Marshals Defense Argument

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 1 of 26
Jeffrey C. Matura, State Bar No. 019893

Melissa J. England, State Bar No. 022783
Graif Barrett & Matura, P.C.
1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 500
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Telephone: (602) 792-5700
Facsimile: (602) 792-5710
jmatura@gbmlawpc.com
mengland@gbmlawpc.com
Attorneys for Defendant Town of Colorado City
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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United States of America,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
Defendants.
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Pursuant to this Courts Order [Doc. 983], defendants Town of Colorado City,
Arizona, and the City of Hildale, Utah (collectively the Defendants) submit the
following closing argument regarding injunctive relief.1
I.
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DEFENDANTS JOINT CLOSING

ARGUMENT REGARDING
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Town of Colorado City, Arizona; City of

Hildale, Utah; and Twin City Water Authority,
Inc.,
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Case No. CV-12-8123-PCT-HRH
INTRODUCTION.
The evidence the United States presented during the October 2016 evidentiary
hearing confirmed that the United States seeks injunctive relief that is disconnected from
the facts, the law, and the jurys verdict. The United States offered ideas such as
disbandment or subdivision approval or new impact fees but did not offer any
actual plan. The United States witnesses also completed little, if any, analysis, were
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This closing brief supplements the Defendants Joint Response to the United States
Post-Trial Brief Regarding Injunctive Relief [Doc. 940]. The Defendants incorporate the
arguments raised in that Post-Trial Brief into this closing brief.
largely ignorant about the facts, and generally testified in whatever way they believed
would most benefit the United States. The Defendants, in contrast, presented this Court
with a specific plan and detailed, unbiased steps this Court can order with respect to
injunctive relief, including how to restructure and improve the Colorado City Marshals
Office (CCMO), how to handle the subdivision dispute that the United Effort Plan Trust
(UEP Trust) has created, and how to ensure that housing and utility decisions are made
in a non-discriminatory manner.
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The United States also continues to ignore the legal standard this Court must
apply.2
The Supreme Court has held that injunctive relief should be no more
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burdensome to the defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.
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Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). Any injunctive relief must also be
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tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods,
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Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991). An injunction that is overly broad, unduly
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burdensome, or not narrowly tailored is an abuse of the Courts authority and subject to
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reversal on appeal. See United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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It is within this backdrop that the Defendants offer the following proposals
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regarding the appropriate injunctive relief this Court should enter under 42 U.S.C.
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14141 and the federal Fair Housing Act. These proposals are based upon the testimony
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and documents presented to this Court during the evidentiary hearing.3
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II.
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RESTRUCTURING THE CCMO, HIRING ADDITIONAL OFFICERS,

AND REQUIRING OTHER REMEDIAL STEPS ARE APPROPRIATE
INJUNCTIVE MEASURES.
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In its advisory verdict under 42 U.S.C. 14141, the jury concluded that the
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Defendants, through the CCMO, violated the Establishment Clause of the First
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The United States Closing Brief [Doc. 1022] contained 26 pages of text, which violates
this Courts order that the closing briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, total. See Order
[Doc. 983], at p. 2.
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The United States Closing Brief [Doc. 1022] includes facts and arguments not
presented during the evidentiary hearing, which again violates this Courts order that the
closing briefs should focus primarily upon evidentiary hearing testimony. See Order
[Doc. 983], at p. 2.
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Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and engaged in
an unreasonable seizure of property, an unreasonable seizure of a person, and an arrest
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 Importantly, the jury also
concluded that the CCMO did not engage in unreasonable searches of property,
unreasonable investigatory stops, or use excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.5
The United States therefore did not succeed on all of its claims, and this Court cannot
ignore the jurys findings in favor of the CCMO when considering the appropriate
injunctive relief.6
A.
Dan Corsentino Provided A Detailed Plan For This Court To Adopt.
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Dan Corsentino is uniquely qualified to opine on the appropriate injunctive relief
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for the CCMO. He is the former Pueblo County Sheriff, a position he held for 17 years.
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Mr. Corsentino inherited a Sheriffs Office in which no community confidence existed
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and that had a history of problems. Mr. Corsentino improved the Sheriffs Office and
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achieved a triple-crown accreditation by satisfying national standards for the
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Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, the American Correctional
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Association, and the National Commission on Accreditation for Health Care.
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Corsentino also worked as the Chief of Police for Fountain, Colorado, a small community,
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and served on the Colorado POST Board, during which he reviewed officer discipline and
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certification issues.7
Mr.
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Mr. Corsentino completed substantial analysis on the CCMO that the United
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States police expert, Chief Harris, did not. For example, Mr. Corsentino made two trips
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to Colorado City and Hildale to evaluate the CCMOs systems, including the hiring,
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firing, internal affairs, policies and procedures, and communications center. He also
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See Verdict Forms [Doc. 932].

Id,
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Because the United States did not request that the jury complete special interrogatories,
no specific police incidents are necessarily connected to any particular constitutional
violation. It is therefore speculative for the United States to try and connect the two.
7
See Dan Corsentinos Hearing Transcript, at pp. 525 529. Mr. Corsentinos full
resume was admitted as Exhibit 3406.
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interviewed the officers and reviewed their training, report-writing skills, vehicles, and
weapons. He then completed a ride-along with Deputy Hyrum Roundy and met with the
local municipal judge to obtain her insights into the conduct of the officers and the
standing of the CCMO within the community.8
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Based upon Mr. Corsentinos background, experience, and analysis, he offered the
following steps to improve the CCMO:
1.
Restructure the Hiring Committee for New Officers. The Town Manager
and a representative from the Town Council should not sit on the hiring committee for
new officers. Rather, the Chief of Police and other law enforcement professionals should
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sit on the committee and then recommend candidates for hiring to the Town Council.9
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2.
Hire Two Additional Officers and One Administrative Assistant.
This
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additional staff will help free-up the Chief of Police so that he can focus on administrative
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and management responsibilities. It will also allow the Chief to improve his visibility
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within the community, including building relationships with community groups, attending
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school meetings, and taking other proactive and community-based steps.10
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3.
Reorganize the CCMO. This reorganization would include removing the
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Town Manager and the Town Council from the internal affairs process and evaluating
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whether to hire a detective to assist the officers with their investigations.11
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4.
Rewrite the CCMOs Policies and Procedures. Rewriting the CCMOs
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policies and procedures will help address specific issues that the jury identified, including
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search and seizure of property, seizure of a person, and probable cause, as well as issues
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raised in this case under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.12 The new
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Id. at pp. 532 536.

Id. at pp. 622 623.
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Id. at pp. 544 547. The CCMO has already hires a new administrative assistant.
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Id. at pp. 548 549.
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Id. at pp. 549 550. Also, the CCMO is already working with Lexipol and has received
a revised version of the CCMOs policies and procedures (known as the General
Orders).
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policies and procedures will meet nationally-accepted standards for constitutional policing
and include requirements for continuous training and updates.
5.
Create and Implement a Pilot Program for Body Cameras. Implementing
and using body cameras will help remove doubt about what occurred during any particular
police incident, including property disputes involving the UEP Trust.13
6.
Additional Officer Training. The officers should obtain additional training
on the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the state and federal Fair Housing Acts,
landlord and tenant law, diversity, and other related topics.14
7.
Enhance Collaboration with Regional Law Enforcement.
The Chief of
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Police should meet with Washington County Sheriff Cory Pulsipher and Mohave County
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Sheriff Doug Schuster to develop a better working relationship and to seek their input on
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law enforcement issues facing the CCMO.
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community or regional boards so that he can interact with other law enforcement
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personnel.15
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8.
The Chief of Police should also join
Hire Mentor for the Chief of Police. The CCMO should hire an individual
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to mentor the Chief of Police in the performance of his job and to help him improve the
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CCMO. This individual should provide mentorship for at least one year and should come
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from a nationally-recognized police organization, such as the Police Executive Research
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Forum or the International Association of Chiefs of Police.16
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Mr. Corsentino outlined these and other steps in a strategic plan that was submitted
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to this Court.17 He also analyzed the Defendants finances and concluded that, although
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Id. at pp. 550 551.

Id. at pp. 551 553. Also, the officers have already received additional training since
the jurys verdict. See Training Records, admitted as Exhibits 3430, 3431, 3432.
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Id. at pp. 553 554.
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Id. at pp. 555 557.
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See Strategic Plan, admitted as Exhibit 526. Mr. Corsentino is also working on a more
detailed strategic plan for the CCMO to follow and which will provide further guidelines
on how to improve the CCMO and address the jurys conclusions.
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implementing these steps will involve increased costs, they are not cost prohibitive.18
These steps are appropriate under the law to remedy the jurys conclusions. This Court
should therefore adopt them as its form of injunctive relief with respect to the CCMO.19
B.
Disbandment Is Inconsistent With How The United States Has Treated

Other Police Departments, Would Provide Less Police Coverage, Is Too
Costly, And Would Usurp Utah POST And Arizona POSTs Authority.
The United States request to disband the CCMO is contrary to the long-standing
judicial principle to not use a sledgehammer where a more delicate instrument will
suffice. Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 213 (2nd Cir. 1986). Disbandment is also
inconsistent with how the United States has treated other police departments alleged to
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have committed the same or far worse conduct as the CCMO, would provide less
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coverage to the residents of Colorado City and Hildale, is too costly, and would take away
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the authority of Utah POST and Arizona POST. Each issue is discussed below.
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Disbandment Would Treat The CCMO Differently Than Other

Police Departments.
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A comparison chart showing the United States investigations into other police
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departments under 42 U.S.C. 14141 was provided to this Court during the evidentiary
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hearing.20 This chart includes information about the United States investigations into six
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separate police departments under the First, Fourth, and Fourteen Amendments that
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involved allegations of conduct far worse than anything alleged against the CCMO,
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including officers using Tasers and canines on African Americans, using deadly force
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against individuals with mental illnesses, failing to properly investigate sexual assault
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claims, and other extreme misconduct.21 The remedies the United States sought and
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1.
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See Dan Corsentinos Hearing Testimony, at pp. 557 558.

