PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY.
VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

CASE 1. De La Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012
(What Constitutes CPG)
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena, obtained a
loan in the sum of Php 250,000.00 from Aguila (Aguila Sons and Co.)
a. As a security for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their 277m 2
residential lot in Marikina
However, Antonia also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of
Gemma Avila (Gemma, the herein respondent) of the same property. The
sale was made because of Antonias failure to pay her obligation from
Aguila.
a. To which, Gemma also mortgaged the same property to Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a loan from the
bank.
Antonia, together with his son Alvin John, filed against Gemma praying for
the annulment of the said deed of sale. She claims that the said property
was conjugal property and was sold without the consent of his husband
who already died by that time. She also invokes the presumption of
Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code.
The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia and upheld the presumption of
conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, this petition.
Issue: WON the said property that was sold is part of the Conjugal Partnership
Ruling: The said property cannot be presumed to be part of the Conjugal
Partnership.
Ratio: The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies only for
the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour
of the conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing proof of
exclusive ownership.
1. As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of
the Civil Code, the Dela Penas did not even come close to proving that the
subject property was acquired during the Marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the actual
acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.
2. Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of,
Antonia Dela Pena, married to Antegono dela Pena, such is merely a
description of the civil status of the wife and and cannot mean that the
husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the inconclusiveness of
the said description is that it is possible that the property was acquired
when she was single but only registered when she got married.
CASE 2. Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
(What constitutes CPG Definition, FC 106 & Presumption of CPG, FC 116)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage

in 1977.
o Had no separate properties prior to their marriage.
o During the course of said marriage, produced four children.
In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation (for
cohabiting with another woman).
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal
separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.
o Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children
remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
o The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their
children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the
earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held
that the phrase denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous
decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance
with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its
original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the
couples property relations.
Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they
did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between
them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of
gains.
Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work
and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property
of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Article 119, NCC.

The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon the absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are
void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband
and wife.
A R A N E T A C A C H A P E R O D E N I L L A L A T M A A L A M A R A S I G A N
P A S C U A L S A G U N S A L T E R A S V A L L E C R U Z V I L L A N U E V A
PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before
they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita
started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and
Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit
that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition
of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were
acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
CASE 3.Villanuevav. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 143286 | April 14, 2004

(What are included in CPG)
FACTS:
1. On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial
court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas
son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance
from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming
that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
2. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been
married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five
(5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City.
3. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu
4. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which
he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as
the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of
land in Mandaue City.
5. Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations
6. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited
with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their
illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the
income of the properties.
7. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has
no occupation; She had no properties of her own from which she could
derive income.
8. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate
son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties
9. Settlement between parties was asked but not met
10. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya; Petitioners appealed; Eusebia died,
and was then substituted by her heirs; CA upheld trial courts decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between
Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal
HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed
RATIO:
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before
the effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code
shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties
CASE 4. Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154

(What are included in CPG, FC 117, 115, 118, 119, 120)
FACTS:
Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question
consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought on installment basis. Thus, the
spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The corresponding
deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de
Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of
Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these
sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO
REYES."
While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold
absolutely the lots in question Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De
Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At
the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking
terms.
Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two
parcels of land contending that said properties were conjugal properties of
himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by
herself" and without his knowledge or consent.
Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal
properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same in good faith and
for adequate consideration.
Julia testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment basis
and that the first payment came from her personal funds.
The CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of
Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the
consent of her husband.
ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties.
HELD: Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half
share of Ponciano.
Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
P A S C U A L S A G U N S A L T E R A S V A L E C R U Z V I L L A N U E V A

That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage
in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. There is no
question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during
the marriage.
Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses.
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are
liabilities of the partnership.
Julias claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns
which she herself prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership
wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid to her were income
of the conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the properties in
question as capital assets of the conjugal partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the
fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses
does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired
during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not
affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the
wife.
Ratio
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband
do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows
Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the subject property. However,
the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding
that the wife did not give her consent.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to
the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end,
his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where
the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
CASE 6.Jovellanos v. CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
If property bought by installments (FC 118)
Facts:
CASE 5.Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 | 2011-04-06

