to the
crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former clerk of the Central Post Office and
son of a director of the Bureau of Posts in Region I.[37]

On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned postal employees
Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar and directed them to proceed to Camp Crame. At
the office of the SOG, they were told to go over some pictures for identification of
the culprits. The three recognized and pointed to the suspects in a line-up.
Tagudar identified Saguindel and Liwanag.[38] Miranda pointed at Frias and
Liwanag[39] while Bautista identified Frias, Mendoza and Liwanag .[40] Petitioner
himself, when told to identify his alleged cohorts, pointed to Severino Castro as
their contact at the post office.[41] Five of the suspects who were not identified in
the line-up were however implicated by Liwanag, Mateo and petitioner.

SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-in-band

(hijacking) before the Municipal Court of Meycauyan, Bulacan against petitioner

and ten (10) others, namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles, Perez, Frias,
Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal Case No. 7885).[42]

On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and aforequoted was

filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496.

On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal

issued orders for the arrest of the accused[43] and fixed bail at P13,000.00 each.
Saguindel and Relator filed a motion to quash the Information asserting that
under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D. 1850, they should be tried by a
court martial.[44] The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on January 3, 1984[45]
on the ground that courts martial could no longer exercise jurisdiction over them
by virtue of their separation from military service.

Evidence for the Defense

Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a patrolman since August
21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation Division or the Detective Bureau of the
WPD to which the General Assignment Section belonged, he was the recipient of
several awards and recognitions starting with ranking fifth in the Final Order of
Merit in the basic course for police officers.[46] He also claimed to have received
a loyalty medal for meritorious service above the call of duty[47] and several
commendations[48] for the distinguished performance of his duties. On that
fateful date of May 3, 1982, he was a member of the Special Task Force Unit
covering the tourist belt area.

Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted knowing only Martin
Mateo whose name appeared in the initial follow-up operation he allegedly
participated in regarding a P250,000 qualified theft case on May 16, 1980 at the
Shemberg Marketing Corporation.[49] Although a suspect, Mateo was not
charged in the information subsequently filed in that case. Sometime in March
1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police headquarters seeking assistance in
his bid to lead a new life. Considering Mateos familiarity with underworld

characters, petitioner readily made him an informer who was paid from time to
time out of the police intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an effective informer.
In fact, he allegedly supplied vital information on the identities and whereabouts
of suspects in robbery cases at the La Elegancia Jewelry Store, at the Likha
Antique and Crafts,[50] and in an alleged racket in Aranque Market in Manila
involving jewelries.

As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing petitioners ownertype jeep whenever he was given an assignment. In one instance however,
petitioner saw Mateo using his jeep with some male companions. Because
Mateo denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner from then on refused to
lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an allowance to cover his
travelling expenses.

About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and requested the
latter to give him a good project as he was working for his transfer to the
Metrocom Intelligence Security Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged
petitioner to lend him his jeep in order that he could follow-up a bank robbery
case. That same evening, petitioner approached his kumpare, accused Rodolfo
Miranda, to borrow the latters old Mercedes Benz since, if the jeep was used,
Mateo could be identified as an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and
went around boasting of the Mercedes Benz.[51]

Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner advised him to
return the car between the hours of two and three in the afternoon at the Lakan
Beer House at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta. Cruz,
Manila where petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera who would be
celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and company at around
3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly before 5:00 in the
afternoon when he was constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because he
had to attend a mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the police
headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to his area of responsibility in the
tourist belt. He returned to the beer house at about 6:00 in the evening hoping to
find Mateo and the automobile. A little before 8:00 oclock, someone informed him
that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded Mateo for being
late; the latter apologized and said that his surveillance bore good results.
Petitioner then returned the car to Miranda, through the latters cousin.

At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo, escorted by a group of
military men, went to petitioners house at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The
group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested him. Wearing only
short pants, petitioner was made to board a car where he was handcuffed. The
men asked him about the Benz and the identities of his companions in an alleged
hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having knowledge of the exact location of
the car but denied participation in the crime. Nobody apprised him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.[52]

Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the residence of

Miranda to get the Benz. They were on board two cars. When petitioner noticed
that they were not heading for Mirandas place, he clutched the hand of Lt.
Pagdilao, pleading for pity and thinking that he was about to be salvaged. Lt.
Pagdilao however informed him that they would be dropping by petitioners house
first per the investigators information that more checks could be recovered
thereat. A warrantless search was then allegedly conducted in petitioners house
but nothing was found. Suddenly, someone from the other car came out of a
nearby house owned by Mateo and reported that they had recovered some
checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of Miranda who was also invited
for questioning. The latter surrendered his Benz to the group.

At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner repeatedly coaxed to admit

participation in the hijacking. As he vehemently denied the accusation against
him, someone blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded him in a
car. He was taken to an unidentified place and made to lie flat on his back. An
object was tied to his small finger to electrocute him. While a wet handkerchief
was stuffed in his mouth, someone mounted his chest and applied the water cure
(tinutubig) through his nose. Because these ordeals were simultaneously carried
out, petitioner felt unbearable pain. He sought permission to get in touch with his
father-in-law, Atty. Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They urged him to
cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him.

Meanwhile, petitioners wife reported to the WPD General Assignment Section

her husbands forcible abduction by armed men whom she mistook for CIS
agents. A check with the CIS yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo

Dator went to the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was being
investigated but no details were given thereon pending clearance with superior
officers.[53] Consequently, a newspaper carried an item on the SOGs refusal to
allow petitioners co-police officers to see him in his detention cell.[54]

Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD who was
transferred to the SOG, was able to visit him. Petitioner revealed to Victorino the
maltreatment done him but the latter expressed helplessness about it. In fact,
Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that the SOG would not incriminate
him (para hindi ka pag-initan dito).[55] The advice came after petitioner was
warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be liquidated by the SOG,
[56] should he refused to cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioners cell and
confided that he had been similarly maltreated and forced to implicate petitioner.

After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to petitioner.
Because its contents were false, petitioner refused to sign it. Placing his arm
around petitioner, a certain Capt. Lagman told petitioner that he thought they had
an understanding already. Petitioner later discovered that Lagman was not
member of the military but an agent of the SOG, and a member of the Contreras
gang. Petitioner was therefore constrained to sign the statement because of his
excruciating experience (hirap na hirap). He however admitted having read the
document before affiixing his signature thereto and initialing the corrections
therein. The waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the
certification he executed were allegedly also obtained by duress. Although he
picked out one Severino Castro in a police line-up, he did not even know Castro.
He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a certain Boy Zapanta.

Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against Lt.
Rosendo Ferrer and several John Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal
Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its dismissal for petitioners failure to appear
despite subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions as well as to
authenticate his statement.[57] However, petitioner swore that he never received
the subpoenas.

Petitioners alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose birthday on May 3,

1995 was the reason for the celebration at the Lakan Beer House. While his
baptismal certificate indicated that he was born on May 4, 1956,[58] a joint
affidavit[59] also attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956. Gary
Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated Almogueras testimony as to
petitioners alleged presence during the birthday celebration.

The Respondent Courts Decision

On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein questioned 51-page
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y

Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie
Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No.
532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
and hereby sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to
THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as
maximum, both of reclusion temporal, and to pay their proportionate share of the
costs of the action. Accused Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with
costs de oficio, for insufficiency of evidence.

No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth of any proof as
to the actual damages suffered by the Bureau of Posts or the owners of the
pilfered mail matters, and it further appearing that the mail van which was
hijacked had been recovered, as well as most of the checks and warrants which
were surrendered by some of the accused, without prejudice to the institution of
the proper civil action to recover damages should proof thereof be available.

Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, which are the .32
Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson, Serial No. 11707, its holster and six (6) live
ammunition respectively, which were surrendered by accused Relator, and
Exhibits J, J-1 to J-5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22 pieces,

respectively, of Social Security System and Medicare checks and vouchers, be

returned to the Firearm and Explosive Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon
City and the Social Security System, respectively, upon proper receipts.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General, Central Post

Office, Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the Commanding General and
Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for their information and guidance with
respect to the other accused who are still at-large.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by the

Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant
alternative petition for certiorari and/or review on certiorari charging the
Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at said Decision.

The Issues

The amended petition raises the following:

Assignments of Error
and / or
Excess of Jurisdiction / Grave Abuse of Discretion

xxxxxxxxx

First

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction when it made its determination of the alleged guilt of
petitioner on the basis of mere preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

Second

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioners having borrowed the Mercedes
Benz car utilized by the other accused in the hijacking of the mail van idubitably
established his direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation in the said
hijacking, the same being in gross disregard of basic Rules of Law.

Third

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the voluminous SSS Medicare and
Pension Checks were confiscated from and surrendered by petitioner and three
of the other accused and in finding the testimonies and investigation reports
relative thereto, credible and unrefuted, said findings being, insofar as petitioner
is concerned, absolutely without any basis in the evidence and in fact contrary to
the prosecutions only evidence that has some measure of competency and
admissibility.

Fourth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in finding that
dorsal portions of the checks and warrants allegedly taken from petitioner were
signed by him to indicate his admission of accountability therefor and that his
signatures thereon confirm the confiscation from and/or surrender by him of said
checks, said findings being absolutely without any support in the evidence.

Fifth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting and considering against petitioner his
alleged extra judical confession, despite petitioners uncontradicted testimony and
documentary proof that he was made to give or sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the
presence and assistance of counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross
violation of Constitutional Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence.

Sixth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioners participation in the hijacking of
the mail van is indubitably established by the manner by which the SOG
operatives succeeded in ferreting out the members of the hijacking syndicate one
by one through patient sleuthing and in finding that they did so without resorting
to extra-legal measures and that no evidence having been adduced to show that
they were actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the herein
accused, then their testimonies should be accorded full credence.

Seventh

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that even setting aside the inter-locking
confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, x x x substantial and
sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo (Petitioner).

Eight

Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred and gravely

abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that accused

Filoteos (petitioners) and Mateos [alleged] unexplained possession of the stolen

checks raised the presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in
question, petitioners alleged possession not being borne out but disputed by the
prosecutions own evidence.

Ninth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot
be entertained for being quite weak and implausible. The truth of the matter
being that they should have been sustained since petitioner was not identified by
the direct victims-eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or were
present at the hijack and none of the checks and treasury warrants were found in
his possession or retrieved from him.

Tenth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the participation of petitioner in the
criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence
of record and that said evidence not only confirms the conspiracy between [him
and the other accused] as easily discernible from their conduct before, during
and after the commission of the offense; but also their participation therein as coprincipals by direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation.

Eleventh

The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in cavalierly rejecting, through the use of pejorative
words, and without stating the legal basis of such rejection, the various vital
factual points raised by petitioner, in gross violation of the express mandate of
the 1987 Constitution.

The Court believes that the above errors may be condensed into four:

(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed
by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence
against him?

(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and
intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible?

(3) Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper?

(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?

The Courts Ruling

Preliminary Issue: Rule 45 or Rule 65?

Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on the procedural

aspects of the case. Petitioner, a segurista, opted to file an (amended) alternative
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. We however hold that the instant petition must be considered
as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
[60] this Court clearly ruled:

Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the
Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
shall be subject to review on certiorari by this Court in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides, in

Section 2, that only questions of law may be raised in the Petition for Review and
these must be distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are not to be reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this general principle. Here,
reading petitioners Petition for Review and Memorandum in the most favorable
possible light, petitioner may be seen to be in effect asserting that the
Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain (f)acts in arriving at its factual
conclusions.

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly
provides that (d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure
questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order
to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave
misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by
convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough
treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a persons life and liberty are at
stake.[61]

As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable
only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. For waffling on
procedural matters, petitioner could have lost this battle through a summary
dismissal of his alternative petition. But in view of the importance of the issues
raised, the Court decided to take cognizance of the matter.

First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver

On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the
admissibility of petitioners extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his
complicity in the crime. Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in
admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony

and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the
presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way that
his waiver of the said right was likewise without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner
therefore questions the respondent Courts admission in evidence of his
extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases[62] upholding the admissibility
of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel especially
where the statements are replete with details and circumstances which are
indicative of voluntariness. We shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled
waiver of his right to counsel.

The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as
follows:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of

the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section
as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices and their families. (underscoring supplied. Obviously, the 1973
Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right
to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, above underscored.)

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera,[63] the Court categorically held
that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not included
in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. This Court said:

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should
be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession
obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense,
who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible
in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in
evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and
even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date.

By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring

that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation
must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or
in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of
said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of
cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was
in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel,[64]

the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court,
through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile,[65] issued the guidelines to be observed by law
enforcers during custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that (t)he
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel.[66] Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino,[67] the Court
through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:

x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be

given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26
April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs.
Galit. x x x.

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the
1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of
promulgation of Morales.

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the
Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and
his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The
prospective application of judge-made laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of
Appeals[68] where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in
accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that (j)udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code which states that (l)aws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, the principle of
prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions,
which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the law means.[69]

Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should
be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be
sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that (p)enal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony

who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional

provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights
and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by
the government, or by individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties
for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state.[70] Penal laws, on
the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an
offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the
power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and
enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law.[71]

Hence, petitioners vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison[72] to make his

extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial
confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation of
Morales on April 26, 1983.

The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel

notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether such waiver was made
voluntarily and intelligently.[73] The waiver must also be categorical and
definitive,[74] and must rest on clear evidence.[75]

In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code,[76] petitioner stated that:

x x x matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng Special

Operations Group, PC/INP Central Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp
Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga karapatan alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng
Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay
malaya at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na walang
abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa dahilang alam at
nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at wala naman akong isasalaysay kung
hindi mga katotohanan lamang, bagamat ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na
ikuha ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin namang
tinanggihan:

x x x x x x x x x;

Na ako ay hindi sinaktan o minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha mula sa akin na

hindi niresibohan;

x x x x x x x x x.

Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner of

his right to counsel even in waiving the same right[77] but petitioner did not even
inform him that his father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty
minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General
Assignment Section,[78] still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel.

It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights
as an accused. He was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student
in the police basic course.[79] Having been in the police force since 1978, with
stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics
used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects.[80] in other words, he was
knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture?

Petitioners claim that he was tortured into signing the confession appears
incredible, or at least susceptible to serious doubts. The allegation of torture was
negated by the medical report[81] showing no evidence of physical injuries upon
his person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no reason to
maltreat him in particular when the record shows that the investigating team
respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent. When he was
presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan,
petitioner even waived his right to present evidence[82] instead of impugning his
confession on account of the torture allegedly inflicted upon him. If indeed he had
been tortured, he would have revived the case he filed against his alleged
torturers upon learning of its dismissal.

Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different documents on

record bearing the same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his
penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial
confession and waiver of detention. Human experience has proven that the lines
and strokes of a persons handwriting reflect his disposition at a certain given
time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed to declare that
petitioners signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear
immediately after he had been subjected to maltreatment. In view of the
foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily
made, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioners consent in
executing the same had been vitiated.[83]

Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or

maltreatment is a factual question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings
of which are binding on this Court whose function, as afore-discussed, is
principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover, we have pored over the
assailed Decision and we are satisfied that respondent Court performed its duty
in evaluating the evidence. More on this later.

The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers
invited him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he
was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of the
crime.[84] Petitioners claim is belatedly made. He should have questioned the
validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the trial court. On this point, this
Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.:[85]

Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without
a warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against
him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and
presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality
of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an

accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant.
He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this
ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured
when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint for
grave coercion, grave threat & maltreatment which was docketed as I.S. No. 8212684 before the Fiscals Office of Quezon City.[86] The complaint was an
offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of the SOG upon his arrest.
However, as stated above, he did not lift a finger to revive it upon its dismissal.

The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence

Contrary to petitioners claim, his culpability has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the hijacking knowing fully well that his
owner-type jeep would give away his identity. He could not be identified by the
postal employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking said vehicle
and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up driving the Mercedes Benz where
the postal employees were made to ride, and commandeered the van. That the
checks were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and
upon learning that the authorities had begun to nail down the identities of the
malefactors, he had entrusted them to his kumare. It was petitioner himself who
led the team of Lt. Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt.
Arsenio Carlos that his share of the checks were in the possession of his kumare
in the neighborhood.[87]

In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct participant
in the commission of the crime. His alibi has been correctly considered by the
Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance between Kalvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown Manila where petitioner claimed to have
been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers,

which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated during that time in

approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not therefore have been physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity when the
crime was committed.[88]

Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioners confession, this Court

holds that the full force of the totality of the prosecutions evidence proves his guilt
well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense is the wellsettled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts -- in this case, the
Sandiganbayan itself -- particularly in the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable
error.

x x x It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in passing on the credibility of the witnesses, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misapprehended or
misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[89]

The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial courts conclusion on issues of
credibility is accorded with highest respect by the appellate courts (People vs.
Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170). Appellate courts will generally respect the findings
of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses since trial courts are in a better
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. They heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. x x x.[90]

So overwhelming is the prosecutions evidence that respondent Court opined that

even without the inter-locking confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag the
remaining evidence would still be sufficient for conviction.[91] Said the
respondent tribunal:

However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo,

Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the considered opinion that substantial and
sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator,
Mateo and Saguindel who had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this
Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was responsible for securing the use of the
Mercedes Benz car used by the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with
Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered voluminous assorted checks
which were part of the loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm was used by
him in the hi-jacking, which firearm was identified by prosecution witnesses
Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel was identified in line-ups at the SOG office as
the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an Armalite rifle by prosecution
witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three (3) accused, namely, Mateo, Relator
and Saguindel also jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence to
refute the evidence presented by the prosecution against them. Such flight to
evade prosecution constitutes an implied admission of guilt.

Moreover, accused Filoteos and Mateos unexplained possession of the stolen

checks raises the presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in
question. It is a rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when
stolen property is found in the possession of one, not the owner, without a
satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be presumed the thief. This
rule is in accordance with the disputable presumption that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
doer of the whole act. In the instant case, said accused has not given such
satisfactory explanation, much more so when their possession had been
positively established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Capt. Ferrer
and Sgt. Carlos and by accuseds own signatures at the back of said checks.

Furthermore, accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being
quite weak and implausible. His claim that he merely borrowed the Mercedes
Benz car from Rodolfo Miranda to help out his co-accused Mateo, who had been
utilized by the police as an informer and was following up tips in certain unsolved
cases, appears to be incredible and fantastic. He also claimed that he could not
have participated in the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the
morning of May 2, 1982, he waited at the corner of Zurbaran St. and Avenida
Rizal between 2-3:00 oclock p.m. of the same day and then went to the WPD
headquarters to attend the police formation at around 5:00 oclock p.m. when
Mateo failed to show up. Thereafter, he tried to show through his witnesses Gary
Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with them between 3:00 oclock to

4:45 oclock p.m., then from 6:00 oclock to 8:30 oclock p.m. and, finally, from
10:45 oclock p.m. to 11:00 oclock of the same date. It was through said
witnesses that he tried to establish his whereabouts between 4:30 oclock to 7:30
oclock p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period from the time the mail van was hi-jacked
up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and Tagudar were brought to
Caloocan City and freed by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show that it
was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the hi-jacking. We
take judicial notice that the distance between the crime scene and downtown
Manila is some 15-20 kilometers and negotiable over first-class roads in some
thirty (30) minutes.

We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as

convincing as the evidence of the participation of each of the accused. As
ratiocinated in the assailed Decision:[92]

The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel in the

criminal conspiracy have (sic) been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence on record and which evidence not only confirms the existence of the
conspiracy between them as easily discernible from their conduct before, during
and after the commission of the offense, but also their participation therein as coprincipals by direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation. Their
concerted efforts were performed with closeness and coordination indicating their
common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal responsibility, the act of
one is the act of all, and each of the participants are responsible for what the
others did in all the stages of execution of the offense.

Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?

The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and though not argued by
the parties in their pleadings, the question of which law was violated by the
accused should be discussed and passed upon. In fact, petitioner should have
brought up such question as it may benefit him with a reduced penalty.

The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under

Presidential Decree No. 532.[93]

Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates:

Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
Under said decree, with respect to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is
committed on a Philippine Highway which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been
defined as any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof, or
railway or railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or
locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation
of goods, articles or property or both, while under Section 2 (e) thereof Highway
Robbery/Brigandage has been defined as the the seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of property of
another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway. (Underscoring supplied)

The offense described in the information and established by the evidence

presented by the prosecution properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid
special law. Therein, it was conclusively proven that a postal van containing mail
matters, including checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national
highway in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force, violence and
intimidation against the three (3) postal employees who were occupants thereof,
resulting in the unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and its contents
consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the crime was
committed by the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private
individuals in conspiracy with their co-accused Castro and Escalada who were
postal employees and who participated in the planning of the crime. Accordingly,
all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated offense under the law in
point are present. (Underscoring in the original text.)

Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the taking or
robbery was perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur Highway), ergo,
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-

Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated. Such
reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the case of People vs.
Isabelo Puno,[94] where it was ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more
than the situs of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court
through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more
than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show,
in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent
means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are
shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery
is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the
purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band
of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a
band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band sala
a los campos para dedicarse a robar. (Italics ours.)

In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If

the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in
band if there are at least four armed participants. The martial law legislator, in
creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary.
This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction,
since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the
decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction
is the best and strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or

brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident
from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing
the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute x x x highway

robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries:

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular

person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, and which single act of depredation would be capable of
stunting the economic and social progress of the people as to be considered
among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people, such that said isolated act
would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished
is said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery

involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3)

persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely
organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate
commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence presented
that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of
depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another. What was duly proven in the
present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no
evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show
the indiscriminate commission thereof.[95]

Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D. 532.[96]
The facts alleged therein and proven by the evidence constitute the offense of
robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 294, par. 5,
all of the Revised Penal Code.[97] From the facts, it was duly proven that:

* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools, etc.)

* belonging to another were

* unlawfully taken by the accused

* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

* with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)

* in an uninhabited place, or

* by an band, or

* by attacking a moving motor vehicle

* on a highway; and

* the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)

Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which is, prision correctional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.

Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be lightened.

However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only herein petitioner and not his coaccused who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayans Decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y

Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery
as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the
costs of the action.

All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 71523-25. December 8, 2000]

ROLANDO SANTOS y RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 72420-22. December 8, 2000]

JESUS E. ESTACIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

[G.R. No. 72384-86. December 8, 2000]

ALFREDO R. FAJARDO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 72387-89. December 8, 2000]

MARCELO S. DESIDERIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:

Challenged in these four separate petitions for review on certiorari is the Decision
dated July 19, 1985[1] of the Sandiganbayan disposing of Criminal Case Nos.
5949 to 5951 as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused Alfredo Fajardo, Jr.

alias Boy Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y Silvestre, Jesus Estacio y Estrella and
Rolando Santos y Ramirez alias Mickey Mouse, GUILTY as co-principals in the
three (3) separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents and hereby sentences them as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 5949, there being no modifying circumstance in

attendance, each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and/or the Central Bank of the
Philippines in the amount of P1 million representing the amount defrauded, and
to pay their proportionate costs of said action;

2. In Criminal Case No. 5950, there being no modifying circumstance in

attendance, sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and/or the Central Bank of the
Philippines, in the amount of P3 million representing the amount defrauded, and
to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action;

3. In Criminal Case No. 5951, there being no modifying circumstance in

attendance, sentences each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands in the amount of P5 million
representing the amount defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the
costs of said action.

Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and Desiderio appear to have been
detained at the NBI as of February 16, 1982 by virtue of a Presidential
Commitment Order, although all of them were later bonded and released on
different dates, except Santos who has remained in custody up to the present.
Accordingly, they should be granted the benefits of such preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows: Santos
from February 16, 1982 up to the date of the promulgation of this decision;
Estacio up to April 29, 1985; Fajardo, Jr. up to April 26, 1982 and Desiderio up to

April 19, 1982.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Hon. Governor, Central Bank; the
Citibank; the Bank of the Philippine Islands and the Bankers Association of the
Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan three (3)
informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents against Felipe
Salamanca, Mariano Bustamante, Basilio Tan, Alfredo Fajardo, Jr., Jesus
Estacio, Rolando San Pedro, Manuel Valentino, Rolando Santos, Marcelo
Desiderio, Jaime Tan and Emilio Reyes.[2] The informations filed were similarly
worded except for the dates of commission of the crime charged, the number of
the checks involved, and the amounts allegedly misappropriated. Thus:

That on or about (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981
in Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), in the
City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Manuel
Valentino, employed as Bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing Office, Central Bank
of the Philippines and accused Jesus Estacio y Estrella, employed as JanitorMessenger of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and as such are public
employees, with abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official
position, in order to implement a plan or scheme to defraud the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch, which plan or scheme was previously
formulated and agreed upon by all the herein accused immediately prior to
(October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case
No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), accused Manuel
Valentino pursuant to said plan or scheme, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and taking advantage of his official position and with intent to
gain and to defraud, falsify the Clearing Statement prepared by the Central
Clearing office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and submitted to the Clearing
Section of the Central Bank of the Philippines as well as the Manifest prepared
by the Central Bank Clearing Office in connection thereto by crossing out the
entry in the duplicate copies of the aforesaid Clearing Statement and Manifest

which entries refer to Check No. (27101 in Crim. Case No. 5949, 27111 in Crim.
Case No. 5950, and 27108 in Crim. Case No. 5951) and Check No. (27105 in
Crim. Case No. 5949, 27118 in Crim. Case No. 5950 and 27121 in Crim. Case
No. 5951) issued by accused Bustamante against his checking account at the
Bank of Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch, which has only an outstanding
balance of P1,000.00 and which checks were deposited in the current account of
Magna Management Consultant with the Citibank Greenhills Branch by accused
Rolando San Pedro and as a result of the aforesaid falsification which made it
appear that no such checks were submitted by the Bank of Philippine Islands to
the Central Bank of the Philippines for clearing, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, Laoag City Branch has not issued any notice of dishonor or stop
payment to the Citibank Greenhills Branch, and as a consequence thereof
accused Rolando San Pedro was able to withdraw from the Citibank the full
amount of the two checks amounting to (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No.
5951) and thereafter all the accused appropriated among themselves the
proceeds thereof to their own personal use and benefit and to the damage and
prejudice of the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, Laoag City Branch in the aforementioned amount of (P1,000,000.00 in
Crim. Case No. 5949, P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and
P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951).

Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo, Desiderio, Estacio,

Valentino and Santos, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the crimes charged.[3] Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan, Reyes and
Bustamante have remained at-large while San Pedro died. Upon agreement of
the prosecution and the defense, a joint trial of the three cases was ordered
conducted.[4]

Estacio was first discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness.[5]

Later, he filed a motion for his re-inclusion in the information as an accused
allegedly for the sake of the safety of his family. The Sandiganbayan granted his
motion and thus he was re-included as an accused in Crim. Case Nos. 59495951.[6] The prosecution also moved for the discharge of Valentino as an
accused but the Sandiganbayan denied that motion. Exercising its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan eventually discharged Valentino from the three informations to
be a state witness.[7]

The antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petitions are as follows:

Sometime in 1981, a syndicate masterminded by Felipe Salamanca infiltrated the

Clearing Center of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity).
In its operation, the syndicate employed two schemes: the switching scheme,
and the pilferage scheme.

In the switching scheme, a syndicate would open a current account with such
banks as the Bank of America (BA) and the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) in
Iloilo. As a matter of procedure, checks drawn on the BA were forwarded to the
Central Bank for clearing. Upon receipt of those checks by the clearing clerk of
the Central Bank, who was a member of the syndicate, he would substitute those
checks with ones bearing the stamp of another bank. Thus, instead of forwarding
the checks to the BA, these were misrouted to cause delay in the clearing
procedure. Upon the lapse of the clearing period, the depositor would withdraw
the amount of the checks. However, the scheme faltered as the huge amounts
covered by the checks caused suspicion on the part of the PVB. It called up the
BA to inquire about those checks and hence, the former bank discovered that the
checks were insufficiently funded.

In the pilferage scheme, current accounts would be opened with a provincial

bank, such as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Laoag branch, and a city
bank such as the Citibank-Greenhills, Manila. A BPI check deposited with
Citibank would then be forwarded to the Central Bank clearing house where
members of the syndicate, who were employed there, would pilfer the check and
alter the Central Bank manifest and the entries in the clearing bank statements.
The pilferage was intended to provide opportunity for the syndicate to blot out
entries referring to the pilfered check. Consequently, BPI-Laoag would not know
that a check drawn on it had been deposited with Citibank. After the lapse of the
five-day clearing period, the syndicate would withdraw the amount deposited
from Citibank simply because said bank would have considered the check
cleared and funded, as no protest or notice of dishonor could be received from
BPI-Laoag. In utilizing this scheme in the commission of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951, the syndicate netted Nine Million Pesos
(P9,000,000.00).

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The prosecution offered the testimonies of sixteen (16) witnesses,[8] and

documentary evidence marked Exhibits A to DD, and Annexes B to QQ, with submarkings, to prove the following:

On October 14, 1981, one Mariano Bustamante[9] opened a savings account

with BPI-Laoag with an initial deposit of P3,000.00: P2,000.00 of which was in
check, and P1,000.00 in cash.[10] That same day, he opened a current account
with P1,000.00 as initial deposit in the same bank. Upon his request, a
checkbook was issued to him.[11]

That same month, Marcelo Desiderio, allegedly a representative of Magna

Management Consultant, approached Maria Nieves Garrido, personal banker of
Citibank-Greenhills, and requested signature cards and other requirements for
the purpose of opening a current account. Thereafter, Desiderio returned to the
bank, submitted the required documents and duly accomplished forms, and
made an initial deposit of P10,000.00. Thus, a checking account in the name of
Magna Management Consultant was opened in Citibank-Greenhills with Rolando
San Pedro as its representative. A checkbook was given to Desiderio.[12]

On October 15, 1981, at the Ramada Hotel, Felipe Salamanca informed Manuel
Valentino that two (2) checks were to be deposited with Citibank the following
day. Salamanca instructed Valentino to watch out for those checks in the clearing
house at the Central Bank. On October 16, 1981, two (2) checks in the amounts
of Four Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Nineteen Pesos
(P498,719.00), and Five Hundred One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Pesos and
Thirty Centavos (P501,260.30) were indeed deposited with the CitibankGreenhills under the current account of Magna Management Consultant,
represented by Rolando San Pedro. On October 30, 1981, two (2) more checks
were deposited at the same bank in the total amount of P3,000,000.00. Another
deposit of checks was made on November 20, 1981 in the total amount of
P5,000,000.00. All these checks were brought to the Central Bank Clearing
Center.

The checks deposited on October 16, 1981 did not reach the Central Bank on
that day, which was a Friday, but on Monday, October 19, 1981. Manuel
Valentino, a bookkeeper at the Clearing Operations Division of the Central Bank,
received from Jesus Estacio, a Central Bank janitor-messenger, the demand
envelope containing the two (2) BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount of
P1,000,000.00 in the comfort room on the fourth floor of the Central Bank
administration building. Therein Valentino altered the amount of P1,076,416.95
by crossing out the amount of One Million Pesos. Thus, under the column Total
amount received, only the amount of P76,416.95 was reflected in order that BPILaoag would not look for the P1 million check.[13] Valentino then brought the
altered clearing statement back to the Clearing Center and prepared a Central
Bank Manifest where he changed the figure in the original copy to tally with those
in the altered clearing statement.

On October 30, 1981, the syndicate employed the same scheme. As soon as the
demand envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks arrived, Valentino took it and
gave it to Jesus Estacio who then brought the same to the comfort room at the
fourth floor. Valentino followed him there and took the two BPI checks amounting
to P3,000,000.00, and altered the figures in the BPI Clearing Statement.
Valentino thereafter brought said envelopes to the clearing house, and prepared
the Central Bank Manifest, likewise altering the figures in the original to tally with
the figures in the altered clearing statement.

At the last operation on November 20, 1981, the group followed the same
procedure Valentino asked Estacio to give him the demand envelope and the
former then went to the comfort room. Valentino took the two BPI-Laoag checks
in the total amount of P5,000,000.00 which he later gave to Salamanca. Again,
he altered the figures in the clearing statement and those in the Central Bank
Manifest so that these would conform with each other.[14]

As a matter of procedure, the demand envelopes containing the checks intended

for BPI-Laoag, the altered Central Bank Manifests, and the clearing statements
were forwarded to the Regional Clearing Center. The pilfered checks deposited
in the account of Magna Management Consultant were not included in those
envelopes. Because BPI-Laoag did not receive the checks with a total value of

P9,000,000.00, these were not processed. Consequently, as no objection or

protest regarding the checks were registered and no notice of dishonor of the
checks for insufficient funds was made by the BPI-Laoag, and since the
reglementary period for making such protest or notice of dishonor had elapsed,
Citibank-Greenhills considered the checks as good and funded.

Hence, on different dates covering the period from October 26 to December 6,

1981, Citibank-Greenhills allowed withdrawals in the aggregate amount of
P9,000,000.00 from the account of Magna Management Consultant. Withdrawals
were made through checks endorsed by Rolando San Pedro and encashed by
Jaime R. Tan.[15] The proceeds of the anomalous transactions were divided
among the members of the syndicate. Salamanca gave Estacio P10,000.00 after
the October 19, 1981 operation, P4,900.00 after the October 30, 1981 operation
and P5,000.00 after the November 20, 1981 operation. Valentino received
P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 after the October 16 and 30, and
November 20, 1981 operations.

On January 28, 1982, Segundo Gonzaga, then Administrative Assistant for

Transit Center (Clearing Center of BPI), was informed through a long distance
telephone call by the manager of BPI-Laoag that their clearing transactions on
October 19, 1981, October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981 registered an
outstanding discrepancy of P9,000,000.00 as reflected in their inter-office
reconciliation statement. The manager of BPI-Laoag and the BPI Regional
Manager for Northern Luzon who went to the office at BPI-Ayala showed the
clearing statements to Gonzaga. Upon comparing the xerox copies of the BPI
Clearing Statements (Laoag copies) and xerox copies of the clearing envelope
sent to Citibank Manila, Gonzaga noticed the alterations. Thus, he went to the
Accounting Department of BPI-Ayala and found out that the Central Bank debited
their bank in the amount of P9,000,000.00.[16]

Gonzaga went to Citibank-Greenhills and talked to Jake Ocampo, its assistant

manager, about the clearing items. After checking their outgoing clearing checks
for October 19, 1981, October 30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, Ocampo told
Gonzaga that they did not recall said clearing checks. He gave Gonzaga
reproduced microfilm copies of those checks. Gonzaga submitted the checks to
his superiors with an accompanying report.[17] The BPI and the Central Bank
jointly referred the matter for investigation to the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) which assigned the case to Head Agent Salvador Ranin of the Special
Investigation Division.[18]

On February 12, 1982, the Chief of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of the Central Bank,
Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the banks Chief Security Officer, and the BPI VicePresident and Comptroller brought Manuel Valentino to the NBI. The following
day, Agent Ranin took Valentinos statement. Valentino waived his rights to
remain silent and to counsel. He signed the waiver on the first page of his
statement. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took Valentinos supplementary
sworn statement. The same NBI agent took Jesus Estacios statement on
February 17, 1982 and supplementary statement on March 22, 1982. Like
Valentino, Estacio waived his right to counsel. In their respective statements,
Valentino and Estacio admitted their participation in the commission of the crime,
narrated how they carried out the plan to defraud the banks, and identified those
who participated in the criminal acts. After the investigation, Agent Ranin came
out with a Memorandum Report dated April 26, 1982.[19]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

On December 2, 1969, the Central Bank of the Philippines employed Jesus

Estacio as janitor-messenger. In 1978, a certain Rico Javier introduced Estacio to
Felipe Salamanca. When Salamanca learned that Estacio was connected with
the Central Bank, he asked Estacio if he knew any bookkeeper thereat as his
compadre needed one. Estacio replied that he would look for one. A week later,
Salamanca called up Estacio and asked him if he had found a bookkeeper.
Estacio mentioned Manuel Valentino. Salamanca instructed Estacio to bring
Valentino to Jacks Restaurant in Quezon City after office hours. In that
restaurant, Estacio introduced Valentino to Salamanca. Valentino was in turn
introduced to Basilio Tan. During their conversation, Valentino told Salamanca
about his work as a bookkeeper at the Central Bank.[20]

Sometime in October 1981, Valentino requested Estacio to accompany him to

the EDCOR office. There they met Salamanca, Marcelo Desiderio, Rolando
Santos and Basilio Tan. Salamanca told Estacio to stay outside the office
because the group was going to discuss something. Half an hour later, the group

dispersed. That same month, Estacio saw Romeo Villasanta, another accused, at
the clearing office of the Central Bank. When Estacio asked why Villasanta was
there, the latter answered that he was just expediting something. Estacio saw
Villasanta for the second time that same month talking with Valentino at the
clearing office. Valentino asked Estacio to point out the office of the Department
of Economic Research to Villasanta because Villasanta would be doing some
research. Estacio went with Villasanta to the fourth floor and showed him the said
office. Villasanta then inquired where the comfort room in that floor was. Estacio
thereafter went back to his work and did not see Villasanta anymore.[21]1

On November 20, 1981, Valentino asked Estacio to bring an envelope to the

fourth floor and to wait for him at its lobby. Estacio acceded and later, Valentino
arrived. Valentino took the envelope from Estacio and went to the comfort room.
Thereafter, Estacio went to the Clearing Office.[22]

Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from the NBI was
looking for him, Estacio went to the NBI. There he told Agent Ranin that he
wanted to call a lawyer but Agent Ranin did not allow him to do so. Agent Ranin
investigated him from 5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on February 17, 1982. This
continued the following day and lasted a week. In the course of the investigation,
Agent Ranin promised Estacio that he would not be harmed should he cooperate
and admit the charges against him, and that he would be freed once he becomes
a state witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a newspaper and poked his
gun at him. Estacio was allowed to read the statement before he signed it.[23]

On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at the NBI for about
two months, his wife and children would visit him every week and he could talk to
them freely.[24] He was transferred to Muntinlupa and detained at the Death Row
for two years. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took his second statement that
was a continuation of his first statement. He was unable to read his
supplementary statement because of fear of Agent Ranin, who was scaring him.
He stressed that the statements he made before the NBI were not true and that
he only signed those documents[25] because he was afraid of Agent Ranin.[26]

Rolando Santos came to know Felipe Salamanca when he sold his car to him

(Salamanca) on installment with P15,000.00 as down payment with the balance

of P20,000.00 to be paid in two or three months. He accepted partial payment for
the car. After a time, Salamanca fully paid the balance. In July 1981, Salamanca
gave him P3,000.00. Twice or thrice, Salamanca tried to convince him to join a
scheme to defraud a bank. After Salamanca had paid him the full price of the car,
Salamanca asked him again to join his group. All he had to do was to open a
checking account. He could have easily facilitated this, being the Vice-President
for Finance of American Steamship Agencies. In those meetings with Salamanca
where he was persuaded to open a checking account with a bank, Basilio Tan,
the son of a general and his classmate at San Beda College, Valentino, and
Desiderio were present. When he told Salamanca that he was not interested in
the scheme to defraud a bank, as he was busy with his job, Salamanca got mad.
On October 20, 1981, an unidentified assailant shot him in his house. He
sustained three (3) gunshot wounds and was confined at the Paraaque Medical
Center.[27]

Marcelo Desiderio came to know Felipe Salamanca sometime in July 1981 when
Salamanca went to his office[28] because he wanted to open an account with
Citibank-Greenhills. Desiderio went to Citibank-New York to inquire about the
requirements for opening an account. Two days later, he gave Salamanca the
bank forms and signature cards to be accomplished. He learned from Salamanca
that the forms would be filled up by Rolando San Pedro. For the initial deposit,
Salamanca gave him P10,000.00 in cash and check. He also received P2,500.00
as consultancy fee. He went to Citibank-Greenhills to make the deposit and the
bank issued him a checkbook.[29]

Desiderio denied that he was present in any meeting where Salamanca and his
group discussed a plan to defraud a bank. He acceded in opening the bank
account at Citibank-Greenhills because Salamanca assured him that the account
would be opened in connection with a loan application with the Citibank of New
York. He denied that Salamancas group tasked him and Rolando Santos with
opening accounts in Metro Manila banks, particularly with Citibank-Greenhills. He
denied knowing Santos and Estacio personally although he admitted that
Estacio, with Manuel Valentino, came to his office to deliver a tailored suit for a
certain Atty. Martin. He further denied knowing Jaime Tan but admitted knowing
Alfredo Fajardo, who was his client when he was still connected with BPI.[30]

Alfredo Fajardo opted to waive his right to testify and said that he has no
documentary evidence to present before the Sandiganbayan.[31] Another
accused, Emilio Reyes, voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and was
detained at the Security and Sheriff Services office.[32] He filed a motion for
reinvestigation on June 16, 1987 but it was resolved against him.[33] He pleaded
not guilty to the charges against him.[34] However, since July 17, 1989, Reyes
failed to appear for trial. On February 16, 1990, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him
in these cases on account of the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[35] Because the cases against Reyes were tried in absentia,
the Sandiganbayan ordered that these be archived without prejudice to revival for
purposes of contempt citation in the event that he shall have been apprehended
and brought within the jurisdiction of the court.[36]

Rolando San Pedro was arrested on March 22, 1988 at the vicinity of the
Sandiganbayan.[37] He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges against him.
[38] On June 11, 1989, he died.[39] Thus, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the
cases against him. In the Resolution of February 23, 1990, which was
promulgated on March 12, 1990, the Sandiganbayan resolved that the cases
against Felipe Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan and Mariano Bustamante be
archived.[40]

As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio, Desiderio, Santos, and

Fajardo of the complex crimes of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Estacio, Desiderio and Fajardo filed separate motions for reconsideration,[41]
while Santos filed with the Supreme Court a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for certiorari.[42] On September 26, 1985, the Sandiganbayan denied
those motions for reconsideration.[43] Hence, the instant petitions for review on
certiorari that they individually filed with this Court, but which were consolidated
in the Resolution of December 10, 1985.[44]

In its consolidated comment on the petitions, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) questions the propriety of raising factual issues in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.[45] The OSG
asserts that in such a petition, this Courts jurisdiction is confined to questions of
law and hence, this Court is not supposed to reweigh evidence but only to
determine its substantiality. On this matter, in Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,[46]
this Court, after citing Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] said:

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly
provides that `(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure
questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order
to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave
misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by
convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough
treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a persons life and liberty are at
stake.

While only petitioner Estacio is a government employee in these cases, as the

three others are private individuals, it is in the light of this pronouncement that the
instant petitions shall be considered and resolved. Moreover, in the recent case
of Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,[48] the Court, citing Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9,
1990, held that a petition for review on certiorari questioning the final judgment,
order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Courts or other courts, may raise factual issues. In the exercise of its sound
discretion, taking into account the attendant circumstances, this Court retains the
option of either taking cognizance of, and deciding such issues, or referring the
case to the proper court for determination. In these criminal cases, this Court
chooses to take cognizance of factual questions raised in the interest of proper
administration of justice.

In their separate petitions, petitioners assert that there was no proof beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crimes charged principally because:

(a) the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are

inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel was violated when said
confessions were executed;

(b) the discharge of Valentino from the informations to be a state witness was
improper; and

(c) conspiracy, which made all petitioners equally guilty, was not adequately
proven.

Notably, petitioners Santos and Estacio aver that, should they be convicted as
charged, they should be held individually liable only as an accomplice.[49]

Relevant to petitioners contention on the admissibility of the extrajudicial

confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino is Article IV, Section 20 of the
1973 Constitution providing for the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation. It reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution states:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the 1973 Constitution
does not specify the right against uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel,

which is found in paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the latter constitutional provision cannot be applied to extrajudicial
confessions made prior to its date of effectivity. In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
this Court held that:

x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an

accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with
the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the
extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without
the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by
such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that
extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and
effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive
ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales,
Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that `(t)he right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:

`x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not to

be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on
26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs.
Galit. x x x.

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12 (1) of the
1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of
promulgation of Morales.[50]

Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these cases as the
extrajudicial confessions in question here, were taken on February 13, February
17 and March 22, 1982, long before the date of promulgation of the Morales

Decision on April 26, 1983. Prior to this date, the guidelines requiring that waiver
of the right to counsel by an accused can be properly made only with the
presence and assistance of counsel, had yet to be formulated and pronounced
by this Court.[51]

The rule on prospective application of judge-made laws was stressed in Co vs.

Court of Appeals.[52] In that case, the Court, through then Chief Justice Andres
R. Narvasa, ruled that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing
that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code
stating that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall
apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidences of what the law means.

As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino and petitioner

Estacio of their right to counsel during custodial investigation, the intelligent and
voluntary execution thereof should be determined. The pre-interrogation
advisories to the extrajudicial confessants uniformly state:

01. QUESTION: Mr. MANUEL VALENTINO, we are informing you that you are
under investigation in connection with the alleged Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial/Official Documents committed at the Central Bank of the Philippines.
But before we ask you any question, you must understand your legal rights. You
have the right to remain silent. You have the right not to give any statement if you
do not wish to. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in any
proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of counsel of your own choice. If
you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you
before we ask you any question. Now, after having been so informed, are you still
willing to give a free and voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth and
nothing but the truth in this investigation?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

02. Q: Are you willing to sign a Waiver of your rights?

A: Yes, sir.

WAIVER

I have been advised of my right to remain silent; that anything that I say may be
used as evidence against me and that I have the right to a lawyer to be present
with me while I am being questioned.

I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement and answer

questions. I do not want the assistance of counsel and I understand and know
whag (sic) I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no
force or pressure of any kind has been used against me.

(Sgd. with thumbmark)

MANUEL VALENTINO y SOCAN
13 February 1982, NBI, Manila[53]
It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with
the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is
presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his
confession is involuntary and untrue.[54] The defense attempted to prove that
Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to threats and intimidation at the
NBI to obtain their confessions. Other than their bare assertions, Valentino and
petitioner Estacio miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove
the NBIs use of force or intimidation on their persons. Before signing their
statements, they never protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of
maltreatment that they could have relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI. In
People vs. Pia,[55] the Court said:

x x x It has been held that where the defendants did not present evidence of

compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain

to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness of confessions.

That the statements were intelligently executed is borne out by the fact that both
confessants have reached the tertiary level of education: Valentino holds the
degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce[56] while petitioner Estacio reached
the first year of college education in banking and finance.[57] Possessed with
sufficient education and not proven to be mentally unfit, they could have
protested the forced extraction of culpability from themselves if indeed that was
true.

Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions in question are replete with details on the
manner in which the crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability
that these were involuntarily made.[58] Voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its language such that, if upon its face the confession exhibits no
sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being
replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may
be considered voluntary.[59] In U.S. vs. De los Santos,[60] the Court said:

If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a full
comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as
evidence, and it then becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by
the presumption a very strong one that no person of normal mind will deliberately
and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be
a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the members of the
syndicate and the sophisticated manner by which the crimes in question were

perpetrated if Valentino and Estacio, who were directly involved therein, did not
reveal these.

With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of Valentino and

petitioner Estacio against their co-accused, once again, this Court declares that
although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant,
jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that
tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.[61] In People vs. Alvarez,[62] this
Court ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show
the probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable
as evidence against a co-accused. The Court elucidated further in People vs.
Encipido[63] as follows:

It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were

independently made without collusion, are identical with each other in their
material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein
to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the
crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it
being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other
than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime
charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking
confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial
confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants
thereof.

Petitioner Estacio claimed that, to his surprise, he found Valentino at the NBI.
They talked for a while and Valentino told him to say whatever he (Valentino)
would say.[64] That allegation alone cannot be considered as indicative of
collusion between them as their sworn statements both contain facts showing
their deep involvement in the scheme to defraud a bank. Human experience
dictates that no one would volunteer to demonstrate ones culpability unless it
was the truth. It may thus be safely presumed that in telling petitioner Estacio to
say whatever he would say, Valentino was merely cautioning petitioner Estacio to
tell the truth. Nevertheless, even without the extrajudicial confessions of
petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a
finding of culpability.[65]

On the validity of the discharge of Valentino from the information to be a state

witness, the determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster
the successful prosecution of criminal offenses is part of prosecutorial discretion.
[66] However, it is the courts that finally determine whether the requirements of
the Rules of Court[67] have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused
to become a state witness.

It should be recalled that petitioner Estacio was originally discharged to be a

state witness. Upon his manifestation that he would rather remain an accused in
these cases for the protection of his family, the court re-included him in the
information. Apparently considering the nature of the crimes and the secrecy by
which these were perpetrated, the prosecution was left with no recourse but to
side with Valentinos motion for his discharge to be a state witness. The absolute
necessity for the testimony of someone who was a participant in the criminal
scheme is buttressed by the ruling that where a crime is contrived in secret then
the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so he can testify against the
other conspirators.[68] In a conspiracy which was done in secret, there is a
necessity to discharge one of the accused to provide direct evidence of the
commission of the crime.[69]

Worth noting, however, is that Valentinos testimony and his sworn statements
differ with regard to petitioner Estacios participation in the commission of the
October 19, 1981 criminal act, and the participation of petitioner Fajardo in the
three crimes. Valentino stated in his sworn statement that on October 19, 1981,
when he noticed that the BPI representative had placed the demand envelope
containing the BPI-Laoag checks for clearing at the Laoag counter behind him,
petitioner Estacio, who was the syndicates messenger, immediately came with a
push cart. Petitioner Estacio placed the demand envelope in the pushcart and
proceeded to the comfort room in the fourth floor where Valentino followed him to
alter the documents to suit the syndicates purposes. On the other hand, when he
testified, Valentino asserted that he did not see petitioner Estacio at the meeting
when they hatched the first operation on October 16, 1981. When the alterations
were made on October 19, 1981, Valentino claimed that petitioner Estacio was
not with them[70] for it was he himself who brought the bundle of checks to the
fourth floor comfort room where Villasanta took the checks and altered the bank
statements.

With respect to petitioner Fajardo, Valentino averred in his supplementary sworn

statement that petitioner Fajardo was present in three or four conferences where
he participated in the discussion to defraud a bank.[71] However, on the witness
stand, Valentino swore that petitioner Fajardo had no participation in these
cases[72] or in the three operations subjects of these cases.

These discrepancies in Valentinos sworn statements and testimony are material

ones as far as petitioners Estacio and Fajardo are concerned. On this issue, the
Court has consistently held that:

x x x discrepancies between the statement of the affiant in his affidavit and those
made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex-parte
affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinate in
importance to open court declarations because they are oftentimes not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired in his affidavit and those made by him. This is so because affidavits
are frequently prepared by the administering officer and cast in the latters
language or the latters understanding of what the affiant had said, while the
affiant frequently simply signs the affidavit after the same has been read to him.
[73]

In People vs. Fabro, the Court ruled that repudiation and recantation of
confessions which have been obtained in accordance with the Constitution are
looked upon with disfavor as unreliable.[74] However, that ruling may not find
application under the circumstances of these cases. In Fabro, it was the accused
himself who recanted his confession when, on the witness stand, he denied he
committed the crime. No other witness testified for the defense. On the other
hand, in these cases, Valentino, a co-conspirator who appeared as a state
witness before the court, adhered to his confession as regards the participation
of the accused, except that he testified that petitioner Estacio was absent when
the first crime was planned and committed, and that petitioner Fajardo was not
involved in the three cases. It has been held that where a witness who testified
for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the defense by retracting his
previous testimony, the test to decide which testimony to believe is a comparison
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence.[75] Although these

cases do not involve the conflicting testimonies of a witness, that rule may be
applied in a conflict between a sworn statement and the testimony while
recognizing the inferiority of a sworn statement to a testimony. In these cases,
the narration of facts in Valentinos sworn statements were in substance
reproduced in his testimony which, in turn, was supported by other testimonial
evidence and the voluminous documentary evidence.

In the absence of any reason to question the credibility of Valentino and that of
his testimony, that portion of his testimony on the nonparticipation of petitioner
Estacio in Crim. Case No. 5949 and petitioner Fajardo in all three cases shall be
controlling. We deem the variance in Valentinos testimony as endeavors to rectify
his sworn statements to conform to the truth. To reiterate, such variance, does
not make him a less credible witness or affect the merit of his testimony, as the
other pieces of prosecution evidence support it and do not prove that it is
untruthful or contrived.

The value of Valentinos testimony in the prosecution of these cases cannot be

underestimated. It fills in the gaps in the prosecution evidence that the other
prosecution witnesses failed to cover. Without it, conspiracy to defraud the BPILaoag of P9,000,000.00 through falsification of the clearing statement and
manifest would not have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[76] As creditably
shown by the prosecution, the crimes were committed not solely by the person
who altered the clearing statement and manifest. That all-important act, the
conception of which could have been hatched only by one familiar with banking
procedures, would not have been possible if not for the indispensable
cooperation of others. Thus, Valentino testified:

Q Will you please describe in detail what was agreed upon during the meeting?