See the Defendants Proposed Order, attached as Exhibit 1. The Defendants also
submit their objections to the United States Proposed Order, attached as Exhibit 2, and
their response to the United States Digest of Proposed Findings of Fact, attached as
Exhibit 3.
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See Comparison Chart, admitted as Exhibit 3521.
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Id.; see also Department of Justices reports and press releases, admitted as Exhibits
3380, 3382, 3383, 3384, 3385, and 3512.
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obtained included new policies and procedures, improved community outreach, improved
training, improved internal affairs processes, and for some departments a monitor.22
In not one of these investigations did the United States seek or obtain disbandment.
Consistency in results is an important judicial principle. Mr. Corsentino reviewed
the comparison chart, compared it to the United States request to disband, and described
the importance of consistency as follows:
Well, it seems to me that the application of the law should be

consistent, even though each case is different and theres different
actions that were taken in cases, but when there is violations that are
found in the similarities of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, in these cases in a couple of these cases human life
was taken, quite egregious, quite excessive force, but a monitor was
assigned to those departments or there was improved policy
procedure, improved internal affairs. I was looking for the
consistency of the application and I thought that the consistency was
critical as a predictable outcome for the Colorado Citys Marshals
Office.23
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This Court should maintain consistency within the law and reject the United States
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request to disband the CCMO.24
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2.
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Disbandment Would Result In Less Police Coverage.
The United States idea is to force the Defendants to contract with Mohave County
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and Washington County for police coverage.
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services for the residents.
This idea would result in less police
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The Mohave County Sheriff did not testify during the evidentiary hearing, and so
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this Court does not know his thoughts, ability, or willingness to assume police coverage.
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Instead, the United States presented James Schoppmann, who discussed a proposed
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contract for the Mohave County Sheriffs Office to provide police coverage in Colorado
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Id.
See Dan Corsentinos Hearing Transcript, at p. 571.
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The United States effort to treat the CCMO officers differently based upon their
perceived religious beliefs also became clear when Chief Harris the United States
expert testified that he would only advise letting the CCMO officers reapply for their
positions if they were not a member of FLDS. See Chief Harris Hearing Testimony, at
pp. 357 358.
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City.25 A simple review of this contract shows a significant reduction in the available
services. For example, Mohave County Sheriff Deputies are only certified in Arizona,
and so the contract covers police services in Colorado City, not Hildale, meaning that
Mohave County Deputies would have to stop at the Arizona border.26 In contrast, the
CCMO officers are dual certified in Arizona and Utah. Mohave County would also have
only one deputy to patrol Colorado City from 6:00 am to 2:00 am each day, unless the
deputy was on another call within the county, in which case no Mohave County deputy
would be on patrol in Colorado City.27 Even if another call does not occur, however, no
Mohave County deputy would patrol Colorado City from 2:00 am to 6:00 am, a critical
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time when many incidents occur. Currently, the CCMO provides 24-hour police presence
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and has six deputies available to respond to a call. Finally, the contract states that the
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Mohave County substation would only be open during regular county business days and
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hours,28 whereas the CCMO is available and on-duty 24-hours a day.
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Cory Pulsipher is the Washington County Sheriff. He also testified about the
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reduction in police services that would occur if the Washington County Sheriffs Office
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were to assume policing in Hildale. First, Sheriff Pulsipher admitted that the Washington
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County Sheriffs Office does not have the resources or manpower necessary to provide
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24-hour police presence in Hildale.29 In fact, he currently has only four deputies on duty
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to cover the entire 2,500 square miles within the county, which Sheriff Pulsipher
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described as already thin coverage due to the vast area of the county.30 Second, the
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Washington County Sheriff Deputies are not dual certified, which means they would also
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stop at the Utah border, except in an emergency situation, in which case they would travel
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into Arizona to hold the scene (not process it) until a Mohave County Sheriff Deputy
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See Proposed Intergovernmental Agreement, admitted as Exhibit 515.

See James Schoppmann Hearing Transcript, at p. 227.
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See Proposed Intergovernmental Agreement, admitted as Exhibit 515, at 2(a)(i).
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Id. at 2(a)(iv).
29
See Sheriff Pulsiphers Hearing Transcript, at p. 268.
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Id. at p. 272.
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arrived.31 This idea is contrary to the position that Arizona POST has taken, which is that
an officer from another state cannot respond to a call in Arizona without first obtaining an
Arizona certification. Arizona POST has also stated that this conduct violates A.R.S.
13-2411, which prohibits impersonating a peace officer. Finally, Washington County also
does not have a substation in Hildale.32
The undisputed evidence as confirmed by the United States own witnesses
shows that disbandment will result in less police services for the residents. This Court
should avoid such a dangerous result.33
3.
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Obtain
Equivalent
injunctive relief that the United States proposes. See United States v. Puerto Rico, 922
F.Supp.2d 185 (D. Puerto Rico 2013) (rejecting proposed settlement agreement under 42
U.S.C. 14141 because it was likely Puerto Rico could not afford the proposed changes).
The evidence shows that they cannot.
Daniel Rondeau is a forensic accountant.34
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To
Another factor this Court must consider is whether the Defendants can afford the
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The Defendants Cannot Afford

Replacement Police Services.
He reviewed Colorado City and
Hildales financial statements and audits, as well as the CCMOs expenditures and
budgets, to determine their current economic status.35 His opinion is that the Defendants
are in a state of plateau financially because they have not grown in the last several years
and do not expect any major future growth.36 He also concluded that the cost for the
31
Id. at pp. 273 274.

Id. at p. 269.
33
See Daniel Corsentinos Hearing Transcript, at pp. 537 544, in which he described
why disbandment is inappropriate and why the County Sheriffs are ill-suited to handle the
police services in Colorado City and Hildale.
34
See Daniel Rondeaus Hearing Transcript, at p. 1016; see also Daniel Rondeaus
resume, admitted as Exhibit 3408.
35
See Daniel Rondeaus Hearing Transcript, at pp. 1020 1023; see also Financial
Statements admitted as Exhibits 3287 through 3309, 3336 through 3342, and 3409.
36
See Daniel Rondeaus Hearing Transcript, at p. 1023; see also Historical Financial
Results Spreadsheets, admitted as Exhibits 3513 through 3520.
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Defendants to obtain equivalent police services from the counties exceeds the Defendants
budgets.37 Mr. Rondeau explained these economic realities as follows:
Yeah, I do not see how the communities could possibly afford the
proposals that have been put forth. Although Ive heard the
testimony that its sort of a menu that somehow somebody could
select some lesser amount. Any lesser amount would be less
coverage than having somebody in these cities because of these state
line issues.38
The Defendants cannot afford to pay for equivalent replacement police services, with both
Colorado City and Hildale having to contract for outside services at a cost much higher
than the current cost for the CCMO. This Court should therefore reject the United States
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idea.39
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Disbandment Would Usurp Utah POSTs And Arizona POSTs

Authority.
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Each CCMO officer is dual certified in Arizona and Utah, and therefore subject to
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4.
discipline from Arizona POST and Utah POST.
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This Court heard that Utah POST began investigating the CCMO officers in 2012
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for many of the same issues that the United States alleged in this case. Yet, in August
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2016, Utah POST cleared all the officers of any misconduct because there was not
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sufficient evidence to warrant any discipline.40 Mr. Corsentino explained the importance
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of Utah POSTs finding as follows:

Well, being a former POST Board member in Colorado, what takes
place is there is an investigation thats done by a POST-certified
investigator, and they reach a conclusion, usually its pretty
comprehensive, and they reach a conclusion, and that conclusion is
its either sustained and its actionable, meaning that theres going to
be a decertification of the officer, and should there be criminal
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See Daniel Rondeaus Hearing Transcript, at pp. 1027 1029.

Id. at p. 1028.
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The United States idea to disband the Colorado City Dispatch Center also ignores the
costs of obtaining new dispatch services and that the Dispatch Center currently provides
dispatch services to other communities and emergency service agencies.
40
See Utah POST Letters, dated August 22, 2016, admitted as Exhibits 3426 and 3427.
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charges its then referred to either the local prosecutor and/or the
Attorney Generals Office.
When there is insufficient evidence or the case is closed out, the

confidence level that I have in this is that the Utah POST has
essentially cleared the officers in the Colorado City Marshals Office
of any violation that they were looking at and found insufficient
evidence to move this case along any further.
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Whats important about this is that there is a system in place, and

that system needs to run its course. There is a system in place in
Colorado, theres a system in place in Arizona, and theres a system
in place in Utah, and POST Boards are part of an accountability
system that will take action against law enforcement officers, they
will move to decertify them and they will take them from the law
enforcement profession if theres wrongdoing.41
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Utah POSTs conclusion with respect to each officer is uncontroverted. And although the
United States argues that the standard Utah POST applies is different than what the United
States wants it to apply, the Utah State Legislature has set that standard. It is not for the
United States to change it or to exert its political influence on how it is administered. It
would also be improper for this Court to take away Utah POSTs authority to investigate
and discipline (or, in this case, exonerate) certified police officers as it deems necessary.
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This Court is also aware that Arizona POST began investigating the CCMO
officers in coordination with, and conveniently just before, the trial in this case. But this
Court also heard that Detective Travis Meadows, who headed the investigation, reached
his conclusions against the officers early in his investigation and before he even
interviewed the officers.42 Not surprisingly due to that imbalance, Arizona POST decided
to file administrative complaints against the officers. These complaints, however, are just
the next step in the process, not the end. Each officer denied the allegations in their
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41
See Dan Corsentinos Hearing Transcript, at pp. 561 562.

See Detective Meadows Hearing Transcript, at pp. 162 163. One can only imagine
how the United States would have reacted if a CCMO officer reached a conclusion before
even completing an investigation. Certainly, the United States would have argued from
the mountaintop that such conduct was improper; yet, the United States is working handin-hand with Arizona POST and supporting its improper investigation.
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respective complaint and requested a hearing before the Arizona Office of Administrative
Hearings.43 These hearings will likely occur in April or May 2017, during which each
officer will have the opportunity they were not afforded during the POST investigation to
defend themselves. An Administrative Law Judge will then issue a recommendation back
to Arizona POST. The CCMO officers are confident that the Administrative Law Judge
and then Arizona POST will clear them of wrongdoing, just as with Utah POST, once
they hear all the evidence and do not prejudge them as did Detective Meadows.44
Arizona POST and Utah POST have systems to deal with police officer
misconduct. Utah POST already cleared the CCMO officers. If Arizona POST finds that
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one or more of them acted improperly, it will take appropriate action, which could include
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a wide-range of discipline. But for this Court to take officer discipline away from Arizona
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POST would usurp Arizona POSTs authority. This Court need not disband the CCMO,
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or even consider such an extreme option, because Arizona POST and Utah POST are
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already in place and working.45
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III.
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The United States seeks comprehensive injunctive relief against the Defendants
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ADDITIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

IS UNNECESSARY.
under the federal Fair Housing Act. This additional relief is unnecessary because identical
injunctive relief already exists. The Defendants have also taken proactive steps to ensure
compliance with the Fair Housing Act, and the UEP Trust is already litigating its
subdivision dispute in the Mohave County Superior Court.
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See Requests for Hearing, all attached as Exhibit 4.