Facts:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment
of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder
against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.
The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of
P115,000 from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel
of land as security thereof.
Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which,
the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder.
Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her
husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal
property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to
the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1
year).
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later
reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.
Issue: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Held:Yes. Petition is DENIED.
Issue/s:
Held:
Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a (lease and conditional sale

agreement) of a property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still
married to his first wife, Leonor, with whom he had three children.
Leonor died on January 2, 1959.
May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette (respondent).
December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her husband,
built an extension at the back of the said property.
January 8, 1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife executed a deed of
absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said
property to his children in the first marriage (petitioners).
September 8, 1985, Daniel died.
Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property
belonging to the second marriage due to the fact that the deed of absolute
sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8, 1975).
To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?
The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but
also proclaims that reimbursements should be made to the children of the
first marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC).
Ratio:
The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease
period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel had only the
right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is

transferred upon delivery, however, the ownership may still be with the
seller until full payment of the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of
absolute sale be given, entitling the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner,
rather than just having inchoate rights to the property. The time when he
was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to his
second wife, Annette, which makes the said property as their conjugal
property.
ART 118: any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed
Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the
lease was contracted during the first marriage, wherein a portion of the
payment came from.
CASE 7.Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009
(If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118)
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to
Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon
full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the
name of Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his
sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and
Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the
lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive
property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further
alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at
the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was
the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully
paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2
years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
(What constitutes CPG; Improvements on the CPG Property, FC 120)

FACTS:
Spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos (respondents) had a lot which was
actually registered in the name of the wife only.
1989: Eliseo, with Erlindas consent, mortgaged the property with GSIS in
exchange for a loan of PHP 136,000.00 with which they had their residential
house built on said property. (Eliseo is a BIR Employee, so he was able to get a
loan with GSIS). The loan is payable via monthly salary deductions from Eliseo.
1993 (July): the property was transferred to Francisco Muoz Jr. (petitioner)
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Erlinda (for herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Eliseo) for a consideration of PHP 602,000.00 (as stated in
the document).
1993 (Sep): the spouses filed a petition with the RTC for the nullification of the
deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage
transaction, and the documents transferring the title to Munozs name were
falsified
Erlinda and Eliseos story:
Erlinda and Eliseo alleged that in 1992, Munoz granted them a
P600,000 loan to be secured by a first mortgage on the land;
That Munoz gave Erlinda a P200,000 advance to pay the GSIS loan, and
made her sign a document purporting to be the Mortgage Contract;
That Munoz promised to give the remaining P402,000 balance when
Erlinda surrenders to him the title of the land and after the GSIS
mortgage had been cancelled, and after submitting an affidavit
executed by Eliseo stating that he is waiving all his rights to the
property;
That in the same year, Erlinda gave Munoz the title of the land but
failed to get Eliseos signature on the affidavit, and because of this,
Munoz refused to give the balance of P402,000 and instead, required
Erlinda to return the P200,00 advance. However, she was unable to do
so because it was already used to pay for the GSIS debt. Munoz then
kept the title of the land and after a year, (1993), they discovered
that a new title had already been issued in the name of Munoz, and
that their original title (named after Erlinda) had already been
cancelled.
Munozs story:
There is a valid contract of sale. Munoz allegedly refused to agree to a
mortgage and loan because Erlinda and Eliseo lacked the capacity to
pay, and were unwilling to cover the incidental charges of the loan.
The sale was with the implied promise to repurchase the land within
one year, during which period Erlinda and Eliseo would pay a rent to
Munoz every month (P500).
When Erlinda and Eliseo failed to repurchase the property after one
year, Munoz had the title transferred in his name, and when they
failed to pay the monthly rentals despite his demands, he filed an
ejectment case with the MeTC.
CASE 8. Munoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 156125 (2010)