A It was agreed upon that Salamanca and Villasanta will open an account at
Laoag Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Desiderio also and

Santos are also in charge in opening accounts in Metro Manila, particularly

Citibank, Greenhills. Basilio Tan, he is stationary in the office. Jaime Tan and
Rolando San Pedro are the ones in charge in withdrawals at the Citibank.[77]

However, the liability of each of the petitioners must be considered within the
purview of the following pronouncement in the celebrated case of People vs.
Berroya[78] where the Court said that:

x x x to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must

be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the conspiracy. Hence, the mere presence of an accused
at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any active
participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction. Thus,
assuming Vienes was a participant in the planning to abduct a Taiwanese
national, in the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual abduction, there is a
paucity of evidence as to whether or not Vienes carried out his part of the plan.
(emphasis supplied)

In these cases, even if Valentinos supplementary sworn statement stating that

petitioner Fajardo participated in the discussion of the scheme to milk money
from a bank should be given evidentiary weight, still, that evidence is not enough
to convict him. There is no evidence showing that he participated in opening a
bank account in the procedure to alter the clearing manifests and statements, or
in the withdrawal of substantial amounts resulting from such alteration of
documents. There is thus insufficient evidence against petitioner Fajardo to find
him culpable for the crimes charged in these cases and hence, he should be
acquitted.

Similarly situated as petitioner Fajardo, is petitioner Santos. His admission to

having attended several meetings of Salamancas group did not satisfactorily
define his liability as a conspirator considering the absence of any proof that he

committed an overt act in pursuance of the syndicates scheme. His pretext of

having entered into a car sale with Salamanca may ring hollow in truth but the
weakness of his defense cannot be taken against him considering the
insufficiency of prosecution evidence on his participation in the actual
commission of the crime. His acquittal is, therefore, likewise in order.

With respect to petitioner Estacio, Valentinos testimony on the first syndicate

operation on October 16, 1981 should be counted in his favor. There is
insufficient evidence that he participated in the alteration of documents at the
Central Bank Clearing Office on October 19, 1981 much more in the prior
discussion to perpetrate the crime. Hence, his acquittal in Criminal Case No.
5949 should follow. However, as regards the syndicate operations on October 30,
1981 and November 20, 1981, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of his role
in carrying the demand envelopes to the Central Banks fourth floor comfort room
where alterations were made. By the nature of his work, he had access to these
demand envelopes containing BPI checks. His participation in the conspiracy
was therefore vital to the realization of the syndicates objectives.

Parenthetically, the Court notes with dismay the Sandiganbayans

pronouncement that petitioner Estacios wishy-washy attitude in offering himself
as a state witness confirmed his knowledge of the intimate details of the
conspiracy and the mode or manner by which its operations and schemes would
be initiated and consummated.[79] Such conclusion is in consonance with the
presumption of guilt, not with that of innocence. An accused may have some
reasons for his irresolute action as far as testifying for the prosecution is
concerned. Petitioner Estacio had such reason he feared for the safety of his
family considering that he would be up against a syndicate that, because of the
success of its evil scheme, had the money to harm their perceived enemies. That
petitioner Estacio was deeply enmeshed in the syndicates activities to bleed
money from banks is shown by the fact that in Crim. Case No. 6603 involving the
syndicates operation in the Solidbank, his conviction for the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public/commercial documents was affirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 75362.[80] But such conviction for another crime must not be the basis for a
conclusion that the accused is guilty of another crime charged, although
basically, the same criminal acts were committed. We therefore find the
Sandiganbayans pronouncement totally unexpected of a court that must
determine the culpability of an accused based on the prosecution evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense or the reputation of an accused.

Petitioner Desiderio, on the other hand, has been proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for having participated both in the discussion and mapping out
of the malevolent scheme and in its actual execution. Desiderios knowledge of
banking procedures provided the rationale for his giving birth, or having authored
the scheme along with Salamanca and Villasanta.[81] He had served as branch
manager in the BPI where he was employed for twenty-seven years, or until he
was charged with estafa for accommodating a clients loan against an uncollected
deposit.[82] Nieves Garrido, a personal banker at Citibank-Greenhills, who
entertained him when he made queries about opening a current account,
confirmed his having opened said account for Magna Management Consultant,
thereby lending credence to and corroborating Valentinos testimony on his role in
the implementation of the criminal scheme.

Petitioner Desiderios claim that he opened that account in accordance with his
legitimate role as consultant in Mardes Management Consultant is a lame
excuse. Anyone, especially a businessman such as San Pedro or Salamanca,
could have opened a current account without hiring the services of a
management consultant. That lame excuse sounds even lamer considering the
evidence showing that his alleged client was also engaged in management
consultancy. Desiderio thus relied on denial as a mode of defense. A denial, like
other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence
which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution
convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial
is negligible.[83] Desiderios denial of complicity in the scheme cannot, therefore,
prevail over the positive testimonies of Nieves Garrido and Valentino that he
played the important role of opening the current account that paved the way to
the inside jobs of petitioner Estacio, Valentino and, probably, Villasanta. His sole
overt act under the syndicates scheme facilitated the commission of all three
counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents.

Notably, in these cases, the Sandiganbayan observed that none of the accused
refuted the documentary exhibits offered in evidence by the prosecution.[84] The
pieces of documentary evidence consist of bank records including deposit slips,
ledger cards, specimen cards, checks for deposit and withdrawal, clearing
statements and clearing manifests. All of these clearly and positively buttress the
prosecutions theory as to how the pilferage scheme was successfully

implemented. The defense obviously could not demolish the evidentiary weight of
the prosecutions documentary evidence and hence, it focused on the prosecution
evidence on the membership of the accused in the syndicate, and on the
probative value of the interlocking confessions of Valentino and petitioner
Estacio. There is thus no alternative to giving full credence and merit to the
prosecutions documentary evidence, and to declaring them to be in complete
accord with the prosecution theory on the commission of the offenses and the
nature and extent of participation of the accused.

The informations filed in these cases individually charge an offense defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 2 (a) in relation to Article 171, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (2) the
offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.[85] It is indubitable that estafa was committed by abuse of confidence
in these cases. The conspirators that enlisted and utilized the assistance of
Central Bank employees abused the confidence that the banking system reposed
upon such employees. As a result of such abuse of confidence, the BPI
sustained damage in the aggregate of Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00). Verily,
the perpetrators of the crimes breached even the confidence that people reposed
on the Central Bank and the whole banking system.

By falsifying clearing documents, the offenders committed the complex crime of

estafa thru falsification of public documents. Under Article 171 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, any public officer or employee who, taking advantage of his official
position, makes untruthful statements in a narration of facts, commits the crime of
falsification of public documents. This kind of falsification requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false.[86]

The prosecution has duly proven these requisites. Valentino occupies a public
position as bookkeeper at the Clearing Office of the Central Bank. He intercepted
and pilfered BPI-Laoag checks with the assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitormessenger at the Central Bank. In the comfort room, Valentino and/or Villasanta,
who has so far avoided the clutches of the law, tampered with the clearing

statements and clearing manifests which Estacio had taken from Valentinos
desk. The tampered documents, along with the pilfered demand envelopes, were
then sent to the Central Bank Regional Clearing Center in Laoag. These inside
jobs were perpetrated as part of the decadent scheme that private individuals
had hatched to gain monetary gratification.

Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) under which the defendants were charged in these
cases, states that any person who shall defraud another by means of using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits shall be held liable for the crime of swindling (estafa). Under the
peculiar circumstances proven in these cases, the crime actually committed by
the offenders is that defined in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code on other
deceits. The first paragraph of this article states that (t)he penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not
more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter. Although the information charged the accused with
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code defining the
crime of falsification by public officer of employee, the Sandiganbayan correctly
found that the accused violated paragraph 4 of the same Article which states as
follows:

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

Inasmuch as the crime committed in these cases is the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of public documents and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code

states that when an offense is a necessary means for committing another

offense, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period, the penalty for the crimes committed in these cases is that imposed for
falsification of public documents or prision mayor in its maximum period and a
fine of P5,000.00.

While it appears that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the basis for
imposition of penalty should be that imposed by law for falsification of public
documents, it erred in imposing the maximum penalty of the indeterminate
sentence it meted upon the accused. Finding no modifying circumstances, the
Sandiganbayan imposed for each complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public document, the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.

Under the procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for complex crimes
enunciated in Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan,[87] the first step in determining the
proper penalty is to consider whether or not aggravating and/or mitigating
circumstances attended the commission of the crimes.

Only petitioner Estacio claimed that he voluntarily surrendered. For said

mitigating circumstance to be appreciated, surrender must be made
spontaneously or in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt, or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of finding and
capturing him.[88] According to NBI Agent Ranin, petitioner Estacio went to the
NBI bearing a referral note from Atty. Agapito Fajardo, Chief of Anti-Fraud Unit of
the Central Bank.[89] However, it was proven by the prosecution beyond
peradventure of doubt that petitioner Estacios alleged surrender was anything
but spontaneous. He went to the NBI on February 17, 1982,[90] five days after
Atty. Fajardo had brought Valentino to that office for questioning, and a day after
a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) had been issued against him and
Valentino.[91] Moreover, the booking sheet and arrest report states that petitioner
Estacio was arrested on February 16, 1982.[92] Voluntary surrender having been
insufficiently proven, as far as penalty is concerned, petitioner Estacio in Crim.
Cases Nos. 5950-51 shall suffer the same penalty as petitioner Desiderio who
did not present proof that could mitigate the penalty that he should suffer for the

crimes.

Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the penalty prescribed by
law is a single divisible penalty, the accused shall be imposed the medium period
of such penalty when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances.
The propriety of imposing the medium period of the more serious penalty for a
complex crime after considering the modifying circumstances notwithstanding
that Article 48 requires the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period has
been settled.[93] It is supported by the doctrine that penal provisions shall be
interpreted in favor of the accused.

The medium period of prision mayor is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. In the absence of impediments to the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, for each crime committed, the penalty that should be imposed
upon petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case Nos. 5950 and 5951, and upon petitioner
Desiderio in Crim. Case Nos. 5949, 5950 and 5951, shall be the indeterminate
sentence comprising of the minimum penalty within the range of prision
correccional, to the maximum penalty of prision mayor medium plus a fine of
P5,000.00. It will be observed that the maximum penalty erroneously imposed by
the Sandiganbayan is ten (10) years and one (1) day which is already within the
period of prision mayor maximum.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Rolando Santos y

Ramirez in G.R. Nos. 71523-25, petitioner Alfredo R. Fajardo, Jr. in G.R. No.
72384-86 and petitioner Jesus E. Estacio in G.R. No. 72420-22 with respect to
Criminal Case No. 5949 are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged for lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan as far as
petitioner Marcelo S. Desiderio in G. R. No. 72387-89 and petitioner Jesus E.
Estacio, with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 5950 and 5951 are concerned, is
herby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that, for each crime, they shall
suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1)
day of prision correccional maximum to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium.

SO ORDERED.

R. No. 140740. April 12, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO BALOLOY,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the

evening of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn
Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery
was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who
claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby
creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in
this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for
having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his
conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.

The information[1] charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with homicide reads
as follows:

That on August 3, 1996 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, at Barangay

Inasagan, Municipality of Aurora, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Genelyn Camacho, a
minor against the latters will and on said occasion and by reason of the rape, the
said Genelyn Camacho died as a result of personal violence, inflicted upon her
by the accused.

Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.

7659.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156.

Upon arraignment[2] on 10 December 1996, JUANITO entered a plea of not

guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia,

Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996,
he asked GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog
whose house was about 200 meters away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never
returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo, who informed him that
GENELYN had already left with one ganta of rice. Jose then started to look for
GENELYN. Speculating that GENELYN might have taken shelter at the house of
their neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios
house. Unfortunately, Jose did not find GENELYN there. Not losing hope, Jose
proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio. On his way, he met Wilfredo, who
accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. GENELYN was not there either. They
continued their search for GENELYN, but when it proved to be in vain, the two
decided to go home.[3]

A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and JUANITO arrived.
JUANITO informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose foot
was showing. When asked whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was
GENELYNs. Immediately, the three went to the waterfalls where JUANITO
pointed the spot where he saw GENELYNs body. With the aid of his flashlight,
Jose went to the spot, and there he saw the dead body floating face down in the
knee-high water. True enough, it was GENELYNs. Jose reported the incident to
Barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon Cenizas order, the Bantay Bayan
members and some policemen retrieved and brought GENELYNs dead body to
Joses house.[4]

Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that GENELYN came to

his house in the afternoon of 3 August 1996 to borrow some rice. GENELYN had

with her an umbrella that afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN
failed to reach her home when Jose came to look for her.[5]

Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 p.m. of 3

August 1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo Balogbog, arrived at his house to look
for GENELYN, but they immediately left when they did not find her. At about 7:30
p.m., JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house, trembling and apparently weak.
JUANITO was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp. When Ernesto asked
JUANITO where he was going, the latter said that he would catch frogs; and then
he left. After thirty minutes, JUANITO returned and told Ernesto that he saw a
foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. With the disappearance of GENELYN in
mind, Ernesto lost no time to go the house of Jose. JUANITO followed him.
There, JUANITO told Jose that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls.
When Jose asked whether it was GENELYNs, JUANITO answered in the
affirmative. The three then proceeded to the waterfalls, where JUANITO pointed
the place where he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose immediately approached
the body, and having confirmed that it was GENELYNs, he brought it to a dry
area.[6]

Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio Camacho hand over
a black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza. The latter asked those present as to
who owned the rope. When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza
brought him away from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him.[7]

Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to molest his

(Ernestos) child, an incident that caused a fight between him (JUANITO) and his
(Ernestos) wife.[8]

Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August 1996, he was

informed by Joses brother that GENELYN was drowned. He and the Bantay
Bayan members proceeded to the place of the incident and retrieved the body of
GENELYN. At 8:00 a.m. of the following day he, together with Edgar Sumalpong
and Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace the path up to where
GENELYN was found. There, they found a black rope and an umbrella. They
gave the umbrella to Joses wife, and the black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza,

who was then attending the wake of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who were at
the wake whether anyone of them owned the rope. JUANITO answered that he
owned it. Thereafter Ceniza talked to JUANITO.[9]

Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the recovery of the black
rope and umbrella at the waterfalls where GENELYNs body was found.[10]

Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that
at about 8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio
Camacho, and JUANITO arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found
GENELYNs dead body at the waterfalls. Ceniza forthwith ordered the members
of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body of GENELYN, and reported the incident
to the police headquarters of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She specifically named
JUANITO as her suspect. She then went home and proceeded to Joses house
for GENELYNs wake. She saw JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he was
very uneasy.[11]

Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on her way to
Joses house, Antonio gave her a black rope, which he reportedly found at the
spot where the dead body of GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the
people at the wake about the rope. JUANITO, who was among those present,
claimed the rope as his. She brought JUANITO away from the others and asked
him why his rope was found at the place where GENELYNs body was
discovered. JUANITO answered: I have to claim this as my rope because I can
commit sin to God if I will not claim this as mine because this is mine. Ceniza
further asked JUANITO to tell her everything. JUANITO told Ceniza that his
intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest and kill her. When
GENELYN ran away, he chased her. As to how he raped her, JUANITO told
Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers into GENELYNs vagina and then raped
her. Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine.[12]

After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on his right
shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his body. Upon
further inquiry, JUANITO told her that the wound on his shoulder was caused by
the bite of GENELYN. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a policeman for his

own protection, as the crowd became unruly when she announced to them that
JUANITO was the culprit. JUANITO was forthwith brought to the police
headquarters.[13]

Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at

the Aurora Police Station, testified that at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he
was at Joses house. Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the
killing of GENELYN, and she turned over to him a black rope which belonged to
JUANITO. He wanted to interrogate JUANITO, but Ceniza cautioned him not to
proceed with his inquiry because the people around were getting unruly and
might hurt JUANITO. Mosqueda immediately brought JUANITO to the police
station, and on that same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses. The
following day, a complaint was filed against JUANITO.[14]

Dr. Arturo Lumacad, Municipal Health Officer of the Aurora Rural Health Clinic,
testified that he examined JUANITO so as to verify the information that JUANITO
sustained wounds in his body.[15] His examination of JUANITO revealed the
following injuries:

1. fresh abrasions on the right portion of the cheek;

2. multiple abrasions on the right shoulder;
3. abrasion on the left shoulder; and
4. abrasions on the left forearm.[16]

Dr. Lumacad also testified that he examined the dead body of GENELYN on 4
August 1996 and found the following injuries:

1. 2.5-inch lacerated wound at her left neck, front of the head;

2. 1-inch wound at the right cheek just below the first wound;
3. multiple contusions on her chest;

4. contusion at the right hip; and

5. fresh lacerations on her vagina at 9 oclock and 3 oclock positions.[17]

He opined that the fresh lacerations could have been caused by a large object
inserted into GENELYNs vagina, such as a male sex organ, a rod, or a piece of
wood or metal.[18]

Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court of Aurora,

Zamboanga del Sur, testified that when he arrived in his office at around 8:30
a.m. of 4 August 1996 several people, including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were
already in his courtroom. He learned that they came to swear to their affidavits
before him. After reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her
statements were true. Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to
JUANITO as the culprit. Judge Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether
the charge against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect: [N]apanuwayan
ko, sir (I was demonized). While Judge Dicon realized that he should not have
asked JUANITO as to the truthfulness of the allegations against him, he felt
justified in doing so because the latter was not under custodial investigation.
Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO whether he had a daughter as old
as the victim and whether he was aware of what he had done to GENELYN.
Again, JUANITO responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously
narrated that after he struck GENELYNs head with a stone he dropped her body
into the precipice.[19]

Lopecino Albano, process server in the court of Judge Dicon, corroborated the
testimony of the latter as to JUANITOs admission that he was demonized when
he raped and killed GENELYN.[20]

The sole witness for the defense was JUANITO, who invoked denial and alibi. He
testified that he was at his mothers house at around 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996.
An hour later, he left for the creek to catch frogs; and while catching frogs, he
saw a foot. He forthwith headed for Ernesto Derios house to ask for help. There,
he told Ernesto and his wife of what he had seen. Ernestos wife asked JUANITO
whether the person was still alive, and JUANITO answered that he was not sure.
At this point, Ernesto informed him that Jose Camacho was looking for

GENELYN. JUANITO and Ernesto then proceeded to the house of Jose to inform
the latter of what he, JUANITO, had seen. The three forthwith went to the creek.
There, they found out that the foot was GENELYNs and that she was already
dead. Upon Joses request, JUANITO and Ernesto informed Joses brother about
the incident, and they proceeded to the house of Ceniza. Thereafter, they, along
with the members of the Bantay Bayan, went back to the creek to retrieve the
body of GENELYN.[21]

JUANITO further recalled that after the body of GENELYN was brought to her
parents house, he helped saw the lumber for her coffin. Thereafter, he went to
Ernestos house to get the sack containing the seventeen frogs he had caught
that night, which he earlier left at Ernestos house. He was shocked to find out
that the rope which he used to tie the sack, as well as all the frogs he caught,
was missing. As it was already dawn, JUANITO left his sack at his mothers
house; then he proceeded to the house of Jose to help make the coffin of
GENELYN. But, at around 8:00 a.m., policeman Banaag came looking for him.
He stopped working on GENELYNs coffin and identified himself. Banaag took
him away from the house of Jose and asked him whether he owned the rope.
JUANITO answered in the affirmative. At this point, policeman Mosqueda came
near them and escorted him and Banaag back to Joses house. At Joses house,
Mosqueda announced to the crowd that JUANITO was the suspect in
GENELYNs untimely demise. JUANITO was then detained and investigated at
the police station.[22] During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge
Dicon, he was never assisted by a lawyer.[23]

In its challenged decision,[24] the trial court found JUANITO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. On the challenge on the
admissibility of the admissions he made to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge
Dicon, it ruled that they are not the law enforcement authorities referred to in the
constitutional provisions on the conduct of custodial investigation. Hence,
JUANITOs confessions made to them are admissible in evidence. Moreover, no
ill-motive could be attributed to both Ceniza and Judge Dicon. It also found
unsubstantiated JUANITOs claim that he was threatened by his fellow inmates to
make the confession before Judge Dicon; and that, even assuming that he was
indeed threatened by them, the threat was not of the kind contemplated in the Bill
of Rights. The threat, violence or intimidation that invalidates confession must
come from the police authorities and not from a civilian. Finally, it ruled that
JUANITOs self-serving negative evidence cannot stand against the prosecutions

positive evidence.

The trial court, thus, convicted JUANITO of rape with homicide and imposed on
him the penalty of death. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity. Hence, this automatic review.

In his Appellants Brief, JUANITO imputes to the trial court the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED

CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO WITNESSES LUZVIMINDA
CE[N]IZA AND JUDGE CELESTINO DICON AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED.

II

ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSEDS ALLEGED

CONFESSION THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BASED ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Anent the first assigned error, JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated
Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution[25] when it admitted in evidence his
alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.
According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before
they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is
of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public
officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the
Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show
that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the
presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.

In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the prosecution miserably
failed to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to the contradicting
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope
owned by him. Consequently, with the inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial
confession and the apparent contradiction surrounding the prosecutions
evidence against him, the trial court should have acquitted him.

In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the trial
courts finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as
charged. His bare denial and alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Moreover, he was unable to establish by sufficient
evidence that Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon had an ulterior motive
to implicate him in the commission of the crime.

The OSG recommends that the civil indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial
court be increased to P75,000; and that in line with current jurisprudence, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 be awarded to the heirs of GENELYN.

We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial

confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza.

It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions
made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under
investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.[26]

In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked

by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he

raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration
was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It
was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in
connection with the commission of the offense.

It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts disclosed to her by
JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of Dr. Lumacad. GENELYNs physical
resistance and biting of the right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the wound
on JUANITOs right shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body. His
admission that he raped GENELYN was likewise corroborated by the fresh
lacerations found in GENELYNs vagina.

Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on
the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him.
Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in
a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy.[27]

However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during
custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded
to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It
is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested
by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So,
he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the
assistance of counsel.[28] Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been
filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves
scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time JUANITO was already
under the custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement
of the witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their
oaths on their statements.

While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but was rather brought
to the police headquarters on 4 August 1996 for his protection, the records reveal
that JUANITO was in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the primordial

concern of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him of his
freedom of action would not have been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested,
or by his submission to the person making the arrest.[29]

At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge
Dicon was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence
inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal admission of
the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons
who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.[30]

JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he was at
the scene of the crime. Alibi is a defense that places an accused at the relevant
time of a crime in a place other than the scene involved and so removed
therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.[31] Likewise, a
denial that is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is a negative and
self-serving evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[32]

Anent the alleged inconsistencies in the details surrounding the recovery of the
black rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and do not impair the credibility of
the witnesses. Minor inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies
have been coached or rehearsed.[33] What matters is that the testimonies of
witnesses agree on the essential fact that JUANITO was the owner of the black
rope and the perpetrator of the crime.

Even if JUANITOs confession or admission is disregarded, there is more than

enough evidence to support his conviction. The following circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was
JUANITO who raped and killed GENELYN:

1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his daughter

GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog.

GENELYN did so as told, but failed to return home.

2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house bringing
a sack and kerosene lamp, trembling and apparently weak.

3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernestos house and told

Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls, without disclosing the
identity of the deceased.

4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Joses house, the former told Jose that it
was GENELYNs foot he saw at the waterfalls.

5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh lacerations on her
vaginal wall at 9 and 3 oclock positions.

6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho, Andres Dolero and
Edgar Sumalpong recovered at the crime site a black rope, which they turned
over to Ceniza, who was then at GENELYNs wake.

7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the black rope,
JUANITO claimed it as his.

8. When Ceniza examined JUANITOs body, she saw a wound on his right
shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body.

9. Dr. Lumancads physical examination of JUANITO revealed abrasions, which

could have been caused by scratches.

Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the

following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
inferences are based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.[34] All these requisites are present in the case at bar.

With JUANITOs guilt for rape with homicide proven beyond reasonable doubt, we
are constrained to affirm the death penalty* imposed by the trial court. Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
pertinently provides: When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.

As to JUANITOs civil liability, prevailing judicial policy has authorized the

mandatory award of P100,000[35] as civil indemnity ex delicto in cases of rape
with homicide (broken down as follows: P50,000 for the death and P50,000 upon
the finding of the fact of rape). Thus, if homicide is committed by reason or on
occasion of rape, the indemnity in the amount of P100,000 is fully justified and
properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special complex crime.
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 may be additionally awarded to the
heirs of the victim without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof; the
fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings, which constitutes the basis for moral damages under the Civil Code,
is too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial.[36]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Aurora,
Zamboanga Del Sur, in Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156, finding accusedappellant Juanito Baloloy guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification
that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as indemnity
and P50,000 as moral damages.

In consonance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the

Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

BENJAMIN JESALVA,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 187725
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 19, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated
November 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw[4]
(petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Facts

On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a

criminal complaint[5] for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days
thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging

petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo[6] (Leticia) died
on September 14, 1992.[7] After conducting a hearing on the bail application of
petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December
18, 1992, granted him bail.[8] On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the
filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the records
of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon.[9]

Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information[10]

dated January 26, 1993, which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior
strength, with treachery and evident premeditation with the use of motor vehicle
and during night time, did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, manhandle and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo,
inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her
death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.[11] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:

In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the
victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,[12] Jo
Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain
Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 oclock that night,
Glorias group left Nenas place and boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With
the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and
drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the
rest consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.

After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who
flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel as it was
usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated
at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by
Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from Leticias house. While at Glorias
house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until
the next day because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia
three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After
petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately
accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards 7th
Street where Leticias house was situated.

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo
Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced
upon petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Ladys Village]
OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the vehicle and
SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check
what was going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since
childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of
heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond, immediately started the
engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite
his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters
holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV
Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman

naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and
[panty] were beside her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried
her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a
tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction.
De Vera called out, What is that? Because he received no response from Noel
Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to check
the site later.

Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding
that he even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he
hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he
no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police station to report the
incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.

De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area
but to no avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they
met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him to
be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation
but professed innocence. He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the
police found her.

Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the
next day. However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person
seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He surrendered at one (1)
oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.[13]

The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed
to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that
they should just remain as friends because she was already married, and that
she loved her handsome husband.[14] Moreover, the prosecution asseverated
that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St.
Rafael Subdivision, [15] together with other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1
Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on
board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle

and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his
residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas calls.[16] Lastly, at
about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin
Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he
voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped
out of his vehicle.[17] At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique
Renoria, together with other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner
inspected the place, which petitioner identified as the place where he and Leticia
sat. They found bloodstains thereat.[18]

After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense
filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence,[19] which the RTC,
Branch 51, denied in its Order[20] dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the
defense filed a Motion[21] for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994
and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further
action in the case;[22] hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52.
Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence
of the defense.[23]

Version of the Defense

In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed
Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had
many reasons why he should not kill her.[24] The prosecution manifested that it
would not conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his
testimony was tantamount to pure denial.[25] To prove that there was a broken
chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de
Vera. The CA narrated:

12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about 12:30 a.m., he
was driving his tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon; upon reaching the
junction of the national road or highway, he saw a man and a woman three
meters from the edge of the road; he stopped his tricycle and focused the
headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he saw the woman leaning on the left
arm of the man while the man was on a squatting position; he asked them what
is that? and did not get any response; that the man was hiding his face and saw
little blood on the clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a polo
shirt and pants; he decided to bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then
returned to the scene but found no one there; he reported the matter to [SPO1]
Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the place; they searched for the
man and woman but they could not find them; they checked the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital but nobody had been brought there; then they proceeded
back to the junction and later to the Sorsogon town proper; upon reaching
Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia talking with a man, whom he (De Vera)
recognized as the man with the woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the man to go to
Police Sub-Station 1; at the police Sub-Station 1, he came to know the name of
the man Noel Olbes; he saw bloodstains on Olbes arms, hands, face and nose;
the police interrogated him about it and he replied that he just helped the woman.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner] for a longtime;

and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman in Criminal
Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms and because of this, he is
indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to [petitioner];
[petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the case.[26]

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of SPO1

Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:

6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of September 9,

1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-Station 1 that he saw a
man, who was in squatting position, and a woman, who had blood on the upper
right breast of her clothes, lean[ing] against the man and that after De Vera
brought his tricycle passenger home, he returned to the site but he could not find
the two anymore; upon receiving the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with

SPO1 Sincua and De Vera, proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going
to the hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they searched
the place and went to the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at
around 1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay
Tugos; De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he saw with the woman at the
crossing so they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation; Olbes told
them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he tried to lift her up
but when he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he became afraid as he might be
implicated in the crime so he brought her to Hazelwood, which is five meters
away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m. the patrol team found Leticia Aldemo, whom
they found naked from the waist down; at the garage of Hazelwood; they found
the long pants of the victim lying beside her and noted that her panty was still on
one of her knees; the victims body appeared to have been laid down; they did not
find any blood in the garage except where the victims body was found outside
the garage, they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains;
he (SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him to their
investigator.

7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who are holding
office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that on September 8,
1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely in Almendras to drink a
bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to downtown Sorsogon and roamed
around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or
11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food and took a bottle of beer; upon the
invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena and drank another bottle of beer; he
brought Lea to her home at OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas
house, he walked and upon reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying
on her belly naked from the waist down; the woman was just uttering guttural
sound; her jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking pity on the woman
and since it was raining that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in
order that she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the panty
and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle stopped for a while and
focused its headlight on them and proceeded on its way; when he laid down the
woman in the shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and he was stained with
her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left; he walked towards the
Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-five minutes, two policem[e]n
apprehended him and brought him to the police station for investigation; while
being investigated, he was not apprised of his constitutional rights and made to
sign the police blotter; he was detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the

victim; after 7 or 8 hours, he was released; and he executed a Sworn Statement

and affirmed its contents.[27]

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.[28] and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes) testified
on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death:

9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9, 1992 a

patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose state; she sustained
the following injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5 cm punctured wound,
occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal left area[;] (4) multiple
contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid left area[;] (5) contusion
hematoma 3rd upper left arm; (6) contusion hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion
left elbow[;] (8) hematoma, 3rd left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple
confluent abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12)
abrasion right elbow[;] (13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skullsegmented fracture parietal bone with separation.

He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back of the
skull) was caused by a pebble which they recovered from said area; the
punctured wound on the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may
have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three findings could
also have been caused by the punch made by the perpetrator; the fourth finding
could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the
fifth and the sixth findings could have been caused also by some of the abovementioned means; the eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing
on a hard object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument
or a fist blow while the tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a rough
object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the eleventh finding could have
been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth finding could be caused by a
blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the thirteenth finding could also be
caused by a fall or fist blow.

He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed on her.

xxxx

14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different kinds of injuries sustained
by the victim. In addition, he stated that since there were wounds sustained by
the victim in the dorsum part of the foot and sustained injuries on both knees,
upper portion of the back of the hand, the victim could have been thrown off while
unconscious.[29]

The RTCs Ruling

On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not
of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the
absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was
not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
were not duly proven. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Benjamin

Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code and considering
that there was no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto and
taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum of
P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for compensatory
damages plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).

SO ORDERED.[30]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.[31]

The CAs Ruling

On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner could
not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the former
holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of lifting her in
order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any misdeed or
omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring Leticia to a
nearby hospital, because his fear of being implicated in the crime clouded his
better judgment. Thus:

All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to sustain the accusedappellants conviction for homicide.

As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award of P10,000.00 by the trial
court meritorious, the records reveal that services of private prosecutor was
engaged.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by

reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its
minimum period. Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal as maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty.

Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the indeterminate

penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[32]

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[33] which the CA,

however, denied in its Resolution[34] dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

A)
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS CONVICTING
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BASED ON PURELY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH
CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT
WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND

B)
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT,
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER
IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON
RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD
HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY.[35]

Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and
where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was
responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if
he took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where Leticias
house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as

a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia
when she was still alive. He avers that the statements he made at the police
station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he was, technically,
under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of his right to remain
silent.[36] Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia,
per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting
petitioners innocence. Petitioner claims that the evidence shows that there was
more blood in Hazelwood than in the place where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby
suggesting that something worse than her jumping out of the vehicle might have
happened.[37]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG,
argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we
accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed
by the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs ruling, did not err in
convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because the
particular circumstances enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily
meet the requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover,
the OSG claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in
the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited on
custodial investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived
of his rights since he was never held for questioning by any police officer upon
arriving at the police station and, besides, he was accompanied by his first
cousin, Fiscal Jayona.[38]

Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information
or a confession from him.[39] The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the

investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction

is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to
whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements.[40] The assailed statements herein were
spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through
questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal
Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement
that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992.
[41] The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional
procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be

convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in
the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient,
and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said
crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to
petitioner as the culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are
instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms
part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all
circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret
or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[42]

Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when

the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others,
as the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial evidence
may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential

requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[43]

We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the circumstantial
evidence proved by the prosecution, when viewed in its entirety, points unerringly
to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person responsible for the death of the
victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the following combination of the circumstances
which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to
[petitioner] and no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the victim Leticia
Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop as she was already married)
together with Gloria Haboc, and six other individuals left Nena Ables house at 10
p.m. of September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong thereat. They rode in
[petitioners] red panel.

2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others proceeded to
Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with other two male companions,
consumed one bottle of Fundador, in addition to the three bottles of beer. At
11:30 p.m., the group left the place.

3. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin Jesalva, together
with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria Haboc to her home, which was
only twenty meters away from Leticias residence.

4. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five minutes, and denied another
drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately accelerated his vehicle en route to 6th
Street instead of the shorter and direct route, the 7th street, where Leticia
Aldemos house is located;

5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband Efren Aldemo;

6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling the St.
Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat and when they approached and
beamed a flashlight, they saw Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly
drove away in the direction of Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he lives.
SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom he had known since his
teen-age years) to stop but the latter did not respond or heed his call;

7. At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of Leticia Aldemo
sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, naked from the waist down. He lifted her up and brought the body at
Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away from the highway.

8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around 2:15 a.m. of
the same day, and brought her to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital in comatose
condition.

9. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister, who in turn informed the
victims husband of the incident.

10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for Benjamin Jesalva
to invite him at the police station but was not able to find him.

11.
At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin Jesalva,
together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose Jayona, presented himself at
the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the
victim Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30 in the early
morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael Subdivision but upon reaching the
crossing of OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital,
she jumped out of his vehicle. These declarations were recorded in the police

blotter by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4 William Desder,
the PNP Sorsogon Chief Investigator.

12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with [petitioner]
and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision to conduct an
ocular inspection. [Petitioner] pointed to the police the place where he and the
victim spent their time. The police photographed what appear[ed] to be
bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed by [petitioner].
13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the occipital area
was caused by a pebble which he recovered from said area; the punctured
wound in the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been
secondary to a fall on a rough surface, the cerebral contusion, the punctured
wound in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be caused by a punch
by the perpetrator. As to the multiple contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect
of the deltoid left area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong
grip; the contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left elbow could as well
be similarly caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip. As to the
abrasion on the right knee, the same could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or a fist blow. The multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the right foot could
have been caused by a fall on a rough object. The abrasions on the right elbow
could have been caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow. The
same is true with the contusion hematoma found on the victims right elbow.[44]

Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly

establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive
declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an
accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the
CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial was weak,
self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence as to the
matters that occurred during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An
accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of
proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find
that the prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this case.[45]

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would
warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated
October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal
Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157399

Appellee,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted),
ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO,
JAIME OCHOA, all of the National
Power Corporation, and RAUL
GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas,
Alias George Aonuevo, alias

Mara Aonuevo (At large),

Accused. Promulgated:

JAIME OCHOA,
Appellant. November 17, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,[1] Jaime Ochoa and Raul
Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of
Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and
penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, in an amended Information,[2] docketed as Criminal Case No.
19558, which alleges

That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being the Treasurer
of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa,
both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign
Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively, also of
NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George
Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange
trader, said public officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave
abuse of authority and committing the offense in relation to their office,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with their private coaccused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to

be falsified the NPCs application for managers checks with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars
from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account number
of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in truth and in fact as the accused well
knew that the Payment Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR
authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making
alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and
with the use of the said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in
diverting, collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75),
Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation, which they thereafter
malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power Corporation in the
aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while
Gutierrez has remained at large.

On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated

1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the
NPC;

2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information
was (sic) the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division
(LOMAFED);

3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at
the time mentioned in the information;

4.
funds;

That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public

5.
That accused Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not
require him to take custody or control of public funds;

6.
That the application forms for cashiers check or Managers check
are not accountable forms of the NAPOCOR.[3]

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its Decision,[4] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of
Commercial Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa
shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against the
accused.

On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby
ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial
Document. However, because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY
LIABLE for the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure
Order against the accused embodied in this Courts Resolution dated April 18,

2002 is recalled.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul
Nicolas, alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo with last known address at
1348 A. Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas
Boulevard, Manila.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred
in

1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;

2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;

3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.
[6]

The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not
disputed by the parties:

In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) became embroiled in a

controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which
were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch (PNB)
but were subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers/cashiers checks (the
first check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00 while the second was for
P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was
obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from

a local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw
Branch), which local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore
bank. This off-shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then
supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this
case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the
account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied
in three [3] Payment Instructions) included a value date (which was July 13,
1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned procedure,
culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign currency
agreed upon.

On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted
Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise,
per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted
on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however,
despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2) managers/cashiers
checks (Managers check for brevity) for such purpose, did not make the agreed
remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the
funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the
accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to
remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both
explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.[7]

The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the
two PNB Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an
Application for Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #1111212-04) of a private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw
Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the
Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers
check to be charged to NPCs savings account did not contain any account
number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the
funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul
Nicolas @ George Aonuevo @ Mara Aonuevo, who is still at large.

In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed
any of the acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the
ACC; that he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he received the

proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He claims that
his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of
stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel
and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains
that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center
and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted
by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the
affidavit.

To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following

essential elements:

a.] The offender is a public officer;

b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;

c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and

d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or

through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of,
such funds or property.[8]

Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the
information without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be
informed of the accusation against him. He points out that the information alleges
willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the judgment
found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.

Appellants contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either through

a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through

negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation.[9] To sustain a

charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence[10] and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of
evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful
malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.[11] Explicitly stated

Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a
case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first
mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only
a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction
thereof is proper.[12]

The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the

crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is
neither novel nor of first impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[13] we
ruled that an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can validly be
convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:

While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we

held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging
the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant

was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made
possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal
intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of
the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other
words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which
turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the
cases decided by this Tribunal.

....

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed
with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the
evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to
him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be
incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for
a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

In People v. Consigna, et al.,[14] we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also

applies to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful
malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to the present case,
can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through negligence
where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based
on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn
statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He
contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that

Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers to a custodial

investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody[15] and
the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the suspect.[16] More specifically

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement

authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at
once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question
which tend to elicit incriminating statements.[17]

Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.[18] Such a situation
contemplated has been more precisely described thus where

After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation

arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army
camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only
by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his
morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained
and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that
experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into

silence....[19]

Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked

by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the
picture.[20] Thus we held in one case[21] that admissions made during the
course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within
the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision
also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual,
[22] or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation,[23] or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and
not in his official capacity.[24]

Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is
not covered by the provision although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take
extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because we recognized
the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense
on television.[25]

Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a

spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having
committed the crime,[26] nor to a person undergoing an audit examination
because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.[27]
Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately
apparent vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement
was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team[28] and
before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry
into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.

Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was
confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to
NPC personnel, not to police authorities.[29] Appellant can hardly claim that,

under the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of compulsion

may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where
impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and
incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been
persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way
as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional
provision.

The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at

the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his
predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from
coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by
NPC personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any investigation
conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from
the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.

Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran[30] in insisting that the constitutional

safeguard should have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested
or under detention at the time. He also invites our attention to the
pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas[31] that the right to counsel is
available if a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in
custody but he is a suspect.

The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional

protection covers not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the
ruling with the statement that what is being eschewed is the evil of extorting a
confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As defined, extortion
is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a person by illegal use of
fear, whether by force, threats or any undue exercise of power.[32] In the context
of obtaining an admission, extorting means compelling or coercing a confession
or information by any means serving to overcome his power of resistance, or
making the confession or admission involuntary.[33] In this case, we find nothing
on record to support appellants claim that his statements were extorted from him.

Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on

what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to the
conclusion that the rights are available when the person is already in custody as
a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any
significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas[34] qualified this statement by saying that
[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently held,
following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only
when the person is already in custody.[35]
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were
admissible in evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. He contends that although his statement was supposedly gathered
from the transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him and
Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared the sworn
statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.

The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as

witness Atty. Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him
the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of its contents.[36] Atty.
Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go over the document before affixing
his signature thereto.[37] He also inquired whether or not appellant was coerced
or intimidated by anybody when the statement was taken.[38] Appellant denied
that he was coerced or intimidated,[39] affirmed the contents of the document as
a true reflection of his statements,[40] and signed the same.[41] It need not be
overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which
has in its favor the presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only
by clear and convincing evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption
of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the
signatures thereon, stand.[42]

In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at the
time he signed the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore not
physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This pretext
however collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava, who
stated that appellant was confined for three days and, who, when queried
whether ischemic heart disease had any emotional or psychological effect, gave
the inconclusive reply that it may or may not. Moreover, as aptly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the

alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is supposedly

astute in business matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign Trader
Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit
retracting the same after his recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.[43]

Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the
transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extrajudicially. The record, however, shows that the prosecution presented the team
leader of the NBI investigators who conducted the investigation, although his
testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due
execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of its
contents. If at all, the admission of the reports existence is an acknowledgment
that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.

All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant
to prop up his cause, his appeal must fall.
WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 159734

November 29, 2006

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 159745

November 29, 2006

FILIPINA M. ORELLANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Rosario "Baby" Astudillo (Rosario) and Filipina "Lina" Orellana

(Filipina) via separate petitions for review on certiorari seek a review of the
Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the

Court of Appeals affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 783 (the trial court) finding them guilty of Qualified Theft and
denying their Motions for Reconsideration, respectively.

On complaint of Western Marketing Corporation (Western), petitioners were

collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along with Flormarie Robel (Flormarie)

and Roberto Benitez (Benitez), in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, under an

Information dated September 9, 1996 reading:

The undersigned accuses FLORMARIE CALAJATE ROBEL, ROBERTO F.

BENITEZ, ROSARIO ASTUDILLO a.k.a. "Baby" and FILIPINA ORELLANA Y
MACARAEG of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT as follows:

That during the period comprised from January 1996 to February 1996, the
above-named accused, being then employed as relieving cashier/service-incharge (Flormarie Calajate Robel), supervisor/floor manager (Roberto F.
Benitez[)], sales clerks (Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby" and Filipina Orellana y
Macaraeg) at the WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by
LILY CHAN ONG, and as such had free access to the company premises,
materials, supplies and items store[d] thereat, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence and intent of
gain, and without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away two (2) booklets of Sales
Invoices Nos. from 128351 to 128400 of the said corporation and thereafter use
the said invoices in the preparation of fictitious sales and withdrawals of
merchandise with the total value of P797,984.00 Philippine Currency, belonging
to the said WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and
prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Emphasis supplied)

Additionally, petitioners, Benitez and Norberto "Carlo" Javier (Javier) were

individually charged also with Qualified Theft in four (4) separate Informations all
dated September 9, 1996.

The Information indicting petitioner Rosario, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q96-67829, and that indicting petitioner Filipina, docketed as Q-96-67830,
respectively read:

The undersigned accuses ROSARIO ASTUDILLO a.k.a. "Baby" of the crime of

QUALIFIED THEFT as follows:

That on or about the period from May 1, 1994 to February 16, 1996, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then employed as sales
representative/clerk at the WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION (P. Tuazon
Branch), represented by LILY CHAN ONG, and as such had free access to the
company cash sales, with grave abuse of confidence and intent of gain, and
without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the excess sum/amount between the
tag price and discounts price in the sum of P12,665.00, belonging to the said
WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and prejudice in the
amount aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

xxx

The undersigned accuses FILIPINA ORELLANA Y MACARAEG of the crime of

QUALIFIED THEFT, committed as follows:

That on or about the period from May 1, 1994 to January 27, 1996, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then employed as Sales clerk
at the WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by LILY CHAN
ONG, and as such had free access to the company cash sales, with grave abuse
of confidence and intent of gain, and without the consent of the owner thereof,
did,

then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
excess sum/amount between the tag price and discount price of each and every
items sold by her to company customers, in the sum of P4,755.00, belonging to
the said WESTERN MARKETING CORPORATION, to its damage and prejudice
in the amount aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Petitioners, Benitez and Javier, with the assistance of their respective counsel,
pleaded not guilty during arraignment.6 Flormarie has remained at large.

By Order of December 10, 1997, Criminal Case No. Q-96-67828, the case
against Javier, was dismissed on account of the desistance of the private
complainant.7 The remaining cases against petitioners and Benitez were
consolidated for joint trial.

By Decision of May 28, 1998, the trial court found the accused-herein petitioners
and Benitez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft and were
accordingly sentenced as follows:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67827

Accused Roberto F. Benitez, Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby", and Filipina

Orellana y Macaraeg shall each suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of
reclusion temporal, and to pay the amount of P797,984.00, jointly and severally
for their civil liability;

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67829

Accused Rosario Astudillo a.k.a. "Baby", shall suffer imprisonment of TWELVE

(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as
maximum, of reclusion temporal, and to pay the amount of P12,665.00 for her
civil liability;

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67830

Accused Filipina Orellana y Macaraeg, shall suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12)

YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as
maximum, of reclusion temporal, and to pay the sum of P4,755.00 for her civil
liability; and

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-67831

Accused Roberto F. Benitez, shall suffer imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS

and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, of
reclusion temporal, and to pay the amount of P11,079.00 for his civil liability.

The penalties imposed on all the accused are quite harsh, but as the maxim
goes, "Dura Lex Sed Lex", the Court could not impose otherwise.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Petitioners and Benitez elevated their cases on appeal. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification as to the penalties imposed,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 28, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827, appellants Roberto Benitez, Rosario

Astudillo and Filipina Orellana are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified theft and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ranging from 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 15 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay to the offended party the amount of

P797,984.00, jointly and severally, as reparation for the unrecovered stolen

merchandise;

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67829, appellant Rosario Astudillo is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum
period as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum, and to pay to the offended party amount of
P12,665.00 as reparation for the stolen goods.

3. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67830, appellant Filipina Orellana is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional in
its maximum period as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
medium period as maximum and to pay to the offended party the amount of
P4,755.00 as reparation for the stolen property;

4. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67831, appellant Roberto Benitez is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum
period as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period
as maximum and to pay to the offended party the amount of P11,079.00 as
reparation for the stolen goods.

SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

After petitioners and Benitezs respective Motions for Reconsideration were

denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed these separate petitions for
review which were, on motion of the Office of the Solicitor General, ordered
consolidated.10

In her petition, Rosario proffers the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED AN

APOLOGY FOR BREACH OF PROCEDURE AS AN ADMISSION OF A CRIME.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT DEPARTED [FROM] THE NORMAL

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND CONVICTED PETITIONER OF
THE OFFENSE OF THEFT WITHOUT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
UNLAWFUL TAKING.

THE COURT OF A QUO (sic) GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION TO ARRIVE AT CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BY INDECENTLY
CONSIDERING AND DISTORTING EVIDENCE TO CONFORM TO ITS
FLAWED CONCLUSION.11 (Underscoring supplied)

On her part, Filipina raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONVICTING
THE PETITIONER FILIPINA ORELLANA Y MACARAEG OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

WHETHER OR NOT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION OBTAINED THROUGH

TRICKERY AND SCHEME WITHOUT THE BENEFIT AND ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED

WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY MAY BE PROVED SIMPLY ON THE

GROUND THAT ALL ACCUSED ARE CO-EMPLOYEES AND WORKING IN
ONE COMPANY12 (Underscoring supplied)

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:

Petitioners were hired by Western, a chain of appliance stores, as salespersons

at its branch at P. Tuazon Boulevard in Cubao, Quezon City. Benitez and
Flormarie were hired as floor manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever,
respectively, at the same branch of Western.13

On February 21, 1996, in the course of preparing the January monthly sales
report of the P. Tuason branch of Western, Branch Accountant Marlon Camilo
(Camilo) noticed that the computer printout of the monthly sales report revealed a
belated entry for Cash Sales Invoice No. 128366. Upon verification from
Westerns head office, Camilo learned that the branch received the booklet
containing 50 cash sales invoices to which Invoice No. 128366 formed part.

Camilo then confirmed that the booklet of sales invoices bearing numbers
128351 up to 128400 was missing. And he noted that the daily cash collection
report did not reflect any remittance of payments from the transactions covered
by the said invoices.

Some cash sales invoices were later recovered. From recovered Invoice No.
128366, Camilo found out that Flormarie was the one who filled it up and
received the payment reflected therein.

From recovered Invoice Nos. 128358 and 128375, Camilo found out that the
goods covered thereby were missing. Concluding that the transactions under the
said invoices were made but no payment was remitted to Western, Camilo
reported the matter to Ma. Aurora Borja (Aurora), the branch assistant manager.

Benitez soon approached Camilo and requested him not to report the matter to
the management, he cautioning that many would be involved.

Aurora and Camilo later met with Benitez, Filipina, cashiers Rita Lorenzo (Rita)
and Norma Ricafort (Norma) during which Benitez and Filipina pleaded with

Camilo not to report the matter to the management. Flormarie, who called on
Camilo by telephone, made a similar plea as she admitted to stealing the missing
booklet of invoices, she explaining that her father was sick and had to undergo
medical operation, and offering to pay for the goods covered thereby.14

In the meantime, Flormarie had gone absent without leave.

Aurora eventually reported the case of the missing invoices and the shortage of
cash sales collection to Westerns branch manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily).15

In a subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina admitted having brought home some
appliances while Benitez gave a handwritten statement reading:16

Ako si Roberto F. Benitez ay humihingi po ako ng tawad kay Mrs. Lily Ong at
Western Marketing Corp. Ang mga kasalanan ako po ay:

1) Ang pagkuha ng Promo na dapat ay para sa Customer.

2) Ang paggamit ng gift check na para rin sa Customer ang kinukuha ko at ako
ang gumagamit.

3) Ang pagamit na rin sa Pera na tinatawag na Short-Over ay amin ding

ginagawa. Example nagbayad ang Customer ng 9000 and C.P. 8,900 and 9,000
ay nasulat sa original na INV.

4) Ang pagkuha na rin ng mga Product tulad ng sumusunod, na ako nagplano at

si Ate Lina.

Kay Ate Lolit Tiffin Carrier

Cookware Set 7 pcs.

Ate Lina Cookware Set 7 pcs.

Norma Cookware Set 7 pcs. Airpot Lemon

Robert National Elec. Stove HNK-211 Rice Bowl

Ito lahat ay nilabas namin ng linggo 02-18-96 ng gabi. Ako po ay nangangako na

hindi na ito uulitin ang lahat ng mga kasalanan sa Western ay kay Mrs. Lily Ong
at Pinapangako ko po na Sumpa man kasama ang pamilya at salamat din po
dahil ako ay pinatawad nila at binigyan pa ng isang pagkakataon. Maraming
maraming salamat po.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In a still subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina made a written statement in the
formers presence reading:

Ako po si Lina M. Orellana na nangangako kay Ate Lily na hinding-hindi ko na

uulitin iyong naglalabas ng mga items tulad ng cookware set at casserole na ang
mga kasama ko po rito ay sina Lolit, Norma, Robert na isinagawa namin. Na
kami po si Robert ang nagsabi kay Lolit na maglabas ng stock pero bago po
namin ginagawa iyon nagsabi po kami kay Lolit na sumagot naman ng ng oo
pero kami po ni Robert and nagkumbinsi sa dalawa. Kung mauulit pa ho ito kung
anuman po ang gusto ni Mam Lily na gawin sa akin ay lubos ko pong
tatanggapin.18 (Underscoring supplied)

Also in a meeting with Lily, Rosario, who was earlier implicated by Flormaries
husband in his telephone conversation with Aurora,19 wrote:

Mam Lily,

Sana ho Ate Lily patawarin ninyo ako sa nagawa kong kasalanan, regarding sa
"Short-over". Siguro ho nagawa ko lang ho yon sa pakikisama sa kanila, sa mga
kasamahan ko dito sa Nuestra, alam ko ho na mali yon kaya pinagsisisihan ko
ho yon. Sana ho mapatawad ninyo ako sa nagawa kong kasalan.