See Dan Corsentinos Hearing Transcript, at pp. 562 563, in which he agreed that [i]t
would be inappropriate to prejudge these officers until that [Arizona POST] investigation
is concluded.
45
The United States request to disband also ignores that the CCMO has hired a new
officer who was not involved in any of the allegations or issues raised in this case.
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A.
This Court is familiar with the Cooke case brought against the Defendants. Most
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of the issues the United States alleged in this case were the same as those alleged in the
Cooke case; in fact, Jinjer Cooke testified on the United States behalf during the liability
trial. After the Cooke case, Judge Teilborg issued an injunction against the Defendants
under the Fair Housing Act, which states the following:
During the ten-year period beginning from the date of this Judgment,
Defendants and their agents shall not (1) discriminate because of
religion against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
the provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or
rental of a dwelling; or (2) coerce, intimidate, threaten, interfere
with, or retaliate against any person in the enjoyment of his or her
dwelling because of religion or because that person has asserted
rights, or encouraged others to assert their rights, protected by the
federal Fair Housing Act or the Arizona Far Housing Act.46
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This language is patterned after the same provisions of the Fair Housing Act that the
United States pursued in this case, including 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) and 3617.47 Judge
Teilborg has therefore already enjoined the Defendants from engaging in the same
conduct that the United States asks this Court to include in its injunction. Judge Teilborg
also created an expedited process for individuals who believe the Defendants have
violated his injunction to have their concerns heard.48
If this Court were to issue another injunction under the Fair Housing Act,
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Judge Teilborg Has Already Issued An Injunction Against the

Defendants Under The Fair Housing Act.
confusion would result. For example, which Court would retain jurisdiction? If an
individual believed the Defendants violated one or both of the injunctions, would they
46
See Judge Teilborgs November 26, 2014 Amended Judgment and Permanent
Injunction, admitted as Exhibit 723. Judge Teilborgs issued his first injunction on
September 4, 2014, which was admitted as Exhibit 3372. The United States argues that
these injunctions have somehow expired, but their language shows otherwise. It is also
clear that Judge Teilborg issued the Amended Judgment and Permanent Injunction to
correct a legal error contained within the original injunction. See David Dargers Hearing
Transcript, at pp. 793 804.
47
See Complaint [Doc. 1], at 57 61.
48
See Judge Teilborgs September 14, 2014 Order, at p. 7, lines 3 10, admitted as
Exhibit 3372.
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seek relief in this Court or Judge Teilborgs? And if an individual does not receive relief
in one Court, can it then go to the other Court and make the same arguments again under
the second injunction? These and other problems are all avoided if this Court simply
recognizes Judge Teilborgs injunction and declines to enter a duplicative injunction.
The Defendants have also taken affirmative steps to improve their conduct under,
and ensure compliance with, the Fair Housing Act. For example, all employees (including
the CCMO officers) received two sessions of Fair Housing Act training from the
Southwest Fair Housing Council.49
discrimination training and participated in the annual Fair Housing survey with the State
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of Arizona.50 The Defendants filmed this training to make it available to any employees
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who could not attend, to use as a refresher, and to show to new employees.51 The
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Defendants have also asked the Southwest Fair Housing Council to provide yearly or bi-
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yearly training.52
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Judge Teilborgs injunction, and the Defendants proactive steps to comply with it,
show that yet another duplicative injunction covering the same issues is unnecessary.
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B.
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No Injunctive Relief Regarding The UEP Trusts Subdivision Dispute Is

Necessary Or Appropriate.
The United States wants this Court to order Colorado City to stamp with approval a
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The employees also received workplace
UEP Trust subdivision proposal, even though its proposal does not comply with Colorado
Citys subdivision ordinance or Arizona law, and even though it has not been reviewed for
the health, safety, and welfare of the Colorado City residents.53 The United States also
seeks this relief even though it has never identified the UEP Trust as an aggrieved
49
Id. at p. 804; see also Training Materials, Sign-In Sheets, and Certificate of Attendance,
admitted as Exhibits 3430, 3431, 3432, and 3433.
50
Id. at pp. 804 805.
51
Id. at p. 817.
52
Id. at pp. 816 818.
53
Right now, no proposal exists from the UEP Trust because it has not submitted any
proposed plats or other required subdivision documents to Colorado City for review. See
David Dargers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 840 841.
14
person under 42 U.S.C. 3602(i). Regardless, this Court need not enter any injunctive
relief regarding the UEP Trusts subdivision issue because whether it subdivides or not is
entirely within its control.54 Yet, it has chosen not to, and even to this day it refuses to
submit a simple subdivision application. Furthermore, the Mohave County Superior
Court has already retained jurisdiction to handle this subdivision issue.
1.
This Court heard from Dale Miller regarding the subdivision issue. Mr. Miller is a
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professional engineer who works for Rick Engineering and who was proactively hired by
Colorado City to work with Zachary Renstrom, the UEP Trusts engineer, on the UEP
Trusts subdivision and platting requests.55 Mr. Miller began working with Mr. Renstrom
in 2014. Before he began this work, however, he first conducted a formal review of
Colorado Citys subdivision ordinance and concluded that, other than some minor
cosmetic changes, the ordinance was standard and appropriate.56 He also invited Mr.
Renstrom to comment on the ordinance, but Mr. Renstrom refused.57
After some initial meetings and conversations, Mr. Miller and Mr. Renstrom
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The UEP Trust Rejected Its Agreement With Colorado City

Regarding An Abbreviated And Modified Platting Process.
agreed to a process by which the UEP Trust could use a modified process to plat its
property without following all the steps of the subdivision ordinance.
This process
became known as an abbreviated and modified platting process.58 Mr. Miller and Mr.
Renstrom then appeared before the Colorado City Town Council on February 2, 2015 to
present the proposed process, after which the Town Council voted to tentatively approve
an abbreviated subdivision process for a UEP subdivision with a clear definition of what
54
The United States argument that Colorado City refuses to approve UEP Trust
subdivision plats is false. Colorado City has encouraged the UEP Trust to subdivide
through the appropriate lawful process and has repeatedly tried to work through the issues
and facilitate the subdivision, only for the UEP Trust to improperly accuse it of
discrimination.
55
See Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at p. 941.
56
Id. at pp. 941 943; see also Subdivision Ordinance, admitted as Exhibit 1022.
57
Id. at p. 943.
58
Id. at pp. 944 946.
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is considered improved and unimproved, with the understanding that the Council may
need or want to revisit eligibility.59
Mr. Miller then drafted a Memorandum of Understanding to reduce to writing what
he and Mr. Renstrom had agreed to, and what the Town Council had approved.60 The text
of the Memorandum of Understanding defined the types of properties eligible and
ineligible for the abbreviated and modified platting process.61
Renstrom and Bruce Wisan dated February 17, 2015 and attaching the Memorandum of
Understanding, Mr. Miller stated that the MOU addresses the Town Council directive
and is in line with our discussions during and immediately following the Council meeting
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on February 2.62 Mr. Miller asked Mr. Renstrom and Mr. Wisan to identify any revisions
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they wanted, but neither suggested any revisions.63
In an e-mail to Mr.
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Instead, Mr. Renstrom submitted a dot map to Mr. Miller to try and visually
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convey the information in the Memorandum of Understanding.64 The dot map itself,
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however, was not an agreement. Mr. Miller also identified several errors on the dot map,
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which he sent to Mr. Renstrom.65
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The next step was for Mr. Miller to draft a Development Agreement to turn the
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Memorandum of Understanding into a legally-binding agreement.66 The Development
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Agreement contained the exact same language as the Memorandum of Understanding.67
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Id. at pp. 946 949; see also February 2, 2015 Meeting Minutes, admitted as Exhibit
3343.
60
See Memorandum of Understanding, admitted as Exhibit 486.
61
Id.; see also Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 950 956.
62
See February 17, 2015 E-Mail, admitted as Exhibit 3361.
63
See Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 951 952.
64
See Dot Map, admitted as Exhibit 3495; see also Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at
pp. 957 958.
65
See February 23, 2015 E-Mail, admitted as Exhibit 3511; see also Blow-Up Example of
Dot Map Problems, admitted as Exhibit 3522, and Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at pp.
956 965.
66
See Development Agreement, admitted as Exhibit 3363.
67
Id.
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Mr. Miller sent the Development Agreement to Mr. Renstrom on March 6, 2015 and
asked for any comments or changes, but once again he did not respond.68
Mr. Miller believed that the UEP Trust would sign the Development Agreement so
the parties could commence subdividing.69 But instead, the UEP Trust refused. Mr.
Renstrom sent an e-mail to Mr. Miller on March 13, 2015 with a series of questions and
accusatory statements.70 Mr. Miller expressed his surprise over receiving such an e-mail
as follows:
And Id just like to premise that the review of this document by

saying that this e-mail caught me totally off guard and by surprise. I
was rather shocked when I got it, because up until receipt of this email I thought Zach Renstrom was 100 percent on board with the
MOU and the development agreement, which is essentially the same
thing. And all of a sudden it appears that you know, heres a party
that had been working with me for however many months, and all of
a sudden he does a 180 and is questioning the MOU and the
development agreement.
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So, you know, it leads you to believe that somebody got to him and
told him, you will not agree, you know, with this document, even
though its the same thing.71
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Mr. Miller answered Mr. Renstroms questions and tried to convince him to have the UEP
Trust sign the Development Agreement, but the UEP Trust still refused.72
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The UEP Trust then demanded that Colorado City sign an agreement that the UEP
Trusts attorneys had drafted and called an Agreement to Record Subdivision.73 This
agreement violated Arizona law regarding subdivision and was contrary to the agreement
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68
See March 6, 2015 E-Mail, admitted as Exhibit 3364; see also Dale Millers Hearing
Transcript, at pp. 966 967.
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70
See March 13, 2015 E-Mail, admitted as Exhibit 3496.
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Id. at pp. 976 980.
73
See Agreement to Record Subdivision, admitted as Exhibit 490.
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that Mr. Miller and Mr. Renstrom reached and that the Town Council approved
regarding the abbreviated and modified platting process.74
Mr. Miller attended a Town Council meeting on April 13, 2015.75 He updated the
Town Council on his interactions with Mr. Renstrom, the Memorandum of
Understanding, the Development Agreement, and the UEP Trusts demand that Colorado
City instead sign its Agreement to Record Subdivision.76 After discussion, comments
from the public, and concerns to ensure that everything was handled correctly, the Town
Council voted to withdraw its offer of an abbreviated and modified platting process
(which the UEP Trust had already rejected), advise the UEP Trust to comply with the
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subdivision ordinance, and seek guidance from Judge Teilborg.77 The UEP Trust then
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continued its litigation threats.
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Despite the UEP Trusts refusal to sign the Development Agreement that it had
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previously agreed to, it can still subdivide its property today if it so desired. All it has to
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do is submit a subdivision application. It can also request exceptions to the subdivision
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ordinance. Mr. Miller and David Darger have repeatedly advised the UEP Trust to submit
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an application to move the process forward, but it refuses.78 The reason is because it does
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not want to incur the costs normally associated with subdivision, and instead wants this
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Court to order Colorado City to approve the UEP Trusts non-compliant subdivision
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proposal and thereby shift the costs to Colorado City and its residents.79 The UEP Trust
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See April 13, 2015 Town Council Meeting Minutes, admitted as Exhibit 3344.
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Id.
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Id.; see also Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 983 984, in which he describes
that the Town Council had also received a letter from the Arizona Attorney Generals
Office stating that the Development Agreement may be discriminatory because it treats
vacant property different from developed property.
78
See April 29, 2015 E-Mail to Mr. Renstrom, admitted as Exhibit 3500; see also
Subdivision Application and Variance Request, admitted as Exhibit 3438; Subdivision
Fee Schedule, admitted as Exhibit 3437; Dale Millers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 984
987; and David Dargers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 825 832.
79
See David Dargers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 827 828, and 842. Colorado City has
also offered the UEP Trust the ability to subdivide its property in phases to help with the
cost, but the UEP Trust has again refused. Id. at pp. 842 843.
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created this entire situation and has used its false accusations against Colorado City about
discrimination just to avoid the required and customary costs to subdivide.80 The United
States bought the UEP Trusts argument and decided to support a property owner who
wants to violate Arizona subdivision statutes, rather than a municipality that is trying to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of all residents. This Courts intervention in this
dispute is entirely unnecessary.
2.
The Mohave County Superior Court Is Now Handling This Issue.
This Court should also decline to issue any injunctive relief regarding the UEP
Trusts subdivision issue because the Mohave County Superior Court has already retained
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jurisdiction.
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threatened litigation, Colorado City filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief to obtain a
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final judicial decision on the issue.81 Colorado City seeks declaratory relief regarding
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whether it has the authority under Arizona law to regulate subdivision issues for property
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located within its boundaries, and whether it can require the UEP Trust to comply with its
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subdivision ordinance for the property it seeks to subdivide.82 Judge Conn from the
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Mohave County Superior Court is now handling this Complaint. The UEP Trust moved
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to dismiss it and argued, in part, that Judge Teilborg should resolve the issue. Judge Conn
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denied the motion to dismiss, retained jurisdiction, and has since issued a scheduling order
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to resolve the dispute in a fairly quick timeframe.83 The UEP Trust can present all its
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evidence and arguments to Judge Conn, after which Judge Conn will make a final ruling,
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which Colorado City will then follow.84 Additional judicial relief from this Court is
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After the UEP Trust refused to sign the Development Agreement and
The UEP Trusts claim that it would have to dig-up and replace every utility pipe is
false. In fact, this claim is such an abuse of the truth that it undermines its own
credibility.
81
See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, admitted as Exhibit 3377; see also David
Dargers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 836 839.
82
Id.
83
See Judge Conns Order denying the UEP Trusts motion to dismiss and the Scheduling
Order, both attached as Exhibit 5.
84
See David Dargers Hearing Transcript, at p. 839, in which Mr. Darger responded as
follows when asked whether Colorado City would follow the Courts ruling: Yes. Thats
why we filed it, so that we could have that Court give direction on it and Of course.
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unnecessary and could cause confusion because this Court and Judge Conn could reach
different conclusions. It therefore makes more sense for Judge Conn to resolve the issue
because he will have the benefit of full briefing, the presentation of all the evidence and
witnesses, and potentially a trial to decide the issues.
C.
The United States wants this Court to order the Defendants to adopt new policies
and procedures to state that they will only issue building permits if the property owner
consents. This relief would cause additional problems.
No Injunctive Relief Is Necessary With Respect To Building Permits.
Andrew Barlow is the Building Official for Colorado City and Hildale.85 He is
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certified through the International Code Council to issue permits and complete
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inspections.86
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completes an application, submits plans for review, pays any required fees, and then
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schedules any necessary inspections for final approval.87 Mr. Barlow does not require an
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applicant to submit documentation that they own the property or that they have an
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occupancy agreement for the property.88
To obtain a permit, an applicant receives a plan submitted checklist,
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This Court heard substantial testimony regarding the unique way in which property
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ownership works in Colorado City and Hildale. The FLDS Church originally organized
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the UEP Trust upon tenants of the FLDS faith and under the laws of the State of Utah.
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Members of the FLDS Church consecrated their property to the FLDS Church as part of
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their religious expression and beliefs. In 2005, the State of Utah took over the UEP Trust,
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which is a function of the FLDS Church, and has since systemically evicted hundreds, if
22
not thousands, of residents from homes that they or their ancestors built and consecrated
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to the FLDS Church, including most recently elderly women with serious medical
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Whatever the Court orders, then we will follow that.