During the pendency of the RTC case, the MeTC ordered Erlinda and Eliseo to
vacate the property, surrender the house to Munoz and pay the overdue
rentals.
Eliseo and Erlinda presented evidence (scientific examination) from the NBI
attesting to their claim that the signatures of Eliseo in the Affidavit (waiving
his rights over the land) were forged.
Munoz presented evidence that the property is paraphernal (that it is solely the
wifes property, not conjugal) since it was registered in the name of Erlinda.
Munoz averred that the land was previously owned by Erlindas parents, and
there was in fact a civil case filed by the surviving heirs of Erlindas father
against another heir (Erlindas brother), and as a result of a compromise
agreement, Erlindas brother agreed to transfer to the other compulsory heirs
of the father, including Erlinda, the rightful shares of the land.
RTC RULING: Erlinda and Eliseos petition, dismissed. There is a valid sale.
Eliseos approval of it (through the waiver) is not required because the
property is also found to be paraphernal. RTC disregarded the NBI examination
results because, anyway, Eliseos signature is not needed for a valid sale.
CA RULING: RTC ruling is reversed; the deed of sale is void; CA applied NCC
158. The property, although paraphernal in the beginning, became conjugal
property when it was used as a collateral for the loan made with GSIS, which
was in fact paid thru conjugal funds (recall that the loan was payable thru
Eliseos monthly salary deductions). Therefore, the property cannot be validly
sold or mortgaged without Eliseos consent, pursuant to FC 124(25).
ISSUE: W/N the property in question is paraphernal and conjugal (Note:resolution
of this issue will subsequently lead to the answer to w/n there was a valid sale
without Eliseos consent)
HELD: It is parphernal property, not conjugal. Thus, Eliseos consent is not needed.
There was a valid and equitable mortgage. (The petition of Munoz is denied; CA
decision upheld but with modifications: Munoz is ordered to reconvey the property
to Eliseo and Erlinda upon payment of the debt, including interests, within 90 days
from the finality of the decision.)
RATIO DECIDENDI:
SC SAYS: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether
the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.
In this case, there is clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the property
from her parents. Pursuant to FC 92 and FC 109, properties acquired
by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be
excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property
of each spouse.
CA held that it became conjugal property when it was mortgaged with GSIS
because the loan was payable through monthly deductions from Eliseos salary.
Wrong.
CA misapplied NCC 158. Although Eliseo and Erlinda were married

under the NCC (and therefore, there is CPG and not ACP), the FC
already superseded the NCC provisions on CPG. This is why FC 105
states that the provisions on CPG shall also apply to CPGs already
established before FC took effect, without prejudice to vested rights.
CA should have referred to the FC provisions on CPG, instead of those
in the NCC.
FC 120 superseded NCC 158. It provides the solution in determining the
OWNERSHIP OF IMPROVEMENTS that are made on the separate property of
spouses, at the expense of the CPG. It provides:
When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value
are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the ownerspouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
In this case, Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly
salary deductions. This totalled at P60,000 only and not the entire amount
of P136,000. The rest were in fact paid by Erlinda. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that the value of the lot is more than the amount paid by Eliseo.
Hence, it remained paraphernal property pursuant to FC 120, despite the
improvements made thereon.
Subsequently, Eliseos approval of a sale/mortgage is not required.
CASE 9. Mariano v. CA, 174 SCRA 59
(Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122)
FACTS:
Respondent Daniel Sanchez wife, Esther Sanchez filed a suit against
Petitioner Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan
City, for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses allegedly
purchased by and delivered to the latter.
A writ of preliminary attachment issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon
a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00,
and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P
15,000.00 or so.
Petitioners motion for the discharge of the attachment having been
denied, Petitioner Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals ordered the Trial Court to receive evidence on
whether or not the attachment had been improvidently or irregularly
issued.
The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the attachment had
indeed been improperly issued, and consequently dissolved it.
Trial then ensued upon the issues arising from the complaint as well as
Petitioner Lourdes Mariano's answer with counterclaim-which included a
claim for damages resulting from wrongful attachment.

Thereafter judgment was rendered in favor of defendant Lourdes Mariano
and against plaintiff Esther Sanchez.
Respondent Daniel Sanchez, Esther's husband filed a complaint for
annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in
his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent Daniel Sanchez alleged that the conjugal assets could not
validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his
wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as
household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal
dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also applied for a preliminary
injunction pending adjudication of the case on the merits.
The Quezon City Court issued an order setting the matter of the injunction
for hearing, and commanding the sheriff, in the meantime, to desist from
proceeding with the auction sale of the property subject of Daniel Sanchez'
claim.
PetitionerLourdes Mariano filed a motion to dismiss the action; this, the
Court denied.
Petitioner instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals where she initially enjoyed some measure of success: her petition
was given due course, and the Quezon City Court was restrained by the
Appellate Court's Seventh Division from further proceeding with the
case. Eventually, however, the Eighth Division came to the conclusion that
there was no merit in her cause and dismissed her petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership of the Respondent is liable for his wifes
liability in connection with her business.
HELD: Yes. Under Art. 121 paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
RATIO: In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by
separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to
seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal
assets. For it being established that Esther had engaged in business with her
husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part
at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond
for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.
The CFI of Rizal (Pasig) rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending appeal to the judgment,
a writ of execution granting upon respondents-spouses of a notice of
sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo
then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. private
respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership
levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound
to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
The case was lifted to the Court of Appeals by the petitioner but rendered
judgment in favour of the respondent granting the auction sale.
Hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: WONa surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership
HELD: NO
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute also involves
the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
CASE 11. Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004
(Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122)
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the
Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).
(PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty
with the ABC for the payment of the said loan.
CASE 10. Ayala V. CA, 289 SCRA 272

