IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix
the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have
already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title,
the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for
an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force
and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1.

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of
law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the
court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission
to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
rules of admission to the practice of law.
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA, vs ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda
(spouses Aranda) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, charging their former
counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The
spouses Aranda were the defendants in Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio
Aranda, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.
In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006,[1] the spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elaydas handling of their case was sorely
inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence, [2] to wit:
4. That on February 14, 2006 hearing of the said case, the case was ordered submitted for decision
[the spouses Aranda] and [Atty. Elayda] did not appear; certified copy of the order is attached as Annex C;
5. That the order setting this case for hearing on February 14, 2006 was sent only to [Atty. Elayda]
and no notice was sent to [the spouses Aranda] that is they were unaware of said hearing and [Atty. Elayda]
never informed them of the setting;
6. That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of
such order notwithstanding the follow-up they made of their case to him;
7. That [Atty. Elayda] did not lift any single finger to have the order dated February 14, 2006
reconsidered and/or set aside as is normally expected of a counsel devoted to the cause of his client;
8. That in view of the inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court naturally rendered a judgment dated March
17, 2006 adverse to [the spouses Aranda] which copy thereof was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and [the
spouses Aranda] did not receive any copy thereof, certified xerox copy of the decision is attached as Annex
D;
9. That they were totally unaware of said judgment as [Atty. Elayda] had not again lifted any single
finger to inform them of such adverse judgment and that there is a need to take a remedial recourse
thereto;

10. That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of appeal hence the judgment became
final and executory hence a writ of execution was issued upon motion of the plaintiff [Martin Guballa] in the
said case;
11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag implemented the writ of execution and it
was only at this time that [the spouses Aranda] became aware of the judgment of the Court, certified xerox
copy of the writ of execution is attached as Annex E;
12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the status of their case before Regional
Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City and to their utter shock, dismay and disbelief, they found out that
they have already lost their case and worst the decision had already become final and executory;
13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a remedial recourse of the situation (the
Sheriff initially gave them fifteen (15) days), Sheriff Madarag forcibly took possession and custody of their
Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. 529;
14. That they were deprived of their right to present their evidence in the said case and of their
right to appeal because of the gross negligence of respondent. [3]
In its Order[4] dated August 15, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed Atty. Elayda to submit his Answer to the
complaint with a warning that failure to do so will result in his default and the case shall be heard ex parte.
Atty. Elayda filed his Answer[5] dated September 1, 2006, in which he narrated:
7. That this case also referred to [Atty. Elayda] sometime December 2004 after the [spouses Aranda] and its
former counsel failed to appear in court on February 7, 2005;
8. That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to contact [Atty. Elayda] to prepare for
the case and in fact on May 30, 2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask for postponement of the case for reason that
he still have to confer with the [spouses Aranda] who were not around;
9. That contrary to the allegations of the [spouses Aranda], there was not a single instance from December
2004 that the [spouses Aranda] called up [Atty. Elayda] to talk to him regarding their case;
10. That the [spouses Aranda] from December 2004 did not even bother to follow up their case in court just
if to verify the status of their case and that it was only on July 19, 2006 that they verified the same and also
the only time they tried to contact [Atty. Elayda];
11. That the [spouses Aranda] admitted in their Complaint that they only tried to contact [Atty. Elayda]
when the writ of execution was being implemented on them;
12. That during the scheduled hearing of the case on February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] was in fact went to
RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City and asked Mrs. Edith Miano to call him in Branch 73 where he had another
case if the [spouses Aranda] show up in court so that [Atty. Elayda] can talk to them but obviously the
[spouses Aranda] did not appear and Mrs. Miano did not bother to call [Atty. Elayda];
13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the necessary pleadings in court because
the [spouses Aranda] did not get in touch with him;
14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the latter failed to give their contact number
to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the [spouses Aranda] go to his office to leave their contact number;
14.
That the [spouses Aranda] were negligent in their I dont care attitude towards their case and for this
reason that they alone should be blamed for what happened to their case x x x.
At the mandatory conference hearing held on March 14, 2007, all the parties appeared with their respective counsels. The
parties were then given a period of 10 days from receipt of the order within which to submit their position papers attaching
therewith all documentary exhibits and affidavits of witnesses, if any.
After the submission of the parties position papers, Investigating Commissioner Jordan M. Pizarras came out with his
Decision[6] finding Atty. Elayda guilty of gross negligence, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six months, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt of the
finality of this DECISION. He is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a
more severe penalty.[7]
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128 [8] dated March 6, 2008, adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Pizarras report, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents negligence and unmindful of his sworn duties to his
clients, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. [9]
Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review maintaining that he was not negligent in handling
the spouses Arandas case as to warrant suspension, which was too harsh a penalty under the circumstances.