85
See Andrew Barlows Hearing Deposition Transcript, at p. 9.
86
Id. at p. 19.
87
Id. at pp. 30 33.
88
Id. at pp. 33 34.
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problems and nowhere else to live. Colorado City and Hildale are not parties to these
property disputes and have told everyone to comply with the law. Requiring the property
owners consent to obtain a building permit will not solve these problems.
Mr. Barlow has firsthand experience dealing with the property disputes while
trying to ensure that proper and safe permitting occurs. He provided the following
explanation for why the property owners signature is not necessary to obtain a permit:
Because the purpose of the Building Department is to is to ensure

safe building practices to make sure that the building is safe and, you
know, to protect people, protect lives, property, and to and to keep
the cost of construction down as much as possible. Its not
necessarily to get involved in land disputes.89
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And when asked why he believes that removing the owners signature line from the
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application form helped to avoid discrimination, Mr. Barlow explained the following:
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Because I just think that it would make it easier for people to get the
permit. I dont feel like we need to complicate the permitting
process. The purpose of the of the Building Department is to
ensure that its safe housing safe housing building practices. Its
not my its not the Building Departments responsibility to help
even help decide who is in the home, or its not its not something
thats part of the Building Department.90
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This testimony is uncontroverted.
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The Building Department should not get involved in resolving property disputes
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between the UEP Trust and an applicant. Nor should it enforce rental agreements or
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require the payment of rental fees before it issues a permit. Yet, that is what would occur
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if this Court orders the Defendants to issue a building permit only if the property owner
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consents.91
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89
Id. at p. 56.
Id. at pp. 61 62.
91
The United States also fails to recognize that any individual or entity, including the
UEP Trust, can file a request with Judge Teilborg under his injunctive order if they
believe the Defendants have acted in a discriminatory manner with respect to building
permits. This protection alleviates the need for any additional injunctive relief.
90
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D.
The Defendants Have Revised Water Regulations To Ensure Fair

Treatment To Existing Customers And New Applicants.
In 2014, and following the Cooke case, the Defendants revised water regulations to
further define the water conservation policy, allow one meter to serve additional buildings
on the same property, recognize existing non-conforming uses, prohibit the needless waste
of culinary water, clarify the responsibility for construction costs, and describe the
conditions for impact fees. The Defendants again revised the water regulations in 2015 to
provide greater clarity and to address customer complaints. These revisions included
adopting a meter sizing chart, clarifying that an application expires after six months if no
fees or deposits are paid, and requiring an applicant to obtain the existing customers
consent to transfer the water connection for a particular property or, in the alternative,
providing a five-day notice to cancel a service agreement to the customer of record if
contact attempts fail. This procedure was developed to protect the due process rights of
the existing customer and the applicant.
The Defendants again revised the water regulations in 2016 in response to
customer complaints and removed the requirement that a new applicant obtain the current
customers consent when applying for service to property that has an existing service
agreement. The regulations instead outline a simple verification that a current customer is
no longer occupying the property. The intent is to facilitate the transfer of service to a
new applicant as quickly as possible, yet protect a current customer occupying that
property from illegal self-help evictions.
David Darger testified that the Defendants have responded to citizen complaints in
a positive effort to resolve concerns and have revised the water regulations to provide
non-discriminatory service. Mr. Darger also provided an example of the kind of disputes
that the Defendants face to show why it is important to protect the due process rights of all
individuals involved:
So we had a person by the name of Merril Harker who has an
account. He has a son-in-law named Spencer Black, Jr. And they
have a disagreement. Mr. Black was living in this at this lot. And
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so Mr. Harker wants to evict or tell Mr. Black, you get out of this
property.
So Mr. Harker has the account. Hes the customer on the record. He
comes to the Utility Department and says, I want this account
temporarily turned off. I want the water shut off. And so the Water
Department says, well, youre the account holder, so well shut it
off. So they shut it off and locked up.
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Mr. Black goes and cuts the lock. So what does the City do? Well,
we refer it to our legal counsel, and its in process.
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Thats our only issue. That is our only issue, is if theres somebody
there, maybe theyve been there for a year, maybe 15 years, and
theyre a current customer, we want to handle that appropriately.
We want to give everyone due process. And thats why we have
we try to have a level of due process. And were sensitive to the
complaint of someone having a hard time trying to get water into
their name. And I believe that weve resolved that.92
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If an applicant or existing customer believes they are being treated unfairly, and their
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concerns are known, the Defendants are positively responding to resolve those concerns.
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If their concerns are still not resolved, they can seek redress from Judge Teilborg. No
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additional injunctive relief is necessary.
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E.
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No Legitimate Dispute Exists Regarding The Culinary Water Impact

Fee.
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The United States request that this Court order an independent engineering firm
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to review the Defendants culinary water impact fee ignores the fact that an independent
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engineering firm already set the current impact fee.93
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This Court heard from Dustyn Shaffer, who works for Sunrise Engineering and
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who wrote the Culinary Water Impact Fee Facilities Plan for Colorado City and Hildale in
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December 2014.94 Mr. Shaffer explained that Arizona and Utah have very strict laws on
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92
See David Dargers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 808 809.

Water impact fees allow municipalities to develop water resources to accommodate new
connections. To arbitrarily strike down a years-long impact fee process would deprive
the Defendants of the very tool needed to comply with Judge Tielborgs injunction to
provide new water connections.
94
See Culinary Water Impact Fee Facilities Plan, admitted as Exhibit 3360.
93
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how impact fees can be developed, and those are laid out specifically on notifications,
public hearings, exactly what can and cannot be used for the impact fee analysis, [and]
what kind of improvements are eligible for that study.95 Mr. Shaffer also explained that
he held a public meeting in Colorado City in January 2015 to explain his conclusions
regarding the impact fee and that Zach Renstrom and Bruce Wisan were present on behalf
of the UEP Trust, but neither raised any complaints or critiques about the impact fee or
the work that Sunrise Engineering completed even though they were invited.96
Based upon Sunrise Engineers analysis, Mr. Shaffer concluded that the maximum
eligible impact fee is $12,210.97 The Defendants then adopted an impact fee in the
10
amount of $12,000, which Mr. Shaffer believes is reasonable.98 If the UEP Trust
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believes it is unreasonable, it can file a complaint with the Utah State Ombudsman, but it
12
has not done so.99 Mr. Shaffer also recommends that Colorado City and Hildale update
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their impact fee every three to five years, which means the next update will occur between
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2017 and 2019.100 No reason exists for this Court to issue any injunctive order regarding
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the impact fee.
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F.
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The United States request for a monitor is unnecessary. Judge Teilborg has
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already retained jurisdiction until November 2024 to resolve any fair housing issues
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through his injunctive order.101 The fact that the Defendants have complied with this
A Monitor Is Unnecessary To Ensure The Defendants Compliance.
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95
See Dustyn Shaffers Hearing Transcript, at p. 895.

Id. at p. 903 906.
97
See Culinary Water Impact Fee Facilities Plan, admitted as Exhibit 3360; see also
Dustyn Shaffers Hearing Transcript, at pp. 910 912.
98
See Dustyn Shaffers Hearing Transcript, at p. 912. Zach Renstrom, who testified for
the United States, also agrees that it is reasonable to adopt and charge an impact fee to
develop water and that Apple Valley, a neighboring community, also charges a $12,000
impact fee. See Zachary Renstroms Hearing Transcript, at pp. 448 449, and 460 461.
99
Id. at p. 913.
100
Id. at pp. 913 914.
101
See Judge Teilborgs November 26, 2014 Amended Judgment and Permanent
Injunction, admitted as Exhibit 723.
96
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injunction for the past two years (as evidence by the lack of any adverse order from Judge
Teilborg) shows that additional oversight via a monitor is unnecessary. The Defendants
are proactively responding to complaints to resolve them and prevent discrimination. The
United States also fails to consider the cost of a monitor and the Defendants inability to
pay. Finally, long-standing case law shows that this Court should be reluctant to impose a
monitor because it is not the least intrusive method to remedy the jurys conclusions, but
rather would result in overreaching federal intrusion into the Defendants business
operations. See e.g., United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 661 F.2d 562, 576 and 579 (6th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Jamestown Center-In-The-Grove Apartments, 557 F.2d 1079,
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1080-81 (5th Cir. 1977).
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IV.
CONCLUSION.
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The Defendants request that this Court reject the United States ideas for injunctive
13
relief, which are disconnected from the facts, evidence, and law. Instead, this Court
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should adopt the specific plans that the Defendants have outlined above.
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commonsense is needed here, not the destroy-at-all-costs attitude of the United States.
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The Defendants hope that this Court will be the voice of reason.
Some
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Dated January 9, 2017.