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for
sum of money against the PBMCI
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC).
As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo
Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and
severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thereafter, AIDC filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig).
.
Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching
requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to
answer for the payment of the loans.
Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied
on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage
out of conjugal funds.

Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied
shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of
the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists
even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in
this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.
Facts:
1.
According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in

the pursuit of the petitioner-husbands profession or business.44
2.
ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for
the loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching
3.
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the
petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate
business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of
the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for
the said account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of
the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and
the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from
the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.
Case 12.Homeowners v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005
Charges upon obligations of CPG
4.
5.
6.
Miguela Dailo (respondent) and Marcelino Dailo Jr. got married and
purchased a house a lot in San Pablo City.
a. The sold lot was from one Sandra Dalida. However, the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed only in favour of Marcelino Dailo as
vendee to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favour of Gesmundo
which authorized the latter to secure a loan from Homeowners Saving and
Loan Bank (petitioner) to be secured by the said house and lot property of
the Dailos.
a. All these transactions were without the consent of the respondent
Miguela
The loan from the petitioner was not paid upon maturity and the
petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure to which the same was
highest bidder in the public auction.
Then on December 1995, Marcelino died.
The respondent prayed for the nullity of the mortgage and ownership
because the subject property was conjugal in nature and was sold without
her consent.
The RTC and the CA ruled in favour of the respondent declaring the nullity
prayed for.
ISSUE: WON the Conjugal partnership should be liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino
Ruling: No. Other than the petitioners bare allegation that the loan redounded to
the benefit of the family, there was no other evidence supporting such claim.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.
Ratio:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Art. 121 of the Family Code states that [T]he conjugal partnership shall
be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited; . . . .
For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a
doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court.
How it was established that the property regime was CPG:

The marriage was celebrated under the Civil Code (marriage was on Aug.
1967). In the absence of the marriage settlement governing the property
relations of the spouses, the Conjugal partnership of gains became the
property regime.
CASE 13. Ando v. Campo, G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and

Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor.
Andresito Campo and the other respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers
or haulers.
Respondents were dismissed from employment. Consequently filing a case
for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. PACSI and Ando were
directed to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of
attorneys fees).
PACSI and Ando appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters
decision. Respondents moved for its execution.
To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale
on Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of Paquito
V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando.
Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC.
Ando claims that the property belonged to him and his wife and not the
corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of the execution sale.
RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the
NLRC Sheriff.
Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued
that the property to be levied belonged to him and his wife in their
personal capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It was
likewise denied.
WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason
of a debt incurred by him, in his representative capacity and his company,
PACSI.
No. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. Thus, a
sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of
the judgment debtor.
The property in question belongs not only to Ando, but his wife as well.
She stands to lose the property subject to execution without ever being a
party to the case which is tantamount to deprivation of property without
due process.
CASE 14. G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57402, February 28, 1985
(Charges upon and obligations of CPG: with consent)

