Philippine habeas corpus cases

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Philippine habeas corpus cases are cases decided by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, concerning the writ of habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in order to prevent any violence in
cases of rebellion or insurrection, as the case may be. In Philippine jurisdiction, the
present 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article III, Section 15 provides that The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. In Article 8, Section 18,
there are limitations imposed in case of suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Contents [hide]
1

Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. Reports 87, 1905 [1])

Montenegro v. Castaeda (91 Phil. Reports 882, 1949)

Lansang v. Garcia (G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971; 42 SCRA 448 [2])

Aquino v. Enrile (G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183 [4])

Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (L-61388, April 20, 1983 ,121 SCRA 472, [5])

The 1987 Philippine Constitution

References

Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. Reports 87, 1905 [1])[edit]

At the early years of the American Rule in the Philippines, lawlessness was rampant
and criminal activities were at large. Governor-General James Francis Smith, with
the consent of the Philippine Commission, suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the provinces of Batangas and Cavite. A petition was raised
questioning such suspension of the writ.
The Supreme Court issued a ruling sustaining the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. It said that the decision of the Governor-General is his duty on his part, and
that the court cannot question the acts of the executive and legislative branches of
government. Simply put, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is a political question that courts cannot decide upon.
Montenegro v. Castaeda (91 Phil. Reports 882, 1949)[edit]
President Elpidio Quirino suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
some parts of Luzon in order to stifle the emergence of the Hukbalahap guerillas.

Such suspension was again questioned in the Supreme Court. The court affirmed
the presidents acts of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, based
on the decision in the Barcelon case.
Lansang v. Garcia (G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971; 42 SCRA 448 [2])[edit]
On August 21, 1971, grenades exploded at Plaza Miranda in the city of Manila
during a public meeting of the Liberal Party. Acting on such an event, on August 23,
1971,[3] President Ferdinand Marcos suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on the entire country. Petitions were filed in the Supreme Court for the
release of several arrested persons.
The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was proper for having
factual and legal basis clearly provided forth by the government. But the Supreme
Court, reversing the Barcelon and Montenegro cases, declared that the Judiciary has
the authority to inquire into the factual basis of such suspension, and that the
suspension is to be annulled if no legal ground would be established. Thus, such
action is now considered justiciable to be decided by the courts.
Aquino v. Enrile (G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183 [4])[edit]
Decided during martial law, it involved the petition of habeas corpus of Marcos
critics, notably Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno. The Supreme Court decided
unanimously to dismiss the petitions, but as Chief Justice Querube Makalintal put it,
"there was no agreement as to the manner the issues would be treated and
developed. The same destination would be reached, so to speak, but through
different routes and by means of different vehicles of approach." He said that the
reason why the Court did not produce a single, collegial opinion, among others, was
that the members of the Supreme Court are conscious of "the future verdict of
history" upon their stand.
Even before the cases were decided, Diokno, to the chagrin of the Supreme Court,
opted to withdraw his petition on the ground that no fair decision can be made of
the court to render him justice. What made it worse was the fact that before the
Supreme Court could respond to Diokmos challenge, Marcos issued an order
releasing him and the other petitioners, leaving Aquino behind.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro opined that the declaration of martial law automatically
suspends the application of the said writ, thus Aquino cannot be released. He said
that martial law "is founded upon the principle that the state has a right to protect
itself against those who would destroy it, and has therefore been likened to the right
of an individual to self-defense."
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (L-61388, April 20, 1983 ,121 SCRA 472, [5])[edit]
In this decision involving subversion, the Supreme Court reversed the Lansang
ruling and reverted to the Barcelon and Montenegro ruling that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution[edit]

The present Philippine Constitution, in reaction to the Marcos regime, adopted a

procedure in cases of suspension of the writ or declaration of martial law by the
president.
It states that in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the
President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period not
exceeding sixty days, or place the Philippines or any part of the country under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke or
extend such proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in session it shall,
convene without need of a call within twenty-four hours following such proclamation
or suspension.
Such check and balance placed on the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Lansang
case. It is provided that the Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or the extension thereof. It is mandated to promulgate its decision
within thirty days from its filing by any citizen.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.
References[edit]
Bernas, Joaquin (2003). The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: a
Commentary. Rex Book Store, Manila
Cruz, Isagani A. (2000). Res Gestae: A Brief History of the Supreme Court. Rex Book
Store, Manila
Magsalin, Mariano (2004). Philippine Political Law, Arellano Law Foundation
Mijares, Primitivo(1976). The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
Union Square Publications, San Francisco, U.S.A.