GRAIF BARRETT & MATURA, P.C.
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By:
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/s/ Jeffrey C. Matura

Jeffrey C. Matura
Melissa J. England
Attorneys for Defendant Town of
Colorado City, Arizona
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
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By:
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/s/ R. Blake Hamilton

R. Blake Hamilton
Ashley Gregson
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants City of Hildale,
Utah, and Twin City Water Authority
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on January 9, 2017, I electronically transmitted the foregoing

document to the Clerks Office using the CM/ECF system for filing and transmittal of
Notice of Electronic filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:
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R. Tamar Hagler
Eric W. Treene
Sean R. Keveney
Matthew J. Donnelly
Emily M. Savner
Sharon I. Brett
United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorneys for Plaintiff United State of America
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R. Blake Hamilton
Ashley Gregson
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants City of Hildale, Utah,
Twin City Water Authority, and Twin City Power
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/s/ Carolyn Harrington

4832-7833-2480
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Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023-1 Filed 01/09/17 Page 1 of 6
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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Plaintiff,
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v.

ORDER REGARDING INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF

Hildale, Utah; Twin City Power; and Twin
City Water Authority, Inc.,
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Defendants.
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The Court, having reviewed the jurys verdict, the evidence presented during the
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October 2016 evidentiary hearing, and the parties briefing, issues the following order
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regarding injunctive relief:
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I.
THE JURYS VERDICT.
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1.
The jury returned its verdict on March 7, 2016.
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2.
With respect to the United States claim under 42 U.S.C. 14141, the jury
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issued an advisory verdict that defendants Town of Colorado City and the City of Hildale
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(collectively the Defendants), through the Hildale/Colorado City Marshals Office
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(CCMO), violated the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fourth
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Amendment with respect to the unreasonable seizure of property, the unreasonable seizure
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of a person, and an arrest made without probable cause. The jury also issued an advisory
26
verdict that the Defendants, through the CCMO, did not violate the Fourth Amendment
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with respect to any unreasonable search of property, any unreasonable investigatory stop,
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or any use of excessive force in making a lawful arrest or other seizure or detention.
3.
With respect to the United States claim under the federal Fair Housing Act,
the jury concluded that the Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct under
42 U.S.C. 3614(a) that violated 42 U.S.C. 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617.
II.
CHANGES TO THE HILDALE/COLORADO CITY MARSHALS OFFICE.

4.
The Defendants, through the CCMO, shall comply with 42 U.S.C. 14141
and not engage in any conduct that: (a) violates the rights of individuals to be free from
unreasonable seizures of persons and property and arrests without probable cause under
the Fourth Amendment; (b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; or
(c) infringes, through law enforcement activities, persons rights to Equal Protection under
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the laws due to religion under the Fourteenth Amendment.

5.
Based upon the jurys advisory verdict and this Courts findings of fact, the
Defendants shall also make the following changes to the CCMO:

a.
Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Defendants shall develop
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new policies and procedures for hiring new officers. These new
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policies and procedures shall restructure the hiring committee to
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remove the Colorado City Town Manager, the Hildale City Manager,
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and any representative from the Colorado City Town Council and the
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Hildale City Council from that committee. Instead, the Chief of
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Police and other law enforcement professionals should sit on the
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committee and then recommend candidates for hiring to the Town
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Council. The Defendants shall provide a copy of these new policies
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and procedures to the United States upon their formal adoption.
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b.
Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Defendants shall
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advertise and conduct a wide-ranging search for candidates to fill
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two additional police officer positions. The positions shall be filled
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within 6 months of the date of this order.
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c.
Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Defendants shall develop
and adopt a new structure for the CCMO to remove the Colorado
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City Town Manager, the Hildale City Manager, and any
representative from the Colorado City Town Council and the Hildale
City Council from being involved in CCMO internal affairs
investigations. The Defendants shall also adopt a revised internal
affairs policy which reflects the organizational change and more
clearly defines the internal affairs investigation process.
Defendants shall provide a copy of this new organizational chart and
policy to the United States upon their formal adoption.
d.
The
Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Defendants shall conduct
10
a comprehensive review of the CCMOs policies and procedures with
11
assistance from a professional consultant in the field and with an
12
emphasis to meet national guidelines for constitutional policing. The
13
new policies and procedures shall be adopted within 30 days
14
thereafter. These new policies and procedures shall also include
15
guidelines for the search and seizure of property, the seizure of a
16
person, probable cause, and internal affairs. The Defendants shall
17
provide a copy of these new policies and procedures to the United
18
States upon their formal adoption.
19
e.
Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Defendants shall purchase
20
body cameras for the CCMO officers and implement a pilot program
21
for their use. The Defendants shall also ensure that the new policies
22
and procedures for the CCMO (as discussed in subsection d above)
23
include a policy regarding the use of body cameras and the storage of
24
their data.
25
f.
The Defendants shall provide yearly training to all CCMO officers
26
regarding the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the state
27
and federal Fair Housing Acts, landlord and tenant law, and any other
28
topics that the Defendants deem appropriate. The training shall be

3
conducted by a qualified third person or organization other than the
Defendants counsel, and the qualified person or organization must
be approved in advance by the United States. The training will be at
least three hours duration, and the Defendants shall bear all costs
associated with the training. The Defendants shall also provide a
copy of the training syllabus and/or materials, as well as a copy of the
sign-in sheet, to the United States within 14 days after each training
session is complete.
training session and require each new officer hired since the last
10
training session to watch the recording and receive any materials
11
provided at the training.
12
g.
The Defendants shall visually record each
The Chief of Police for the CCMO shall seek to meet with the
13
Washington County Sheriff and the Mohave County Sheriff to build
14
a better working relationship and to obtain their input on key law
15
enforcement issues facing the CCMO.
16
h.
Within 6 months of the date of this order, the Defendants shall hire a
17
mentor for the Chief of Police. This mentor shall meet with the Chief
18
of Police at least once a month for the first year and advise the Chief
19
of Police in the performance of his job and the conduct of the
20
CCMO. The Defendants shall pay all costs associated with this
21
mentor, and the mentor shall come from a nationally-recognized
22
police organization, such as the Police Executive Research Forum or
23
the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The length of the
24
contract between the Defendants and the mentor shall be for at least
25
one year, with the option to renew the contract. The Defendants shall
26
provide a copy of this contract to the United States.
27
28
6.
If the United States believes that the Defendants and/or the CCMO have not
complied with any of the above requirements within the stated deadlines, the United
4
States shall provide written notice to the Defendants and their counsel. The Defendants
will then have 30 days to respond in an effort to resolve the United States concerns. If
the United States is not satisfied with the Defendants response, the United States may file
a petition with this Court, after which the Defendants may respond. This Court will then
decide whether to issue any further orders.
7.
The Defendants shall file a notice with this Court every three months for the
first 12 months following the date of this order to update this Court on their compliance
with these changes to the CCMO.
8.
This Court shall retain jurisdiction over the Defendants to ensure their
10
compliance with these injunctive measures regarding the CCMO until November 30,
11
2024.
12
III.
13
THE PROVISION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES.

9.
This Court will not issue any new or duplicative injunction regarding the
14
Fair Housing Act.
15
injunction that Judge Teilborg issued on November 26, 2014, regarding the Fair Housing
16
Act in Cooke et al. v. Town of Colorado City, Arizona, et at., No. CV10-08105-PCT-JAT
17
(D. Ariz. 2014) (the Cooke case).
18
10.
However, this Court orders the Defendants to comply with the
If the United States believes that the Defendants have not complied with
19
Judge Teilborgs injunction, it shall provide written notice to the Defendants and their
20
counsel. The Defendants will then have 30 days to respond in an effort to resolve the
21
United States concerns.
22
response, the United States may file the appropriate motion with Judge Teilborg, as set
23
forth in his September 4, 2014 order in the Cooke case.
24
IV.
25
26
27
28
If the United States is not satisfied with the Defendants
SUBDIVISION.
11.
This Court declines the United States request to enter injunctive relief with
respect to the UEP Trusts subdivision proposal.

12.
The Mohave County Superior Court shall, subject to its discretion, resolve
all issues regarding the subdivision dispute between the UEP Trust and Colorado City.
5
13.
If the UEP Trust submits a subdivision application to Colorado City,
Colorado City shall apply its subdivision ordinance to the UEP Trust in a neutral and non-
discriminatory manner. If the UEP Trust submits a request for an exemption to any
particular provision contained within the subdivision ordinance, Colorado City shall
consider the request in a neutral and non-discriminatory manner.
V.
EFFECT ON LITIGATION HOLDS.

14.
The parties agree that, as of the date of this order, litigation is not reasonably
foreseeable concerning the matters at issue in this case or discussed in this order. To the
extent that any party previously implemented a litigation hold to preserve documents,
10
electronically-stored information, or things related to the matters at issue in this case or
11
discussed in this order, the party is no longer required to maintain such a litigation hold.
12
13
Dated:
14
15
16
H. Russel Holland
United States District Judge
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Jeffrey C. Matura, State Bar No. 019893

Melissa J. England, State Bar No. 022783
Graif Barrett & Matura, P.C.
Telephone: (602) 792-5700
Facsimile: (602) 792-5710
jmatura@gbmlawpc.com
mengland@gbmlawpc.com
Attorneys for Defendant Town of Colorado City
2
3
4
7
8
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
10
11
12
Plaintiff,
13
14
15
v.
Defendants.
17
19
20
21
Defendants Town of Colorado City, Arizona, and the City of Hildale, Utah
(collectively the Defendants) jointly object to the United States proposed order [Doc.
1022-1] as follows. The below paragraph number correspond to the paragraph numbers in
the United States proposed order.1
I.
22
23
24
25
DEFENDANTS JOINT
OBJECTIONS TO THE UNITED
STATES PROPOSED ORDER