FACTS:
1. Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a businessman
engaged in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany
logs and operates a logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur.
2. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged primarily in the
business of leasing heavy equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the
like.
3. Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-Tractors
under the terms of which the latter leased to the former tractors for the
purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite
of Narciso's logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. The contract
provided for payment of rental for the use of said tractors.
4. Luis Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors instituted an action urging Luis to
pay a certain amount (P155,410.25), representing the unpaid rentals
5. G-Tractors accepted his offer for a compromise agreement, stating the
mode of payment (installment plan); Luis failed to comply; G-Tractors
filed a motion for execution; Luis asked for suspension of the motion
stating that he still has a pending loan with a banking institution; request
for suspension denied
6. Levy was accordingly made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain personal
properties of the spouses at their residence in Quezon City. Auction sale
was held, and G-Tractors was awarded with the sale of such.
7. Luis then offered to redeem such properties for the same amount;
accepted; a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors
8. On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all rights,
interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have
over a parcel of residential land of the Registry of Deeds of QC which
parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property of the spouses Luis and
Josefina.
9. Sheriff sold at public auction to the highest bidder for cash
10. Certificate of Sale was then issued to G-Tractors as the highest bidder for
P180,000
11. On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI of Quezon
City for "declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of
plaintiff's conjugal property with damages and injunction", claiming that
the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable
considering that the subject matter was never used for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership or of the family
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable
for the debt of the husband
HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the
debt of the husband. CAs decision reversed and set aside
RATIO:
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership
shall be liable for:

(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership
His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use
of petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of constructing
switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of the logging
concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his exclusive
property but that of his family. There is no doubt then that his account
with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity
of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the
right to embark the conjugal partnership.
It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in
connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in
mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as
he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer
and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate
pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business,
the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the
losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains of
the Narcisos in order to satisfy the judgment debt of the private
respondent Luis R. Narciso was validly and legally made in accordance with
law.
CASE 15. Ong v. CA, 204 SCRA 297
(Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122 With consent)
FACTS:
Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business. In furtherance of her
business operation, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan but defaulted in
her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint to collect the sum
legally due against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter being joined as
husband of the former.
The Sheriff levied and attached a parcel of land declared under Tax No.
05378 in the sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In the Public Auction,
defendant Boix was adjudged highest bidder and a corresponding
Certificate of Sale was also issued in favor of Boix.
Ramon sought to annul the auction sale on the ground that the property
was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts
contracted by the wife, and considering that the indebtedness was
contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned
exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the husband is improper.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the
subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired
during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the
subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built
thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such
circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the
present case, the court holds that the lot in question is paraphernal, and
is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is
conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this
case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business
although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions).
It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging
business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any
objection on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his
implied consent to the wife's engagement in business.
According to Justice Ameurfina-Herrera in her concurring opinion, the rule
that should govern in that case is that the wife's paraphernal properties, as
well as those of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the
obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business. After all,
whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to the
conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the
obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may
also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also
against the conjugal property of the spouses.
CASE 16. Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, 1998-02-12
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as
added security. Upon PBMs failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and
Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the
loan with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and
thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon
respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal
properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan
did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a
certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the
property.
ISSUE: WON the property was conjugal and thus could be held liable for personal
debts contracted by the wife.
HELD: YES.
Issue:

WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Held:
Ratio:
No. Petition is DENIED.

The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family despite
their being stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching
is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is
only to the extent of his corporate stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to
the conjugal partnership.
CASE 17. Security Bank v. Mar Tiera Corp., G.R. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006
CASE 18. Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
FACTS: Spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment
of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB.
The spouses averred that Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB. As
security for the loan, he executed a Real Estate Mortgage involving a parcel of land
and all improvements thereon. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted by
PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered in the
name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings claiming that she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the mortgage
constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal property. She also claimed
that the signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of
the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Ros and declared that Estrella had no knowledge of
the loan and mortgage, thus, under the Civil Code, Ros could not encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without Aguete's consent. RTC also held that
Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her husband entered
into without her consent, especially in the case at bar where her consent is
required.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the trial court concluded
forgery without adequate proof and assuming for the sake of argument that Aguete
did not give her consent to Ros' loan, the conjugal partnership is still liable because
the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the case
reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the family's business. Therefore,
the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the evidence of Spouses Ros sufficiently proved that Estrella did not consent
nor signed the loan and the Real Estate Mortgage?
2. W/N the debt obtained by Jose is chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
1. No. Although it is true that a suit for annulment of a contract will prosper if the
wife did not consent to it, in the case at bar, the SC finds that Aguete gave her
consent. The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary
public, hence they are public documents. The execution of a document that has
been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the
alleged signer. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete's signatures were
really forged.
2. Yes. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands
to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
CASE 19. Costuna v. Domondon, 180 SCRA 333 (1989)
(Charges upon and obligations of the CPG, FC 121/122; Without consent)
FACTS:
Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna acquired three parcels of land during their
marriage.
1976: Aged 68, Amadeo made his last will and testament. After this, Amadeo
and Estela were beset with marital problems.
1977: Amadeo sustained third degree burns and had to be treated in different
hospitals. His relatives requested that he be brought to his hometown in Samar
because his signatures are needed (re: his other properties there). Amadeo
never returned to his wife Estela, despite demand, even a petition for habeas
corpus.
Amadeo filed a petition for the partition of properties, with the Juvenile
Domestic and Relations Court. Because he failed to get Estelas consent to the
partition despite repeated demands/requests, Amadeo was constrained to sell
half of the undetermined portion of the conjugal property, without the wifes
consent. It was sold to Laureana Domondon.
1978: Amadeo died.
Estela instituted a special proceeding for the allowance of Amadeos Will.
However, Domondon opposed it, claiming that half of the conjugal property
10

was already sold to her by Amadeo prior to his death. The probate court did
not rule on this, but it allowed the will.
Domondon filed a case with the RTC to compel Estela to comply with the Deed
of Sale executed by Amadeo before his death, that is, to convey to Domondon
the properties already sold to her. The RTC ruled in favour of Domondon.
Estela appealed to the CA, but the CA ruled the same. Ergo, the present case.
Estela argues that the sale of the half of the conjugal properties (not yet
determined what properties because the Court was not able to proceed with
the partition due to lack of Estelas consent) was prejudicial to her rights as
sole heir of Amadeo and as spouse.
ISSUES:
(a) W/N the sale of 1/2 of the conjugal property by Amadeo is valid without
Estelas consent
(b) W/N the CPG should be made liable for the payment of the hospital and medical
expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned the conjugal home and his wife
HELD: (a) The sale is declared valid and (b) yes, the CPG is liable.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
SC SAYS: As a general rule, the other spouses consent is necessary. However,
in this case, the consent of Estela was unreasonably withheld by her. The Court
is constrained to relax the application of the law, and consider the sale falling
within the legal exceptions to the general rule.
The Court cannot overlook the vital fact that Amadeo executed a last
will and testament designating Estela as his sole heir. In this
connection, we find merit in Damondon's assertion that no other
motive could be attributed to Estela but her greed.
NCC 161 (now FC 121) provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for
all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
In this case, the shares of Amadeo was sold by him to cover the
hospitalization, medical and other expenses necessary for his survival.
He was old and gravely ill. His other relatives in Samar are also not
that well in financial resources.
SC SAYS: The health and well-being of both or either of the spouses
would undeniably redound to the benefit of their conjugal
partnership. The advancement of the interests of the conjugal
partnership depends in great measure on the soundness of the body
and mind of the partners.
Ergo, the cost of the hospitalization of Amadeo is chargeable to the
CPG, it being to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.
CASE20. Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361
(Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122 (b) Without Consent)
FACTS:
Petitioner Honorario L. Carlos averred in his complaint filed on October 13,
1994 that in October 1989, respondent Manuel T. Abelardo and his wife
Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to
advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot
located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque,
Metro Manila.
To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently
and on their own, Petitioner Carlos, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in
the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who
acknowledged receipt thereof.The amount was in full payment of the
property.
When Petitioner Carlos inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the
status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their
obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a
definite settlement of the same.
Thereafter, respondent Abelardo expressed violent resistance to
petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death
threats against Petitioner Carlos.
On August 24, 1994, Petitioner Carlos made a formal demand for the
payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply
with their obligation.
Thus, on October 13, 1994, Petitioner Carlos filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, docketed as
Civil Case No. 4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner asked for the
payment of the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its equivalent in Philippine
currency plus legal interest from date of extra-judicial demand. Petitioner
likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs
of suit from respondent.
On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of
Petitioner Carlos.
On November 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner
to respondent and his wife.
The Court of Appeals found that the amount of US$25,000.00 was
respondents share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.
ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay for the loan of US$25,000.00 even when
acknowledgement executed and signed by the Respondent wife was not signed by
the Respondent husband.
HELD: Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article
121 of the Family Code.
RATIO: As gleaned from the records, the following facts are undisputed: (1) there
was a check in the amount of US$25,000.00 issued by petitioner; (2) this amount
was received by respondent and his wife and given to a certain Pura Vallejo for the
11

full payment of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive
Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila; (3) this house and lot became the
conjugal dwelling of respondent and his wife; and (4) respondents wife executed
an instrument acknowledging the loan but which respondent did not sign.
Respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the
profits and income of the corporation. There was no showing that respondent was a
stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name does not appear in the Articles of
Incorporation as well as the Organizational Profile of said company either as
stockholder or officer.Not being a stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits
or income of said corporation. Neither did respondent prove that he was an
employee or an agent so as to be entitled to salaries or commissions from the
corporation.
Respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family
because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home
of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of
respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such
loan together with his wife.
The Court finds sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner,
contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not entitled
thereto.
CASE 21. Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 59889, June 5, 2008
(B. Without consent, Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122)
FACTS:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in
January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired Lot situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City.
Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot
to petitioners forP8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino
allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a
house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December
13, 1986 petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed
of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
Respondent Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title
with Damages. Also, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages. Respondent Florentino executed the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale n favor of petitioners.
The RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners to
vacate the lot and remove all improvements. The RTC likewise
dismissed but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration
of the sale with interest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision:
Hence, this appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: WONthe subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal

property of respondents
HELD: No. The subject lot was a conjugal property.
Petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino
because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale
dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents'
separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor
prejudiced Elisera's interest over it.
Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Likewise, under Article
160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless
it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's supposed exclusive nature is
insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all the
evidence for respondents. On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it
cannot be presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage and
that it is conjugal property since it was registered "in the name of
Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to Elisera Chiong ." But
Elisera also presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her
and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and Elisera
categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed
that the lot is a conjugal property Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot
was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13,
1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject
lot.
CASE 22. Ravina v. Villa-Abrille, G.R. No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009
(Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122, without consent)
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband
and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and
are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
Spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land (LOT 7) located in Davao
City. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was
still single and which is registered solely in his name.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros
lot.
Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family.
By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her
12

objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary
Anns consent.
wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the
decision of the husband to institute the case.
While Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the (CAFGU) began transferring all
their belongings from the house to an apartment. They were also stopped from
entering it.
CASE 23. Fuentes v. Roca

(Charges upon CPG- Obligation Without Consent)
Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of
Sale, against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas).
Petitioners assert that the subject lot was the exclusive property of Pedro
having been acquired by him through barter or exchange. They allege that the
subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his
exclusive properties.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the subject property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal
property
(2) Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns
consent.
HELD: The subject property is a conjugal property of Pedro and Mary Ann and
therefore its sale by Pedro without Mary Anns consent is void.
RATIO:
Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence
was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or
barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed
through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the
same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability,
the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code.
The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband
without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is
void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife,
thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the
FACTS:
1. On Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales
from his mother, Sabina.
2. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who
would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale.
Since Tarciano and Rosario had been estranged spouses already and the
latter was already living in Manila and the former still in Zamboanga, the
lawyer said that he saw and notarized Rosarios affidavit manifesting her
consent to the sale in one of his trips to Manila.
3. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case
to annul the sale and to reconvey the property on the ground that the sale
was void absent the consent of Rosario and her signature was a mere
forgery
4. The RTC ruled in favour of the Fuenteses because of prescription of 4 years
but the CA decided otherwise.
o The CA concluded that the property relation between Tarciano
and Rosario was governed by Conjugal Partnership of Gains as it
was celebrated under the Civil Code. Under such law, an action
for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent
may be brought by the wife during the marriage within the 10
years of the 1989 sale.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the conjugal property is still valid absent the consent of
Rosario (her signature being forged).
RULING: No. the sale of the conjugal property is invalid. Absent the consent of the
other spouse, there can be no disposition or encumbrance on conjugal property.
RATIO:
1. The CA erred in the applying the provisions of the Civil Code because the
Family Code already took effect at the time the sale was made. The latter
stated that the law should apply to marriages whose CPG property regime
was established under the Civil Code without prejudice to rights already
conferred upon.
2. Nevertheless, the action by the children does not fall outside the
prescription period may it be under the Civil Code (which was 10 years
from the discovery of the fraud) or under the Family Code (wherein Art.
124 did not mention any prescription period)
3. Since the couple had already been estranged for 30 years and the
wife has not at all participated in the giving of consent, the sale
was invalid.
o Art. 124. States that x x x In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
13
4.
spouse
may
assume
sole
powers
of
administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or
inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And
this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of
law as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses
written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely
wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.
Note: the Court ordered the Rocas to pay the Fuenteses the amount the latter paid
Tarciano with interest as well as the improvements they have introduced
into the said property.
CASE 24. People v. Lagrimas, G.R. No. L-25355, August 28, 1969
(Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122 Personal debts, FC 122, RPC
108)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
Froilan Lagrimas was charged for the murder of Pelagio Cagro.

Thereafter, the heirs of Cagro filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment on the property of the accused, which was
granted.
Lagrimas was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the appellants.
The judgment became final.
The lower court issued a writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity. A
levy was had on 11 parcels of land declared for tax purposes in the name
of the accused and the sale thereof at public auction was scheduled.
However, the wife of the accused, Mercedes Lagrimas, filed a petition to
quash the said attachment contending that the property belonged to the
conjugal partnership and could not be held liable for pecuniary indemnity
the husband was required to pay. Her petition was granted.
Another judge set aside the said order. But upon Mercedes filing a motion
for reconsideration, a third judge revived the original order, declaring such
attachment and the writ of execution thereafter issued null and void.
WON properties from the conjugal properties of Mercedes and Froilan can
be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity incurred by the latter.
Yes. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; xxx.
It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability
may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing
for the law speaks of partnership assets. That upon complying with the
responsibilities enumerated in article 161, the fines and indemnities
imposed upon a party of the conjugal partnership will be satisfied.
If the appealed order were to be upheld, Froilan would be in effect
exempt therefrom and the heirs of the offended party being made to
suffer still further; that for a transgression of the law by either husband or
wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens of an extremely
onerous character.
CASE 25. Buado and Buado v. Court of Appeals & Nicol, G.R. No. 145222, April 24,
2009
(Charges and upon the obligations of CPG: Personal debts)
FACTS:
1. On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a
complaint for damages against ErlindaNicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No.
84-33. Said action originated from ErlindaNicols civil liability arising from
the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners.
2. On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay
damages.
3. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this
Court. It became final and executory on 5 March 1992.
4. Trial court issued a writ of execution
commanded that of the goods and chattels of ErlindaNicol, or from her
estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in the amount of P40,000,
representing the moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses and exemplary damages
if sufficient personal property cannot be found to satisfy this
execution and lawful fees, then you are commanded that of the lands
and buildings of said defendant you make the said sum of money in the
manner required by the Rules of Court
5. Finding ErlindaNicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
6. On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriffs sale was issued.
7. Two days before the public auction sale, an affidavit of third-party claim
from Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting Buados
to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with
Buados as the highest bidder.
8. On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.
9. Romulo Nicol, the husband of ErlindaNicol, filed a complaint for annulment
of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against
Buados and the deputy sheriff.
14

Buados connived and directly levied upon and execute his real
property without exhausting the personal properties of ErlindaNicol.
No proper publication and posting of the notice of sale.
His property was only sold at a "very low price" whereas the judgment
obligation of ErlindaNicol was only P40,000
10. Buados filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged
to the partnership.
HELD: No, it is not chargeable to the conjugal property

RATIO:
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article
122 of the Family Codeexplicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the
civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership
HELD:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be
enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that
the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of
the Family Code have been covered.
CASE 26. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
(Personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108)
FACTS:
Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of
murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found
guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the
heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered
the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered
in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a
notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal
assets of Melecia.
15

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PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY.

VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage

Article 119, NCC.

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

CASE 3.Villanuevav. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 143286 | April 14, 2004

CASE 4. Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

CASE 5.Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 | 2011-04-06

Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a (lease and conditional sale

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

(What constitutes CPG; Improvements on the CPG Property, FC 120)

CASE 8. Munoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 156125 (2010)

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

CA misapplied NCC 158. Although Eliseo and Erlinda were married

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

CASE 10. Ayala V. CA, 289 SCRA 272

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in

How it was established that the property regime was CPG:

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and

(Charges upon and obligations of CPG: with consent)

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

No. Petition is DENIED.

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

ISSUE/S: WONthe subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

CASE 23. Fuentes v. Roca

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

Froilan Lagrimas was charged for the murder of Pelagio Cagro.

PERSONS & FAM ILY RELATIONS | ATTY. VARGAS | CASE DIGESTS

HELD: No, it is not chargeable to the conjugal property

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