Habeas corpus
A LAW EACH DAY (KEEPS TROUBLE AWAY) By Jose C. Sison | Updated July 30, 2007 12:00am
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These are age-old Latin words first used in English law that literally mean you have
the body. The complete phraseology in Latin is habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
which is a writ or a mandatory precept in writing couched in the form of a letter
issued by a court of justice and directed to a person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the person detained at a designated time and place,
with the day and cause of his apprehension and detention. The writ requires the
person detaining another to do, submit to and receive whatsoever the judge or
court issuing it, shall consider in that behalf. It is called the great writ of liberty
because of its efficaciousness in dealing with, and settling issues about all manner
of illegal confinement (Blacks Law Dictionary).

It is phrased in the archaic and obsolete Latin language but it is still relevant and
popularly used especially in the Philippines because of the increasing incidence of
human rights violations in the form of enforced disappearances. Lately it has
become almost a household phrase coming out not only from the glib tongues of
companeros and companeras but also from of the lips of any Juan, Tomas or Kulasa
mainly because of the high profile, long running and unsolved Jonas Burgos
disappearance.

As used in our Constitution, habeas corpus refers not only to the mandatory
precept of the court but also to the right of the citizens to an immediate
determination of whether or not a person is detained or restrained of his liberty by
due process. So the term applies to both the writ itself and the privilege of, or right
to the writ.

The writ is issued by a court of justice as a matter of course in all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto
(Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court). As long as the application for the writ is
sufficient in form and substance and verified under oath, the writ will be allowed
(Section 3, idem). You have the body or habeas corpus is therefore understood
more as a statement of fact rather than a question.

But if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of competent
jurisdiction or that he is a convicted felon or that he is imprisoned by virtue of a
lawful judgment, the writ will be disallowed (Section 4, idem).

The right to an immediate determination of the legality or illegality of the

confinement technically known as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may
be suspended in case of the actual existence of invasion or rebellion when public

safety requires it (Section 15, Article III, Constitution). Only the President can
suspend the writ as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Section 18, Article
VII, idem). In other words, persons judicially charged for rebellion or offense
inherently in or directly connected with invasion are not entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus as a matter of course when the President has suspended the writ
under those situations. The person who cannot apply for the writ during the actual
existence of rebellion or invasion must be judicially charged. If he is only arrested
and detained without any charge of rebellion or invasion being filed against him
within three days, he shall be released (Section 18, idem).

In granting the President the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, the present
Constitution actually removed the exercise of a lot of Presidential discretion by
deleting such amorphous terms as insurrection and imminent danger of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion found in the 1973 Constitution. This is one of the
concrete manifestations of the framers great concern for individual liberty that is
the greatest hallmark of constitutional democracy.

Thus in the Jonas Burgos case, the Supreme Court readily issued the writ of habeas
corpus based on the verified petition of his mother that the persons named therein
have been involved in his abduction and have since then been restraining him of his
liberty without due process. Here the writ was issued as a matter of course, since
the right to said writ has not been suspended. It is in keeping with the meaning and
essence of habeas corpus or you have the body so you have to produce him and
explain why you are detaining him.

The person allegedly detaining another may answer the allegation by claiming that
he could not produce the body of said person because he is not under his custody or
power or under his restraint. His defense may also consist of alleging that he has
released the detainee for whom the petition is filed. In the Burgos case, the military
denied having him in their custody. By the issuance of the writ however, there is
already a prima facie presumption that the military is detaining him. So the burden
is now on the military to prove that Burgos is not really under their custody. Bare
denials without sufficient proof to back them up cannot prevail over positive
assertions back up by prima facie evidence whether direct or circumstantial.

This is the present status of the Burgos case. It is now in the hands of the Court of
Appeals to determine which evidence is more reliable and credible. After all
therefore, the enjoyment of the right to liberty is a matter of proof of the identity of
the person detaining another and that the detention or restraint of liberty is illegal.