Hildale, Utah; and Twin City Water Authority,
Inc.,
16
18
INTRODUCTION.
1.
Objection.
This paragraph is unnecessary for any final order.
It also
misstates the facts because it omits that the United States also brought a claim under 42
U.S.C. 2000b, which this Court dismissed. See Order [Doc. 38]. This paragraph also
fails to state that the United States dismissed Twin City Power as a defendant and does not
26
27
28
For each paragraph in which the Defendants object, the Defendants request that this
Court not include that paragraph in any final order. The Defendants also submit a new
proposed order contemporaneously with filing this objection.
seek any injunctive relief against Twin City Water Authority. See the United States Post-
Trial Brief [Doc. 939], at p. 12, footnote 8.
3
4
2.
Objection. This paragraph misstates the jurys verdict. The jurys verdict
regarding the Fair Housing Act did not include Twin City Power.
3.
Objection. This paragraph misstates the jurys advisory verdict with respect
to the Fourth Amendment. The jury concluded that the Defendants, through the CCMO,
did not engage in any unreasonable search of property, any unreasonable investigatory
stops, or use excessive force in making a lawful arrest or other seizure or detention. See
Jurys Verdict [Doc. 932].
10
4.
Objection. This paragraph misstates the jurys advisory verdict with respect
11
to the Fourth Amendment. The jury concluded that the Defendants, through the CCMO,
12
did not engage in any unreasonable search of property, any unreasonable investigatory
13
stops, or use excessive force in making a lawful arrest or other seizure or detention. Id.
14
This Court has also not yet entered its own findings of fact, which at a very minimum
15
should include findings in the Defendants favor, as is consistent with the jurys verdict.
16
This Courts findings of fact may also include other findings in the Defendants favor
17
based upon the evidence, or lack of evidence, presented.
18
5.
Agreed.
19
6.
Agreed.
20
21
II.
GENERAL INJUNCTION.
7.
Objection.
The United States request to permanently enjoin the
22
Defendants is more burdensome than necessary, not narrowly tailored, and is contrary to
23
the law. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunctive relief should be
24
no more burdensome to the defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the
25
plaintiffs.); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991)
26
(injunctive relief must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.); United States
27
v. Warwick Mobile Homes Estates, Inc., 558 F.2d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that
28
[e]stablished principles of equity dictate that in considering whether to grant injunctive

2
relief a court should impose upon a defendant no restriction greater than necessary to
protect the plaintiff from the injury of which he complains.).
Constitutional violation is found, Courts are cautioned not to use a sledgehammer where
a more delicate instrument will suffice, not to move too quickly where it appears the
state, in the exercise of its administrative authority, will in its own way adopt reforms
bringing its system into compliance with the Constitution, and advised to give the state
a reasonable opportunity to remedy a constitutional deficiency, imposing upon it a court-
devised solution only if the state plan proves to be unfeasible or inadequate for the
purpose. Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 213 (2nd Cir. 1986).
And even when a
10
Any injunctive relief regarding the Fair Housing Act is also unnecessary because
11
Judge Teilborg already issued a 10-year injunction against the Defendants under the Fair
12
Housing Act to enjoin the same exact conduct that the United States seeks to enjoin in this
13
paragraph. See Judge Teilborgs November 26, 2014 Amended Judgment and Permanent
14
Injunction, admitted as Exhibit 723. Duplicative injunctions on the same issues and
15
against the same Defendants would create confusion as to which Court has priority
16
jurisdiction and which Court an individual should seeks redress from if an issue arose.
17
Duplicative injunctions also create the possibility of contradictory rulings from two
18
separate Courts on the same issues. If this Court decides to issue a duplicative injunction,
19
then the timeframe should run concurrently with Judge Teilborgs injunction, meaning it
20
would end in November 2024.
21
Finally, the inclusion of the Defendants agents, employees, successors and
22
assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them is too broad. These
23
terms are undefined and unclear as to who is covered by them.
24
8.
Objection.
25
Defendants with respect to 42 U.S.C. 14141 is more burdensome than necessary, not
26
narrowly tailored, and is contrary to the law. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
27
702 (1979) (injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendants than
28
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain

3
Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991) (injunctive relief must be tailored to
remedy the specific harm alleged.); United States v. Warwick Mobile Homes Estates,
Inc., 558 F.2d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that [e]stablished principles of equity
dictate that in considering whether to grant injunctive relief a court should impose upon a
defendant no restriction greater than necessary to protect the plaintiff from the injury of
which he complains.). And even when a Constitutional violation is found, Courts are
cautioned not to use a sledgehammer where a more delicate instrument will suffice, not
to move too quickly where it appears the state, in the exercise of its administrative
authority, will in its own way adopt reforms bringing its system into compliance with the
10
Constitution, and advised to give the state a reasonable opportunity to remedy a
11
constitutional deficiency, imposing upon it a court-devised solution only if the state plan
12
proves to be unfeasible or inadequate for the purpose. Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207,
13
213 (2nd Cir. 1986).
14
If this Court decides to issue an injunction despite the above case law, then the
15
timeframe should run concurrently with Judge Teilborgs injunction, meaning it would
16
end in November 2024.
17
III.
18
THE COLORADO CITY MARSHALS OFFICE.

9.
Objection. Disbanding the CCMO is an extreme remedy, not the least
19
restrictive means to remedy the issues in this case, contrary to the facts and law, and
20
would result in a massive judicial intrusion on private autonomy. Metropolitan Housing
21
Develop. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
22
MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. Vill. of Garden City, 05-CV-2301 ADS WDW, 2013 WL
23
6334107 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2013) (expressing a general reluctance of the judiciary to
24
impose affirmative relief.). Disbandment is also contrary to the other options available
25
to this Court and the evidence presented during the October 2016 evidentiary hearing.
26
See Defendants Joint Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed concurrently
27
herewith.
28
4
If this Court decides to disband the CCMO, then it should include language in its
final order requiring the law-enforcement entity that takes over the policing services to
hire all current officers with the CCMO, to have them continue to patrol within the
communities, and to keep their same salaries and benefits. Alternatively, this Court could
order the County Sheriffs to continue to provide law-enforcement services to Colorado
City and Hildale that they are already providing and legally-required to provide, but
without forcing additional costs onto the Defendants.
10.
Objection. Disbanding the CCMO and requiring the Defendants to contract
with an outside law-enforcement entity is an extreme remedy, not the least restrictive
10
means to remedy the issues in this case, contrary to the facts and law, and would result in
11
a massive judicial intrusion on private autonomy. Metropolitan Housing Develop.
12
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
13
14
15
impose affirmative relief.).
16
minimum of one police officer present in the Cities for 24 hours a day, which
17
representatives from the Mohave County Sheriffs Office and the Washington County
18
Sheriffs Office testified during the October 2016 evidentiary hearing is something that
19
they cannot provide. See Defendants Joint Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive
20
Relief, filed concurrently herewith. Other reasonable and more cost-effective options also
21
exist. Id. Also, the CCMO already provides 24-hour police presence in both communities
22
and has six officers present to respond to a call at any time.
This paragraph requires the Defendants to provide a
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
11.
10
impose affirmative relief.). The United States proposed order requires the Defendants to
11
provide a minimum of one police officer present in the Cities for 24 hours a day, which
12
13
14
15
16
17
and has six officers present to respond to a call at any time. Finally, requiring the
18
Defendants to complete this work within one month is not realistic, as other agencies
19
would have to be approached and negotiations entered into to see if they were even
20
willing to provide police services.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
12.
impose affirmative relief.). The United States proposed order requires the Defendants to
provide a minimum of one police officer present in the Cities for 24 hours a day, which
10
11
12
13
14
15
and has six officers present to respond to a call at any time. Finally, requiring the
16
Defendants to complete this work within one month is not realistic, as other agencies
17
would have to be approached and negotiations entered into to see if they were even
18
willing to provide police services.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
13.
Objection. Permitting an outside law-enforcement agency to contract with a
27
dispatching service other than the Defendants Dispatch Center is an extreme remedy, not
28
the least restrictive means to remedy the issues in this case, contrary to the facts and law,
7
and would result in a massive judicial intrusion on private autonomy. Metropolitan
Housing Develop. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir.
1997); see also MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. Vill. of Garden City, 05-CV-2301 ADS WDW,
2013 WL 6334107 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2013) (expressing a general reluctance of the
judiciary to impose affirmative relief.). No evidence was presented that the Dispatch
Center is not capable of providing dispatching services; rather, evidence was presented
that it provides dispatch services to other critical emergency services agencies other than
just the CCMO. The United States also presented evidence during the October 2016
evidentiary hearing that the costs to dispatch County Sheriffs in the communities would
10
be absorbed without any new or additional costs to the Defendants. See Defendants Joint
11
Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed concurrently herewith.
12
If this Court decides includes this language, then it should also include language in
13
its final order requiring the new dispatching service to hire all current employees of the
14
Dispatch Center and to keep their same salaries and benefits. Alternatively, this Court
15
could order the County Sheriffs to continue to provide law-enforcement services to
16
Colorado City and Hildale that they are already providing and legally-required to provide,
17
but without forcing additional costs onto the Defendants.
18
14.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
impose affirmative relief.). Other reasonable and more cost-effective options also exist.
26
27
herewith.
28
8
If this Court includes this language in its final order, then the initial contract period
should be for 1 year, after which the Defendants can petition this Court to discontinue the
contract and to return law enforcement to the CCMO. If this Court decides to disband the
CCMO, then it should include language in its final order requiring the law-enforcement
entity that takes over the policing services to hire all current officers with the CCMO, to
have them continue to patrol within the communities, and to keep their same salaries and
benefits. Alternatively, this Court could order the County Sheriffs to continue to provide
law-enforcement services to Colorado City and Hildale that they are already providing
and legally-required to provide, but without forcing additional costs onto the Defendants.
10
15.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
herewith.
20
This proposed language is also very problematic in setting up conflict over
21
unilateral and arbitrary contract changes or cost increases and unnecessary court
22
involvement. If this Court includes this language in its final order, then it should also
23
include language requiring the outside law-enforcement agency to obtain this Courts
24
approval before it increases any costs to the Defendants or makes any other changes
25
associated with its contract services. Alternatively, this Court could order the County
26
Sheriffs to continue to provide law-enforcement services to Colorado City and Hildale
27
that they are already providing and legally-required to provide, but without forcing
28
additional costs onto the Defendants.