After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and
the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was negligent and unmindful of his sworn duties to his
clients.
In Abay v. Montesino,[10] this Court held:
The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public service and secure
justice for those who seek its aid. Thus, the practice of law is considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required
for the conferment of such privilege.
Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and of
morality which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the
legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.Any conduct found wanting in these
considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action. In
the present case, the failure of respondent to file the appellants brief was a clear violation of his
professional duty to his client.[11]
The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should
be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention, care,
and time to all the cases he is handling. As the spouses Arandas counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress
of said spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect
the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the
scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the spouses whereabouts. While it is
true that communication is a shared responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary duty to
inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for
his clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is
necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it
is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have
constant communication with each other. Again, Atty. Elaydas excuse that he did not have the spouses Arandas contact
number and that he did not know their address is simply unacceptable.
Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty. Elaydas explanation that he cannot be faulted for missing the February
14, 2006 hearing of the spouses Arandas case. The Court quotes with approval the disquisition of Investigating
Commissioner Pizarras:
Moreover, his defense that he cannot be faulted for what had happened during the hearing on
February 14, 2006 because he was just at the other branch of the RTC for another case and left a message
with the court stenographer to just call him when [the spouses Aranda] come, is lame, to say the least. In
the first place, the counsel should not be at another hearing when he knew very well that he has a
scheduled hearing for the [spouses Arandas] case at the same time. His attendance at the hearing should
not be made to depend on the whether [the spouses Aranda] will come or not. The Order submitting the
decision was given at the instance of the other partys counsel mainly because of his absence there. Again,
as alleged by the [the spouses Aranda] and as admitted by [Atty. Elayda] himself, he did not take the
necessary remedial measure in order to ask that said Order be set aside. [12]
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses Arandas case for decision. Thus, a
judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of money. Notice of said judgment was received by Atty.
Elayda who again did not file any notice of appeal or motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and
executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda came to
know of the adverse RTC judgment, which by then had already become final and executory, only when a writ of execution
was issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.

Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. His conduct shows
that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his clients case but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He
proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to
his clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. [13]
On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free. [14] Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,[15] the
Court held:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it
is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. [16]
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the Decision of the Investigating
Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Elaydas personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. A.M. No.
10-10-4-SC
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts or passages of his writings, or the ideas or
language of the same, and passing them off as the product of ones own mind. [1]
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said
case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive
department[2] to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses
committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent from their article, A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book,
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark
Ellis from his article, Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law in 2006.The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del Castillos discussion of the principles of jus
cogens and erga omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona,
Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay
L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O.
Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez,
Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls
for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet
arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by
dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court
on how to go about the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the
said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well
as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect. Paragraph 9 of their published statement reads,

But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case
based on polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise
its power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous
disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of
concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. (Emphasis supplied).
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of
public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the
motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We
made it clear in the case of In re Kelly[3]that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties,
the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is
contempt of court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,
there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can
threaten the independence of the judiciary.[4] The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.[5]
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the
UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.[6] Their actions likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and
13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin
M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn
G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution,
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution,
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting,
through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the
investigation before the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court. Enclosed are copies of the said dummy and signed statement, respectively, attached to the said letter
dated August 10, 2010 and to the Compliance dated August 31, 2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards.
Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.
Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named UP College of Law faculty members be effected by personal
delivery.
SO ORDERED.
Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod | 201 SCRA 210 |G.R. No. 100113 |September 3, 1991
Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano questioned
the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least 10 years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent worked in his fathers law
office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2 years, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of
an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of various companies.
Issue
1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods
appointment.
Held

1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in courtIn general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court.
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity
as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act
or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by
the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for
the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a
privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the
bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission
to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the
law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in
the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed
as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant
questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee
of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found
that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also
believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC
therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN . Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the
legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LMPPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
xxx
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing
law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. [8] Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.
[10]
Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the evidence does not support the
charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent
to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738 vs ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, February 19, 2008
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street,
Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. DiazCatu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila[4] where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. [5] When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, [6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As
head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The
parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was
then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As
there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent.[7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he
represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he
prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal.
By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: [8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. [9] This was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he
was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713,
GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local
chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the
Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex
specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang
barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because
they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of
their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other
words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours.
Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. [14] Since the law itself
grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours,
there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of
these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation,
no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. [16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should
have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO
PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD
OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or
be
connected
with
any
commercial,
credit,
agricultural,
or
industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of
the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to
society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined
as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
(emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.[19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers
oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath
as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty.
Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank
issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and
the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established
the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate,
the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan,
at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as
their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank
actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which
subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGGs
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to
this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service.
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no
adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of matter and the metes and bounds of
intervention that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter
and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.
He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue
in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the intervention. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to
be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract
principles of law. The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions
that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not
that
of
the
usual court litigator
protecting
the
interest
of
government.
Petition
assailing
the
Resolution
of
the
Sandiganbayan
is
denied.
Relevant
Dissenting
Opinion
of
Justice
Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A lawyer, having once held public office or
having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which
he
has
investigated
or
passed
upon
while
in
such
office
or
employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private
interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1.
applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON ON
THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.
BRION, J.:
This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty.
Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which query the latter referred to the Court for consideration. In
the course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered that the query was beyond pure policy interpretation and
referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a matter that required concrete action on the factual situation
presented.
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public
officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employmentfor
a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement,
or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: Why may an incumbent engage in private practice under (b)
(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot,
as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very
public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself who is no longer in a position of possible
abuse/exploitation cannot?[1]
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC), Branch
81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of
prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private
counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who
may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from
government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where she used
to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise of clout, influence or
privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use in the private practice of his profession.
However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of
Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so
long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former Clerk of Court
of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following observations when the
matter was referred to him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is to uphold the time-honored principle of public
office being a public trust. Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and
employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and
sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that [t]hey [public officials and
employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of
undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government employee
and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or
undue influence, as the case may be.[2]
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and recommendation.[3] The OCAT took the view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an
incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision of law. [4]
and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term such practice after the phrase provided that. It may
indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase engage in the private practice of their profession should
be prefatory sentence that public officials during their incumbency shall not be disregarded. However, read
in its entirety, such practice may only refer to practice authorized by the Constitution or law or the
exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term law was intended by the legislature
to include a memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law.
xxx
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and
employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act,
accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the
Constitution
xxx
The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that in case of
conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over the former. [5]
[Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside employment
to one that does not require the practice of law.[6] The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they
have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service. [7]
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution dated November 11,
2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of profession during
employment and within one year from resignation, retirement from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise
required the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her
incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a report on his
verification.[8]
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon reported
the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo M. Macalam, et
al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;
(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa, et al., on (sic) February,
2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;
(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, on February 21, 2008, as
counsel for the plaintiff; and
(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps. Mariano and Olivia Silverio,
on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the defendants.

Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a Manifestation
(received by the Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008 Resolution. She likewise
stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well, she informed the Court that she had previously taken
the following judicial remedies in regard to the above query:
1.
SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had been
dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) a recourse taken when undersigned was still a
private practitioner;
2.
SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, which had been
also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4, 2008 (Annex B) a recourse taken when
undersigned was already a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took
her oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]
She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases so that eventually, the Honorable Supreme
Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2)
and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private practice of undersigneds
law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a similar, express prohibition in regard to
undersigneds practice of profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor within the supposedly restricted 1-year
period?
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of determining how the
Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and form (as the Court does not give interpretative
opinions[9] but can issue circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts [10] and in the
exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof [11]), but also with the task of responding to
admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.
After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of the query for the
guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the present administrative matter a finished task,
subject only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffes admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and immediately after her resignation,
is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run away from under the cover of the letter-query she
filed and her petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to our level. We note that
at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least
three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the
fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing
before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were dismissed, and her intent
to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July
23, 2008 because the court declined to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in the petition, as any decision
that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the uncertainty or controversy. [12] The second, filed
with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC,
Branch 54, Manila, on December 4, 2008.[13] Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling on Atty.
Buffes actions, as no actual court case other than the present administrative case, is now actually pending on the issue she
raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffes recourse to this Court and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the
intent to shop for a favorable answer to her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffes actions relates to possible objections on
procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be
penalized for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The essence of due process is
the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be heard. [14] The records of this
case show that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to
our November 11, 2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffes appearances
before Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her legal positions on
these appearances have also been expressed before this Court; first, in her original letter-query, and subsequently, in her
Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration needs to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her
appearances in her previous Branch within a year from her resignation.
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will
not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employees
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)
(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the
one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work
with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove
any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or

employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and
the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public. [15]
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to
contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the
definitive rule on the outside employment that an incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to
his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the
following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or
conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnels duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that
court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools,
review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential
information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government,
unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside
employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the
practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the
practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[16] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
[17]
Under both provisions, a common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may
wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with
court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to
apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply
to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffes situation falls under Section 7.

Atty. Buffes Situation

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffes admission that she immediately engaged in
private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it
noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects to its application to her situation; she perceives it
to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office Branch 81 for a year immediately after resignation, as she
believes that her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as counsel and
her former duties as Clerk of Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public
officials and employees as against those already separated from government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained above, that the general
rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful
under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can practice their
profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties
and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to
practice their profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel from doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffes basic premise is
misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her
separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6713. The clerk of courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office
where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on
the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent
cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no
conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffes basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffes approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to
risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it disturbing that she first violated the law
before making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers
known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law
and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a
cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffes part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as unlawful, Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the
Code
of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word shall, this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to
do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)s unfairness. Unlawful
conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the
Rule is broad enough to include it. [18] Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to
bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in
unlawful conduct.[19] Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyers oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before
the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted
to replicate the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same court they came from. She,
like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law. [20] By her
irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers. [21] Her offense is not in any way
mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she
followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue,
in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose
implications do not promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [22]
Considering Atty. Buffes ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa loquitur finds
application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[23] In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,[24] the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his
actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the
Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of
several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the
payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. [25] The Court held that those
cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further
inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.[26]
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,[27] that no evidentiary hearing is required before the
respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta [28] where we punished a lawyer
for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a
trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person
to be disciplined.[29]
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,[30] the respondent was disciplined and punished for contempt for his slurs regarding the
Courts alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt.
The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against the Court through the
media and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court
over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power. [31]
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do
not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been
given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[32] The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.[33]
In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCATs observation that Atty Buffes letterquery may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as
practice of the legal profession soon after ones separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she
cited, it is time to ring the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow this practice to continue.
As we observed earlier,[34] Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her
misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the
Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora

to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although
this is not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we cannot help
but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have
spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have exercised because of the OCATs
observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from the service.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together with a stern
warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts of professional misconduct. [35] This
penalty reflects as well the Courts sentiments on how seriously the retired, resigned or separated officers
and employees of the Judiciary should regard and observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the
office that they used to work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other
acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffes record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
GARRIDO VS GARRIDO
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit 1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment against the respondents
Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino
Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me
that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my
husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me
that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila
together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the
prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea.
He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his
difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido
denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were
educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary

course.4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten
(10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979,
with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with
Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was
not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between
her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his
second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept
silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action
against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage
Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity 7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the
marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also
alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and
the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied
this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. 10 The IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her
Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment. 12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No.
XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty.
Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under
Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in
the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from
disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido
took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous
marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject
its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in
this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the

determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. 13 We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this ruling. 14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. 15 The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome
of the charge is wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to
the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is
not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his
continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law.
Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for,
among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to
the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings.
As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed
her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of
compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the upright and respectable members of the community. 20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. 21We make these distinctions as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or
multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies
to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family
institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other
than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was
subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to
the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage
with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands
respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of
gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible
to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had
romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. 26 This
was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage.
This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without
taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free
to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to
accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2)
women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more
than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia
A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt,
using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the
present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar
admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. 27 As a lawyer, he
violated his lawyers oath, 28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the
crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code,
which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in
promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own
personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are
mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also
used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 33Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings,
accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable
under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford
them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his
private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from
responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar. 35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have good moral character, a
person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the
opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she
is known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido
was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted
confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with
him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the
knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she
lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential
advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering
into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and
affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took
a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty.
Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she
should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him,
upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this,
because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third
marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid;
hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by
the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage
transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage
a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong 39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they
wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to
retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that
her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.
Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear
demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so
corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with
whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty.
Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point
of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second
family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his
second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior
demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. 40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court,
must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before
she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P.
Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised
with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a
legal professional and as an officer of the Court.42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the
parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the
court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after
their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in
her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without
placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.