Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
4/2/2012 2:35 PM
Comment
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute:
Eviscerating the Mansfield Rule
ROBERT BUCHHOLZ*
ABSTRACT
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England Law | Boston (2012). B.A., English, cum
laude, Saint Anselm College (2006). I would like to thank my wife, Lindsey, for her constant
support throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the Law Review staff for
their editing assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
1 Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Auth., LAS VEGAS OFFICIAL LAS VEGAS TOURISM
WEBSITE (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.visitlasvegas.com/vegas/index.jsp.
2
See W. Dudley McCarter, The Right to a Fair Jury Trial Not a Perfect One, 53 J. MO. B. 170,
171 (1997) (A jurors testimony or affidavit may not be used to impeach the verdict as to
misconduct inside or outside the jury room, whether before or after the jury is discharged.);
see also Jason R. Mudd, Note, Liberalizing the Mansfield Rule in Missouri: Making Sense of the
Extraneous Evidence Exception After Travis v. Stone, 69 MO. L. REV. 779, 782-83 (2004).
3 (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B.).
4 *I+mpeachment of verdict is defined as *a+ partys attack on a verdict, alleging
impropriety by a member of the jury. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 821 (9th ed. 2009).
5
6
Rule 606(b) is rooted in the Mansfield Rule and strikes a balance between promoting justice
through verdicts rendered by impartial juries and promoting the stability and finality of the
jury decision-making process. Mudd, supra note 2, at 784.
7
The Sixth Amendment provides that *i+n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . . U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
8 Kent A. Lambert, Evidentiary Hearings on Juror Bias, LITIG. NEWS, Summer 2010, at 2, 3.
9 See Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Mo. 2010) (The *Mansfield+ *R+ule
competes with the desire and duty of the judicial system to avoid injustice and to redress the
grievances of private litigants. . . . The court [must] balance[] the interest of privacy for juror
discussion against the right to a fair trial . . . . (quoting After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil
Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Wis. 1982))); Developments in the Law, Race and the Criminal
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Recognition of the unique evils associated with racism10 and the evil of
state-supported racial prejudice11 has caused some legal scholars to
proposeand some courts to adoptan independent exception to the
Mansfield Rule that permits juror testimony for the purpose of impeaching
verdicts tainted by racial, ethnic, or religious bias.12
Recognition of such an exception, however, draws an unprincipled
distinction between types of bias and, in doing so, overlooks the harmful
effect that such a distinction will have on the continued vitality of the
Mansfield Rule.13 This Comment argues that the Missouri Supreme Courts
recent decision in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute is founded precisely on
this arbitrary dividing line: It elevates the form of the bias over its
functionality and fails to recognize that all overt bias in the jury room is
detrimental to the judicial process.14 In this regard, the courts recognition
of a special exception in cases of racial, ethnic, or religious bias provides a
glaring pretense for future judicial inroads into the jury deliberation room
and threatens to swallow the Mansfield Rule in its entirety.15
Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1473, 1595-96 (1988) [hereinafter Race and the Criminal
Process](stating that many jurors harbor racial prejudicesboth subtle and overtand that
attempts to find legal redress for such bias are often rebuked by the evidentiary rules that
prevent inquiry into jurors mental processes).
10
15
Nor does there seem to be a principled reason to limit the exception only
to claims of bias, when other types of jury misconduct undermine a fair
trial as well. If a jury does not follow the jury instructions, or ignores
relevant evidence, or flips a coin, or falls asleep, then surely that
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Part I discusses how the Missouri courts have approached the issue of
overt juror misconduct prior to Fleshner. In particular, it: (1) the traditional
Missouri rule that juror testimony about matters affecting jury deliberation
may not be used to impeach the jurys verdict; (2) the exception to this rule
that allows jurors to testify about juror misconduct outside the courtroom;
and (3) Missouri courts procedure for assessing juror prejudice at post-trial
hearings. Part II takes a detailed look at the Fleshner courts decision and
explains: (1) the background facts; (2) the procedural history; and (3) the
courts holding that racial, ethnic, or religious comments during jury
deliberations automatically warrant a new trial. Part III argues that the
courts decision wrongly created an independent exception to the
Mansfield Rule by drawing an artificial line between which types of
inquiries into the deliberation process are permissible and which ones are
not based solely on the form of the alleged bias.
I.
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18
Id. at 87 n.4 (citing Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 348 (Mo. 1967)).