9
16.
10
herewith.
11
IV.
12
SUBDIVISION.
17.
Objection. Requiring Colorado City to stamp as approved the UEP Trusts
13
subdivision plats is contrary to Arizona law because they do not comply with the
14
subdivision ordinance and have not been reviewed to ensure the health, safety, and
15
welfare of the residents. This language would also require Colorado City to violate
16
Arizona, including A.R.S. 9-463 and A.R.S. 9-463.01(C)(1), which states that, By
17
ordinance, every legislative body of any municipality shall: 1. Require the preparation,
18
submission and approval of a preliminary plat as a condition precedent to submission of a
19
final plat.
20
Mohave County has also not approved the UEP Trusts subdivision plats. Rather,
21
its review was limited in scope and purpose, which Mohave County described as follows:
22
The review is not based on any adopted subdivision regulation;

neither the subdivision regulations for Colorado City nor the
Mohave County Land Division Regulations . . . . Additionally, this
scope of work does not include review of the infrastructure for
culinary water, sewer, electric, telephone, drainage, floodplain zones
and locations, or roadway design and construction, or any other
aspect of development review.
23
24
25
26
27
28
10
See September 1, 2016, Memorandum. After completing its initial review, Mohave
County sent a letter to the UEP Trust that further limited the scope of its review as
follows:
4
5
6
7
In accordance with the approval of the Mohave County Board of

Supervisors, the Mohave County Development Services Department
has coordinated an engineering review of the proposed plat by
Willdan Engineering, a professional engineering consultant under
contract with the County.
12
Willdan Engineering has performed professional engineering review

of the plat consisting of 26 plan sheets to determine whether the lots
and roadways shown to be delineated appear to be in proper form
and, from a technical standpoint, meet the engineering requirements
to be recorded by the County Recorder. The review of the plat was
not intended to provide approval for the plat considering
compliance with any adopted County regulations or other
standards.
13
See October 21, 2016, Letter from Mohave County Development Services, admitted as
14
Exhibit 532 (emphasis added).
15
addresses the final comments made in the attached review letter, the plat appears to be in
16
proper form and, from a technical standpoint, meet the engineering requirements to be
17
recorded by the County Recorder. Id. The UEP Trust therefore manipulated Mohave
18
County to try and obtain approval of its subdivision plats from a technical standpoint
19
without having to comply with any Colorado City or Mohave County subdivision
20
regulations. Furthermore, the plats in question have never been submitted to this Court,
21
have never been submitted to Colorado City and is an insult to the intelligence of the
22
Court by proposing approval of a blank check for the UEP Trust.
8
9
10
11
This letter further stated that when your engineer
23
Injunctive relief on this issue is also unnecessary because the Mohave County
24
Superior Court is already hearing this issue. See Defendants Joint Closing Argument
25
Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed concurrently herewith. This Court should therefore
26
permit the Mohave County Superior Court to resolve this issue; otherwise, contradictory
27
and inconsistent results could occur.
28
11
Finally, the UEP Trust can subdivide its property if it wants by submitting a
subdivision application. It can then also submit a request for exceptions. The UEP Trust
refuses to submit an application or comply with the subdivision application because it
wants this Court to shift the costs associated with subdividing to Colorado City and its
residents. Id.
18.
Objection. This paragraph requires Colorado City to treat future subdivision
applicants differently than how the United States wants it to treat the UEP Trust, which
exposes Colorado City to future discrimination lawsuits.
situation, this Court should not include this language and should require the UEP Trust to
10
also comply with the subdivision ordinance. Id.
11
V.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE

PROVISION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES.
A.
Adoption of Building Department Policies and Procedures.
19.
Objection.
building permits. See Defendants Joint Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief,
filed concurrently herewith. Furthermore, any new policies should not be subject to the
United States approval. Rather, if the United States believes the Defendants policies or
procedures are improper, it can petition this Court to review those policies and
procedures.
20.
Objection.
The Defendants already have objective, uniform, non-
discriminatory policies and procedures regarding the application for, and the issuance of,
building permits. Id.
a.
Objection. This language is unnecessary because the Defendants

already have non-discrimination language in their policies and
procedures. Id.
26
28
25
27
To avoid this untenable
b.
Objection. Requiring the Defendants to include the property owners

signature on a building permit application form would insert the
12
Defendants into civil property disputes between property owners and
occupants. Id.
c.
Objection.
Requiring the Defendants to provide advance written
notice to the property owner would insert the Defendants into civil
property disputes between property owners and occupants. Id.
d.
Objection. This language is unnecessary because a permit holder or
applicant can already appeal an adverse decision with the
Defendants, the Town Manager, the Town Council, or the Building
Official. Id.
10
e.
Objection. Requiring the Defendants to include the property owners
11
signature on a building permit application form would insert the
12
Defendants into civil property disputes between property owners and
13
occupants. Id.
14
21.
Objection.
15
16
building permits. Id. Furthermore, any new policies should not be subject to the United
17
States approval.
18
procedures are improper, it can petition this Court to review those policies and
19
procedures. The policies and procedures are also already available to the public.
20
22.
Rather, if the United States believes the Defendants policies or
Objection.
Requiring the Defendants to include the property owners
21
signature on a building permit application form would insert the Defendants into civil
22
property disputes between property owners and occupants. Id.
23
23.
Objection.
24
25
building permits. Id. Furthermore, any changes to those policies and procedures are
26
subject to the approval by the Town Council after a public discussion and vote. If the
27
United States believes any modification is improper, it can petition this Court to review
28
the modification.
13
24.
Agreed.
B.
Amendments to Water Service Regulations.
25.
Objection.
The Defendants have already updated their Water Service
Regulations through a public process to address this very issue, and the requirement for a
current customers approval prior to transferring a water service to a new customer was
removed from the Water Service Regulations in response to citizen concerns.
Defendants Joint Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed concurrently
herewith. Requiring the Defendants to transfer an existing water connection to a new
customer if that new customer states their right to the property and shows permission to
10
occupy the property ignores the due process rights of the existing customer. Instead, the
11
Defendants current process of working with the new customer and the existing customer
12
protects everyones rights. Id.
13
26.
Objection.
See
14
Regulations through a public process. Id. Removing the obligation of the new customer
15
to obtain the consent of the existing customer ignores the due process rights of the
16
existing customer. Instead, the Defendants current process of working with the new
17
customer and the existing customer protects everyones rights. Id.
18
27.
Objection.
19
Regulations through a public process. Id. If the United States believes that these updates
20
are improper, it can petition this Court to review them. The Water Service Regulations
21
are also already available to the public.
22
28.
Objection. Any modifications to the Water Service Regulations are subject
23
to the approval of the Utility Board and respective Town Councils after public discussions
24
and votes. If the United States believes any modification is improper, it can petition this
25
Court to review the modification.
26
29.
Agreed.
27
28
14
C.
Website and Public Notice.
30.
Objection. The Defendants websites were not issues litigated in this case.
In fact, this Court has not received any evidence regarding the Defendants websites, what
they contain, how often they are updated, etc.
www.tocc.us, which contains all the information required under Arizona state law, as well
as other additional information for the public to view. Hildale posts all its information
through various Utah government websites. No changes to these websites are necessary
or appropriate.
31.
Colorado City has a website at
Objection. The Defendants websites were not issues litigated in this case.
10
In fact, this Court has not received any evidence regarding the Defendants websites, what
11
they contain, how often they are updated, etc.
12
www.tocc.us, which contains all the information required under Arizona state law, as well
13
as other additional information for the public to view. Hildale posts all its information
14
through various Utah government websites. No changes to these websites are necessary
15
or appropriate, nor should this Court dictate what information the Defendants put on their
16
websites home page.
17
a.
18
19
Objection.
Colorado City has a website at
Injunctive relief on this issue is unnecessary for the
reasons stated in paragraph 31 above.

b.
Objection.
20
reasons stated in paragraph 31 above. Also, this proposed language
21
is contrary to state law, which sets forth the notice requirements for
22
Council meetings.
23
c.
24
25
28

d.
26
27
Objection.
Objection.

e.
Objection. The Courts order is already public record. The proposed

summary language is also misleading because this Court did not find
15
that the Defendants engaged in illegal discrimination.
proposed language also omits that the jury found in the Defendants
favor with respect to unreasonable searches of property, unreasonable
investigatory stops, and excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment.
6
7
VI.
The
CULINARY WATER IMPACT FEE.

32.
Objection. Sunrise Engineering already completed a Culinary Water Impact
Fee Facilities Plan and Impact Fee Analysis for the Defendants. See Defendants Joint
Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed concurrently herewith. A review by
10
11
another engineer is unnecessary.

33.
12
Fee Facilities Plan and Impact Fee Analysis for the Defendants. Id. A review by another
13
engineer is unnecessary.
14
34.
15
16
engineer is unnecessary. Furthermore, the Impact Fee Facilities Plan is scheduled to be
17
updated by a professional engineer within the next two years. Consultation with the UEP
18
Trust is also inappropriate because no municipality is required to consult with a single
19
property owner or its retained engineer regarding an impact fee. The UEP Trust had its
20
opportunity to object during Sunrise Engineerings work, but it refused. Id. It can also
21
request a review from the Utah Ombudsman, but it has declined. Id.
22
35.
23
24
engineer is unnecessary. The timeframes proposed are also completely unreasonable.
25
Furthermore, the proposed language disregards established state law, which outlines a
26
detailed and comprehensive public participation process to adopt impact fees.
27
28
16
36.
37.
engineer is unnecessary. If the United States wants to retain its own engineer to complete
a review, it can bear those costs.
8
9
10
38.
11
39.
12
13
14
VII.
15
MANDATORY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

40.
Objection. The Defendants have already participated in training regarding
16
the Fair Housing Act and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Defendants
17
Joint Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed concurrently herewith. The
18
Defendants have also scheduled additional, yearly training on these same topics. Id.
19
41.
Objection. The Defendants have recently participated in training regarding
20
the Fair Housing Act and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The
21
Defendants have also scheduled additional, yearly training on these same topics. Id.
22
Obtaining approval from the United States on who conducts the training is also improper
23
and unnecessary, as the Defendants are working with the Southwest Fair Housing
24
Council, which the Arizona Department of Housing recommended. Id.
25
42.
Objection.
The Defendants have already participated in recent training
26
regarding the Fair Housing Act and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
27
The Defendants have also scheduled additional, yearly training on these same topics. Id.
28
Obtaining approval from the United States on who conducts the training is also improper
17
and unnecessary, as the Defendants are working with the Southwest Fair Housing
Council, which the Arizona Department of Housing recommended. Id.
43.
Objection. The Defendants have already participated in training regarding
the Fair Housing Act and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The
Defendants have also scheduled additional, yearly training on these same topics. Id. The
Defendants also videotaped the training session so that new employees can view the
videotape. Id.
44.
Objection. The Defendants already use a sign-in sheet for all training. Id.
Requiring someone to verify that they attended under penalty of perjury is also
10
improper because the Defendants do not have the authority to require such a verification.
11
Finally, the Defendants have already provided the United States (and this Court) with the
12
sign-in sheet for the most recent training. Id.; see also Training Materials, Sign-In Sheets,
13
and Certificate of Attendance, admitted as Exhibits 3430, 3431, 3432, and 3433.
14
VIII. MONITOR.
15
45.
Objection. Appointing a monitor is not the least intrusive means to remedy
16
the jurys findings under the Fair Housing Act. See e.g., United States v. City of Parma,
17
Ohio, 661 F.2d 562, 576 and 579 (6th Cir. 1981) (reversing the appointment of a special
18
master to oversee the implementation of a Court order because it is an extraordinary
19
remedy that would not represent the least intrusive method of achieving the
20
governments stated goal of removing discrimination); United States v. Jamestown
21
Center-In-The-Grove Apartments, 557 F.2d 1079, 1080-81 (5th Cir. 1977) (relief for
22
violating the Fair Housing Act should be tailored in each instance to the needs of the
23
particular situation and should minimize federal intrusion and assure that defendants
24
could retain maximum control of their business operations consistent with the national
25
policy of equal housing opportunity.). Other reasonable and cost-effective options also
26
exist.
27
concurrently herewith.
See Defendants Joint Closing Argument Regarding Injunctive Relief, filed
28
18
Also, Judge Teilborg has already issued a 10-year injunction against the
Defendants with respect to the Fair Housing Act. See Judge Teilborgs November 26,
2014 Amended Judgment and Permanent Injunction, admitted as Exhibit 723. Another
layer of oversight via a monitor is therefore unnecessary, duplicative, and cost prohibitive.
A.
Appointment of Monitor.
46.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
policy of equal housing opportunity.). Other reasonable and cost-effective options exist.
17
18
herewith.
19
20
21
22
23
B.
Authorities and Responsibilities of Monitor.
24
47.
25
26
27
28
19
herewith.
10
11
12
13
a.
Objection. A monitor is unnecessary for the reasons set forth in
14
paragraph 47 above. It is also improper to make all statements to the
15
monitor subject to penalties for perjury because such a requirement is
16
too broad and vague, thereby making it subject to abuse. If this Court
17
decides to include this type of language, then it should include all
18
statements made by any representative of the United States as well.
19
b.
20
paragraph 47 above. Also, zoning amendments and variances, and
21
applications for exceptions to or relief from any municipal land-use
22
decisions, rules, or ordinances were not issues litigated in this
23
dispute, and therefore should not be part of any final order.
24
c.
25
paragraph 47 above. Also, zoning, planning, licenses, residential
26
rental taxes, irrigation water service, sewer service, and waste
27
disposal were not issues litigated in this dispute, and therefore should
28
not be part of any final order.