Yun pong tungkol sa kaso ni Marie, wala ho akong alam don. Kumare ko nga ho
sya pero yung pagnanakaw niyang ginawa wala akong kinalaman don. Kahit ho
siguro magkautang-utang ako hindi ko magagawa yon.

Inuulit ko ho, sana ho mapatawad ninyo uli ako sa nagawa kong kasalanan at
pinapangako ko ho na hinding-hindi ko na uulitin.

Maraming salamat ho,

(Sgd.)Baby Astudillo

P.S. yun ho palang perang na-oover naming, pinaghahatian po namin nila Rita at
ni Marie.20 (Underscoring supplied)

Still in a separate meeting with Lily and her siblings on one hand, and Flormarie
and her husband on the other, Flormarie wrote what she knew of the incident as
follows:

Ito ang nalalaman ko kung paanong nangyari ito sa loob ng tindahan ng Western
Mktg. P. Tuazon Branch.

*SHORT-OVER

Ang tag price, kung ang customer ay hindi tumawad, binabago na lang ang
presyo sa duplicate copy and then kinukuha na lang sa cashier ang pera tapos
naghahati-hati na lang si robert, baby, lina, lolit, Rita at Marie, Norma, Fe.

xxx

*INVOICE

Ito ay itinuro sa akin ni Kuya Robert, kukunin ko ang invoice at pagkatapos

binigyan niya ako ng (3 resibo series) at hindi ko na po alam kung anong ginawa
na niya sa invoice.

Ang paraan magreresibo ako tatatakan ko ng paid kasama kung sino ang taong
maglalabas ng unit tapos ibebenta ko na yong unit yung pera kinukuha ko na
bibigyan ko lang siya ng kahit magkanong amount kung sino yong taong
inutusan ko.21 (Underscoring supplied)

Flormarie, in the company of her sister Delma and Lily, subsequently appeared
before a notary public to execute a similar statement reading:

xxxx

2. Ako ngayon ay kusang loob na lumapit sa Western upang humingi ng

kapatawaran sa aking mga nagawa at upang makipagkasundo sa isang maayos
na pagbabayad sa mga halagang aking nakuha sa Western at mahalaga sa
lahat, upang isiwalat ang mga taong kasangkot sa katiwaliang ito at mga paraan
ng paggawa nito.

3. Halos lahat ng mga kawani ng tindahan ay kasangkot sa mga sumusunod na

katiwalian:

3.1. Short-Over Ito ay ang pagtatala ng mas mababang halaga ng paninda sa

mga "duplicate copies" ng resibo kapag ang kustomer ay hindi tumawad sa "tag
price" at nagbayad ng "cash". Ang sobrang halaga ay pinaghahatian namin nina
ROBERT BENITEZ ("Robert"); ROSARIO ALTUDILLO ("Baby"); FILIPINA
ORELLANA ("Lina"); LOLIT BORJA ("Lolit"); RITA LORENZO ("Rita"); NORMA
RICAFORT ("Norma") at FE CABIGAN ("Fe").

xxxx

3.3. INVOICING Sa pamamagitan ng mga resibong na may tatak na "paid" na

ibinibigay ni Robert sa aking nailalabas ko ang mga paninda na akin namang
naibebenta.22

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Flormarie and her sister, together with Lily, later executed a statement before
Cubao SPO1 Jose Gil Gregorio, reading:

TANONG: Ayon kay MARLON CAMILO, Western Marketing Corp Branch

Accountant nadiskubre niya ang pagkawala ng isang booklet ng Sales Cash
Invoice (50pcs.) na may numerong 128351 to 128400 nitong mga nakaraang
araw may kinalaman ka ba sa nasabing pangyayari?

SAGOT: Opo.

T : Kung mayroon kang kinalaman sa nasabing pangyayari ito ba ay kusang loob

mong ginawa?

S : Itinuro lang po ito sa akin.

T : Ano ang iyong ginawa?

S : Ako po ang kumuha noong nawawalang isang booklet ng Cash Sales Invoice
sa turo ni ROBERT BENITEZ na Sales Supervisor sa Western Marketing Corp.

xxxx

T : Sa tatlong series ng Cash Sales Invoice na napunta sa iyo ano ang iyong
ginawa?

S : Ginamit ko po ito sa paglalabas ng mga items/unit sa Western Marketing

Corp.

xxxx

T : Sa maikling salaysay, ikuwento mo nga sa akin kung papaano mo isinagawa

ang iyong pagnanakaw sa pag-gamit ng mga Cash Sales Invoice?

S : Ganito po ang ginawa ko, iniuwi ko sa aming bahay yung tatlong series ng
resibo na ibinigay sa akin ni ROBERT BENITEZ at tinuruan po niya ako na
sulatan ko yung mga resibo ng mga items na gusto kong ilabas, at pagkatapos
po ay ibinalik ko ito sa Western Marketing Corp at binigay ko ito kay ROBERT
BENITEZ, at ang sabi niya sa akin ay siya na raw ang bahala na magpalabas
noong mga items na aking isinulat sa resibo.

xxxx

T : Bukod kay ROBERT BENITEZ may mga tao bang karamay sa naganap na
transaksiyon?

S : Mayroon po.

T : Sino-sino ito?

S : Sina LINA ORELLANA po, Sales Lady po, ROSARIO ASTUDILLO, sales lady.

T : Sa iyong pagkakaalam, ano ang kanilang mga partisipasyon na naganap na

transaksiyon?

S : Si LINA ORELLANA po ang sales lady, at siya rin ang may pirma doon sa
resibo, at ganoon din po itong si ROSARIO ASTUDILLO.

xxxx

T : Magkano naman ang ibinibigay sa iyo ni ROBERT BENITEZ kapag nailabas

ng yung mga items doon sa resibo na iyong ginawa?

S : Hindi ko na po matandaan basta pinapartihan niya ako at yung dalawang

sales lady.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In an inventory of stocks conducted at the branch office of Western, several other

appliances were found missing as were unauthorized deductions from the cash
collections.24 The total missing merchandise was valued at P797,984.00 as
reflected in the inventory report.25 And discrepancies between the actual sales
per cash sales invoice and the cash remittance to the company in the sum of
P34,376.00 for the period from January 1994 to February 199626 were also

discovered, prompting Western to initiate the criminal complaints for Qualified

Theft.

Both petitioners raise as issue whether the employees extra-judicial admissions

taken before an employer in the course of an administrative inquiry are
admissible in a criminal case filed against them.

Petitioners posit in the negative. They argue that as their extra-judicial

statements were taken without the assistance of counsel, they are inadmissible
in evidence, following Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.27

It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence,
petitioners failed to file any objection thereto including their extra-judicial
admissions.28 At any rate, this Court answers the issue in the affirmative. People
v. Ayson29 is instructive:

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid

down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as
the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make
a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated
by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a

police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without

full warnings of constitutional rights."

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or

"in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already
stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."30 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Ayson adds:

The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the

investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to
the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether
at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought
against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc) which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations.31

People v. Tin Lan Uy, Jr. 32 is similarly instructive:

Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked

by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the
picture. Thus we held in one case (People v. Ayson, [supra]) that admissions
made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines
do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the
constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made
to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who
was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal
confidante and not in his official capacity. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not
under custodial investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own

choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.

The extra-judicial confession33 before the police of Flormarie (who, as earlier

stated, has remained at large) in which she incriminated petitioners bears a
different complexion, however, as it was made under custodial investigation.
When she gave the statement, the investigation was no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. The
records show that Camilo had priorly reported the thievery to the same police
authorities and identified Flormarie and Benitez as initial suspects.

It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to incustody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The
presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting
officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other
words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the
Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so
against third persons. This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and
voluntarily given.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through
deceit, promise, trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them
their contents. There is nothing on record, however, buttressing petitioners claim
other than their self-serving assertion. The presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience35 such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary
is proved thus stands.36

The circumstances surrounding the execution of the written admissions likewise

militate against petitioners bare claim. Petitioners admittedly wrote their
respective letters during office hours in Lilys office which was located in the
same open booth or counter occupied by the cashier and credit card incharge.37 And this Court takes note of the observation of the trial court that

petitioners written notes were "neatly written in Tagalog, and not in broken
Tagalog as spoken by Lily Ong".38

In another vein, Rosario labels her written statement as a mere "apology for
breach of procedure".39 Her resort to semantics deserves scant consideration,
however. A cursory reading of her letter reveals that she confessed to the taking
of "short-over."

There is a "short-over" when there is a discrepancy between the actual amount

collected appearing in the yellow (warehouse) copy and the remitted amount
appearing in the blue (accounting) copy.40

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a

statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve
an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged. It is
an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient
to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of
guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms,
of his guilt of the crime charged.41

The issue on the admissibility of petitioners respective extra-judicial statements

aside, an examination of the rest of the evidence of the prosecution does not set
petitioners free.

The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things.42

Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1)

the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave
abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter
or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.43

Cashier Rita testified in a detailed and categorical manner how the petitioners
took the alleged amounts of "short-over" deducted from the sum of cash
collections. The tampered invoices presented by the prosecution which glaringly
show the variance in the amounts corroborate Ritas claim.

Rosario contends, however, that there was no "unlawful taking" since the
amounts of "short-over" did not belong to Western. The argument does not lie.
The "excess" sums formed part of the selling price and were paid to, and
received by, Western. The discrepancy in the amounts came about on account of
the alteration in the copies of the invoices which should have faithfully reflected
the same amount paid by the customer.

As for petitioners claim of entitlement to the "excess" amounts as salespersons

commission, it was not established in evidence.

Even assuming that the "short-over" was intended to defray sundry expenses, it
was not incumbent upon the salespersons to claim them and automatically apply
them to the miscellaneous charges. It was beyond the nature of their functions.
The utilization of the "short-over" was not left to the discretion of the
salespersons. The element of unlawful taking was thus established.

A further review of the nature of petitioners functions shows, however, that the
element of grave abuse of confidence is wanting in the case.

Q : As an accountant employee since June 1995, Mr. Witness, you are familiar

that in the procedure in any particular branch of Western Marketing Corporation,

are you aware if somebody buys an item from one store, do you know the flow of
this sale?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : In fact, in the store there are employees which are assigned with specific
duties or functions, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Like for instance, lets take the case of Filipina Orellana. Her function is
merely to entertain customers who go to the store and intend to buy one of the
items that are displayed, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : So, if this customer is resolved to buy one item, Filipina Orellana as a sales
clerk, all she has to do is to refer the particular customer to another employee of
the company, is that correct?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Now, you have also employees who are preparing invoices, they are called
invoicers, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : So when Filipina Orellana refers this customer to the invoicer, the invoicer
now will take over from that function of Filipina Orellana after referring this
customer?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And this invoicer now will refer the invoice for this particular item for payment
to the cashier of the company, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And it is the cashier who will receive the payment from this customer?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And in fact, the customer or the cashier will receive the exact amount of
payment as reflected in the invoice that was prepared by the invoicer, is it not?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : From that point up to the payment, Filipina Orellana has no more hand in that
particular transaction, her function is only to entertain and refer the customer for
sales purposes, that is correct?

A : Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied)

Mere circumstance that petitioners were employees of Western does not suffice
to create the relation of confidence and intimacy that the law requires.45 The

element of grave abuse of confidence requires that there be a relation of

independence, guardianship or vigilance between the petitioners and Western.46
Petitioners were not tasked to collect or receive payments. They had no hand in
the safekeeping, preparation and issuance of invoices. They merely assisted
customers in making a purchase and in demonstrating the merchandise to
prospective buyers.47 While they had access to the merchandise, they had no
access to the cashiers booth or to the cash payments subject of the offense.

Lily conceded that petitioners were merely tasked to "assist in the sales from day
to day"48 while Camilo admitted that the cashier is the custodian of the cash
sales invoices and that no other person can handle or access them.49 The
limited and peculiar function of petitioners as salespersons explains the lack of
that fiduciary relationship and level of confidence reposed on them by Western,
which the law on Qualified Theft requires to be proven to have been gravely
abused. Mere breach of trust is not enough. Where the relationship did not
involve strict confidence, whose violation did not involve grave abuse thereof, the
offense committed is only simple theft.50 Petitioners should therefore be
convicted of simple theft, instead of Qualified Theft.

On Criminal Case No. Q-96-67827 respecting petitioners collective guilt in taking

away merchandise by making it appear that certain items were purchased with
the use of stolen cash sales invoices:

It is settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. To
effectively serve as a basis for conviction, conspiracy must be proved as
convincingly as the criminal act. Direct proof is not absolutely required for the
purpose.

A review of the inference drawn from petitioners acts before, during, and after
the commission of the crime to indubitably indicate a joint purpose, concert of
action and community of interest is thus in order.51

In Rosarios case, the Office of the Solicitor General made a sweeping

conclusion that the extent of her participation in the act of taking merchandise
need not be specified since she attributed her other act of taking "short-over" to
"pakikisama" or companionship.52 The conclusion does not persuade.

Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.53 As indicated early on,

there were two different sets of imputed acts, one individual and the other
collective. Rosarios admission was material only to her individual guilt as she
referred only to the "short-over". The wording of her admission cannot be
construed to extend to the other offense charging conspiracy under which no
overt act was established to prove that Rosario shared with, and concurred in,
the criminal design of taking away Westerns merchandise.1wphi1

The prosecution relied on Auroras statement that Flormaries husband

mentioned Rosario as among those involved in the anomaly.54 Under the
hearsay evidence rule, however, a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, those which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules.55

Aurora testified that she witnessed Filipina, along with Benitez, in inter alia hiring
third persons to pose as customers who received the items upon presenting the
tampered invoice.56

Filipina in fact gave a written statement acknowledging her own act of asporting
the merchandise. The rule is explicit that the act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.57 The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.58

Moreover, Filipinas statement dovetailed with Benitezs admission, which was

corroborated by Flormaries confessions.59 In cases alleging conspiracy, an
extra-judicial confession is admissible against a co-conspirator as a
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said coconspirator in the crime committed.60

Except with respect to Rosario, then, this Court finds well-taken the trial courts
observation that the admissions were full of substantial details as to how the
accused conspired to commit the criminal acts and as to how they manipulated
the sales transactions at Western to effect and consummate the theft of the
goods.

In fine, insofar as Filipina is concerned, a thorough evaluation of the evidence

warrants the affirmance of her guilt beyond reasonable doubt of having conspired
with Benitez et al.

On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado61 is instructive. In

the determination of the penalty for Qualified Theft, note is taken of the value of
the property stolen, which is P797,984.00. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00,
the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in the maximum period Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)
Day to Ten (10) Years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, the amount of P22,000.00 is

deducted from P797,984.00, which yields a remainder of P775,984.00. This
amount is then divided by

P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is
that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty.

The total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years,
however.

As for the penalty for Qualified Theft, it is two degrees higher than that for Simple
Theft, hence, the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 18, 2002 is
MODIFIED.

THIRD DIVISION

AGUSTIN P. DELA TORRE,

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO G. CONCEPCION,

RAMON BOY LARRAZABAL, PHILIPPINE TRIGON SHIPYARD
CORPORATION, and ROLAND G. DELA TORRE,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------x
PHILIPPINE TRIGON SHIPYARD CORPORATION and ROLAND G. DELA
TORRE,
Petitioners,

- versus -

CRISOSTOMO G. CONCEPCION, AGUSTIN DELA TORRE and RAMON BOY

LARRAZABAL,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 160088

G.R. No. 160565

Present:

CARPIO,* J.
VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* * JJ.

Promulgated:

July 13, 2011

X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These consolidated petitions[1] for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set
aside the September 30, 2002 Decision[2] and September 18, 2003
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 36035, affirming in
toto the July 10, 1991 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles
City (RTC). The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4609, an action for Sum of
Money and Damages, ordered the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
various damages to the plaintiff.

The Facts:

Respondent Crisostomo G. Concepcion (Concepcion) owned LCT-Josephine, a

vessel registered with the Philippine Coast Guard. On February 1, 1984,
Concepcion entered into a Preliminary Agreement[5] with Roland de la Torre
(Roland) for the dry-docking and repairs of the said vessel as well as for its
charter afterwards.[6] Under this agreement, Concepcion agreed that after the
dry-docking and repair of LCT-Josephine, it should be chartered for 10,000.00
per month with the following conditions:

1. The CHARTERER will be the one to pay the insurance premium of the vessel

2. The vessel will be used once every three (3) months for a maximum period of
two (2) weeks

3. The SECOND PARTY (referring to Concepcion) agreed that LCT-Josephine

should be used by the FIRST PARTY (referring to Roland) for the maximum
period of two (2) years

4. The FIRST PARTY (Roland) will take charge[x] of maintenance cost of the said
vessel. [Underscoring Supplied]

On June 20, 1984, Concepcion and the Philippine Trigon Shipyard Corporation[7]
(PTSC), represented by Roland, entered into a Contract of Agreement,[8]
wherein the latter would charter LCT-Josephine retroactive to May 1, 1984, under
the following conditions:

a. Chartered amount of the vessel 20,000.00 per month effective May 1, 1984;

j. The owner (Concepcion) shall pay 50% downpayment for the dry-docking and
repair of the vessel and the balance shall be paid every month in the amount of
10,000.00, to be deducted from the rental amount of the vessel;

k. In the event that a THIRD PARTY is interested to purchase the said vessel, the
SECOND PARTY (PTSC/ Roland) has the option for first priority to purchase the
vessel. If the SECOND PARTY (PTSC/Roland) refuses the offer of the FIRST
PARTY (Concepcion), shall give the SECOND PARTY (PTSC/Roland) enough
time to turn over the vessel so as not to disrupt previous commitments;

l. That the SECOND PARTY (PTSC/Roland) has the option to terminate the
contract in the event of the SECOND PARTY (PTSC/Roland) decide to stop
operating;

m. The SECOND PARTY (PTSC/Roland) shall give 90 days notice

of such termination of contract;

n. Next x x year of dry-docking and repair of vessel shall be shouldered by the

SECOND PARTY (PTSC/Roland); (Underscoring Supplied]

On August 1, 1984, PTSC/Roland sub-chartered LCT-Josephine to Trigon

Shipping Lines (TSL), a single proprietorship owned by Rolands father, Agustin
de la Torre (Agustin).[9] The following are the terms and conditions of that
Contract of Agreement:[10]

a. Chartered amount of the vessel 30,000.00 per month effective August, 1984;

b. Downpayment of the 50% upon signing of the contract and the balance every
end of the month;

c. Any cost for the additional equipment to be installed on the vessel will be borne
by the FIRST PARTY (PTSC/ Roland) and the cost of the equipment will be
deductible from the monthly rental of the vessel;

d. In the event the vessel is grounded or other [force majeure] that will make the
vessel non-opera[xx]ble, the rental of the vessel shall be suspended from the
start until the vessel will be considered operational;

e. The cost for the dry-docking and/or repair of vessel shall not exceed
200,000.00, any excess shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY (TSL/Agustin);

f. The SECOND PARTY (TSL/Agustin) undertakes to shoulder the maintenance

cost for the duration of the usage;

g. All cost for the necessary repair of the vessel shall be on the account of the
SECOND PARTY (TSL/Agustin);

h. That the SECOND PARTY (TSL/Agustin) has the option to terminate the
contract in the event the SECOND PARTY (TSL/Agustin) decides to stop
operating;

j. The FIRST PARTY (PTSC/Roland) will terminate the services of all vessels
crew and the SECOND PARTY (TSL/Agustin) shall have the right to replace and
rehire the crew of the vessel.

k. Insurance premium of the vessel will be divided equally between the FIRST
PARTY (PTSC/Rolando) and the SECOND PARTY (TSL/ Agustin). [Underscoring
supplied]

On November 22, 1984, TSL, this time represented by Roland per Agustins
Special Power of Attorney,[11] sub-chartered LCT-Josephine to Ramon
Larrazabal (Larrazabal) for the transport of cargo consisting of sand and gravel to
Leyte. The following were agreed upon in that contract,[12] to wit:

1. That the FIRST PARTY (TSL by Roland) agreed that LCT-Josephine shall be
used by the SECOND PARTY (Larrazabal) for and in consideration on the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (5,500.00) PESOS, Philippine currency per
day charter with the following terms and conditions.

2. That the CHARTERER should pay 2,000.00 as standby pay even that will
made (sic) the vessel non-opera[xx]ble cause[d] by natur[al] circumstances.

3. That the CHARTERER will supply the consumed crude oil and lube oil per
charter day.

4. That the SECOND PARTY (Larrazabal) is the one responsible to supervise in

loading and unloading of cargo load on the vessel.

5. That the SECOND PARTY (Larrazabal) shall give one week notice for such
termination of contract.

6. TERMS OF PAYMENTS that the SECOND PARTY (Larrazabal) agreed to pay

15 days in advance and the balance should be paid weekly. [Underscoring
Supplied]

On November 23, 1984, the LCT-Josephine with its cargo of sand and gravel
arrived at Philpos, Isabel, Leyte. The vessel was beached near the NDC Wharf.
With the vessels ramp already lowered, the unloading of the vessels cargo began
with the use of Larrazabals payloader. While the payloader was on the deck of
the LCT-Josephine scooping a load of the cargo, the vessels ramp started to
move downward, the vessel tilted and sea water rushed in. Shortly thereafter,

LCT-Josephine sank.[13]

Concepcion demanded that PTSC/ Roland refloat LCT-Josephine. The latter

assured Concepcion that negotiations were underway for the refloating of his
vessel.[14] Unfortunately, this did not materialize.

For this reason, Concepcion was constrained to institute a complaint for Sum of
Money and Damages against PTSC and Roland before the RTC. PTSC and
Roland filed their answer together with a third-party complaint against Agustin.
Agustin, in turn, filed his answer plus a fourth-party complaint against Larrazabal.
The latter filed his answer and counterclaim but was subsequently declared in
default by the RTC.[15] Eventually, the fourth-party complaint against Larrazabal
was dismissed when the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Concepcion on
July 10, 1991.[16] In said RTC decision, the following observations were written:

The testimonies of Roland de la Torre and Hubart Sungayan quoted above,

show: (1) that the payloader was used to unload the cargo of sand and gravel;
(2) that the payloader had to go inside the vessel and scoop up a load; (3) that
the ramp according to Roland de la Torre, was not properly put into peak (sic)
such that the front line will touch the bottom, particularly will touch the sea x x x;
(4) that the tires (of the payloader) will be submerged to (sic) the sea; (5) that
according to Sungayan the ramp of the vessel was moving down; (6) that the
payloader had to be maneuvered by its operator who dumped the load at the
side of the vessel; (7) that the dumping of the load changed the stability of the
vessel and tilted it to the starboard side; and (8) that the tilting caused the sliding
of the cargo toward that side and opened the manhole through which seawater
rushed in.[17]
Hubart Sungayan, who was the chiefmate of LCT-Josephine and under the
employ of TSL/Agustin, also admitted at the trial that it was TSL/Agustin, through
its crew, who was in-charge of LCT-Josephines operations although the
responsibility of loading and unloading the cargo was under Larrazabal. Thus,
the RTC declared that the efficient cause of the sinking of the LCT-JOSEPHINE
was the improper lowering or positioning of the ramp, which was well within the
charge or responsibility of the captain and crew of the vessel.[18] The fallo of the
RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. The defendants, Philippine Trigon Shipping Corporation and Roland de la

Torre, and the third-party defendant, Agustin de la Torre, shall pay the plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-ONE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS AND EIGHTY SIX CENTAVOS
(841,386.86) as the value of the LCT JOSEPHINE with interest thereon at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of demand, that is from March 14,
1985, the date when counsel for the defendant Philippine Trigon Shipyard
Corporation answered the demand of the plaintiff, until fully paid;

2. The defendants, Philippine Trigon Shipyard Corporation and Roland de la

Torre, shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of NINETY THOUSAND PESOS
(90,000.00) as unpaid rentals for the period from May 1, 1984, to November,
1984, and the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(170,000.00) as lost rentals from December, 1984, to April 30, 1986, with
interest on both amounts at the rate of 6% per annum also from demand on
March 14, 1985, until fully paid;

3. The defendants and the third-party defendant shall likewise pay to the plaintiff
jointly and severally the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(25,000.00) as professional fee of plaintiffs counsel plus FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (500.00) per appearance of said counsel in connection with actual trial
of this case, the number of such appearances to be determined from the records
of this case;

4. The defendants counterclaim for the unpaid balance of plaintiffs obligation for
the dry-docking and repair of the vessel LCT JOSEPHINE in the amount of
TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS AND THIRTYFIVE CENTAVOS (24,304.35), being valid, shall be deducted from the unpaid
rentals, with interest on the said unpaid balance at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of the filing of the counter-claim on March 31, 1986;

5. The counter-claim of the defendants in all other respects, for lack of merit, is
hereby DISMISSED;

6. The fourth-party complaint against the fourth-party defendant, Ramon

Larrazabal, being without basis, is likewise DISMISSED; and

7. The defendants and third-party defendant shall pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Agustin, PTSC and Roland went to the CA on appeal. The appellate court, in
agreement with the findings of the RTC, affirmed its decision in toto.

Still not in conformity with the CA findings against them, Agustin, PTSC and
Roland came to this Court through these petitions for review. In G.R. No. 160088,
petitioner Agustin raises the following issues:

AGUSTINS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROXIMATE

CAUSE OF THE SINKING OF LCT JOSEPHINE IS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PETITIONER (Agustin) AND THE RESPONDENTS TRIGON (PTSC) AND DE LA
TORRE (Roland).

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENT RAMON

LARRAZABAL AS SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE LOSS AND SINKING OF LCT
JOSEPHINE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LCT
JOSEPHINE AND PAYLOADER WITHOUT INFORMING THE PARTIES OF
THEIR INTENTION.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONER DIRECTLY AND

SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE RESPONDENTS TRIGON AND DE LA TORRE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH KIND OF LIABILITY IS NOT DULY ALLEGED
IN THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT CONCEPCION AND NOT ONE OF
THE ISSUES TRIED BY THE PARTIES.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS

LIABLE BASED ON CULPA CONTRACTUAL.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCULPATING PETITIONER

FROM LIABILITY BASED ON THE LIMITED LIABILITY RULE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF

THE CODE OF COMMERCE ON THE LIABILITY OF THE SHIP CAPTAIN.[20]
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 160565, PTSC and Roland submit the following
issues:

PTSC and ROLANDS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.

DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRxx IN APPLYING THE

PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES PARTICULARLY ON
CONTRACTS, LEASE, QUASI-DELICT AND DAMAGES INSTEAD OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CODE OF COMMERCE ON MARITIME COMMERCE IN
ADJUDGING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CONCEPCION.

II.

DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRxx IN UPHOLDING THE

FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT.

III.

DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITxx GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
IN APPRECIATING THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

IV.

DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ADJUDGING PETITIONERS

JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH RESPONDENT AGUSTIN DE LA
TORRE, ERRxx WHEN IT MADE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WHICH ARE BEYOND THE ISSUES SET FORTH AND CONTEMPLATED
IN THE ORIGINAL PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES.[21]

From the foregoing, the issues raised in the two petitions can be categorized as:
(1) those referring to the factual milieu of the case; (2) those concerning the
applicability of the Code of Commerce, more specifically, the Limited Liability
Rule; and (3) the question on the solidary liability of the petitioners.

As regards the issues requiring a review of the factual findings of the trial court,
the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the rule that findings of fact
of a trial judge, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
before this Court.[22] The CA, in reviewing the findings of the RTC, made these
observations:

We are not persuaded that the trial Court finding should be set aside. The Court
a quo sifted through the records and arrived at the fact that clearly, there was
improper lowering or positioning of the ramp, which was not at peak, according to
de la Torre and moving down according to Sungayan when the payloader
entered and scooped up a load of sand and gravel. Because of this, the
payloader was in danger of being lost (submerged) and caused Larrazabal to
order the operator to go back into the vessel, according to de la Torres version,
or back off to the shore, per Sungayan. Whichever it was, the fact remains that
the ramp was unsteady (moving) and compelled action to save the payloader
from submerging, especially because of the conformation of the sea and the

shore. x x x.

xxx

The contract executed on June 20, 1984, between plaintiff-appellee and

defendants-appellants showed that the services of the crew of the owner of the
vessel were terminated. This allowed the charterer, defendants-appellants, to
employ their own. The sub-charter contract between defendants-appellants
Philippine Trigon Shipyard Corp. and third-party defendant-appellant Trigon
Shipping Lines showed similar provision where the crew of Philippine Trigon had
to be terminated or rehired by Trigon Shipping Lines. As to the agreement with
fourth-party Larrazabal, it is silent on who would hire the crew of the vessel.
Clearly, the crew manning the vessel when it sunk belonged to third-party
defendant-appellant. Hubart Sungayan, the acting Chief Mate, testified that he
was hired by Agustin de la Torre, who in turn admitted to hiring the crew. The
actions of fourth-party defendant, Larrazabal and his payloader operator did not
include the operation of docking where the problem arose.[23] [Underscoring
supplied]

Similarly, the Court has examined the records at hand and completely agree with
the CA that the factual findings of the RTC are in order.

With respect to petitioners position that the Limited Liability Rule under the Code
of Commerce should be applied to them, the argument is misplaced. The said
rule has been explained to be that of the real and hypothecary doctrine in
maritime law where the shipowner or ship agents liability is held as merely coextensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its
extinction.[24] In this jurisdiction, this rule is provided in three articles of the Code
of Commerce. These are:

Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of
third persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the
goods which he loaded on the vessel; but he may exempt himself therefrom by
abandoning the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned

during the voyage.

--Art. 590. The co-owners of the vessel shall be civilly liable in the proportion of
their interests in the common fund for the results of the acts of the captain
referred to in Art. 587.

Each co-owner may exempt himself from this liability by the abandonment,
before a notary, of the part of the vessel belonging to him.

---

Art. 837. The civil liability incurred by shipowners in the case prescribed in this
section, shall be understood as limited to the value of the vessel with all its
appurtenances and freightage served during the voyage.

Article 837 specifically applies to cases involving collision which is a necessary

consequence of the right to abandon the vessel given to the shipowner or ship
agent under the first provision Article 587. Similarly, Article 590 is a reiteration of
Article 587, only this time the situation is that the vessel is co-owned by several
persons.[25] Obviously, the forerunner of the Limited Liability Rule under the
Code of Commerce is Article 587. Now, the latter is quite clear on which
indemnities may be confined or restricted to the value of the vessel pursuant to
the said Rule, and these are the indemnities in favor of third persons which may
arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on
the vessel. Thus, what is contemplated is the liability to third persons who may
have dealt with the shipowner, the agent or even the charterer in case of demise
or bareboat charter.

The only person who could avail of this is the shipowner, Concepcion. He is the
very person whom the Limited Liability Rule has been conceived to protect. The
petitioners cannot invoke this as a defense. In Yangco v. Laserna,[26] this Court,

through Justice Moran, wrote:

The policy which the rule is designed to promote is the encouragement of

shipbuilding and investment in maritime commerce.

x x x.

Grotius, in his law of War and Peace, says that men would be deterred from
investing in ships if they thereby incurred the apprehension of being rendered
liable to an indefinite amount by the acts of the master, x x x.[27]

Later, in the case of Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA,[28] this Court, this time
through Justice Sabino R. De Leon, Jr., again explained:

No vessel, no liability, expresses in a nutshell the limited liability rule. The

shipowners or agents liability is merely coextensive with his interest in the vessel
such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. The total destruction of the
vessel extinguishes maritime liens because there is no longer any res to which it
can attach. This doctrine is based on the real and hypothecary nature of maritime
law which has its origin in the prevailing conditions of the maritime trade and sea
voyages during the medieval ages, attended by innumerable hazards and perils.
To offset against these adverse conditions and to encourage shipbuilding and
maritime commerce, it was deemed necessary to confine the liability of the owner
or agent arising from the operation of a ship to the vessel, equipment, and
freight, or insurance, if any.[29]

In view of the foregoing, Concepcion as the real shipowner is the one who is
supposed to be supported and encouraged to pursue maritime commerce. Thus,
it would be absurd to apply the Limited Liability Rule against him who, in the first
place, should be the one benefitting from the said rule. In distinguishing the rights
between the charterer and the shipowner, the case of Yueng Sheng Exchange
and Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co.[30] is most enlightening. In that case, no less
than Chief Justice Arellano wrote:

The whole ground of this assignment of errors rests on the proposition advanced
by the appellant company that the charterer of a vessel, under the conditions
stipulated in the charter party in question, is the owner pro hac vice of the ship
and takes upon himself the responsibilities of the owner.
xxx

If G. Urrutia & Co., by virtue of the above-mentioned contract, became the agents
of the Cebu, then they must respond for the damages claimed, because the
owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain.

But G. Urrutia & Co. could not in any way exercise the powers or rights of an
agent. They could not represent the ownership of the vessel, nor could they, in
their own name and in such capacity, take judicial or extrajudicial steps in all that
relates to commerce; thus if the Cebu were attached, they would have no legal
capacity to proceed to secure its release; speaking generally, not even the fines
could or ought to be paid by them, unless such fines were occasioned by their
orders. x x x.

The contract executed by Smith, Bell & Co., as agents for the Cebu, and G.
Urrutia & Co., as charterers of the vessel, did not put the latter in the place of the
former, nor make them agents of the owner or owners of the vessel. With relation
to those agents, they retained opposing rights derived from the charter party of
the vessel, and at no time could they be regarded by the third parties, or by the
authorities, or by the courts, as being in the place of the owners or the agents in
matters relating to the responsibilities pertaining to the ownership and
possession of the vessel. x x x.[31]

In Yueng Sheng, it was further stressed that the charterer does not completely
and absolutely step into the shoes of the shipowner or even the ship agent
because there remains conflicting rights between the former and the real
shipowner as derived from their charter agreement. The Court again quotes
Chief Justice Arellano:

Their (the charterers) possession was, therefore, the uncertain title of lease, not
a possession of the owner, such as is that of the agent, who is fully subrogated to
the place of the owner in regard to the dominion, possession, free administration,
and navigation of the vessel.[32]
Therefore, even if the contract is for a bareboat or demise charter where
possession, free administration and even navigation are temporarily surrendered
to the charterer, dominion over the vessel remains with the shipowner. Ergo, the
charterer or the sub-charterer, whose rights cannot rise above that of the former,
can never set up the Limited Liability Rule against the very owner of the vessel.
Borrowing the words of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Indeed, where the
reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself does not apply.[33]

The Court now comes to the issue of the liability of the charterer and the subcharterer.

In the present case, the charterer and the sub-charterer through their respective
contracts of agreement/charter parties, obtained the use and service of the entire
LCT-Josephine. The vessel was likewise manned by the charterer and later by
the sub-charterers people. With the complete and exclusive relinquishment of
possession, command and navigation of the vessel, the charterer and later the
sub-charterer became the vessels owner pro hac vice. Now, and in the absence
of any showing that the vessel or any part thereof was commercially offered for
use to the public, the above agreements/charter parties are that of a private
carriage where the rights of the contracting parties are primarily defined and
governed by the stipulations in their contract.[34]

Although certain statutory rights and obligations of charter parties are found in
the Code of Commerce, these provisions as correctly pointed out by the RTC,
are not applicable in the present case. Indeed, none of the provisions found in
the Code of Commerce deals with the specific rights and obligations between the
real shipowner and the charterer obtaining in this case. Necessarily, the Court
looks to the New Civil Code to supply the deficiency.[35] Thus, the RTC and the
CA were both correct in applying the statutory provisions of the New Civil Code in
order to define the respective rights and obligations of the opposing parties.

Thus, Roland, who, in his personal capacity, entered into the Preliminary
Agreement with Concepcion for the dry-docking and repair of LCT-Josephine, is
liable under Article 1189[36] of the New Civil Code. There is no denying that the
vessel was not returned to Concepcion after the repairs because of the provision
in the Preliminary Agreement that the same should be used by Roland for the
first two years. Before the vessel could be returned, it was lost due to the
negligence of Agustin to whom Roland chose to sub-charter or sublet the vessel.

PTSC is liable to Concepcion under Articles 1665[37] and 1667[38] of the New
Civil Code. As the charterer or lessee under the Contract of Agreement dated
June 20, 1984, PTSC was contract-bound to return the thing leased and it was
liable for the deterioration or loss of the same.

Agustin, on the other hand, who was the sub-charterer or sub-lessee of LCTJosephine, is liable under Article 1651 of the New Civil Code.[39] Although he
was never privy to the contract between PTSC and Concepcion, he remained
bound to preserve the chartered vessel for the latter. Despite his non-inclusion in
the complaint of Concepcion, it was deemed amended so as to include him
because, despite or in the absence of that formality of amending the complaint to
include him, he still had his day in court[40] as he was in fact impleaded as a
third-party defendant by his own son, Roland the very same person who
represented him in the Contract of Agreement with Larrazabal.

(S)ince the purpose of formally impleading a party is to assure him a day in court,
once the protective mantle of due process of law has in fact been accorded a
litigant, whatever the imperfection in form, the real litigant may be held liable as a
party.[41]

In any case, all three petitioners are liable under Article 1170 of the New Civil
Code.[42] The necessity of insuring the LCT-Josephine, regardless of who will
share in the payment of the premium, is very clear under the Preliminary
Agreement and the subsequent Contracts of Agreement dated June 20, 1984
and August 1, 1984, respectively. The August 17, 1984 letter of Concepcions
representative, Rogelio L. Martinez, addressed to Roland in his capacity as the
president of PTSC inquiring about the insurance of the LCT-Josephine as well as

reiterating the importance of insuring the said vessel is quite telling.

August 17, 1984

Mr. Roland de la Torre
President
Phil. Trigon Shipyard Corp.
Cebu City

Dear Sir:

In connection with your chartering of LCT JOSEPHINE effect[ive] May 1, 1984, I

wish to inquire regarding the insurance of said vessel to wit:

1. Name of Insurance Company

2. Policy No.
3. Amount of Premiums
4. Duration of coverage already paid

Please send a Xerox copy of policy to the undersigned as soon as possible.

In no case shall LCT JOSEPHINE sail without any insurance coverage.

Hoping for your (prompt) action on this regard.

Truly yours,
(sgd)ROGELIO L. MARTINEZ
Owners representative[43]

Clearly, the petitioners, to whom the possession of LCT Josephine had been
entrusted as early as the time when it was dry-docked for repairs, were obliged to
insure the same. Unfortunately, they failed to do so in clear contravention of their
respective agreements. Certainly, they should now all answer for the loss of the
vessel.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G. R. No. 129970. April 5, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO PAVILLARE y

VARONA and SOTERO SANTOS y CRUZ, accused, EDUARDO PAVILLARE y
VARONA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM: yacats

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case no. Q96-65214 entitled People vs. Eduardo
Pavillare y Varona, a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom.

On March 14, 1996 the accused-appellant and his co-accused were criminally
charged as follows:

INFORMATION

"The undersigned accuses EDUARDO PAVILLARE Y VARONA and SOTERO

SANTOS Y CRUZ of the crime of kidnapping for Ransom, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of February, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with another person, whose
true name, identity and whereabouts had not as yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and /or intimidation did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one SUKHJINDER
SINGH at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, this City, and thereafter
brought him at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston street, this City, for the
purpose of extorting ransom money in the amount of P20,000.00 Philippine
currency, thereby detaining and depriving him of his liberty for more than three
hours, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party."

On April 29, 1996 both accused were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty".

The accused Sotero Santos y Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge against
him for failure of the private complainant to identify him as one of the
malefactors. On February 28, 1997 the trial court granted the motion and
acquitted accused Sotero Santos. The trial of the case proceeded only as against
the accused-appellant Pavillare. Chiefx

The private complainant, an Indian national named Sukhjinder Singh testified in

court that at about noon of February 12, 1996 while he was on his way back to
his motorcycle parked at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, three
men blocked his way. The one directly in front of him, whom he later identified as
herein accused-appellant, accused him of having raped the woman inside the red
Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the accusation, the three men
nevertheless forced him inside the taxi cab and brought him somewhere near St
Joseph's College in Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his
motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. Singh testified that the accusedappellant and his companions beat him up and demanded one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) for his release but Singh told him he only had five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) with him. The accused-appellant forced him to give the phone
numbers of his relatives so they can make their demand from them. Singh gave
the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Singh and the appellant made the call.
The private complainant also stated in court that it was accused-appellant who
haggled with his cousin for the amount of the ransom.[1] When the amount of
twenty five thousand was agreed upon the complainant stated that the
kidnappers took him to the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston streets and
parked the cab there. The accused-appellant and two of the male abductors
alighted while the driver and their lady companion stayed with the complainant in
the car. When the complainant turned to see where the accused-appellant and
his, companions went he saw his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle and
together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers
brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The
ransom money was handed to the appellant by the complainant's cousin, after
which the accused-appellant counted the money and then, together with his
cohorts, immediately left the scene.[2]

Lakhvir Singh, the complainant's cousin, testified in court that the kidnappers
made about three to four phone calls a few minutes apart. The kidnappers
allowed him to talk to the private complainant to prove that he is indeed in their
custody. The kidnappers also told Lakhvir that his cousin, Sukhjinder, raped their
companion and threatened that unless Lakhvir pays one hundred thousand
pesos for Sukhjinder's release "tutuluyan namin ito". Lakhvir told the kidnappers
he does not have that much money and after some haggling the kidnappers
settled for twenty five thousand pesos.[3] The kidnappers also gave instructions
to deliver the money outside the Aurora Boulevard branch of the Land Bank near
the old Arcega's movie house. Lakhvir stated in court that he did as instructed.
When he and another relative reached the designated place three men
approached him and one of them, whom he identified in court as the accused-

appellant herein, asked him "Ano dala mo ang pera?" Lakhvir said "yes" but, he
refused to give the money until he saw his cousin. One of the kidnappers told him
to follow them and they proceeded to a mini-grocery nearby. A few minutes later
one of the kidnappers came with his cousin. Lakhvir handed the money to the
accused-appellant who counted it before leaving with his companions.[4] CODES

SPO1 Eduardo Frias testified for the prosecution that he was the police officer
who took the sworn statement of the private complainant on February 14, 1996
pertaining to the February 12, 1996 incident.[5] When the accused-appellant was
apprehended in connection with another case involving the kidnapping of another
Indian national the private complainant herein again showed up at the police
station on March 11, 1996 and identified the accused-appellant as one of his
kidnappers. Another sworn statement was executed by the private complainant
after he identified the accused-appellant at the police station.[6]

For the defense, the accused-appellant testified that on the whole day of
February 12, 1996, the alleged date of the incident, he was at the job site in
Novaliches where he had contracted to build the house of a client and that he
could not have been anywhere near Roces Avenue at the time the complainant
was allegedly kidnapped.[7] One of his employees, an electrician, testified that
the accused-appellant was indeed at the job site in Novaliches the whole day of
February 12, 1996.[8]

On July 15, 1997 the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding EDUARDO PAVILLARE guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of having committed the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of ransom, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death; to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P20,000.00, as actual damages, with interest at 6%
percent per annum from February 12, 1996; to pay him the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.

The Branch clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit the entire
records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review."[9]

This, case is before us on automatic review.

The accused-appellant Pavillare prays for an acquittal based on reasonable

doubt. On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant was apprehended in
connection with the kidnapping of another Indian national. While under police
custody the appellant was required to stand in a police line-up where he was
supposedly identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors. Five
separate charges arising from five separate incidents of kidnapping, all of whom
were Indian nationals, were filed against him. He claims that he was identified by
the private complainant as one of his abductors because the Indians needed a
"scapegoat" for the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian nationals then
pending. HTML

The appellant argues that the private complainant could not identify his captors
by himself which is shown by the inconsistencies in his testimony and by the
improper suggestion made by the investigating police officer pointing to the
accused-appellant as one of the malefactors. In court the private complainant
stated that he described his abductors to the police investigator while the latter
typed his sworn statement. He said that two of the abductors look like policemen,
the third one was "tall, a little bit aged" and the other one was the driver. Their
female companion was pretty. Pavillare points out however, that the sworn
statement given by the private complainant does not contain a physical
description of the kidnappers and that SPO1 Frias, who took the complainant's
statement, testified in court that the complainant described one of his abductors
as short, bejeweled and with a pock marked face. The different descriptions
allegedly given by the private complainant and the absence of a physical
description of the kidnappers in his sworn statement supports the accusedappellant's contention that the complainant could not describe his abductors.
Pavillare contends that his arrest in connection with a different case for the
kidnapping of another Indian national provided the complainant an improper
suggestion that he was indeed one of the culprits in this case. The appellant
claims that SPO1 Frias pointed to him and conversed with the private
complainant before the latter was asked to identify the kidnappers. The time
interval from the date of the incident on February 12, 1996 up to the day the
accused-appellant was identified at the police line-up on March 11, 1996 further
weakened the complainant's vague recognition of the culprits. Pavillare finally

argues that he should not have been convicted of kidnapping for ransom but only
of simple robbery as it is borne by the undisputed facts that the offenders were
motivated by an intent to gain and not to deprive the complainant of his liberty.
The money demanded by the offenders was not ransom money but one in the
nature of a bribe to drop the accusation for rape of their lady companion.

The Solicitor-General filed brief praying for the affirmance in toto of the appealed
decision. The appellee contends that in court the private complainant
unhesitatingly and consistently identified the accused-appellant Pavillare as one
of the kidnappers. Throughout his narration of the incident in court the
complainant referred to Pavillare as one of the kidnappers because he was the
one who made the phone call and the one who received the ransom money. The
complainant had more than adequate opportunity to observe his abductors and
he testified in court that Pavillare is one of them. As a sign of the complainant's
candor, he admitted in court that he does not recognize the other co-accused,
Sotero Santos, as one of his abductors and for which reason the case was
dismissed against him. The complainant's failure to state an accurate description
of the kidnappers in his sworn statement does not belie his identification of
Pavillare in court as it is the general rule that affidavits are often inaccurate and
incomplete. The argument of the accused-appellant that his identification in the
police line-up was made with improper motive either from the other Indian
nationals who were at the police station or from SPO1 Frias is without evidentiary
basis. Moreover, the complainant's testimony is corroborated by the testimony of
his cousin who met the kidnappers and handed over the ransom money to them.
The trial court did not err in giving credence to the complainant's identification of
Pavillare as one of the abductors. Esm

The Solicitor-General further contends that the accused-appellant's alibi that he

was in Novaliches when the crime was committed cannot stand against the
positive identification of two witnesses and that his alibi does not make it
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it happened. As
regards accused-appellant's plea to be convicted instead of simple robbery is
without legal nor factual basis. The complainant was restrained of his liberty even
if only for a few hours and his captors demanded money for his release which in
fact they did after the ransom money was paid. Whether or not the kidnappers
only wanted money from the complainant the manner by which they compelled
him to give money, i.e. by restraining his liberty until the ransom money was paid,
constitutes kidnapping for ransom. Finally, the submission that the offenders

demanded a bribe and not ransom money is likewise unfounded. There is no

evidence that any one of the kidnappers was a public officer in the performance
of his duties when they demanded money from the complainant in exchange for
his liberty.

Accused-appellant Pavillare filed Reply brief to reiterate his contention that the
prosecution did not controvert his testimony to the effect that the complainant
could not recognize his abductors and that it was SPO1 Frias who pinpointed him
to the private complainant as one of the malefactors. Pavillare cites the
complainant's failure to identify his own relative who met him at the police station
after the arrest of the accused-appellant and argues that considering that the
complainant was held captive only for about two hours and the interval of almost
one month from the day of the incident up to the time the accused-appellant was
identified at the police line-up, the complainant was deprived of any reliable
recollection of his captors. The complainant's failure to give a physical description
of the abductors when he gave a sworn statement to the police two days after the
incident supports the accused-appellant's contention that the complainant could
not identify his captors. It is also claimed that the improper identification of the
accused-appellant at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel renders
the said identification, including that made in court inadmissible in evidence.

The appeal is without merit. Esmsc

The accused-appellants defense that the identification made by the private

complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at
the line-up without the assistance of counsel is without merit.

Section 12 (1) Art III of the Commission states that "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
mandate is inadmissible in evidence.[10] The prohibition however, does not

extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is

not yet a part of custodial investigation.[11] It has been repeatedly held that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein
and which tend to elicit an admission.[12] The stage of an investigation wherein a
person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the
mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature.[13] It has also been
held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the
admissibility of an in-court identification.[14] The identification made by the
private complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his
abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not
assisted by counsel. In court, the private complainant positively identified
Paviallare as one of his captors and testified as follows:

"Q:.....Were you able to recognize the faces of the men and woman who
abducted you on the afternoon of February 12, 1996?

A:.....Yes, sir I can recognize if I see them again.

Q: .....If you see them in court will you be able to identify them?

A: .....Yes, sir.

Q:.....Please point to them if the accused are inside the court room?

A: .....That man, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing at a man seated inside the court room and when asked to
identify himself he gave his name as Eduardo Pavillare. Esmmis

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Other than the accused Pavillare, do you recognize anybody else in this
court room if among those who abducted you in the afternoon of February 12,
1996?

A:.....None, sir.

Q:.....Tell us how were you abducted by the accused Pavillare and his
companions in that particular date in the afternoon of February 12, 1996?

A:.....While I was returning to my motorcycle, they blocked my way and asked for
my name, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q: .....Who blocked your way and asked for your name?

A: .....He was infront of his companions, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness referring to accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....If you know, Mr. Singh, where were you taken by the accused after they
abducted you at the corner of Roces Avenue and Scout Reyes St., Quezon City?

A:.....It was a deserted street somewhere in St. Joseph College, Quezon City, sir.

Q:.....After you reached that deserted place, what happened next, if any?

A:.....They asked me for P100,000.00 and I told them that I have only P5,000,00
and they told me that if I give P 100,000.00 they will let me go, sir.

Q:.....Who demanded the amount of P100,000.00 from you?

WITNESS: Esmso

A:.....He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Again, witness pointing to the accused earlier , identified as Pavillare.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Could you tell us what did your abductors tell to Lakhvir while they are
talking over the telephone?

A:.....They told him that they should pay the amount of money for my release, sir.

Q:.....Incidentally, can you tell us who among your abductors who actually talked
to Lakvir over the telephone?

A:.....He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Again, witness is referring to accused earlier identified as Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Why do you know that it was the accused Pavillare who was talking to
Lakhvir over the telephone?

A:.....Because I was near him and I saw him talking to Lakhvir, sir.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Where did the two of you go?

A:.....Inside the mini-grocery, sir.

Q:.....After you went inside this mini-grocery, what happened next, if any?

A:.....I saw my cousin Lakhvir. He asked me if I am okey and I told him that they
bit me up but I am still fine, sir.

Q:.....After you told your cousin that you are okey except for the beating that you
got but you are fine, what transpired next, if any? Msesm

A: .....Lakhvir gave the P20,000.00, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q: .....To whom did Lakhvir handed the P20,000.00?

A: .....To him sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to the accused Pavillare earlier identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Why do you know that only P20,000.00 was handed over by accused
Pavillare?

A:.....Because they counted the money and they complained about it, sir.

Q:.....Who counted the money?

A:.....He was the one who counted the money, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to accused Pavillare earlier identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Were you present when Pavillare counted the money?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....After Pavillare got the P20,000.00, what happened next, if any?

A:.....They left immediately and they left me too, and we went to get my
Motorcycle, sir."[15]

On cross-examination the complainant stood firm on his identification of the

accused-appellant as one of the abductors. He testified: Percuriam

"ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....You said that at approximately 12:00 o'clock noon of February 12, 1996
while, you are going back to your motorcycle you were blocked by four persons,
is that correct?

ATTY. CRUZ:

.....Misleading, he said 3 persons, your Honor.

COURT:

Reform.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....You were blocked, by 3 persons, is that correct?.

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....Who was the person immediately in front of you when you were blocked?

A:.....He was the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was earlier identified.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....What about the two (2) other persons?

WITNESS: Exsm

A:.....They were behind me, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....What was the distance if you can tell us?

A:.....Almost together and then when they asked me my name I replied and they
hold my arms, sir.

Q:.....Who hold your arms?

A:.....He was the first, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was identified earlier.

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....You said that there were 5 persons who abducted you?

A:.....Yes, sir, 4 male and one female.

Q:.....On March 11, 1996 your cousin informed you or your friend informed you
that there were persons apprehended because also of kidnapping incident?

A:.....Yes, sir. There were 4 of them arrested and when I went to see them I only
recognized one of them, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO:

Q:.....Who was that person?

A:..... He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER: Kylex

Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. MALLABO:

That would be all for the witness, your Honor.

COURT:

Any redirect?

ATTY. CRUZ:

Few redirect, your Honor.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Mr. Witness, before you went to the police station on March 11, 1996 you
were aware of how many suspects were in custody of kidnapping of Gormel, is it
not?

A:.....Yes, sir they were 4 of them.

Q:.....You were aware that 4 persons were arrested for the kidnapping of your
friend Gormel?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....These 4 people were shown to you, were they not?

A:.....Yes, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....But when you were asked to identify who among them were involved in
your kidnapping you only pointed one of them?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:..... You did not point to the other accused?

A:.....No, sir. Kycalr

Q:.....The only one whom you pointed as being involved in your kidnapping was
none other than the person of the accussed Pavillare?

A:.....Yes, sir."[16]

Moreover, the complainant's cousin Lakhvir Singh who met the kidnappers to pay
the ransom money corroborated the complainant's identification of the accusedappellant Pavillare. Lakhvir Singh testified as follows:

"Q:.....After reaching the designated area somewhere along Aurora Boulevard,

what happened next, if any?

A:.....As we parked our motorcycle near Land Bank, the kidnappers immediately

approached us, sir.

Q:.....How many kidnappers approached you?

A:.....Three (3) of them, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....How were you able to know that they are the kidnappers?

A:.....Because when they approached us one of them said: "Ano dala mo and
pera?"

Q:.....Tell us, were you able to recognize the faces of these three persons who
approached you and demanded to you whether you brought the money?

A:.....Yes, sir.

Q:.....If you see anyone inside the courtroom, please point to him. Calrky

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing at a man sitting inside the courtroom and when asked to identify
himself, he gave his name as EDUARDO PAVILLARE.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....After Pavillare demanded to you whether you brought with you the money,
what did you do next, if any?

A:.....I told them "I have the money with me but I would not hand the money to
you until I see Sukhjinder Singh."

Q:.....What was the response of the accused Pavillare after you told him that
Sukhjinder Singh be first shown to you before you turn over the money?

A:.....One of them told us to follow him and they would bring Sukhjinder Singh,
sir.

Q:.....From that place, where did you go if you can still recall?

A:.....We proceeded to a small grocery store near Land Bank, sir.

Q:.....After going inside this grocery store near Land Bank, tell us what happened
next, if any?

A:.....After a few minutes, one of the kidnappers arrived together with Sukhjinder
Singh, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....After you saw Sukhjinder Singh together with one of his kidnappers, what
did you do next, if any?

A:.....I immediately approached Sukhjinder Singh and I asked him if he was hurt
by the kidnappers and he said "yes but I am now okey."

Q:.....After Sukhjinder confirmed to you that he was previously beaten and that
he was already okey at that time, what did you do next, if any?

WITNESS:

A:.....After that, one of the kidnappers said: "Andiyan na ang tao ninyo ibinigay
mo sa akin ang pera".

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....Who among the kidnappers who said that?

A:.....That person, sir.

INTERPRETER: Kortex

Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q:.....After Pavillare demanded that you turn-over to him the money, what did you
do next, if any?

A:.....I gave him the money, sir.

Q:.....When you said "him", to whom are you referring to?

A:.....To him, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:

If you recall, how many money all in all did you give to Eduardo Pavillare that
afternoon of February 12, 1996?

A:.....P20,000.00, sir.[17]

x x x............................x x x............................x x x

We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the
identification in open court of the accused-appellant by the private complainant
and his cousin as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample opportunity
to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The complainant had
close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and
later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His
cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid the
ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in close contact
with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical
appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his
abductors if he sees them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately
recognized him as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as the one who

blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and
received the ransom money. As an indicium of candor the private complainant
admitted that he does not recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos for which
reason the case was dismissed against him. It bears repeating that the finding of
the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect and as a
rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely
observe the demeanor of the witness in court. Rtcspped

As regards the alibi forwarded by the appellant, we find that the positive
identification made by two eyewitnesses for the prosecution pointing to the
appellant as one of the kidnappers prevails over it. The appellant's employee
who testified to corroborate his alibi only stated that in the month of February
1996 the accused-appellant was at the Novaliches job site everyday[18] The trial
court properly took judicial notice that it will take only a few hours drive from
Novaliches, where the accused-appellant claimed to be on the day of the
incident, to Roces Ave., in Quezon City,where the complainant was kidnapped.
[19] Absent any competent proof that Pavillare could not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time and day it was committed, the trial court correctly denied
weight and credence to the appellant's alibi.

Pavillare's argument that the complainant could not have identified his abductors
were it not for the improper suggestion made by the police investigator is based
on the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the accused-appellant himself. The
police investigator was not confronted with this accusation[20] and the defense
did not present any evidence to support it. It is on record that when Pavillare's
counsel made an attempt to question the police investigator, SPO1 Frias, on a
matter not covered by the direct examination, i.e., where SPO1 Frias recorded
the physical description given by the complainant of his abductors, the trial court
suggested that the defense may later call SPO1 Frias to the stand as a defense
witness apparently to give the defense a chance to prove its allegation that the
complainant did not give any physical description of his abductors and that the
identification at the police line-up is tainted with an improper suggestion.[21] The
defense counsel never called SPO1 Frias to the stand. The appellant must prove
the veracity of his own defense[22] and the prosecution could not controvert what
was not presented in evidence. In the same vein, the defense did not present any
competent proof that Pavillare was identified by the complainant only as a
scapegoat for the four other kidnapping cases committed against other Indian
nationals. Slxmis

The cited variance between the complainant's testimony in court and his affidavit
on whether or not the complainant gave a physical description of his abductors
before the police investigator pertains to a minor detail. Both the complainant and
police investigator SPO1 Frias testified that the former gave a physical
description of the abductors to the police. The complainant testified that he gave
the physical description of the kidnappers while the police typed his affidavit but
no such physical description of the kidnappers is stated in the affidavit. On the
other hand, the police investigator testified that the said description was entered
in the police logbook. The defense never required SPO1 Frias to produce the
logbook in court to ascertain whether such a description was given during the
investigation. As a rule, variance between the private complainant's affidavit and
his testimony in court, as long as it does not deviate from the nature of the crime
as stated in the Information, does not weaken the credibility of the testimony in
court.[23]

Finally, the accused-appellant's argument that he should have been convicted of

simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves
that the prime motive of the accused-appellant and his companions is to obtain
money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours, are both
unmeritorious. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.- any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1......If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2......If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3......If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4......If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or

is the subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.[24] Missdaa

The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin are replete with
positive declarations that the accused-appellant and his companions demanded
money for the complainant's release. The pretense that the money was
supposedly in exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not supported
by the evidence. The complainant's cousin testified that at the agreed drop-off
point Pavillare demanded the ransom money and stated, "Andiyan na ang tao
ninyo ibigay mo sa akin ang pera". The accused-appellant released the
complainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the
money Pavillare and his companions immediately left the scene. This clearly
indicated that the payment of the ransom money is in exchange for the liberty of
the private complainant. The death penalty was properly imposed by the trial
court.[25]

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the
nature of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by
depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply
restrained from going home.[26] As squarely expressed in Article 267, abovequoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.

Four Members of the court maintain their position that RA 7659 is

unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nonetheless they

submit to the ruling of the majority of this Court i.e., that the law is constitutional
and the death penalty should be imposed in this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in

Criminal Case No. Q96-65214 finding the accused-appellant Eduardo Pavillare y
Varona guilty of kidnapping for ransom and imposing the DEATH penalty and the
awards for actual and moral damages is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146277. June 20, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERT CASIMIRO y

SERILLO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated October 17, 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Albert Casimiro
guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, 4, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the
costs.

The information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did

then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2
DOROTHEO SUPA of the 14th Regional Field Office, Narcotics Unit, posing as
buyer, about nine hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick
form, without any authority of law to do so and knowing fully well that the article is
a prohibited drug, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.[2]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,

whereupon the trial of the case followed.[3]

Three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo Supa,[4] Alma
Margarita D. Villaseor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. Their testimonies
established the following:

On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of
Police Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng at the 14th Regional Narcotics
Office, DPS Compound in Baguio City. She informed Chief Inspector Leleng and
PO3 Juan Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant herein,
was engaged in the distribution or sale of marijuana. As proof, Rose told the
police officers to wait and accused-appellant would call them up on that day.
Accused-appellant, however, did not call up. Nonetheless, Police Chief Inspector
Leleng formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Edgar Afalla as team
leader, PO2 Dorotheo Supa as poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marquez Madlon and
PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. as back-up men.[5]

The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics agents to wait
for a call from accused-appellant. True enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the
telephone rang. When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he found that it was
accused-appellant who was calling. Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa
to accused-appellant as someone who wanted to buy marijuana. Accusedappellant allegedly agreed to meet PO2 Supa at around 1:00 p.m. the following
day outside Anthonys Wine and Grocery at the YMCA Building, Post Office Loop,
Upper Session Road. PO2 Supa said he wanted to buy one kilogram of
marijuana and accused-appellant said it would cost P1,500.00. Accusedappellant said he would wear white pants and a black leather jacket to their
meeting the following day.[6]

On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went to the
grocery store. SPO2 Madlon and PO3 Piggangay waited secretly inside the Post
Office building, around 12 meters across the street, where they could see PO2
Supa and Rose. At around 1:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived. Rose greeted
him, O Bert, heto na yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na kayong magusap. Aalis na ako. (Bert, here is the buyer I told you about. Ill leave you two
alone to talk.) Rose then left the two men alone.[7]

PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana.
Accused-appellant gave the poseur-buyer a paper bag, which contained an
object wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After determining from its appearance
and smell that the object inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the
back-up team to make an arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no
longer gave the marked money to accused-appellant because he placed the
latter under arrest, reciting to him his rights, while the back-up team ran from
across the street.[8]

After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the 14th Narcom
Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials
on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The
policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request
for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana.[9] They also
prepared a receipt of property seized, dated August 18, 1999, (Exh. L) which
states:

18 August 1999

RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the undersigned

seizing Officer have seized and taken possession of the property described
hereunder from the

a. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs.-old, single, waiter, native of

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and resident of #2 Happy Homes, Old Lucban,
Baguio City.

b. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this office on or about
181330H August 1999, in front of Anthonys Grocery along the vicinity of Post
Office Loop, Baguio City.

c. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as amended by RA

7659.

EXHIBIT
QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION
REMARKS
A
One (1) Bricks Marijuana Dried Leaves wrapped in a newspaper page placed
inside a black plastic bag with markings Prime wear shirt haus place[d] inside a
dark gray paper bag with markings Spencer & SM City
Delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer.

WITNESSES:

(signed)
1. PO3 Juan A. Piggangay
PNP

(signed)
2. PO2 Dorotheo T. Supa
PNP
(signed)
ALBERT CASIMIRO Y CERILLO
(Suspect/ Owner)

(signed)
SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon
PNP (Seizing Officer)

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel.[10] The

dried leaves were then examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
Cordillera Administrative Region.[11] Police officer and forensic chemist Alma
Margarita Villaseor found the specimen to weigh 904.6 grams. The chemistry
report dated August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves were
positive for marijuana.[12]

The defense then presented evidence showing the following: Accused-appellant,

then 25 years old, residing at No. 1 Old Lucban Street, Happy Homes, Baguio
City,[13] said that at around 8:00 a.m. of August 16, 1999, he took the child of his
neighbor to the Christian Mission Center School near the Baguio General
Hospital. He then went home and stayed there during the day, as he usually did,
except when he needed to fetch the boy from school. At around 5:00 or 5:30
p.m., he reported for work at the Perutz Bar[14] on Magsaysay Avenue, where he
worked as a waiter, until 3:00 a.m. of the next day.[15]

On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call from Rose, an

acquaintance who worked as a guest relations officer at a club on Magsaysay
Avenue. Rose offered to help him find a better job and asked that they meet at
Anthonys Wine and Grocery. In the past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or
marijuana, but he refused to buy from her as he had no money.[16] At around
1:00 or 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant met Rose in front of the grocery store.
While she talked to him about a job opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3
Piggangay grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted I-handcuff, ihandcuff! (Handcuff him, handcuff him!) Accused-appellant was then taken to the
Regional Narcotics Office by the policemen, accompanied by Rose.[17]

At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accused-appellant about the

marijuana allegedly seized from him. Accused-appellant said he denied having
carried the bag of marijuana which he had seen Rose carrying earlier.[18] After
taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him
in a secluded place if he did not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make
him admit ownership of the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release
accused-appellant if he gave them money. When accused-appellant replied that
he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, If you have no money, then we will work
on your papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa. The policemen then took
accused-appellant to a hospital for a physical examination and afterwards asked
him to sign a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report without
explaining their contents or allowing him to read them.[19]

On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accusedappellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of its decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Albert Casimiro guilty beyond doubt
of Violation of Section 4 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended by
Sections 13 and 17 of RA 7659 (Sale or delivery of 904.6 grams of marijuana
brick) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a Fine of P500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The marijuana brick weighing 904.6 grams (Exhs. J to J-4) being the subject of
the crime and a prohibited drug is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.

The accused Albert Casimiro, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be credited

in the service of his sentence 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in accordance
with the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that the evidence against him is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[21]

We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal, the rule does not apply where it is shown that any
fact of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court.[22] In this case, several such circumstances stand
out as having been overlooked or misapprehended by the lower court which
entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.

First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the
lower court declared:

The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which
was signed by the accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The
receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their
standard operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was
seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.[23]

Indeed, the receipt (Exh. L) could not be considered evidence against accusedappellant because it was signed by him without the assistance of counsel.[24]

Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the
suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as
suspect/ owner. In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a
prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made
without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana
was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.[25]

In People v. Obrero,[26] this Court held that an uncounseled statement is

presumed by the Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an
unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of
counsel.

PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights

while he was being arrested outside the grocery:

Q: What happened after you brought out your comb and started combing your
hair?

A: Sir, my two companions went to our place and effected the arrest of the
suspect.

Q: What else happened after the two members of the team rushed to your place?

A: We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and brought him to our
Narcotics office.

Q: How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?

A: Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, You are under arrest
for violation of 6425. You have the right to remain silent. You have the rights to
call for a lawyer of your own choice. Anything you say may be used as evidence
in favor or against you. And we brought him to the office, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Sir, we investigated him and the suspect identified himself as Albert Casimiro.
[27]

The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accusedappellant could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning
was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It was
merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the
suspect.[28] We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accusedappellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police
investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say
whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of
counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.

Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant. As he

points out, he could not have been so careless as to call the telephone number of
the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to the policemen there.
Nor can we believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the
appointed place, Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one who wanted
to buy marijuana as if the latter were buying something not prohibited or illegal.

While drugs may indeed be sold to police officers,[29] these transactions are
usually done face-to face. It is improbable that a drug dealer would discuss the
details of an illegal sale over the telephone with someone he has never seen
before.

Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a drugrelated case.[30]

In People v. Mapa,[31] accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after the

prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the NBI for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from the accused. In
People v. Dismuke,[32] this Court ruled that the failure to prove that the specimen
of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused
was fatal to the prosecutions case. In People v. Laxa,[33] the policemen
composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the alleged apprehension of accused-appellant. One policeman
admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time
in the police headquarters. It was held:

This deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces

doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Were the bags which the policemen
allegedly recovered from the scene of the buy-bust operation the same ones
which PO2 Espadera marked in the police headquarters? This question gives
rise only to surmises and speculations, and cannot prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of accused-appellant.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of
custody. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3
Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of marijuana
immediately after allegedly seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery
store but only did so in their headquarters.[34] The narcotics field test, which
initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the
scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office.[35] There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the

same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and

given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.

According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw accused-appellant give PO2
Supa was colored gray or blue, the same color as that of the bag sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service for laboratory examination.[36] PO2 Supa stated,
however, that the bag of marijuana which accused-appellant was carrying in the
grocery was colored brown.[37] The discrepancy in the testimony of these two
police officers casts additional doubt on the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti.

Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a
buy-bust operation. The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves
everybodys support. But it is precisely when the governments purposes are
beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As
Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.
[38] Our desire to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the expense of
constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of
accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from
custody, unless he is being lawfully held for another crime. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is hereby ordered to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y

SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y
PINEDA, and MIGUEL BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of

Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding
appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and (2) finding
appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.

On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio

Escorpiso, Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder, the accusatory
portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of

Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping each other, and who were then armed with a firearm, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation, by means of
treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of Joseph Galam y Antonio, by then and there suddenly firing at the
said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not given any provocation, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.[1]

At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and

Miguel Buenviaje pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje,
who was arrested only on 10 July 1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment.

The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:

At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos
was at a vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he
heard one Tessie Pawid screaming from across the road: Enough, enough,
enough! In front of her were Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were
engaged in a fisticuff. By the time Pawid was able to subdue the two men by
standing between them and embracing Galam, Buenviajes face was already
bloodied and Galams shirt collar torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to
face Galam and, with his right index finger making a slicing motion across his
throat, shouted: Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin, papatayin kita. Galam
retorted, Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika. Buenviaje did not respond anymore
and left on a tricycle.[2]

More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to
death at the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short) owned by
him, which was located at Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.

According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, earlier or

at 3:00 p.m. of that fateful day, a man whom she later identified as Benjamin
Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the Rooftop and asked whether a woman wearing a
green t-shirt had checked in. She answered in the negative. As she was about to
leave, Sayaboc asked another question, What time does your bosing arrive? She
replied that she did not know. She then went to the second floor of the
establishment.[3]

Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30 and
5:45 p.m. Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside the information
counter with his hands tucked in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of beer.
She then went up to the kitchen, but was delayed in delivering the beer because
she gave some instructions to the dishwasher. When she gave the beer to
Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked why it took her so long to bring the
beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and some other
waitresses. Then the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.[4]

Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground floor of
the building. When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam,
causing the latter to fall to the ground face up, with blood spurting out of his
chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and disappeared into the darkness.[5]

Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao, Chief
Barangay Tanod of Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way
to the Kowloon Restaurant located along the national road, he saw Marlon
Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The three
were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop and Diego
Theater. The younger Buenviaje was on the drivers seat, while the older
Buenviaje and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao ordered pancit
bihon. While he was waiting outside of the restaurant, he noticed that the tricycle
was still parked in the vacant lot, and the three occupants thereof were talking
with each other. After getting his order and while he was getting out of the
restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop
building. He thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin
Sayaboc, walking briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon
Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle sped off towards the center of the town.[6]

The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital, where
he was declared dead on arrival.[7] Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted an
autopsy on his cadaver, found four gunshot wounds and opined that the first two
of which were inflicted from behind and the last two were frontal.[8]

That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano Police
Station, assigned some investigators to go to the scene of the crime to gather
evidence. At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., he and Lt. Alejandro Parungao brought
Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo were interviewed by the
cartographic artist, who thereafter drew a cartographic sketch showing the face
of the assailant.[9]

On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP
Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam

to death.[10]

On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial
Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of
Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being
interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc
to the inner part of the room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised
the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to
have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one,
Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police
officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with
Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, okay, he continued the
investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time.
However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo
would leave to go to the comfort room.[11] That night Sayaboc executed an
extrajudicial confession[12] in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing
Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He
likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was
also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.

At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case, 1counsel
for accused Mike Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso manifested
that he be given fifteen days to file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the
evidence.[13] The trial court acceded. But instead of filing such motion first, he
filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July 1999.[14] The motion for leave to file the
pleading was filed the next day only.[15]

The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order[16] issued on 16

August 1999. Further, it ruled that because of they did not seek nor were granted
express leave of court prior to their filing of the demurrer to evidence, the
Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted their case for
judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
only Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the presentation of his defense.

Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi.

He also flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his
rights. He testified to having been beaten by six or seven police officers in the
investigating room, who then coerced him to confess to having killed Galam.[17]
Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated 20 March
1995[18] and an affidavit dated 10 April 1995[19] to support his claim of police
brutality and retraction of his confession.

In its decision dated 9 November 2000,[20] the trial court found Benjamin
Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying
circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances. It then
sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel
Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery employed by
Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared them guilty of
the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and the two others as
accomplices. Each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty and to pay
solidarily with Sayaboc the amounts of P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as
moral damages; and the costs of the suit in favor of the heirs of Joseph Galam.

From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT SAYABOC

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND
SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY, HE IS

GUILTY ONLY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS
TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL NOR BY AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON BUENVIAJE AND
ACCUSED ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL
AFTER THEY FILED THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.

In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that the crime
committed by Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no proof of treachery
because the two eyewitnesses did not see the commencement of the shooting.
Besides, treachery, as well as evident premeditation, was not specifically
designated as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Neither can the
aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward be appreciated because
they were not alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial. Sections 8 and
9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating
and qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the information, are beneficial to
the accused and should, therefore, be applied retroactively.

As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the extrajudicial
confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against him because
Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial
investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel.
He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He
was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police
Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya.

Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso

claim that they were denied due process because they were not able to present
evidence in their defense. They ask this Court to relax the rule of criminal
procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that
Sayabocs extrajudicial confession that he shot the victim in the back is adequate
proof of treachery. Invoking People v. Aquino,[21] the OSG contends that for
treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, it needs only to be
specifically alleged in the information and does not have to be preceded by the
words qualifying or qualified by. As to the proven circumstances of craft and price
or reward, the same cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which are applicable to actions that are pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.

The OSG further asserts that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession is admissible in

evidence against him, since it was made after he was informed of, and accorded,
his constitutional rights, particularly the right to an independent counsel of his
own choice. No evidence was adduced during the trial to substantiate the claim
that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this
claim was made for the first time in this appeal, and was based merely on an
information furnished by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro (now deceased) to
Sayabocs counsel in this appeal, which makes the said information hearsay
twice removed.

As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional

circumstance exists in this case that may warrant the relaxation of the rule that
the denial of a unilateral demurrer to evidence carries with it a waiver of the
accuseds right to present evidence.

Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we hold

that such cannot be used in evidence in this case.

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be

voluntary.[22] The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution
is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds
rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially
when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this
requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear
to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against
his alleged intimidators for maltreatment,[23] the failure to properly inform a
suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession
valueless and inadmissible.[24]

In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungaos claim that he conferred with Sayaboc
for half an hour informing him about his constitutional rights, the extrajudicial
confession provides only the following:

PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be
asked to you regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy.
Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph
Galam, owner of the said Disco House as a result of his death. Before questions
will be asked [of] you I would like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new
Constitution of the Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to remain silent

or refuse to answer the questions which you think will incriminate you; That you
have the right to seek the services of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this
office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.

QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you willing to
give your true statement regarding the death of Joseph Galam?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this investigation?

ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo.

QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to assist you in
this investigation?

ANSWER: Yes, sir. [25]

Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession
contains the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right
to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara,
[26] the Court explained:

The stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions

which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form or model.
Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt Opo as the
answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of
a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.

The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information

rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.[27] It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the
suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was
a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the
police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another
offense.

We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a
competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim
that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the
testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty.
Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.
The trial court attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and
intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:

As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It was in his
character for him to want to be a central figure in a drama, albeit tragic for others.
He would do what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others. Hence,
Atty. Cornejo could only advise him of his constitutional rights, which was
apparently done. The said counsel could not stop him from making his
confession even if he did try.[28]

We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a garrulous man who
would do what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others is immaterial.
The waiver of a right is within the rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a
showing, to the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful attempt at each stage of the
investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions. If
anything, it appears that Sayabocs counsel was ineffectual for having been
cowed by his clients enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.

The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel
should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect

understands the import and consequences of answering the questions

propounded. In People v. Deniega,[29] we said:

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered

meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the
advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.

This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a
confession. Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorneys duty to, first and
foremost, seek the truth. However, counsel should be able, throughout the
investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client
and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes
ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of
an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.

We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining

evidence to bring criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have
rights that cannot be interfered with. Those tasked with the enforcement of the
law and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden of ensuring that all
evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their duties are
untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements
of the law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against
possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation
cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from
evidence.

For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in

evidence against him. We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its
burden of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.

From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc shot and killed
Galam in the early evening of 2 December 1994. He was seen waiting at the
Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of that day, shooting Galam shortly after the

latters arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime to a waiting tricycle.
Credible witnesses described Sayabocs appearance to the police soon after the
shooting incident and prepared affidavits about the incident. They identified
Sayaboc at the police station while he was in custody, during the preliminary
investigation, and, again, in open court. Such positive identification constitutes
more than sufficient direct evidence to uphold the finding that Sayaboc was
Galams killer. It cannot just be rebutted by Sayabocs bare denial and weak alibi.

Appellants claim that the information against them is insufficient for failure to
specifically state that treachery and evident premeditation were qualifying
circumstances holds no water. In People v. Aquino,[30] we held that even after
the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or
qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, from our review of the
case, we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery has been
sufficiently proved to qualify the crime to murder.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Thus, two conditions must be
present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method
or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery
cannot merely be supposed. [31]

In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses did not hear
any shout or conversation between the assailant and the victim immediately
before the attack could only mean that Sayaboc had approached his victim
through stealth.[32] While not improbable, that conclusion is merely an inference.
The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified as to how the aggression
began. The witnesses testified having heard four shots, the last two of which
were seen as having been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The autopsy
conducted by Dr. Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and the
shoulder, and two wounds on the right side of Galams back. Although it is

plausible that the initial shots were fired from behind, such inference is
insufficient to establish treachery.[33]

Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance.

Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act
is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent. The requisites of evident premeditation are (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his
act.[34]

Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill
Galam, the testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the
Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time
when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before that
plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.[35]

The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved, can
neither be considered because they were not specifically alleged in the
information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that the information specify the aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the imposition of
penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be
given retroactive effect.[36]

Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of homicide
only, which is punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances appreciated for or against him, the penalty to be
imposed upon him should be in the medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty whose minimum is within the range
of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in
its medium period.

We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel

Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial
court because they were denied the right to be heard by the trial court. It must be
remembered that their demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July 1999 was without
prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said pleading was filed only
the next day. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of court. The
trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure when it disallowed
the abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their behalf.

The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified

waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused.[37] The rationale for this
rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said
evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any
evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
convenience. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of
filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial
thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its evidence.[38]

The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the
abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their behalf. They cannot
now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by themselves and
counsel.

On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence of
conspiracy between Marlon Buenviaje and Sayaboc.

It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy.[39] But the same
was not established by competent proof in this case. The extrajudicial
confession[40] and the newspaper reports[41] adduced by the prosecution, which
both contained Sayabocs statement pointing to Marlon Buenviaje as the one who
paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible in evidence. The first, as

earlier stated, was executed in violation of Sayabocs constitutional rights. The

second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as
witnesses to affirm the veracity thereof.[42]

Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be shown

by circumstantial evidence.[43] As correctly found by the trial court and concurred
with by the OSG, the concatenation of circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon
Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc, thus:

1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph Galam,

causing him injuries on his face and prompting him to make a threat to kill the
latter;[44]

2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who had no
discernible motive to do so;[45]

3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and the other
appellants in the tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot near the crime scene;
[46]

4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and disappeared;[47]

5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or until 10 July
1997; and

6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje offered
prosecution eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad, allowances, and two
motorcycles in consideration of her retraction of her testimony against Sayaboc.
[48]

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is more than
one circumstances established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites
are present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator equally guilty as Sayaboc,
Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the same penalty as that of Sayaboc.

However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is paucity of

evidence linking them to the killing. They might have been with Marlon Buenviaje
in that tricycle, but there is nothing to show that they knew of the conspiracy to
kill Galam. Absent any active participation in furtherance of the common design
or purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the crime scene or in the
tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not necessarily make them
conspirators. Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without the
cooperation and the agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish
conspiracy.[49]

Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial courts award
of actual damages, representing the wake and burial expenses, is reduced to
P106,436, this being the amount supported by receipts. The award of moral
damages is, however, increased to P50,000 conformably with current
jurisprudence.[50] In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to P50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva

Ecija, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 is MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin
Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Joseph Galam the amounts of P106,436 as actual damages; P50,000 as
civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
of reasonable doubt.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADO BAGNATE, appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay, finding appellant Amado
Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874
and of Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of Death in each case.

The Information against appellant in Criminal Case No. T-2874 reads as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more
or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and while armed with a bolo, with nocturnity, treachery,
superior strength, and with disregard of the respect due to the victim on account
of age and sex, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and hack with said bolo one AURIA BROA,[1] a 70-year old blind woman,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which caused her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

ACTS CONTARY TO LAW.[2]

The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2875 reads:

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more
or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and by means of violence, force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
ROSALIE RAYALA, against her will and consent, and on the occasion thereof,
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and while armed with a
bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
hack aforenamed Rosalie Rayala, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
on the different parts of her body, which caused her death, to the damage and
prejudice of her heirs.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded not guilty to both

charges against him,[4] and joint trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel
Ambion for custodial investigation. Without asking the name of appellant, SPO2
Ambion informed him in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be
assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or in his favor,
and that he cannot be tortured or molested. Asked if he is willing to cooperate,
the accused assented and gave his name as Amado Magnate. SPO2 Ambion
later learned that appellants real name is Amado Bagnate. When appellant told
SPO2 Ambion that he is willing to confess, SPO2 Ambion again informed
appellant of his rights, and asked him further if he wants to be assisted by
counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in Manila. SPO2 Ambion offered
the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. SPO2
Ambion then left to fetch Atty. Brotamonte whose office was located several
meters away from the police station. However, Atty. Brotamonte told SPO2

Ambion that he will just follow as he was having his office blessing at that time.
After some time, Atty. Brotamonte arrived at the police station. Before proceeding
with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave the
investigation room and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to
appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked and examined appellant
to see if he was physically harmed by the policemen and found none although
Atty. Brotamonte noticed that appellants left hand was handcuffed to the table.
Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. The
investigation was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking
the questions. It was translated thereafter into English with the help of Atty.
Brotamonte, for the purpose of putting it into writing. After typing the first page of
the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained the contents thereof to
appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon. While all this was
going on, SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales was taking pictures.[5] The first page of the
confession reads:

PRELIMINARY : Mr. Amado Bagnate, you are in this office being investigated for
your involvement in the crimes imputed against you particularly the killing of
Aurea Bronia and Rosalie Rayala and at the same time having carnal knowledge
of the two in Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. But before we proceed in this investigation,
may I inform you that under our New Constitution, you have the right to remain
silent, and that anything you may say may be used in your favor or against you in
any court proceedings in the entire Philippines; that you have the right to be
assisted by a counsel of your own choice or if you cannot afford to have one, the
state represented by our office will provide you a competent counsel; that you are
free from torture or any form of physical violence which will tend vitiate your
statements. Do you clearly understand your constitutional rights which were
related to you in Bicol dialect?

ANSWER : Yes sir, I clearly understand my Constitutional Rights because it was

related to me in Bicol dialect.

INVESTIGATOR : Do you want to avail of your Constitutional rights?

ANSWER : I want to be assisted by a competent counsel.

INVESTIGATOR : Do you have a counsel of your own choice?

ANSWER : I have none sir.

INVESTIGATOR : Since you do not have your own counsel, our office will
provide you one, is this acceptable to you?

ANSWER : Yes sir.

INVESTIGATOR : If our office will provide you the services of Atty. Paterno
Brotamonte, who is a competent lawyer is this acceptable to you?

ANSWER : Yes sir.

INVESTIGATOR : May I again remind you that anything you say in this
investigation may be used in favor or against you in any court proceedings in the
entire Philippines. Do you still wish to give your free and voluntary statements?

ANSWER : Yes sir.

INVESTIGATOR : Do you understand the questions that were asked from you?

ANSWER : Yes sir, because they were related to me in Bicol dialect.

INVESTIGATOR : Are you willing to sign your given statements?

ANSWER : Yes sir.[6]

SPO2 Ambion then proceeded with the second and third pages of the
confession, following the same procedure of propounding the questions in the
Bicol dialect and translating it thereafter into English for each page.[7] Atty.
Brotamonte again read and explained the contents thereof to appellant[8] after
which they again separately signed on pages two and three thereof. The second
and third pages are quoted in verbatim, to wit:

03. Q- Please state your name and other personal circumstances?

A- AMADO BAGNATE Y BRONIA, 28 years old, single, duck caretaker presently

working in Balatong Pulilan, Bulacan and a native of Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.

04. Q- When and where did the incident happened?

A- At on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.

05. Q- Will you please narrate in detail, your knowledge of the said incident?

A- At on or about 6:00 P.M. August 6, 1997 I together with Faustino Bufi[9] and
Carlito Begil drink a bottle of gin at the store of Yolanda Buban at Buhian,
Tabaco, Albay and while we were drinking said Carlito Begil told us that he will
have sex with a woman on that night, however he did not elaborate who the
woman is and at about 8:00 P.M. of same date we already consumed the bottle
of gin and we decided to go home.

06. Q- Please continue

A- So I proceeded to the house of my brother-in-law Roberto Angeles to spend

the night at the said house however at on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 I
go out of the house and proceeded to my grandparents house which is about five
arms length from the house of Roberto Angeles leaving the bolo on the ground
and entered my grandparents Aurea Bronias house and go directly on the room
where Rosalie Rayala is sleeping and once inside the room I embraced the
sleeping Rosalie Rayala and started on kissing her however Rosalie Rayala
spank and boxed me but still I continued on kissing her but still he spank me, so I
go out of the room and sits on the door but Rosalie Rayala followed me so I
kissed her again but she spank me again so I got hold of the bolo and hack
Rosalie Rayala hitting her on her neck which caused her to fall on the ground
and I pulled Rosalie Rayala and have carnal knowledge of her while she is still
alive, while Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles were standing and viewing what I
am doing and after satisfying my lust said Carlito Begil goes on to of Rosalie
Rayala and started on pumping her and after satisfying his lust, my grandparent
Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and thinks that my grandparent
Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her on her neck and when she fall I
pulled her away from the house towards the grassy portion of the yard wherein
Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles followed me wherein I was unable to
determine who from the two had carnal knowledge of my grandparent because I
already left them and I proceeded to the main road to Tabaco, Albay.

07. Q- Please continue further.

A- Before I finally proceeded to the main road I passed by the house of Jose
which I had forgotten his family name and Armando Bosque both Barangay
Tanods of our place and told the two that is being wanted by my godfather Julian
Baloloy that there was something that happened in the house of my
grandparents house, and the two goes with me and because I was already then
frightened I just go with them and hurriedly left the place and proceeded to
Roberto Angeles house and called my sister and I was allowed to enter and I
prepared a cup of coffee and after drinking same I hurriedly left the house and
finally proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep bound for the town proper
and spend the rest of the night at the town plaza and at about 6:00 A.M. August
7, 1997 I proceeded to the church to hear mass and after that I went to my
sisters house at Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay and I eat my breakfast and after eating I left
my sisters house named Avelina Calla and it came to my mind that I will evade
arrest and decided to proceed to Metro Manila then to my place of work in

Pulilan, Bulacan.

08. Q- How were you able to reach the Tabaco Police Station?

A- I was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay for accordingly

an alarm to apprehend me was set by elements of the Tabaco Police wherein
one of them was able to trace me but luckily I was able to evade them but finally I
was apprehended at Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay and later on was brought to the
Tabaco Police.

09. Q- How are you related with the victims namely Rosalie Rayala and Aurea
Bronia?

A- This Rosalie Rayala she is my nephew and Aurea Bronia she is my

grandparent.

10. Q- This investigator, had no more question to ask from you, do you have
anything more to add in this statement of yours?

A- Now no more sir, but I will just relate other details if the need arises.

11. Q- Are you willing to sign this statement of yours?

A- Yes sir.[10]

After appellants confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte left the
police station and went back to his office. As far as he could recall, the entire
process took more than an hour.[11]

The next day, August 8, 1997, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base,
Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the
presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the voluntariness and
veracity of the confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures of
appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant the consequences
of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into
admitting them. Judge Base inspected appellants body and asked him if he was
forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing to sign
it again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying that his conscience
bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in the
presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which appellant affixed his signature.[12]

There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial confession of

appellant showed how the crimes were committed by him.

Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and
assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his
constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent
counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully apprised of the
consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators of the
crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil, and
that he was only forced into owning up to the crimes because Angeles threatened
to harm him or his sister, Angeless wife, if he did not do so.

Appellant recounted on the witness stand that in the afternoon of August 6, 1997,
he was having a drink with Carlito Begil and Faustino Bufe at the store of
Yolanda Bulan in Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. While they were drinking, Begil
mentioned that he is planning to have sex with someone he did not identify. They
finished drinking at around 8:00 in the evening and started walking home. While
he and Begil were walking, Begil asked him to accompany him to Rosalie
Rayalas house but he declined because he was already hungry and he wanted
to eat first. He then went to the house of Roberto Angeles who is married to his
sister Maria Nellie Bagnate. While he was on the porch having a smoke, Angeles
arrived very drunk. Begil arrived later. Begil and Angeles drank kalampunay. He
took only one glass of the drink and went inside the house to get a cigarette.
When he went back to the porch, Angeles and Begil were already gone. At
around 12:30 in the morning, he went inside and slept. The shout of his ninong,

Julian Baloloy, telling him to fetch a barangay tanod, awakened him. He fetched
Jose Rodriquez and Armando Bosque and they went to the house of Rosalie,
located thirty meters away. He was told to build a fire while the rest searched for
something. After idling in the yard for some time, he went back to Angeless
house to have coffee. Angeles and Begil then arrived and Angeles told him to flee
or he (Angeles) will kill his (appellants) sister. Angeles gave him P10.00. He took
a jeep to Tabaco and reached the Tabaco plaza at 2:00 in the morning. He
proceeded to his sisters house, Avelina Bagnate, in Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay, and
passed the time there. Then he went to the Tabaco town proper. He was finally
arrested in Bangkilingan, Tabaco and brought to the police headquarters at 5:00
in the morning of August 7, 1997.[13]

The trial court found appellants extra-judicial confession admissible in evidence

on which basis, it convicted appellant of the crimes charged against him. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Auria Broa the amount of
P50,000.00 as damages; and,

2. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2875 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of
Rosalie Rayala in the amount of P50,000.00 as damages.

SO ORDERED.[14]

In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE.[15]

The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellants confession.

Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent
counsel as he failed to advise him of the penalty to be imposed on the crimes he
was accused of committing; hence, he was not aware of the consequences of his
admissions.

To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be express and

voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and
competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be
continuously assisted by counsel from the very start thereof. The presence of
counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession,
and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that is, providing
full protection to the constitutional rights of the accused.[16]

The rule is premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully
apparent.[17] It is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing
guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from
being coerced to admit any that is untrue.[18] To be an effective counsel, a
lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything
which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.[19]

In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than
perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately
conferred with appellant to ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to
make sure that no force or duress was employed by the police authorities on the
latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions propounded
by SPO2 Ambion. The testimony of Atty. Brotamonte during cross-examination
leaves no room for doubt that he adequately assisted appellant during the
investigation, viz:

ATTY. MAROLLANO:

Q: Now, upon your arrival, were you offered a seat?

A: No, because immediately when I arrived I asked the accused to stand and
examined the body of the accused, if there were injury or what and I asked the
accused, if these policemen inflicted injury to him, if he was harmed and
according to accused, none.

Q: And in doing that particularly, what did you do to examine the body of the
accused of it bare some signs of injury?

A: Because as a lawyer I have to protect the right of the accused. If the accused
has body injury definitely I will be requiring the policemen to submit the accused
for medical examination before the investigation will be conducted.

Q: In doing that, how did you do it to the accused?

A: I let the accused to stand and I asked him if any of the policemen harmed
inflicted bodily injury to him and he told me no one of the policemen.

Q: Any of the policemen present?

A: No, when I arrived, I request two (2) policemen to step-out because I have to
talk to the accused when I propound question and examine the body of the
accused and the accused was inside the room.

...

Q: And you were satisfied by the answer of the accused and you did not even
bother to search the body of the accused?

A: In my observation, the accused was telling the truth. Otherwise, he will inform
this representation because I already informed him that I am a lawyer and I will
protect him if somebody harmed him.

...

ATTY. BROTAMONTE:

As narrated in that affidavit, I explained to the accused that before I introduced

myself, I told him that the policemen informs this representation that you are
going to give your sworn statement before the police and I told him that I am a
lawyer and I will assist him until the policemen finished the investigation and I
told him to tell the truth to the policemen and told him that if you want to give your
sworn statement to the police, you can do it because that is your right under the
constitution, to remain silent.

Q: That is why for example, right to be informed; you have the right to remain
silent, and whatever you said will be used against in you, did you not explain
these one by one?

ATTY. BROTAMONTE:

I explained that one by one. In fact I told the accused that the sworn statement
you are going to make now might be used against you by the police but the
accused is willing to give his sworn statement.

ATTY. MAROLLANO:

Q: I see. Now, you said that you helped in the translation of the sworn statement
in the Bicol dialect. Meaning that the questions were propounded in English and
you helped the police investigator to translate it in Bicol dialect?

A: No, when I state that I helped the police in the translation of the answer, what
the policemen were asking the witness in Bicol and they translated in English and
I even helped the policemen in the translation of the question and the answer of
the witness in Bicol dialect.[20]

Clearly, appellant signed the confession with the assistance of a competent and

independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before
Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, who, before
administering the oath to appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his
rights and the consequences of his confession. Judge Base testified, thus:

Q: Judge, please explain to the Honorable Court the circumstances how this
sworn statement, how the affiant was able to come into your house and the
sworn statement was sworn to?

ATTY. MAROLLANO:

The witness is not sure whether he was in his house or office.

A: The police investigator came to my office and informed me that they were
investigating a rape and murder case that happened somewhere in the mountain
of Tabaco, Albay and informed me that the suspect has been apprehended and
that the suspect is willing to sign an affidavit of confession so I advised the police
investigator to comply strictly with respect to investigation custodial legis and I
informed him that that case should be assisted by a lawyer and the investigator
told me that he contacted Atty. Brotamonte to assist the suspect in the
investigation and I said Its better. So, after that the suspect was brought to me
together with Atty. Brotamonte because I requested Atty. Brotamonte to be
present also and the suspect. I investigated the suspect and he admitted to me
that what he stated in this affidavit which is actually a confession that he killed
the two women and actually raped one of them is correct and true. So, after
explaining to him the consequence of his having confession to the crime being
charged against him and he was still willing to sign the confession I let him sign
the confession in my presence and in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and after
which I subscribed the affidavit.

PROSECUTOR BERANGO: (To witness)

Q: Now, Judge could you tell the Honorable Court while the accused was in your

presence if there was any pressure or compulsion upon the accused to sign this
document?

A: When the police investigator came to me I instructed him not to use any force
and when the suspect was presented to me, actually I inspected his body if there
was any sign of abrasion and I actually asked the suspect if he was forced or
coerced into signing the crime charged and he said, no. And I asked him if this
confession is voluntary and he said, yes. And he said he is being bothered by his
conscience.[21]

The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of

the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants
extrajudicial confession. Section 12 (1) to (3), Article III of the Constitution
provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 [22]

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession

given by an accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent,
or, without having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his
own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided
with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence of

counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or

any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution
that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the
crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is
incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused
that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all,
the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit
his guilt in the commission of a crime.

To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an

accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be:

.willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished

from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individuals constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404,
418) this Court stressed that an accuseds right to be informed of the right to
remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle."[23]

As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the entire
procedure from the time appellant signified his intention to give his extrajudicial
confession up to the time he signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that
appellant was not aware of the consequences of his admissions as Judge Base
explained it to appellant when he appeared before the latter to swear to the
veracity of his confession.

The Court notes that while Judge Base testified that he asked appellant to sign
anew the extrajudicial confession in his presence, the copy thereof marked as
Exhibits A, B, and C attached to the records of the case do not show any
subsequent signature made by appellant. Nevertheless, appellant did not refute
Judge Bases testimony, and it does not detract the fact that appellant executed
the extrajudicial confession voluntarily with the assistance of an independent and
competent counsel, and that he subsequently acknowledged having executed
the same voluntarily and swore to its veracity before Judge Base.

Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was brought to the
Tabaco police station, the police officers boxed and kicked him, telling him to
confess to the crimes.[24] As the records show, like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge
Base also asked him if he was forced to confess but Bagnate said that he was
not. If it were true that he was forced to confess to the crime, then appellant
should have complained of such abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as he
had the opportunity to do so when the two conferred with him on separate
occasions.

Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or

violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative
action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared
to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these
should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.[25]

To consider appellants allegation of maltreatment as true is to facilitate the

retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without
any proof whatsoever.[26]

The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the

Constitution. It constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.[27]

Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession

made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The Rule specifically requires that
there should be some other evidence tending to show the commission of the
crime apart from the confession.[28] Appellants confession is corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in its primary sense,
that a crime has actually been committed.[29]

The evidence of corpus delicti in both cases consists of the victims deaths, as
evidenced by the death certificates of Aurea Broa[30] and Rosalie Rayala,[31]
and the findings of the autopsies conducted on the victims cadavers by Tabaco
Rural Health Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba showing that both were hacked to death
and Rosalie was raped.

The autopsy on victim Aurea disclosed the following:

Hacked wound back of the neck about four (4) inches in length affecting skin,
subcutaneous tissue, muscle and the cervical bone.

Hacked wound, neck anteriorly affecting larynx about 2 inches in length.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to hacked wound, neck.[32]

While the autopsy conducted on Rosalie revealed the following:

Stabbed wound neck, posteriorly about 1 inches in length, 2 inches depth

reaching the cervical bone.

Hacked wound left shoulder about 1 inches length superficial slanting direction.

Hacked wound - right neck about 4 inches length affecting skin subcutaneous
muscle & Blood vessels, right earlobe cut.

Hacked wound below the chin about 3 inches length affecting skin and
subcutaneous tissue.

Hacked wound, left neck about 5 inches in length affecting skin subcutaneous
tissue, muscle, Blood vessels and the cervical bone.

Hacked wound, left middle ear auricle about 1 inch in length, left occipital region
about 1 inch in length.

Multiple linear abrasion both scapular region.

Contusion floor of the vaginal wall.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple hacked wound,

neck.[33]

The foregoing findings coincide with appellants extrajudicial confession. As he

stated therein, he hacked both victims on the neck with a bolo and he dragged
Aurea towards the grassy portion of the yard. Appellant also admitted that he
raped Rosalie. The autopsy report shows that Rayala had contusions on the floor
of her vaginal wall, thus confirming that Rosalie had been raped. The autopsy
report likewise confirmed that the victims suffered hack wounds on their necks.
The recovery of the bolo after appellant had left the place likewise jibes with
appellants declaration in his confession that he hacked both victims with a bolo.
[34] These are details that appellant could not have known if he did not commit
the crimes.

It must also be noted that appellant was arrested only five hours from the
occurrence of the crimes. It is not possible that within such short span of time,
appellant would be able to know the details of the crimes as he described them
when he gave his confession if it were true that he really did not commit them.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if,
upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to
cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be

supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be

considered voluntary.[35]

Lending additional credence to the truthfulness of appellants extrajudicial

confession is the defense evidence itself, establishing that: Around 12:00
midnight of August 7, 1997, defense witness Julian Baloloy heard cries for help
coming from the house of Aurea. Together with his son, Rodel, who brought a
flashlight, they went to the house and called out to Aurea and Rosalie but there
was no response. When they went inside the house, they saw blood and strands
of hair on the floor but there was no sign of the two. They shouted for help and
Roberto Angeles, whose house is located in front of the victims house about
thirty meters away, arrived. Appellant arrived next, saying that he just came from
work and was not able to clean his hands. When Rodel Baloloy shone his
flashlight on appellant, they saw that his hands were sticky and covered in red.
Julian Baloloy then ordered appellant to fetch a barangay tanod. When Armando
Bosque and Jose Rodriguez arrived, they started to look for Aurea and Rosalie
while appellant was told to build a fire. At the back of the house, they saw
impressions on the yard indicating that an object had been dragged, after which,
they found the dead bodies of Aurea and Rosalie fifty meters away.[36]

Defense witnesses also testified that appellant did not join the search and
therefore, the latter could not have known or seen the injuries suffered by the
victims when they were found. It has been noted that appellant, in his confession,
had accurately specified the injuries he inflicted on both victims. Julian Baloloys
testimony that they saw marks on the yard indicating that something has been
dragged corroborated appellants statement that he dragged Aurea. Moreover,
that Julian Baloloy saw appellants hand sticky and covered in red, which Baloloy
described as if you have just slaughtered a pig and you (sic) hands smudge with
blood and when you washed your hands, it could still (sic) red, bolsters the
conclusion that appellant indeed had participated in the gruesome crimes.[37]

Thus, the confession of appellant being admissible in evidence and corroborated

by evidence of corpus delicti, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Rape with Homicide.

In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. T-2874, the trial
court considered the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, treachery, superior
strength, and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of age and
sex, as alleged in the Information, thus qualifying the killing of Aurea to murder.

However, the Court finds that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. The evidence on record does not sufficiently prove
that it attended the commission of the crime as no one actually saw the incident.
The fact that Aurea was blind does not necessarily qualify her killing as
treacherous. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[38] Appellants
confession merely stated: after satisfying his lust, my grandparent Aurea Bronia
shouted although she was blind and thinks (sic) that my grandparent Aurea
Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her on her neck and when she fall (sic) I
pulled her away from the house towards the grassy portion of the yard . . .. There
is nothing in appellants confession that demonstrates that he deliberately
employed a particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the
crime.

Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating circumstance

considering that it was not shown that the darkness of the night was purposely
sought by appellant to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its
execution.[39]

It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aureas house. However,
dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the
consideration of his criminal liability as it is not alleged in the Information.[40]

Nonetheless, it is alleged in the Information and established by the prosecution

that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659,[41]
any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by death if committed with abuse of superior strength. Hence, the trial court

correctly imposed the death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2874.[42]

As regards the damages awarded to the heirs of Aurea Broa in the amount of
P50,000.00, the Court considers the same as representing civil indemnity. In
murder cases, civil indemnity requires no further proof other than death.[43]

The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral
damages, which is based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.[44] Considering that the prosecution
failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea Broa are entitled to moral
damages, the same may not be awarded.[45]

In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.[46] Considering the generic
aggravating circumstances of disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.[47]

In Criminal Case No. T-2875, the trial court likewise correctly imposed the death
penalty. Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
Rep. Act No. 7659 imposes the penalty of death when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed.

The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor of the
heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount of civil indemnity in
cases of rape with homicide to P100,000.00.[48] The heirs of Rosalie must be
awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages without need of proof,[49]
in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. The fact that the heirs suffered the
trauma of mental or physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the
basis for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require
recital thereof at trial.[50]

Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling of the

victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be

awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.

The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be awarded the
amount of P54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the admission made by the
defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie incurred expenses in said amount.
[51]

Before concluding, the Court observed, as borne by the records of this case, that
appellant could not have been the only perpetrator of the crimes. As appellant
revealed in his confession, he hacked each of the victims on the neck with his
bolo only once. The autopsy report, however, shows that Aurea Broa suffered two
neck wounds while Rosalie Rayala suffered five hack wounds and one stab
wound, all on the neck. Appellant confessed that he dragged Aurea towards the
grassy portion of the yard and immediately left the scene. Yet, Rosalie was also
found on the grassy portion of the yard. The autopsy report further showed that
Rosalie likewise suffered multiple linear abrasions on both scapular regions, thus
giving the impression that she was also dragged towards the yard. Somebody
else must have brought Rosalie to the place where she was found. Indeed, there
are clear indications that there are other perpetrators of the crimes of murder and
rape with homicide. Appellant alone could not have inflicted all the injuries
sustained by the victims.

In view of all these circumstances, the police authorities as well as the

prosecutors office of Tabaco, Albay, should be required to apprise the Court
whether or not further investigation of this case was conducted for the
identification and arrest of the other perpetrators of the crimes to completely
bring justice to their victims.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco,
Albay, in Criminal Case No. T-2874 finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to
damages. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Aurea Broa the amounts of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos

(P50,000.00) as moral damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)

as exemplary damages.

The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. T-2875, finding Amado
Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
imposing on him the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Rosalie Rayala civil
indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); moral
damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00); and
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of both Aurea Broa and Rosalie Rayala the
amount of Fifty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine Pesos (P54,259.00) as
actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of

the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case
be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

The Chief of the Tabaco Police Station and the Tabaco Prosecutors Office are
hereby ORDERED, with ten (10) days from receipt of copy of herein resolution,
to apprise the Court whether or not subsequent investigations were conducted to
determine the other perpetrator(s) of the crimes involved herein.

SO ORDERED.