Baumle, 420 S.W.2d at 348 (quoting Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A juror who has reached his conclusions on the basis of
the evidence presented for his consideration may not have his mental processes and
innermost thoughts put on a slide for examination under the judicial microscope. Id.
19
20
Gold, supra note 11, at 135. In Tanner v. United States, the Court explained:
Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to
secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct
sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus
used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private
deliberation, the constant subject of public investigationto the
destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.
483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987) (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)).
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See Middleton v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 152 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Mo. 1941) (involving a
situation where a juror visited several used-car dealerships measuring the type of car
involved in the accident at trial); Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(involving a situation where a juror brought a medical booklet into the jury room and
discussed, in a positive light, the use of a drug involved in the medical malpractice case);
Stotts, 822 S.W.2d at 890 (involving a situation where a juror visited the accident scene
involved in the case). Missouri case law is unclear whether the extraneous evidence exception
is available only in situations where the party complaining of the testimony fails to make a
timely and proper objection or whether failure to object to such testimony and extraneous
evidence constitutes independent exceptions to the Mansfield Rule. Compare Neighbors, 926
S.W.2d at 37 (holding that failure of the opposing party to object and the existence of extrinsic
evidence were conditions that had to be met before juror testimony was competent to impeach
the verdict), with Stotts, 822 S.W.2d at 891 (holding that juror testimony was admissible under
two independent theories: (1) the testimony related to a jurors gathering of extraneous
evidence, and (2) the opposing party failed to object). For a discussion of the two
interpretations, see generally Mudd, supra note 2, at 779.
30 66 S.W.3d at 3 (*The juror+ obtained evidence outside of that presented at trial, which
bore directly on the issue of the *defendants+ sight distance, an issue hotly contested at trial
and which was the subject of the testimony from both sides expert witnesses.).
31 Id. at 4.
32 Id. at 5 (stating that the juror in question testified that her observations did not enter into
the deliberations).
33
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Mo. 2010) (citing Travis, 66 S.W.3d at
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hearing, the party moving for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct
must offer evidence that establishes the existence of such misconduct. 34 If
the evidence shows that the alleged juror misconduct actually occurred
(i.e., the moving party makes a prima facie case of juror misconduct), the
Missouri courts presume that the moving party was prejudiced.35 The
burden of evidence then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there
was no prejudice to the opposing party.36 Furthermore, in attempting to
counter this strong presumption of prejudice, juror affidavits and juror
testimony, which [tend] . . . to minimize the effect of [the] misconduct,
are entitled to very little weight.37 This suggests that the courts decision
regarding the prejudicial effect of the juror misconduct is made primarily
although not exclusivelyin the abstract.38
II. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute
A. Facts
Michelle Fleshner sued her former employer, Pepose Vision Institute,
P.C. (PVI), for wrongful termination following PVIs decision to fire her
due to her cooperation with a federal investigation into PVIs labor
4).
34 Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 158 (noting that allegations requiring a new trial must be
supported by proof (citing Sennert v. McKay, 56 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Mo. 1932))).
35 Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 5 (Prejudice to the losing party must be presumed, shifting the
burden of evidence to the respondent to show lack of prejudice to the appellant. (quoting
Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 158) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 158
(The burden of evidence shifted to plaintiff to show that there was in fact no prejudice to
defendant.).
36 See Middleton, 152 S.W.2d at 158 (It is presumed that error is harmful, unless it is clearly
shown to be otherwise. (quoting State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid, 64 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. 1933)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
37 See id. at 160.
38 See Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Delaney, 732 F.2d 639,
643 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1064 (2d Cir. 1983). But see
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 n.7 (1982) (*A juror+ who is trying as an honest man to live
up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a
certain matter. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950))); United States v.
Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that in situations involving prosaic
misconduct, a court can and should consider the effect of extraneous information or
improper contacts on a jurors state of mind*+ . . . *or+ any other thoughts a juror might have
about the contacts or conduct at issue (quoting United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2001))); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 533 (6th Cir. 1984) (*I+f a district court
views juror assurances of continued impartiality to be credible, the court may rely upon such
assurances in deciding whether a defendant has satisfied the burden of proving actual
prejudice.).
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Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 85-86 (Mo. 2010).
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85-86.
Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
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51
304 S.W.3d at 86. The Missouri courts have recognized the significance of a fair trial:
The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is foundational to the
judicial process. Speck v. Abell-Howe Co., 839 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992). It is fundamental that jurors should be thoroughly impartial
as between the parties. The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is
an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to a trial by jury
guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. (citing Kendall v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
327 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Mo. 1959)). Parties to a civil case are always entitled
to a decision based on the honest deliberations of twelve qualified jurors. .
. . When even one unqualified juror is seated, the complaining party is
entitled to a new trial. Petry Roofing Supply, Inc. v. Sutton, 839 S.W.2d
337, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Brines By and Through Harlan v. Cibis, 784 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989)).
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comments,58 (2) the prejudicial effect of the comments on the other jurors, 59
and (3) the public policy behind the Mansfield Rule.60
First, with respect to the overt nature of a jurors comments, the court
concluded that [w]hen a juror makes statements evincing ethnic or
religious bias or prejudice during deliberations, the juror exposes his
mental processes and innermost thoughts. What used to rest[] alone in the
jurors breast has now been exposed to the other jurors.61 Consequently,
[t]he juror has revealed that he is not fair and impartial.62 Second, in
regard to the prejudicial effect on other jurors, the court concluded that it is
unnecessary to determine whether the alleged statements actually
prejudiced other jurors63 because racial, ethnic, or religious statements are
per se prejudicial and deny the parties their constitutional rights to a trial
by [twelve] fair and impartial jurors and equal protection of the law.64
Finally, addressing the policy underlying the Mansfield Rule, the court
concluded that strict adherence to the rule would deny a party redress in
situations where the jurys verdict was clearly influenced by improper
racial, ethnic, or religious bias. 65 Ultimately, the Fleshner court concluded
that the ethnicity or religion of any party or witness . . . should have no
bearing on the outcome of the trial because such considerations are
unrelated to the evidence.66
including appeals to racial bias made openly among jurors); After Hour Welding, Inc. v.
Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Wis. 1982) (While the rule against impeachment of a
jury verdict is strong and necessary, it is not written in stone nor is it a door incapable of being
opened.); Evans v. Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co., 31 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. App. 1929)
(noting that only one juror need be prejudiced in order for a verdict to be invalid).
58
65
Id. at 89 (*N+either a wronged litigant nor society itself should be without a means to
remedy a palpable miscarriage of justice. (quoting Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354,
356 (Fla. 1995))).
66
Id. at 90.
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ANALYSIS
III. The Fleshner Courts Creation of a New Exception to the Mansfield
Rule in Situations Involving Racial, Ethnic, or Religious Bias Drew
an Unprincipled Distinction Between Types of Juror Bias.
In arriving at its decision, the Fleshner court drew an arbitrary
distinction between types of prejudice by focusing on the form 67 of the
alleged bias rather than the functionality of that bias.68 Specifically, the
court created an independent exception69 to the Mansfield Rule on the basis
of racial, ethnic, or religious juror bias without adequately explaining how
such bias is meaningfully distinct from other forms of juror bias. 70 Relying
upon its preconceived rational ordering71 of racial, ethnic, and religious
bias, the courts decision infuses these types of bias with special
significance,72 treating them as distinct from other forms of prejudice
without drawing a significant distinction between the two categories. 73
67
See generally Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608-09 (1999).
68 Cf. Dixwell L. Pierce, Form Versus Substance, 46 VA. L. REV. 1150, 1151 (1960) (explaining
Justice Douglass dissenting opinion in McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., which argued that the
majoritys reasoning drew upon a formalistic distinction between a sales tax and a use tax,
despite the fact that a use tax and a sales tax applied at the very end of an interstate
transaction have precisely the same economic incidence. (quoting McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth
Co., 322 U.S. 327, 333 (1944))).
69 See infra Part III.A.
70 See Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 90 (stating that alleged*ly+ anti-Semitic comments made
during deliberations in this case are not simply a matter of political correctness to be brushed
aside by a thick-skinned judiciary (quoting Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 358
(Fla. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71 See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM
TO CRITICAL THEORY 31 (Carolina Academic Press, 2d ed. 2005) (explaining how rationality
describes the tendency of things to get organized and subjected to rules and orderly
processes (quoting ROLAND N. STROMBERG, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY SINCE 1789, at
185 (1968))).
72 See id. at 39 (Legal formalism . . . is a process of judicial decision making in which the
use of syllogism creates the false impression that the judicial process is value-free and, hence,
unquestionably correct.).
73 See Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 90 (A racially or religiously biased individual harbors certain
negative stereotypes which, despite his protestations to the contrary, may well prevent him or
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her from making decisions based solely on the facts and law that our jury system requires.
(quoting United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986))).
74 McCarter, supra note 2, at 170 (*A litigant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,
for there are no perfect trials. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548, 548 (1984))).
75
See Mudd, supra note 2, at 797 (noting the liberalizing effect of an extrinsic-evidence
exception to the Mansfield Rule).
76 See Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 87-90.
77 See id. at 87 & n.4, 89. But see Substitute Brief of Respondent at 30-31, Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d
81 (No. SC90032).
78
79
80
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81
Id. at 90.
See id. at 89.
83 See Mudd, supra note 2, at 786 (noting that Missouri adhered to strict application of the
Mansfield Rule prior to the adoption of the extrinsic-evidence exception).
82
84 See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2008) (The statements
about Native Americans in particular were gross generalizations built upon prejudice and had
no place in the jury room. Impropriety alone, however, does not make a statement extraneous.
That would unravel the internal/external distinction and make anything said in jury
deliberations extraneous information so long as it was inappropriate.); Substitute Brief of
Respondent, supra note 77, at 29-30 (noting that exceptions to the common law Mansfield Rule
exist only in extrinsic-evidence situations (citing Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996))). But see Amended Substitute Brief of Appellant at 40, Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d 81
(No. SC90032) (*O+utright appeals to anti-Semitism constituted overt acts of misconduct and
fall fairly within the scope of extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside
influence, no different than if a juror had relied on outside information obtained about a
witness or a party that was not part of the evidence at trial.).
85 See Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 88.
86 See id. (noting that this Court has never considered whether the trial court may hear
testimony about juror statements during deliberations); Substitute Brief of Respondent, supra
note 77, at 29-30 (noting that the petitioners attempt to expand the extraneous-evidence
exception to include comments made by the jurors during deliberations is unsupported by
Missouri case law).
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94
See Gold, supra note 11, at 140-41 (If the judge discovers the verdict was not based on
racial prejudice but employs another value inconsistent with the letter of the law, the judge
might use that inconsistency as a basis to overturn the verdict.).
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Cf. Mudd, supra note 2, at 794 (The extraneous evidence exception would not be an
exception at all if it only applied in the absence of objection.).
97 Cf. Oral Argument at 27:08, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88-605),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_88_605 (I think the Solicitor
Generals submission is somewhat disingenuous when he suggests to this [C]ourt that he does
not seek to unravel the whole cloth of procreational rights, but merely to pull a thread. It has
always been my personal experience that when I pull a thread, my sleeve falls off. There is no
stopping.).
98 The facts of this hypothetical are modeled after the facts of Fleshner v. Pepose Vision
Institute, 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010).
99
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102 See Bernard Gert, Moral Impartiality, MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL., Sept. 1995, at 102, 104 (A
is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and only if As actions in respect R are not
influenced at all by which member(s) of G benefit or are harmed by these actions. (emphasis
omitted)). In court interactions, racial and ethnic biases are exhibited by *c+onduct that
overtly communicates biases or na*+ve stereotyping. See JOHN G. RICHARDSON, NATL CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, BIAS IN THE COURT! FOCUSING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND
COURT STAFF IN COURT INTERACTIONS 1-7 to 1-8 (1997).
103 Cf. Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 347 (Mo. 1967) (Following the verdict in a
negligence lawsuit against a truck driver, juror told defendants counsel that *he+ used to
work as truck driver *and+ he wouldnt have brought back a verdict against the truck driver if
he had a thousand feet to stop in.).
104
See RICHARDSON, supra note 102, at 1-7 to 1-8 (stating that bias is exhibited through
*m+istaken conclusions drawn by judges, attorneys or juries about the behavior of litigants or
witnesses, due to ignorance of variation in behavioral norms amongst cultural groups).
105 See id.
106 See Alice H. Eagly & Anne M. Koenig, Gender Prejudice: On the Risks of Occupying
Incongruent Roles, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 63,
63-64 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
107
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110
113
118 Cf. United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532-33 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that where
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)s exception for extraneous evidence is applicable, a juror may
testify regarding her mental processes). But cf. United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 644
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that where Rule 606(b)s exception for extraneous evidence is
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CONCLUSION
The Missouri Supreme Courts decision in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision
Institute wrongly created an independent exception to the Mansfield Rule
in situations where overt racial, ethnic, or religious comments are made
during jury deliberation. Specifically, the courts rationale is flawed in that
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128