20
d.
paragraph 47 above.
e.

paragraph 47 above.
f.
6
7

paragraph 47 above.
48.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
herewith.
20
21
22
23
24
49.
25
26
27
28
21
herewith.
10
11
12
13
Finally, land use, planning, and zoning were not issues litigated in this case, and
14
15
should therefore not be part of any final order.

50.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
herewith.
28
22
Finally, the inclusion of contractors, agents, servants, delegates, designees,
bailees, partners, joint venturers, vendors, financers, and suppliers is too broad and
vague, thereby making it subject to abuse.
51.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
herewith.
21
22
23
24
25
52.
26
27
28

23
herewith.
10
11
12
13
14
53.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
herewith.
27
28
24
a.
Objection. A monitor is unnecessary for the reasons set forth in paragraph
53 above. Also, the Defendants already comply with Arizona and Utah law,
respectively, regarding when and how to provide notice of all regular,
special, and emergency Council meetings, as well as meetings of all other
public bodies. No additional notice is necessary.
b.
53 above. Also, any member of the public is already entitled to attend all
10
11
public meetings.
c.
12
53 above. Also, the Defendants already comply with Arizona and Utah law,
13
respectively, regarding when and how to provide notice of any executive
14
session, including the information required in that notice.
15
monitor (or any other third party) to attend an executive session would
16
violate Arizona law, including A.R.S. 38-431.03, and Utah law, including
17
Utah Code 52-4-204. Similarly, Arizona law does not require a public body
18
to record executive session meetings. See A.R.S. 38-431.01. Arizona law
19
also limits those individuals who are allowed to receive copies of the written
20
executive session minutes. See A.R.S. 38-431.03.
21
d.
22
23
Enabling a

53 above.
e.
24
53 above. Also, the inclusion of contractors, agents, servants, delegates,
25
designees, bailees, partners, joint venturers, vendors, financers, and
26
suppliers is too broad and vague, thereby making it subject to abuse. This
27
language also does not exempt attorney-client privileged or work product
28
information and communications.

25
54.
10
11
12
13
herewith.
14
15
16
17
18
To the extent this Court imposes a monitor, then the Defendants agree to this
19
language.
20
C.
Reporting by the Monitor.
21
55.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
26
herewith.
10
To the extent this Court imposes a monitor, he/she should report to all parties,
11
including the Defendants and not just the United States, every 90 days. Also, any future
12
reporting should be with the approval of all parties, including the Defendants and not just
13
the United States. A monitor should also submit all reports to the Court.
14
56.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
herewith.
27
28
27
To the extent this Court imposes a monitor, he/she should submit any reports to all
4
5
parties, including the Defendants and not just to the United States.
57.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
herewith.
18
19
20
21
22
a.
23
paragraph 57 above. To the extent the Court imposes a monitor, 10
24
days to provide a comprehensive response to an allegation of
25
noncompliance is insufficient time; rather, 30 days is more
26
reasonable. Also, the monitor should inform all parties, including the
27
Defendants and not just the United States, of any allegation of
28
noncompliance.
28
b.
paragraph 57 above. To the extent the Court imposes a monitor, the
United States should not be able to conduct any interviews; rather,
the monitor can conduct any requested interviews and then report to
the Court regarding the information learned during those interviews,
if necessary.
IX.
8
9
10
RECORD KEEPING AND RIGHT OF ACCESS.

58.
Objection. The Defendants maintain and preserve all records consistent
with their obligations under Arizona and Utah law, respectively. No change from that law
is necessary.
11
59.
Objection. The United States has no need to have full and direct access to
12
all staff, employees, facilities, documents, records, files, and data of the Defendants.
13
Nor should the United States be permitted to accompany the monitor on any inspections
14
or tours. Rather, the United States can receive any public records it wants by submitted a
15
public records request under Arizona or Utah law, respectively.
16
60.
Objection. The United States has no need to have access to personnel,
17
documents, and facilities. Rather, the United States can receive any public records it
18
wants by submitted a public records request under Arizona or Utah law, respectively.
19
61.
Objection. A monitor is unnecessary for the reasons stated above. To the
20
extent this Court imposes a monitor, the Defendants agree to this language. However, this
21
Court should also add language to require the monitor and the United States to provide a
22
certification, under the penalty of perjury, to the Defendants and their counsel that they
23
have complied with their confidentiality obligations with respect to any non-public
24
information in their possession or control.
25
X.
JURISDICTION, SCOPE, AND TIME FOR PERFORMANCE.
26
62.
Agreed.
27
63.
Objection.
28
Defendants with respect to the CCMO is more burdensome than necessary, not narrowly
29
tailored, and is contrary to the law. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)
(injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendants than necessary to
provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd.,
941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991) (injunctive relief must be tailored to remedy the
specific harm alleged.); United States v. Warwick Mobile Homes Estates, Inc., 558 F.2d
194, 197 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that [e]stablished principles of equity dictate that in
considering whether to grant injunctive relief a court should impose upon a defendant no
restriction greater than necessary to protect the plaintiff from the injury of which he
complains.). And even when a Constitutional violation is found, Courts are cautioned
10
not to use a sledgehammer where a more delicate instrument will suffice, not to move
11
too quickly where it appears the state, in the exercise of its administrative authority, will
12
in its own way adopt reforms bringing its system into compliance with the Constitution,
13
and advised to give the state a reasonable opportunity to remedy a constitutional
14
deficiency, imposing upon it a court-devised solution only if the state plan proves to be
15
unfeasible or inadequate for the purpose. Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 213 (2nd Cir.
16
1986).
17
Any injunctive relief regarding the Fair Housing Act is also unnecessary because
18
Judge Teilborg already issued a 10-year injunction against the Defendants under the Fair
19
Housing Act to enjoin the same exact conduct that the United States seeks to enjoin in this
20
paragraph. See Judge Teilborgs November 26, 2014 Amended Judgment and Permanent
21
Injunction, admitted as Exhibit 723. Duplicative injunctions on the same issues and
22
against the same Defendants would create confusion as to which Court has priority
23
jurisdiction and which Court an individual should seeks redress from if an issue arose.
24
Duplicative injunctions also create the possibility of contradictory rulings from two
25
separate Courts on the same issues.
26
If this Court decides to issue a duplicative injunction, then the timeframe should
27
run concurrently with Judge Teilborgs injunction, meaning it would end in November
28
2024.
30
64.
Objection. This Court should also include language that the Defendants can
move this Court to shorten the duration of its final order due to the Defendants
compliance with its terms, or in the interests of justice.
4
5
65.
Objection. This Court should also include language that any time limits can
be shortened by mutual written agreement of the parties or on motion to the Court.
66.
Objection. This Court should also include language that in the event the
parties, rather than just the United States, contends that there has been a failure of any
party, rather than just the Defendants, to comply with this Courts order, any party,
rather than just the United States, can move this Court to impose any remedy necessary.
10
XI.
EFFECT ON LITIGATION HOLDS.
11
67.
Agreed.
12
68.
Objection. The Defendants already comply with Arizona and Utah law,
13
respectively, regarding the maintaining of documents. No change to this law is necessary.
14
XII.
15
16
COSTS OF LITIGATION.
69.
Objection. The United States is not entitled to any costs of litigation in this
matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3614(d)(2).
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
31

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Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 1 of 26

Jeffrey C. Matura, State Bar No. 019893

Attorneys for Defendant Town of Colorado City

United States of America,

DEFENDANTS JOINT CLOSING

Town of Colorado City, Arizona; City of

Case No. CV-12-8123-PCT-HRH

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 2 of 26

and documents presented to this Court during the evidentiary hearing.3

RESTRUCTURING THE CCMO, HIRING ADDITIONAL OFFICERS,

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 3 of 26

an unreasonable seizure of property, an unreasonable seizure of a person, and an arrest

Dan Corsentino Provided A Detailed Plan For This Court To Adopt.

Dan Corsentino is uniquely qualified to opine on the appropriate injunctive relief

Mr. Corsentino inherited a Sheriffs Office in which no community confidence existed

achieved a triple-crown accreditation by satisfying national standards for the

Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, the American Correctional

Association, and the National Commission on Accreditation for Health Care.

See Verdict Forms [Doc. 932].

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 4 of 26

standing of the CCMO within the community.8

Hire Two Additional Officers and One Administrative Assistant.

school meetings, and taking other proactive and community-based steps.10

Reorganize the CCMO. This reorganization would include removing the

whether to hire a detective to assist the officers with their investigations.11

Rewrite the CCMOs Policies and Procedures. Rewriting the CCMOs

Id. at pp. 532 536.

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 5 of 26

and include requirements for continuous training and updates.

Create and Implement a Pilot Program for Body Cameras. Implementing

police incident, including property disputes involving the UEP Trust.13

Additional Officer Training. The officers should obtain additional training

landlord and tenant law, diversity, and other related topics.14

Enhance Collaboration with Regional Law Enforcement.

law enforcement issues facing the CCMO.

The Chief of Police should also join

from a nationally-recognized police organization, such as the Police Executive Research

Forum or the International Association of Chiefs of Police.16

Id. at pp. 550 551.

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 6 of 26

Disbandment Is Inconsistent With How The United States Has Treated

Disbandment Would Treat The CCMO Differently Than Other

See Dan Corsentinos Hearing Testimony, at pp. 557 558.

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 7 of 26

Consistency in results is an important judicial principle. Mr. Corsentino reviewed

the importance of consistency as follows:

Well, it seems to me that the application of the law should be

request to disband the CCMO.24

Disbandment Would Result In Less Police Coverage.

and Washington County for police coverage.

services for the residents.

This idea would result in less police

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 8 of 26

hours,28 whereas the CCMO is available and on-duty 24-hours a day.

See Proposed Intergovernmental Agreement, admitted as Exhibit 515.

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 9 of 26

does not have a substation in Hildale.32

The undisputed evidence as confirmed by the United States own witnesses

should avoid such a dangerous result.33

The Defendants Cannot Afford

He reviewed Colorado City and

Id. at pp. 273 274.

Case 3:12-cv-08123-HRH Document 1023 Filed 01/09/17 Page 10 of 26

budgets.37 Mr. Rondeau explained these economic realities as follows: